Chapter 2

War in Italy (91–87 BC)

Despite the fact that this war encompassed military operations on a number of fronts ranging across Italy and was one of the most serious that Rome ever faced, in terms of our sources we must rely on short overview narrative accounts, mostly from Appian, supplemented by a series of more detailed fragments. The loss of detailed narrative histories – be they Livy’s, those of Sisenna, or even Lucceius – force us to view such a major war in a condensed and fragmentary manner.¹ Furthermore, although the war took place in Italy, the surviving sources are all written from the winner’s perspective, as is usually the case with Rome’s wars, although we do possess some numismatic evidence from the Italian side (see images).

1. Italy Divided: Romans and Italians

The Italian Federation

The massacre at Asculum can be seen as the trigger point for the opening of hostilities between Rome and the peoples of Italy that rebelled from her control. However, as seen from Poppaedius’ abortive march on Rome earlier in 91 BC, it seems that a number of the Italian peoples had already mobilized and thus were ready and waiting when the signal for revolt came. At the outset we must avoid all simplifications that make these wars simply a revolt by the oppressed peoples of Italy against their Roman overlords. Upward of twelve different Italian peoples took arms against Rome in the initial phase of the war, each with differing backgrounds and reasons for doing so. The Periochae of Livy, Diodorus and Appian all provide details on the peoples who rebelled, but each with a different perspective:

The following Italian nations revolted: the Picentes, Vestinians, Marsians, Paelignians, Marrucinians, Samnites, and Lucanians.²

Engaged in the war with the Romans were the Samnites, the people of Asculum, the Lucanians, the Picentines, the people of Nola and other cities and nations.³

When the revolt broke out all the neighbouring peoples showed their preparedness at the same time, the Marsi, the Peligni, the Vestini, the Marrucini; and after them the Picentines, the Frentani, the Hirpini, the Pompeiians, the Venusini, the Apulians, the Lucanians, and the Samnites, all of whom had been hostile to the Romans before.⁴

We can see that Livy and Diodorus provide far fewer names than Appian, who seems to combine the two. Appian provides us with far more than the names, however, as his account seems to indicate two waves of rebellion; with the Marsi, Peligni, Vestini and Marrucini in the first wave, who rebelled following the massacre at Asculum, and a second grouping who rose up later, in 91 BC. Interestingly, the first four peoples had been in alliance prior to their conquest by Rome and thus seem to have resurrected a pre-Roman alliance.

Salmon argues that this clearly indicates the presence of two separate, but allied, groupings amongst the rebels, one composed of peoples of central and eastern Italy who were predominantly Latin speakers, and another one composed of predominantly Oscan speakers to the south, making twelve key peoples in total. Livy and Diodorus are thus only preserving details of one of the two groupings in their accounts.⁵ For Salmon, these two groupings can be supported by the variations in the coinage issued by the Italian rebels, with some in Latin and others in Oscan.

Each of these two groupings appears to have been centred around, or led by, a dominant people. In the central alliance this was the Marsi, and in the southern one it was the Samnites. Diodorus even refers to the two groupings agreeing a boundary between their spheres of influence, set at the Cercola.⁶ This is generally considered to be a reference to a particular natural boundary between the Marsic and Samnite territories, but exactly what it refers to has been lost to us. These two groupings then seem to have created one overarching federation, with a federal capital Corfinum, which was renamed Italia. This capital was the location of a common treasury and store of supplies, as well having a federal council, giving this system all the trapping of a federation. Diodorus also provides details of a unified command structure, with two annual consuls and twelve praetors, one for each of the peoples. The first consuls were Q. Poppaedius Silo, for the Marsi, commander of the central alliance, and a Samnite named either as C. Aponius Motylus or C. Papius Mutilus.⁷

Thus Diodorus provides us with what is a particularly Greek view of the Italian rebels: a Greek federation, albeit with borrowed Roman magistracies and institutions. However, there are three key questions. The first one centres around how much Diodorus’ view and the language he used reflected the reality of the situation, and the extent to which he saw it though a Greek filter? Again, we have no Italian records for how they organized themselves. Secondly, did the sources Diodorus used view the Italian Federation through Roman eyes, by giving it consuls and praetors and making it resemble a Roman system?⁸ Thirdly, there is the question of whether these arrangements were meant to be permanent or were just for the duration of the war.

In terms of command structure, it does seem that the ‘Italian Federation’ did have a joint command structure, but only in so far as there were two major groupings within the rebellion, one centred on the Marsi and one on the Samnites. The Marsi were led by Q. Poppaedius Silo and the Samnites by C. Papius Mutilus. Thus the rebellion had two principal centres of command, each with its own leader. To Greek eyes, this may have looked like a traditional Greek federation. To Roman eyes, it may well have looked like the consular arrangement. However, this does not mean that the term ‘consul’ was used, nor that annual elections were held, nor that any other race could provide one of the two principal leaders. Thus Rome faced one Italian Federation, combined of two principal sub-groups or regional alliances. This meant that Rome faced a war on two fronts: central and southern Italy, or a Marsic and a Samnite campaign.

However, rather than fight two separate and unconnected wars, the two groupings of states created an overarching federation, with all the trappings necessary to co-ordinate their efforts and seemingly to provide governance for life after Rome. A Roman alliance in Italy would seemingly be replaced by an Italian federation, run for the benefit of all states rather than just one. In many ways, this harked back to the Greek model of federations created by the Greek city states, such as the Achaean and Aetolian leagues, to counterbalance the great Hellenistic kingdoms they faced. This overarching federation would also allow for the pooling of manpower, the benefits of which the Romans had ably demonstrated over the previous two centuries.

This brings us to the all-important question of what the Italian rebels’ aims were?⁹ Initially, it seems that the Marsic grouping sent ambassadors to Rome following the Asculum massacre to try to negotiate Roman citizenship for their citizens. Appian provides the following:

They sent ambassadors to Rome to complain that although they had cooperated in all ways with the Romans in building up the empire, the latter had not been willing to admit their helpers to citizenship. The Senate answered sternly that if they repented of what they had done they could send ambassadors, otherwise not. The Italians, in despair of any other remedy, went on with their preparations for war. Besides the soldiers who were kept for guards at each town, they had forces in common amounting to about 100,000 foot and horse. The Romans sent an equal force against them, made up of their own citizens and of the Italian peoples who were still in alliance with them.¹⁰

A negotiated settlement was always an unlikely outcome, especially given the massacre at Asculum, which meant that armed struggle and the defeat of Rome was the only option. However, this still leaves us with the question of what were their longer terms aims? Some have argued that independence from Rome was the ultimate goal, others that this was the first stage of a desire for Italian unification; neither seems likely. Unification can be ruled out on account of the fact that the races which occupied the peninsula in this period were not of common ancestry, blood or culture, ranging from Gauls in the north through Etruscans, Latins and Oscans to the Greeks in the south, to name but a few. If nothing else, two centuries of Roman rule had shown the clear benefits, both at home and abroad, of abolishing the warfare that had racked the peninsula prior to the Roman conquest. Cooperation brought with it peace and prosperity at home and a large empire overseas.

With the creation of the Italian Federation, a demand for equality within the Roman system transformed itself into a desire to replace the Roman-dominated alliances with a more equitable system. Even if they were victorious on the battlefield and gained Roman citizenship, could the balance of power between Rome and the peoples of Italy remain the same? By its very nature, an Italian victory would end Roman supremacy within the peninsula and bring about a more balanced system of alliance, for the benefit of all, not just one city. Under such circumstances, the victors would not so much gain Roman citizenship for themselves as abolish Roman citizenship altogether, with everyone having equal citizenship in the Italian Federation. Thus Roman citizens would become Italian federal citizens, which would offer full rights and legal protection to all. Rome would thus then become another state within the federation, with no one hegemon.

As always, a note of caution must be sounded with any speculative reconstruction. The Italian Federation may have looked and even preached equality between its members, but it was dominated by two powers: the Marsi and the Samnites. Furthermore, many would have been looking no further than defeating Rome on the battlefield and ending their hegemony in the peninsula, rather than having a clear idea of what structures would be raised in their place. Finally, there must have been a myriad of different views within each of the rebel peoples, never mind between them.

Another interesting question arises regarding the Italian Federation and Rome’s empire. Given the undoubted wealth and prosperity that the Romans had reaped and the key role that the Italians (through their manpower) had played in this process, would the Italians have done anything other than usurp Rome at the head of the empire? The question of whether this federation would have survived beyond the duration of the war must be linked to this issue of the empire. The Roman system had demonstrated the great rewards that unity brought with it, from peace and security at home to empire overseas. If the desire was to see an Italian federation with an Italian empire, the key question is whether such a thing would have been possible.

In terms of the empire, the armies would be the same; it would simply be the Senate of Corfinum issuing the orders, rather than that of Rome. The crucial difference is the fact that Rome’s empire was for the benefit of the few and controlled by the few. At the centre lay an alliance of Roman noble families, who had solved their internal differences (notably the patrician-plebeian dissensions) before they gained their empire. If the Federal Italian Council was to replace that of Rome, how would it cope with so many conflicting peoples and voices, especially as the rebellion seemed to centre on the Marsi and the Samnites? Would such a federal system accommodate a number of competing peoples in the longer term, or would it have been doomed to dissension and further bloodshed?

