Chapter 10  

TRUMPET-TONGUED DENUNCIATION

“The country will now have a chance of seeing whether the present crowd can do any better.”¹

JOHN A. COSTELLO, JULY 1951

“If that bloody fellow had been working for me, I’d have won me bloody case!”²

PATRICK KAVANAGH

In June 1953, Jack Costello characterised a series of by-election results as a “trumpet-tongued denunciation” by the voters of the Fianna Fáil administration.³ The phrase could equally serve as a description of his political approach as leader of the Opposition. During the three years he was out of power, he kept up a constant and comprehensive critique of Government policy, and in particular the austerity introduced by his constituency rival Seán MacEntee in the 1952 Budget.

But while politics played a huge part in Costello’s life in these years, so too did the law, in what was arguably his greatest period as a barrister. The aura of having headed a government added to his legendary status in the Law Library, and he was regarded as being at the height of his powers.⁴ This was demonstrated in the Patrick Kavanagh libel trial, discussed below.

He very quickly returned to the routine of spending most days working in the Law Library until five o’clock or after.⁵ But political work took up more time than it had before 1948, mainly because Costello was the recognised leader of the Opposition in the Dáil. While Richard Mulcahy remained leader of Fine Gael, Costello “would certainly have been seen in the country as the ‘real’ leader”.⁶ This had political implications. Costello’s pre-eminence was an indication that the inter-party arrangement remained in place, waiting for a chance to return to government. This may explain, as Cornelius O’Leary suggested, why de Valera did not attempt to solidify his position with a snap election, as he had in 1933, 1938 and 1944. This time was different, because “a viable alternative government was in the offing”.⁷

It is significant, too, that it was Costello, rather than Mulcahy, who approached Dillon in May 1952 with a suggestion that he should rejoin Fine Gael.⁸ Dillon took up the suggestion, bringing Oliver J. Flanagan into the party as well. Costello acted as a focus, organising meetings of “the Heads of the various groups which form the combined Opposition”,⁹ ensuring that the unity forged around the Cabinet table was not lost while on the Opposition benches. He told his constituency executive that Fine Gael would continue the work it did in the Inter-party Government “in an Inter-party Opposition”. He said the Opposition’s role was “to protect the people against the preponderant power of a mammoth party which by its very nature threatens the liberty and integrity of the citizens in a small country.”¹⁰ Observers recognised his strong position within Fine Gael “by virtue of the ascendancy he acquired as head of the former Government and of his role as formulator of policy since becoming leader of the Opposition”.¹¹

One of the key tasks facing Costello was to defend the record of the Inter-party Government. As his close friend Senator James Douglas wrote in early August, Fianna Fáil, “especially MacEntee, is trying to put over the idea that the Inter-party was reckless and irresponsible in its financial policy … it seems to me that the game is to create a general impression that the country has been left in a serious financial position, and then to claim later that it was saved from financial ruin by Fianna Fáil”.¹²

Costello tackled these suggestions head on in a speech to his constituency executive later in the month. He claimed the Inter-party Government’s policy of capital development had led to an unprecedented expansion in agriculture and industry. “It is still our policy and one which we believe should, in spite of the difficulties of the times, and particularly because of the uncertainties of the future, be pressed forward with all reasonable speed.” He defended his government’s record on inflation, pointing out that it had refused to sanction increased milk prices, despite the political advantages of doing so. “We left the finances of the State in a sound and healthy condition, and the continuance of the bold and courageous policy of capital expenditure to develop the resources of the State … will best secure the maintenance of employment, financial stability and economic security.”¹³

This speech, which was fully reported in the newspapers, was seen by The Leader as the start of “real controversy” on the question of whether a financial crisis was looming. Costello’s emphatic denial of such a disaster was to dominate his political activity in the coming months.¹⁴ At this time, and throughout this period in opposition, he was heavily reliant on his son-in-law, Alexis FitzGerald, who acted “as a kind of one-man research centre and as speech writer”.¹⁵ FitzGerald’s ideas on economics, particularly on capital investment and the repatriation of sterling assets, dovetailed with Costello’s own views. They were also politically useful—there was a need to respond to Fianna Fáil’s policy of austerity.

The Costello family had their summer holiday in Italy,¹⁶ as they were to do for several years around this time. On his return to the political frontline, he told his friend Tom Bodkin that reports from the country “indicate dissatisfaction with the present government and a general expectation of an early election”. He was particularly critical of Lemass for making speeches full of “gloomy prophecy and indications of bad times ahead. He has cast himself for the role of the politician who will tell the people the facts no matter what the political consequences. The fact, of course, is that he has found himself enmeshed in his own promises which he can’t fulfil.”¹⁷ He told Dillon that he would “deal with some of Lemass’s major misrepresentations” in a speech in his constituency.¹⁸

This speech, delivered at the opening of Fine Gael rooms in Rathmines in October 1951, made fun of Lemass for his “Dunkirk manner”. Costello pointed out that the Tánaiste “only dons his mantle of heavy statesmanship when the burdens of Government press upon and dismay him. The perception which he now displays of the problems of Irish economics did not after all come to our assistance during the trials of last winter.” He apologised for “striking a disharmonious note of cheerfulness”, but said, “I don’t think that things are so bad and I doubt if the Tánaiste does either. After all, this is a technique that has been used before—prophesying the arrival of evil days and claiming credit if they do not come … the only reason they talk as they do, is to injure at the cost of the nation the reputation of their predecessors …”¹⁹

This reputation was about to suffer another injury, this time from the Central Bank, which issued its report for the 1950/51 financial year in October. With some understatement, the Irish Times described it as a “gloomy review of financial tendencies”.²⁰ The Central Bank complained that Marshall Aid “was expended largely on consumer or near-consumer goods”; that “the constantly increasing scale” of State spending had pushed up costs; and that the public works programme was “disproportionate”. The economic position, it complained, “is one of high consumption, high investment (with insufficient early output of the character most needed) and low savings”.²¹

A few days after the report’s publication, Dillon sent a memorandum to Costello, criticising the Central Bank’s views as “crazy, damnable doctrine”. He summed up the report as saying that “it is economically criminal to spend money on building houses or hospitals for our own people in Lifford or Monaghan, but economic virtue and vision to lend the money to the British Government at 1.25% to build houses and hospitals 100 yards down the road in Strabane and South Armagh … If this report is accepted, the wisest thing young people could do would be to fly this country as quickly as possible.”²²

Costello didn’t need any encouragement from Dillon to reject the report. He had evidently criticised the Governor of the Central Bank, Joseph Brennan, to his friend Tom Bodkin. The latter said that, in the light of their earlier conversation, he was “not surprised to read what I can only describe as Poor Joe’s diabosterous report. He seems to have ossified, though even when we were boys together at Clongowes he showed signs of a reactionary temperament despite his academic brilliancy.”²³

MacEntee added to the controversy by publishing a White Paper on the country’s external trade and payments on 29 October. This claimed Ireland was unique in Europe, with only Greece among the OEEC nations approaching its lack of balance in international trade. The White Paper forecast an adverse trade balance of £70 million, prescribing reduced spending on consumer goods and cuts in imports as the only solution.²⁴

In a speech in Cork at the start of November, Costello attacked the Central Bank’s economic diagnosis, “which has since been supported by the tendentious and misleading White Paper … An atmosphere of crisis has been created and maintained to the point where real damage may be done to our people and our economy unless immediate steps are taken to restore public confidence …” He recalled his forecast in his speech to the Institute of Bankers in 1949 of a “temporary disequilibrium in the Balance of Payments” caused by the repatriation of sterling assets to pay for capital investment. “What I foretold has happened, but it is not ‘crisis’ …” He also noted that neither the Central Bank report nor the White Paper had mentioned that the monthly figure for the adverse balance of trade had been declining since June.²⁵

In fact, while the balance of trade for 1951 turned out to be the largest ever recorded, it was lower than MacEntee forecast, at £61.6 million.²⁶ The Minister claimed the lower figure was due to the corrective measures taken by the Government.²⁷ Others weren’t so sure. A series of articles in The Leader in August and September 1952 strongly supported Costello’s argument that imports reached their peak in April 1951, and that the problem was caused by increased import prices rather than volumes. In other words, it wasn’t extravagant consumption that caused the problem, but international price inflation due to the Korean War. Not surprisingly, perhaps, Costello preserved the series in his private papers, underlining the conclusion that the White Paper had used “selected statistics to support a preconceived thesis”.²⁸

When the Dáil resumed in November, the dispute over the two documents was centre stage, and Costello led the fight for the Opposition. He said that “when a lie is started it is very difficult to catch up on it. I doubt if we will ever be able to get it out of the heads of the people that this gap in the balance of payments … has been brought about by some sort of profligacy and unnecessary spending on luxury goods by the last Government.” This, naturally, he denied, adding that “the suggestions and tendentious information, or misinformation I should call it, contained in this White Paper are utterly without foundation”.²⁹

