The world of the nomads was the central Asian steppes, a vast grassland sea extending from the northern and western reaches of China across Asia to the southern plains of Russia north of the Black Sea, with a small extension into the Hungarian plain even farther west (Figure 6.1). This is a midcontinental region of often harsh climates: hot and dry in the summer, bitterly cold in the winter. It is also, crucially, too dry over most of its extent to support agriculture, and it was therefore not an area where settled, sedentary states could establish themselves, relying as they did on peasant farmers as the foundation of their wealth. Instead, the steppes were the home of pastoralists: peoples who lived by the management of herds of domesticated animals but who made little use of domesticated plants. The organization and dynamics of nomadic society flowed from this fundamental economic fact.
The culture of the pastoralists who lived on the Eurasian steppes was based on the relationship of three key components: equestrian expertise, herds of grazing animals (in particular, cattle or sheep), and wagons usually pulled by oxen. These three components combined to make the peoples of the steppes exceptionally mobile: They could move en masse from one pasture to another as the seasons dictated. They did not generally wander aimlessly but, rather, moved between a few pasturelands that would allow yearlong grazing; indeed, they even practiced limited agriculture while there. But mobility also allowed these nomads simply to pick up and move when political, economic, or climatic exigencies dictated.
Horses and Warfare
From a purely military perspective, the most important component of steppe culture was the development of horseback riding skills. The horse had always been an important animal for the peoples who lived on the grasslands of Eurasia. In early times, the horse was simply a game animal, hunted for its meat like almost any other prey. At some point in the distant past, horses were domesticated. They were not yet ridden, but they were kept and raised for their meat, hides, and milk. It was then discovered that the horse could also be ridden. Traditionally, it has been argued that the use of the horse as a mount dates to around the middle of the second millennium BCE. However, recent archaeological evidence has pushed the date back nearly 2500 years to approximately 4000 bce. In any case, the taming of the horse as a riding animal had a profound impact on nomadic culture. It allowed the steppe peoples to range over a much wider distance than had been possible before. Individual tribal groups now had access to additional resources and markets, and they came into contact and conflict with other tribes and peoples.
Figure 6.1 The Central Asian Steppes
In warfare, the ridden horse gave the warrior several important advantages over the man fighting on foot. Strategically, the horse provided access to a larger sphere of operations. A mounted man can cover two to three times the distance of a man on foot in a comparable time. This allowed mounted warriors to strike an enemy without horses with near impunity. Moreover, once on the battlefield, the horseman had tactical advantages as well. He had, of course, greater mobility, which allowed him to move quickly and to concentrate his efforts at a particular point. But, for the early mounted nomad, perhaps more important than the offensive potential was the security provided by the horse. The horse made it possible for the warrior to flee without fear of serious pursuit. It is no doubt from this tradition of evading ineffective pursuers that the later nomadic tactic of feigned flight originated.
The Composite Bow
Short yet powerful, the composite bow was the main weapon of the mounted steppe warrior.
The full potential of the horse as part of a devastating tactical system was realized when it was combined with another steppe innovation, the composite bow, bringing together both mobility and firepower. The composite bow appeared during the second millennium bce. Made of three different materials—wood, horn, and sinew—the bow was constructed by laminating, gluing, and drying the components so that the bow curved back on itself. This meant that the composite bow was short yet powerful. Its relatively small size made it the ideal weapon for a man on horseback.
Oxen and Wagons
The herds of grazing and draft animals and the vehicles of the pastoralists might not at first glance seem pertinent to a discussion of warfare as it developed on the Eurasian steppes. They did, however, play an important role in the conduct of war for the nomadic tribes, especially when in conflict with more sedentary peoples. Once again, the herds and wagons used by these peoples made them a mobile society. Not only could the warriors of the steppe peoples range widely on their horses, but so, too, could their families and their logistical base—their herd animals. This mobility made it difficult to bring the nomadic tribes to battle. Such was the case in 512 bce when a large Persian army under Darius I crossed the Danube into the territory of the Scythians (see below). These nomads par excellence sent their herds and families out of harm’s way while the main force of warriors—which included some of the younger women, who also fought in the ranks—harassed the Persians and employed a scorched-earth policy, denying supplies to the Persians. Darius was eventually forced to withdraw with heavy losses.
The carts and wagons of the nomads may have had yet another impact on warfare. A growing body of archaeological evidence points to the vehicles of the pastoralists being the prototypes of the chariots that dominated warfare in the Middle East, India, and China during much of the second millennium bce. The chariot seems to have had its origins in the wheeled vehicles of the steppe folk, which appeared about 2000 bce (see Chapter 1). This, however, raises the question as to why chariots would be used by warriors who had already mastered the art of riding horses. We cannot be certain of the answer. Perhaps the composite bow had not yet been perfected in its small, handy form for use on horseback. It has recently been argued that chariots were, at least among the steppe nomads, symbols of status used in rituals and races rather than in warfare, where horses were indeed superior. (See the Issues box “Stirrups and the Effectiveness of Cavalry” for another key cavalry technology.)
