Introduction

This volume covers ancient Egyptian history from the late Predynastic Period to the Arab Conquest of Egypt in 642 AD. This is a vast span of time, some 4,000 years altogether, yet, for such a long period, there is remarkably little surviving evidence for specific battles and wars, although the imagery of war is common in most periods.

Egypt was united into one state around 3000 BC. The date assigned by Egyptologists to this event, and the beginning of the First Dynasty, varies by some 200 years. In recent years, excavations at the Upper Egyptian site of Abydos, notably by the German Archaeological Institute, have revealed so much “new” material that a Dynasty “0” has been created. Although there are artifacts from this period, notably the “slate palettes” and ceremonial maceheads, some from the site of Nekhen, that show violent and militaristic scenes, there is no direct evidence relating to the wars and battles that are presumed to have created the Egyptian state. Even if the “Narmer Palette” is a record of an Upper Egyptian victory over Lower Egypt (as has long been assumed), it is couched in a typically Egyptian stylized image of the pharaoh smiting enemies, of a type that would continue to appear until the Roman period. The depictions of soldiers do, however, show that the principal types of weapon, bow and arrows, axe, and spear, were already developed.

Evidence from the first two dynasties is hardly any more explicit. The rock inscription formerly at Gebel Sheikh Suleiman in Nubia (now in the National Museum, Khartoum) has generally been attributed to the reign of the pharaoh Djer (c. 3050 BC), and understood as a record of Egyptian military activities in Nubia. The figures around the base of a statue of Khasekhemwy (c. 2600 BC), allied with other scanty evidence, have suggested that there was a civil war during his reign. Images of pharaohs smiting Libyans and Asiatics suggest conflicts with immediate neighbors, perhaps on the western borders of the Delta and in Sinai, rather than farther afield. They are not, however, evidence of specific actions.

The Old Kingdom (Third to Sixth Dynasties, c. 2686–2181 BC) has little more evidence to offer. More scenes of pharaohs in the symbolic act of smiting were carved at quarry sites in Sinai, and a few fragments of relief depict the army in action, although the context is lost. The annalistic text known as the “Palermo Stone” refers to a major campaign in Nubia in the reign of Sneferu (c. 2613–2589 BC), and Egyptian activities in the region of the Second Cataract, along with other archaeological material, does suggest major Egyptian involvement in the region. Inscriptional evidence from the late Old Kingdom tomb of the border official, Harkhuf, at Aswan, tells how the army was used to accompany trading expeditions into Nubia and also that bands of Nubian mercenary troops came back to Egypt.

Fragments of relief depicting archers are the earliest surviving parts of battle scenes, probably from the pyramid temples of the Fourth Dynasty pharaohs Khufu or Khafre. Similar fragments, which imply military activities, have been recovered from pyramid complexes of the Fifth and Sixth Dynasties, but no “historical” texts survive with them. Scenes in two late Old Kingdom tombs, those of Inti at Deshasheh and Kaemheset at Saqqara, are the first depictions of siege warfare, showing scaling ladders and the undermining of walls by sappers.

The breakdown of the central government during the First Intermediate Period appears to have seen the rise of local armies under the command of the local governors (nomarchs). Scenes in the tombs of such governors at Beni Hasan in Middle Egypt show attacks on walled towns and training exercises (otherwise quite rare in Egyptian art). There is also considerable evidence for Nubian mercenaries based at Gebelein in Upper Egypt. There is slightly more evidence from the end of the First Intermediate Period (c. 2181–2000 BC) for the military activities of the princes of Thebes that brought about the reunification of Egypt by Mentuhotep II (c. 2055–2004 BC), notably the fragmentary scenes of battle from the king’s temple at Deir el-Bahari (Thebes) and the mass burial of soldiers apparently killed during an attack on a walled town. The events of this period could perhaps be classed as “civil war.”

The pharaohs of the 12th Dynasty (c. 1985–1795 BC), notably Amenemhat I, Senusret I, and Senusret III expanded Egyptian control over Nubia. Inscriptions give some information from which the general process can be reconstructed, but there are no detailed narratives of the individual conflicts. These pharaohs also established massive fortresses to defend the transit of luxury trade through the newly conquered territory. These fortresses were particularly numerous around the vulnerable Second Cataract: Semna and Kumma controlled the narrow gorge at the head of the cataract, with smaller forts on the islands and west bank at Askut, Meinarti, Shalfak, and Uronarti. There were two large supply depots at the foot of the cataract, at Buhen and Mirgissa. Although constructed of sun-dried mud brick, these fortresses were impressive examples of military architecture, carefully planned internally, and defended with ditches, glacis, bastions, and complex gateways. The end of Egyptian rule in Nubia came with attacks on the fortresses by Egypt’s erstwhile trading partner, the kingdom of Kush based on Kerma. There is evidence for serious destruction in the fortresses during the 13th Dynasty, and ultimately occupation by Kushite troops, in some cases under the command of Egyptians.

The Second Intermediate Period (c. 1795–1550 BC) once again saw the division of Egypt, with an Upper Egyptian kingdom centered upon Thebes, and a kingdom controlling the Delta and much of Middle Egypt. Later tradition calls the rulers of this northern kingdom the “Hyksos” and it is generally accepted that there were close contacts with Canaan at this time. Whether there was a large Asiatic population in Lower Egypt at this time is a more controversial issue. The northern kingdom had direct trading contacts with the Kushite kingdom based on Kerma in the northern Sudan, which had captured and occupied the fortresses of the Second Cataract region. This phase apparently saw the introduction of the horse and chariot, and the composite bow, into Egypt. Although extremely rare to begin with, chariots were to come to dominate the warfare of the next 400 years, the Late Bronze Age (the Egyptian New Kingdom).