In his contribution, Lemass said that there was a problem, but not a crisis—a remark which became the headline for the following day’s Irish Times.³⁰ As Costello pointed out, this description had been “borrowed” from his own speech in Cork.³¹ He was later to claim that by winning the argument over whether there was a crisis, the Opposition had headed off the threat of an autumn supplementary budget.³² However, while Lemass may have down-played the seriousness of the situation in the Dáil, MacEntee was sticking to his guns within government, and in the long run was to win the argument in favour of austerity. The divisions within Cabinet were highlighted by Costello, who contrasted the expansionist policy of Lemass with the restrictive policy of MacEntee. The Minister for Finance was, according to Costello, “suckled in a creed outworn since the day when Gladstone died”.³³

In his Ard Fheis speech in February, he noted that MacEntee “has recently resurrected the crisis … from the Limbo of Governmental errors to which it was consigned” by Lemass. While the Tánaiste had described the situation as a problem rather than a crisis, MacEntee was now claiming it was “difficult almost to the verge of desperation”. Costello accused his constituency rival of “striving for dramatic effect” but achieving only melodrama. “We decline to accept the view that the country is on the verge of economic disaster.”³⁴

The Budget built on MacEntee’s gloomy view of the economy was presented to the Dáil on 2 April 1952. It removed subsidies from tea, butter and sugar, and reduced subsidies for bread and flour, while increasing welfare payments in partial compensation. The subsidy cuts saved £6.67 million, while the welfare increases cost £2.75 million. Other measures included a one-shilling increase in income tax, and a swingeing £10 million increase in excise duties on tobacco, beer, spirits and petrol.³⁵ It was massively unpopular, and “contributed significantly to both the reality and the atmosphere of depression”.³⁶

In criticism which he would repeat frequently in the coming years, Costello claimed the Budget was cruel, unnecessary and unjust. Lemass appeared to agree, at least in part: “It is an easy matter to describe the Budget as brutal and cruel; we are dealing with a brutal and cruel situation; there is no easy way out of it.”³⁷ Later, when the Finance Bill introducing the Budget measures came before the Dáil, Costello claimed he would not be a party to such measures in government. “I would not stay one second in office, nor would I be associated with anybody in office who would be responsible for a Budget or a Finance Bill of this kind.”³⁸ This promise was to be forgotten in the crisis year of 1956.

One of MacEntee’s economy measures was the withdrawal of Costello’s State car. The bad news was broken by de Valera, who must have wondered when he went into opposition in 1954 if the favour would be returned.³⁹ In fact, not only did Costello not try to withdraw de Valera’s car when their roles were reversed, he insisted that his predecessor should keep his Packard as “he was accustomed to it and found it comfortable”. Later, in response to a query from de Valera about insurance, Costello said the car should be available to him on exactly the same terms as when he was Taoiseach.⁴⁰ Deprived of his car in 1952, Costello wrote to the Garda Commissioner to thank him for the four years of “devoted service” he had received from his drivers.⁴¹ He reverted to driving his own car, a Humber, which he did with care but considerable speed—he claimed to never look at his speedometer, so if anything ever happened he could honestly say he didn’t know what speed he was travelling at.⁴²

MacEntee’s biographer has argued that the 1952 Budget was not quite as severe as is commonly thought, as current and capital expenditure both rose slightly in real terms compared to the previous year, and the capital investment plans of the Inter-party Government remained largely intact. In fact, the Government rejected MacEntee’s proposals to cut capital investment, opting to raise taxation instead.⁴³ This contradiction was noted at the time by Costello, who pointed out that the Government’s planned capital programme was “as great if not greater than the capital programme we had”. He accused MacEntee of secretly planning a Budget surplus, through unnecessary increased taxation, in order to pay for this programme. This was being done, he alleged, because Fianna Fáil had criticised Inter-party Government borrowing, and so could not follow a similar policy.⁴⁴

In any event, the result of MacEntee’s policy was deflation, which led to increased unemployment. Ken Whitaker, then a rising star within the Department of Finance, later rejected the view that there was an alternative policy of expanding demand through fiscal action. He argued that while the 1952 Budget may have been too severe, there was no way of pursing an expansionary policy when there were virtually no sources of foreign borrowing available.⁴⁵ Whitaker insisted that in the absence of Marshall Aid, the Inter-party Government would have had to pursue a similar course if it was still in power.⁴⁶

Whitaker may well have been right, but it would have been too much to expect the Opposition leaders to admit this. Costello in particular kept contrasting his government’s “system of productive capital expenditure based on the system of the double budget” with Fianna Fáil’s “adoption of a system of taxation”.⁴⁷ Rising prices and taxes would particularly hit “those sections of the community for whom … Fine Gael as a party has always been concerned … the sections described for want of a better terms as the ‘white collared workers’ …”⁴⁸

Costello claimed he wasn’t opposing for opposition’s sake; rather he was setting forth a realistic alternative, the policy of capital investment followed by his government, “which, if continued, would have saved the country from the spectre of increased unemployment and emigration which is now haunting the land”. He said this programme would have been funded by national loans (rather than foreign borrowing, which as we have seen was virtually unobtainable at the time). Instead, he said, the Fianna Fáil government introduced a Budget “which is not merely calculated but deliberately designed to depress the standard of living of the Irish people … what is being attempted is tantamount to a fiscal revolution or rather counter-revolution, calculated to assault and deflate the incomes of the people and their standard of living”.⁴⁹

These attacks, allied to the evident unpopularity of the Budget measures, had their effect within Fianna Fáil. Senator Michael Yeats (a former candidate in Dublin South-East) put down a parliamentary party motion criticising the Government’s economic policy, which attracted 35 signatures. De Valera and MacEntee made it clear there would be no change; but after the leadership won the vote, Lemass said in Yeats’s ear, “Never mind, Senator, you were 98 per cent right.”⁵⁰

As the Dáil limped towards its summer recess, tempers were evidently stretched beyond breaking point, with a number of physical altercations between Deputies. Fine Gael TD Seán Collins so enraged Fianna Fáil’s Mark Killilea that the latter crossed the Dáil chamber in an effort to strike him; the following day, Collins was in fact struck, by Education Minister Seán Moylan. Moylan having admitted the assault, de Valera conceded that a “simple apology” was not enough to close the incident. But he suggested the cause had been the personal remarks made within the Chamber. His proposed solution was a committee to draw up rules to deal with “this whole question of privilege, abusive personal remarks and personal imputations” so that the targets of such invective would not have to take “the law into their own hands”. Not surprisingly, Costello wasn’t happy; de Valera’s proposed solution completely ignored Moylan’s assault, which he characterised as “one of the gravest which has occurred in the history of this Parliament”. The Taoiseach responded by saying that if someone insulted him, “and I have no redress other than to knock him down, and I am fit to knock him, I will do so”.⁵¹

Within hours of this exchange, another altercation took place, when Dillon was jostled on the stairs leading from the Dáil chamber by Fianna Fáil’s William Quirke, the Leader of the Seanad, who knocked the cigarette from his mouth.⁵² In the course of a debate that evening on the Moylan incident, Costello claimed that such assaults were occurring “all too frequently”, pointing out that in each case a member of Fianna Fáil had assaulted a member of Fine Gael.⁵³ Moylan apologised in the Dáil, while Quirke did so in the Seanad. Dillon remained unmollified, claiming there was “a careful Fianna Fáil organised conspiracy” and calling for extra gardaí to be deployed in Leinster House “to restrain Senators or others who go rambling through our corridors looking for drink and fight”.⁵⁴

By October 1952, Costello was able to point to improving balance of trade figures. These, he claimed, showed the Government’s diagnosis of the situation was wrong—as was the “cure which it so roughly administered … the cure of gloomy talk, pessimistic outlook, credit restrictions, severe taxation, high interest rates and progressively increased unemployment … Because the Government took an incorrect view … every section of the community has been made to suffer.”⁵⁵

In his February 1953 Ard Fheis speech, Costello set out what The Leader described as “the most complete and detailed statement of policy which has been heard from any Irish political leader within living memory … it was a programme prepared by a party confident of being concerned with responsibility for government in the near future and staking its claim to office on positive proposals rather than on generalised bromides or pious aspirations”. It was, the journal said, part of a process Costello had engaged in since becoming leader of the Opposition. “He has consistently dedicated himself to the difficult task of laying down … a new economic policy for Fine Gael … He has succeeded in persuading the public that Fine Gael have no intention of being a party of the past.”⁵⁶

The speech, which was later published by Fine Gael as a pamphlet, Blueprint for Prosperity, again criticised the Government’s deflationary policy. Costello argued that it must be replaced by “a policy of financial easement and economic expansion … We cannot be content with mere exhortations to harder work and increased production, but must instead take steps to change the conditions of production in such a way as to lead to that greater creation of wealth which alone can bring a greater measure of prosperity.”