This in turn leads to the question of Italian tactics. Although the rebellious peoples were geographically unified, Rome still maintained a number of colonies throughout rebel territory, most notably on the coast, along with a number of cities that remained loyal, all of which would have remained thorns in the rebels’ sides until captured. Key to their longer term success, however, would be to persuade enough of the neutral Italian peoples to defect to the new Italian Federation to ensure that the manpower balance swung in their favour. Thus, in many ways, we have a repeat of Hannibal’s initial tactics in the Second Punic War: score swift victories against Rome and strip her of her manpower resources, which in the long term would prove the decisive factor in any war. Although the rebels could field over 100,000 men, Rome still had control of large parts of northern and southern Italy, control of the seas and a large overseas empire (both formal and informal), from which they could call up further resources. If this war became a drawn-out affair then the rebels would surely suffer Hannibal’s fate, worn down by the endless Roman military machine.

The Roman Alliance

Viewed from the Roman perspective, it must have been the scale of the rebellions that caught them by surprise. They had already received a warning through Poppaedius’ march on Rome and had sent representatives out to monitor areas whose loyalty was suspect, which led the Praetor Servilius to Asculum in the first place. Furthermore, in 125 BC the city of Fregellae had revolted following the aborted citizenship proposals of M. Fulvius Flaccus, which may well have been part of a wider abortive revolt. As it was, the revolt of Fregellae on its own was isolated and easily crushed.¹¹ On this occasion, however, a number of Italian peoples across central and southern Italy had risen in arms. Furthermore, whilst one city could be isolated, these rebellions had united to form a rival alliance that offered all the benefits of the Roman one, such as peace and security in Italy and the prosperity of an overseas empire, with apparently none of the drawbacks, such as Roman interference in internal affairs or second-class status in Italy.

Although a number of the surviving sources, such as Florus, deploy calamitous rhetoric for the opening of the war, as the situation stood in 91 BC, Rome’s position was far from hopeless.¹² The core of the early Roman state – Latium, Etruria and Campania – remained loyal, or at least had not openly rebelled, giving Rome a solid block of territory on Italy’s western coast and a buffer around Rome itself. In the north, both Umbria and Cisalpine Gaul remained loyal, while in the south, the Greek cities remained loyal also (see Map 2).¹³ Rome was also strategically in a far stronger position than in any previous war fought in Italy, given her vast resources in the Mediterranean from both her provinces and her allies. We have references to Gallic and African contingents fighting in Italy, as well as additional naval forces from Asia.¹⁴ The key to Roman success again harked back to the Hannibalic invasion a century earlier: avoid the quick military defeats and ensure that her remaining allies, including those in the wider empire, did not desert to the opposition.

Fighting during the latter stages of 91 BC appears to have been limited, as both sides continued with their mobilizations. Appian refers to Rome ultimately fielding 100,000 men, to match the size of the Italian armies.¹⁵ Brunt has argued that during 90 BC Rome had mobilized and deployed some 75,000 infantry and cavalry.¹⁶ Archaeological remains in the form of sling shot found at Asculum reveal Roman legions numbering up to at least XV (IV, IX, XI and XV to be exact), though the number in Italy in total, but not at Asculum, may have been higher.¹⁷

With no major campaigns during the rest of 91 BC, the conduct of the war fell to the consuls of 90 BC, L. Iulius Caesar and P. Rutilius Lupus. Each consul seems to have been assigned to fight one of the two main Italian rebel groupings (the Marsi and Samnites), Caesar in central and southern Italy against the Samnites, and Lupus in the central and eastern Italy against the Marsi. Thus, despite the overarching title of Italian War or Social War traditionally given to this period and the nature of there being one overarching ‘Italian Federation’, the war was divided into two fronts – Marsic and Samnite – and two differing but interconnected campaigns.

2. The First Year of Campaigning (90 BC) – The Marsic Campaign

Given that the Marsic leader C. Poppaedius Silo already had 10,000 men under arms by mid-91 BC, we must assume that he took to the field immediately following the massacre at Asculum to set about securing the rebel territory in the region. The Periochae of Livy reports a siege of the Roman colony of Alba on the Via Valeria, leading from Rome to the rebel territories in eastern Italy (see Map 2). At the opening of the campaigning season for 90 BC, Poppaedius was faced by P. Rutilius Lupus, of whom we sadly know little (including any prior military experience). Nevertheless, given the importance of the campaign, it is clear that the Senate sent with him a body of experienced and talented legates to support his campaign, notably amongst them C. Marius himself and an up-and-coming Roman politician from Picenum named Cn. Pompeius Strabo.¹⁸Marius’ inclusion and subordinate role is an interesting one. Plutarch’s life of Marius barely dwells on this period, but it appears that Marius was selected to be one of Rutilius’ legates due to family connections between the men, despite Marius’ age of 66.

Again, we have little coherent narrative for the year that describes the campaigning as a whole. Orosius reports that Pompeius Strabo received senatorial orders to invade Picenum, the region from which his family came and in which it still maintained extensive estates.¹⁹ More than anything else the Picentine campaign was of great symbolic value given that it was the place where the war had originated, with the massacre at Asculum, and taking that city would be of great symbolic importance.

Battle of Mount Falernus

At some point early in the campaigning season, the army of Pompeius encountered forces commanded by three Italian ‘praetors’, named by Appian as C. Vidacilius, T. Lafrenius and P. Vettius, commanding contingents of Picentes, Vestini, and Marsi respectively.²⁰ We have no details of the battle, other than it was by Mount Falernus and that Pompeius was defeated. Appian records that Pompeius retreated to the city of Firmum, where he was placed under siege by T. Lafrenius. Orosius also briefly mentions the defeat.²¹

Keaveney has argued that the defeats described by Appian and Orosius are separate ones, primarily based on the seemingly later position these events occupied in Appian’s narrative of the year.²² However, given the number of simultaneous campaigns ongoing at this point and the fact that Appian’s text is not known for its strict adherence to chronology, there is no need to separate this defeat into two different ones.

Unnamed Battle

This first Roman defeat appears to have set the tone for the early Roman campaign throughout the region as a whole. Appian records that one of Rutilius’ legates, C. Perperna, encountered the forces of P. Praesenteius, who it is argued was the commander of the Paeligni in central Italy.²³Appian is the only source for this conflict:

Publius Praesenteius defeated Perperna, who had 10,000 men under his command, killed 4,000 and captured the arms of the greater part of the others, for which reason the consul Rutilius deprived Perperna of his command and gave his division of the army to Caius Marius.²⁴

Thus one of Rutilius’ legates had met with defeat for a second time, this time losing the greater part of his army. The bulk of the main Roman army remained under the command of the consul Rutilius and his legates Q. Servilius Caepio and C. Marius. Orosius reports dissension between Lupus and Marius over which tactics to pursue, with Lupus pushing for a knock-out victory against Poppaedius and Marius advocating caution.²⁵ Again, we can see parallels to the Second Punic War, with disagreements over whether it was better to pursue the quick knock-out win or avoid the quick knock-out defeat. Nevertheless, under Lupus’ command the main Roman army engaged a large Italian army at some point on the River Tolenus (see Map 2). They were faced by P. Vettius Scato, the Marsic ‘praetor’, and an army of unknown size.

Battle of River Tolenus

Both Appian and Orosius preserve accounts of what was the greatest battle of the war to date:

The consul Rutilius and Caius Marius built bridges over the River Tolenus at no great distance from each other. Vettius Scato pitched his camp opposite them, but nearer to the bridge of Marius, and placed an ambush by night in some ravines around the bridge of Rutilius. Early in the morning, after he had allowed Rutilius to cross the bridge, he started up from ambush and killed a large number of the enemy on the dry land and drove many into the river. In this fight Rutilius himself was wounded in the head by a missile and died soon afterward. Marius was on the other bridge and when he guessed, from the bodies floating down stream, what had happened, he pushed away those in his front, crossed the river, and captured the camp of Scato, which was guarded by only a small force, so that Scato was obliged to spend the night where he had won his victory, and to retreat in the morning for want of provisions. The body of Rutilius and those of many other patricians were brought to Rome for burial. The corpses of the consul and his numerous comrades made a piteous spectacle and the mourning lasted many days. The Senate decreed from this time on that those who were killed in war should be buried where they fell, lest others should be deterred by the spectacle from entering the army.²⁶

In so much as Marius was constantly suggesting in private that a delay would prove beneficial to the conduct of the war and that the young recruits ought to be drilled in camp for a short time, Rutilius thought that the action of Marius was prompted by some hidden motive. He therefore made light of his advice and carelessly brought his army into an ambush set by the Marsi. There the consul himself and many nobles were killed and 8,000 Roman soldiers slaughtered. The Tolenus River carried the arms and bodies of the dead within sight of Marius, and thus furnished proof of the disaster. After quickly gathering together troops, Marius took the victors by surprise and slew 8,000 of these Marsi.²⁷

Thus the largest engagement of the war to date had nearly resulted in a disastrous defeat for the Romans, with a consul and 8,000 men killed. If it were not for the quick actions of Marius (at the age of 66), this battle would have been a total disaster for the Romans. In terms of causalities, the battle was a draw, with 8,000 dead on both sides, but in propaganda terms, it was a significant Roman defeat, with the loss of a consul, and the commensurate effects on Roman morale. In effect, Rutilius had given the Marsi what they wanted, a clear victory for propaganda purposes, showing the vulnerability of Roman military might.