The Theban rulers Tao and Kamose regained control of much of Lower Nubia and their successor Ahmose reunited Egypt, establishing what is now known as the 18th Dynasty and the New Kingdom (c. 1550–1069 BC). There is slightly more detailed evidence for these campaigns from both royal inscriptions and records of private individuals who took part in the wars. Although these have legitimately been used to reconstruct the history of events, both types of document are still bound by the conventions of Egyptian texts. Similar records continue throughout the early 18th Dynasty, illuminating the military expansion of Egypt under the pharaohs Amenhotep I, Thutmose I, and Thutmose II, until the joint reign of Thutmose III and Hatshepsut. With the sole reign of Thutmose III an edited version of a different type of document gives much more detail about the pharaoh’s 17 campaigns in western Asia over a period of 20 years. This text, the “Annals of Thutmose III” is carved as an official record in the temple of Amun at Karnak (Thebes) but is edited from the actual Day Books kept during campaigns. Although it is still framed within the conventions of royal reports to the gods, it contains more detail about the progress of the army and the conflicts, with lists of booty captured. Significant here are the large numbers of chariots and horses.

Diplomacy, rather than warfare, seems to have maintained Egypt’s pre-eminence in western Asia in the reigns of the pharaohs Amenhotep II, Thutmose IV, Amenhotep III, and Akhenaten. This is detailed in the archive of state correspondence known as the “Amarna Letters.” Besides details of the problems confronting the city-states of Syria, Palestine, the letters enumerate the armor and weapons of the international arms trade.

The end of the 18th Dynasty, from the latter part of the reign of Akhenaten, through those of Tutankhamun and Horemheb, saw the rise of the Anatolian kingdom of the Hittites as the major threat to Egypt’s influence in western Asia. The situation may have led to conflict earlier, but is well documented in the early 19th Dynasty reigns of Sety I (1294–1279 BC) and Ramesses II (1279–1213 BC). Indeed the “victory” of Ramesses II at Qadesh 1274 BC) is, perhaps ironically, the most depicted and documented battle in Egyptian history. It is also documented in the Hittite royal archives, giving a rare alternative view to the official Egyptian records.

The reigns of Sety I and Ramesses II are also important for the evidence of military conflict with the Libyans that was to become ever more important in the later 19th and 20th Dynasties. The scenes carved to record the military actions of Sety I in Asia and against the Libyans are the earliest major surviving battle reliefs in situ: only fragments and dismantled blocks survive for earlier pharaohs. Although military scenes figure prominently in the temples built by Ramesses II, many of them actually depict the battle of Qadesh.

In the reign of Ramesses II’s son, Merneptah (1213–1203 BC), the Libyan threat increased, and an invasion of Egypt by the Libu and Meshwesh, with allies and mercenary troops, is recorded in both a prose account and more literary eulogy of the pharaoh. This second account contains the only known reference to Israel in Egyptian texts and has consequently been called the “Israel Stela.” Implicit in the text is an Egyptian advance into Palestine earlier in Merneptah’s reign.

The reign of Merneptah’s son, Sety II (1200–1194 BC), apparently saw civil or dynastic war and the rival kingship of Amenmesses, perhaps Sety’s own son. The end of the 19th Dynasty might also have been a time of civil war, although not as long lasting and serious as some earlier Egyptologists suggested.

The reign of Ramesses III saw the re-establishment of Egyptian authority over parts of Palestine, but this was a time of crisis throughout western Asia. The temple of Ramesses III at Medinet Habu (Thebes) carries both conventional military images and strikingly original depictions. The most notable of the campaigns depicted are those against the Libyans and the “Sea Peoples.” The battle with the “Sea Peoples” is the first surviving depiction of a “naval” conflict. The king also had to fight with the Kushite kingdom of Irem, which seems to have become increasingly powerful on the border of Egypt’s Nubian provinces.

For the remainder of the 20th Dynasty, the evidence is from texts and archaeology rather than depictions. This reveals that there were constant incursions of Libyans into Egypt (although not necessarily all were military in nature), and that Egypt lost control of its territories in Palestine in the reign of Ramesses VI, and in Upper Nubia in the reign of Ramesses X or XI. There was some sort of civil war in Egypt in the reign of Ramesses XI, followed by military activities against the Egyptian viceroy in Lower Nubia.

The collapse of Egypt’s empire should be seen in the broader context of the “end” of the Late Bronze Age, and the factors that caused that are still hotly debated. In Egypt, the phase immediately following is known as the “Third Intermediate Period” (c. 1069–656 BC). Pharaohs with Libyan names appeared, and a series of Libyan chiefdoms dominated Lower Egypt. It is not until the later Libyan period that there is any evidence of military activities. In this case, it is not abroad, but within Egypt. The High Priest of Amun and Crown Prince Osorkon, took his army to Thebes on a number of occasions and used force to assert his authority. The limited, and very one-sided, evidence suggests a period of civil war in which Thebes was trying to assert its independence from the northern pharaohs and set up its own rival ruler.

In Nubia, following the end of Egyptian rule there in the late 20th Dynasty, there must also have been military activities. Again these are not documented for some time, the first indication of a civil war being found in the extremely difficult inscription of Karimala carved in the temple at Semna at the Second Cataract. Military actions must have played a significant role in the formation of the new Kushite state that had come into existence by about 750 BC. Under the rule of Kashta (c. 750–736 BC), the Kushite army had become sufficiently large and well armed to invade Egypt and take control of Thebes and leave a garrison there. Again, military activities within Egypt itself are implicit, but the response of Kashta’s successor, Piye (c. 736–712 BC), to the southward expansion of the Libyan dynast, Tefnakht, is detailed in the text of a very long inscription, known as the “Victory Stela.” Although couched in the language of a conventional Egyptian royal inscription, this document does detail the progress of Piye’s campaign against the coalition of northern rulers led by Tefnakht. There are references to conflict on the river, to sieges, and to siege engines, scaling towers, and ladders.

