9
Based on our strategy to go straight for Dacca and bypass centres of resistance, we issued orders to our formations. In the north-western sector under XXXIII Corps, 20 Mountain Division with 340 Mountain Brigade was to capture the communication centre at Bogra, and move up to the Brahmaputra river. The main thrust line was via Pirganj, then down south to Bogra, bypassing Hilli. 6 Mountain Division, which was earmarked for the defence of Bhutan and not at our disposal for the offensive was ordered by us to simulate a threat to the town of Rangpur. The inland waterways flotilla in Assam was moved to the border at Dubri to assist operations down the river. For command and control of operations in the western sector, Army HQ had earlier sanctioned the raising of II Corps headquarters on a reduced static establishment. We had anticipated this and had created the infrastructure, logistics, and communications well before personnel began arriving in mid-November. Lt Gen. T.N. Raina was nominated to command the corps. I had known Raina earlier and had been a fellow cadet and platoon officer at the Officers' Training school at Mhow. As I joined the artillery I was commissioned four months later than Raina and therefore he had become that much my senior. I briefed Raina on his tasks. He was reluctant to take risks and wanted his divisions to advance shoulder to shoulder. He had little control over his divisional commanders, Maj. Gen. Dalbir Singh commanding 9 infantry Division, openly flouting his orders and frequently being downright rude. The other divisional commander of 4 Mountain Division kept a low profile. We had originally planned for 9 infantry Division to capture Jessore and then move on to assist 4 Mountain Division which was to capture Jhenida, Magura, Faridpur, and Goalundo Ghat. The inland waterways flotilla was to move down river to Goalundo Ghat to ferry troops to Dacca if necessary. There were acrimonious discussions during the war game held at the corps headquarters. Maj. Gen. Dalbir Singh wanted to move on the main road and not bypass Jessore using the Boyra axis. In order to frustrate this plan he executed a preliminary operation of Boyra, thereby losing the advantage of surprise. Raina too wanted his two divisions to move shoulder to shoulder as he was most apprehensive about his flanks. Throughout the operation Raina was cautious, perhaps over cautious. This approach was responsible for slow progress in this sector. Fortunately some of the brigade commanders displayed dash and initiative.
In the south-eastern sector we had built up the infrastructure for the IV Corps. The corps commander, Lt Gen. Sagat Singh, had an aggressive outlook. He had 8 Mountain Division from Nagaland less one brigade under the command of Maj. Gen. Krishna Rao. The division had no artillery of its own as it had been in a counter-insurgency role. We made up the artillery component by pulling out regiments from the Chinese border. Similarly, 57 Mountain Division from Mizoram commanded by Maj. Gen. B.F. Gonsalves had its artillery component made up to strength. We took a calculated risk in these moves, taking only the director of military operations at Delhi into confidence. The other division of IV Corps was the corps reserve division, 23 Mountain Division commanded by Maj. Gen R.D. Hira.
The external boundaries of India depicted in this map are neither correct nor authentic
WESTERN SECTOR
We had planned for 57 Mountain Division to contain Comilla and move to the Meghna. Unfortunately we were unaware that the railway line to Coronation bridge had been made motorable. We wanted 23 Mountain Division to bypass Comilla and advance to the river port of Chandpur on the Meghna river. Lt Gen. Sagat Singh was insistent throughout that he capture Comilla and its cantonment at Maynamati. However, given our preliminary operations near Feni, I ordered that the thrust line of 23 Division bypass Comilla and be directed to Chandpur, which I considered to be the more critical objective. We had a contingency plan only for crossing the Meghna river as the navy had declined to operate there. We proposed to allot two squadrons of MI-8 helicopters that we had been promised. As the MI-8s did not arrive we allotted the corps all the 14 MI-4 helicopters we had. Though army headquarters had stipulated that the port of Chittagong should be our prime objective we ignored this instruction and gave IV Corps specific orders to thrust towards the Meghna river and, if possible, to cross it in order to exert pressure on Dacca. We therefore had to find other troops to advance to Chittagong. We therefore created 'Kilo' Force to carry out this task. We pulled out the two modified infantry battalions from the Mizo hills (which were organizationally designed only for counter-insurgency), two East Bengal battalions, one BSF battalion, one CRPF battalion, one mountain artillery regiment, one BSF artillery post group, and Mujib Battery. We had planned that Brig Shahbeg Singh with his Mukti Bahini sector headquarters would command this force. I had briefed Aurora who was to visit Agartala to instruct IV Corps and Shahbeg Singh accordingly. Aurora was, however, told by Shahbeg that he would not do so as his military reputation would suffer, and would instead continue with the Mukti Bahini. I was speechless when Aurora informed me of this, and had then had to find a headquarters to command Kilo Force. I then requested the DMO to permit us to use Brig. Anand Saroop and the staff of the counter-insurgency school, which was under Army HQ, for this purpose. Inder Gill, pragmatic as ever, agreed. Shahbeg was very close to Aurora, and after the fall of Dacca worked directly with him in civil affairs and other roles. He acquired notoriety after his retirement when he became a military leader under Jarnail Singh Bhinderwale in Punjab.
