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When I look back on my journey through life I realize that it was indeed tempestuous. My school days were not the happiest, as a couple of British teachers nurtured some anti-Semitism, but I was able to cope with that. On the other hand, the Jewish community in India has never experienced any anti-Semitism from fellow Indians. The Jewish community has prospered in India for some 2000 years. My days in the army were eventful and I was the only Indian officer in the regiment the others being British. I had no problems when I joined the regiment because its officers were from the upper crust of British society and true gentlemen. As the war progressed, officers of different social status joined. Later, towards the end of the war, a few Indian officers joined the regiment. One of them was Shaukat Reza, my second-in-command. He later commanded the Pakistani 9 Infantry Division in East Pakistan. When I knew Shaukat he was a caring officer. Anthony Masceranas (the well-known news correspondent) had alleged that the 9 Infantry Division that he commanded was responsible for the largest number of atrocities. Shaukat was moved in October 1971 to GHQto become director general of military operations, Pakistan Army. My experiences of working with British officers were for the most part cordial. If you knew your job they gave you your due. I remember in Burma, as a young captain, my battery commander, Dick Peters, patting me on my back during a particular operation with the words: 'Jacko, your reward will be in heaven.'
I was fortunate in the Arakan, as a major, to get to know Lt Col Cariappa, Lt Col Tnimayya, Lt Col L.P. (Bogey) Sen, Lt Col S.P.P. Thorat, and Maj. Bikram Singh. Later, when we returned to India, I remained a major until 1956. The others had after Independence shot up to the ranks of general officers, taking their seniority from the date of their commissions.
Army life is tough. One has sometimes to serve under pompous and ambitious bullies. I had problems with some of them. One had to stand tall and not bend. I had the ill fortune to serve under Maj. Gen. 'Bijji' Kaul in the 4 Infantry Division. Kaul had the political backing of Defence Minister Krishna Menon. Kaul tried to 'recruit' me into his coterie of confidantes to further his military and possibly political ambitions.
Great pressure was exerted on me to bend to his wishes. At one point I even thought of resigning. Fortunately, Gen. Kumaramangalam heard of this and had me posted out. Some years later Kaul phoned me at the Staff College to give evidence against General Manekshaw at an enquiry instituted to examine his anti-national activities. Kaul threatened me, saying that if I did not cooperate my career would be in jeopardy. I still declined. True to his word, Kaul had my name moved from the top of the promotion list to the bottom. Years later, when Kaul retired after his incompetent handling of the 1962 war, he was in Delhi, heartbroken and shunned, I went to see him. Tears streaming down his cheeks, he said, 'Jacob, of all people you have come to see me'. I said, 'General you were once my GOC. Do please let me know if I can help in any way.' He did not respond and I left him in tears. Such is life. Later, as a brigadier, when I was commandant, Artillery School, I had problems with Maj. Gen. Naravane who had once been a fellow prisoner of war of Kumaramangalam. The experience had, it is said, affected his mental balance. He wanted me to pass the 75mm mountain gun for which he was project-in-charge and had come for trials. The gun had over 90 defects, some of them major, so I refused. He gave me a low average annual confidential report. This notwithstanding, I was promoted to command a division and had the good fortune to serve under Lt Gen. Moti Sagar, who was then Southern Army Commander. Moti had been my platoon commander and thus my immediate officer, instructor when I was a cadet. 12 Infantry Division which I commanded came directly under Moti, and he gave me a free hand and encouragement. He was a thorough gentleman.
Unfortunately, personal vendettas are on the increase. The army chief, Gen. Gopal Bewoor, phoned me when I was Eastern Army commander to say that he was posting Maj. Gen. S.K. Sinha to 23 Infantry Division and that I should 'fix' him. I did not respond. Some time later Manekshaw, on one of his many trips to Calcutta to attend company board meetings, came to see me. He told me that Sinha was responsible to Gen. Kaul for orchestrating the inquiry against him in 1961 and that I should fix him. I did not like being told to do what I felt was not correct. I ensured that as I had been told to fix Sinha, he would get a good confidential report. When Bewoor received it he phoned me and asked why I had given him a good report, and the basis on which I had initiated it when Sinha had not even completed a year under me. I replied that according to regulations an army commander can initiate a report on any officer at any time. I added that if he wrote adverse comments and if Sinha appealed I would quote this conversation. Sinha was later cleared for promotion.
