Chapter 9  

A VERY HAPPY SUCCESS FOR THE CHURCH

“Dr Browne has had the start of a whole day to make his allegations, and no matter what I do I shall never catch up with him to the end of my public life.”¹

JOHN A. COSTELLO, APRIL 1951

“That the clash should have come in this particular form and under this Government, with Mr Costello at its head, is a very happy success for the Church.”²

JOHN CHARLES McQUAID, APRIL 1951

If the removal of Queen Victoria from her perch outside Leinster House was an early indication of the controversy that would surround the repeal of the External Relations Act, the new Cabinet took an equally symbolic step at its first meeting which presaged the other great controversy that would affect its reputation—the Mother and Child crisis.

This was to agree a message from Costello to Pope Pius XII. The Taoiseach told the Pontiff that he and his colleagues “desire to repose at the feet of Your Holiness the assurance of our filial loyalty and devotion as well as our firm resolve to be guided in all our work by the teachings of Christ and to strive for the attainment of a social order in Ireland based on Christian principles”.³ Costello told his friend Michael MacWhite, the Ambassador to Rome, that he received “a wonderful letter from the Pope signed by his own hand” in reply, adding that “it was worth while for that alone becoming Taoiseach”. He said he had “an intense desire to go to Rome” while in office, “particularly to see the Pope”.⁴ This did not look like a government likely to cause problems for the Church.

During the Mother and Child Crisis, Cardinal D’Alton commented that, in contrast to the “unreliable” Browne, the bishops could be thankful “that the Taoiseach is so sound on the matter”.⁵ Historian Ronan Fanning has written that “it is almost impossible to exaggerate the near-feudal deference of Costello and his Ministers to the Hierarchy in general and to the Archbishop of Dublin in particular”.⁶ But it is important to recognise that John A. Costello’s deference wasn’t the result of expediency, lack of courage or absence of principle. He sincerely believed that deference and obedience were not only right, but required.

Even 20 years later, in his “Seven Days” television interview with David Thornley, Costello became extremely exercised on being challenged about his acceptance of the ruling of the bishops. “We believed … that you must have in politics and in statesmanship and in legislation and in the conduct of all affairs of the State the principles of Christianity put into operation and … we were told by an authoritative body in the Catholic Church that a measure if brought into operation would be contrary to morals and the teaching of the Church … I would do the same again, and any other Government would have to do it.”⁷

One can disagree with Costello’s actions, but he cannot be accused of inconsistency—unlike, for instance, Noël Browne, whose public stance in the Dáil, when he accepted the ruling of the bishops, differed from his later position. Costello may well have been wrong, but he was acting out of principle, principle he adhered to throughout his life.

There have been suggestions that Costello was a member of the secretive, ultra-Catholic organisation the Knights of Columbanus. Evelyn Bolster, the historian of the Knights, claimed that Costello, along with Seán T. O’Kelly, was a member of the Columbians, an offshoot of the Ancient Order of Hibernians which merged with the Knights in the 1920s. But, importantly, she did not suggest that he was a member of the Knights while Taoiseach. In fact, she named the members of the organisation who were in Cabinet as Mulcahy, MacEoin, Norton and Blowick.⁸

The new Taoiseach’s obsequious attitude to McQuaid is well demonstrated in their correspondence. While Costello was usually polite in letters, the tone he adopted with McQuaid was of quite a different order. Replying to an invitation to a special Mass to celebrate the anniversary of the Pope’s coronation, Costello wrote, “I accept the invitation as I am sure will each member of the Government to whom I will have it immediately conveyed.” Acceptance of a similar invitation the following year was “not merely our duty but a privilege”. It is important to note that McQuaid occupied a more exalted position than other churchmen. When Cardinal Griffin of Westminster wrote to the Taoiseach seeking a grant for the Irish Centre in Kilburn, Costello immediately sought McQuaid’s advice. McQuaid noted the Cardinal’s proposal to have the centre “open to all denominations”, a development he evidently viewed with concern.⁹ This was enough to kill the initiative from Costello’s point of view.

The Government’s ostentatious Catholicism was not just for home consumption; in November 1949, MacBride stressed the importance of ministerial pilgrimages to Rome during the Holy Year of 1950. In particular, he considered it “essential that the Taoiseach … should pay an official visit to Rome … in the middle of the month of January … as a means of encouraging other Catholic Governments to follow the Irish example”. Costello duly travelled to Rome in January, accompanied by his wife, Ida, and two of his children, Declan and Eavan (whose travelling expenses he paid). During his visit, he met Monsignor Giovanni Montini, the future Pope Paul VI.¹⁰ On a later trip commemorating the fourteenth centenary of Columbanus’s birth he met Archbishop Angelo Roncalli, later Pope John XXIII. This occasion saw Costello, MacBride and de Valera united, with McQuaid, in a celebration that saw 20,000 pilgrims converging on Luxeuil in the French Alps.¹¹

As was only natural in a graduate of the National University of his era, Costello was suspicious of Trinity College—in fact, he was also suspicious of the only Trinity graduate in the Cabinet, Noël Browne.¹² His attitude towards Protestants has already been noted in the introduction. This of course was before the ecumenical era, a period when Catholics were forbidden to enter Protestant churches, never mind Trinity College. This caused difficulty at the funeral of former President Douglas Hyde, where the Cabinet waited outside St Patrick’s Cathedral rather than attending the service. Poet Austin Clarke, who did go inside along with at least one other Catholic, the French Ambassador, scornfully depicted

Costello, his cabinet
In Government cars, hiding
Around the corner, ready
Tall hat in hand.¹³

Given the prevailing attitude, it is not perhaps surprising that the bishops didn’t just expect deference from politicians; they expected submission. In December 1948 Noël Browne wrote a perfectly polite letter to Archbishop Joseph Walsh of Tuam, explaining that he didn’t want Castlebar Hospital to be entirely staffed by nursing sisters, as it was to be a training centre and he wanted to provide promotional opportunities for lay nurses to discourage emigration to England. But he respectfully added that in other circumstances and other hospitals “I would be delighted to see an all-religious staff.”¹⁴

This innocuous reply led to a vicious response from the hierarchy, directed to Costello rather than to Browne. Having drawn attention to the fact that the Minister was a Trinity graduate (no more needed to be said, evidently), the letter accused him of seeking to impose conditions which would effectively exclude religious from nursing or supervisory positions in regional hospitals. “We protest against the Minister’s action as a slight on the religious vocation and as savouring of secularism.”¹⁵ Costello’s handwritten reply regretted that Browne’s letter “should have been interpreted in such a way as to cause misgivings in the minds of the Irish Hierarchy”, stated that “any policy savouring of unfair discrimination against religious sisters … is something that was never intended and which it is our fixed determination to avoid”, and promised to continue to use the services of the sisters.¹⁶ This response indicates why the bishops expected immediate capitulation from Browne over the Mother and Child Scheme: it was what they were used to.

