XVIII
‘I ask, what is going on? What is happening? As for me I am in the dark. Someone says, “We hold Cingulum - we have lost Ancona; Labienus has deserted from Caesar.” Are we talking about a general of the Roman People or about Hannibal.. . . He claims that he is doing all this to protect his dignity. How can there be any dignity where there is no honesty?’ - Cicero, c. 17-22 January 49 BC.1
‘Let us see if in this way we can willingly win the support of all and gain a permanent victory, since through their cruelty others have been unable to escape hatred or make their victory lasting - save for Lucius Sulla, and I do not intend to imitate him. This is a new way of conquest, we grow strong through pity and generosity.’ - Caesar, early March 49 BC.2
At the beginning of the Civil War Caesar paraded the Thirteenth Legion and addressed the men. In his own account he tells us that he spoke of the injustices done to him by his enemies, and of how his old friend and ally Pompey, now jealous of his achievements, had been lured away to join them. Most of all the proconsul laid before the legionaries the contempt shown for the hallowed rights of the tribunes of the people, ignoring their right of veto - something that not even Sulla had done. He did not dispute the Senate’s right to pass the senatus consultum ultimum, but denied that it had been necessary, and also made clear that it had never been used in similar circumstances, but only when Rome itself was under direct threat. Other sources tell us that to underline his point Caesar brought Antony and Cassius before the troops. They were still wearing the disguises in which they had fled from Rome, and the sight is said to have deeply moved the soldiers, first to pity and then to anger against the men who had trampled on the college of magistrates first created to protect the ordinary citizens. By the time Caesar had finished, the legionaries were yelling out that they were ready to avenge the wrongs done both to him and to the tribunes. It is not clear whether this parade occurred in Ravenna or in Ariminum after crossing the Rubicon. What mattered most was the reaction of the troops. The Thirteenth had been formed by Caesar seven years earlier and had served with him ever since. The soldiers trusted him to bring them victory as he had always done in the past. They remembered his generosity with spoils, with praise and decorations. At some point he almost doubled the basic annual salary of a legionary, from 125 to 225 denarii. Many of the Thirteenth were probably from north of the Po, men officially with Latin status, but whom he had treated as full citizens. Their officers, both the half-dozen or so tribunes and the sixty centurions, all owed their commissions and subsequent promotions to him. Some may originally have been recommended to him by Pompey - all of these were allowed to leave unharmed and with all their possessions, if their conscience told them to honour their earlier loyalty. We are not told how many men chose to take advantage of this. All ranks - not just in the Thirteenth but throughout the entire army - had gained much from Caesar and could expect even more in the future, particularly plots of land for discharged veterans. A Senate dominated by Caesar’s opponents was unlikely to be generous in this regard. In this pragmatic sense the army in Gaul had a vested interest in Caesar’s victory, now that it had come to civil war. They knew and trusted their commander after serving together for so long, whereas few knew his opponents to any degree.
The loyalty of Caesar’s army throughout the Civil War - and indeed even after his death - was truly remarkable, but is all too easily taken for granted. Much of it was clearly the result of the bond between the general and his officers and men, which grew up during the campaigns in Gaul, as he carefully cultivated and rewarded them. Yet it would be wrong to see this as the whole story, or to deny that politics played any part at all. The officers in particular may have had fairly detailed knowledge of what had gone on in Rome. It seems reasonable to say that most of Caesar’s army came to believe that he - and by extension they - had been treated shabbily by a group of senators whose own behaviour made it difficult to see them as the legitimate leaders of the Republic. For many Romans - wealthy and humble alike - there was a strong sentimental attachment to the tribunate. A sense of what was right, along with old loyalty and self-interest combined to ensure that Caesar’s army had no hesitation about fighting other Romans to set things right.3
The choice of which side to join does not seem to have required much thought for the overwhelming majority of Caesar’s troops, but for most Romans it was very difficult. Only a small number of people were deeply committed by the time hostilities opened. Even some of those who might have appeared fervent partisans now took a step back. One was Caius Claudius Marcellus, who as consul in 50 BC had presented the sword to Pompey and called on him to defend the Republic. Now that civil war had come, he chose to remain neutral, perhaps thinking of his marriage to Caesar’s niece. Calpurnius Piso could not be expected to side against his son-in-law, but did not play an active part in the war, especially in the early months. Family ties and longstanding bonds of friendship played a major role in determining allegiance for many men, but in the small world of the Roman elite many men had links with the leaders on both sides and faced a very difficult decision. Most did not feel a strong commitment to either side, but memories of the struggle between Sulla and the Marians suggested that refusing to take part would not guarantee a man’s safety Brutus, Servilia’s son, had studiously avoided ever speaking to Pompey, as he had executed Brutus’s father in 78 BC during Lepidus’ rebellion. Now he decided that his mother’s long-time lover was in the wrong and declared himself willing to serve under the command of his father’s killer. In part this was a matter of principle, but with his family connections there can have been little real doubt about his decision. He had been raised in Cato’s house and shared his uncle’s love of philosophy, while his wife was one of Appius Claudius’ daughters.4
There was one major defection from Caesar’s army when Labienus left him in the middle of January His senior legate had served with him in Gaul from the very beginning and had proved himself to be by far the most gifted of his senior officers. Compared to the other legates, Labienus was granted a more prominent place in the Commentaries. Scholars have put forward the conjecture that Labienus held the praetorship before coming to Gaul, perhaps in 60 BC, but there is absolutely no evidence for this. If this is correct, then he would have been at least fifty years old by the time of the Civil War and thus had been eligible for the consulship for a considerable time. On Caesar’s behalf he had effectively postponed his own career for the duration of the campaigns in Gaul. As a legate he won some glory, although the lion’s share of this went always to the proconsul. Several of his independent operations, especially those against the rebellious tribes in 54-53 and 52 BC, would certainly have won him a triumph had Labienus been a provincial governor himself, instead of a subordinate. He had also become very rich during these campaigns, for Caesar was far more generous with money than he was with glory. Cicero bemoaned the new-found wealth of Labienus. He may also have attracted the scorn of Catullus, if the theory is true that he was the Mentula - dick or dickhead - attacked in his poems. It is more than possible that Caesar intended further reward and hoped to have Labienus as his consular colleague in 48 BC. There seem to have been rumours about the senior legate’s loyalties as early as the summer of 50 BC, but Caesar had chosen to show his confidence in his subordinate by sending him to Cisalpine Gaul, near to Italy and therefore also nearer to hostile influences. In the event the gesture failed