Life on the steppes gave nomadic military forces one further advantage over their sedentary enemies: They were used to constant campaigning. Life on horseback following herds meant that entire nomadic societies lived in tents and camps, with a limited diet, under constant threat of attack. In other words, they took for granted a life that the soldiers of a sedentary army had to get used to and often looked forward to quitting. The endurance and barbaric ferocity that settled peoples saw and disdained in nomads was matched by nomadic disdain for the “soft, effeminate, perfumed” inhabitants of cities, towns, and farms. In short, a deep cultural gulf separated pastoral nomads from their agricultural neighbors.
And, yet, the two worlds could not be separated, because pastoralism could rarely be completely selfsufficient as an economic system. Though disdaining agricultural peoples, nomads often needed the products of agricultural societies, especially those made possible by a settled life, such as large-scale metalworking. Even if some products such as silk cloth were not strictly necessary, they had value to nomads both in practical terms and as status symbols. As a result, the settled and nomadic worlds were in constant contact with each other. Sometimes, this relationship took place peacefully through trade, for nomads could offer some products—wool, skins, hides, even horses—in demand in settled areas. But nomads quickly found that they could parlay their military superiority into possession of settled goods in several ways: They could raid and pillage; they could (especially if they had already raided successfully) agree not to raid on condition of receiving tribute; or they could invade, conquer, and put the settled area’s administration to work for them collecting taxes. Which route any particular nomadic group chose depended on a number of factors, and the entire pattern of trade/raid/tribute is closely related to the question of the political organization of nomadic societies.
Limited Political Hierarchy
The geography of Inner Asia was mostly inimical to the development of strong centralized military or political systems. Pastoral nomadism allowed disgruntled or dissatisfied tribes to leave larger groups without serious disruption to the social or economic life of the tribes’ members. Tribes required only pasturelands and/or access to trade routes or raiding opportunities. Unlike settled peoples, the nomads were rarely tied to particular land or even a particular region. A supratribal leader, then, was limited in his ability to control or direct the tribes in his domain, let alone punish errant subordinates, who could simply depart with their people and flocks to other pastures.
Whatever centralized authority did exist was normally in the form of a confederation of tribes, in which the confederation leader could not rely solely on the stick of military force to keep his subordinates in line. Instead, unity and obedience to the leader were maintained primarily through that leader’s ability to successfully lead the confederation on raids for plunder. In other words, control over the acquisition and distribution of the spoils of war was the primary carrot by which confederation leaders ensured their continued rule. An influx of tribute could substitute for plunder economically. But first, the leader had to prove his worth as a warrior by leading a successful raid, and it took the distribution of truly large amounts of tribute to quell even temporarily the factionalism of subordinate tribes.
Leadership
The formation of tribal confederations took place only after a sometimes long series of battles, as the various tribal chiefs demonstrated their ability to lead, especially in battle. Tribes not directly involved in the fighting for leadership watched carefully before committing themselves, as the successful chief was expected to lead the confederation on raids against neighboring settled populations. Such large- scale raids were almost without exception far more profitable than if individual tribes raided on their own. Also under consideration was the ability of the leader to direct the defense when the confederation came under attack from the armies of settled peoples or other Inner Asian tribes.
The leadership of the confederation was personal and seldom hereditary until after the process of testing in battle had been completed. The confederation leader was also expected to lead his forces personally in battle, both in the raids of settled lands and on campaigns to punish wayward tribes. War was a constant feature of the life of tribal confederations; in fact, periods of peace were likely to lead to a collapse of the confederation unless the influx of tribute were substantial enough to allow the leader to buy the loyalty of subordinates instead of enforcing it. Xiongnu, Seljuk, and other tribal confederation leaders spent almost as much time directing their military forces against tribal dissenters as they did in raiding civilized peoples. Once the leader died or suffered a serious defeat, the confederation usually collapsed, to begin the cycle anew.
Leadership and Culture
In terms of nomadic relationships with their sedentary neighbors, several seemingly paradoxical results flowed from the dynamics of steppe leadership. The first was that nomadic confederations were often strongest when they interacted with a strong (or at least prosperous) settled civilization, for prosperity generated the wealth of tribute and booty necessary for the creation of political hierarchy among the nomadic tribes. Even better for nomadic political stability was a long-term rivalry between two settled areas, each of which could pay for nomadic allies—the Byzantine and Persian rivalry of the sixth century is an example (see Chapter 8).