Thus in the three battles to date, the Romans had lost more than 12,000 men (4,000 against the Paeligni, 8,000 at Tolenus and an unknown number at Falernus) and more than 10,000 wounded. Tolenus highlighted two clear defects of the Roman war effort: poor quality commanders and armies of fresh recruits. As seen earlier (Chapter 1), Rome was committed to a number of overseas wars, which, according to Brunt’s estimates, were utilizing seven legions already.²⁸ The rapid mobilization of forces in Italy seems to have affected the quality of the troops in Rome’s armies in Italy, with fresh recruits being thrown straight in at the deep end. Once again, Roman politics played a part, with untested military leaders in command, ignoring the advice of their vastly more experienced legates.²⁹

Given the state of emergency, the Senate avoided holding an election to replace Rutilius as consul and took the expedient measure of appointing commanders in the field to take charge. Unfortunately, they choose to award command of Rutilius’ army jointly to C. Marius and Q. Servilius Caepio. With hindsight, this decision seems strange, given the reputation and recent actions of Marius. Yet the Periochae of Livy preserves a notice that Caepio had recently distinguished himself in battle, though we have no further details: ‘When Quintus Caepio, deputy of Rutilius, was besieged and successfully repelled his enemies, and was given equal powers to Caius Marius… .’³⁰

There may also have been some lingering suspicion of Marius within the Senate itself and a desire to avoid appointing him in sole charge of an army once again, thus boosting his profile once more. Yet, if there were these political considerations, they should have come second to the military ones. Rome badly needed a morale-boosting victory in the Marsic campaign, and Marius was Rome’s most experienced general. And, despite his age, he had shown that he had lost none of his instincts. It seems that the two commanders separated the remaining Roman forces and conducted their own campaigns.

Unnamed Battle

The Periochae of Livy preserves a note to an otherwise unattested battle between the Paeligni and a Roman commander named Sulpicius, who, it has been argued, was Ser. Sulpicius Galba.³¹ The note simply states that Sulpicius routed the Paeligni.³² This battle seems to have avenged the loss of C. Perperna (above) and formed the only Roman success in central Italy of this campaign.

Unnamed Battle

At some further point in the Roman campaign, Caepio encountered the forces of Poppaedius. Orosius briefly mentions this battle and adds that Poppaedius’ army was made up of Marsi and Vestini.³³ Again, it is Appian who preserves an account of the battle:

The opposing general, Q. Poppaedius, fled as a pretended deserter to this Caepio. He brought with him and gave as a pledge two slave babies, clad with the purple-bordered garments of free-born children, pretending that they were his own sons. As further confirmation of his good faith he brought masses of lead plated with gold and silver. He urged Caepio to follow him in all haste with his army and capture the hostile army while destitute of a leader. Caepio was deceived and followed him. When they had arrived at a place where an ambush had been laid, Poppaedius ran up to the top of a hill as though he were searching for the enemy, and gave his own men a signal. The latter sprang out of their concealment and cut Caepio and most of his force in pieces. The Senate joined the rest of Caepio’s army to that of Marius.³⁴

Thus a second Roman general in succession had fallen to a Marsic ambush and met with a similar fate. Caepio may well have placed too much strength in the friendship he had with Poppaedius from before the war (see Chapter 1). Rome’s Marsic campaign was now in disarray, with three successive defeats in central Italy, and casualty figures that must have exceeded 20,000 dead in this campaign alone (we have no figures for Caepio’s defeat). Finally, the Senate affirmed what most Romans would have expected and appointed the six-time consul Marius in sole charge of what was left of the Marsic campaign for the remainder of the year. We have no clear idea of how many soldiers he had left under his command.

Unnamed Battle

It seems that Marius determined to restore Roman morale with a victory before the campaigning season was over and whilst his sole command lasted. He seems to have worked in concert with his old deputy and protégé L. Cornelius Sulla, despite the supposed enmity between the two men during this period. Again, details of this campaign are sketchy and we only have brief accounts, but it appears that Marius and Sulla, at an unknown location, met armies of the Marsi, who were led by an unknown commander, and the Marrucini, who were commanded by Herius Asinius. Interestingly, we do not know whether Poppaedius was in command of the Marsi at this battle. Again, Appian preserves a brief narrative of the battle:

Cornelius Sulla and Caius Marius defeated the Marsi, who had attacked them. They pursued the enemy vigorously as far as the walls enclosing their vineyards. The Marsians scaled these walls with loss, but Marius and Sulla did not deem it wise to follow them farther. Cornelius Sulla was encamped on the other side of these enclosures and when he knew what had happened he came out to meet the Marsi, as they tried to escape, and killed a great number. More than 6,000 Marsi were slain that day, and the arms of a still greater number were captured by the Romans.³⁵

The Periochae of Livy adds the detail that the Marrucinian commander Asinius was killed, whilst Orosius states that 7,000 were captured.³⁶ Thus, in his first battle in sole command of the Marsic campaign, Marius inflicted the first defeat on the Marsi and scored Rome’s first major victory of the campaign. Following this victory, Sulla was dispatched back south to relieve the siege of Aesernia (see below). The Marsi seemingly reformed under the command of Poppaedius and attempted to give battle once again, but Marius reverted to Fabian tactics and refused to give battle. Diodorus preserves an interesting fragment that details a meeting between Marius and Poppaedius and fraternization between their armies:

As the armies came close to one another their grim belligerency gave way to peaceful feelings. For as they reached the point where features could be distinguished, the soldiers on both sides detected many personal friends, refreshed their memory of not a few former comrades in arms and identified numerous relatives and kinsmen… . Seeing this Marius himself advanced from the battle line and when Poppaedius had done likewise they conversed with one another like kinsmen. When the commanders had discussed at length the question of peace and the longed for citizenship, in both armies a tide of joyous optimism surged up and the whole encounter lost its warlike air and took on a festive appearance.³⁷

This extraordinary fragment of narrative, if true, throws into sharp relief the civil war element of this conflict, with soldiers in the opposing armies fighting friends, former comrades and kinsmen, with little personal rancour between them. At the soldiers’ level, the war appears to have been fought as a matter of following orders, rather than any ideological or nationalistic aims. The meeting between the commanders also highlights the similarities between the two men and their armies. Both were Italian noblemen, one part of the Roman elite with close Italian ties, the other part of the Italian elite with close Roman ties. In the longer run, this meeting, at which Marius had consorted with the figurehead of the rebellion, would not have helped improve the Senate’s view of the Roman commander, and may have led to the decision not to renew his imperium for the following year.³⁸

Cicero actually reports a similar meeting between Pompeius Strabo and the Marsic general Vettius Scato, though we are not able to date the event. Again, we have a Roman general of Italian stock meeting his Marsic counterpart on friendly terms. Cicero reports a similar lack of rancour in the meeting:

That conference was conducted with fairness: there was no fear, no suspicion, even their mutual hatred was not great, for the allies were not seeking to take our city from us, but to be themselves admitted to share the privileges of it.³⁹

Battle of Firmum

Away from such encounters, events in the north-east showed a similar recovery. We have no idea of how long Pompeius Strabo had been under siege in Firmum, but Orosius has him breaking out of the siege following Marius’ victory. Having been besieged in Firmum, Pompeius apparently bided his time and plotted his break out. Appian records the following engagement, though we have no details as to the time lapse between the two battles:

The latter [Pompeius] armed his remaining forces, but did not come to an engagement. Having learned that another army was approaching, he sent Sulpicius⁴⁰ around to take Lafrenius in the rear while he made a sally in front. Battle was joined and both sides were having a doubtful fight when Sulpicius set fire to the enemy’s camp. When the latter saw this they fled to Asculum in disorder and without a general, for Lafrenius had fallen in the battle. Pompeius then advanced and laid siege to Asculum.⁴¹

Thus Pompeius had managed to turn a defeat into victory, killing one of the opposing commanders and clearing the Italian forces that were defending the route to Asculum. Orosius reports that upon this news the Senate ordered the restoration of dignified dress in Rome as a mark of the achievement.⁴² It is possible that Asculum was under siege prior to Pompeius Strabo’s arrival, as he preserves an interesting note on the activities of a Sex. Iulius Caesar (Cos. 91).⁴³ Unfortunately, Appian constantly mixes up the consuls of 91 and 90 BC, obscuring Sextus’ role in this war.

Unnamed Battle

Nevertheless, Appian records that Sextus was successful in battle against an unknown opponent. All we have is the following statement from Appian:

He attacked 20,000 of the enemy at some place while they were changing camping-places, killed about 8,000 of them, and captured the arms of a much larger number.⁴⁴

Given the position in Appian’s text, it is assumed that this clash took place in 90 BC. Appian goes on to state that Sextus died of disease whilst commanding the siege of Asculum, and was succeeded by C. Baebius. This whole reference is difficult to reconcile with the rest of the campaign narrative, and a number of modern commentators have attempted to amend the name and or the location of the command.⁴⁵ If we are to keep the reference as we have it, then we can only assume that Sextus, as proconsul was sent to besiege Asculum first, early in 90 BC, but that his death led to Pompeius being assigned command of the siege; what became of Baebius we do not know.

There are other scattered references to actions in this period though we have no dates to place them accurately in the campaign. Diodorus records the siege of the city of Pinna in the territory of the Vestini. The city remained loyal to Rome despite a massacre of the town’s children by the Italian besieging forces.⁴⁶ Diodorus also records that the Picentines released a Cilician chief from prison, named Agamemnon, who assisted them by raiding Roman territory in a guerrilla campaign.⁴⁷

Thus the first full year of campaigning in the Marsic campaign had seen Rome make a disastrous start, with a string of defeats, culminating in the deaths of the consul Rutilius and one of his replacements, Caepio. Roman losses must have exceeded 20,000 soldiers dead and a similar number wounded. Far exceeding the physical losses was the damage that these defeats had done to Rome’s martial reputation. As the year progressed, the Italian Federation had shown itself to be militarily superior to the Romans, thus fulfilling their need for quick victories to show their viability as a viable alternative to Rome. As will be discussed below, this led to the rebellions against Rome spreading, further weakening Rome’s war effort.