and Labienus went to join Caesar’s enemies. He may in fact have simply returned to an earlier loyalty, since he came from Picenum, a region dominated by Pompey’s family Past service with Pompey has been conjectured, as well as support in his career. All of this is plausible enough, but personal dissatisfaction may have been just as important. Successful generals have throughout history tended to display supreme self-confidence, often combined with a readiness to denigrate the skill of others, and jealousy of other men’s fame - Napoleon’s marshals and the Allied senior commanders in the Second World War spring to mind, but many examples could be found. Labienus had given a large chunk of his best years to Caesar and seems to have felt that this had not been sufficiently recognised. On several occasions during the campaigns he may well have felt that it was his ability and deeds, and not Caesar’s, which had won the day. Our sources give the impression that he had an abrasive character and was by no means a likeable man. Resentment at having always to come second to another man, and the conviction that his real worth had not been recognised, may well have contributed to his decision. He may also have judged that Caesar was likely to lose the war, especially once the proconsul was deprived of his own talent. Hearing that Labienus had defected, Caesar decided on another gesture and gave instructions that all of his baggage should be sent after him.5
The prospect of gain and personal advantage from picking the right side were evidently important for many men faced with the prospect of war. As early as August 50 BC Cicero’s correspondent Caelius Rufus had expressed his own cynical view:
You won’t forget of course, that in a domestic squabble, carried on constitutionally and without resort to armed conflict, then men ought to espouse the more honourable cause; however, when it’s a war and the military camp, espouse the stronger, and hold the side to be best which is strongest. In all this strife I can see that Pompey will be backed by the Senate and the ‘lawyers’ - all those with plenty of fear and little hope will join Caesar, whose army is incomparably better.6
True to his word, Caelius joined the side with the better army rather than the one championed by most distinguished men and with the better cause. Not everyone agreed with his judgement on the balance of power. Caesar had ten legions, all veterans of the campaigns in Gaul, along with the equivalent of two more in the twenty-two independent cohorts raised in Transalpine Gaul, and auxiliaries and allies from Gaul and Germany. Losses to battle, accident and disease make it unlikely that any of the legions - especially the ones with longest service - had anything like their paper strength of soldiers. A generous estimate would give Caesar something like 45,000 legionaries at the beginning of 49 BC, but the figure could as easily have been as low as 30,000-35,000. Man for man these soldiers were better than any of the troops available to the enemy. There were the two legions that had been taken from Caesar and were now camped in southern Italy. One of these, the First, had on its formation taken an oath to Pompey, but the other - originally the Fifteenth, now renumbered the Third - had been raised by and for Caesar. Both units had served for three campaigns in Gaul. Pompey swiftly realised that the optimistic reports of their disaffection with their old commander were little more than a fantasy For the moment at least, he did not feel confident enough to lead these men into battle against their former comrades and general. He did have seven fully formed and trained legions in the Spanish provinces, but these had little or no experience of actual warfare and so lacked the confidence Caesar’s men possessed after years of victory Even more importantly they were far away, unable to play a part in the initial stages of the conflict. In the long term Pompey and his allies could call on far greater resources of manpower, money, animals and equipment than Caesar. A flood of recruits in all parts of Italy was confidently predicted, and with the consuls on their side they had access to the wealth of the State. Overseas, Pompey had clients and connections in Spain, North Africa and throughout the East, all of whom could be called upon to supply soldiers and contribute financially to the cause. It would take time to mobilise all these resources, to raise an army or armies, equip them and provide logistic support, as well as turning raw recruits into soldiers. One of the reasons why Pompey and his allies had adopted such an inflexible line in the months building up to the war was their absolute confidence that they possessed the military might to crush Caesar. On balance this was probably a fair assessment, as long as their opponent gave them time to prepare.
THE ITALIAN CAMPAIGN, JANUARY TO MARCH
The news that Caesar had crossed the Rubicon stunned his opponents. January was a difficult time to keep an army supplied in the field. In spite of earlier rumours, they may well have known that the bulk of his forces were still north of the Alps. It was probably also an indication that, even after passing the senatus consultum ultimum and beginning to mobilise, many of them really did expect him to back down in the face of their unity and obvious strength. Perhaps there was an assumption that he would wait for the campaigning season and carefully mass his forces before acting, maybe even remain on the defensive in the hope of continued negotiation. In the days following 7 January the Senate had convened on several occasions outside the boundary of the city, so that Pompey could reassure the senators. His father-in-law Metellus Scipio was given command of Syria, while Domitius Ahenobarbus was to go to Transalpine Gaul as proconsul. Caesar notes in the Commentaries that they did not deign to ratify all these appointments with a vote in the Popular Assembly in the usual way. However, both men did perform the normal ceremonies for a magistrate setting out for a command, and then rushed off to their provinces, as did the propraetors appointed to other commands. One of the latter was given Cisalpine Gaul. Caesar’s opponents had openly decided to make use of force against him, but they were not yet ready. Levies were underway, arms and equipment were being gathered, but by no stretch of the imagination could Italy have been described as prepared to meet an invasion. Caesar was not ready either, in the sense that he would surely have liked to have a stronger force at his immediate disposal before acting. He had sent orders to several other formations instructing them to move to join him, but they would not all arrive for some time. His opponents were still unprepared, and waiting would only give them a chance to grow stronger. Never one to delay unless this would bring him clear advantage, Caesar advanced with only the Thirteenth.7
Ariminum, already infiltrated by his men, did not resist him. For a while he remained there but sent Antony with five cohorts to occupy Arretium (modern Arrezo), despatching three more to Pisaurum, Fanum (modern Fano) and Ancona respectively. There was no fighting. News of the crossing of the Rubicon seems to have reached Rome on about 17 January Pompey and his leading allies promptly left the city, for Pompey quickly realised that at present he simply did not have the forces to stop Caesar. This meant that Rome had been abandoned by all senior magistrates and so the public life