The external boundaries of India depicted in this map are neither correct nor authentic
NORTH-WESTERN SECTOR
I was instructed by Manekshaw that I should also utilize the special Frontier Force under the command of Maj. Gen. Sujan Singh Uban in our main offensive. I found it difficult to integrate them with our regular forces as I had pulled out the two infantry battalions from Mizoram for Kilo Force. I gave them the task of capturing Rangamati in the Chittagong hill tracts, held by a few commandos and irregulars. The task given was independent of our main forces in a thickly forested hilly area. Their forces moved from Mizoram to their objective. They completed their task by the end of hostilities and then moved down to Chittagong to be transported back to India. Operations in the western (11 Corps) sector were not proceeding as rapidly as we had expected. initially the Pakistanis resisted fiercely before evacuating Jessore. I kept on prodding Raina to move, but with little success. We were only allotted one battalion group from 50 Parachute Brigade, the remainder of the brigade being held as Army HQ reserve. I then requested Inder Gill to release the remainder of 50 Para Brigade to take Jessore from the rear. After much discussion, Gill agreed, stipulating that it would revert back to Army HQ control as and when he required it. I agreed, and immediately summoned the brigade commander, Brig. Mathew Thomas and briefed him on his mission. I spoke to the corps commander and asked him to give Brig. Thomas every assistance, and if possible allot him an additional battalion. The brigade moved on 6 December. In the meanwhile, Jessore was abandoned by the Pakistanis and 9 infantry Division moved in. The division was to send two brigades along the Magura-Faridpur axis to reinforce 4 Mountain Division's thrust. 9 infantry Division spent precious days 'reorganizing', and despite protracted requests failed to reinforce 4 Mountain Division. I then ordered Brig. Thomas to move along the Magura-Faridpur axis. The leading battalion of the brigade met stiff resistance from Pakistani paramilitary forces at Magura. The commanding officer of the battalion, amongst others, was killed in the assault. In the meanwhile, Gill asked me to move 50 Parachute Brigade, less one battalion group earmarked for our para drop at Tangail, back to the west. 9 infantry Division was given the task of moving one brigade to contain Khulna, and if possible, capture it. The divisional commander decided to concentrate the entire division to this task instead of moving along the Magura-Faridkot axis. The corps commander was apologetic, but took no action. Maj. Gen. Dalbir Singh tried to capture Khulna, committing his troops piecemeal, and in the process sustaining heavy casualties. On 16 December, on my way to Dacca to obtain Niazi's surrender, whilst changing helicopters at Jessore, I was surprised to see an artillery helicopter about to take off to direct artillery fire in support of 9 infantry Division's belated attack on Khulna! The ceasefire had been in force since the 1700 hours of 15 December. I passed orders to the division to desist from further offensive operations and to implement the ceasefire.