Investment would be funded by “prudent” repatriation of sterling assets through “deliberately planned and controlled deficits” in the balance of payments; by some foreign capital; and by savings at home. Costello stressed the importance of maintaining financial confidence, ruling out a break with sterling. It was also vital to restore public belief in the future of the country. Among his concrete proposals were the establishment of a domestic money market (following the example of the Reserve Bank of India) so that banks could secure at home the liquidity they sought in London; changes to the Control of Manufactures Acts to attract risk-bearing foreign capital; a central savings office; and a Capital Investment Board.⁵⁷

This was, as The Leader noted, an ambitious statement of policy; it contained many ideas which would later have a significant impact on the Irish economy. MacEntee evidently recognised the appeal of the speech, for he had officials in the Department of Finance and the Revenue Commissioners draw up memoranda on various points raised by Costello. The officials were predictably critical (Whitaker, for instance, suggested it was “obviously absurd to set up Indian credit arrangements as standards to be followed by this country”), especially of the proposed Capital Investment Board.⁵⁸

Inside government, Lemass was pushing a rather similar agenda to that set out by Costello, arguing in July 1953 that continuing unemployment and emigration were caused by the low level of capital investment by private enterprise. Therefore, he argued, “there appears to be no practical alternative to an enlarged programme of State investment”. He wanted £10 million per year invested in road development and other labour-intensive projects. MacEntee rejected this proposal, arguing that “work for work’s sake” would be created “at the cost of heavier taxation and great risk to the country’s financial stability”. However, MacEntee was overruled, with the Government agreeing to the establishment of a National Development Fund of £5 million per year. MacEntee attempted to reopen the question, arguing that this extra sum would make a Budget deficit a certainty, and that the decision would signal “that ‘the lid is off’ and that economy is no longer to be seriously thought of”. His appeal for further consideration appears to have gone unanswered.⁵⁹

Costello was predictably unimpressed, dismissing the Fund as “a new machine for distributing political benefits”, and claiming that the Government was attempting to repair the damage it had caused to the economy with “works of an impermanent, and probably of an uneconomic character, which are little better than temporary Relief Schemes”. Capital investment, he said, “does not consist in pulling weeds out of the river Dodder, nor in wiping out villages for the sake of impatient road hogs … This is not Capital Investment, but rather rehabilitation of the victims of disaster—the disaster of FF finances …”⁶⁰

MacEntee’s policies on borrowing, and on Ireland’s sterling assets, were also the subject of criticism from Costello. He pointed out that despite the austerity policy introduced by the 1952 Budget, the banks’ sterling holdings actually increased. “The Irish people have to suffer austerity, to eat less and live less well in order that the Irish banking system should increase its holding of sterling assets.” The money, he insisted, would have been better used at home, especially as the value of sterling was depreciating.⁶¹ To make matters worse, MacEntee had held off seeking a loan in the autumn of 1951, when Irish credit was good. When he finally launched a loan the following year, the air of crisis he had generated meant a much higher level of interest was needed to attract investors.⁶²

Apart from the economy, health was also a controversial issue during the lifetime of the Fianna Fáil government, inevitably given the Mother and Child crisis. Costello nailed his colours to the mast early on—everyone accepted the need for improved health services, and the challenge now was to agree a scheme “which will conflict neither with moral principles nor with the just social requirements of the community”.⁶³ When Health Minister Jim Ryan published his White Paper at the end of July 1952, it “accepted the principle of the No Means Test, but its application is circumscribed. Dr Browne had envisaged care of the children up to 16, it is now cut down to 6 weeks … He has won a formal point of principle, but is it the shadow as opposed to reality?”⁶⁴ Many would argue that that was exactly what Browne got—but it was enough to allow him to vote for the Fianna Fáil scheme and continue supporting the Government.⁶⁵

The Fianna Fáil scheme also (after much negotiation) satisfied the hierarchy; but the doctors remained implacable. It is instructive that Fine Gael opposed the Bill, and was the only party to do so. This lends support to the view that medical, rather than episcopal, influence was the main motivating factor in Fine Gael opposition to the Mother and Child scheme. On Costello’s prompting, Sweetman wrote an indignant letter to the Guardian, after that paper’s Dublin correspondent suggested that Fine Gael had only objected to the Health Bill when they “got wind that the Hierarchy was intending to issue a statement attacking the Bill as contrary to Catholic social teaching”. Sweetman pointed out that the Fine Gael opposition was “based on principles consistently advocated by the Party since 1945, when it violently opposed the objectionable proposals then introduced by Mr de Valera’s Government”.⁶⁶

In a vociferous speech, accompanied by much thumping of the bench in front of him, Costello denounced Ryan’s scheme as “unjust to the middle classes”, a mere “extension of the dispensary services”, which offered no real benefit to anyone. The proposal to take a £1 “contribution” from those outside the scope of the Bill to allow them to participate was, he claimed, “a fraudulent subterfuge to get over a moral objection which was put forward to the free-for-all scheme”. The Bill, he said, was “incapable of amendment”, and he vowed to “oppose it as vigorously and with every possible means lawfully and constitutionally within my power and at my disposal”. He insisted that Fine Gael remained committed to a “proper” health scheme, and criticised Ryan’s decision to disband the expert committee Costello had established within the Department.⁶⁷

Noël Browne claimed what was really irritating Costello was that “his friends were kicked out of the Custom House”. The former Minister claimed that the former Taoiseach had given this expert group “carte blanche to bring in whatever scheme is acceptable to the Medical Association”. Ryan accused Fine Gael of political expediency, saying he had never heard “a more unreasonable … or a more vigorous speech against any measure introduced in this House”.⁶⁸ With some justice, Costello could be accused of going over the top. As Captain Peadar Cowan said at a later stage in the debate on the Health Bill, “Deputy Costello always suffers here from the serious defect of grossly exaggerating his point.”⁶⁹ In any event, the 1953 Health Act became law—but its actual implementation was to be left to a new Costello government.⁷⁰

The first electoral test since the general election, and the Budget, came in June 1952, with no fewer than three by-elections, in Mayo North, Limerick East and Waterford. The latter seat had been held by Fine Gael’s Bridget Redmond; the other two were Fianna Fáil’s. Opening the by-election campaign in Limerick, Costello urged Opposition co-operation to ensure the Government didn’t win the seat. The Opposition had called for a general election to seek the voters’ views on the Budget—now the people had their chance. He promised that if returned to power, his government would immediately restore the food subsidies removed by MacEntee.⁷¹ In Waterford, he said a vote against the Government “will be a clear signal to halt the present drift towards economic stagnation before it has gone too far … Finance must be made the servant and not the master of the nation.”⁷² In Mayo, he accused the Government of being solely concerned with balancing the budget. “With what happens to the rest of the economy they are not concerned … We are in favour of a progressive financial policy, but with the traditions of our party we can be relied upon to maintain the fundamental soundness of such a policy.”⁷³

Given the Dáil arithmetic, three Opposition victories could have led to a change of government. It was, Costello told Tom Bodkin, a time of “great alarums and excursions—hopes and fears. Hopes on the part of my colleagues that they would win the three by-elections—fears of the consequences to me personally on my part.” However, while Fine Gael won Limerick East—a “first class miracle”, according to Costello—Fianna Fáil took the seats in Mayo North and Waterford, leaving the overall numbers in the Dáil unchanged. “They are a tough … crowd that will not be easy to beat but will be beaten … Business is stagnant here, unemployment increasing, taxes and prices rising. And still they hold grimly on …”⁷⁴

The first test of opinion in the capital came with the death of Independent TD Alfred Byrne of Dublin North-West. Fine Gael didn’t contest the election, agreeing to support Byrne’s brother Thomas, as did Labour.⁷⁵ Clann na Poblachta ran The O’Rahilly, while the Fianna Fáil candidate was Lord Mayor Andrew Clarkin. MacEntee’s Budget was the main target of opposition attack, with Costello saying that a Fianna Fáil victory “would be taken as an endorsement of their actions in removing the food subsidies”.⁷⁶ He again accused the Government of misinterpreting the situation, and therefore adopting the wrong policies. “The fruits of Fianna Fáil policy have been so bitter that I think it can reasonably be said that its policy has been disastrous.”⁷⁷