of the Republic for the moment ceased to be conducted in the proper way. Many uncommitted senators went with them, remembering the bloody entries into Rome made by Marius and Sulla. Others simply left Rome and went to their country houses, planning to keep a low profile. Around this time a number of unofficial envoys came to Caesar at Ariminum. One was Lucius Julius Caesar, son of the former consul who had served as his legate for a number of years. He brought a message from Pompey, assuring Caesar that his actions were not motivated by personal hostility, but were dictated by his duty to the Republic. His old ally urged Caesar to lay down his command voluntarily and prevent civil war. A similar request was brought by the praetor Lucius Roscius. Caesar replied by stating that all he wished was to exercise the rights legally granted to him by the Roman people. His enemies had been raising troops for some time. If they wanted peace then Pompey should go to his province, then both of them could lay down their commands and disband their armies - along with all the other troops in Italy - at the same time. Not for the last time he also asked Pompey to come and meet him in person. By 23 January Lucius Caesar the Younger reached Pompey, who was now at Teanum in Apulia. According to Cicero writing two days later, Caesar’s:
terms were accepted with the proviso that he must at once withdraw all his garrisons from the towns which he had occupied outside his province. Once that was done, they replied that we should return to the city and settle the matter in the Senate. I hope at present that it will be possible for us to have peace. For one leader regrets his rash folly and the other his lack of forces.8
The Italian campaign 49 BC
Letters were sent to Caesar informing him of the offer - as he himself put it, that he should ‘go back to Gaul, abandon Ariminum and disband his forces’. To him this was an ‘unfair deal’. No date was given for Pompey’s departure to his provinces or his laying the command down and giving up his armies. It was obvious that he was effectively being asked to give up the military advantage he had gained by his sudden invasion. His opponents wanted him to withdraw and then trust to their giving his demands a sympathetic hearing in future meetings of the Senate. There was no reason for Caesar to believe that things would go better for him than they had in the debates of the last eighteen months. Pompey and his allies did not trust Caesar enough to stop raising troops in expectation that he would accept their terms. In return Caeser did not trust them sufficiently to take the first step towards peace and go back to his province. Caesar does seem to have been especially frustrated by Pompey’s reluctance to agree to a face-to-face conference. In the past the two men had got on well and he seems to have been confident that he could reach a genuine agreement with his former son-in-law. Pompey may have been unsure about whether or not he could resist Caesar’s persuasiveness. For a man with a morbid fear of assassination and memories of an earlier and very brutal civil war, it is possible that he was reluctant to risk such a meeting. Yet in the end it was probably more a question of his relationship with Cato and his other new allies. Their alliance was recent, his friendship with Caesar older and of longer duration. Whatever he felt himself, Pompey knew that these men simply would not believe in his good faith and constancy if he privately met Caesar. Cato had already urged the Senate to appoint Pompey as supreme commander until the crisis was over and the rebellious proconsul defeated. This was rejected by the consuls and ex-consuls who were too proud to be commanded by anyone else. Jealousy and suspicion between allies was as much a hindrance to a negotiated settlement as mistrust between enemies.9
Caesar resumed his advance. A report reached him that Iguvium was held by a garrison of five cohorts under the command of the propraetor Quintus Minucius Thermus, but that the townsfolk favoured him. The two cohorts with him at Ariminum were added to the one stationed in Pisarum and sent under Curio to the town. Thermus retreated, his raw recruits deserted and went home, and Curio’s men were welcomed at Iguvium. Trusting in local goodwill, Caesar pushed on to Auxinum and had soon overrun Picenum, supposedly the heartland of Pompey’s family There was one small skirmish in which a few prisoners were taken, but the general population was displaying no enthusiasm for rising up against Caesar and his men. The cause against Caesar had little popular appeal and his army was not plundering or doing anything else that might have created hostility. A few of the Pompeian soldiers even chose to join him. Many communities also remembered the gifts Caesar had distributed to them from the profits of Gaul - he took particular satisfaction in reporting that even the town of Cingulum, which had been especially favoured by Labienus, now willingly opened its gates to him.10
By this time it was February and Caesar had reunited the detachments of the Thirteenth and been joined by the Twelfth. At Asculum another Pompeian garrison fled before him, and it was not until he reached Corfinium that he encountered any serious opposition. In command there was Domitius Ahenobarbus, who had not yet managed to get anywhere near his province. Together with his subordinates he had managed to muster a force of more than thirty cohorts, but these were entirely raw recruits. Pompey had not wanted Ahenobarbus to defend the town, as he had no doubt of the inevitable outcome when such inexperienced troops came up against Caesar’s veterans. He was himself much further south in Apulia with the First and Third legions, as well as a number of recent levies. However, he had no power to issue orders to Ahenobarbus and could do no more than send letters urging him to abandon the town and join him. Domitius Ahenobarbus was not a man to change his mind too readily and wrote replies imploring Pompey to come to him. There were no similar divisions over strategy for Caesar. He closed on Corfinium, driving off some enemy cohorts which attempted to break down the bridge outside the town. Soon afterwards Antony was sent with a quarter of the army to Sulmo in response to an appeal from the town.
In another bloodless victory the Pompeian commander was captured, taken to Caesar and promptly allowed to go free. In the meantime the Caesarean army gathered food in preparation for the siege of Corfinium. After three days it received a major boost to its strength when it was joined by the Eighth Legion and the twenty-two cohorts raised from Transalpine Gaul and trained and equipped as legionaries. The troops were set to building a line of circumvallation strengthened by forts to surround the town.
Before the blockade was complete, Domitius Ahenobarbus received a final letter from Pompey making it clear that he had no intention of marching to relieve Corfinium. Deciding now that the town’s prospects were not good, he publicly announced that help was on its way, while privately planning his own escape. However, his increasingly furtive manner soon revealed the truth to his legionaries. A council was organised consisting of the tribunes, along with the centurions - almost two hundred of these if the thirty-three cohorts were at full strength - and representatives of the ordinary soldiers to debate the matter. Some of the troops were Marsi, who had a close tie to their commander through his family’s estates in the region. At first they were staunchly loyal, even threatening to use force against the other legionaries, but their mood changed when they became convinced that their leader planned to abscond. Ahenobarbus was placed under arrest by his own men, who immediately sent envoys to surrender themselves and the town to Caesar. This was welcome news, since although he had little doubt of the outcome of the siege it would clearly pin him down for several weeks. Instead the matter had been resolved in only seven days. However, he was reluctant to enter the walls immediately, for night was falling and he did not trust his legionaries not to misbehave once they got into the dark streets of the town. So far his army had not plundered or laid waste the lands they passed through, as they had so often done in the past. Instead he had the troops stand to arms in the lines around Corfinium throughout the night to prevent any fugitives from slipping out. Near dawn one of the senior Pompeians, Publius Cornelius Lentulus Spinther, who had been consul in 57 BC, surrendered himself and was soon followed by the remaining senior officers.