Meanwhile, 4 Mountain Division captured Magura on 8 December and advanced towards Faridpur on the Ganges and proceeded to cross the wide, unbridged Madhumati river. In the meanwhile, a column of 7 Mountain Brigade of this division which had been sent to Kushtia ran into a Pakistani force, was taken by surprise, and suffered casualties. The division, instead of continuing its advance on the thrust line allotted to it, diverted troops to follow the retreating Pakistanis across Hardinge Bridge. The delay caused by the deviation from the original thrust line slowed down the advance to Faridpur. When I spoke to the corps commander I was taken aback by his assertion that he was unaware of this diversion of effort. Not only did the corps headquarters fail to control the advance of 4 Mountain Division, but far more serious was its failure to ensure that the division less a brigade, that was to contain Khulna, failed to move on the thrust line stipulated to assist 4 Mountain Division in its advance to Faridpur on the Ganges. Even more startling was the corps commander's refusal to move the inland waterways flotilla which had reported to the corps short of Hardinge Bridge on 5 December. When I spoke to the corps commander, requiring him to move the craft which had the capacity to move one infantry brigade to Goalundo Ghat opposite Dacca, he replied that he could not do so given the small-arms fire from the north bank of the river. I retorted that I had for eight years on my way to school crossed Hardinge Bridge, and the river was so wide that it was not possible to see the opposite bank. He remained silent and it was clear to me that he had no intention, even if the opportunity presented itself, to use craft for the attack on Dacca. On 18 December the craft finally moved to Dacca to transport Pakistani prisoners to India.
4 Mountain Division's advance was delayed due to the diversion of troops from its thrust line by some three days. 4 Mountain Division, clearing heavy opposition and crossing two more rivers in a series of bold operations, crossed Madhumati river on the night of 14/15 December against determined Pakistani resistance and moved on to Faridpur. It is regrettable that the failure of the corps to control its formations from deviating from the specified thrust lines and to acquiesce to 9 Infantry Divisions not moving on its thrust line and diverting its efforts to Khulna, lost 11 Corps the opportunity of assisting 101 Communication Zone in its capture of Dacca.
In the north-west sector the operations by 20 Mountain Division and 71 Mountain Brigade were executed with vigour. 71 Mountain Brigade moved swiftly from the Siliguri corridor to contact the Pakistani garrisons at Nulphamari and Dinajpur by 15 December when the ceasefire came into force. 340 Mountain Brigade executed a wide bypassing manouvre of the Hilli defences to Pirganj and then swung south to Bogra which was contacted prior to the ceasefire. The other brigades of Division, 202 and 165, advanced separately in order to control the sector. By the time the ceasefire came into effect, 20 Mountain Division had achieved the objectives allotted to it even though it had to face the fiercest opposition.
In the south-eastern sector, 8 Mountain Division's 59 Mountain Brigade together with 5/5 Gorkha Rifles moving from Shillong successfully contained the Pakistani 202 Brigade at Sylhet, which was needlessly reinforced by 311 Pakistani Brigade at Maulvi Bazaar. We had expected the brigade to fall back to Coronation Bridge on the Meghna crossing. Had they done so, IV Corps' limited crossing of the Meghna would have been very difficult. When I received the intercept regarding the movement of this brigade to reinforce Sylhet I gave a whoop of joy! For all practical purposes two Pakistani brigades were out on a limb, far far away from the centre of gravity, Dacca. After the war, while interrogating the GOC of the division, Maj. Gen. Abdul Majib Quazi, I asked him why he had moved this brigade to Sylhet, to which he replied that he was determined that we should not capture Sylhet. Niazi's fortress strategy and the divisional commander's unimaginative implementation of it speeded up the disintegration of the Pakistani defence posture and speeded up our advance to Dacca.
57 Mountain Division under Maj. Gen. Gonsalves moved speedily to secure its objectives. They discovered that the Pakistanis had removed the rails from the railway line from Akhura to Brahmanbaria, converting it into a road. We had not considered advancing on this axis as we had anticipated that the Pakistani infantry brigade would fall back from Maulvi Bazaar to Brahmanbaria and not, as it did, to Sylhet. We therefore agreed with 57 Mountain Division's request for a change in the thrust line using this axis. 57 Mountain Division, after clearing other resistance, was able to cross the Meghna river with some light infantry elements and send foot patrols towards Dacca. They were unable to get any vehicles or guns across.