One example of a policy that was effectively dictated by McQuaid was on adoption. Costello had supported the introduction of legal adoption during the 1948 election campaign; but in office things were different. Justice Minister Seán MacEoin told the Taoiseach that he had concluded “that it would be extremely difficult to frame a practical proposal that would not be likely to lead to a very undesirable controversy”.¹⁷ MacEoin didn’t specify the source of the “undesirable controversy” and denied at a meeting of the Fine Gael parliamentary party that opposition was coming from the Church.¹⁸

But others believed differently. James Dillon recalled MacEoin telling the Cabinet after consulting McQuaid on proposed adoption legislation that “he won’t have it!” As far as MacEoin was concerned, that was the end to the matter. Dillon, with evident disapproval, noted of his colleague, “It would never have occurred to him to cross the Archbishop.”¹⁹ Patrick Lynch described MacEoin as “greatly influenced by the Church, by the Knights of Columbanus. Reactionary in all his views, a most conservative Catholic … He was the spokesman for the Hierarchy at the Cabinet table.”²⁰ Those conservative views were reflected in MacEoin’s account of a visit to Spain: “I met a Christian gentleman in General Franco, and I could see why my colleague General O’Duffy rip (who was my best man at my wedding in Longford) was prepared to support him in his efforts to break the Communistic Red Government of Spain.”²¹

MacEoin was eager to follow Catholic principles in his Department. After the Vatican requested an amnesty for prisoners to mark the 1950 Holy Year, MacEoin recommended to his colleagues a remission of one-quarter of all sentences. He acknowledged that this might be seen as excessive, but pointed out “that the Vatican have asked for a significant gesture”. This appeared to be a clinching argument for him, but the Cabinet disagreed, finally approving a maximum remission of three months for lesser offences and six months for those sentenced to penal servitude.²²

After he moved to the Department of Defence, he approved (without consulting the Cabinet) a proposal by the head chaplain of the Army that the Defence Forces should be dedicated to “Our Lady, Queen of the Most Holy Rosary”. After the change of government, de Valera raised concerns about “giving to citizens belonging to non-Catholic denominations grounds for feeling offence to their conscience”. It was agreed to call the ceremony an invocation rather than a dedication, and that non-Catholic members of the Defence Forces would not be compelled to attend the ceremonies. The invocation went ahead in October 1951.²³

Dillon himself was a staunch Catholic, but as his biographer points out, “he also had a very clear sense of the boundary between politics and religion: he would not have been his father’s son if he had not”.²⁴ Patrick Lynch recalled Dillon giving Noël Browne the benefit of his insights into the way the Church operated. “My family have been identified with politics for a very long time, and we know how the Black Brigade works. Never challenge the Black Brigade on an issue of principle. That’s the mistake you are making Noël, if you approach them with practical proposals you can’t lose.”²⁵ Dillon disapproved both of MacEoin’s supine attitude on adoption and Browne’s confrontational approach to the Mother and Child scheme.

When the crisis broke, Browne believed that he could appeal to public opinion, and he had good grounds for this belief, after three successful years in the Department of Health, particularly in tackling TB. He arrived in the Custom House at a good time—plans for improving the treatment of TB had been put in place by Fianna Fáil, new drugs were coming on stream, and MacBride had insisted on the provision of funding from the Hospital Sweepstakes for capital investment in health. But he also brought to the job a crusading zeal, and an enthusiasm for publicity which broke down social taboos about the disease. By 1950, the number of TB deaths had fallen to 2,353, the lowest ever recorded at that time, compared to an annual average of 3,649 in the previous decade. He had also overseen the provision of 7,000 new hospital beds, the Cancer Council, the Blood Transfusion Service, the National Rehabilitation Organisation, and BCG inoculation. But the Mother and Child Scheme was to prove a step too far.

The roots of the scheme lay in the 1945 Health Bill, which after extensive amendment became the Health Act of 1947. In October of that year, Bishop James Staunton wrote to de Valera on behalf of the hierarchy, raising concerns about the Health Act and the powers it gave to the Minister. The hierarchy believed these powers interfered with the rights of “the individual person, the family, the professions and voluntary institutions”. Interestingly, it did not mention the absence of a means test, but concentrated on the powers to detain people who were a probable source of infection, the sections dealing with health education, and the requirement on doctors to notify certain diseases.²⁶

The letter and memorandum were read out to the Cabinet. De Valera then asked his Minister for Health, Dr Jim Ryan, to look into the points raised. Ryan prepared a memorandum, which pointed out that ministers tended to put more powers than they intended to use into legislation, in order to avoid court challenge, and that many Acts could be said to “enable them to violate Catholic principles”. But in practice, these powers had not been abused, so there was no reason to fear the Health Act. De Valera was not impressed with this argument, saying he would not transmit Ryan’s memorandum as it stood, as it required “considerable revision”. He eventually sent a version of the memorandum to Staunton two days before the change of government, but avoided giving his own views on the basis that there had been a legal challenge to the Act in the meantime.²⁷

This legal challenge was the one launched by James Dillon, with Costello and McGilligan among his counsel, which was mentioned in Chapter 6. As we saw then, Fine Gael in general, and Jack Costello in particular, had been severely critical of the Government’s health proposals, both in 1945 and in 1947. This criticism had been aired during the election campaign. More surprisingly, Noel Hartnett of Clann na Poblachta also criticised the Act because it “interfered with the Catholic principles governing the rights of the State and of the family”.²⁸ But in government, once some amendments were made to the Fianna Fáil proposals, Costello and his colleagues were prepared to continue with them—although there were rumblings within Fine Gael. Mulcahy forwarded to his party colleagues in Cabinet (including Costello) a letter from a party supporter criticising the proposals. Mulcahy noted that the supporter, a Dr Sheehan from Kerry, “was publicly very active against the Health Bill which we opposed. We have to take some notice of his criticism …” In his letter, Sheehan complained that “the Fine Gael Ministers have turned a complete somersault” and were supporting the proposals “which they opposed when Dr Ward was Medical Gauleiter”. He added that Browne “appears to be the worst Pink Totalitarian of them all … genetically un-Irish, upbringing un-Irish”.²⁹

In fact, Browne had proposed some significant changes to the scheme, including the repeal of the section allowing compulsory medical inspection of children, clarification that health authorities were not being given compulsory powers, and the establishment of a medical appeal panel to hear the cases of people detained as probable sources of infection.³⁰ But the most significant amendment proposed by Browne in a memorandum for Cabinet in June 1948 was not accepted. Browne suggested that the Minister should be given power to charge for services under the Mother and Child Scheme. Under the 1947 Act, the service would have been free to all sections of the community. Browne’s memorandum for government noted that the Irish Medical Association objected to the provision of free services to people who could afford to pay for them. He “does not propose at this stage to commit himself to the acceptance or rejection of the point of view of the Association”. But his proposed amendment would allow him to decide later whether or not to charge for the service and in the meantime would “lessen the opposition of the medical profession to it”.³¹

This was a sound enough tactic. But at the Cabinet meeting on 25 June, Browne was outflanked by Norton, who, “in the proletarian voice which he affected on such occasions … shouted down to me, ‘Yer not goin’ to let the doctors walk on ye, Noël?’ Before I could answer him, the Taoiseach asked, ‘What would you prefer, Doctor?’ I replied that I would prefer to keep the existing proposals, free of direct charge, and with no means test, already included in the Fianna Fáil Health Act.”³² Browne’s biographer has pointed out that this was all very embarrassing for him, as Norton had “depicted him in cabinet as cautious and fearful … and had put him unexpectedly … on the defensive on an issue which was critical to his understanding of his own mission”.³³ Browne now went off to draft the scheme, under the impression that he had the full support of his Cabinet colleagues.

The text of Browne’s Bill to amend the 1947 Health Act was approved by Cabinet on 4 November 1949. However, at no point did Cabinet approve the actual introduction of the service, or the regulations setting it up. This point was seized on by Costello to show that the Mother and Child Service per se did not have Government approval. Intriguingly, he asked his officials in February 1950 to check on what decisions had been made by Cabinet on the scheme—the only one they could find was that of June 1948. He was reminded of this finding in March 1951 when the situation was coming to a head.³⁴

A more experienced minister might have been expected to cover his back by gaining such formal approval. However, the terms of the 1947 Act strongly suggest that Browne was not required to have his regulations approved—Section 28 empowered the Minister for Health to make regulations as to how health authorities were to exercise their powers under Part III of the Act.³⁵ John Horgan has pointed out that a more experienced government might have insisted that the regulations, which would inevitably have cost implications, should be brought back for approval.³⁶

There were two main sources of opposition to the Mother and Child Scheme, medical and episcopal, and it is a mistake to underestimate the importance of either. While the bishops were to prove the final straw for Browne’s Cabinet colleagues, the doctors made the initial running, in public at least. The entrenched power of the medical profession was not a uniquely Irish phenomenon: in Britain, the opposition of doctors to the National Health Service led to “the most important, most difficult domestic fight of the post-war Labour Government’s life”.³⁷