Rome’s Marsic campaign only stabilized when Marius assumed command of the main Roman army with his two victories, at the end of the battle of Tolenus and at the unnamed battle later in the year. In this he was ably supported by Pompeius Strabo, who had turned defeat into victory and begun the symbolically important siege of Asculum. Nevertheless, as the year ended, Rome’s military reputation had been dented, and despite the late rally, the year belonged to the Marsic alliance.

3. The First Year of Campaigning (90 BC) – The Samnite Campaign

Similarly, the Samnite campaign did not start well for Rome. Overall command fell to the consul L. Iulius Caesar, who also had a number of legates supporting him, including ex-consuls T. Didius (Cos. 98) and P. Licinius Crassus (Cos. 97), as well as L. Cornelius Sulla. As with the Marsic campaign, both sides spent the remainder of 91 BC mobilizing forces, though again we hear of attacks on Roman colonies that still held out and were now in rebel territory, most notably that of Aesernia in Samnium.⁴⁸ If anything, we have less details of this year’s campaigning in the Samnite campaign than we do for the Marsic one. Nevertheless, as with the Marsic campaign, it seems that the consul was eager to engage the enemy, and early in the Samnite campaign Caesar faced a force of Samnites, led by Vettius Scato.⁴⁹

Battle of Aesernia

We only have brief notes of this battle. Orosius places it at Aesernia, the Roman colony that was under siege. We must presume that Caesar was moving to relieve the siege when he encountered Vettius Scato. Both Appian and Orosius note that Caesar was defeated, but seem to differ on scale. Appian has 2,000 Romans killed, whilst Orosius refers to it as a slaughter, with Caesar needing to completely rebuild his army with a number of Gallic and African contingents. Orosius also adds the detail that Caesar was forced to flee the battle.⁵⁰

Vettius then moved on to the siege of the city of Aesernia, which continued to hold out. With Caesar’s army cleared from their path, the Samnites continued with this policy of reducing Roman cities, with Marius Egnatius capturing the nearby city of Venafrum. Appian ascribed this to treachery from within the city, which resulted in the slaughter of two Roman cohorts garrisoned there.⁵¹ Such a slaughter seems to have been a common feature of the Samnite campaign, seemingly in stark contrast to the image given by Diodorus of the friendly meeting between the armies above, though it could simply be that we have fewer details on the sieges in the Marsic campaign.

The Samnite campaign appears to have continued in the same vein. A Samnite army led by C. Papius invaded Campania and attacked the Roman colonies there. Nola, on the Via Popilia, fell, also apparently through treachery. On this occasion the 2,000 strong defending garrison was offered a choice:

Caius Papius captured Nola by treachery and offered to the 2,000 Roman soldiers in it the privilege of serving under him if they would change their allegiance. They did so, but as their officers refused the proposal, the latter were taken prisoners and starved to death by Papius.⁵²

Thus we have the first recorded incident of the war in which Roman or allied soldiers deserted to the Italian Federation. With no opposition from Caesar, Papius continued his attacks on Roman and allied towns in the region, taking the cities of Stabiae, Surrentum and Salernum. The first two sat on Italy’s western coast (on the Bay of Naples) and the latter on Via Popilia. Once again, we hear of defections to the rebels’ side:

The prisoners and the slaves from these places were taken into the military service. Then he plundered the entire country around Nuceria. The towns in the vicinity were struck with terror and submitted to him, and when he demanded military assistance they furnished him about 10,000 foot and 1,000 horse. With these Papius laid siege to Acerrae.⁵³

Battle of Acerrae

It was only at this point that the consul Caesar appears to have been able to regroup his army, probably indicating that his losses were more severe than the 2,000 mentioned by Appian. Again, we have accounts in both Appian and Orosius of the battle:

Caesar, with 10,000 Gallic foot and certain Numidian and Mauritanian horse and foot, advanced toward Acerrae. Papius took a son of Jugurtha, formerly king of Numidia, named Oxynta, who was under charge of a Roman guard at Venusia, led him out of that place, clothed him in royal purple, and showed him frequently to the Numidians who were in Caesar’s army.⁵⁴ Many of them deserted, as if to their own king, so that Caesar was obliged to send the rest back to Africa, as they were not trustworthy. Papius attacked him rashly, and had already made a breach in his fortified camp when Caesar emerged with his horse through the other gates and slew about 6,000 of his men, after which Caesar withdrew from Acerrae.⁵⁵

Orosius merely adds the detail that the rebel army was composed of both Samnites and Lucanians.⁵⁶ Thus Caesar, with his rebuilt army, was able to score his first victory of the Samnite campaign. He apparently wrote of his victory to the Senate, which received the news gratefully. Nevertheless, despite his ‘victory’, he was still forced to withdraw, perhaps due to the loss of the African contingent. In reality, we have to question how much of a victory this was. Although he had killed 6,000 of the enemy, he had been forced to withdraw once again and concede more territory to Papius, who had already received more troops than he lost from the Italian communities that had changed sides.

Battle of Taenum

Caesar, however, soon reduced the value of the limited victory even further when, on the march back from Acerrae, he appears to have fallen into an ambush. Only Appian preserves details of this battle:

While Caesar was passing through a rocky defile with 30,000 foot and 5,000 horse, Marius Egnatius suddenly fell upon him and defeated him in it. He retreated on a litter, as he was sick, to a certain stream where there was only one bridge, and there he lost the greater part of his force and the arms of the survivors. He escaped to Teanum with difficulty and there he armed the remainder of his men as best he could. Reinforcements were sent to him speedily and he marched to the relief of Acerrae, which was still besieged by Papius, but when their camps were pitched opposite each other neither of them dared to attack the other.⁵⁷

Thus Caesar managed to lose the second army of his campaign and ended his year of office as he started. As noted above with the consul Rutilius, although he was surrounded by wiser and more experienced commanders, the consul appears to have blundered from one disaster to another in the hopes of a quick victory, gifting the rebels the quick victories that they needed far more than the Romans. Away from Campania and Caesar, we have details of three more theatres of war in the Samnite campaign his year.

Unnamed Battle

The first was in Samnium itself, and was a clash involving the attempted relief of Aesernia by L. Cornelius Sulla, who had been sent with twenty-four cohorts to attempt to relieve the city. Frontinus preserves details of the battle, which is also mentioned by Orosius, though the two accounts differ considerably.

Lucius Sulla was surprised in a defile near Aesernia by the army of the enemy under the command of Duillius, asked for a conference, but was unsuccessful in negotiating terms of peace. Noting, however, that the enemy were careless and off their guard as a result of the truce, he marched forth at night, leaving only a trumpeter, with instructions to create the impression of the army’s presence by sounding the watches, and to rejoin him when the fourth watch began. In this way he conducted his troops unharmed to a place of safety, with all their baggage and engines.⁵⁸

Sulla was sent with twenty-four cohorts to Aesernia, where Roman citizens and soldiers were being hard pressed by a very close siege. He saved the city and its allies after he had fought a great battle and inflicted a terrific slaughter upon the enemy.⁵⁹

Thus, on the face of it, we have two contradictory accounts. In Frontinus, Sulla walks into an ambush, which he skilfully manages to escape, whilst in Orosius he scores a great victory and saves Aesernia. The other problem we have with this is that the Periochae of Livy explicitly states that Aesernia fell after a long siege around this time: ‘…the colony at Aesernia, together with Marcus Marcellus, fell in the hands of the Samnites…’.⁶⁰

It is possible that Sulla went on from extracting his forces from this ambush to scoring a notable victory over the forces of Duillius. Keaveney hypothesized that Sulla went on to lift the siege, but that the town later fell in a fresh siege.⁶¹ No other source makes reference to anything other than a long drawn-out siege ending with the city being starved into submission, which the Periochae of Livy places in the same period as Sulla and Marius’ victory against the Marsi. Given all this evidence, it seems unlikely that Sulla saved the city, though it is possible that he scored a victory against the Italian commander Duillius in the manner Orosius describes.

Battle of Grumentum

In Lucania, in southwestern Italy, operations were being commanded by the legate P. Licinius Crassus (Cos.97). However, experience proved to be no arbiter of success, as Crassus showed when he gave battle against the Lucanian commander M. Lamponius. Appian, Frontinus and Diodorus preserve short notes on this battle:

Marcus Lamponius destroyed some 800 of the forces under Licinius Crassus and drove the remainder into the town of Grumentum.⁶²

When the camp of the Volscians had been pitched near bushes and woods, Camillus set fire to everything which could carry the flames, once started, up to the very fortifications. In this way he deprived the enemy of their camp. In the Social War Publius Crassus was cut off in almost the same way with all his troops.⁶³

Lamponius rushed headlong at Crassus, for he believed that it was appropriate, not that the masses should fight on behalf of their leaders, but rather that their leaders should fight for the masses.⁶⁴

Thus it seems that Crassus’ camp was attacked by Lamponius, who set fire to the surrounding vegetation. Crassus, it seems, managed to escape with minimal casualties and seek refuge in the city of Grumentum. We hear no more of this threat during the year. In Apulia, Appian preserves a note detailing further Roman reverses:

Canusium and Venusia and many other towns in Apulia sided with Vidacilius. Some that did not submit he besieged, and he put to death the principal Roman citizens in them, but the common people and the slaves he enrolled in his army.⁶⁵

Thus, it can be argued that the Samnite campaign of 90 BC was an almost total disaster. The consul Caesar was heavily defeated on two occasions; the Samnites took a number of key Roman cities within their territory and conquered a series of Roman cities up to the Bay of Naples, and secured control of the Via Popilia. If this were not enough, Rome suffered reverses in Apulia and Lucania and saw a number of formerly allied cities defect to the Samnite alliance and supply them with fresh troops.