The evidence of the “Victory Stela” of Piye implies a style of campaign typical of the Late Bronze Age, but in western Asia there were now changes in army, weaponry, and warfare, introduced by the principal power, Assyria. The Assyrians had iron weapons, although at this stage they might not been the decisive factor in their victories. More significant may have been the larger types of horse that had been introduced and bred, leading to a far greater use of cavalry and reduction in chariotry. The Assyrians used a heavy chariot, rather than the fast light-framed vehicle of the Late Bronze Age. They also had sophisticated siege engines and scaling towers that they used with great effect, and which are depicted in the scenes of their campaigns in Palestine.

Established as the major power holders in Egypt, the Kushites under Piye’s successors, Shabaqo, Shebitqo, and Taharqo, began to offer support to the rulers of Palestine and the Levant in their bids for independence from the Assyrians. The first major conflict came at the battle of Eltekeh (701 BC), in which the Egyptian–Kushite army was forced to retreat. Later activities were apparently more successful, but led to Assyrian invasions of Egypt. The Kushite position was made more difficult by the political machinations of the Libyan dynasts, one of whom, Psamtik, eventually succeeded in reuniting the whole of Egypt under his rule, forcing the last Kushite pharaoh, Tanwetamani, to abandon Thebes and Upper Egypt (656 BC).

Psamtik I (664–610 BC) was fortunate that his bid for independence from Assyrian vassaldom came at a time when the Mesopotamian Empire was under pressure on several different fronts. In a long reign, Psamtik I was able to consolidate his position and remove any internal opposition. He seems to have achieved this with the aid of mercenary troops from Anatolia, principally Lydia and the Greek cities of Ionia. Psamtik I’s reunification of Egypt was followed in the reign of his successors by attempts to restore Egyptian authority in western Asia and Nubia. The activities of Nekau II (610–595 BC) in Judah, and in aid of the last Assyrian king, brought Egypt into conflict with the new major power, the kingdom of Babylon. Nekau enjoyed only limited and short-lived success, which came to an end when Babylon attempted to invade Egypt. Psamtik II’s Nubian campaign (593 BC), although hailed as a victory, seems to have had no lasting gains of territory in the south. The later kings of the 26th Dynasty, Wahibre and Ahmose II, became involved in the politics of their rather distant western neighbors, the Greek cities of Cyrenaica, a region that was to be increasingly important to Egypt.

In 525 BC, Egypt fell to the invading armies of the new power in western Asia, Persia. For the next three hundred years Egypt was either ruled by the Persians or in rebellion against them. Egyptian independent rulers (the 28th–30th Dynasties and Khabbash) established contacts with the Greek cities and islands that were also hostile to Persian ambitions. For this period, Greek sources provide more information on events than Egyptian ones. Egyptian successes were in part affected, if not determined, by the complex politics of the states of mainland Greece and the Ionian coast of Asia Minor. Egypt gave aid, usually in the form of grain, to Greek cities such as Athens and welcomed the support of ships and mercenary troops from Athens and from Sparta.

The defeat of the Persians by Alexander the Great of Macedon (332–323 BC) brought Egypt under Macedonian control, and so it remained for three hundred years under the Ptolemaic dynasty. These pharaohs effectively established an empire extending into Palestine and Syria with smaller territories and cities all around the coast of the Aegean and eastern Mediterranean from Cyrene to the western coast of Anatolia, and including such important islands as Cyprus. There is more detail on battle and military activities from this time as the sources are not solely royal narratives. The organization of the army and techniques of warfare were now different from those of earlier times. The armies were far larger, often comprising huge numbers of mercenary troops. The emphasis had moved from the elite chariotry of the Late Bronze Age to the infantry organized into a phalanx of pike-men, with smaller contingents of archers, sling throwers, and cavalry. With control of the sea and the islands being a major focus for the rival Hellenistic monarchies, there were many more sea battles, with resulting developments in ship construction.

Although the Ptolemies ultimately lost control of the sea at the battle of Kos (256 BC) they still retained considerable territory and important cities outside of Egypt proper. The Ptolemies consistently had to fight with their neighbors, the Seleukid kings of Syria, for control of parts of Palestine. The situation was briefly resolved with the Egyptian victory at the battle of Raphia (217 BC) notable for its use of elephants by both armies.

Internally, there was opposition to the Ptolemaic dynasty, most notably in Upper Egypt, based on the city of Thebes, although there was a more widespread “native revolt” following the battle of Raphia. The dynastic squabbles of the later Ptolemies also had repercussions throughout the country. In their capital city, Alexandria, the mob emerged as a force that became increasingly prominent in Roman times.

With the defeat of Kleopatra VII and Marcus Antonius at the battle of Aktion in 31 BC and the fall of Alexandria to Octavian (Augustus), the following year, Egypt became a province of the Roman Empire. The consolidation of Roman control of the country and its southern borders is well documented by literary sources, archaeological remains, and evidence from the neighboring southern kingdom of Meroe. The Roman army system was introduced into Egypt, and there is much evidence for its location and for individual soldiers. New fortresses were built, particularly in the Western and Eastern Deserts. There were periodic outbreaks of opposition to the authorities, some related to the Jewish Wars of the Flavian emperors, and the Jewish revolt (115–117 AD). Tensions between Greeks and Jews in Alexandria frequently erupted into conflict. On some occasions, such as the rebellion of the Boukoloi (171/172 AD), stirred up by the priest Isidoros, the conflict spread from Alexandria to other parts of Egypt.