Not only was Bewoor wanting tofix officers, so also was Gen. 'Tappy' Raina. Raina had phoned me to fix Lt Gen. Stan Menezes who was then commanding IV Corps under me. Raina said that Menezes was fit only for the staff and unfit to command an army, and that I should not recommend him for the post of army commander. I told him that Menezes was a competent officer and that I would be recommending him for that rank. He thereupon retorted that he would not pass him as army commander but on the staff as vice chief, equivalent to the rank of army commander. Later he phoned me regarding the recently promoted Lt Gen. W.A.G. Pinto, and said that I should fix him. I replied that he as army chief had cleared Pinto for promotion to the rank of Lt General when he was his director of military training. I said I would not fix Pinto and was not prepared to be used. Pinto was later cleared for the rank of army commander.
I owe a great deal to Gen. Kumaramangalam. He took a liking to me from our days at the Artillery School. Later I was his staff officer at the Artillery Directorate. He trusted me completely and gave me a free hand. When I took a number of policy decisions and signed policy letters, the master general of ordnance, Lt Gen. Sant Singh wanted my scalp when I was moving to do a course at the Staff College. Kumaramanglam supported me and the action against me that Lt Gen. Sant Singh demanded, fizzled out. I indeed owe much to Kumaramangalam and was greatly saddened by his passing away.
The army I joined in 1941 has changed dramatically through the years. An army officer in those days was respected. To quote an example, in 1943 I was sent from Burma with a small detachment to collect the latest mortars for the regiment from the ordnance depot at Jabalpore. I collected the weapons and went to the railway station. There I met the station master and asked him when the next train from Jabalpore to Calcutta would leave. He said the next train was due to arrive but said it was the Calcutta Mail, but as there was no room for the mortars I would have to wait for a much slower train the next day. I asked about the mail van, but he said it was full. I said, 'Cannot you unload the mail and send it later?' impressing upon him that we needed these weapons urgently. He was sympathetic and said that he would need some authority to do so. I told him I would provide a letter of authority. He took out his pad and I wrote: 'I Capt. Jack Jacob, Royal Indian Artillery, authorize the station master, Jabalpore to unload the mail and transport weapons in its place', Jack Jacob, Capt.'. The mail was unloaded and the mortars loaded and moved rapidly to the front. This is an example of the status then enjoyed by army officers. Since 1947, the status of the army officer vis-a-vis his counterparts in the civil service and police has been steadily eroded over the years. The civil service boast that they are government but in reality they are government servants. They feel that the Mont Blanc pens they wield are more powerful than the sword. The three services remain disappointed with the sixth pay commission. Though people opting for the non-combat services has increased, the continued shortage of officers remains a matter of grave concern.
We have perhaps the best military in the world, but they require the support and appreciation of the government and the people, and modern equipment. Modern weapon systems are complex and take a long time to assimilate, and also require logistical back up. We are short of guns. After the induction of the Bofors gun, no 155mm howitzers have been bought. There are critical shortages of spares and ammunition. For example, during the Kargil incursions by some five battalions plus of Pakistan's Northern Light Infantry spread over a few kilometres of barren ridge, we ran out of 155mm ammunition and the Israelis had to fly it in.
Considering our GDP, the allocations for defence are proportionately low. Monies allotted are not fully utilized and much of it surrendered due to the inordinate delays resulting from irrational procedures.
Today, driving around Lutyen's Delhi you will see numerous guards at the residences of army generals. These guards they claim are there for reasons of security. Unless since changed, 'Regulations Army in India' authorized only one guard in a station. Even the vice chief in 1979 was not authorized a guard. The number of soldiers employed as guards and to undertake domestic chores is burgeoning, at a time when active units are short of manpower. It is time that these soldiers revert to the duties for which they were enrolled. Incredibly, the government has authorized retired service chiefs to be allotted two batmen each. Nowhere else in the world does such a provision exist.