4. The Spread of the Rebellion – The Etruscan, Umbrian and Gallic Campaigns

In addition to the two major campaigns described above, of which we have some details, there are other perhaps more important campaigns of which we know next to nothing, but which were of vital importance to the war’s outcome. Both the Periochae of Livy and Orosius refer to campaigns in Etruria and Umbria, which had apparently latterly risen in revolt:

The Praetor Porcius Cato conquered the Etruscans and his legate Plotius conquered the Umbrians. Both victories entailed the most distressing hardships and much bloodshed.⁶⁶

Deputy Aulus Plotius defeated the Umbrians and praetor Lucius Porcius the Etruscans. Both nations had revolted.⁶⁷

Appian also mentions the revolt, but not the military campaigns:

While these events were transpiring on the Adriatic side of Italy, the inhabitants of Etruria and Umbria and other neighbouring peoples on the other side of Rome heard of them and all were excited to revolt.⁶⁸

Regrettably, this is all that survives of two of the most important campaigns of the war. Central to the success of the Italian Federation’s rebellion was to score quick victories over Rome, thereby showing her weakness and encouraging the other peoples of Italy to revolt. We know from the other sources that the Etruscans and Umbrians were not part of the original rebellion, and thus we can deduce that the Italians were indeed successful in encouraging key Roman allies to revolt. With Etruria and Umbria in revolt, and possibly allied to the Italian Federation, Rome would now be surrounded by hostile territory in Italy. We have no idea of how serious or widespread these revolts in Etruria and Umbria were, but Orosius does speak of hard-fought victories.⁶⁹ We can assume that if the Etruscans and Umbrians were wavering in 91 BC, the reported Roman losses during early 90 BC must have contributed to their decision.

The most interesting factor here is the apparent speed and ease with which these two peoples were defeated. Whilst Orosius labels them ‘distressing and bloody’, based on a more detailed Livian narrative, none of the other surviving sources mention these military campaigns. Both peoples seem to have been defeated by the end of 90 BC, which is surprising given the difficulties Rome was having in the two other major campaigns and the fact that they must have committed the bulk of their troops to the two consuls. Given both of these factors, we can only presume that these revolts were not as widespread as in the rest of Italy and only involved an isolated number of communities, which were relatively easy to isolate and defeat, albeit with a large amount of bloodshed. Aside from the swift military resolution to these revolts, the offer of citizenship to those who had not yet rebelled must have greatly aided the Romans in containing these fresh rebellions (see below).

Although we lack any details of the campaigns, the outcomes were important for two key reasons. Firstly, Rome had militarily prevented the rebellion from spreading and further undermining their position, thus neutralizing a key element in the Italian Federation’s plans. If Rome could keep the rebellion isolated to just those two alliances, centred on the Marsi and Samnites, and prevent the war from spreading, then the war could be contained and effectively managed. Secondly, these additional rebellions, even if they were isolated, seem to have shocked the Senate into considering a political solution to accompany the military one (see below). Furthermore, the Periochae of Livy informs us that the Salluvii peoples of Transalpine Gaul also rebelled, perhaps indicating that these rebellions and defeats were having a wider impact on Rome’s regional standing. Again, we only have the one reference to the campaigns: ‘In Transalpine Gaul, Caius Caelius defeated the rebellious Salluvians.’⁷⁰

5. A Political Solution: The Senate and the Lex Iulia

According to Appian, the revolts in Etruria and Umbria so alarmed the Senate that they agreed to a political solution to the crisis, and one which they had so voraciously opposed only a year earlier:

The Senate also voted that those Italians who had adhered to their alliance should be admitted to citizenship, which was the one thing they all desired most. They sent this decree around among the Etruscans, who gladly accepted the citizenship.⁷¹

This is one of the most important references in the ancient sources, as it details the extension of Roman citizenship. However, if we are not careful, it can also be one of the most misunderstood references. In Appian, this measure was unnamed, but the sources contain three other passing references to the granting of citizenship according to the Iulian Law, while one source refers to the discussions that took place:⁷²

The general Gnaeus Pompeius, son of Sextus, for their valour made Spanish cavalrymen Roman citizens in camp at Asculum on November 17 in accordance with the Iulian Law.⁷³

… the Latins have adopted whatever of them they have chosen; even by the Iulian law itself, by which the rights of citizenship were given to the allies and to the Latins, it was decreed that those people who did not ratify the law should not have the freedom of the city, which circumstance gave rise to a great contention …⁷⁴

… when citizenship was given to all Latium by the Iulian law …⁷⁵

… for example, if in the Italian War the Senate should deliberate whether or not to grant citizenship to the Allies.⁷⁶

As it is commonly depicted, the law mentioned by Appian was the Lex Iulia, which was presumably passed by L. Iulius Caesar upon his return to Rome towards the end of his year in office. This seemed to grant Roman citizenship to all Italian and Latin communities that had not rebelled, thus supposedly meeting the main demand of the Italian communities, and thus preventing further rebellions.

Bispham provides the most concise and up-to-date summary of the arguments involved in the laws that extended Roman citizenship.⁷⁷ He argues that Lex Iulia was a rushed measure that had little in the way of detailed planning (hardly surprising given the nature of the crisis), and which allowed for allied communities who had not revolted to become citizens if they so chose. This measure was not a blanket enfranchisement of all Italy, but was an offer of citizenship for those allied communities who wanted it, thus isolating the moderates, who hoped for gain within the Roman system, from the radicals, who wanted outright independence from Rome, whether as part of a greater Italian federation or not.

As well as the Lex Iulia, the sources contain references to three other laws: the Lex Plautia-Papiria, the Lex Calpurnia and the Lex Pompeia. The first two are considerably obscure, both in terms of content, chronology and relationship to each other and to the Lex Iulia. Some have argued that the Lex Plautia-Papiria was a tribunician measure that extended citizenship to the rest of Italy, whilst others that it was limited to certain groups.⁷⁸ The only details of the law come from a speech of Cicero. Again, this measure seems to have been aimed solely at Rome’s allies, and again, it was a voluntary measure.

The freedom of the city was given him in accordance with the provisions of the law of Silvanus and Carbo. If any men had been enrolled as citizens of the confederate cities, and if, at the time that the law was passed, they had a residence in Italy, and if within sixty days they had made a return or themselves to the praetor.⁷⁹

Then the consuls [tribunes] Silvanus and Carbo passed a law, that anyone who belonged to an allied people could obtain Roman citizenship, if only he was living in Italy at the time that the law was passed, and if he made an application to the praetor within sixty days. Licinius Archias was unable to provide the necessary evidence that he was entitled to Roman citizenship …⁸⁰

The Lex Calpurnia is referenced only in one fragment of Sisenna and seems to be limited to granting citizenship to allied soldiers who had displayed bravery in the field. The Lex Pompeia is much easier to understand, being passed by Cn. Pompeius Strabo during 89 BC, and being concerned with the granting of Latin rights to Cisalpine Gaul, and was therefore a targeted measure to ensure that the Gauls in northern Italy did not join in with the rebellion.⁸¹

Thus, whilst the Romans conducted faltering and downright disastrous military campaigns against the Marsi and Samnites, they were considerably more successful in preventing the rebellion from expanding beyond their ability to deal with it militarily. By a combination of military campaigns and political concessions, Etruria, Umbria, Latium and the two Gauls were kept within Roman control, isolating the contagion to the Marsic and Samnite alliances. It was this, more than anything else, which brought victory to the Romans in this war. However, as with most legislation, the devil was in the detail, and as Appian states, these new citizens faced a key political restriction:

The Romans did not enrol the new citizens in the thirty-five existing tribes, lest they should outvote the old ones in the elections, but incorporated them in ten new tribes, which voted last. So it often happened that their vote was useless, since a majority was obtained from the thirty-five tribes that voted first. This fact was either not noticed by the Italians at the time or they were satisfied with what they had gained, but it was observed later and became the source of a new conflict.⁸²

Whether this measure was decided in the Lex Iulia is a matter of much scholarly debate. Bispham argues that given the rushed nature of the measure, this was a matter left for further legislation when the Senate had more time to work these matters out, and this author is inclined to agree with him.⁸³ Thus, by the back door, the Senate enacted a measure that allowed them to maintain control of the electoral system in Rome and negate the impact of these new voters. As Appian states, at the time this was of little issue, but it would become one the major issues in the years that followed, and a key catalyst for further conflicts.⁸⁴

6. Military Reforms

Appian also refers to some military reforms that the Senate were forced to undertake due to the chronic manpower shortages they were suffering (with the Marsic, Samnite, Etrurian, Umbrian and Gallic campaigns, not to mention various overseas commitments):

The Senate, fearing lest they should be surrounded by enemies for want of guards, garrisoned the sea-coast from Cumae to the city with freedmen, who were then for the first time enrolled in the army on account of the scarcity of soldiers.⁸⁵

Thus for the second time in two decades Rome had, out of necessity, expanded the potential pool of military recruits, this time admitting freedmen.⁸⁶ Furthermore, the extension of Roman citizenship to the loyal allied communities meant that those who accepted it became liable for service in the Roman armies, rather than the allied contingents, thus again expanding the numbers available for Roman military service, albeit only after a period of time (enfanchsisment and census).