The result was a triumph. Byrne was elected on the first count, with a massive 61 per cent of the first preferences. Fianna Fáil’s Clarkin got 31 per cent, while The O’Rahilly received just 8 per cent. The British Embassy reported to London that the result, while not affecting the position in the Dáil, was “generally regarded as a major setback to Fianna Fáil”, who had put up a strong candidate and campaigned hard in his support.⁷⁸ Costello claimed that no government since the establishment of the State “received such a strong rebuff or such an unmistakable demonstration of public mistrust”. He pointed out that Fianna Fáil didn’t win a majority of the votes in any of the three previous by-elections either. “After such a crushing defeat any self-respecting democratically elected government would dissolve the parliament and submit themselves and their policy to the people … An alternative government is available to them with a forward progressive policy that is based upon confidence in the people and in their capacity to develop the resources of the country.”⁷⁹

The next opportunity for the Opposition came in June 1953, after the deaths of a Labour TD from Cork East and a Fianna Fáil deputy in Wicklow. The economy again proved the dominant theme, with Costello telling voters in Cork that the Government’s “policy of enforced austerity and … restrictionism which has caused decline in industry and business prospects must be abandoned”.⁸⁰ In Wicklow, he complained of the “disgracefully false charge” by Fianna Fáil that the Inter-party Government “engaged in a wild spree of borrowing”. He claimed his government’s record was better than that of Fianna Fáil, further accusing de Valera of securing the support of Independents with a programme “which sounded more like a Deed of Purchase than a policy”.⁸¹

In Wicklow, Fine Gael candidate Mark Deering was in third place on the first count, which was headed by Fianna Fáil’s Paudge Brennan, son of the deceased TD, followed by Labour’s Senator James McCrea. However, Deering pulled ahead on transfers and managed to take the seat. In Cork East, Richard Barry of Fine Gael topped the poll, and took the seat with the transfers of Labour’s Sean Keane Junior, whose father had held the seat before his death. Costello told a correspondent in England that the results “were very encouraging and we are in full swing in preparation for a General Election which cannot be long postponed”.⁸²

The Fine Gael gain from Fianna Fáil in Wicklow narrowed de Valera’s majority, but the Taoiseach opted to meet the challenge head on. On the Monday after the by-elections, the Government decided to put down a confidence motion for debate in the Dáil on Wednesday 30 June. The Taoiseach spoke for 55 minutes, the leader of the Opposition for 15 minutes longer.⁸³ Costello claimed the motion was “a ragged cloak for the Government’s political shame”, saying that with a “meagre majority” it planned to continue in office “in defiance of the will of the people … in the hope that something may turn up at some time in the future to save them from the wrath of the electorate”. He claimed the six constituencies which had seen by-elections were a “perfect microcosm of the whole country”, and that the Fianna Fáil vote had fallen from 46 per cent in the general election to just 39 per cent. However, he forecast that the Independent deputies “whose political existence depends on their maintaining the present Government in power [would] continue to do so”.⁸⁴ Of course, he was right—the Government won the vote by 73 to 71, and also regained the political initiative.

Two weeks later, former Ceann Comhairle Frank Fahy died. De Valera quickly moved the writ for the Galway South by-election, which was held on 21 August. Fianna Fáil was always likely to do better in this constituency than in some of the urban areas, and the quick campaign allowed the party to build on the momentum generated by the confidence vote. The Fine Gael candidate, Brendan Glynn, described Fianna Fáil’s “terrifying organisation, as thorough and frightening to many in this constituency as its counterpart behind the Iron Curtain”. But he said they had been “quite shaken” in the few days before the vote, and that Costello’s “wonderful meeting in Ballinasloe on Wednesday night nearly finished them”.⁸⁵ In fact, the Fianna Fáil candidate was elected on the first count with 54.5 per cent of the vote; however, Glynn increased the Fine Gael vote from 29 per cent in the 1951 general election to 33 per cent, a reasonable though not dramatic performance in a difficult constituency.

At the end of November, Costello appealed for the co-operation of supporters of all Opposition parties “to bring about the final break up of the Government which has wrought such havoc”.⁸⁶ But most observers felt that the Government had actually consolidated its position, especially since three of its Independent supporters—Noël Browne, Michael ffrench-O’Carroll and Patrick Cogan—joined Fianna Fáil in October.⁸⁷ While Galway wasn’t in itself particularly important, the by-election “acquired almost national significance by the fuss with which it was surrounded”.⁸⁸ As 1954 dawned, the Government looked relatively stable—but within a few months, Jack Costello would be back in office as Taoiseach.

Before looking at how that came about, we should consider Costello’s other preoccupation in these years, the law. As was pointed out at the start of the chapter, this was arguably his most successful period as a barrister. He was at the height of his powers, had the status of being a former Taoiseach, and was one of the most sought-after senior counsels. When Arthur Cox was asked to act for Winston Churchill in a libel action being taken against him by Brigadier Eric Dorman-O’Gowan,⁸⁹ he asked Costello to lead the legal team. Churchill’s British lawyer, Hartley Shawcross, told his client that “Costello is said to occupy easily the leading position at the Irish bar and he impressed me as being undoubtedly a fighter.”⁹⁰ However, the former Taoiseach did not get an opportunity to defend the Prime Minister, as the matter was settled out of court.⁹¹

A libel action which did go to trial involved two Irish institutions—The Leader magazine, and poet Patrick Kavanagh. Kavanagh took exception to a profile of him published in The Leader in October 1952, and sued for libel. Among other things, the profile referred to Kavanagh holding court in McDaid’s pub, surrounded by younger artists: “The great voice, reminiscent of a load of gravel sliding down the side of a quarry, booms out … With a malevolent insult, which, naturally, is well received, the Master orders a further measure … ‘Yous have no merit, no merit at all’—he insults them individually and collectively … His observations on contemporary city life are shot through with a superficiality and lack of perception.” However, the profile also acknowledged that Kavanagh was “our finest living poet”, that he had been “harshly” treated by the State, and that his poem The Great Hunger was “probably the best poem written in Ireland since Goldsmith gave us The Deserted Village”.⁹²

According to his biographer, Kavanagh didn’t expect the action to come to trial, anticipating that The Leader would agree an out of court settlement.⁹³ Curiously, Costello indicated at the time that it was Kavanagh who wouldn’t settle. He told Tom Bodkin that he had “a certain amount of sympathy with the Plaintiff though I think he was very wrong in bringing the action in all the circumstances and particularly in not giving us an opportunity of doing something before the Proceedings were instituted. However, I suppose he knows his own business best.”⁹⁴

The trial was a public sensation—future Chief Justice Ronan Keane, who attended as a law student, recalls members of the public queuing out the Round Hall of the Four Courts and down the quays trying to get in. The level of public interest was only matched by the Arms Trial almost 20 years later.⁹⁵ The Kavanagh action opened on Wednesday 3 February 1954, before a newly appointed judge, Mr Justice Tommy Teevan. Kavanagh’s legal team was led by former Fine Gael TD Sir John Esmonde; Costello led for the defence.

The offending profile was read in full, and Kavanagh’s counsel claimed that he had been “gravely injured in his character, credit and reputation and in his profession as a writer and journalist, and had been brought into public hatred, scandal and contempt”. Kavanagh told the jury that “a wild life is total anathema to me”.⁹⁶ In his cross-examination, Costello demonstrated a detailed knowledge of Kavanagh’s writings, and compared the relatively complimentary tenor of the profile in The Leader with Kavanagh’s own published criticism of other people’s work, which according to his biographer was “far more vicious and personal”.⁹⁷ Observers were struck by Costello’s effective way of appealing to the jury, contrasting his “plain man of the people persona with Kavanagh’s profession of himself as an artist”.⁹⁸

The profile had referred to “the ceiling of his Pembroke Road flat on which his friend Brendan Behan has woven such delicate traceries of intermingling colour to suggest a London sky at evening”.⁹⁹ During the second full day of cross-examination, Kavanagh vehemently denied being a friend of Behan, becoming quite heated on the subject. One of Behan’s brothers, Seamus, wrote directly to Costello after reading newspaper reports of this evidence. He said that Kavanagh had perjured himself. “I have frequently seen Mr Kavanagh in my brother’s company, and I have been myself introduced to Mr Kavanagh by my brother in McDaid’s of Grafton Street (Harry Street). You may make what use you wish of this letter.”¹⁰⁰

However, Costello didn’t need to use the letter, for on the day it was written he was able to produce in court a copy of Kavanagh’s novel Tarry Flynn, signed by the author: “For Brendan, poet and painter, on the day he decorated my flat, Sunday 12th, 1950” (the month was not included in the inscription). As Kavanagh’s biographer noted, this badly damaged his credibility with the jury, “who may have had difficulty in following the heavily literary content of the cross-examination, but who could recognise what appeared to be a palpable lie on his part as to his relations with Behan”. The book had been given to Costello by Rory Furlong, a half-brother of Behan’s, who had also been annoyed by Kavanagh’s evidence.¹⁰¹