A complaint of junior and middle-level officers is the lavish lifestyle of senior officers. It may be relevant to take an example from the UK. The chiefs of defence staff of the rank earlier of field marshal or equivalent now four-star generals, reside in a government flat in Kensington in London. There is no guard (this even during the days of IRA terrorism) and only a receptionist in the lobby. I visited some of them in earlier days. There was only one batman, and on occasion the officers served the drinks themselves.
I am impressed by our young officers. They are far better trained than I was and far better educated militarily. I had to learn my soldiering on the battlefield. Our middle piece officers are dedicated and competent. After Cariappa, Thimayya, Kumaramangalam, and Manekshaw we have not produced any army chief of any great distinction. Fortunately after many years, we have in Gen. V.K. Singh an army chief who is not only competent but commands an exemplary degree of integrity.
Today there is a parallel chain of command in the services. A wives' chain of command influence matters where they should have no locus standi. I had earlier to speak to the army chief, Raina, regarding the posting out of a commanding officer on a timeframe of 24 hours. On enquiring, the army chief told me that the wife of the second-in-command had written to his wife. I asked whether he or his wife was running the army, to which he did not reply. I told him that the posting order should be cancelled immediately or I would see the defence minister regarding the matter. He agreed to issue orders to cancel the posting (and did).
Lord Louis Mountbatten, as viceroy, had instructed that when an officer was appointed army commander, no further report would be initiated and that the army commander's dossier would then be held by the defence minister. This he did to ensure the independence of the army commander, who was a field army commander as opposed to being a 'chief of army staff'. The army chief is not a commander in chief, and is appointed from amongst the army commanders and is, under normal circumstances, the seniormost among them.
There is a need to recast and redefine our organizational and tactical doctrines. Army training manuals stipulate that defence is the basic operation of war. This is not so. The basic operation is the attack or offensive. Our organizations are tailored with this in mind. The British and some Commonwealth countries' infantry battalions have four rifle companies. This was based on British military thinking prior to and during the two world wars with weightage on defence. The Russian, American, and most other armies have three rifle companies in a battalion. It is difficult for a commanding officer to handle more than three companies in offensive operations. During my years in Burma I did not see any assault with more than one company in the assault, one in reserve, and one as part of the firm base. The only arm that has been reorganized since the Second World War is the artillery. The eight-gun battery of two troops has been reorganized as a 6-gun battery.
In September 1971, Eastern Command was provided with wheeled armoured personnel carriers (APCs) for two battalions. I was given the task to work out the establishment of the battalions as also the operating procedures. The Infantry and Staff Duties Directorates at Army HQ wanted to keep the existing organizations and to just mount the infantry in the APCs, as was the case in the old motorized battalions. I reorganized them on the lines of assault units: units of three assault companies. I streamlined the organizations, shed the platoons that were no longer relevant. Fortunately the director, military operations, Maj. Gen. Inder Gill backed me and got the reorganizations through and I wrote out the operating procedures. Thus in 1971, the mechanized infantry came into being. There was not sufficient time for training and these two battalions were not used to their full effect in the subsequent operations.
The armoured regiments too need reorganization. We have 14 tanks in a squadron, four troops of three tanks, and two in squadron HQ. This organization is based on outdated tactics. The Russians used tanks most effectively during the Second World War, thousands of T-34s being employed in battle, the Kursk being one. There are only ten tanks in a Russian company/squadron, three troops of three tanks and one for the commander. We should also rationalize our armoured regiments. Many countries are giving preference to brigade group organizations rather than the division. The armoured division was intended to be used for the breakout, that is, after the enemy defences have been breached. The division is then unleashed to strike at targets in the rear. The armoured divisions in our wars have been underutilized. Given the greater flexibility of the armoured brigade group we need to restructure our armoured formations laying emphasis on maneuverability and flexibility.
Today the greatest military threat is China. China refuses to drop its claims on Arunachal Pradesh and is building up its infrastructure including rail, roads, and airfields in Tibet. China can, in a space of some two weeks, deploy some 30 divisions in Tibet. China is of course also trying to establish control in the Indian Ocean with bases in Ramree Island and Gwadar in the Gulf of Oman.