The external boundaries of India depicted in this map are neither correct nor authentic
NORTHERN AND SOUTH-EASTERN SECTORS
Meanwhile, 23 Mountain Division, advancing on the axis Chaudagram - Mudafarganj, bypassing the Lalmai defences, sped on to Chandipur, isolating the garrison at Laksham. Pakistani troops in this area of operations withdrew to the cantonment at Mynamati. IV Corps had by 9 December reached their objectives of Chandpur and Daudkandi, and secured the vital Meghna Bulge. The approaches to Dacca from the east lay open. Later, in Dacca, Niazi told me that when Chandpur fell he knew that the war was lost. I had earlier to push hard to get the corps to accept Chandpur as a prime objective and had orders issued for 23 Mountain Division to advance from Chaudagram to Chandpur against the wishes of the corps commander and army commander who were keen on clearing Lalmai Hills, Comilla, and Maynamati cantonment. The corps, obsessed with Maynamati which we wanted to be contained, insisted in clearing it, tying up two brigades, 61 Brigade of 57 Mountain Division and 181 Mountain Brigade of 23 Mountain Division, with 61 Mountain Brigade being put under command of 23 Mountain Division for this operation. Despite protracted assaults and unnecessary casualties, the Maynamati garrison held out and surrendered only after the ceasefire. Meanwhile, Kilo Force was advancing to Chittagong, clearing Feni on 6 December. Lt Gen. Sagat Singh was determined to get to Chittagong before Kilo Force. He ordered 181 Mountain Brigade of 23 Mountain Division to advance to Chittagong instead of attempting to cross the Meghna. Pakistani forces were preparing defences at Faujdahat on the approaches to Chittagong, out of range of our aircraft. The aircraft from the aircraft carrier Vikrant were not available. On the morning of 14 December, two Canberra pilots reported to me for briefing for a bombing attack on Tungi, a few miles north of Dacca. Tungi had been selected by the chiefs of staff at Delhi as a 'strategic target'. Our troops were on its outskirts and it was within artillery range and in the range of our support aircraft so it was by no means a strategic target. I told the pilots that there was no need to attack the target given to them at Tungi, a factory under construction, and of no relevance to our operations and that they should bomb the defences at Faujdahat which was out of range of our support aircraft. I briefed them on the target which they bombed successfully. Late that night, I received a telephone call from a very agitated Devasher, senior staff officer at headquarters, Eastern Air Command, telling me that the air chief had demanded to know who had had the audacity to divert a strategic air strike that had been ordered by the three chiefs of staff at Delhi. I explained to Devasher that we were conducting fluid, fast moving operations and there was no time to observe the niceties of lengthy conventional procedures of approaching the chiefs of staff in Delhi for their concurrence in a switch of targets. I told him that he could inform the chief of the air staff that the responsibility for this diversion was mine and mine alone; and that the pilots were not to blame. The chief of air staff was a pragmatic officer and accepted the necessity for this diversion and I heard no more of the matter. Faujdahat was contacted by ground troops just prior to the ceasefire on 15 December.
On 8 December Manekshaw telephoned me saying that he could not get the Western Army Commander Lt Gen. Candeth to move sufficiently rapidly and was therefore sacking him. He intended replacing him by 1 Corps Commander Lt Gen. K.K. Singh, and moving Maj. Gen. Harish Rai, Candeth's chief of staff, to command 1 Corps. I was shocked to hear him say that. I knew Candeth well as a good and effective commander. I told Manekshaw that it was inadvisable to change horses midstream, adding that Lt Gen. K.K. Singh's track record in command in 1965 left much to be desired and that the current operations of 1 Corps were pedestrian. After some further exchanges, he said that he would reconsider. I am told that Maj. Gen. Harish Rai, Candeth's chief of staff, in his memoirs has mentioned that he had received a warning order to stand by to replace K.K. Singh. Candeth commanded the western army with competence.
