10

Surrender: The true story

The airdrop on 11 December at Tangail, planned in October, was a complete success. The link-up with troops from the north took place, as planned, on 12 December. The troops reached the outskirts of Dacca on 13 December. Siddiqui and his 20,000 men failed to move with our troops to Dacca.

There was hectic activity at the UN. The Soviets had thus far vetoed all resolutions that did not link a ceasefire with the recognition of the will of the people of East Pakistan.

On 6 December George Bush, the American ambassador at the UN, called for an immediate ceasefire and withdrawal of our troops. This resolution too was vetoed by the Soviet Union. An Argentine resolution in the General Assembly demanding a ceasefire and withdrawal of our troops was passed by 104 votes to 11.

Consternation was caused in Delhi by the movement of the American aircraft carrier Enterprise, an amphibious assault ship, four guided missile destroyers, a guided missile frigate, and landing craft. It moved through the Straits of Malacca on the night of 13/14 December. The task force moved into the Indian Ocean through the great channel between Sumatra and the Great Nicobar with the Indian Navy wholly unaware that any such movement was taking place.

On 13 December there was an American resolution in the Security Council demanding an immediate withdrawal which was vetoed by the Soviet Union. The latter then informed us that there would be no more vetoes. Manekshaw then issued an order to us to capture all the towns we had bypassed, and cited these. There was no mention at all of Dacca though we were on the outskirts. He copied this order to our corps commanders. If we implemented this order we would have had to pull back our troops. At the Eastern Command, we decided to ignore it and proceed with our offensive on Dacca! I am reminded of a parallel: Nelson prior to battle of Copenhagen in 1801, when ordered to withdraw, put the telescope to his blind eye with words, 'I see no order to withdraw: Attack!!'

I was being blamed for the strategy and plan to bypass the towns and go for Dacca. I was told by Aurora that 'my head would be on the chopping block'. I got through to Niazi on the wireless on the night of 13 December, and offered generous terms if he surrendered; that we would ensure protection of ethnic minorities and that the forces who surrendered would be treated with the dignity due to soldiers as required by the Geneva Convention. I also spoke to him on 14, 15, and the morning of 16 December.

On the morning of 14 December we got a lucky break: a signal intercept indicating that there was to be a meeting at Government House at 1200 hours. We arranged with the air force to bomb it. The strike was effective and the governor, Dr Abdul Motaleb Malik resigned and went to the Intercontinental Hotel. That was the end of the last government of East Pakistan. That evening Niazi and Farman Ali handed over a ceasefire proposal to the American Consul General Spivack, the proposal specifying:

(1) A ceasefire and a cessation of all hostilities,

(2) hand-over of the administration to the UN,

(3) the UN ensuring

(a) the safety of all armed and paramilitary forces pending their return to West Pakistan.

(b) the safety of all West Pakistan civilians,

(c) the safety of all migrants settled since 1947,

(d) no reprisals.

There was no mention of India in the proposals.

The message was delievered to Bhutto in New York on 15 December where he was attending meetings of the Security Council. Bhutto rejected the ceasefire proposals outright. The Security Council that night was debating a Polish Resolution (Soviet block) requiring a ceasefire and withdrawal. Bhutto tore up the resolution as it did not, as other resolutions, condemn India for being an aggressor. He shouted at the meeting that they would never surrender but would fight to the bitter end.

On the morning of 16 December, Manekshaw phoned me and said, 'Jake, go and get a surrender'. I asked him if I should negotiate the surrender on the basis of the draft sent to him some days earlier. He replied, 'You know what to do; just go'. I then mentioned that Niazi had invited me for lunch, and informed Aurora. I met Mrs Bhanti Aurora outside the office, and she told me that she was going to Dacca as her place was beside her husband. I returned to Aurora and asked him if he was taking his wife with him. He replied in the affirmative. I said it was risky taking her there, to which he replied that it would be my responsibility to ensure her safety!

I proceeded to Dacca accompanied by a staff officer. I took my draft of the Instrument of Surrender, which was yet to be confirmed by Army HQ. I changed helicopters at Jessore to save refuelling time. An officer ran up to me handing over a signal message from Army HQ. I expected that the message would confirm the draft I was carrying with me. It read: 'Government of India has approved of General Jacob having lunch with Gen. Niazi.' I proceeded on to Dacca.