Costello’s cross-examination was relentless, forensic, and devastating for Kavanagh. The poet spent a total of 13 hours in the witness box, answering 256 questions from his own counsel, and no fewer than 1,267 from Costello. At one point his return to court was delayed for 20 minutes as he was examined by a doctor. Kavanagh referred to his tormentor as the representative of a “small, pernicious minority”, but then apologised. Costello brushed off the comment, saying he took no offence from it.¹⁰² This exchange took the venom out of the cross-examination—but by this stage, Costello had done what he needed to do.¹⁰³

It took the jury just an hour and a quarter to decide that Kavanagh had not been libelled. He was “stunned … and dreadfully upset” by the verdict. There was some criticism of Costello’s cross-examination, then and later, as being unduly aggressive. But Kavanagh evidently didn’t feel that way—he voted for Costello in the 1954 election.¹⁰⁴ The poet was also reported to have said of Costello, “If that bloody fellow had been working for me, I’d have won me bloody case!”¹⁰⁵

As well as recognising Costello’s legal skills, he also recognised that the new Taoiseach might feel—or be made to feel—a sense of obligation towards him, and that he would therefore be a soft touch. Costello did in fact have a great respect for the poet, and spoke of his sympathy for him as he faced serious poverty (although of course as a barrister his first responsibility was to win the case for his client).¹⁰⁶ By the time the case was appealed, he was Taoiseach and therefore played no role in the proceedings. The Supreme Court granted the appeal, but the case was settled before coming back to the High Court. Kavanagh let it be understood that he had got nothing out of it because The Leader had no money, but in fact he did receive an undisclosed lump sum.¹⁰⁷

A more immediate prospect of some financial gain was through the Taoiseach, who he proceeded to hound in search of a job. For Christmas 1954, he sent Costello a copy of a new poem, “Prelude”. The Taoiseach responded that he wished he could “acknowledge more gracefully and more substantially the grace and substance” of the poem.¹⁰⁸ In February, Kavanagh wrote to “the man who of all people in Ireland probably knows me most intimately”, saying his economic position was “impossible” and he would have to emigrate. He suggested a number of solutions to his plight, which he indicated had first been suggested by Costello himself “though I failed to take up the cue at the time”. These were a grant from the Arts Council, or a job in the Radio Éireann newsroom, or in the publicity department of Aer Lingus.¹⁰⁹

The Taoiseach set to work, trying to persuade the President of UCD, Michael Tierney, to provide Kavanagh with a job, while also putting pressure on the Arts Council to do something for the poet. He told Paddy Little, the Director of the Council, that “the underlying idea is to give assistance to a person of literary achievements who is in need of encouragement perhaps more than financial aid”.¹¹⁰ Kavanagh may have disputed the latter observation, as he was at this time recovering in hospital after having a lung removed. The Taoiseach visited him in hospital, spending over an hour with the poet.¹¹¹

At the end of May, Costello wrote with good news—Tierney had arranged for Kavanagh to deliver lectures in UCD. He also believed the Arts Council would be prepared to “sponsor” him in some capacity. Costello suggested a commission for a volume of poetry, a critical study, or a book of essays.¹¹² Kavanagh replied that he “would like very much to put into book form my arguments regarding the nature of the poetic mind; this could be a very interesting book … This would not be essays but a loosely continuous argument under a generic title.”¹¹³

The Council agreed to this suggestion, but predictably the promise of money in the future wasn’t enough for the poet. At the start of July he wrote to Costello to announce that his landlady was threatening to evict him by the end of the month because he owed over a year’s rent. He asked the Taoiseach to see if the Council would give him £100 up front.¹¹⁴ This Costello did, telling Little that “it would all be part of the effort to help one of our great living poets to survive and would, I believe, be within the competence of the Council even if no return were ever received for the expenditure”.¹¹⁵ Not surprisingly, the Council didn’t agree, especially as “Mr Kavanagh has let it be known that he is to receive a grant from the Council and that he feels entitled to spend any such money that he may receive on any purpose that he himself thinks fit.”¹¹⁶ However, under strong pressure from the Taoiseach, the Council gave in and agreed to commission Kavanagh to write the book, with a £100 advance.¹¹⁷ As an indication of how the Council members felt about this, they adopted at the same meeting a standing order banning all future individual applications for financial assistance.¹¹⁸

This wasn’t the end of the matter, as was usual where money and Patrick Kavanagh were concerned. He wrote to Costello in June 1956 sympathising on the death of his wife—and also seeking an appointment to talk to the Taoiseach about his financial situation.¹¹⁹ At around this time, the poet had sought the payment of the remaining £100 from the Arts Council, which was only due when he finished the book, “and became abusive when he met with a refusal”.¹²⁰ This was presumably what he wanted to talk to Costello about, but the balance of the money doesn’t appear to have been paid.

There is no doubt that Kavanagh had found a very powerful patron in Jack Costello. It is possible that the Taoiseach’s support was due to a guilty conscience after their court encounter, but it is far more likely that it was another example of his humanitarian instincts. He collected various hard-luck cases throughout his life, and did his best to help them. He continued to do this after he left office—for instance, he frequently gave Kavanagh lifts in his State car.

On one such occasion, the irrepressible poet asked Costello’s Garda driver, Mick Kilkenny, to buy him a half-bottle of whiskey in the Waterloo House on Baggot Street (the inference being that he was barred from that establishment at the time). Costello said a Garda on duty couldn’t go into a pub and offered to go in himself, but the driver insisted on doing it to save the former Taoiseach the embarrassment of being seen in a pub. Characteristically, Kavanagh complained about the price, as the whiskey was sixpence more than other places. Equally characteristically, after Costello was dropped home he asked his driver to take Kavanagh wherever he wanted to go. The poet told Kilkenny that Costello was a “wonderful man”, who was never too busy to pass the time of day with him.¹²¹

As well as a very busy professional life, the period as leader of the Opposition between 1951 and 1954 also saw an increasing volume of constituency work. Costello was now a national figure, and had to deal with correspondence from all over Ireland as well as from Dublin South-East. He spent a lot of time dealing with requests from constituents seeking help getting jobs or housing. As he wearily told a Dublin Corporation official some time later, “notwithstanding abundant evidence to the contrary, my constituents have a child-like belief that I am able to get houses for them …”¹²²

Not every request, though, was so mundane. In September 1952 he got a letter from Michael Gallagher of Gort, who complained that his neighbour “has got an unlicensed bull for his seven milch cows, which is danger to us next the wall outside. If he break out, our heifer is in danger. See to him please.” Costello’s secretary, Ita McCoy, wrote that he “considers this the prize letter of his political career, and therefore does not want to part with it”. He did, however, want the local TD to look into the matter.¹²³ After all, every vote counts.

Politics was allowed to intrude as little as possible into domestic life. In 1953, The Irish Home magazine sought to do a feature on his home life, following a similar article on President O’Kelly. Positive coverage was assured by the promise that the text and the photographs would be submitted to him for approval before publication, but he declined anyway, as “my wife and myself do not wish the privacy of our home to be the subject of public comment”.¹²⁴ Family life continued to be important to him, especially now that grandchildren were arriving. He was known to his grandchildren as ‘Pampam’, while Ida was called ‘Nangie’—a result of the inability of their first granddaughter, Jacqueline FitzGerald, to pronounce Grandpa and Granny properly as a small child.¹²⁵

At this time, the youngest Costello daughter, Eavan, went for a medical examination before taking up a job as a librarian in UCD. A heart problem was discovered, which needed surgery to insert an artificial valve. She had to go to London for this pioneering surgery, being one of the first people to have it.¹²⁶ However, by March 1953 she had recovered enough to take up her job.¹²⁷

Wilfrid’s troubles continued, and it appears that he was in residential care at this time. The Abbot of Glenstal, Dom Bernard O’Dea, wrote in February 1952 to say he had received “an excellent letter from him … in which he admitted his unreasonableness to the family”. In reply, Costello said, “Wilfrid is continuing to make progress. He is quite settled down and writes very cheerfully.”¹²⁸ This may have been a reference to his time in a psychiatric hospital in Scotland.¹²⁹

In the Dáil, Costello continued to be influenced by his professional background. In July 1953, he supported a Courts of Justice Bill, despite concerns that some of its provisions would impinge on judicial independence, because it also provided for increases in judicial salaries. He claimed that judges had been hit by the economic downturn just as the unemployed had, and that salary increases were needed to ensure they could continue “to keep themselves free from not merely the actuality of corruption, but from the possible breath of corruption”. Intriguingly, he denied a personal interest, saying that “not merely have I no ambitions and no desires but I rather think I have no opportunity of ever finding myself upon the Bench”.¹³⁰ Whatever about ambition and desire, he was about to be offered an opportunity for a place on the highest bench of all.