Caesar’s portrait of Ahenobarbus is scarcely flattering, but our other sources were even less kind. It was claimed that he had decided to commit suicide and demanded that his physician supply him with poison. However, when he heard that Caesar was not executing his important prisoners, he immediately repented of his rashness and was delighted to be informed by his doctor that he had only taken a harmless draught. Domitius Ahenobarbus then went out to surrender to the man whose bitter opponent he had been for at least a decade. Altogether there were fifty senators and equestrians amongst the Pompeians who surrendered, probably on 21 February. Caesar had them brought before him, repeated the charges that he had been unfairly and illegally treated and forced into war, reminding some of them of personal favours he had done them in the past. After that, all were allowed to go free. Caesar had already followed the same policy earlier in the campaign, but never up to this point had so many or so distinguished a group received the benefit of his clemency. Ahenobarbus had brought 6 million sestertii of public money with him to provide pay for his troops. This was handed over to Caesar by the town’s magistrates, but he ordered that it be sent back to his enemy, lest it be thought that ‘he was more restrained in dealing with men’s lives, than their wealth’. The surrendered soldiers were asked to take an oath to him. Soon, these legions would go under Curio’s command to fight for Caesar in Sicily and Africa.11
The clemency of Corfinium became famous, and his moderation formed a central part of Caesar’s propaganda campaign. Everyone had expected him to behave like Sulla or Marius - or even, though few would dare to say it, like the Pompey who had earned the nickname of the ‘young butcher’. Instead his soldiers were kept under tight discipline, did not plunder and only fought when they were themselves resisted. Even his bitterest enemies were allowed to go free, although both Lentulus and Ahenobarbus went straight off to fight against him again. The overwhelming majority of people in Italy were apathetic to the issues about which the Civil War was being waged. Amongst the wider population both Pompey and Caesar were highly respected and seen as great servants of the Republic. If Caesar’s legions had come marauding and slaughtering their way through Italy, then this might well have turned more of the population against him. His policy of clemency made practical sense. Armies failed to spring from the soil of Italy as Pompey had promised just a few months before. One senator acidly suggested that maybe it was about time the great man started stamping his foot. Very early on Pompey had decided that Rome was indefensible. At some point he reached the further conclusion that Caesar could not be beaten in Italy with two veteran, but possibly unreliable, legions, supported by the rawest of recruits. Instead he planned to shift the war away, taking his forces across the sea to Greece where they could be trained and a massive army gathered with the support of the eastern provinces. It was not a popular decision with other senators, and for this reason, as well as wanting to conceal his intentions from Caesar, he at first kept the idea to himself. The stand at Corfinium wasted the equivalent of three legions, but Pompey managed to concentrate the remainder of his forces at Brundisium (modern Brindisi). Merchant vessels were requisitioned and the process of shipping men and equipment over the Adriatic begun. It was a long and complex task, but Pompey had always excelled at organisation on a massive scale and set about the task with all his accustomed skill.12
Caesar arrived outside Brundisium on 9 March. He had six legions, the veteran Eighth, Twelfth and Thirteenth, along with some new recruits and presumably the cohorts from Transalpine Gaul, some of whom were soon to be formally converted into a legion, the Fifth Alaudae - the name meant the ‘Larks’, probably from its distinctive feathered crest or shield design. Pompey had only a rearguard of two legions awaiting shipment. Caesar set his men to building booms to close off the narrow entrance to the harbour. The defenders put their own engineering skills to good use to prevent this. There were further attempts at negotiation, but none came to anything. Pompey once again refused Caesar’s plea for a personal meeting. Then, when they were at last ready, the Pompeians evacuated the town during the night of 17 March. Pompey escaped with virtually all his men, apart from two ships that ran aground on the boom built by Caesar’s men. The townsfolk - at last able to express their resentment against the Pompeians according to Caesar, but doubtless also through a keenness to avoid rough treatment at the hands of the legionaries - pointed out the traps built by the enemy to cause casualties amongst Caesar’s men. Pompey had got away with a substantial force, around which he could in time build a great army Then, when he was ready he could invade Italy from Greece just as Sulla had done so successfully. As Pompey so often declared, ‘Sulla did it, why shouldn’t I?’13
ROME
For the moment Caesar could not follow. The Pompeians had gathered up and taken most of the merchant ships from the region, and it would take a long time to collect and bring vessels from elsewhere. Caesar was not inclined to wait, sitting on the defensive and handing the initiative back to his opponents. It was now spring, the opening of the proper campaigning season when armies found it easier to operate. The bulk of his own army - some seven legions along with numerous allies and auxiliaries - was still north of the Alps. Pompey’s best legions were in the Spanish Peninsula, cut off from their commander and led by his legates. At the moment they were still passive but it was unlikely that this would last forever, especially if Caesar massed all his forces and prepared for a seaborne invasion of Greece. He did not need a fleet of ships to reach Spain, neither would the enemy forces there have much difficulty marching on Gaul or Italy. In contrast it would take many months for Pompey to form and train an army, so that there was no real prospect of his trying to invade Italy from Greece during 49 BC. Yet Pompey was not inactive and he and his allies planned to cut off the food supplies going to Italy from the provinces. Defeating the armies in Spain would deprive Pompey of his best troops and weaken him, even if it would not be the decisive encounter of the war. It was beneficial and, most important of all, it was possible. Without hesitation Caesar decided to attack the Pompeians in Spain. He joked that he was going to fight ‘an army without a general’, and that then he would deal with ‘a general without an army’ when he went to confront Pompey in Greece. In the meantime Curio would go to secure Sicily and ensure that it continued to ship its surplus crops to Italy. Another force went to take Sardinia.14