On landing at Dacca, I was met by the representatives of the UN, Marc Henry, Kelly, and others. They told me that they were accompanying me to take over the government and to arrange the withdrawal of the Pakistan military, paramilitary, and Pakistani civilians. I thanked them but declined their offer. Fighting was going on in Dacca between the Mukti Bahini and the Pakistan Army.

The Pakistanis had sent me a staff car. The chief of staff of Pakistan's Eastern Command accompanied me in the car to the headquarters of Eastern Command. We had barely proceeded a few hundred yards when a group of freedom fighters blocking the road fired at the car. I jumped out exclaiming 'Indian army'. Seeing my olive green Indian Army uniform they stopped firing but wanted to kill the Pakistani chief of staff. I reasoned with them, trying to persuade them to allow us to proceed. They reluctantly agreed. Meanwhile the press caught up with us. The Time Magazine correspondent reported that I had threatened to 'shoot you fellows'. I was unarmed! After a few minutes we were allowed to proceed. I entered Niazi's office. Present there were the seniormost Pakistani army, navy, and air force officers, as also some other senior military officers. I was shocked to see Maj. Gen. Nagra seated on the sofa with his arm around Niazi engaged in cracking bawdy jokes in Punjabi. Siddiq Salik in his book Witness to Surrender (1977) wrote that the jokes were unprintable!

We had moved Nagra just a few days earlier to replace Maj. Gen. Gurbax Singh, who was in command of the force that was moving to capture Dacca, but was wounded. Nagra had known Niazi from before when he was posted as military advisor to our High Commission in Islamabad. The ceasefire had taken effect at 1700 hours on 15 December. On the morning of 16 December, Nagra, who was some 30 miles outside Dacca with elements of 95 Mountain Brigade and 2 Para, well after the ceasefire went into force, sent a message to Niazi to send his representative. Niazi was at a loss to understand this message as he was expecting me. Nagra, flying a white flag, was escorted to Niazi's headquarters. I saw the three jeeps with white flags parked outside.

I called Nagra outside, gave him a sharp dressing down for disgraceful conduct unbecoming of a general officer. I told him to send some troops into Dacca, to the airfield and Intercontinental Hotel to protect the officials there. I also instructed him to arrange a table and two chairs at the Race Course for signature of The Instrument of Surrender, as also to provide a detachment for a joint guard of honour. I told him to leave behind a jeep for me. Nagra's later conduct was questionable. He hijacked Maj. Gen. Rao Farman Ali's new Mercedes and drove off with it to his former HQ in Assam. He was ordered to hand it over to command HQ, where it was taken on charge and given a registration number by Army HQ. There were several other allegations against the general. Aurora declined to recommend him for any decoration and wanted to institute disciplinary proceedings against him. He however reconsidered the matter and decided not to.

I re-entered the building. The draft Instrument of Surrender was read out. Niazi, with tears rolling down his cheeks, said: 'Who said I am surrendering? You have only come to discuss a ceasefire and withdrawal as proposed by me.' The service chiefs present also voiced their objections. Rao Farman Ali objected to surrendering to a 'Joint Command'. Time was running out so I called Niazi aside. I told him that if he did not surrender I could not take responsibility for the safety of their families and ethnic minorities but if he did I would ensure their protection. I asked him to reconsider, again reminding him that if he did not surrender I would not be responsible for the safety of their families. I then added that I would give him 30 minutes to reconsider and if he did not I would order the resumption of hostilities and the bombing of Dacca. I then walked out to be met by the press. I was extremely worried. Niazi had 26,400 troops in Dacca, we had about 3,000 some 30 miles out. I was in a quandary as what to do in the event of his refusing. Aurora and his entourage were expected to land in an hour or two and the ceasefire was to expire shortly. I had nothing in hand. The Pakistan Commission of Enquiry report later stated 'there was Gen. Jacob pacing outside, calmly puffing his pipe'. Far from it, I was extremely worried and tense. I spoke to the Pakistani sentry asking him about his family. He burst into tears saying that I as an Indian officer was talking to him whilst his own officers did not. After 30 minutes I walked into the office to be met by a deathly silence, my draft surrender document lying on the table. I asked Niazi if he accepted this document, to which he did not reply. I repeated the enquiry thrice. He still did not respond. I then picked up the document, holding it high, and said 'I take it as accepted'. Tears rolled down Niazi's cheeks, there were glares from those present. I called Niazi aside and then told him that I had arranged for the signing to take place at the Race Course in public. He objected strongly. I then told him that he would have to surrender his sword. He said that he did not have a sword but would surrender his revolver. I then told him he would have to provide a guard of honour. My thoughts went back to 1945 just after the Japanese surrender. When I landed in Sumatra, the Japanese provided me with a guard of honour. Niazi said there was no one to command it. I pointed to his ADC and said that he should command it. I permitted them to retain their weapons for their protection until such time as we could disarm them.