Worries about the centralising power of the State may seem overblown to modern eyes, but in the late 1940s and early 1950s they were real enough. Those opposed to increased State involvement had the recent example of totalitarian regimes in mind—Neil Farren, the Bishop of Derry and a UCD contemporary of Jack Costello, explicitly made the link, claiming that “the power and spirit behind practically all social legislation is … taken from the worst principles of Nazi and Soviet materialism”.³⁸

A further complication was the situation within Clann na Poblachta. Browne’s biographer John Horgan has pointed out that the Minister and his associate Noel Hartnett were “indisputably operating a dual strategy. One strand had as its objective the creation of a free-for-all Mother and Child Scheme; the other had the implicit, and increasingly the explicit, aim of forcing the Clann out of government in order to preserve its ideological purity.”³⁹ This conflict within the party was being openly discussed in the newspapers by February 1951,⁴⁰ as was Browne’s “inclination to withdraw from the present Government”.⁴¹ MacBride claimed that Browne set out his aim of breaking up the party and the Government at a dinner in the Russell Hotel in November 1950—he circulated Cabinet colleagues, including Costello, with a memorandum of their conversation.⁴² The Taoiseach was therefore well aware that Browne was isolated within his party, as well as within the Cabinet.

The Taoiseach was also well informed of medical opinion. Dr Tom O’Higgins remained a committee member of the Irish Medical Association while he was a minister. Costello himself was greatly influenced by Alexis FitzGerald’s brothers, Oliver and Paddy, both of whom were prominent and influential in medical circles.⁴³ Oliver’s son, Alexis, remembers Costello being in their house while he was Taoiseach, probably around the time of the Mother and Child controversy, and that Costello was accompanied by Dillon and possibly Norton.⁴⁴ In any event, as a barrister, Costello would have been sympathetic to the views of fellow professionals. He became steadily more convinced of the case against a free Mother and Child Scheme, telling Patrick Lynch on 23 March 1951 that he was totally opposed to it, and would not be a member of a government that implemented it.⁴⁵

While Fine Gael links with the medical profession were well known, one of Browne’s fellow Clann na Poblachta TDS was also warning Costello against the scheme. Dr J.P. Brennan, TD for Dun Laoghaire, was the Master-General of the Irish Guild of St Luke, SS. Cosmas and Damian, an organisation for Catholic doctors. “The Guild is concerned essentially with the traditional application of Catholic principles in the practice of medicine, and nothing else. There is no doubt that these appear to be endangered by the 1947 Act.”⁴⁶

Medical opposition, then, was partly informed by the same concerns bothering the bishops, about excessive State interference with the rights of the family (and the medical profession, of course). But it was also driven by concerns over the financial position of doctors, and Browne seems to have seen this as the primary motivation in the opposition to him. He may have been right too. But his handling of his fellow doctors was less than diplomatic. He told an IMA deputation in October 1950 that his personal preference would be for “a whole time salaried service”, but he accepted that the public and the profession would not accept such a development for many years. He also insisted that while the scheme could be improved, “the decision regarding abolition of a Means Test was immutable and the Association must recognise this fact”.⁴⁷ Such a hardline approach inevitably stiffened the IMA resistance, prompting Costello to try to negotiate a solution himself.

The Taoiseach had made a point of making conciliatory noises in a number of speeches to medical bodies. He told a meeting of the IMA that improvements in health services could only be achieved if there was “full understanding and complete co-operation between the medical profession and the Government … Anything in the nature of unfriendly relations or intractable misunderstandings can only bring difficulties and frustration in their train for all of us.”⁴⁸ He told the annual dinner of the Royal College of Physicians that while some friction might arise between the Government and the medical profession, “there is absolutely no reason why the causes of this friction should not be removed by amicable discussion and friendly cooperation”.⁴⁹ No reason, except for an obdurate Minister and an equally obdurate profession.

On 25 November 1950 the Medical Secretary of the IMA, Dr P.J. Delaney, wrote to Costello asking him to receive representatives of the Association to discuss health developments. He said he was acting on a suggestion by Dr T.F. O’Higgins, the Minister for Defence.⁵⁰ The Taoiseach immediately agreed, and along with Norton met an IMA delegation four days later.⁵¹ Costello later told the Dáil that he put forward Browne’s view “as an advocate, a view with which I did not agree. I put it forward as strongly as ever I could …” He claimed that Browne was furious, accusing himself and Norton of selling him down the river, and refusing to allow them to negotiate any further on his behalf.⁵²

The written record bears out Costello’s version of events, although it is more temperate than the fury Browne allegedly showed in a face to face meeting. A letter from Browne rather stiffly thanked Costello for sending him a report on his meeting with the IMA. He hoped that once they had considered what the Taoiseach had said, “they will realise that the Mother and Child Scheme cannot be changed in its fundamentals and that accordingly the way will be open for me to continue negotiations”. On the same day, he wrote to the Association asking if they had made up their minds on his scheme, “as he is anxious to be in a position to introduce the Scheme early in the New Year”.⁵³ He later explained to Costello that he had done this to avoid the spread of any impression that future negotiations would be conducted by the Taoiseach and the Tánaiste, rather than himself. “I would be very much obliged, therefore, if you would be good enough to communicate with the Association making it clear to them that any future negotiations about the Mother and Child Service will be conducted with the Minister for Health.”⁵⁴

The IMA set up a special committee on the strength of its meeting with Costello “in the hope of bridging the difficulties which presently exist”.⁵⁵ This produced an alternative scheme which was rejected out of hand by Browne as it compromised the principle of not having a means test. At the beginning of March 1951, Browne wrote again to Costello saying he was “still willing and anxious to negotiate with the Association and to consider any reasonable proposals which they may put forward. As, however, its latest letter leads me to believe that it has no sincere desire to reach agreement except on its own terms, I have decided to proceed without further delay with measures for the introduction of a Mother and Child Service, and I enclose a copy of a letter which I am sending to the Association today conveying this decision.”⁵⁶ This rather rash action by Browne now brought the second strand of opposition to his plans to the centre of the stage.

As we have seen, the hierarchy had raised concerns about the 1947 Health Act with de Valera before the change of government. After some publicity about Browne’s plans in the summer of 1950, the issue was considered by the bishops at their meeting on 10 October. On their behalf, Bishop James Staunton wrote to Costello once again raising concerns about the powers taken by the State under the proposed scheme. The bishops complained that these were “in direct opposition to the rights of the family and of the individual and are liable to very great abuse … If adopted in law they would constitute a ready-made instrument for future totalitarian aggression.”

Significantly, the first concern now mentioned by the hierarchy related to the absence of a means test. While the State had the right to intervene in a subsidiary capacity, it did not have the right to supplant the duty of parents to provide for the health of their children. The State “may help indigent or neglectful parents: it may not deprive 90% of their rights because of 10% necessitous or negligent parents”.

The letter also complained about the State taking over provision of physical education and education in regard to motherhood. There were concerns, too, about gynaecological care, which in some countries was taken to include contraception and abortion. “We have no guarantee that State officials will respect Catholic principles in regard to these matters.” It added that “doctors trained in institutions in which we have no confidence” (a reference to Trinity) might be employed under the scheme and provide care “not in accordance with Catholic principles”. Curiously, despite the fact that the letter was dated 10 October, a note on Costello’s copy states that it was handed to him by McQuaid on 7 November.⁵⁷ The Taoiseach told the Dáil that the letter was “personally handed” to him on that date, after McQuaid’s return from a visit to Rome.⁵⁸ The delay seems rather strange, but it would appear to explain why Costello only mentioned the letter to Browne on 9 November.⁵⁹

In the meantime, Browne had met three bishops—McQuaid, Staunton and Browne of Galway—on 11 October, the day after the hierarchy’s meeting, but before Costello received the resulting letter. Browne believed he had resolved his difficulties; in fact, according to McQuaid’s later version of events, he had actually made a very poor impression on the prelates (mainly, it would appear, because he was prepared to argue his case, rather than accepting their ruling).