Caesar had military control of all of Italy, for not a single walled town or city resisted him. He was eager to hasten to Spain since time was not on his side, and as every month passed Pompey would only continue to grow stronger. Most of the magistrates had gone with his opponents, as had some distinguished senators. Many more remained in Italy but had yet to commit themselves to either side. Caesar wanted the Senate to meet and hoped to give every impression that the organs of the State continued to function even at this time of crisis. His enemies claimed that they represented the true Republic. Caesar wanted to challenge this and show that the State continued to function in Rome, where it was supposed to be, and so to make clear that his cause was legitimate, that he did not fight against the Republic, but against a faction that had usurped power. As a result he wanted as many senators as possible to attend the meeting that was called for 1 April. Cicero was still in Italy, and in a series of letters Caesar’s associates tried to persuade him to attend. The orator had worked hard to avoid the situation developing into war in the first place and had been dismayed by the militant enthusiasm he had seen in others. When war began, he was appalled by the speed with which Rome was abandoned, and then even more disgusted when he realised that Pompey planned to evacuate Italy altogether. Cicero felt an old and deep loyalty to Pompey as a man, and from the beginning his instinct and judgement had dictated that whatever happened, he must in the end be on the same side. Pompey had often disappointed him, not always giving him the praise he wanted, forming the alliance with Crassus and Caesar and, most of all, abandoning him to his fate when Clodius had forced Cicero into exile. Nevertheless, the deep affection remained, along with the hope that the great man would one day live up to what the orator believed was his full potential to be a force for good within the Republic. Yet since his return from exile Pompey and others had encouraged him to develop a friendship with Caesar. Apart from the warm correspondence, the involvement in Caesar’s building plans and Quintus’ service in Gaul, Cicero himself had received a major loan from Caesar. In the months leading up to the war this had greatly exercised him, as he had no wish to be seen as having been bought by Caesar, still less of fighting against him in order to avoid the debt.15
Cicero had not welcomed his posting as governor of Cilicia, but had taken care to perform his duties well. In a campaign against the tribes of Mount Amanus he - or in truth his more experienced legates - had won a minor victory. Though scarcely a military man, the orator was desperately eager to be awarded a triumph for this success. In 50 BC the Senate had voted him a public thanksgiving, a common preliminary to the greater honour. Cato had opposed the motion and later primly informed Cicero that this was because he felt it would be better to honour him for his good and honest administration, since this was of far more worth to the Republic. Curio had at first also been hostile. Days of thanksgiving prevented public business from being conducted and he may have been worried that Caesar’s opponents would seek to gain advantage through manipulating the calendar in this way. However, Caesar swiftly instructed the tribune to back the claim and in the end the motion passed easily. Salt was rubbed into the wound when Cato successfully put forward a vote awarding twenty days of thanksgiving to Bibulus, who had campaigned in the same mountains as Cicero, which bordered Cilicia and his own province of Syria. Cato’s son- in-law had achieved little and had in fact suffered at least one serious defeat. Granting him an honour at all was questionable, but one of this length was absurd, yet presumably it was felt that he should be granted a number of days surpassing those ever given to Pompey and only equalled by Caesar. Cicero accepted the hypocrisy necessary for success in politics. His predecessor in Cilicia had been Appius Claudius, who had plundered the province for his own gain. Privately Cicero described his actions as those of a ‘wild beast’, but he was invariably scrupulously polite, even warm, in his dealings with Claudius himself. Nevertheless Cato’s actions left a bitter taste. Caesar wrote to Cicero after the vote congratulating him, doubtless encouraging his hopes for a triumph, and crowing over his old adversary’s double standards.16
Cicero was in a difficult position when the Civil War began. He had not yet laid down his proconsular imperium for he could not do this until he celebrated his longed for triumph. Therefore he was still attended by lictors and had the right to command troops. Much as he disapproved of the attitude and behaviour of Pompey, Cato, Domitius Ahenobarbus and their associates, he did not feel that he could side against such men or fail to support the legally elected consuls of the year. He was given the task of raising troops, but soon gave this up as impractical and played no active part in the campaign. Caesar’s crossing of the Rubicon he thought an appalling crime, but his attitude softened a little when he heard of the clement treatment of the captured Pompeians. Cicero wrote to commend him, especially in the case of Lentulus, who had supported him in 63 BC. Cut off from Pompey at Brundisium - admittedly Cicero made no great effort to reach him since he hated his strategy of leaving Italy - he waited events at one of his country villas. In early March, probably before Brundisium fell, Caesar had written a brief letter to the orator, urging him to:
have no doubt that I have many times been grateful to you, and look forward to having even more reason to be grateful to you in the future. This is no more than you deserve. First, though, I implore you, since I expect that I shall swiftly come to Rome, that I may see you there, and draw on your counsel, goodwill, dignity, and assistance of every kind.
I will close as I began. Please excuse my haste and the brevity of this letter.17
Cicero responded on 19 March, writing to ask exactly what Caesar meant by his ‘goodwill’ and ‘assistance’. He repeated his willingness to work for peace, as long as this protected ‘our mutual friend Pompey’, for the Republic would benefit most if the two men were reconciled. On the 26th Caesar wrote again, thanking Cicero for commending his clemency, and noted that ‘there was nothing further from my nature than cruelty’. Again Caesar urged him to come to Rome, this time saying that he wanted his ‘counsel and resources’. Another incentive was the presence with the Caesarean army of the orator’s son-in-law Publius Cornelius Dolabella, and Caesar assured the orator of the favour in which the young man was held. Two days later the two men met at Formiae. Cicero was determined not to be used and staunchly resisted the pressure to come to Rome:
He kept saying that my refusal was a condemnation of him, which would make others less likely to come, if I did not go. After a lot of talk, [Caesar said] ‘Well come then, and talk about peace.’ As a free agent?’ I asked.
He said, ‘Should I tell you what to say!’ ‘In that case,’ I said, ‘I will argue that the Senate cannot approve your taking an army to Spain or transporting one to Greece. And more than that,’ I went on, ‘I shall deplore Cnaeus’ [i.e. Pompey’s] fate.’ So then he said, ‘I really do not want you to say that.’ ‘That’s what I thought, but I do not want to go there, because I will either have to say that and more besides, about which I cannot hold my tongue, if I am present, or else I cannot go.’