I then discussed with his chief of staff other modalities regarding the surrender of other garrisons and troops. I tried to get through on the wireless to Aurora who could not be contacted. Apparently he had gone to Agartala to pick up Gen. Sagat Singh. We then moved to the Mess for lunch. Gavin Young of the Observer was standing outside and requested if he could have lunch. We moved to the dining room. I was taken aback to see the tables properly set and loaded with silver trophies. I did not feel like eating and moved to one side. Gavin Young did a two-page piece for his paper the Observer, 'The Surrender Lunch'. At around 1560 hours, I asked Niazi to accompany me to the airport. As Nagra had not left a jeep for me, I sat with Niazi in his staff car. The Mukti Bahini fighters jumped on the car and it was with some difficulty that we reached the airport. Fortunately, en route we stopped a jeep with two of our paratroopers who were sightseeing. I asked them to follow us.

Nagra had not sent any troops to the airfield. I sent my staff officer to go and see if he could get some troops, some of whom should be entering the city. A little while later a truck loaded with armed Mukti Bahini arrived at the airfield. A man wearing our olive green uniform, wearing the badges of rank of a major general approached us, followed by two armed men. I placed him as 'Tiger' Siddiqui and sensed trouble. Siddiqui, who had some 20,000 fighters, did not fire a shot to halt the Pakistanis retreating through Tangail and did not move with us to Dacca. I felt that he had come to kill Niazi. I had to ensure that Niazi lived to sign the Instrument of Surrender. I told the two paratroopers to cover Niazi and point their rifles at Siddiqui.

I politely asked Siddiqui to leave the airfield. He did not respond. I repeated this request. He still did not respond. I then shouted to him to get his truckload of fighters off the airfield, and heaved a sigh of relief when they left. A few days later Siddiqui called the international media with their camera crews to witness the public bayoneting of people he called traitors. These pictures were later widely circulated.

Around 1630 hours Aurora and his entourage arrived in a fleet of five M14 and four Allouette helicopters. Aurora was accompanied by his wife and the navy and air force chiefs. Lt Gen. Sagat Singh and some of his divisional commanders also alighted, as did Wing Commander Khondker. Osmani, unfortunately was not there; the helicopter in which he had been travelling having been shot at and damaged. I had planned to travel in the last car with Aurora and Niazi, but Aurora asked me to make way for his wife, who then took her place by her husband's side. The ADC, who was carrying the papers to be signed and I had to hitch our way on a truck to the Race Course. Though there was very little time for any preparations, the ceremony went off reasonably well. After inspecting the guard of honour, Aurora and Niazi sat at the table and signed the Instrument of Surrender. I glanced at the documents and was aghast to see the heading which read 'Instrument of Surrender - to be signed at 1631 IST [Indian Standard Time]'. I looked at my watch, which showed that the time was 1655 hours. The documents they brought to be signed had to be re-signed by both in Calcutta some two weeks later!

Niazi removed his epaulette, took out his revolver and handed it to Aurora; tears rolled down his cheeks. It was getting dark. The crowd at the Race Course began shouting and there were threats to lynch Niazi; anti-Pakistani slogans and abuses resounded. They then moved towards Niazi. The senior officers present formed a cordon around him and whisked him off in one of our jeeps.