Browne later recalled that he had told Costello that he had satisfied the misapprehensions of the bishops; further, he even claimed that the Taoiseach, after meeting McQuaid on 12 October, had been “in a position to corroborate His Grace’s and Their Lordships’ satisfaction with the explanation which I gave in relation to their misapprehensions concerning the Scheme”. Costello flatly denied that he had said anything of the kind. “In view of what I had been told by His Grace at my interview with him I certainly could have given you no such assurance.”⁶⁰

Costello gave the Staunton letter to Browne in November, asking him to draft a reply. In this reply, Browne claimed that the only “fundamental difference in principle” between the existing Public Assistance system and the Mother and Child Service was the absence of a means test. Browne ventured to suggest that the objections of the hierarchy might be based “on the misapprehension that there will be compulsion on mothers or children to avail of the Scheme … There is no such compulsion.” Parents would retain the right to provide for the health of their children if they wished.

He insisted that the “education in respect of motherhood” contemplated under the Scheme related to diet during pregnancy and the avoidance of smoking, and care would be taken to ensure that “its operation will include nothing of an objectionable nature under this head”. Responding to the concerns about medical personnel, Browne (himself, of course, a Trinity graduate) said that “this country is predominantly Catholic, the medical profession is predominantly Catholic and there is an adequate and zealous clergy which will be quick to detect any practices contrary to Catholic teaching and to instruct its flock appropriately”.⁶¹

This draft was given to Costello. Browne later said he believed it had been sent, and as he heard no more about it, he assumed the “misapprehensions” had been laid to rest. Costello told a very different story. He said he had told Browne he had not sent the reply, that he had, “out of consideration for you and in an earnest desire to help you in your difficulties with the Hierarchy … offered my personal help to you as intermediary with the Hierarchy to try to smooth their difficulties and resolve their objections, which I felt could be done by appropriate amendments of the Scheme …”⁶² Given that the Taoiseach was taking a similar approach with the doctors, this seems reasonably plausible. But in fairness to Browne, he may well have been misled by the date on the hierarchy’s letter. He must also have misinterpreted whatever Costello said to him after the latter’s meeting with McQuaid on 12 October.

In parallel with his talks with the IMA, the Taoiseach was in close consultation with McQuaid. The Archbishop later told Bishop Browne that he had met Costello immediately after their meeting with Noël Browne, and again on 7 and 25 November. He had also met Norton twice, and MacEoin and the Attorney General (Charles Casey) once each. As a result, he believed the possibility of the Mother and Child proposals being accepted by Cabinet “is not even to be considered”.⁶³

In mid-January, the Archbishop outlined to the hierarchy’s standing committee what he had been told by Costello. “The Bill is not Government policy. Not a single Minister wants it, except Dr Browne … [The] Taoiseach … has given me the assurance that whatever the Church declares to be right in respect of the Mother and Child Health Service will be unequivocally accepted by him, even if the Minister had to resign or the Government fall. In fact, the Minister is the greatest single embarrassment that the Government endures … I have, by arrangement with the Taoiseach, dealt with the Taoiseach as head of the Government. I have allowed the contest to be fought between the Doctors and Minister. The Taoiseach foresees and fears that Dr B. may resign and carry away the support of the Clann: that would mean the fall of the Government. The Taoiseach proposes to have Dr Browne answer the Hierarchy’s letters, to send to us that answer, to await our decision as to whether Dr B’s answer is in accord with the Bishops’ desires, and thus to put the Hierarchy’s answer squarely to Dr Browne … I do not consider it advisable to give Dr Browne and the Clann the chance of going to the country on the basis that the bishops destroyed the Mother and Child Scheme for poor women and children. But I am convinced that, even at that risk, we may yet be obliged to break the certain introduction within our country of Socialist State medicine.”⁶⁴

McQuaid’s mention of the political dimension is interesting, as it is usually overlooked in accounts of the Mother and Child crisis. As we have seen, Browne’s biographer John Horgan argues that he had a dual strategy—on the one hand, he wanted to implement the Mother and Child Scheme; on the other, he wanted to force the Clann out of Government on an issue which would restore its radical credentials. Whatever happened, he would win.⁶⁵ From what Costello told McQuaid, the Taoiseach was clearly aware of this strategy, and determined to try to outflank Browne. There was little he could do about the Minister resigning if he didn’t get his way on the Mother and Child Scheme. But he could do something to lessen the impact of the resignation—and one way was by enlisting the help of the hierarchy. It might be a stretch to say that Costello was using McQuaid as much as McQuaid was using Costello. But certainly the two men were using each other.

This, then, was the explosive situation into which Browne tossed his Molotov cocktail by deciding at the beginning of March 1951 to press ahead with the introduction of the scheme. McQuaid was “surprised to read in the daily press of the sudden determination of the Minister for Health to implement the Mother and Child Health Service”. He was even more put out to receive a pamphlet from the Minister “which purports to explain the principles of the Mother and Child Service which the Minister is about to introduce”. McQuaid wrote to Browne setting out his concerns, and copied the letter to Costello. He pointedly thanked the Taoiseach for “the immediate understanding and cooperation I have on every occasion received from you … in all that concerns the provision of a sane and legitimate Mother and Child health service”.⁶⁶ McQuaid reminded Browne that he had withheld approval from the scheme in October. “Now, as Archbishop of Dublin, I regret that I must reiterate each and every objection made by me on that occasion and unresolved, either then or later.”

On 15 March, after returning from the funeral in Connemara of Fine Gael T.D. Josie Mongan, the Taoiseach was told Browne was looking for him. The Minister wanted an extra £30,000, saying if he got that sum he would “have the doctors killed on Sunday”. Costello asked Browne about McQuaid’s letter, but the Minister said there was “nothing in that”, an assessment based on his own theological advice. By his own later account in the Dáil, Costello said, “Whatever about fighting the doctors, I am not going to fight the Bishops and whatever about fighting the Bishops, I am not going to fight the doctors and the Bishops. It may come to a point where either you or I will leave the Cabinet on this, unless we can settle the matter with the Bishops.”⁶⁷

Costello subsequently wrote to Browne, chiding him for not responding to McQuaid’s letter. “I am afraid you do not appear to realise the serious implications of the view expressed in that letter since you have, by advertisement and otherwise, continued to publicise the Scheme to which objections have been taken. Such action might well seem to be defiance of the Hierarchy … I have no doubt that all my colleagues and, in particular, yourself, would not be party to any proposals affecting moral questions which would or might come into conflict with the definite teachings of the Catholic Church.” He urged Browne to come to an agreement with the hierarchy to remove their objections, adding that any financial problems in relation to the scheme would be immediately resolved “once the larger issues raised in the correspondence from members of the Hierarchy are settled”.⁶⁸

An increasingly testy correspondence between the two men ensued. On 19 March, Browne denied that the hierarchy were opposed to the Mother and Child Scheme. He pointed out that he had sent the brochure to each bishop, but only McQuaid had raised objections. He also said he had been in contact with a member of the hierarchy who assured him that “so far as he is aware the Hierarchy as such have expressed no objection to the Mother and Child Scheme whatsoever on the grounds of Faith and Morals”. He then asked a pointed question of the Taoiseach: “I would be interested to know whether your withholding of approval to the M&C Scheme is due either to the supposed opposition of the Hierarchy to the Scheme or to the possible opposition of any individual member of the Hierarchy.”⁶⁹ Browne’s approach not only challenged Costello’s position as leader of the Government, but McQuaid’s as leader of the hierarchy.