Augustus had foreseen that Egypt’s wealth and importance might pose problems within the Roman Empire and had ensured that it was under the direct rule of the emperor through a prefect, rather than a senatorial officer. This did not, however, prevent pretenders to the imperial purple from appearing. Vespasian was proclaimed as emperor in Alexandria by the prefect Iulius Alexander, but he was the only pretender who gained wider recognition. The aspirations of Avidius Cassius, Iulius Aemilianus, “Firmus,” Domitius Domitianus, and Aurelius Achilleus, all came to nothing.

The increasing importance of Christianity in Egypt did not end religious tensions in Alexandria and Egypt. Doctrinal disputes brought Egypt into conflict with a number of emperors, and imperial appointees to the See of Alexandria were usually greeted with riots. With the brief revival of paganism under the emperor Julian, and the Edict of Theodosius closing the temples, tensions broke into violence and widespread destruction of buildings.

INTERPRETING THE EVIDENCE

Egyptian art that dominates the entrance towers of the temples appears to be full of images of violence, notably the massive figures of the pharaoh smiting his enemies. A closer examination of these images reveals that remarkably few of them are “historical” and related to actual events. Although it is, in part, due to accident of survival, there are relatively few depictions of “real” battles for the vast span of Egyptian history, and most of those surviving belong to the New Kingdom (c. 1550–1069 BC) and specifically to the reigns of Sety I, Ramesses II, and Ramesses III.

It must be emphasized that survival of monuments is an important factor. Recent excavations at Abydos have recovered small fragments of battle scenes of the reign of Ahmose, and other isolated fragments survive from the Old and Middle Kingdoms showing that the depiction of battles was a well-established genre. Nevertheless, the destruction of many earlier monuments means that the materials for the study of warfare and battle are immediately weighted in favor of the New Kingdom. It also appears, from the fragmentary evidence, that battle scenes were a feature of the temples associated with the king’s burial, rather than those designated for the cults of the gods. It is only in the relatively brief period of the reigns of Sety I and Ramesses II that battle scenes are found in cult temples.

A similar situation is found with the literary record, with more references to battle and most of the detailed accounts of the conduct of military operations belonging to the New Kingdom. It has long been recognized that the accounts of military activities do not attempt to be objective narratives, and more recent studies of literary genres have emphasized the ways in which “autobiographical” texts are controlled by what it is appropriate within certain circumstances for a text to say (“decorum”). A leading exponent of this analysis has been John Baines, who, in his studies of specific texts, and of “decorum” more generally, points out that certain aspects of military activity fall within the royal, rather than private, sphere: so a soldier might have said that he had brought living captives, but not that he has killed because that was the pharaoh’s responsibility.

On a broader level, Egyptian “historical” texts are rarely that: the “Annals” of Thutmose III are unusual in that they do appear to have been adapted from Day Books of the campaigns. But even in this instance, adaptation is the essential factor: even if the army scribe responsible actually wrote a straightforward “factual” and “objective” account of the day’s activities, this has been edited, and edited specifically for the location of the final text. Of course, most official records, whether in the form of stele or inscriptions on temple walls are statements of legitimacy by the pharaoh. They are, however, our prime sources for reconstructing historical events.

We have nothing surviving from Egypt comparable to the narrative histories (objective or otherwise) of the Greek and Roman worlds, with their detailed accounts of campaigns and battles. Nor do we have any manuals relating to tactics or military training. But again we must rely on those texts that have survived. For example, we know that there was a manual relating to the training of horses for chariotry that was used in north Syria and Anatolia. There are no surviving copies from Egypt, but it is likely that it was translated into Egyptian because many Egyptian terms relating to chariotry are Syrian loan words.

From a brief comment in the “Annals of Thutmose III,” we learn that the Day Books of campaigns were written on papyrus or leather rolls, but, like so many documents, these have not survived, and we have to rely on brief edited accounts in official texts. A few letters used as scribal exercises relate to equipping of expeditions or life in garrisons. Such texts might possibly be fabricated letters, but even so the “information” that they contain can be presumed to be “real” and consequently useful to our analyses.

Given these problems with basic source materials, it is not surprising that there have been relatively few general studies of warfare in ancient Egypt, compared with the Greek and Roman worlds, and that those that have been written have focused on the technologies and material remains of weaponry and fortresses, and the organization of the army. The material relating to battle is remarkably limited, with relatively detailed accounts from the pharaonic period of only two battles, Megiddo and Qadesh. Here, the information is derived from official versions. There are even fewer instances where there is more than one source for a battle or war. The Hittite royal archives supplement the Egyptian sources on the Qadesh campaign, and the conduct of the wars of the Theban princes against the Hyksos is documented from several different sources and genres. The inscription of Piye recounting his conflict with the Libyan dynasts is one of very few post-New Kingdom records of military activities. Limitations imposed by the nature of the texts and by the space available where they were written, mean that nearly all accounts are rather brief.

With so many problems relating to the evidence for the history of wars against foreign peoples, it is not surprising that the evidence for civil unrest within Egypt during the pharaonic period is negligible. There is a little surviving evidence for dynastic opposition, usually inappropriately dubbed “Harim Conspiracies,” but there was doubtless more violent opposition than there is evidence for. The survival of a record of the trial of courtiers involved in the conspiracy against Ramesses III is remarkable. Similarly, the archive of private correspondence of the Theban scribes Dhutmose and his son Butehamun details events during the civil war of the reign of Ramesses XI.