The offer came from an unlikely source—Eamon de Valera. Following the death of Supreme Court Justice John O’Byrne (Costello’s predecessor as Attorney General) in early 1954, the Cabinet agreed that the Taoiseach should approach the leader of the Opposition to see if he was interested in the vacancy. According to his own memorandum of the conversation, de Valera phrased the offer in a rather indirect way. “I said I didn’t know whether he would under any circumstances consider it, or whether in the present circumstances he would feel at liberty to consider it.” Costello replied that “he had burnt his boats and realised the consequences. He had given up hopes of an easy life and he could not give the opportunity for charges of the Sadlier and Keogh type to be made against him.”¹³¹

The latter reference was to two Irish MPS who in 1852 took office under Lord Aberdeen, breaking their pledge to remain in independent opposition at Westminster. The fact that their names were still common political currency just over a century later shows the damage to their reputations. Clearly, this leader of the Opposition felt it would be impossible for him to take a judicial appointment offered by the Government, though de Valera was at pains to stress that the offer was due to “his position at the Bar, and our duty to get the best Supreme Court possible”. But the political implications of acceptance must have been clear to both men.

Political principle played a part—but so did personal preference. Jack Costello frequently said he had no interest in being a judge, saying he preferred “to be fighting my cause, either as an advocate or a politician … A Judge has to be aloof, living in a rarefied atmosphere of seclusion.”¹³² He also felt he wouldn’t have been able to stop being an advocate from the bench—like Cecil Lavery, who was notorious for interrupting counsel’s argument to summarise in a more succinct way the point being made.¹³³ Most who knew him agreed that he wouldn’t have suited, or enjoyed, life on the bench.¹³⁴ After his refusal, the appointment went to Martin Cyril Maguire, who had been called to the Inner Bar on the same day as Costello in 1925, and who was already a judge of the High Court. The Minister for Finance, Seán MacEntee, must have had mixed emotions at this result. He had, on cost grounds, argued that a High Court judge, who would not be replaced, should fill the £3,700-a-year place on the Supreme Court bench, rather than appointing from outside the judicial ranks.¹³⁵ But he had missed an opportunity of getting rid of his most formidable constituency rival.

And electoral considerations were about to become critical again, with two poor by-election results pushing de Valera into a general election. The vacancies were caused by the deaths of two Fine Gael TDS, Dr T.F. O’Higgins of Cork Borough, and James Coburn of Louth. The significance of the result was not the double Fine Gael victory in the 4 March polls, but the scale of the swing towards the main Opposition party. In Louth, the Fine Gael vote increased from 35 per cent in the 1951 general election to 43.4 per cent. The swing in Cork was even more pronounced, from 30 per cent to 44.3 per cent. Costello later told the American Ambassador that the “landslide” in the Cork by-election had been a “great surprise” to Fine Gael.¹³⁶

On the evening the results were announced, the Government met in Leinster House. Shortly before 11 p.m., the Director of the Government Information Bureau, Frank Gallagher, announced that the Taoiseach was “of opinion that it is necessary that a general election should be held as soon as the financial measures required to provide for the public services have been completed”.¹³⁷ This was taken to mean a quick election after the Vote of Account was put through the Oireachtas. Newspaper reports suggested that this statement “came as a surprise even to prominent Fianna Fáil deputies”.¹³⁸

Lemass, who was in London at the time, later told Fine Gael’s Patrick Lindsay that he disapproved of the announcement, as he felt there was really no need for an election.¹³⁹ Many backbenchers were said to be “distressed by the prospect of campaigning immediately under the impact of two very heavy defeats” and brought pressure to bear on the Cabinet to delay polling day.¹⁴⁰ In this manoeuvre, de Valera was helped by his customary ambiguity of phrasing—precisely which “financial measures” was he referring to? Costello submitted a parliamentary question the day before the Dáil was to resume after the by-elections to try to get an answer to that question. In the face of this prompting, de Valera phoned Costello to tell him the election would be held on 18 May, after the Budget, making for a very long campaign indeed.¹⁴¹

The Taoiseach claimed that delaying until after the Budget would allow voters “to be presented with all the essential facts concerning the State finances”, as well as allowing for the use of the latest register of electors.¹⁴² Costello accused him of bowing to political expediency, putting the country “to the trial and the expense of an unnecessarily long drawn out election”, and pointing out that if the Government was calling an election because it had lost public support, “it can have no authority to bring in a Budget”.¹⁴³ That Budget would also, presumably, be designed to appeal to the voters.¹⁴⁴

MacEntee’s last Budget did indeed contain a reduction in income tax, as well as an increased subsidy for wheat and flour. Costello characterised it as “a recantation” of the policies introduced in 1952. “The proposals in the Budget as a whole are an admission of the failure of those policies and in many respects they furnish striking justification of the charges that we made … that the [1952] Budget … contained wholly unjust and unnecessary over-taxation.”¹⁴⁵

Two issues dominated the campaign itself: the economy, and the relative merits of coalition and single-party government. Labour was intent on driving a hard bargain if it was to participate in government again. In 1952, it had determined that a special delegate conference would have to approve any proposal to enter government. As the campaign opened, the party leadership stated that they would only enter a coalition that was “publicly committed in advance to an agreed programme of economic and social measures in broad conformity with Labour policy”. In particular, the party was insisting on the reintroduction of the food subsidies abolished by MacEntee in 1952. The British Ambassador observed that they were attempting to entrench themselves so deeply that “Fine Gael … would have to advance nearly all the way to meet them”.¹⁴⁶ De Valera agreed, accusing the party of demanding the right to veto government policy. “Even as a small minority it is the will of the Labour Party that must prevail.”¹⁴⁷

Fine Gael clearly had to stake out its own position, without alienating Labour. Costello stated that while his party would do its best to maximise its own support, it would “invite those other parties especially representative of important sections of the national life to join with it and participate in the creation and conduct of the vigorous, courageous and constructive government which the country so urgently requires. In such a Government there would be neither domination by a majority nor dictation by a minority, but co-operation for the common good.” He added that collective responsibility would be observed in the same way as in a single-party government¹⁴⁸ (which would be a change from his first administration). He went further towards the end of the campaign, insisting that it would be “contrary to the national interest for Fine Gael to govern on its own” even if it had a majority.¹⁴⁹

Costello responded to attacks by Lemass on the alleged instability of the first coalition by pointing out that it had lasted longer than the outgoing Fianna Fáil government. He added that the public conflicts between Lemass and MacEntee “suggest that all has not been heavenly harmony” over the past three years.¹⁵⁰ He insisted that the one difficulty of the Inter-party Government was Dr Browne, “a personality whom the public have had in the last three years a far better chance of understanding”. He added with satisfaction that Browne had “now become the difficulty of the Fianna Fáil party”.¹⁵¹

Despite his airy dismissal of Noël Browne, he evidently felt slightly defensive about the fall-out from the Mother and Child affair. At the opening of the campaign, he assured a Fine Gael constituency meeting that “Ireland has always been jealous of its reputation for fair treatment of the minority.” However, he quickly added that despite this, he could not accept “the secularist view that would suggest that the Church and the leaders of all religious persuasions are to play in our life but a small and isolated part”.¹⁵² A month later, he accused Fianna Fáil of mounting a whispering campaign claiming that Fine Gael were intent on “persecuting the Protestants”. To disprove this, he pointed out that his party had the highest number of candidates from “the minority”.¹⁵³

During the campaign, Costello made sure to supply a script for all his speeches to the newspapers “so that there could be no possibility of misrepresentation or, rather, no really effective possibility of misrepresentation or distortion of what I said”. But he believed that no matter what he said “my speeches would be misrepresented and words would be put into my mouth that I had never uttered”.¹⁵⁴ He made a virtue of his refusal to set out a detailed policy for government. “Policy … cannot be based on the flimsy structure of extravagant promises made during election times, but on the calm consideration of all available facts … when, being restored to Office, we have learned as only a Government can the full story and the full state of affairs.” He said Fianna Fáil demands for specifics were “designed merely in the hope of embarrassing us in the coming election campaign, and in an effort to divert public attention from their own misdeeds …”¹⁵⁵

Costello told voters that election promises “would dishonour you as much as they would dishonour us. We do not believe that the Irish people are to be bought …”¹⁵⁶ The Opposition was “refusing to tie its hands for the sake of electoral gain. It is a curious position for a Government to have got itself to that it descends to taunting an Opposition for not making dishonest promises …”¹⁵⁷ In particular, he refused to give a commitment to restore food subsidies. At the final Fine Gael rally in O’Connell Street in Dublin, he said Fianna Fáil had been reduced to asking if he was going to reduce prices to 1951 levels. This, he said, was impudence. “It is as if a motorist, who had knocked down and injured some people, were to question the competence of those who were seeking to bind up their wounds and to criticise the general behaviour and driving of other users of the road.” Given the Government’s unpopularity, it was perhaps wiser to avoid promises, and stick to criticism. This he did with relish. Accusing MacEntee of mounting “a flesh creeping campaign”, he noted acidly that “there is a great deal less flesh on the people to creep than there was three years ago …”¹⁵⁸

The British Ambassador observed that the Opposition’s “main attack, since the Budget of 1952, has been upon the scale of taxation and state expenditure. They do not commit themselves, despite repeated invitations from the Government, to how they would reduce them: they are content to exploit popular dislike of Fianna Fáil’s comparatively austere policy … Mr Costello is not committing himself to a thing yet.”¹⁵⁹ However, it is not true to say that the Opposition, and the potential Taoiseach, ran an entirely negative campaign.