On the morning of 9 December, Manekshaw telephoned me ordering an amphibious assault to be mounted immediately on Cox's Bazaar in order to prevent Pakistani forces escaping to Burma. I told Manekshaw there were hardly any troops that could withdraw along the Arakan Road and, that there was no indication of this. Manekshaw was adamant. I told him that I had taken part in several amphibious assaults along the Burmese coast during the Second World War, and that to carry out such a landing we needed craft, equipment, and troops trained for such an operation. None of these were available. He cut me short, saying that these were his directions on behalf of the chiefs of staff, and that he did not care how but I should carry them out. He added that a team of naval officers would report to me on 10 December for the purpose. I again reminded him that not only was there no craft, but no scrambling nets or life- belts, and that none of our troops had ever been to sea. Manekshaw again repeated that the operation should be mounted and that I would have to find the means to do so. I asked the navy in Calcutta to scout around the Calcutta docks to find a suitable vessel capable of transporting a brigade. Fortunately a merchant ship, Vishwa Vijay, had just discharged its cargo, so I gave orders for its requisition. The meeting with the naval officers took place in our operations rooms. None of them had any prior experience of amphibious operations. I had trained for three months for amphibious operations on the beaches south of Cox's Bazaar. Cox's Bazaar itself was unsuitable for an assault landing as a landing there would certainly have been resisted by the small garrison there. Its approaches too were unsuitable for an assault landing. I had trained on beaches around Ukhia, south of Cox's Bazaar, where the beaches were gently sloping and there were some runnels on the approaches. I brought this to the attention of the navy. I told them that I was mustering a force which I was withdrawing from their operations, comprising Headquarters and Mountain Artillery Brigade, which we had earlier allotted to 11 Corps as they had no artillery headquarters, 1/3 Gorkha Rifles, two companies of 11 Bihar, and a detachment of artillery. The navy agreed to provide 150 commandos. As none of our troops had any training whatsoever in amphibious operations and as no special equipment for these operations was available, the naval team agreed to beach the landing craft at low tide and refloat at high tide. The merchant ship with the troops would transfer the troops to landing craft at sea. The aircraft carrier Vikrant was to provide air support as the landing beaches were out of range of our support aircraft. The code name given to this operation was 'Romeo'. The force sailed out of Calcutta on 12 December, two days behind schedule, but the very fact that it was able to do so after just three days of receiving orders was indeed a piece of excellent staff work in pulling troops out of combat, and mounting the force with vehicles, guns, and other equipment.
Romeo Force was transferred at sea to INS Guldar and INS Gharial. So far all the planning had been done off the map, and the actual survey of the beach was yet to be conducted. Unfortunately, the navy decided to change plans while still at sea. Instead of beaching the landing craft and landing the troops dry shod, they decided to disembark the troops by boats and conducted a hurried, incomplete, beach reconnaissance. Even though I had warned the navy to watch out for runnels, the troops were landed on a runnel. Twelve men were disembarked, two of whom drowned; with another effort, 30 men were put ashore. By that time it was confirmed, as I had earlier advised, that there were no enemies in the area, only a Mukti Bahini camp nearby. With the ceasefire coming into effect at 1700 hours on 15 December, Romeo Force was disembarked between 16 and 18 December with the help of local boats. We were indeed fortunate to have got away so lightly with this ill-conceived operation, lacking in sound military thinking and evaluation. The operation ordered by Manekshaw, based on his assessment that the Pakistani forces were withdrawing to Burma down the Arakan road, was a baseless conjecture not supported by any intelligence. There were besides only very few Pakistani troops in the vicinity that could have withdrawn to Burma. Other than a brief telephone call from Manekshaw, no other orders, written or otherwise, emanated from service headquarters at Delhi. Amphibious operations require specialized equipment and craft, detailed planning, intensive training and rehearsals by the participating personnel of the army, navy, and air force. None of these pre-requisites existed. These specialized operations should not be mounted and launched in the cavalier manner ordered by Manekshaw in the name of the chiefs of staff at Delhi. We were indeed fortunate to get off lightly from this ill-conceived operation. incidentally, neither the carrier Vikrant nor the 150 naval commandos participated in the landing.
Mukti Bahini: A Story of Bravehearts
The organization, role, and the operations of these freedom fighters is well known and well recorded in Bangladesh. However, the role of the Indian Army in organizing the Mukti forces and the conduct of joint operations has not received much publicity in India.
The Mukti Bahini, freedom fighters, Mukti forces, and naval commandos together with the East Bengal battalions played a major role in the operations leading to the surrender of the Pakistani forces in East Pakistan. Due credit must be given to their contribution to the liberation of their country from the Pakistani yoke.
The Pakistani Army's brutal crackdown in Dacca and other areas shocked the people of India. On 25 March 1971 Operation searchlight was launched in Dacca. Thousands of students were massacred in the university area. The five East Bengal battalions were dispersed earlier by the Pakistan Army. This notwithstanding, they were able to offer resistance. These battalions gradually made their way into India.