7. Political Backlash at Rome – The Lex Varia

Whilst the Roman nobility were spurred to political concessions towards the end of 90 BC, it seems that earlier in the year they had descended into a political witch-hunt. A tribune Q. Varius Severus Hybrida was persuaded by various factions to propose a law establishing a special tribunal to investigate and prosecute those who had ‘encouraged the allies to revolt’; in other words, a McCarthy-style witch-hunt to seek out ‘enemies’ within the senatorial nobility itself.⁸⁷ In practice, this targeted the allies of Livius Drusus.⁸⁸

This law was passed using violence in the face of the vetoes of his colleagues and set up a special court that tried and exiled a number of prominent Roman politicians. This desire to seek out internal enemies, previously seen during the Gracchan and Saturnine tumults, was to be a feature of the period 91–70 BC, which saw a number of Roman noblemen declared enemies of the state or exiled. The Varian court appears to have been a temporary madness, brought about by the shock of the Italian rebellion. The law was suspended the following year and Varius himself seems to have fallen foul of his own law and exiled.⁸⁹ Nevertheless, it was a sign that in times of extreme pressure the Roman elite were turning on themselves.

8. The Second Year of Campaigning (89 BC) – The Marsic Campaign

As the year 89 BC opened, Rome faced a mixed political and military situation. The campaigns against the Marsi and the Samnites had been disastrous to say the least, with a string of Roman defeats, and losses in excess of 50,000 men, caused by poor quality commanders, especially the two consuls of 90 BC. On the positive side, rebellions in Etruria, Umbria and Transalpine Gaul had been crushed and political concessions had been granted, which would separate the die-hard rebels from the moderates and prevent any but the most determined to rebel against Rome. With the war finely balanced, Rome’s aims for the year will have been to gain ground militarily in both campaigns and avoid the disasters of the previous year. To those ends the consuls for 89 BC were both men with proven military experience in this war: Cn. Pompeius Strabo and L. Porcius Cato, two of the three Roman commanders (the other being Marius himself) with victories to their name the previous year. Interestingly, both consuls seem to have received commands in the Marsic campaign, with Pompeius returning to command the siege of Asculum and Cato the fight against the Marsi.

Marius was notable by his absence, as his command was not extended. Plutarch cites ill health, but given his performance the previous year and again in 87 BC, it seems more likely that various elements of the Senate did not want Marius to continue to show his military prowess and recover the position he once had, especially given his friendly meeting with the rebel figurehead Poppaedius.⁹⁰ Whilst this meeting may have been innocent, it would have been easily open to misinterpretation (perhaps deliberately so in some cases) in such paranoid times.

For the Italian rebels, the failure of the rebellions in Etruria and Umbria and the granting of political concessions would have been blows, but they would have been hoping to continue the military success of the previous year and continue the push into Roman-held territory, perhaps more determined that outright military victory was now their only choice.

This theatre of war saw both consuls of 89 active in the field, though it seems with each commanding a separate campaign. Pompeius appears to have been in command in the northern part of central Italy and Cato to the south.

Unnamed Battle

The first clash appears to have taken place over the winter of 90/89 when Pompeius intercepted an Italian relief force sent to aid the rebels in Etruria, unaware that the rebellion had already been crushed. Appian is the only source who mentions the battle and provides little detail other than that Pompeius attacked a force of 15,000 Italians, killing 5,000 of them, with another 7,500 perishing of starvation during the march home.⁹¹ Pompeius then moved on to command the siege of Asculum.

His colleague Cato campaigned against the Marsi and received a limited amount of attention in the few surviving sources. Appian dismisses his campaigns with just a sentence,⁹² whilst a fragment of Dio preserves an interesting and illuminating incident:

Cato, the greater part of whose army came from the city and was rather too old for service, had little authority at best: and once, when he ventured to rebuke them because they were unwilling to work hard to obey orders readily, he came near to being buried under the shower of missiles which they hurled at him. … The man who began the mutiny, C. Titius, was arrested; he had been a loafer about the Forum, making his living in the courts and was excessively and shamelessly outspoken. He was sent to the city to the tribunes, but escaped punishment.⁹³

Further light may be shed on this extraordinary incident by Orosius, who adds the detail that Cato was in command of the forces previously commanded by C. Marius, and appears to have had Marius’ son amongst his legates. Thus Dio’s description of them being from the city and old appears to refer to an army comprised mostly of Marius’ veterans. It is entirely likely that Marius’ army would not have taken kindly to him being replaced as commander.

This incident is important for a number of reasons. Firstly, it is extraordinary that a Roman army attempted to murder its own commander in the midst of a war of survival. Given the events that came in 88 and 87 BC (Chapters 3 and 4) it is tempting to see this event as a foretaste of things to come. Furthermore, many in the army, which must have been thrown together hastily in the emergency situation, seemed to feel more loyalty toward their former commander than the state and seemed to have placed their own interests ahead of those of the state, again perhaps foreshadowing the rise of client armies. Thus the extraordinary nature of the war seems to have had an affect on the quality and temperament of the soldiers that were rapidly mobilized, with less care being taken and less training and discipline being instilled in them than would have been expected under prior circumstances.

Just as interesting is the fact that the leader of the mutiny, Titius, was acquitted by the tribunes in Rome of attempting to murder the consul. Given the levels of paranoia in Rome seen under the Varian Commission the previous year this is highly surprising and perhaps more than a little suggestive. Under normal circumstances such an act of treason would have been punishable by death, yet given that the army was seemingly composed of a number of Marian veterans, it is probable that Titius himself was a client of Marius and thus may have received the protection of his patron, who was now back in Rome and most likely no friend of Cato. Nevertheless, despite this mutinous army, both the Periochae of Livy and Orosius refer to Cato winning a number of notable victories against the Marsi, though no details are given.⁹⁴

Battle of Lake Fucinus

This string of victories culminated in a clash near Lake Fucinus in the centre of Marsic territory.⁹⁵ The Periochae of Livy states that once again Cato’s forces were winning the encounter when Cato was killed whilst attacking the Marsic camp, which turned the tide against the Romans, culminating in a defeat.⁹⁶ Whilst a number of sources refer to Cato’s death, only Orosius has the following extraordinary detail:

The consul Porcius Cato, accompanied by the Marian forces, fought a number of hard battles. Indeed, he boasted that even C. Marius had not accomplished greater deeds. On account of this, when he was waging war against the Marsi at Lake Facinus, the son of C. Marius, as if an unknown champion, struck him down in the tumult of battle.⁹⁷

Thus, according to Orosius, the accusation is made that Marius’ son (who would figure prominently in the wars that followed), murdered Cato. This evidence ties in with the fragment of Dio quoted above. Whilst the younger Marius was judged harshly by Roman historians for his acts in the later period of the civil war, this is an extraordinary claim, which if true marks Cato as the first consular casualty to fall at Roman hands and emphasizes the earlier point about Roman armies in this period acting more as client armies, than armies of the state.⁹⁸ It must be pointed out that none of the other sources for Cato’s death (Appian, Velleius, the Periochae of Livy, nor Eutropius) repeat this accusation, though only Velleius actually states that it was the enemy who killed him.⁹⁹Although this may have been the first incident of a Roman commander being murdered by one of his own subordinates, it was far from the last (see Appendix III). We are not told who took over command of Cato’s army in the immediate aftermath of Fucinus.

Whilst the Romans suffered a reversal against the Marsi, it seems that a number of Pompeius’ legates were conducting highly successful campaigns of their own against the other rebel Italian peoples, as Pompeius continued the siege of Asculum.

Battle of Teanus River

Again, we only have short sentences from our surviving sources, which cover what must have been long campaigns. Several notable campaigns were conducted by Pompeius’ legate Sulpicius, who defeated both the Marrucini and Vestini and pacified both regions.¹⁰⁰ Orosius refers to this, otherwise unattested, battle, which seems to have been a notable victory for Sulpicius:

The attack of Sulpicius, Pompeius’ legate, overwhelmed and destroyed the Marrucini and the Vestini. This same Sulpicius killed the Italian generals Popaedius and Obsidius in a frightful battle at the Teanus River.¹⁰¹

Following these victories, the Marrucini, Vestini and even the Paeligni all surrendered to Pompeius (as overall commander of the campaign). These capitulations brought a large swathe of central eastern Italy back under Roman control and cut Asculum off from the Marsic territories. Thus slowly and surely Pompeius and his legates were defeating the various rebel peoples, one at a time, and stripping the Italian Federation of support and crucially manpower, in a manner in which the Italians never managed with the Romans.

Unnamed Battle

Furthermore, we hear of another of Pompeius’ legates defeating the Marsi themselves, though again we only have a single reference to these battles. This victory was won by L. Cornelius Cinna (who was to figure prominently in later events): ‘The Marsi were broken in several battles by the deputies Lucius Cinna and Caecilius Pius.’¹⁰²

Battle of Asculum

One of the most symbolic victories of the Marsic campaign came at some point in mid-to-late 89 BC when the Italians attempted to break the siege of Asculum. The two accounts we have of this battle vary slightly.