Relations between Taoiseach and Minister were now close to breaking point. On 21 March, Browne requested the Government Information Bureau to release to the press a letter from the Secretary of his Department to the IMA. Tipped off by Maurice Moynihan, Costello had the publication stopped, as the letter claimed the Mother and Child Scheme was Government policy, a claim with which he disagreed. Costello later told McQuaid that Browne had demanded to know why his statement had been stopped. Costello replied, “Because I am Taoiseach.” Browne then accused Costello of using the hierarchy to defeat the Mother and Child Scheme.⁷⁰

As the sense of crisis mounted, Costello was joined by Norton, Mulcahy, Dillon, O’Higgins, Cosgrave and Patrick Lynch, and sent a telegram to MacBride in Washington, requesting him to return at once. He wrote a letter to Browne which was sent by despatch rider to the Custom House. The Minister had left his office, but returned at around 8.40 to receive it.⁷¹ Costello’s letter responded to the points raised by Browne two days previously. The Taoiseach pointed out that the October letter came from the entire hierarchy “and must be regarded as still expressing the Hierarchy’s views until a contrary expression has been received from the Hierarchy”. He reminded his minister that he had already requested him to have their objections resolved.⁷²

Browne felt it necessary in his reply to stress his religious credentials, saying he had been concerned from the beginning to ensure that the scheme contained nothing contrary to Catholic moral teaching. “I hope I need not assure you that as a Catholic I will unhesitatingly and immediately accept any pronouncement from the Hierarchy as to what is Catholic moral teaching in reference to this matter.” He then attacked the Taoiseach, noting that he hadn’t mentioned any difficulties with the Church during his negotiations with the doctors. “It seems strange that at this late hour when the discussions with the IMA have reached a crucial point that you advance, as the only remaining objection to the Scheme, the one which of all possible objections … should have first been satisfactorily disposed of …”⁷³

The air of crisis subsided somewhat the following day. The request to MacBride to return home was withdrawn, in view of his success in arranging a meeting with Truman⁷⁴ (discussed in the previous chapter). Costello wrote in more conciliatory tones to Browne, stressing that he was motivated solely by “a friendly desire to help a colleague and I take it somewhat amiss to find misconstrued my endeavours”. He added that he had explained to McQuaid why he had delayed responding to Staunton’s letter, and this had been communicated to the hierarchy. “I need hardly say that I accept unreservedly your statement that you would abide by any pronouncement from the Hierarchy as to what is Catholic moral teaching in reference to this matter.”⁷⁵ That afternoon, Browne rang to report on a meeting with McQuaid, at which he agreed that the hierarchy should adjudicate on the matters arising, and undertook to accept their decision. He also asked the Archbishop to try to secure an early decision “in view of the importance of the matter to him, as it might mean his leaving the Cabinet”.⁷⁶ This is confirmed by McQuaid’s account. The Archbishop claimed the Minister “apologised abjectly”, and, when McQuaid said he personally believed the scheme to be contrary to Catholic teaching, added that “that was for him the end”.⁷⁷

Thus, Browne was exactly in the position Costello had said in January he wanted him; waiting for the hierarchy’s ruling on his scheme, and in no position to argue with that ruling. Or so it appeared—Browne was to prove less obedient to the hierarchy than he indicated at this stage. At around this time he also rejected a compromise proposal from Norton that would have required households with an annual income above £1,000 to pay for services. Browne remained wedded to the free scheme, while the Labour leader had come to the conclusion that some scheme was better than none.⁷⁸

Costello, meanwhile, told McQuaid that even if the hierarchy approved the scheme, he was determined not to implement it, as he “was convinced of its impossibility and of the impossibility of fighting the Doctors, who were intensely opposed to the Scheme”.⁷⁹This account ties in with Patrick Lynch’s recollection that on the same day the Taoiseach said he would not be a member of a government that implemented such a scheme.⁸⁰ Again, this raises the question of Costello’s motivation: was he simply following the dictates of his church (the usual interpretation), or had he reverted to traditional Fine Gael policy on State control of medicine? Conor Cruise O’Brien seems to have advocated the second interpretation, saying that Costello, “in an effort to quash Browne’s scheme, called in the help of the Catholic Church”.⁸¹ The truth in all probability lies in a combination of the two factors. Joe Lee suggested that “the strength of Costello’s position was that while his piety was absolutely genuine, it also happened to coincide with the material advantage of the interests he represented”.⁸²

In any case, the Taoiseach’s resolve not to go ahead with a scheme even if the Church approved it was most unlikely to be put to the test. On 4 April, the hierarchy met and followed McQuaid’s advice to reject Browne’s scheme. The Archbishop told his colleagues that if they did so, they would have “saved the country from advancing a long way towards socialistic welfare. In particular, we shall have checked the efforts of Leftist Labour elements, which are approaching the point of publicly ordering the Church to stand out of social life and confine herself to what they think is the Church’s proper sphere.”⁸³

The following evening, McQuaid delivered this decision to Costello at Government Buildings. It was, the Archbishop was careful to put in writing, “the unanimous decision of the General Meeting of the Archbishops and Bishops”. While declining to enter into a detailed examination of the points raised by Browne, the reply stated, “The Hierarchy must regard the Scheme proposed by the Minister for Health as opposed to Catholic social teaching.”⁸⁴

The different responses of Costello and Browne are instructive. As McQuaid later recorded after discussing the hierarchy document with the Taoiseach for an hour and a half, he “at once accepted fully the decisions of the Hierarchy [and] expressed great relief at the decision which would terminate the enormous worry and waste of time occasioned by Dr Browne’s actions”.⁸⁵ Browne, however, after reading the letter in the presence of Costello, Norton and Brendan Corish, said, “It’s all right. The Bishops have not condemned the Scheme on grounds of morals.” According to Costello, Corish was shocked at Browne’s attitude: “If I had not heard the remark, I could not have believed it to be possible.”⁸⁶ After seeking theological advice, Browne put a great deal of store in the distinction between moral and social teaching (the first had to be obeyed by all Catholics; the latter could in conscience be rejected). Clearly, others in the Government were less impressed by this distinction.

McQuaid took a similar view, asking Costello to tell his Cabinet colleagues that “the letter was a definite condemnation of the scheme on moral grounds. Catholic social teaching meant Catholic moral teaching in regard to things social.” This dubious theological gloss was welcomed by the Taoiseach, who said he was pleased to have this statement in advance of the Cabinet meeting to be held later that day, 7 April. McQuaid also pointed out the number of times the bishops had used the phrase “this particular scheme”—in other words, an alterative could be acceptable.⁸⁷

Browne has left a vivid, though obviously one-sided, account of the three-hour Cabinet meeting. He described Costello reading McQuaid’s letter. “Clearly, for him, it was holy writ … He then looked at me and said ‘This must mean the end of the mother and child scheme’.” The Taoiseach agreed “grudgingly” to allow Browne to ask each of his colleagues if they accepted the ruling. All did, although Labour’s Michael Keyes demurred slightly, saying, “They shouldn’t be allowed to do this,” before nodding his agreement with the others. Browne, completely isolated, left the meeting.⁸⁸

That evening, Costello and Norton agreed the terms of the formal Government decision, which was sent by despatch rider to Browne’s home.⁸⁹ This said the Government had decided, after considering McQuaid’s letter (Moynihan advised against citing this letter in a formal government decision),⁹⁰ that the scheme should not be pursued, but that a new scheme should be brought forward that would be “in conformity with Catholic social teaching”, and that would provide the best modern facilities for those who couldn’t afford to pay for them—in other words, it would include a means test.⁹¹

Given Browne’s consistent refusal to consider a means test, this decision left him in an untenable position. Costello told McQuaid that Browne must leave the Cabinet.⁹² A letter was drafted in the Department of the Taoiseach seeking Browne’s resignation, in which the Minister was to be berated for lack of discretion in leaking to the press that he was considering his position. It also pointed out that if he continued in office, the Government “could feel no confidence that effect would be given to their desire for the early introduction of an acceptable Mother and Child Service”, given his fractious relationship with the IMA.⁹³

However, the letter was not sent. Costello still harboured a hope, unrealistic as it now appears, that something could be salvaged from the wreckage. Nearly two decades later, he claimed that if things had been handled differently by MacBride, “the whole situation might have been very well resolved”.⁹⁴ This would, obviously, have required compromise from Browne, and also from the doctors. Neither was very likely. In any event, MacBride had by now had enough. Despite the Taoiseach’s suggestion that “possibly we should hold off”, he wrote demanding Browne’s resignation.⁹⁵

Browne complied, in a terse letter, on 11 April. Costello, characteristically, was more generous in his reply, saying he and his colleagues appreciated Browne’s work in the Department of Health, “and regret that circumstances should have arisen that have made your resignation unavoidable”.⁹⁶ Costello invited Browne to accompany him to Áras an Uachtaráin when he went to advise President O’Kelly to accept the resignation; the outgoing Minister declined, going to the Park on his own an hour and a half later.⁹⁷Presumably the conversation would have been a little stilted had the two men travelled together. But Browne was about to give everyone in the country plenty to talk about.