On 26 March 1971, the Border Security Force (BSF) was ordered by the Indian government to provide all possible assistance to the revolting Bangladesh forces. The Bangladesh battalions and the BSF withdrew to the Indian border. There was sporadic fighting during their withdrawal. They did, however, manage to destroy a few vital bridges, particularly in the eastern areas. On 29 April 1971, the Government of India ordered the Eastern Army to take over the responsibility of assisting the Bangladesh forces in their struggle to liberate their country. The BSF located in the theatre were placed under the operational command of the Eastern Army.
Meanwhile, by the end of March 1971, Bangladesh resistance leaders began arriving in Calcutta. Prominent among these was Tajuddin Ahmed, Nazrul Islam, Qamaruzzaman, Mansur Ali, Col. Mag. Osmani and Wing Commander Khandker. A government in exile was soon formed and housed in a bungalow at 8 Theatre Road. I helped in setting up the infrastructure for both headquarters. I attended some cabinet meetings and frequently met Osmani and Khandker.
Army HQ spelt our three tasks for Eastern Command. The first was to advise and guide the provisional government of Independent East Bengal in their endeavour to wage a campaign of guerilla warfare in East Pakistan.
The next task given was to organize and equip a guerilla force of some 20,000 which could subsequently be expanded to 1,00,000. Eastern Command was to plan, direct, and coordinate guerilla operations in East Pakistan. The guerillas were in the initial stages to operate where there were no Pakistani forces. This was to be followed by striking at outposts, convoys, and sabotage. Finally, the guerillas were to operate as sub-units and groups. I disagreed with the concept of the numbers to be trained and their employment. Manekshaw insisted that 1,00,000 were to be trained. Once trained, they should be employed to attack fortified Pakistani defences. I told him that we had begun setting up eight camps each with the capacity to train 1,000 plus at any one time. I required a period of some three months to train the guerillas and some five months to train junior leaders. Manekshaw replied that three to four weeks were sufficient. I responded that our camps were not sausage machines through one end of which a recruit entered and three weeks later emerged from the other side as a guerilla. He then said that if I could not produce 1,00,000 trained fighters he would send someone who could. Maj. Gen. Onkar Singh Kalkar arrived in May but was unable to cope. Manekshaw then phoned me, saying that Kalkar was unable to respond to his queries, and that I should do so. I told him he should ask the army commander. He then retorted that Aurora was unable to do so. I then oversaw the training and operations; I was told by Aurora that he would handle the training and equipping of the freedom fighters and that I should look after the naval and air wings, and also coordinate the operations of the freedom fighters.
A senior officer of the State Bank of India, a certain Mr Nambiar, was nominated as financial adviser, and asked for a suitable building. This was given and never returned. Today, it still houses the Fort William branch of the State Bank of India.
The Bangladesh Forces HQ was set up at 8 Theatre Road along with the provisional government of Bangladesh. Col. Osmani, in consultation with the Eastern Command, divided the theatre of operations into 8 sectors. Each sector had a Bangladeshi office with a small staff. They worked in conjunction with Indian Army sector commanders in operation 'Jackpot', the code name for the operations of the Bangladesh forces.
Major Zia was to be responsible for the Chittagong sector, Major Khalid Musharaf for Comilla, Major Saifullah for Mymensingh, Wing Commander Bashar for Rangpur, Lt Col Zaman for Rajshahi, Major Usman for Kushtia, and Major Jalil for Khulna. 'Tiger' siddiqui decided to operate on his own from the area he controlled in Tangail, as did Noorul Kadar and Toha. The Indian Army formation commanders in which the sectors were located provided guidance.
We had set up the training camps with a capacity of some 1000 plus trainees. Moorti Camp, A sector in north Bengal, was to be run by 20 Mountain Division as was the Raiganj camp in B Sector. 9 Infantry Division was to run Chakulya Camp in C Sector. Deotamura Camp in Tripula, D Sector was to be run by 57 Mountain Division as was Masimpur in E Sector in Assam. Tura Camp, Sector F.J. in Meghalaya was to be run by 101 Communication Zone. The camp at Silchar in E Sector was to be run by 8 Mountain Division and Dauki, E Sector by 101 Communication Zone.
A total of some 80,000 freedom fighters were organized into teams of 10, squads of 20, and groups of 100. They were armed with rifles, grenades, light machine guns, and explosives. To provide junior leaders of the regular battalions, some 130 cadets were trained at Moorti Camp. Some of those who were trained there visited the camp in 2010.