Asculum was the native town of Vidacilius, and as he feared for its safety he hastened to its relief with eight cohorts. He sent word beforehand to the inhabitants that when they should see him advancing at a distance they should make a sally against the besiegers, so that the enemy should be attacked on both sides at once. The inhabitants were afraid to do so; nevertheless Vidacilius forced his way into the city through the midst of the enemy with what followers he could get, and upbraided the citizens for their cowardice and disobedience. As he despaired of saving the city he first put to death all of his enemies, who had been at variance with him before and who, out of jealousy, had prevented the people from obeying his recent orders. Then he erected a funeral pile in the temple and placed a couch upon it, and had a feast with his friends, and while the drinking-bout was at its height he swallowed poison, threw himself on the pile, and ordered his friends to set fire to it.¹⁰³

Had he [Pompeius] not first overcome and severely defeated the people who had rushed out on an open field, he would not have captured it. Eighteen thousand of the Marsi and their general Fraucus were slain in this battle and 3,000 captured. Four thousand Italians, fleeing from the slaughter, chanced to ascend the summit of a mountain with their column in close formation. Overwhelmed and weakened by the snows there, they suffered a miserable death from exposure.¹⁰⁴

Velleius adds that on the day of the battle, across several engagements in the region, 70,000 Romans and 60,000 Italians met in battle.¹⁰⁵ This defeat precipitated the fall of Asculum, which suffered Roman retribution for its role as the birthplace of the Italian rebellion:

Pompeius entered Asculum and had the prefects, centurions, and all the leading men beaten with rods and beheaded. He sold the slaves and all the booty at auction and ordered the remaining people to depart, free indeed, but stripped and destitute. Though the Senate expected that the proceeds of the booty would somewhat increase the public income, Pompeius did not contribute anything from it to the needy treasury.¹⁰⁶

Thus by the end of 89 BC, the Marsic campaign had swung strongly in Rome’s favour. The Marrucini, Vestini and Paeligni had all been defeated and surrendered to Pompeius, and the city of Asculum (the birthplace of the rebellion) had been destroyed. It seems that it was only the Marsi themselves who continued to fight, though they too had been defeated on several occasions, first by Cato and then by Cinna. Their one notable victory had been the death of the consul Cato, but he had been killed in a skirmish, and possibly by a Roman hand. Key to Rome’s success had been competent commanders methodically attacking and defeating the various peoples that made up the Marsic alliance. This was made possible by the failure of the rebellion to successfully spread to the other peoples of the region. The Marsi had fallen to the same factors that had defeated Pyrrhus and Hannibal in earlier centuries: namely that the core of the Roman system of alliance and manpower remained intact, feeding the Roman armies a continuing supply of troops, with which to grind down the rebel Italian peoples, one at a time.

9. The Second Year of Campaigning (89 BC) – The Samnite Campaign

With both consuls holding command in the Marsic campaign, command against the Samnites fell to a group of legates, the most notable of which were L. Cornelius Sulla and T. Didius (Cos. 98). Following the death of Cato in combat with the Marsi, it seems that Sulla was promoted to proconsular status for the rest of the year.¹⁰⁷ He seems to have begun his campaign in Campania, where Caesar had failed so spectacularly the year before, allowing the Samnites to capture a number of formerly loyal Roman cities. During April of 89 BC, we find him destroying the rebel city of Stabiae on the Bay of Naples.¹⁰⁸ This was soon followed by a siege of the city of Pompeii. The siege is notable, not because of the city’s later fame, but because of a murder that took place during the siege. The man in question was A. Postumius Albinus (Cos. 99) who was serving as legate of Sulla in charge of the Roman naval detachment there. Orosius preserves the best account:

The legate of L. Sulla, Postumius Albinus, a man of consular rank, at that time so aroused the hatred of all the soldiers against him by his insufferable arrogance that they stoned him to death. The consul Sulla gave it as his opinion that civil bloodshed could be atoned for only by shedding the blood of the enemy.¹⁰⁹

Thus once again a man of consular status had been murdered by Roman soldiers, the second time this year, and once again the murderers had gone unpunished. This again shows the poor discipline of the Roman troops under arms during this war and the tolerance that they were being shown by their commanders. In conjunction with Sulla’s campaign, T. Didius retook the city of Herculaneum aided by a legion of loyal Hirpini.¹¹⁰

Battle of Nola

Following the siege of Pompeii, Sulla encountered a Samnite army led by L. Cluentius in the vicinity of Nola. Fortunately, Appian preserves a detailed account of the battle:

While Sulla was encamped near the Pompeiian Mountains L. Cluentius pitched his camp in a contemptuous manner at a distance of only three stades from him, Sulla did not tolerate this insolence, but attacked Cluentius without waiting for his own foragers to come in. He was worsted and put to flight, but when he was reinforced by his foragers he turned and defeated Cluentius. The latter then moved his camp to a greater distance. Having received certain Gallic reinforcements he again drew near to Sulla and just as the two armies were coming to an engagement a Gaul of enormous size advanced and challenged any Roman to single combat. A Mauritanian soldier of short stature accepted the challenge and killed him, whereupon the Gauls became panic-stricken and fled. Cluentius’ line of battle was thus broken and the remainder of his troops did not stand their ground, but fled, in disorder to Nola. Sulla followed them and killed 3,000 in the pursuit, and as the inhabitants of Nola received them by only one gate, lest the enemy should rush in with them, he killed about 20,000 more outside the walls and among them Cluentius himself, who fell fighting bravely.¹¹¹

Thus Sulla scored the first notable victory in the war against the Samnites and drove them from Campania. One point of interest concerns the identity of the Gallic reinforcements that Cluentius received, given that they would have had to march through Roman territory to reach Nola, had they come from Gaul. It is likely that they were formerly in the service of Rome and had defected along with a number of other Roman allies of the region.

Thus Sulla had turned around the disastrous campaign of the previous year, recovered and punished a number of rebel cities in the region and driven the Samnites back into Samnium. This was swiftly followed by an attack on the rebel Hirpini, who lay between Campania and Samnium. In what seems to have been a lightning campaign, Sulla subdued the Hirpini, primarily through shock-and-awe tactics.¹¹² In particular, he made an example of one particular town that had refused to surrender: Aeculanum. Having set fire to their walls, the town surrendered but was sacked anyway, setting an example for any town in the region that did not surrender immediately. Appian records that such an example brought about the swift surrender of the whole Hirpini.¹¹³

Unnamed Battle

With the Hirpini subdued, Sulla then invaded Samnium proper, evading a waiting Samnite army commanded by the general Mutilus. Appian provides the only description of the battle:

Then Sulla moved against the Samnites, not where Mutilus, the Samnite general, guarded the roads, but by another circuitous route where his coming was not expected. He fell upon them suddenly, killed many, and scattered the rest in disorderly flight. Mutilus was wounded and took refuge with a few followers in Aesernia. Sulla destroyed his camp and moved against Bovianum, where the common council of the rebels was held.¹¹⁴

Thus, Sulla ambushed the Samnite army and routed them. As is usual for this war, we have no record of the numbers involved. Again, keeping the momentum, Sulla attacked and captured the Samnite city of Bovianum in a siege of just three hours, according to Appian.¹¹⁵ Following this campaign, Appian reports that he returned to Rome to stand for the consulship. On the back of such a victorious campaign against an old Roman foe, it is hardly surprising that he was elected consul for 88 BC.

Thus, in less than a year, Sulla had turned around the Samnite campaign, driving the Samnite alliance forces from Campania, subduing the Hirpini, invading Samnium itself and defeating the Samnites on their own territory. The key to this victorious campaign seems to have been decisive leadership and avoiding the rash mistakes that had plagued the consul of 90, who continued to fall into Samnite ambushes. Having learnt his soldiering under the tutelage of Marius, this campaign saw Sulla step out of his former mentor’s shadow.

Only one other fragment to this year’s campaign survives and that comes from Ovid who records the death of T. Didius (Cos. 98), who had earlier been successful at the siege of Herculaneum. Ovid records that he fell in battle of 11 June, the same day as Rutilius the year previously, though we have no other details. If northing else, it records the death of another ex-consul and one of Rome’s leading generals of the period.¹¹⁶

Battle of Canusium

Whilst Appian’s focus is on Sulla’s campaigns, we can find scattered references to the other Roman commanders operating in central and southern Italy against the Samnite alliance. In Apulia, on Italy’s eastern coast, we find reference to the Roman praetor C. Cosconius. Appian records him being equally successful in capturing a string of rebel towns, such as Salapia and most notably Cannae, scene of the infamous Roman defeat over a century before. However, pushing southwards, his string of victories came to a halt at the city of Canusium where he encountered a Samnite army. Appian only provides a brief description of the battle, but it is clear that Cosconius was forced to withdraw with heavy casualties on both sides:

He received the surrender of Cannae and laid siege to Canusium; then he had a severe fight with the Samnites, who came to its relief. After great slaughter on both sides Cosconius was beaten and retreated to Cannae.¹¹⁷

Battle of Aufidius River

In a battle that must have been poignant, with echoes of its more famous predecessor, Cosconius chose to make his stand close to Cannae:

A river [the Aufidius] separated the two armies, and Trebatius sent word to Cosconius either to come over to his side and fight him, or to withdraw and let him cross. Cosconius withdrew, and while Trebatius was crossing attacked him and got the better of him, and, while he was flying toward the stream, killed 15,000 of his men. The remainder took refuge with Trebatius in Canusium.¹¹⁸

The Periochae of Livy also records these engagements, adding the detail that a notable Samnite victim was the commander Marius Egnatius, who fell in battle, most probably here at Aufidius. A fragment of Diodorus also refers to the victories of Cosconius.¹¹⁹With the Samnite army in Apulia destroyed, Appian records that Cosconius soon overran the remaining rebel towns in Apulia (Larinum, Venusia and Ausculum) and quickly subdued the Pediculi peoples.¹²⁰ Despite these notable victories, Cosconius disappears from our records following this campaign.¹²¹

Further to the southwest, in Lucania, we have references to two campaigns. The first was fought by the Roman commander A. Gabinius, who was meeting with equal success in capturing rebel towns when he was killed during the siege of a rebel camp.¹²² The Roman campaign against the Lucanians appears to have been brought to a successful conclusion by a commander named Carbo, who is credited with its success, though no other details survive.¹²³

Thus the year saw Roman forces wage successful campaigns in Campania, Samnium, Apulia and Lucania, at the end of which only the Samnites and Lucanians appeared to still be fighting in the Samnite alliance. The changes in Rome’s military fortunes in just a year seem drastic. This year we see a number of Roman commanders operating independently and being successful on the field of battle, notably Sulla and Cosconius. Again, when one fell, namely Gabinius, it seems that another was able to take his place. Furthermore, there were no military disasters, as seen under Caesar the previous year.