First, he gave the correspondence to the morning newspapers, ensuring the widest possible publicity for his viewpoint. Then he made a scathing attack on his former Government colleagues in the Dáil, forcing Costello in turn to make a lengthy contribution setting out his own position and that of his government.

Browne said he “had been led to believe” that his insistence on the exclusion of a means test had the full support of his colleagues, but now knew that it had not. “While … I as a Catholic accept unequivocally and unreservedly the views of the Hierarchy on this matter, I have not been able to accept the manner in which this matter has been dealt with by my former colleagues in the Government.” He repeated the claim that Costello had led him to believe that the hierarchy had been satisfied by his October meeting with McQuaid and his colleagues, and complained again that the Taoiseach hadn’t forwarded his letter to the bishops. “This conduct … is open, it seems to me, to only two possible explanations—either that he would not oppose the scheme if agreement were reached with the Medical Association on the means test or that, in the light of his knowledge of the objections still being made by the Hierarchy and withheld from me, he intended that the scheme without a means test must never in fact be implemented.”⁹⁸

Costello said that he had “seldom listened to a statement in which there were so many—let me say it as charitably as possible—inaccuracies, misstatements and misrepresentations”. He had attempted to act as peacemaker, and had given Browne every help, even after the crucial Cabinet meeting. “I wanted him to know that we still were willing to help him and did not want to turn the corkscrew on him. My attitude during all those frightful months received the thanks embodied in the document read here today by Deputy Dr Browne.”

He pointed out that it was Browne who had sought to amend the legislation to allow for the charging of fees, but the Cabinet rejected the proposal because “we were young as a Government at that time, and we thought we could not put the provision he suggested through the House”. Costello criticised the former Minister for making public matters that were “to be adjusted behind closed doors and … never intended to be the subject of public controversy”. But, with the permission of Archbishop McQuaid, he read further documents into the Dáil record which, he claimed, showed that Browne was wrong to suggest that he had “deluded him and tricked him”. Costello claimed it had been clear all along that he hadn’t replied to the hierarchy’s letter because he was attempting to reach a solution.

Browne’s criticisms of his former colleagues were repaid in full by the Taoiseach, who said he had reached the conclusion that Browne “was not competent or capable to fulfil the duties of the Department of Health. He was incapable of negotiation; he was obstinate at times and vacillating at other times … I regret my view is that temperamentally he is unfitted for the post of Cabinet Minister.” On the vital question of Church–State relations, Costello said that a government which was “given advice or warnings by the authoritative people in the Catholic Church, on matters strictly confined to faith and morals … will give to their directions … complete obedience and allegiance … I, as a Catholic, obey my Church authorities and will continue to do so, in spite of the Irish Times or anything else, in spite of the fact that they may take votes from me or my party, or anything else of that kind.”⁹⁹

Costello’s speech was a carefully constructed defence of his position, and was effective in the context of the Dáil. But his problem was reaching the wider public. As Browne’s biographer John Horgan has noted, “few people would have read all the densely packed columns [of the Dáil debates] … More, on the other hand, would have read at least a large part of the voluminous correspondence which Browne released to the newspapers … reading other people’s letters, after all, is far more fun than reading Dáil debates.”¹⁰⁰

While he was speaking in the Dáil, there was yet another twist. McQuaid had rung up demanding to speak to the Taoiseach. Patrick Lynch, who was in the “bull-pen”, the section of the Dáil where officials sit, was summoned to take the call. The Irish News Agency, one of MacBride’s pet projects, had asked the Archbishop to write a 1,000-word article explaining the bishops’ point of view on the controversy. McQuaid was outraged at this request, and vented his anger on the unfortunate Lynch. When Costello returned to his office, Lynch passed on the message. The Taoiseach put his head in his hands, exclaiming, “Dear God! This is the end.”¹⁰¹

It was far from the end; Costello would be pursued by questions about the Mother and Child crisis for the rest of his life. The Irish Times was particularly critical, both at the time and later. Costello professed not to care, telling a meeting of UCD’s Literary and Historical Society that he was “around long enough not to be particularly upset by what John Masefield would call the flung spray and the blown spume of the Pearl Bar”.¹⁰² As Noël Browne’s iconic status was burnished in later years, Costello’s image was tarnished (although not as much as MacBride’s). But what was the effect, apart from ending Browne’s ministerial career and giving Unionists ample evidence to claim that the Republic was a theocratic state?

McQuaid rated the crisis as the most important event in Irish history since Catholic Emancipation in 1829. “That the clash should have come in this particular form and under this Government, with Mr Costello at its head, is a very happy success for the Church. The decision of the Government has thrown back Socialism and Communism for a very long time. No Government, for years to come, unless it is frankly Communist, can afford to disregard the moral teaching of the Bishops.”¹⁰³

But it wasn’t quite as straightforward as that. Conor Cruise O’Brien pointed out that the government which obeyed the hierarchy was defeated, the party that chose bishops over Browne was shattered, Browne himself was comfortably returned to the next Dáil, and the following Fianna Fáil government introduced a Mother and Child Scheme.¹⁰⁴ This is true, although Browne, while he voted for his successor’s scheme, later disowned it. And there were clearly limits to anti-clericalism in Fianna Fáil. In 1953, when the new health scheme was being criticised by the hierarchy, Dan Breen told a parliamentary party meeting, “It’s a terrible pity that 30 years ago, when we had the chance, we didn’t shoot a few Bishops.” His novel approach to Church–State relations was greeted with silence, “although Eamon de Valera looked glum”.¹⁰⁵ In the long run, the controversy damaged the Church’s image, and certainly couldn’t be seen as a success, happy or not.

To return to the immediate aftermath of Browne’s resignation, Costello took over as Minister for Health himself. The move was supposed to be temporary,¹⁰⁶ but he remained in the post until the change of government—one reason may have been that a new appointment would have required a Dáil vote, which the Government had no guarantee of winning.

James Deeny, the Department’s Chief Medical Officer, was then on secondment to the National Tuberculosis Survey, but was told that the Taoiseach “worked only with the medical staff, whom he saw all day every day. When he had decided what he wanted to do, he sent for the Secretary of the Department and in the presence of the medical people gave him his orders. As he was Taoiseach as well as Minister for Health and had a positive determined manner, no one dared to say anything, but the administration did not like it.”¹⁰⁷

The dislike was returned with interest. Costello held senior civil servants in the Department partly responsible for the crisis that had been allowed to develop. Dr J.D. McCormack, a senior medical adviser in the Department, was also a fellow member of Portmarnock. He claimed to the Taoiseach that there was “a prejudice against the medical profession among the lay administrators”.¹⁰⁸ This confirmed Costello’s suspicions about attempted State control of medicine. He later told the Dáil that he took away from his short time in the Department “one paramount impression … there was, in the course of the day-to-day administration of this Department, being done … something which was … steadily and surely leading to socialised medicine”.¹⁰⁹

The Taoiseach proceeded to sideline the civil servants and put the Department’s medical staff in charge of negotiations with the IMA. Nothing came of this approach before the general election.¹¹⁰ The joint committee he had set up was dissolved by the new Minister, Dr Jim Ryan—Costello blamed the decision on the need to placate some of the Independents supporting the new government¹¹¹ (principally Browne). Given time, Costello’s approach might have led to a compromise, although one that would have suited the medical profession.