I briefed Lt Gen. Sagat Singh regarding the disarming of the Pakistanis and other modalities. We then returned to the airfield. Rear Admiral Shariff, whom I had given permission to meet our naval commander, met Vice Admiral Krishnan. Krishnan asked Shariff to hand over his pistol to him, which he did. We then took off for Agarthala and thence to Calcutta.

I wondered why 1631 hours (4.31 p.m.) was the time specified for signature of the Instrument of Surrender. Parliament was in session so perhaps Manekshaw had told Indira Gandhi that it would be signed at that time. Members were anxious to know what was happening. According to Siddhartha Shankar Ray, the chief minister of West Bengal, who was present in parliament that day, members were anxious to know about the progress of negotiations. The minister of defence repeatedly stated that Gen. Jacob was having lunch. It was most ironic that amidst all these tumultuous events, Jacob would be remembered by posterity for enjoying a very long and leisurely lunch!

Sometime later, when I examined the revolver that Niazi had surrendered, I realized that it could not have been Niazi's. The barrel was choked with muck and had not been cleaned for some considerable time, the lanyard was frayed and dirty. This could not have been the personal weapon of a commanding general. Niazi had probably taken it from one of the military policemen and surrendered it as his personal weapon. I could not help feeling that in a small way Niazi had got some of his own back.

The military operations have been described as a 'lightning campaign' and is studied in military institutions in many countries. In the words of a later Pakistani document of the war with the National Defence College of Pakistan:

Niazi had proposed a ceasefire under UN auspices, withdrawal under the UN, hand over of the government to the UN, and no reprisals. There was no mention of India in his ceasefire proposal. On 16 December he had 26,400 troops in Dacca, we some 3000 outside. The UN Security Council was in session debating a Polish Resolution. He could have fought on for at least two more weeks, and had he fought on for even one more day, the UN Security Council would have ordered a withdrawal. Some Pakistanis say that Niazi's nerve broke and that I bluffed him into surrendering. I negotiated the surrender on my unconfirmed draft document that I had sent to Delhi. It would perhaps be pertinent to quote the Pakistan Government's Hamood-ur-Rehman Commission of Enquiry Report:

This he has repeated in his book The Betrayal of East Pakistan, published in 1988.

Suppose I had failed in Dacca to convert the ceasefire under the UN as proposed by Niazi into an unconditional public surrender, the only one in history, we would have had to go back the next day. I did not fail and India became a regional superpower. The campaign was indeed a 'very close run thing'. We were extremely lucky. The campaign, though studied by armies abroad, is not studied in much detail in India, nor have the lessons from it, particularly mobility and logistics, been given sufficient weightage.

A ceasefire was converted into a surrender and signed in the space of some four hours. The modalities for the ceremony were basic and were arranged with meagre resources. To quote the Duke of Wellington again after Waterloo: 'It was a close run thing!'

The Pakistanis have no love for the Jews. The Pakistanis are well aware that I am a Jew. It is therefore surprising that in their study at the Pakistan National Defence College on the 1971 war in East Pakistan, they give credit for the Indian victory clearly to 'Maj. Gen. Jacob'. In India, however, my contribution to the 'textbook' campaign and in converting a ceasefire into an unconditional public surrender, the only one in history, is not widely known. I would like to reiterate that when my book Surrender at Dacca: Birth of a Nation was published in 1997. I personally gave Manekshaw and Aurora copies of it at a time when they were both fit and active; neither issued any rejoinder. The book has been translated into Chinese, Thai, Persian, Arabic, Bengali, and Hebrew.

The members of the team deputed to write the history of the 1971 war came to see me regarding the 1971 war. They had earlier met Manekshaw, Aurora, Sagat Singh, and Inder Gill. They had not planned to meet me until Gill told them that the only one who could give them an authoritative account of events was Jacob. I briefed them. They looked puzzled as they had been given highly coloured accounts from those interviewed earlier. Brig. Bhimayya, who was assisting the team, got them to see the operation instructions, and all the signals issued, including those ordering the brigades back to the Chinese border and the one of 13 December from Manekshaw, copied to the corp commanders ordering us to return to capture the towns we had bypassed and making no mention of Dacca. Bhimayya told me later that the Ministry of Defence decided that Mankeshaw's and not my account should be accepted.