Our infrastructure and troop strengths are less than adequate. Our mountain divisions require modern weapon systems and lack mobility, particularly troop equipment and helicopter mobility. The artillery is equipped with light howitzers. From my experience during the Second World War, only heavy shells had any effect in the mountains. There is a need for more divisions with heavier guns and more helicopters. It takes time to raise and re-equip mountain divisions.
The geopolitical and geo-military environment that obtains today is highly volatile. In the west we have Pakistan, driven by terrorism and home to many international and home-grown terrorist organizations. The Taliban is gaining control over most of the western parts of the country and is trying to gain control of Sind and southern Punjab. The ISI is stepping up its terrorist activities in Jammu & Kashmir and is establishing terrorist cells in many parts of India. It is also using Nepal and Bangladesh as surrogate jumping off areas for their terrorist activities. Bangladesh too was hosting hostile terrorists for operations in the North East and elsewhere in India. Nepal is another area of concern. The Maoist regime is moving closer to China and is reported to be establishing links with the Naxalites. To the south, the Sri Lanka campaign against the LTTE, though now at an end, is having a spill-over in the southern states.
In this volatile environment, India needs to reorganize its archaic security set up. The US established its Homeland Security and since 9/11 there have been no terrorist attacks there. There is a need to get to grips with the security of our country. We should have a proactive policy rather than a reactive one. Our attitude of 'lassiez faire' must be replaced by a pragmatic approach to national security. We should be able to speak and act from a position of strength (remember Theodore [Teddy] Roosevelt's advice: 'Speak softly but carry a big stick.').
The events of 26/11 exposed our inability to effectively counter ISI-controlled terrorist activities. Our reaction was delayed, ineffective, and pedestrian, the entire drama played out on television. It exposed our police and paramilitary forces in a very poor light.
Travels after Retirement
After retirement I visited many countries in South Africa. I met Nelson Mandela and Chief Buthelezi. In London, I met the queen of England in Saint James' Palace. Present there were Prince Phillip and the former king of Greece. In America, I had meetings with several congressmen and senators. In all these meetings I took the opportunity to lobby for India's interests in various fields.
I was invited to Israel for the 3000th anniversary of the founding of Jerusalem by Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin. I also met my old friend Gen. Mordecai Gur, the defence minister. Rabin and Mordecai Gur were keen to get my views on a range of subjects, and these were discussed in two separate sessions.
In 2009, I was invited to attend the Maccabiah games in Tel Aviv. I took the opportunity of meeting President Shimon Peres, whom I had known over a period of many years.
In London, I had interacted with Lord Geville Janner. Janner had invited me to become a patron of the Commonwealth Jewish Council back in the 1980s. Janner set up meetings for me with many decision-makers in the UK. I also had discussions at the Institute of Strategic Studies in London and had the opportunity of meeting Tony Blair and dining with him.
I have been advocating to the authorities that they reorganize our security infrastructure using the American Homeland Security apparatus as an example. There has been no terrorist attack in the US since 9/11.
The Maoists are taking control over more and more areas and the state governments are unable to counter them. They are linking up too with anti-Indian elements in Nepal, the North East, and Bangladesh. In 1969, Indira Gandhi ordered the army to deal with the Naxalites in West Bengal and they were driven out by mid 1971. Indira Gandhi had a pragmatic approach. If the army was used from 1969 to 1971 to crush the Naxalites, why then is the government now so reluctant to use it? Very recently (March-April 2010), following some particularly vicious Maoist attacks on paramilitary forces and civilians, the Government of India began seriously considering the use of trained armed forces to tackle the menace. In the 6 April Dantewada incident (Chhattisgarh) some 77 paramilitary personnel were killed in an ambush. Subsequently a splinter group of the Maoists derailed a Mumbai bound train near Jhagram (West Midnapore district in West Bengal) killing over 60 innocent civilians and injuring over 200, creating a national furore in press and parliament. Let us hope that better judgement prevails before the situation gets completely out of control.
Finally, my innings is nearing its end. It has been a tempestuous journey. I tried my best to do my duty as a soldier. As a governor, despite pressures, I tried to be apolitical and impartial. I recall lines from a poem by Gerard Manley Hopkins:
For I have desired to be in fields where springs not fail,
Where flies no deep and sided hail,
And a few lilies blow.
Those fields lie near and beckon.
Hic finis fandi