Opposition to rulers is well documented from the Ptolemaic era, from a variety of different sources, but raises many other issues such as nationalism, hostility to the Ptolemies as a dynasty, and to the Greeks (including Macedonians) as a ruling power that played no part in the earlier periods. Another new feature of the documents written at the time of nationalist opposition to the Ptolemies is the moralizing in literature, such as the “Demotic Chronicle.” An important aspect of opposition in the Ptolemaic period is the focus on the southern city of Thebes, which had set up rival rulers, or acted as the main center of an Upper Egyptian kingdom throughout Egyptian history, but particularly during the Libyan period. Opposition to monarchs during the pharaonic period was probably the result of conflicts between the pharaoh and elite factions, and as such would have been more concealed.

Egypt was the result of the unification of two kingdoms, and the imagery of rulership emphasized that, with crowns, protective deities, and symbols for the north and south. At times of national weakness, Egypt did divide, although it cannot be said that there were any natural units. Thebes first emerged as a major power in southern Egypt in the First Intermediate Period and became a major center of opposition to northern rulers in the Third Intermediate and Ptolemaic Periods. Thebes set up rivals to the later Libyan pharaohs, apparently first local, then supporting the Kushites. The city became the principal seat of anti-Ptolemaic activities with its own aspiring rulers. The rebellion of Haronnophris and Chaonnophris in the reigns of Ptolemy IV and V lasted for 20 years and was succeeded by further, if briefer, attempts at independence.

Although the Egyptian borders, most notably those to the south, in Nubia, have received considerable attention because of the substantial remains of fortresses, the internal security of Egypt is less well known. Literature tends to emphasize Egypt’s safety from foreign invasion by its geographical position. However, the evidence suggests that although invading armies, especially those coming from western Asia, did have to contend with the difficulties of crossing northern Sinai, and the defenses of the “Ways of Horus,” smaller groups of nomadic peoples regularly entered Egypt either seasonally or when forced by famine or other causes. There were many entrances into the Nile Valley from the Eastern and Western Deserts and these must have been controlled by guard posts, garrisons, and military patrols. Access to some, if not all, of the main cities was also controlled by guardposts. Texts refer to the city walls of Thebes and Memphis, among others, and although nothing of these survives, it does suggest that certain important parts, if not entire cities, were strongly defended. Within the society, scenes showing police and henchmen accompanying officials give the impression of an authoritarian, even brutal, regime standing in direct contrast to the idyllic images of rural life found in the tombs of the same officials (and perpetuated in much popular literature on ancient Egypt).

The role of the Pharaoh was always predominantly religious. In some sense, he was akin to medieval popes, rather than being a military leader who also had some religious duties. It is impossible to separate the religious from any other role of the pharaoh. The pharaoh thus had the authority of the sun god and was depicted as both terrestrial and celestial conqueror (in the form of the sphinx) and judge. The pharaoh’s duty to control embraced all areas of opposition, both foreigners and the Egyptian people. Hunting wild animals, particularly those of the desert and river, was another way of depicting the pharaoh’s control over the world. At the same time, the pharaoh could assume the form of the most ferocious animals, notably the falcon, the bull, the lion, and the leopard. At the news of a “rebellion” (and all opposition was viewed as rebellion against the king), the king is usually described as “raging like a leopard.” In battle, he roars like a bull (or, in some late New Kingdom texts, like a griffon) and drops on his enemies like a falcon. For a brief period in the late 18th Dynasty, in the reigns of Amenhotep III and Akhenaten, the queens were also depicted as sphinxes and conquerors. Their imagery, derived directly from that of the pharaoh, showed them as the conquerors of Egypt’s female enemies. In this role, the queens were manifestations of the violent solar and lioness goddess, Tefnut.

CHANGES IN WARFARE

There were only two major changes in technology and organization during the long span of Egyptian history. The most significant during the pharaonic period was at the beginning of the New Kingdom with the introduction of horses and chariotry: until then, Egyptian armies had been entirely infantry. This really was a revolution in military technology, allowing a whole new type of battle. At the same time, it was an elite preserve and led to a whole new genre of literature and depiction (ethos). The use of chariotry on a large scale was a phenomenon of the Late Bronze Age. Although there is much less evidence from Egypt for the Third Intermediate and Late Periods, contemporary armies, such as the Assyrian and Babylonian, used larger numbers of infantry and cavalry. Chariots continued to be used in battle into the Hellenistic and Roman periods, but they became more important as transport.

The second significant change in the army came in the Ptolemaic period, when the Hellenistic army was introduced. This put emphasis back on the infantry, but using the phalanx of pike-men that had been developed in Macedon by Philip, father of Alexander the Great. The Ptolemaic period also saw a great expansion of military action at sea. The Hellenistic kingdoms fringed the eastern Mediterranean, and vied for control of the coast, and the islands. Larger warships, the triremes and quinqueremes, were built, and sea battles became more frequent, and decisive. It was defeat at Aktion in 31 BC that effectively brought the Ptolemaic dynasty to an end.

WAR AND SOCIETY

The good preservation of weapons and chariots has focused studies on technology rather than the conduct and social aspects of warfare. Indeed, the conduct of war in Egypt is quite difficult to discuss, simply because of the lack of good evidence. From other ancient sources, such as the Homeric epics (and the Egyptian “Pedubast Cycle,” which was influenced by them), we find accounts of the field of battle as a social occasion in which etiquette was important, as was social status. In these heroic conflicts, warriors did not fight with those of lower social rank. In some societies, individuals identify themselves to their opponents; this can be done by shouting out name and lineage, also by the use of the shield with an individual device.

There is hardly any direct evidence from Egypt for the conduct of battle before the New Kingdom. The New Kingdom (the Late Bronze Age of the Near East) did see a significant change, at least in the first phase of battle. There was now a major social distinction in the army with the elite chariot divisions apparently taking a leading role in the early stages of the battle.