Costello dusted down his Blueprint for Prosperity, first outlined at the 1953 Fine Gael Ard Fheis, for the campaign trail: no break with sterling, the creation of a domestic money market, a Capital Investment Board, encouragement for domestic saving and foreign capital.¹⁶⁰ Industry would be developed “under the stimulus of Capital investment, and through increased agricultural exports, whose economic effect on the country is even more beneficial than Capital investment”. He tentatively expressed a preference for encouraging industry through tax relief rather than increased protections, “which tend to raise prices and thereby put up the cost of living”.¹⁶¹ And he said the proposed Capital Investment Board “would indicate in what field any liberation or relaxation of restriction [on foreign capital] might not be to the advantage of the Irish community”.¹⁶² This cautious sidling towards a more open economy was seized on by Fianna Fáil, and the Irish Press, which accused Fine Gael of being unpatriotic.¹⁶³ Costello responded by promising “the continuance, as a permanent feature of our economy, of the protection of industry with a view to its progressive expansion”.¹⁶⁴

While he had been forced to backtrack, Costello had given an important, if muted, pointer towards future policy developments. In fact, he had already cautiously hinted at dissatisfaction with protection in the Dáil. In the course of a lengthy speech criticising Lemass’s Restrictive Trade Practices Bill (which he claimed would be ineffective, counterproductive, and also possibly unconstitutional), Costello also criticised protectionism. He said Ireland had more restrictive practices than other countries, which had been “bred in the atmosphere of restrictionism which has unfortunately been associated with the national policy of industrial development”. However, he was careful to stress that he was referring to “the intensified campaign or policy of protectionism which was inaugurated in 1932 … Irish industry was protected and encouraged long before 1932.”¹⁶⁵

The elections results revealed a stunning victory for Fine Gael in Dublin South-East. The party took a second seat at the expense of Noël Browne, running for Fianna Fáil for the first and last time. Fine Gael activists had been targeting this second seat since 1951. As the secretary of the Sandymount Branch advised Costello in November of that year, “The votes are there … it is really a matter of hard work—and I’m not particular whether it’s MacEntee or Browne we oust.”¹⁶⁶ Hard work was certainly put in—the Sandymount members were so enthusiastic they organised a branch meeting for New Year’s Eve, 1953.¹⁶⁷ The constituency organisation was comparatively well funded too, thanks to a number of “large subscriptions” collected during the 1951 campaign by then Attorney General Charles Casey for Costello, which hadn’t been spent in the earlier campaign.¹⁶⁸

Costello won his highest ever share of the first-preference vote, at 42 per cent. His surplus was large enough to bring in his running mate, economist John O’Donovan. The Minister for Finance, Seán MacEntee, with 22 per cent of the vote, was fewer than 500 votes ahead of Noël Browne, a gap reduced to just 108 before he took the last seat. MacEntee had been extraordinarily generous to his running mate, allowing Browne to distribute personalised election literature, despite the reservations of his election workers, who feared his seat could be in danger.¹⁶⁹ Characteristically, Browne didn’t remember this generosity in his autobiography, where he claimed MacEntee’s “people dominated the party organisation in the constituency … I knew I wouldn’t be allowed to win.”¹⁷⁰

In any case, MacEntee had a very close shave. At Costello’s retirement dinner in 1969, the Fine Gael Director of Elections for the constituency, Tommy Doyle, recalled MacEntee “standing at one end of the room [in the count centre in Bolton Street], a worried man and not in good health. He got there by the skin of his teeth. John Costello walked up to him, he took him by the hand and he congratulated him warmly. He [MacEntee] was visibly moved.” Evidently perturbed by this image, Costello dryly observed that MacEntee was “a redoubtable warrior, with whom I made many a struggle in the Dáil chamber and on practically every street corner, notwithstanding what Tommy Doyle says, in my constituency”.¹⁷¹

Constituency activists were naturally overjoyed at the result: Fianna Fáil in disarray, Costello topping the poll, O’Donovan elected on his first attempt, and Browne defeated. The annual report of the Sandymount branch rated “the smashing up of the Fianna Fáil party in the constituency as our Number One achievement”.¹⁷² Nationally, the results were equally good for Fine Gael, as the party continued the revival begun in 1951. Its share of the vote rose to 32 per cent and it gained 10 seats on the last general election result, to give a total of 50 (although this included Dillon and Flanagan, returned as Independents in 1951). Fine Gael was now just 15 seats behind Fianna Fáil. Labour had 19 seats (including the outgoing Ceann Comhairle, Patrick Hogan, who was returned unopposed), Clann na Talmhan had 5, Clann na Poblachta 3, and there were 5 Independents.

There was no doubt that there would be a new government, and no doubt either that Jack Costello would be at its head. On the face of it, this is slightly surprising, because Richard Mulcahy was still officially the leader of Fine Gael. His son later wrote that the reasons for him standing aside in 1948 were no longer relevant, but that the question of him replacing Costello never arose.¹⁷³ Presumably the question was settled in 1951, when Costello was recognised as leader of the Opposition, and during the election campaign, when he was clearly seen as de Valera’s rival for the office of Taoiseach. In any case, Labour would have been as reluctant to serve under Mulcahy in 1954 as they were in 1948. Costello’s return to the office of Taoiseach wasn’t universally welcomed within the family—both his wife, Ida, and his eldest daughter, Grace, were upset at the prospect.¹⁷⁴

The identity of the next Taoiseach may not have been in doubt, but there was plenty still to be settled in terms of policy. There followed intensive negotiations between Fine Gael and Labour on a coalition agreement. The British Embassy noted that Fine Gael needed Labour support to form a government, “and it remains far from clear whether Labour will reduce its price or if not how Fine Gael can pay it”.¹⁷⁵ The smaller party demanded four Cabinet seats—including Industry and Commerce, to give it an input into economic policy. Labour also insisted on a detailed policy programme. As the party’s historian observed, “Labour … had learned from experience that if the devil is in the detail, it was best to summon these demons and deal with them at the outset.”¹⁷⁶

One of the key issues was food subsidies, given Labour’s election campaign focus on their reinstatement, and Costello’s refusal to commit Fine Gael. The initial Fine Gael draft of the programme offered an examination of the facts and an “early” announcement by the Government of measures to reduce the cost of living. This vague aspiration clearly wasn’t going to satisfy Labour, who countered with an alternative draft, promising a 6d decrease in the price of a pound of butter from 1 July, as well as a reduction in the prices of flour and butter from 1 October. Costello drafted the compromise which was eventually accepted: as an indication of the Government’s determination to reduce the cost of living, there would be an announcement within a fortnight of a reduction in the price of butter, while the prices of other commodities would be examined with a view to reducing them as soon as possible.¹⁷⁷

Given the respective party positions during the election campaign, this was clearly a victory for Labour. However, Costello claimed (unconvincingly) to the American Ambassador that it was his idea, not Norton’s. “Everywhere he went during the campaign … people had asked him not so much to bring down the price of tea or bread, but rather to bring down butter prices … he is convinced that Mr de Valera’s Government made its fatal mistake by destroying the subsidy on butter all at once.”¹⁷⁸ He later repeated much the same thing in the Dáil—he had been asked about reducing the price of butter “by the women and the children at every meeting I addressed throughout the country … I did not say I would, but I made up my mind that if I were ever in a position to do it, I would do it.”¹⁷⁹ Costello claimed that when he got back into the Taoiseach’s office he consulted the Director of the Central Statistics Office, who said that “butter was a staple and necessary article of diet … of every section of the people, rich and poor”. A butter subsidy would also, perhaps not incidentally, give “some little relief to the dairy farmers”.¹⁸⁰

On welfare, another key issue for Labour, the original Fine Gael draft simply promised to improve Social Welfare services. Labour countered with specific promises—pension increases, improved payments under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, and retirement pensions for men at 65 and women at 60. All the Labour demands were included in the final draft of the programme.¹⁸¹ Whatever about the more conservative elements within Fine Gael, Costello had committed himself to pensions at 65 and 60 during the Dáil debate on Fianna Fáil’s Social Welfare Bill in 1952: “I am in favour of such a provision and always was in favour of it when it was put into Deputy Norton’s Bill.”¹⁸²