Caesar urged Cicero to think the matter over. The latter was convinced that Caesar had no great love for him at present, but felt that he had regained some self-respect. There was a definite hint of menace when Caesar concluded by saying brusquely that if Cicero would not advise him, he would seek guidance from others. The commander’s officers were a motley crew in the orator’s opinion, making the threat seem more ominous.18
The Senate met on the appointed day, summoned by the tribunes Antony and Cassius, and convened outside the formal boundary of the city so that the proconsul Caesar could attend. In itself this was proper, although subsequently Cicero at least was unwilling to accept it as a proper meeting rather than an informal gathering. The turnout was poor, and most notable of all was the absence of distinguished men. Even so Caesar used this as a public opportunity to repeat his grievances - that all he had wanted was the right to exercise privileges granted to him legitimately by the tribunes, but that Pompey’s attitude had changed over time. It was the bitter hatred of his personal enemies who had forced him to war. More practically Caesar requested that senatorial envoys be sent to negotiate with Pompey and effect a reconciliation. Caesar declared his own ambition was to display the same gifts in ‘justice and equity’ as he displayed in action. The motion was approved, but no one was willing to go. Always a popularis, Caesar did not confine his attentions to the Senate. Antony summoned the Concilium Plebis to vote on a number of measures. Before the meeting Caesar addressed a gathering of the people, again explaining his actions and blaming his opponents for the war. He assured them that the city would continue to receive the grain it needed, and even promised to give every citizen a gift of 300 sestertii. As in the Senate, the reception seems to have been muted. The memories of the vicious reprisals inflicted by Marius and Sulla still lingered and the way the war would develop was unclear. In the Commentaries Caesar claims that Pompey had threatened to treat even those who stayed in Italy as if they had sided with Caesar. In the end, most people of all classes felt no strong attachment to either side, wanted to be neutral and simply hoped to survive the Civil War unscathed. Some were convinced by Caesar’s words and attitude, but most remained wary The only open resistance to Caesar came from one of the tribunes, Lucius Caecilius Metellus, who began by hindering him in the Senate.19
The main confrontation came when Caesar decided to make use of the State Treasury The conquest of Gaul had made him wealthy, but he had never been one to hoard his money and had spent freely to win the loyalty of his army and men like Curio and Aemilius Paullus. He was now faced with the cost of supporting a truly enormous war effort. In just a few months he had added three new legions and numbers of recruits to the ten legions, independent cohorts and auxiliaries that he had controlled at the start of the year. In time additional forces would be raised. All of these men had to be paid - it was especially unwise to give any cause for discontent to soldiers who had once served with the enemy. More than that these armies needed to be equipped and fed. In Gaul Caesar had relied heavily on allied communities to supply him with food, but the conditions of civil war were different. Not all provincial and allied communities would side with him, but it was important to avoid treating those who did not too harshly, for in the end he must hope to win them over to his cause. Where necessary Caesar would have to pay for a good deal of his armies’ requirements. Crassus had boasted that only a man who could raise an army from his own resources could truly call himself rich. Caesar was rich, but he was now being called upon to fund a conflict on a massive scale, and no individual possessed that much money.
However, when he went to the Treasury - or perhaps sent men, since this would otherwise have meant crossing the boundary of the city - Metellus stood in front of the doors and imposed his veto. The Treasury was housed in the Temple of Saturn in the Forum. The consuls had left the door locked and barred, taking the key with them, but the soldiers ignored the tribune and chopped it down with axes. In Plutarch’s version blacksmiths had to be summoned to perform this task, and there was a confrontation between Caesar and Metellus outside the building. As the tribune repeatedly tried to halt the work, Caesar’s temper flared up and he threatened to kill him. As Metellus at last backed down, Caesar declared that it was harder for a man of his natural clemency to make such a threat than it would be for him actually to do the deed. The man who had proclaimed that he was championing the rights of the tribunes in January was now as ready as his opponents had been to override and threaten one of these magistrates. He had never hidden the fact that his greatest aim was to protect his own dignitas. Now that war had come the only way to do that was to win, and in order to win he needed cash. The money was taken - 15,000 gold bars, 30,000 silver bars and no less than 30 million sestertii. In addition, Caesar took a special fund kept over the centuries in case there was a repeat of the Gallic attack on Rome in 390 BC. Caesar announced that there was no longer any need of this since he had permanently dealt with the threat from the Gauls. Even so, he made no mention of any of this in the Commentaries, merely noting that Metellus, spurred on by his enemies, was generally obstructive.20
Caesar had returned to Rome for the first time in nine years. At most, he stayed for a couple of weeks and then pressed on to join the army massing for the Spanish campaign. Mark Antony was left in charge of Italy From Cicero’s correspondence we know that men like Curio, Caelius and Dolabella were all confident that the campaign in Spain would be both swift and successful. Sardinia and Sicily were soon taken without meeting any serious resistance. Caesar had won a victory in the Italian campaign, but it was a hollow one in the sense that Pompey and his army had escaped. The war would go on and was already widening. In time it would spread to virtually all the lands around the Mediterranean. Caesar’s enemies were still powerful and would grow stronger. In Italy people were relieved that he had not turned out to be a Sulla, but few had so far been turned into his enthusiastic supporters.21
THE ILERDA CAMPAIGN, APRIL TO AUGUST, 49 BC
Caesar described the Pompeians in Spain as an army without a general. Three legates commanded the seven Pompeian legions in the Spanish Peninsula, but they did not prove an effective team. One, Marcus Terentius Varro, was widely respected as a scholar and during his lifetime wrote a long list of books on an exceptionally broad range of subjects. He had a long political association with Pompey, having in 70 BC written a manual for him on the procedures of the Senate. He had served as his legate before and in 49 BC had charge of Further Spain, but seems to have had only modest military ability During the campaign his army did not join the main Pompeian force and played no significant role. Most of the fighting was done by the remaining five legions under the command of Marcus Petreius and Lucius Afranius. Petreius was the more experienced of the two. He had been in effective control of the army that defeated Catiline in 63 BC. According to Sallust he had already served for thirty years at that time. It is possible that he was the son of one of Marius’ senior centurions. By the time of the Civil War he must have been about sixty and, although a very experienced campaigner, had mainly acted as someone else’s subordinate. Afranius was the consul for 60 BC, better known as a dancer than for any other talents. He had taken part in several of Pompey’s campaigns and so had some military experience, but had never held an independent command. As an ex-consul he was senior to Petreius, but it is unclear whether he took charge or the two men acted as if they had joint authority. In addition to their five legions they had substantial auxiliary forces, including some 10,000 cavalry and eighty cohorts of Spanish infantry. The latter were predominantly heavy infantry (scutati), but also included units of light infantrymen (caetrati) armed with javelins and small circular shields.22