Whilst we lack all but the most cursory of details, it seems that the Italians were unable to lure the Roman commanders into ambushes as they had done the previous year and appear to have been weakened by the need to defend key rebel towns; again an echo of one of Hannibal’s failings more than a century before. Thus we see a number of Italian armies being drawn into fighting Roman forces in order to defend key towns. The Romans, with a series of commanders who appear to have ranged from the competent to the brilliant, were able to slowly pick off the rebel regions one by one, whilst their own territory remained intact. Once again, we can see the powerful effect that the failure of the rebellion to spread had on the Italian Federation. Whilst Rome was again able to call up increasing levels of manpower to cover its losses, the rebels were faced with a diminishing pool of manpower and territory in which to operate.

10. The Consequences of the War

Thus, in both theatres of war, the tide had turned completely in Rome’s favour, with the few remaining rebel peoples being surrounded and cut off from each other. Yet whilst Rome was militarily successful, a war on her own doorstep had come at a high cost, some of which was not immediately visible.

Manpower Losses

The ancient sources all paint a picture of heavy Roman and Italian casualties. Velleius provides a high estimate of 300,000 in total, though modern commentators consider this to be too high.¹²⁴ Brunt estimates that the total may have been 50,000, thus denying the Romans a huge manpower resource to support their empire.¹²⁵ As noted above, in Italy, the Romans were so stretched that freedmen were admitted into military service. Not only did these losses deplete Rome of valuable military manpower, but the seeming collapse of Roman power and its near defeat in Italy had again shaken the myth of Roman invincibility for the second time in just over a decade.¹²⁶ To any outsiders, Rome must have looked weak, and Orosius does record a massive Thracian invasion of Roman Macedonia this year (see Chapter 3).¹²⁷ Into this equation came the figure of Mithridates VI of Pontus (see Chapter 1), who again seemed to take advantage of the Romans’ loss of focus on their empire, threatening their power in Asia Minor (see Chapter 3).

The Financial Crisis and Murder in Rome

It is clear from the few surviving sources that the Marsic and Samnite campaigns devastated both the economy of Italy and the financial system of the Republic in a number of different ways. The first and most obvious of which must have been the devastation caused by the fighting in Italy itself, with upward of 300,000 men under arms at the peak of the war.¹²⁸ The war raged across the various regions of Italy devastating communities and local economies.

Aside from the devastation, was the need for Rome to be able to pay for having upward to 150,000 men under arms in Italy alone. Here the sources do shed some light on the desperate financial plight the Republican government faced. Orosius records the sale of state assets in Rome itself in a desperate bid to raise cash:

The treasury at that time was thoroughly depleted and funds for the payment of grain were lacking. The public properties within the circuit of the Capitol, the ancient possessions of the pontifices, augur, decemvirs, and flamines, were therefore sold under the pressure of necessity. This brought enough money to relieve the deficit for the time being.¹²⁹

As well as the sale of state assets, it is clear from the numismatic evidence that the Roman state relied upon the standard response of all governments throughout the ages, the printing (or in this case the minting) of more money. From the evidence of coin finds it is clear that there was a massive increase in the production of money in the 90–89 BC period.¹³⁰ Such a massive and rapid minting process could only have had the effect of debasing the quality of the precious metals used in the coins, with a consequent inflationary effect.

If this weren’t enough, it is clear that there was a collapse of the credit system in Rome, an ancient credit crunch, brought about by the war in Italy. This much is clear from an incident related by Appian, who reveals a crisis in Rome in 89 BC between creditors and lenders.¹³¹ Barlow provides an analysis of the underlying causes of this credit crisis.¹³² The Roman system of credit was based on the use of land as collateral for the loan. Given that large tracts of land were devastated and others simply no longer accessible to the owners, the whole credit system was undermined, leading to a recall of loans, many of which would have defaulted due to a shortage of liquid cash, in a time of crisis.

As is always the case, this credit crisis soon turned into a political one, with the Urban Praetor A. Sempronius Asellio taking measures to protect debtors from their creditors, by means of resurrecting an ancient law that prohibited the charging of interest on loans.¹³³ Such an archaic law would naturally undermine the whole credit system further and ensured that all loans were thus referred to courts for judgment, preventing foreclosure. Whilst these actions may have provided temporary relief for Rome’s debtors, it clearly exacerbated the credit crisis that the system faced.

This situation became worse still when the praetor Asellio was murdered at the hands of a lynch mob of money lenders in broad daylight on the streets of Rome. Asellio was attacked whilst attending to sacrificial duties at the Temple of Concord (ironically enough), and murdered. Appian and the Periochae of Livy place his death in the Forum, whilst Valerius Maximus states that he fled the Forum but was dragged from a shop he was hiding in and butchered.¹³⁴

Aside from the disastrous consequences for Asellio himself, such an act was an ominous stage in the development of Roman political violence. The murder of Asellio is often overlooked or downplayed compared to the deaths that both preceded and succeeded it. Yet this was a whole new stage of political violence. The Gracchi and Saturninus and their followers had been murdered/executed by or on behalf of the state, in order (or so it was claimed) to save the state from sedition. The murder of Drusus was a political assassination, but had taken place at night and was the work of personal enemies. In this case, the urban praetor had been torn apart by an angry mob, probably in the Forum, in broad daylight whilst conducting a public sacrifice. Not only did no one come to his aid but the crime went unpunished as neither the offer of a reward nor immunity could induce any witnesses to come forward. This was the casual murder of a city official by political opponents who opposed his policies and wanted him removed. It was to be an ominous precedent.

It is clear that the credit crisis was not alleviated, perhaps beyond a temporary lull in proceedings (we hear no more of the Asellian measures themselves). By the next year, the issue was addressed by the consuls (L. Cornelius Sulla and Q. Pompeius Rufus) who seem to have either passed a fresh law or again resurrected an old one limiting the amount of interest that could be charged on loans and providing a partial cancellation of debts (probably a ten per cent reduction).¹³⁵

Thus we can see that Rome faced a perilous financial situation due to the cost, both physical and financial, of fighting the war itself, but also the effects it had on undermining the Roman financial system, leading to a collapse of credit, which in turn led to political murder. This financial crisis was only worsened by the events that followed, notably the loss of Asia and its tax revenues.

The New Italian Question

Key to the Roman victory had been the offer of citizenship to those Italian peoples who had not yet rebelled, or possibly those who had lain down their arms. Whilst this was a crucial factor in the overall success in defusing the rebellion, it left Rome with the important and potentially dangerous task of fulfilling this promise and admitting these people into the citizenship. This would require the Senate to balance its own interests in ensuring the continued dominance of the senatorial aristocracy against the expectations of the new citizens and the fears of the existing citizens, who had always objected to any attempt to dilute their influence in the assemblies (such as it was). Such a potent mix, coming on the back of armed rebellion was always going to be a potentially explosive situation. As argued earlier, it seems more than likely that the initial legislation passed in 89 BC to offer the Italians citizenship did not contain specific provisions for the mechanics of how to do this, and this may account for the failure of the censors of 89 BC (P. Licinius Crassus and L. Iulius Caesar) to conduct a census.¹³⁶

Victorious Commanders

Whilst this war had seen a range of incompetent Roman commanders, most notably the consuls Rutilius and Caesar, it had seen several key military leaders emerge. One in particular was Cn. Pompeius Strabo, who was elected consul for 89 BC on this record of earlier victories and repaid it with the capture of Asculum. Following a similar route was L. Cornelius Sulla, who was elected consul for 88, thanks to his victories against the Samnites the year before. Between them, the commanders had delivered a string of victories in Rome’s wars against the Marsic and Samnite alliances, and both would have been hoping that this would lead to more ‘honourable’ and profitable campaigns overseas.

In addition to this pair was the ever-present figure of C. Marius, six-time consul and one-time saviour of Rome, who, despite being in his late sixties, had salvaged the Marsic campaign of 90 BC, thus showing that his military acumen remained as sharp as ever. His apparent subsequent fall from grace would not have aided his sense of injustice towards certain factions of the Senate, and it is likely that he would not have ruled out a last opportunity for military glory.¹³⁷

Ill-disciplined Armies

Mention of Marius leads back to the death of the consul Cato, apparently murdered by a disloyal army of Marian veterans, led by Marius’ own son, who seemingly had no compunction about murdering a commander to whom they objected. Such an act would have been unthinkable prior to this war, yet was mirrored by an element of Sulla’s own army, who murdered the former consul Postumius Albinus. Both situations highlighted the increased ill-discipline of the Roman armies, probably caused by the rushed mobilization and limited time for training.

Furthermore, men such as Marius and perhaps Pompeius as well, seemingly raised armies, or significant contingents, from their adherents. The sources imply that Marius’ army contained a number of his veterans, who objected to ‘their’ commander being replaced. Similarly, Pompeius’ army seems to have contained a number of men from the Picentine region, where he had estates and notable family connections. Thus both armies seemed to contain a number of men who had a close personal link to the commander. The Cato incident in particular bore portents of what was to come, with an army attaching more loyalty to its commander than the state. The deaths of Cato and Albinus seem to have been a terrible precursor of the civil wars that followed.

Nevertheless, the year 89 BC had seen Rome reverse the disastrous losses of the previous year and stand on the cusp of victory in the opening conflicts of the civil war. However, the effects of the factors detailed above combined to create a situation that was just as dangerous to Rome as the one she had just overcome, and once again her survival was to be threatened.