But time was something the Inter-party Government no longer had. Discussions of the Mother and Child issue, for the sake of clarity, usually ignore the other pressing matters facing the Government, almost as if it was the only problem facing Costello and his colleagues. But of course this was very far from the case, and while the difficulty with Noël Browne may have been the most important factor in triggering the 1951 general election, it certainly wasn’t the only one. As early as January, the Canadian High Commissioner in London was reporting a prediction by Boland, now the Ambassador to London, that there would be an election in May. “Rising costs and increasing shortages were making life difficult for the people and government. The recent country-wide strikes of railway and bank employees had pointed up the strains under which the Irish economy was suffering. I got the impression that the wear and tear of the last couple of years had taken something out of Costello’s coalition which is not likely to go to the country in quite the solid phalanx he foresaw when he was in Ottawa three years ago.”¹¹² Current affairs journal The Leader noted at around the same time that “the situation in industry has taken a serious turn for the worse over Christmas” with strikes threatening national paralysis, while the Government had “given the impression of weakness all along the line in its handling of the Baltinglass issue”. It added that the absurdity of the latter situation “often brings governments down except in a country which enjoys comedy in politics”.¹¹³

Costello was, occasionally at least, able to enjoy the comedy himself. He told a meeting of the Literary and Historical Society in UCD that being in government “brought neither power nor enjoyment”, although some people seemed to believe he was omnipotent. This he denied, exclaiming, “Power! Why, we could not even cook up a job in a village post office!”¹¹⁴ A sense of the pressure the Taoiseach was under is given by a letter to his friend Tom Bodkin in February (before the healthcare situation reached crisis point). Costello apologised for delays in dealing with the Arts Bill. “The spirit was willing but the insanity that swept through the country before and after Christmas and the illness of practically all my colleagues threw such a burden on me that a 24 hour day wasn’t long enough to provide time to deal with everything … Again strikes—milk, bread, railways, banks—Estimates, Prices Orders and a succession of problems delayed me …”¹¹⁵

Similar sentiments were expressed by James Dillon, who wrote at the start of the year to congratulate Costello on the resolution of an ITGWU strike. “When I behold you battering away Christmas Day and every other day, while your colleagues collapse around you, I must confess to a sentiment for which awe is not too strong a word!”¹¹⁶ The Leader agreed, saying that “the Taoiseach has been called upon to do too much. He has been in the centre of things amid the Cost of Living crisis, the Bank Strike, the Rail Strike and the Health debacle, and has often performed functions that otherwise would have been attended to by the respective Ministers in the Departments of Industry and Commerce, Finance and Health.”¹¹⁷

Dillon himself would contribute to the Taoiseach’s problems. His policies had already led to the loss of the support of Independent TDS Patrick Cogan, Patrick Lehane and William Sheldon. At the end of April, Patrick Finucane and Patrick Halliden resigned from Clann na Talmhan in protest at the way he had treated milk producers. As Dillon’s biographer Maurice Manning has written, the collapse of the Government’s support had far more to do with agriculture than it did with the Mother and Child Scheme—which explains why Fianna Fáil made the Agriculture estimates “the battleground for its showdown with the government”. The Independent farmer TDS who had supported the Government in the past were prepared to continue doing so—if the price paid to milk suppliers was increased. Dillon flatly refused. As Manning states, his attitude “is astonishing given what was at stake. Neither did his colleagues in government put him under any pressure to change his stance … There was … nothing inevitable about the collapse of the government after the Mother and Child crisis. It had the wherewithal to stay in office, at least in the short to medium term, had it so chosen. It chose otherwise, and in so doing was not helped by Dillon’s handling of matters under his political remit.”¹¹⁸

The other factor agitating the rural Independents was Norton’s Social Security scheme, which was felt to discriminate against farmers, who weren’t covered. In March, Costello told Bodkin that “the Opposition thought they were sure of defeating us on it but I think they have now changed their minds”.¹¹⁹ However, with certain defeat looming on the Agriculture estimates, the Government had run out of road, and Costello asked his officials on Tuesday 2 May to advise on possible dissolution dates. The next day, he agreed to seek a dissolution for the following Monday, the seventh, with polling on Wednesday 30 May and the assembly of the new Dáil two weeks later.¹²⁰ He told the British Ambassador, Sir Gilbert Laithwaite, that he “found it impossible to carry on in face of attitude of Independents, and was certain that right course was to appeal to the country which he was confident would support his Government”. Laithwaite did not share his confidence. In London, officials noted that this would mean de Valera’s return—“but at least one might then count on a new Irish Minister for External Affairs”.¹²¹

Costello’s annoyance at the Independents was reflected in his statement announcing the election, when he accused them of having “irresponsibly sought to embarrass the Government by exploiting petty grievances. The Government, however, is responsible to the people as a whole. Its sole consideration has been for the common good of all our people which must at all times take precedence over sectional interests.” He also pointed out that his government remained undefeated¹²²—which was true only because a vote had been avoided by the dissolution of the Dáil.

In an address to his own constituents in Dublin South-East, he pointed out that resignations were not unique to inter-party governments. He added that his government had lasted “for a year longer than the average life of a Fianna Fáil Government”, and claimed there was “as much, if not more, harmony in the Inter-party Government as in the single party Government of which I had experience”. He also cautiously addressed the Browne situation, saying his criticism of his constituency rival had been “appropriate in the circumstances of his final actions in office. But I did not, nor do I now, intend to detract from his achievements in those years when he co-operated with us.”¹²³

If he was nervous of a groundswell of support for Browne in his own constituency, he had good reason. More than one hundred people had to be turned away from a Browne meeting in the Mansion House because it was full.¹²⁴ When the Taoiseach addressed a meeting in Ringsend, in the working-class end of Dublin South-East, a group of women came up to the platform waving placards, remaining there for his entire speech. The slogans left no doubt as to which side they were on: “No means test”, “Healthy mothers, healthy children, healthy nation”, “Equal rights to happy motherhood”, “Mothers must have the best care”.¹²⁵ In later years, his Director of Elections, Tommy Doyle, made light of their intervention, telling Costello’s retirement dinner of the “solid phalanx of somewhat forbidding and unprepossessing spinster ladies, who were equipped with placards and made a great deal of trouble about the Mother and Child situation, and really, without any disrespect to them, you would have gauged from their age that this was a topic that shouldn’t give them any personal concern!”¹²⁶

The Taoiseach undertook a fairly punishing schedule, speaking in most major towns over the course of the campaign, although he made sure to spend time in Dublin South-East as well—of the final 18 days of the campaign, no fewer than four were devoted entirely to his own constituency.¹²⁷ He was reported to have travelled 2,100 miles and spoken at 27 meetings, compared to de Valera’s 40 meetings. The Taoiseach’s meetings were marked by “over long” speeches, which left him with a bout of laryngitis at a critical point in the campaign.¹²⁸ He had to cancel visits to Carrickmacross and Cavan on 23 May as a result, while at the start of the campaign he appears to have had dental trouble, visiting the dentist on 9 and 10 May.¹²⁹

His speeches concentrated on what he saw as the achievements of his government. A hand-written conclusion to one summarised his interpretation of the previous three and a half years: “Peace, order, stability and prosperity: these we have given you. You can secure their continuance by having the Inter-party Government returned to office.”¹³⁰