Caesar sent orders for his legate Caius Fabius to take the three legions in the west of the Transalpine province at Narbo and secure the passes of the Pyrenees. Once this was done, Fabius pushed on to close with Afranius and Petreius who had concentrated near the town of Ilerda (modern Lerida). Messengers went to three other legions instructing them to march and join Fabius, along with 5,000 auxiliary infantry and 6,000 allied and auxiliary cavalry. Caesar himself followed, but paused en route outside Massilia. This ancient Greek colony was one of Rome’s oldest allies. As proconsul of Gaul he had taken care to honour and favour the community, but the place also had a strong connection with Pompey dating back to the war against Sertorius. Now the city closed its gates to Caesar’s men and refused to let him enter. The Massilian magistrates claimed that they did not understand the intricacies of Roman politics, but felt that they could not side with either Caesar or Pompey against the other. This plea of neutrality soon rang a little hollow when they let Domitius Ahenobarbus sail into their harbour with a force raised from his own household and slaves. The latter’s family connections with the region may also have encouraged them to welcome him. Unabashed by his recent surrender and release, Domitius Ahenobarbus had finally reached the province he had craved for so many years. The Massiliotes immediately gave him command of the defence and readied themselves to face a siege. Caesar moved three legions to the town and placed them under the command of Caius Trebonius. In support was a squadron of warships under the command of Decimus Brutus, the same man who had led the fleet against the Veneti. After moving them into place and beginning the siege, Caesar left his subordinates to the task and pressed on, escorted by a personal bodyguard of 900 German auxiliary horsemen. It was a busy time, with plans having to be made and appropriate orders despatched. The loss of Massilia to the enemy was a blow, for it was a major port and its facilities and merchant fleet would have been a great asset in supplying the army fighting in Spain. Yet time was not on Caesar’s side and he could not afford to wait. However, in spite of the pressures of command he still found time to write letters to prominent men. Cicero received one from him that had been written just a few days before he reached Massilia. In it Caesar urged the orator against any rash act such as joining Pompey.23
By the time Caesar joined Fabius in June, the six legions were already concentrated in one force along with most of the allies and auxiliaries. The units were probably the Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh and Fourteenth. In numbers the enemy may - or may not, since we do not know the strengths of individual units on either side - have had a slight numerical advantage. Spirit and experience were very much in Caesar’s favour. In spite of the money taken from the Treasury it remained a struggle to meet all the costs of fighting the war. Therefore, ‘at this time he borrowed money from the military tribunes and centurions; and distributed the cash to the soldiers. By doing this he achieved two things at once, since he took a security for the loyalty of the centurions and won the enthusiasm of the legionaries with his largess.’ Caesar’s army was confident, but the enemy had taken up a strong defensive position. Their main camp was situated on the same ridge as the town of Ilerda itself. A smaller force controlled the bridge over the River Sicoris (modern Segre), which separated the two armies. Before Caesar arrived Fabius had constructed two bridges some 4 miles apart and crossed over to the enemy-held west bank. With two substantial armies sitting in position close to each other over the following days and weeks supply soon became a problem, and both sides regularly sent foraging expeditions to the east side of the river as food and forage became increasingly difficult to obtain. Two of Fabius’ legions were out on such an expedition when the bridge they had crossed suddenly collapsed. Fortunately, a relief force crossing by the more distant remaining bridge was able to reach them before they were too badly handled by four legions and a strong force of cavalry sent by Afranius to attack them.24
Caesar arrived two days after the skirmish. The broken bridge was almost repaired and under his orders the work was completed during the night. That same day he carried out a thorough reconnaissance, looking particularly at the terrain. The next morning he led out the entire army, save for six cohorts left behind to protect the camp and the bridge, and advanced to form up in battle order at the bottom of the slope in front of the Pompeian camp. Afranius and Petreius responded to this challenge, but deployed their line no more than halfway down the slope, not too far from the rampart of his own camp. In the manner typical of warfare in this period, the two armies then stared at each other for some time, neither wishing to go forward any further and force a battle. Caesar was reluctant to risk fighting with the ground in the enemy’s favour. At some point in the day he claims to have learnt - presumably from prisoners or deserters - that it was Afranius’ caution that was holding the enemy back. He decided to establish a new camp on the spot, but as on similar occasions in the past was careful to make sure that his troops did not become vulnerable to attack by the nearby enemy during the construction. The legions were formed in the normal triplex acies, so Caesar withdrew the cohorts of the third line and set them to digging a 15-foot wide ditch. As an added precaution they did not construct a rampart, since this would have been too visible. Even without its protection, such a wide ditch would seriously obstruct an enemy charge. By the evening it was ready, and Caesar withdrew the rest of the army behind the line of the ditch. During the night he kept the men under arms, but the enemy made no hostile move. On the following day three legions formed up for battle facing the enemy, while the remaining units, sending parties out to fetch the necessary material for a rampart, in the meantime dug ditches leading back at right angles from the first to create a greater semblance of a camp. The covering force easily repelled enemy harassing attacks and the work was completed. The next day ramparts were finally added behind the ditches.25
Caesar next attempted to occupy a hillock that dominated the ground between the Pompeian camp and the town of Ilerda. He took three legions with him and sent the leading elements of one of them to seize the hill. Afranius had observed the column marching out and his own men were able to beat them in the race to get there first, driving back Caesar’s men as they tried to scramble up the slope. The Commentaries lay some of the blame for this failure on the enemy fighting in the same style as the Spanish tribes, moving at speed and caring little about their formation. While this may well be true - Caesar notes that troops stationed in one place for a long time tend to be influenced by local fighting styles - it may also have been intended to depict his enemy as less Roman than his own men. It was harder to excite an audience by a description of fighting against fellow countrymen than against the wild tribes of Gaul. The fighting went on for much of the day, as each side fed in reserves. The position was narrow and no more than three cohorts could fit into the space and form a fighting line. Losses were heavy on both sides, but after five hours men of the Ninth Legion had enough energy left to charge sword in hand and close one last time with the enemy The Pompeians gave way for long enough to allow Caesar’s men to withdraw. Caesar lost seventy dead, including a senior centurion of the Fourteenth Legion and some 600 wounded, while the enemy suffered around 200 casualties including one primus pilus and four other centurions. Both sides believed that they had won, but the basic truth was that Caesar had failed to capture the position he had attacked.26