I was assigned the specific task of training and planning the operations of the naval commandos. The navy assigned Commander Mathis, a live-wire, to assist me. Some 400 naval commandos were trained in the upper reaches of the river Hoogly. I negotiated with the West Bengal Government to loan me two sea-going craft, the Padma and Pallas. We had 40 mm L 60 air-defence guns mounted on them. The navy also assigned a submariner, Commander Samant, to assist me. Both Mathis and Samant reported directly to me.
I had, as I mentioned earlier, serious differences with Osmani with regard to priorities. I wanted the maximum effort to be placed on the training and equipping of the Mukti forces. Osmani had a typical regular army officer's reservation regarding irregular forces and wanted to focus on raising more regular units rather than concentrating on the freedom fighters. Khandker, however, agreed with my views. Osmani, despite my objections raised three more regular battalions, the personnel being taken from the freedom fighters we had trained.
The five regular East Bengal battalions were reorganized and equipped. 1, 3, and, 7 East Bengal were moved to Tura in Meghalaya and placed under a brigade headquarters and named Z Force. 2 and 4 East Bengal were located in Tripura and re-equipped there. In addition to the East Bengal battalions, three artillery batteries were raised. The Bangladesh regular forces were divided into three forces: Z Force comprised 1, 3, 8 East Bengal supported by No. 2 Field Battery, K Force consisted of 10 and 11 East Bengal supported by No. 3 Battery. S Force comprised 2, 4, and 9 East Bengal supported by No. 1 Battery (Mujib).
Our Air Force transferred to the air component of the Bangladesh Air Force one Otter, one Dakota, and one Aloutte helicopter. The air component also operated directly under me.
From August 1971, freedom fighters were infiltrated into East Pakistan. Initially a few hundred were infiltrated and by the end of November, some 50,000 freedom fighters had been infiltrated. They attacked and harassed the Pakistani armed forces as well as the paramilitary. They instilled a feeling of fear into the rank and file of the Pakistani Army, their operations having a devastating effect on the morale of the Pakistan armed forces. The freedom fighters also gained control of some areas inside East Pakistan. Tiger Siddiqui, with some 20,000 of his followers, controlled Tangail; Zia controlled areas in the east.
The freedom fighters destroyed and disrupted the infrastructure, lines of communication, and logistics of the Pakistan Army. They blew up bridges and railway tracks causing railway traffic to come to a standstill. They blew up power pylons interrupting power supply. They created an environment of fear throughout the rank and file of Pakistani Army and therefore their contribution to the defeat of the Pakistani armed forces was enormous and their achievements should be given due credit.
Some 400 naval commandos and frogmen were trained under Commander Mathis of the Indian Navy, seconded to us at Plassey at the scene of the battle between Siraj-ud-Daula and Robert Clive. The mango groves are still there. With help from a Mukti gunboat mounting a Bofors L60 40mm gun, they captured, sank, and damaged some 15 Pakistani ships, 11 coastal vessels, 7 gunboats, 11 barges, 2 tankers, and 19 river craft. Their achievements were most significant.
We wanted to give the Mukti Navy some more craft. I talked to Calcutta Port Commissioners, and then the chief minister, who were all most helpful. They agreed to loan us two craft, the MV Palash and MV Padma. We reinforced their decks and mounted Bofors L60, 40mm guns on them. The craft were manned by Bangladeshi personnel formely of the Pakistan Navy. Commander Samant, the submariner seconded to us by the Indian Navy was placed by me to command the Padma and Palash. Commanders Mathis and Samant operated directly under me and not Eastern Naval Command. The two craft played havoc on shipping approaching East Pakistan. I recall one evening sitting at the residence of a friend of mine in the shipping business I was shown by the captain of a foreign ship some unexploded 40mm shells which bore Indian marking which he said were fired at his ship. I told him that they were most probably fired by Pakistani craft and I could not understand from where they had obtained the ammunition!
I ordered Samant to attack Pakistani shipping in the anchorages of Chalna and Mangla, and that he was not to go beyond the two anchorages as our troops were in contact with Khulna. I tied up with Advance Air HQ at Fort William and fixed the bomb-line. The Air Force asked me to have the decks of the two craft painted yellow for recognition. I briefed Samant on his task, on the bomb-line, which he should not cross and instructed him to paint the decks yellow.