Raising the XVI Corps

After the war was over, Manekshaw was very nice to me. I was promoted to raise a new XVI Corps south of the Pir Panjal Range of mountains. Before assuming command I spent a few days in Kashmir fishing my favourite trout beats. I was lucky to land my quota of six fish at Kokernag, all over four pounds. The photo of the catch was used by the Kashmir Tourism Department in their tourist brochure.

Aurora approached Mrs Indira Gandhi, seeking to be appointed a governor. She declined. He then approached the Akali government in the Punjab, and they later arranged a seat for him in the Rajya Sabha.

Lt Gen. P.S. Bhagat, VC, was appointed army commander in the newly constituted Northern Command which was my XVI Corp's immediate superior. HQ XVI Corps's responsibility stretched from the Pir Panjal Range to just across the Ravi river. I had to find a suitable site for the corps headquarters, and Jammu was suggested. This I promptly rejected as I did not wish the headquarters to be boxed up in that city. I remembered Nagrota from my days in Samba where I fished for mahseer in the river Tawi that flowed nearby. There was a tiny forest resthouse perched on a cliff overlooking the river from where the view was spectacular. I had it rented as my residence. There was hardly any infrastructure in Nagrota; we concentrated our energies on providing electricity and water.

Raising a corps headquarters is an onerous business. We were soon to be involved in numerous clashes with Pakistani troops on the border. The army commander, Lt. Gen. Bhagat was pragmatic and capable, and gave me a free hand. . He was fond of mixing with people and loved attending parties. As the only serving Victoria Cross awardee, he was the envy of the top brass in Delhi.

There were several incursions by Pakistani troops along the line of control, some quite major, involving many actions to evict them. Bhagat was assigned the task of delimiting the line of control consequent to the changes to the old ceasefire line up to the ceasefire of 17 December 1971. Bhagat chose to use the old 1 inch (1:63,360) to 1 mile map rather than the new 1:50,000 maps. The Pakistanis were using their new over 1:50,000 maps. It was problematic aligning the line of control on maps of different scales. Bhagat inadvertently made a mistake regarding Thakur Chak. While the line of control was to be drawn in relation to the positions held up to the ceasefire, the international border between Jammu and Pakistan could not be changed. Thakur Chak held by Pakistan was on our side of the international border but Bhagat erroneously treated it as part of the line of control and handed it over to Pakistan. I objected strongly but the matter took some time to be resolved in our favour.

I had a very high observation tower built at Thakur Chak which permitted observation of Sialkot and deep into Pakistan. I had a road built linking the various pickets, and this was defiladed from observation and provided for rapid movement along the picket line. I was able to spend some time fishing for mahseer. A little upstream from the resthouse I caught a 40 pound mahseer on very light tackle, which took me all of 40 minutes to land!

Gen Bhagat had perforce to retire because the then chief of army staff, Gen. G.G. Bewoor, was given an extension. If this had not been given, Bhagat would have normally become the next army chief, a position he had set his heart on occupying. Sadly this was not to be. He spent his last day of service with me. He was given the assignment of heading the Damodar Valley Corporation, with his office in Calcutta. Bhagat left my residence with tears in his eyes. Later in Calcutta, he fell seriously ill and died holding my hand muttering 'I want to go on a gun carriage'. We organized a fitting farewell for him. Gen. J.N. Chaudhari, former army chief, travelled with me, following the cortege. He turned round to me and said, 'Jacob, I hope I get a funeral as good as this'.

L.K. Jha was the governor of Jammu & Kashmir, and during the winter months he was based quite close to our headquarters and visited me frequently. Later, in Delhi when he was living at 10 Janpath, he invited me frequently to dine and chat. L.K. Jha was highly intelligent and close to Indira Gandhi. She used him as a channel to clarify certain problems. I lost a friend when he passed away.

On one of my trips to Delhi, I went to see Manekshaw who was staying in the MES Inspection Bungalow. He was sitting alone on the lawn and seemed depressed. He told me that he had requested Mrs Gandhi to appoint him deputy chairman of the Planning Commission, and that she had declined, offering him the post of High Commissioner to Canada instead. I felt sorry for him. My posting orders to Eastern Command as the army commander (GOC-in-C) arrived and I prepared to move to Calcutta.