Display must also have been an important feature of New Kingdom campaigns. On long marches through western Asia, the ordered progress of the army would have been important as a threat. The large numbers of chariots and foot soldiers that a pharaoh could muster would have impressed the extent of his wealth and power. Foreign contingents may also have been important in this aspect, as another indicator of the extent of Egyptian rule. In Nubia, where the fleet was frequently used to convey the army, the ships were decorated with images of the pharaoh as celestial and terrestrial conqueror.

One aspect of Egyptian warfare that has received little detailed treatment is the effect on agriculture of the regions attacked. There is good evidence from Assyrian and biblical records of the practice of cutting crops and trees, and this is attested for the Egyptians in the Annals of Thutmose III and in some Ramesside battle scenes (such as the storming of Tunip depicted in the temple of Medinet Habu). Obviously, the taking of a harvest had practical advantages, as is stated in the annals because it could be used as food for the army, as well as depriving the enemy and causing hardship. This action was limited in time because the crops could be resown the following year. The regular cutting down of orchards reported in the Assyrian records, notably for towns, such as Damascus, must have had longer-term repercussions. Victor Hanson has dealt with the issues of cutting and regrowth in considerably more detail for ancient Greece (Warfare and Agriculture in Classical Greece. Berkeley: University of California Press, revised edition 1998) than has been done for the ancient Near East.

There is less evidence for the Egyptian destruction of crops by fire, attested from biblical and classical sources. The value of the crops as food might have outweighed the punitive and propaganda value of destruction: cutting crops is quite as effective in depriving a population and much more use to an army that has marched a considerable distance. Effective cutting of crops could only be achieved if the enemy was besieged (as at Megiddo) and unable to attack the army. Victor Hanson highlights all of the problems associated with destroying crops, whether by fire, which is only effective when the crop is fully ripe; by cutting, which is very time-consuming; or by trampling, which is not always completely effective. Other factors, such as terrain, are also important: terraced fields are obviously much more difficult to ravage than flat, open ground.

Similar problems occur in the attempts to destroy trees. Cutting is the only effective way of destroying orchards: green wood being difficult to ignite. As Victor Hanson details, there are immense problems in attempting to destroy olive trees, and even trees fired or cut down rapidly regenerate. The depredations of invading armies would have had serious short-term effects, but this is probably all that was desired: the aggressors might have wished to receive the products of orchards through trade or tax in future years.

Of all the social issues, the status of the soldier is the one where the ancient sources are most ambivalent, and modern opinion has been somewhat divided. There is good evidence for conscription and enforced military service in the Old and Middle Kingdoms and some evidence for its continuation into the New Kingdom. The oft-quoted view of Egyptologists that the Egyptians “did not like fighting” (unlike the image of the “bloodthirsty Assyrians”) might owe more to a 19th century racist view than any ancient sources. Certainly there were large numbers of mercenary troops in the Egyptian army at all periods, especially the New Kingdom, but there is no doubt that the bulk of the army was Egyptian. Nubian bowmen were a regular feature of the army, and the later New Kingdom had large contingents of Libyans. This was in part an Egyptian response to circumstances. From the reign of Sety I onward, Libyans were marching into Egypt to settle, apparently as the result of famine in their homeland. Ramesses II and his successors incorporated significant numbers into the army and settled them in specific areas, notably around Bubastis in the eastern Delta. Other foreign troops are found associated with the Libyans, and also in the Egyptian army, notably the Shekelesh and Shardana. Both groups are also numbered among the “Sea Peoples,” who are supposed to have posed a threat to Egypt in the reign of Ramesses III.

Mercenary soldiers certainly had high status: Egyptian wives and servants are documented for Nubian mercenaries at Gebelein in the First Intermediate Period and for Asiatic mercenaries at Akhetaten in the New Kingdom. Military officers of Libyan origin married into the Egyptian elite and eventually became pharaohs.

One of the most controversial issues is the relationship of the army and its commanders to the Egyptian elite as whole. In the early 20th century, Egyptologists argued that there was a “mariyannu” class in Egypt. The mariyannu were supposedly a chariot-owning aristocracy of Indo-European origin. The term certainly occurs in Egyptian texts and is a loan-word from Asia. However, identifying this group with a race was certainly wrong, although it was typical of ideas about race and diffusion that had received widespread academic sanction at that time. Wolfgang Helck, in his influential volume Der Einfluss der Militärführer (“The rise of the military leader”), published, rather significantly, in 1939, reinforced the idea that the New Kingdom saw the rise of military leaders as pharaohs. This process is seen to have culminated with the accession of, firstly, Horemheb, and then the family of Sety I and Ramesses II, to the kingship. These men were certainly army generals before they became pharaohs, but whether they became pharaohs because of their military background (and, presumably, support) is rather more contentious. It might be wrong to separate the military, as an institution, from the rest of the elite. The Egyptian Empire of the New Kingdom required an increased specialization and professionalism in all of the key areas of administration, priesthood, and army. All members of the elite shared the same education, which combined scribal skills with those of chariotry and archery. Indeed, some military officials chose to be depicted as scribes on their monuments. Although in the later New Kingdom and the succeeding periods, the ideal of hereditary offices might have led to whole families being largely, for example, priests, “the military” is unlikely to have constituted a separate power before the later 20th Dynasty.

Related to this issue, another term that has provoked considerable debate is machimoi. There is abundant evidence for the term from the Ptolemaic period, but the key text is Herodotos, who lays great emphasis on the machimoi as a military “caste.” There is no evidence for such a caste in the New Kingdom (despite the mariyannu) and it has now been suggested that the emergence of such a military caste was perhaps a legacy of the Libyan period.