Health might have been expected to provide more difficulty—after all, Fine Gael had been alone in its opposition to Jim Ryan’s Health Act. The initial Fine Gael draft promised to improve the organisation of the health services, to expand them so that no-one would be denied medical or surgical aid because of lack of means, and to provide better hospital and dispensary accommodation. Labour called for the removal of health “from the field of acrimonious political discussion”, the fullest and most effective use of the provisions of the existing Health Act in consultation with Local Authorities and other interests, and on the basis of the experience gained to determine “what further measures may be necessary to ensure proper provision of modern health services for the people”. Fine Gael could hardly be expected to accept the reference to the “existing Health Act” they had so vociferously opposed. The final compromise took its beginning from Labour (removing health from “acrimonious discussion”, consulting with Local Authorities and other interests) and its end from Fine Gael (improving and expanding health services, with no-one denied treatment because of their means). The Fianna Fáil health legislation was tactfully not mentioned.¹⁸³

Fine Gael agreed to a number of other Labour demands, including an Agricultural Wages Tribunal and a specific commitment to continue the protection of Irish industry.¹⁸⁴ The statement was issued simultaneously by Fine Gael and Labour Party headquarters on 31 May.¹⁸⁵ Labour didn’t get all it wanted, but it certainly drove a hard bargain, considering that it had not done nearly as well in the election as had Fine Gael. The latter party had, according to the British Ambassador, “gone a very long way indeed to meet Labour’s demands”.¹⁸⁶

Clann na Talmhan also decided to support the new government, and on the morning the new Dáil met a party meeting confirmed that Blowick would once more join the Cabinet as Minister for Lands, while Clann na Poblachta offered the coalition external support. When the Dáil met on 2 June, Costello was nominated by Mulcahy, with Norton seconding and Blowick also speaking briefly in support. By far the longest speech was made by MacBride. He repeated his preference for a national government, then explained why he would be supporting Costello as the best alternative to such an arrangement—because it reflected the will of the people as expressed in the election, and because inter-party government was superior to the single-party variety. MacBride added that he would have voted for Costello anyway as “a man of integrity, honour and ability … I am satisfied that he is a man fitted to occupy the position of Taoiseach and that he is the man whom the people desire to have as Taoiseach.”¹⁸⁷

De Valera’s nomination was defeated by 66 votes to 78; Costello’s was supported by 79 votes to 66. The difference in the totals was due to Jack McQuillan, who abstained on the vote for de Valera but then voted for Costello. Of the other Independents, Alfred and Thomas Byrne supported Costello, Ben Maguire voted for de Valera, and Donegal Independent William Sheldon (who had supported the First Inter-party Government) abstained. The Ceann Comhairle, Labour’s Patrick Hogan, did not, of course, vote. Costello’s election was greeted with applause from the TDS supporting him, “in which some people in the public gallery joined”.¹⁸⁸ The new Taoiseachelect thanked the Dáil for the honour conferred on him, while recognising “the serious problems that have to be faced”.¹⁸⁹

Later, after receiving his seal of office from the President, he announced his Cabinet. Norton was Tánaiste again, as well as taking the Department of Industry and Commerce; his party colleagues Brendan Corish (Social Welfare), Jim Everett (Justice), and Michael Keyes (Posts and Telegraphs) were also in Cabinet. Blowick of Clann na Talmhan was back in Lands. Mulcahy returned to Education and MacEoin to Defence, while Dillon went back to Agriculture—he later claimed to have been offered a choice of Justice, Finance or Agriculture, but said he had no interest in being a minister if it wasn’t in the latter Department.¹⁹⁰

Finance was a difficult portfolio for Costello to fill. He wanted McGilligan to take it again, but his old colleague pleaded ill-health, and became Attorney General instead. When Dillon also declined, he turned to Gerard Sweetman, who had made himself invaluable in opposition as the energetic and efficient Fine Gael Chief Whip. He may have been less popular with some of the rank and file deputies, who were said “to regard him as heifers must regard the man who is driving them to market”.¹⁹¹ The British Ambassador reported to London that Costello “obviously places much reliance” on Sweetman, who he described as a “glutton for work”.¹⁹² But Sweetman was also a conservative on economic matters—he was described by Hibernia magazine in 1969 as “one of the keenest minds of the nineteenth century”.¹⁹³

Costello appears to have offended him by saying that he would always have available the advice of McGilligan and John O’Donovan, the economist who was appointed Parliamentary Secretary to the Government. According to Cabinet colleague Tom O’Higgins, Sweetman was “extremely annoyed. He was determined to be his own man and did not feel the need for help from anyone else.”¹⁹⁴ O’Higgins suggested the remark was made in private, but it was evidently widely known, as Seán MacEntee referred to it in the Dáil. In 1955, he congratulated his successor on having “shaken himself free, not only of the Attorney-General but also of the Parliamentary Secretary to the Government … He [Sweetman] is, I think, one of the ablest men in the Government and I think … one of the most tenacious and courageous.”¹⁹⁵ Tenacious and courageous he certainly was—but he had reason to be resentful as well.

The other difficulty was what to do with Seán MacBride. Freddie Boland, the Irish Ambassador in London, told British officials that Costello “felt under some obligation” to MacBride, but that the younger generation in Fine Gael “had refused to accept his inclusion in the Government”.¹⁹⁶ This seems extremely unlikely. In fact, MacBride was offered a Cabinet position, but declined. It appears the Clann executive was not in favour of him taking a post,¹⁹⁷ but in any event he believed that with only three TDS, his party was not in a strong enough position to take part. As he put it in a public statement on the eve of the Government’s formation, “With all the good will in the world on the part of all concerned, I would ultimately find myself in the position of a lodger who was not paying for his keep.” He stressed that there was no policy difference, nor was there disagreement on the portfolio he would occupy. The Clann simply didn’t have enough TDS.¹⁹⁸

MacBride’s decision may have been a relief to many in Fine Gael, but Costello appeared to regret it. Replying to a letter of congratulation from MacBride’s wife, Catalina, the new Taoiseach wrote, “We are sorry that Seán will not be more closely associated with us than he is.”¹⁹⁹ But, as he told the Dáil, the new Government would have “his full support and … his experience and his knowledge and goodwill”.²⁰⁰ Events were to show that MacBride was not quite as reliable or supportive as Costello expected.

Instead, Liam Cosgrave, just 34 years old, became Minister for External Affairs. Other young ministers included Corish (35) and Tom O’Higgins (37) in Health, which left the average age of the Cabinet at 52.²⁰¹ Costello made the job offers himself²⁰²—there is no indication of whether he consulted with Mulcahy as party leader before doing so. He only told Tom O’Higgins at one o’clock on the day the new Dáil was to meet that he wanted him to be Minister for Health. The two men met in the Law Library. Costello had just finished a court appearance and was on his way to change before going to Leinster House. He told the younger man he wanted him to join the Government. “I am sure I must have looked as astonished as I felt, because I remember his saying something like: ‘Do you want to?’ to which I stammered an affirmative answer and asked: ‘What post?’ He then said, quite formally: ‘I want you to become Minister for Health in my Government, and furthermore, I want you to take health out of politics’. And that was that.”²⁰³

The other new face in the Cabinet was Pa O’Donnell, victor of the Donegal West by-election in November 1949, who became Minister for Local Government. The Parliamentary Secretaries appointed by the new government were Michael Donnellan of Clann na Talmhan, who was given responsibility for the Office of Public Works; Labour’s William Davin, who was appointed to the Department of Local Government (after his death in 1956 he was replaced by Dan Spring); and four members of Fine Gael: Denis O’Sullivan, who was Chief Whip, Oliver J. Flanagan, who was Parliamentary Secretary to Dillon in Agriculture; Patrick Crotty in Industry and Commerce; and Costello’s newly elected running mate, John O’Donovan, who took the new post of Parliamentary Secretary to the Government.²⁰⁴

O’Donovan’s position was so novel that questions were asked about it in the Dáil. Costello explained that he was not given any executive functions—he was instead to devote his experience as an economist “to assisting the Government and myself in the formulation of economic and financial policy and in the examination of particular economic and financial problems as they arise … it is this way that his special ability, knowledge and experience can, at present, be best utilised in the national interest”.²⁰⁵

In his Dáil speech on the nomination of ministers, Costello said the country had suffered in the previous six years because of the political instability of both the Inter-party and Fianna Fáil governments. This government, he insisted, “has stability and it is going to last”.²⁰⁶ His old friend Arthur Cox—who was one of the Taoiseach’s 11 nominees to the Seanad, where he sat as an Independent—was perhaps more prescient: “You have a tough time before you—but at least it will be interesting!”²⁰⁷