Costello argued that the peace to which he referred was a product of the repeal of the External Relations Act and the declaration of the Republic. This had closed “a chapter of sustained political uncertainty … and an era begun in which undistracted attention can be given to social problems”.¹³¹ His government, he claimed, had removed “the last source of constitutional difference from the politics of the twenty-six counties”.¹³² To complaints that the election was marked by apathy, he pointed out that in previous campaigns the worry had been caused by too much enthusiasm: “What has in the present campaign been described as apathy might more accurately be described as peace.”¹³³

Stability had been established through coalition government, which put into “practical effect the democratic principles of Proportional Representation and adult suffrage in such a way as to guarantee full representation of every section of the community, not merely in the Dáil, but in the Government as well”.¹³⁴ He pointed out that the Fianna Fáil need for an overall majority invariably led to two general elections in quick succession. “The people then only gave it to them to protect themselves from a third general election.”¹³⁵

Prosperity he ascribed to his government’s economic policy, which he contrasted to that of Fianna Fáil, who “like certain kings of old, have learnt nothing or forgotten nothing”.¹³⁶ He said Fianna Fáil were pessimistic about the economic development of Ireland, and were “the last political party in Europe standing steadfast in defence of a system of finance which died with Montagu Norman.” If they objected to the amount the Government had borrowed, they had two choices—“curtail development or increase taxation”.¹³⁷

Costello claimed that in 1947 Fianna Fáil had planned to reinstate the wages standstill policy, and that everyone who had received a pay rise since then should remember that fact. But the Taoiseach admitted that the Government was not yet satisfied with “a society in which there still remained so many social evils … Much has been done but much more has yet to be done.”¹³⁸ And he rejected (accurate) claims by Fianna Fáil that his own party were unenthusiastic about social welfare plans, saying that if the Government was returned, “the Social Security proposals will be enacted without delay”.¹³⁹

He returned to his themes—peace, stability, prosperity—in a final speech in Bray on the eve of polling, in which he stressed that the choice facing voters was between the Inter-party Government and Fianna Fáil. The bitter divisions over the Treaty feud had been removed, he claimed, while the inter-party innovation had introduced institutional flexibility which allowed politics to escape from the “arthritic rigidity which single-party domination had imposed”. And in case that wasn’t enough, he used the opportunity to announce that the Government had decided to accept the pay rise recommended by the Civil Service Arbitrator.¹⁴⁰ The campaign overall was dominated by economic, rather than constitutional, issues, and for that reason was seen as “unquestionably the opening of a new era”.¹⁴¹

The election proved to be a triumph for Fine Gael, and for Jack Costello personally. He received almost a third of the vote, 31.4 per cent, the highest share received by a candidate in Dublin South-East or its predecessor, Dublin Townships, up to then. Most unusually, the other two seats were also filled on the first count, with Noël Browne pipping Seán MacEntee for second place by 139 votes. The new Clann candidate, Dr Patrick McCartan, got less than 2 per cent of the vote. Costello’s son Declan was also elected to the Dáil for Dublin North-West. In his first electoral outing, which came shortly before his twenty-fifth birthday, he topped the poll, winning 22 per cent of the vote.

Nationally, Fine Gael came back from the brink of oblivion, increasing its share of the vote to 25.7 per cent, six points more than in 1948, with the most significant rises in the more agricultural areas—7.6 per cent in Connaught-Ulster and 7.8 per cent in Munster. It also won an extra nine seats. The reunited Labour Party won 16 seats, three fewer than the two parties took in 1948; Clann na Poblachta was reduced to just two, Clann na Talmhan had six, and there were 14 Independents. Fianna Fáil, meanwhile, added 4.5 per cent to its vote, but won just one extra seat, giving the party a total of 69. Inter-party transfers were relatively effective—the Government parties missed out on four seats they could have won with better transfers, but another eight were won on transfers, particularly from Clann na Poblachta.¹⁴²

The result was, to say the least of it, indecisive. It is important to stress that it was not seen at the time as a rejection of the Inter-party Government and an endorsement of Fianna Fáil; quite the opposite. Most newspapers expected that a majority of the Independents would vote for Costello, making him Taoiseach again. The British Ambassador briefed London that the result was a “moral defeat for Fianna Fáil”, but observed that whatever government was returned would face difficulty because it would lack an effective working majority.¹⁴³ On 4 June, Lemass confessed that what would happen when the Dáil met “is still a very open matter”, as the balance of power lay with the Independents. “The position cannot be satisfactory no matter what happens, but the only prospect of some effective work being done is if FF can succeed in forming a government. Another Coalition, dependent on the support of nearly all these Independent deputies, offers a very depressing prospect.”¹⁴⁴

Of the 14 Independents, Dillon and his group—Alfie and Alfred Byrne, Charles Fagan and Oliver J. Flanagan—would vote for Costello. So would Patrick Lehane, Patrick Finucane and William Sheldon, despite their differences with the Minister for Agriculture. This gave Costello 72 votes to the 69 of Fianna Fáil, and left the balance of power with six non-aligned Independents—Browne, Cowan, Cogan, McQuillan, Michael ffrench-O’Carroll and John Flynn. Flynn had supported de Valera in the past, ffrench-O’Carroll was a new TD, and the other four had voted for Costello in 1948. Those Independents now found themselves wooed by both sides. Ffrench-O’Carroll, a follower of Noël Browne, found himself in Costello’s house, as the outgoing Taoiseach and Tánaiste tried to sell him the idea of a health scheme based on social insurance. But he wasn’t convinced. He agreed to act with Browne, who wanted absolute loyalty from those around him, telling ffrench-O’Carroll, “I want people who will go with me all the way.”¹⁴⁵

MacBride tried to make things easier for Costello, saying he would not accept a post in a new Inter-party Government as his presence would “be availed of by some Independents for motives of their own, to create additional difficulties for the government”. In any case, as he acknowledged, the election result was “a repudiation of the policies I have been advocating and of my actions in the course of the last three years”.¹⁴⁶

The Cabinet met on 5 June “on the understanding that they will be staying in office”.¹⁴⁷ But Fianna Fáil were also making a pitch for Independent support, publishing a programme for government which included the continuation of many of Dillon’s policies in Agriculture, new legislation on social security and a mother and child scheme. It was “a shopping list to attract the Independents”,¹⁴⁸ and it worked. Flynn, Browne, Cogan, Cowan and ffrench-O’Carroll were all to support de Valera this time. Only Jack McQuillan of the unaligned Independents decided to support the outgoing Taoiseach.

On the morning the Dáil was due to meet, Industry and Commerce Minister T.F. O’Higgins told the British Ambassador they now expected to be voted out. “Some soreness is clearly felt that the Speaker [sic] who was reelected without contest should not be seeking re-election as Speaker but rejoining Fianna Fáil as a voting member. As new Speaker would be a Fine Gael supporter, this gives de Valera his bare majority.”¹⁴⁹ This duly happened—when the Dáil met, de Valera announced that Frank Fahy, who had held the position since 1932, would not be seeking re-election as Ceann Comhairle. Labour’s Patrick Hogan was elected instead. The result was a gain of one vote for de Valera, and the loss of one for Costello, a swing of two votes. As Maurice Manning has noted, this raises the question of why an Independent who was likely to vote against the Government was not chosen instead of Hogan, but it appears this wasn’t even considered.¹⁵⁰ Costello told the Dáil he felt it was his duty to nominate a Ceann Comhairle, “even in the peculiar circumstances in which we find ourselves in this House today”.¹⁵¹

Costello’s nomination was defeated by 74 votes to 72, the appointment of Hogan as Ceann Comhairle having made the difference. De Valera was elected by 74 to 69, as three of the Independents who supported Costello—Finucane, Lehane and Sheldon—abstained. Dillon quickly christened the five Independents keeping de Valera in power the “busted flush”. Costello said he had “no doubt that the vast majority of the electors desire an Inter-party Government. I have equally no doubt that some of the Independent Deputies who voted against the Inter-party Government were voting against the very people who elected them to this Dáil …”¹⁵² But such complaints, merited or not, could not disguise the fact that the inter-party experiment was over—for the time being.