WAR AND ECONOMICS

We seem to know more about the economic aspects of warfare than about strategy and tactics in battle. This is largely because of the nature of Egyptian documents, and “decorum.” The important role of the bureaucracy in war has been examined by Ian Shaw (“Battle in Ancient Egypt: the Triumph of Horus or the Cutting Edge of the Temple Economy?” In Alan B. Lloyd, ed., Battle in Antiquity. London: Duckworth, 1996, 239–269). Egypt was an extraordinarily bureaucratic society, and the detailed record of captures, both people and things, is found in both official and private texts. As with so much of Egyptian history, the best documentation is from the New Kingdom. The autobiographical texts of soldiers, such as Ahmose son of Ebana and Ahmose-pen-Nekhbet, detail their own captures on the field of battle and their rewards from the pharaohs under whom they served. They are important sources for understanding the economic aspects of war as it affected individuals.

The “Annals of Thutmose III” and some other texts provide details of the state’s revenues from war through captures on the field of battle and booty from defeated cities and states. The “Amarna Letters” are a rich source for understanding the importance of gift exchange between rulers in the spread of military equipment and technology. They detail the types of military equipment sent from Mitanni to Egypt, including chariots, horse equipment and armor, spears, arrows, shields, and helmets. They also inform us about the import of horses to Egypt from north Syria.

On the individual level, texts record the rewards made to soldiers for capturing enemy soldiers and civilians or chariots and horses. Captured civilians were often given to the soldier as slaves. Gold flies and other valuables were also given as reward and as indicators of bravery in the field. Most significant, perhaps, were the grants of land, as these may have aided families in social advancement. The importance of such documentation to the elite is revealed particularly well in the inscription of a man named Mose who lived in the early 19th Dynasty. There had been a family dispute over a period of some 50 years, but the dispute was about the produce from land that had been granted to a soldier ancestor some 200 years earlier, in the early 18th Dynasty.

On a broader level, what becomes clear from the sources is the rapid spread and expansion of the chariotry. The texts from the early 18th Dynasty in Egypt, and contemporary records from western Asia, indicate that chariots were very few in number at the beginning of the period, but by the time of the battle of Qadesh, rulers were able to put hundreds, if not thousands, into the field. The increase in numbers of chariots available to the Great King of the Hittites illustrates this well. Early rulers had few chariots, but by the time of Thutmose III, the Hittite Great King could muster 1,000, and the records of Ramesses II claim that there were 2,500–3,000 chariots of the Hittites, their vassals and allies, at the battle of Qadesh. The Egyptians certainly increased their numbers of chariots through captures. At Megiddo Thutmose III seized 924 chariots, and slightly later Amenhotep II captured a total of 1,822 in his campaigns.

Although all early chariots appear to have been imports or captures, by the mid-18th Dynasty, the Egyptians were manufacturing them themselves, and transferable technologies in warfare and equipment are a characteristic of the period, with an effect on the trade in raw materials. Lacking good-quality timber, Egypt had gold and other luxuries it could use in exchange. Mitanni controlled the trade in deciduous timbers such as oak, ash, and birch that were essential for chariot building, and doubtless this played a significant part in the importance of the kingdom internationally.

Chariots, of course, need horses, and the horse trade was of great importance, especially to a country like Egypt, where it was difficult to breed the animals. At Megiddo, Thutmose III captured 2,041 horses. Again, Mitanni seems to have been an important source, or channel, of horses. The biblical record indicates that later, Solomon, king of Israel, became one of the great horse traders. The horses of the Late Bronze Age were relatively small animals and horse breeding and the introduction of new types of a heavier horse had important military repercussions in the Iron Age, notably an increase in the use of cavalry, firstly by the army of the Assyrian Empire.

The Amarna Letters detail the many other aspects of the international arms trade of the Late Bronze, from armor to different types of arrows. It is typical of Egyptian depictions that little of this imported weaponry is shown being used by Egyptian soldiers. However, the earliest known iron weapon from Egypt, a dagger from the tomb of Tutankhamun, is identical to one described in the Amarna Letters.

Although the gift exchange between rulers was the main way in which arms were traded, the widespread employment of mercenary soldiers would also have disseminated weapons and techniques of warfare. They should perhaps be considered as part of the arms trade itself. The Amarna Letters include a request by an Egyptian vassal ruler in Palestine for Nubian archers, and a fragmentary papyrus of the same date shows a battle between Libyans and what appear to be Mycenaean soldiers, who should also perhaps be regarded as mercenary troops. There was an increase in the number and ethnic groups of mercenaries in the 19th Dynasty. Some, such as the Shardana, with their distinctive helmets and weapons, are to be found both in the Egyptian army and fighting against the Egyptians alongside the Libyans.

All of the sources indicate the “international” nature of the Late Bronze Age, with the spread of technologies and weaponry through the whole of Mesopotamia, western Asia, the Aegean, and northeast Africa. The chariot, for example, spread to Nubia, presumably as royal gift and army supply from the pharaohs. Although battle scenes show Nubian enemies conventionally as bowmen with relatively little equipment, other sources show the use of chariots by the elite and suggest that they were being manufactured in some centers. The Egyptians also received types of armor, shields, and weapons, notably spears and bows, from Nubia. There is also evidence that horses were being bred in Nubia by the time that the Kushite kingdom conquered Egypt in the eighth century BC. The Libyans, too, acquired foreign weapons. By the 19th Dynasty, the Libyans had chariots, and swords of western Asiatic type. Mycenaean Greece and the Aegean was also part of this network, as evidence from Pylos, Mycenae, and Knossos shows.