The Padma and Palash had considerable success en route, sinking many craft on the night of 9/10 December. Samant and his task force of Padma and Palash entered the anchorage of Mangla. Samant in his over-eagerness decided to attack Khulna. He sailed past the bomb line, our aircraft failed to identify the yellow painted decks, and attacked and sank both craft. Samant and the crews of both craft managed to swim ashore. Mukti Bahini were in control of the area, and arranged for their return. We were most impressed by the guts Samant displayed and put his name up for a Mahavir Chakra, which he duly received.
The West Bengal government sought compensation for the loss of the Padma and Palash. Our financial advisor agreed to reimburse the depreciated cost of the craft. The state government, however, wanted the amount required to buy two new craft. I persuaded the financial advisor that in view of the unstinted help provided to our armed forces prior to and during the operations, we should provide sufficient money for two new craft. The latter agreed, and I was thanked by the chief minister for this.
For guerilla operations to succeed, they must strike deep into the roots of the enemy. To achieve success, time, organization, and motivation are important. No guerilla operation can produce quick results. We had a limited time-frame, from May to November 1971, within which we had to train and equip a guerilla force.
The untrained individuals enrolled by the Mukti Bahini had little knowledge of small arms and explosives. I had pressed Manekshaw to give them three months training but was overruled. The young recruits were given between three and four weeks training, barely adequate to train a guerilla. Junior leaders required at least five to six months training. We tried to ensure this. This lack of an adequate training period was to limit their effectiveness. The selection of trainees was somewhat haphazard and the lack of sufficient trained junior leaders severely restricted the conduct of operations.
Osmani, as mentioned earlier, was unfortunately not overly keen on guerilla operations, preferring to concentrate on raising of regular battalions. He withdrew three of the five regular battalions from preliminary operations and formed them into a brigade. Later he raised three more battalions and two more brigade headquarters. The personnel for these raisings were taken from the ranks of the freedom fighters, thus reducing the numbers available for guerilla operations. The regular battalions took part in November and December in some well-executed operations. As we were unable to spare regular Indian Army troops to capture Chittagong, the primary objective spelt out by Manekshaw, a mixed force of East Bengal battalions with two modified infantry battalions was ordered to advance to Chittagong. They reached the outskirts of the city when the ceasefire came into force on 15 December.
The conduct of guerilla operations is complex. These operations, to succeed, need careful planning, thorough briefing, carefully planned induction, and effective command and control. The sector headquarters of the Mukti Bahini were insufficiently staffed and were not able to plan and control operations to the required standards. The induction of guerillas was not properly organized, the targets assigned were too ambitious, and at times haphazard. On occasions when they were confronted with stiff opposition they gravitated back to the Indian border. Sometimes they lacked motivation. For example, 'Tiger Siddiqui', though he helped to retrieve stores from the air drop at Tangail, did nothing to intercept the Pakistan forces withdrawing from Jamalpur and Mymensingh through his stronghold at Tangail. I had also requested the freedom fighters to organize a Second World War French Maquis type of uprising in Dacca. This also did not materialize.
Due credit must, however, be given to the achievements of the Mukti Bahini and the East Bengal battalions. They played a crucial and major role in the operations leading to the surrender of the Pakistan Eastern Command. They fought with courage and determination notwithstanding the limitations of inadequate training and lack of sufficient junior leaders. They created an environment of fear for the Pakistan Army and completely demoralized them, restricting their ability to move and virtually confining them to their posts and defences. They demoralized the Pakistani forces and eroded their will to fight. They occupied large areas of territory, demolishing bridges, electric pylons, and harassing the Pakistanis wherever they could.
For many years both India and Bangladesh played down the contributions of both countries to the defeat of the Pakistani Eastern Command. However, in March 2008, the Bangladesh Army invited ten officers and their wives from India. I led the delegation. The visit lasted ten days, and during it the red carpet was laid out for us and we were royally feted. The Press covered our visit in glowing terms. Delegations from Bangladesh attend Vijay Diwas celebrations on the 16 December at Fort William. Both armies now give due importance to the joint efforts of the Eastern Army, the East Bengal battalions, the freedom fighters, and the people of Bangladesh who made victory possible.