The weather then took a hand, heavy rain causing the river to flood and wash away both of Fabius’ bridges. For the moment Caesar and the army were cut off from the supplies brought by allies as well as reinforcement. One party of Gauls coming to join Caesar was attacked by a large enemy raiding force and took some losses before it was able to pull back to a defensive position. All attempts to repair the bridges at first failed and the basic ration had to be cut to a level that could not long be sustained without the soldiers’ health suffering badly. After some days the legionaries were set to making simple leather-covered, timber-framed boats of the type they had seen in Britain. Under cover of darkness these were carried in carts to a spot 22 Roman miles away and a small camp was built behind a hill next to the river. Later a legion was sent there and, after sending detachments across to the far bank, was able to build a new bridge in just two days. The Gauls, along with the supply convoy they were escorting, were then able to use the bridge and join the main army For the moment the crisis was over, but Caesar was no nearer to defeating the enemy. There were encouraging signs when a number of Spanish communities, sensing that the odds were shifting in his favour, sent envoys promising to defect to him. All were asked to supply him with the wheat he so desperately needed. The new bridge was a vital lifeline, but the distance did not make it convenient for all purposes. Caesar’s legionaries now dug canals to channel the water of the Sicoris and so create a crude ford. By this time the two Pompeian legates felt that they were too exposed, for the enemy cavalry had grown in numbers and confidence and was making their own foraging difficult. They decided to withdraw to the region occupied by the Celtiberians who were especially well disposed towards Pompey.27
They prepared carefully, ordering ships and barges to be gathered all along the River Ebro and brought to the town of Octogesa, some 30 miles from their camp. The craft were used to create a pontoon-style bridge over the wide Ebro. The work did not go unnoticed by Caesar’s scouting patrols, and by coincidence the project was completed on the same day as the improvised ford in the Sicoris was felt to be usable. Afranius and Petreius had a route across the biggest obstacle in their path. They knew that once over the Ebro they would be free from immediate pursuit, at least for a few days. However, they also knew that they first needed to get the army as far as Octogesa. Two of their legions crossed the Sicoris by the bridge outside the town and camped on the eastern bank. During the night the rest of the Pompeian army, save for two cohorts left to garrison Ilerda, marched across to join up with the two legions and the entire force then set off towards the Ebro. Caesar’s outposts reported the movement, and Caesar sent out cavalry to harass and slow down the enemy column. When the sun rose he could see from the high ground near his camp that the Pompeian rearguard was hard pressed by his own horsemen and was having to stop and form up repeatedly to drive the pursuers back. The legionaries knew what was happening and via the tribunes and centurions urged Caesar to let them risk the man-made ford and go across the river to fight. Encouraged by their enthusiasm, he led out five legions, leaving the remaining unit to guard the camp. The cavalry formed a screen above and below the crossing point, and the troops managed to wade through without suffering any losses. In spite of their later start, the advance guard came up with the Pompeian rearguard by late afternoon. Both armies deployed facing each other, but the Pompeians had no wish to fight and remained on high ground, while Caesar’s men were tired. Both armies camped for the night. Ahead of the Pompeians was a line of hills and the two legates planned another night march in order to reach the pass through these before the enemy. The plan failed when it was revealed to Caesar by some prisoners. Though it was still dark he ordered the trumpet call to be sounded that would raise his men. Hearing this, and realising that surprise was lost, the Pompeians went back to camp.28
The next day both sides sent out small reconnaissance patrols to investigate the routes through the hills and confirm the presence of a pass some 5 miles away. Whoever gained possession of this would be able to deny the route to the enemy. The night march having failed, the Pompeians decided to move at dawn. Their camp was between Caesar and the pass, but they were encumbered by a baggage train, whereas the Caesareans had only basic equipment and minimal rations. Caesar set out before dawn, surprising his enemies by heading off in a different direction. Relief turned to dismay as his column slowly began to swing to the right and head round towards the pass. The Pompeians set out and the two sides raced to get there first. Caesar’s men had a more difficult route, but had started earlier and were more lightly burdened. His cavalry also continued to harass the enemy column and slow it down. The Caesareans won the contest, and Afranius and Petreius halted their despondent troops. The officers and men in Caesar’s army were all keen for battle with the enemy at such a disadvantage of position and morale, and pressed him to give the order to attack. Caesar refused, believing that the enemy, cut off from all supplies, would have to surrender anyway. He saw no need to waste the lives of any of his soldiers, or even of the citizens fighting for the enemy. This provoked some muttering from his veterans and half-hearted talk of not fighting whenever he finally did give the order.
Battle of Ilerda
Over the next days the two sides began building lines of fortification, the Pompeians to secure a water supply and Caesar to hem them in and deny them this. During the work large numbers of men on both sides began to fraternise with the enemy, seeking out relatives, friends and neighbours.
Some Pompeian officers were already speaking of capitulation, and Afranius’ own son sent a friend to treat with Caesar. His father’s will to go on seems to have collapsed, but Petreius was still determined and led out his bodyguard of Spanish cavalry and light infantry to massacre every Caesarean soldier they found mingling with their own troops. Some managed to fight their way out, while others were hidden by Pompeian troops and allowed to slip away during the night. Caesar let all the enemy troops in his own lines either go freely or stay as they wished. Petreius begged his soldiers to remain loyal and took an oath never ‘to desert or betray the army and its officers, or to think of personal safety before the common good’. He cajoled Afranius into taking the same oath, followed by the senior and then the more junior officers, and finally the ordinary soldiers.29
The Pompeians made one last attempt to break out of the encirclement. Caesar followed, continually harrying the retreating column. The enemy was again hemmed in, this time in an even worse position with no water supply at all. Caesar still wished to avoid battle and both sides again set to building lines of fortifications. An attempt by the Pompeians to recross the Sicoris was blocked and with their forage almost exhausted Afranius sought peace terms from Caesar. The latter berated the enemy generals for needlessly wasting lives. Nevertheless, as at Corfininium and throughout the war so far, all of them were allowed to go free. Their army was disbanded, Caesar carefully supervising the process. By this time in Further Spain, the remaining legate Varro had been so encouraged by Afranius’ earlier, highly optimistic reports, that he decided to prove himself a keen agent of Pompey and the cause. He held levies and massed supplies. After the surrender at Ilerda was complete Caesar headed towards the Further province. Varro’s confidence had by this time ebbed as news reached him of Caesar’s success and it became apparent that the population of his province was generally well disposed to the victor. His troops deserting him, he swiftly sent word to Caesar and surrendered. All of Spain was now under Caesar’s control. Although there were difficult moments, his expectation of rapid success had proved to be justified. By the end of the summer the resistance at Massilia also ended. This time Domitius Ahenobarbus managed to escape by ship shortly before the city surrendered and so was not captured for a second time. He would fight against Caesar again. So would Afranius and Petreius, who like him were ready to accept their enemy’s mercy, but did not hate him any the less for it. Nor was there any sign that Pompey and his more senior allies were any more eager for peace other than through victory. The war would go on.30