With this interdependence of the states of the Late Bronze Age, it is not surprising that the collapse of the Hittite Empire had widespread repercussions. In the past, this was generally attributed to the “Sea Peoples” as a mass migration of population from the north into western Asia. More recently, this idea of population movement has been challenged, and Robert Drews has re-examined the whole issue in The End of the Bronze Age. Changes in Warfare and the Catastrophe ca. 1200 B.C. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993). He emphasizes the increased importance of infantry over chariotry. Certainly, the evidence from the succeeding historical phases (although scanty for Egypt) shows that the massed chariot ranks of the Late Bronze Age were replaced by infantry and cavalry.

The first millennium BC saw the rise of a series of increasingly large empires, which were in turn taken over. The first, the Assyrian Empire, extended its sway over Mesopotamia and westward to the Mediterranean and briefly into Egypt. It was conquered by the resurgence of Babylonian power, but that empire in turn fell to the Medes and then the Persians. Egypt, under the strong rule of the 26th Dynasty, managed to remain independent, even to challenge the power of Babylon, but ultimately fell to the overwhelming might of Persia. Throughout this period, mercenaries played a significant role in the Egyptian army, many coming from southern and western Anatolia, the lands of Caria, and the Ionian coast. The states of the Greek mainland now played an increasingly important role, and sea battles increased in number (or are better documented). It was also the Greek mainland that produced the major new development in warfare, the phalanx of pike-men. This formation, developed by Philip II of Macedon, was used with devastating effect by Alexander the Great in his campaigns against Persia and continued to play a major role in the wars of his immediate successors (the diadochoi) and the later Hellenistic kingdoms. The armies of the Hellenistic kingdoms were organized and equipped in largely the same ways, and there was frequent defection to an enemy by both troops and commanders. Introductions, such as the use of elephants by the Seleukid kings of Syria, were soon adopted by other monarchs. The fall of the Hellenistic kingdoms to Rome saw the rise of the largest empire, and also the culmination of military standardization. Egypt now shared an army and had military structures of a type that could be found from Britain to Syria.

Map of the Western Delta.

Map of the Eastern Delta.

Map of Middle Egypt from Memphis to Akoris.

Map of Middle Egypt from Akoris to Akhmim.

Map of Northern Upper Egypt from Akhmim to Thebes.

Map of Southern Upper Egypt from Thebes to Aswan.

Map of Western Desert.

Map of Eastern Desert.

Map of Cyrenaica and the Libyan Coast.

Map of Palestine.

Map of Anatolia and North Syria.

Map of Greece and the Aegean.

Map of Western Asia at the Time of the Assyrian Empire.

The First Cataract (only the larger islands are shown).

The Memphite Region.

Plan of the Fortress of Semna, after W.B. Emery.

Plan of the Fortress of Kumma, after W.B. Emery.

Plan of the Fortress of Shalfak, after W.B. Emery.

Plan of the Fortress of Uronarti, after W.B. Emery.

Plan and section of the north defenses of the Inner Fort at Buhen, modified from a drawing by W.B. Emery.

A small battlemented garrison fort at Akhetaten (Amarna) depicted in the tomb of Mahu, chief of the Madjoy, at Amarna. The complete scene shows provisions being brought to the fort. Inside, there are amphorae and foodstuffs, a soldier and spare sandals, shields, axes, bows, and quivers. After N. de G. Davies Rock Tombs of el-Amarna, vol. IV, pl. xxiv.

A coat of scale armor after a painting in the tomb of Qenamun at Thebes (reign of Amenhotep II).

A cowhide shield after a painting in the tomb of Qenamun at Thebes (reign of Amenhotep II) showing the products of royal workshops. The accompanying caption states that 680 were presented to the king.

Two quivers after a painting in the tomb of Qenamun at Thebes (reign of Amenhotep II) showing the products of royal workshops; that on the right is made of cheetah skin.

(Left) A khepesh-sword with scaled hand-grip and a ridge in the shape of a cobra. From a scene showing gifts presented to Thutmose IV in the tomb of Tjanuny at Thebes. (Right) A group of khepesh-swords in a painting in the tomb of Qenamun at Thebes (reign of Amenhotep II) showing the products of royal workshops. The accompanying caption states that 360 were presented to the king.

Axes and daggers depicted in a scene of gifts presented to Amenhotep II in the tomb of Qenamun at Thebes.

Troops from Akhenaten’s bodyguard. In the upper register are an Asiatic with spear and khepesh, a Nubian, and a Libyan, both with bow and axe. The lower register has another Asiatic with spear and khepesh and a Nubian with a cudgel, followed by an Egyptian with a khepesh. From a scene in the tomb of Ahmes at Amarna after N. de G. Davies Rock Tombs of el-Amarna, vol. III, pl. xxxi.

An Egyptian archer wearing a long robe and pointed helmet. Reign of Ramesses II.

A military trumpeter from a scene of the campaigns of Ramesses II.

The felling of orchards outside a fortified town in western Asia, from a scene of one of the campaigns of Ramesses II.

Thutmose IV in his chariot, from a scene on the side of the king’s chariot.

Asiatics bring a chariot and horses as “tribute” to Akhenaten. From a scene in the tomb of Meryre II at Amarna, after N. de G. Davies Rock Tombs of el-Amarna, vol. II, pl. xxxix.

Horses feeding and chariots from a scene in the tomb of Tutu at Amarna, after N. de G. Davies Rock Tombs of el-Amarna, vol. VI, pl. xx.

The manufacture of a chariot, and an axe, and leatherworking. A bow case, two quivers, and other chariotry equipment, daggers (?), and a shield are depicted above. From a scene in the tomb of Puyemre at Thebes (reign of Thutmose III).

Queen Tiye as a female sphinx trampling the female enemies of Egypt. From a panel on the side of the queen’s throne as depicted in the tomb of Kheruef at Thebes.