The second was that the strongest nomadic confederations were often the ones most influenced by the culture of their settled neighbors, despite their disdain for sedentary peoples. This is because the goods that flowed to the steppes from civilizations were not value neutral. Rather, they often came with ideas and cultural values embedded in them, especially ideas about the organization and display of political power. Certain types and colors of Chinese silk implied certain levels of diplomatic recognition, for instance. Goods also came, at times, with people attached: either diplomats or, more often, daughters of settled rulers (as wives for nomadic leaders). All of this meant that nomads nearer to a settled civilization tended to acculturate to the values of that civilization, at least in certain ways. This could make military alliances between the settled and nomadic powers easier, but it could also heighten the interest of the nomadic tribes in conquering settled areas that had become familiar through raiding and tribute.
Nomadic and Settled Worlds: A Trend
Nomadic conquerors, familiar with but unbound by the traditions of the settled states they conquered, had the opportunity to invigorate the leadership of those states. But nomadic conquerors also faced a difficult problem: It was impossible to remain a nomad and rule a settled state effectively. Conquest therefore often introduced a tension between those nomads who wished to become the settled elites of the area they conquered and those who wished to remain true to their roots. Thus, after a period during which nomadic rule united pieces of the steppe and agricultural worlds, the two parts would split again as the fundamental incompatibility of nomadic and settled life reasserted itself.
The trend, over the several millennia of settled- nomadic interaction, was for settled areas to gain at the expense of nomadic areas in splits. The trend was slow and was neither uniform nor locally irreversible. But it was clear, and it resulted primarily from demographics: Agriculture could simply support far more people than pastoralism could. Thus, despite the military advantage nomads deployed, they could never dominate settled states for long.
We now turn to a survey of the most important nomadic peoples and confederations over the period from roughly 2000 bce to 1100 ce, including those who made up the two waves of nomadic activity that peaked around 400 ce and 1000 ce and that bound and in many ways define the period of world military history covered in this section.
The impact of certain technologies on the military effectiveness of steppe nomad armies is clear. Domestication of the horse was undoubtedly a technological breakthrough of the first magnitude (construing “technology” broadly), rivaled only by metallurgy, widespread use of gunpowder, and the technologies of the Industrial Revolution in military significance. The composite bow, by adding firepower to the mobility the horse provided, turned horse-archery into an enduringly successful weapons system. There is much less agreement, however, about the impact of the stirrup on the effectiveness of cavalry. The stirrup was a latecomer in the arsenal of cavalry technolgy, and one difficulty in assessing the impact of the stirrup is that it is not easy to pinpoint when or where it originated. Scattered pictorial and archaeological evidence points uncertainly to an origin in the eastern part of the steppes or the western part of China late in the first millennium BCE. Stirrups seem to have been in use throughout East Asia by the second or third century CE, and to have spread westward across the steppes in the same period. They likely reached Persia in the fifth or sixth century, Byzantium shortly after, and western Europe probably in the eighth century.
What was their impact? The stirrup makes it easier for a horseman to stay on his horse, replacing a precarious balance and knee grip with a firm foothold. The most common argument for the impact of the stirrup, therefore, has been that it made mounted shock combat possible by anchoring the horseman to his horse, allowing him to hold a heavy lance underarm and to bring the full weight of horse and rider to bear with the lance, a tactic that would result in his being thrown off the back of his horse without stirrups. In this view, mounted shock combat, in turn, accounts for shifts from infantry- to cavalry-based military systems—the change from Roman legionnaires to medieval knights, for example.
But such arguments do not, in fact, account very well for patterns of cavalry use, and they misunderstand the mechanics of mounted combat. Heavy cavalry, including the armored cataphracts of some steppe tribes, predate the use of stirrups in many places. It is clear that, in the days before the introduction of the stirrup, cavalry made use of saddles that essentially locked the horseman in place. One of the best-attested examples is the Celtic-style saddle used by the Celts and the Romans. Recent tests have shown that using horns to support the rider’s lower back and wrap over his thighs creates a steady platform for fighting from horseback. But the real effectiveness of a heavy cavalry charge, especially against infantry, rests in its psychological impact— the terror it inspires—rather than on the actual force of its impact. For horses can rarely be made to impale themselves, and since infantry weapons almost always outrange related cavalry weapons—pikes are longer than lances, for example—the cavalry must open holes in an infantry formation before it comes to blows, or the charge will fail (see also the Sources box, p. 111).
This is not to say that the stirrup was not an advance. It made the horseman’s job easier, and, once invented, it spread steadily. In particular, the stirrup gave an advantage to those peoples who were not by nature horsemen. It was perhaps most advantageous in battles between horsemen, which may account for its more rapid spread through the steppes than beyond them. However, it was not decisive in any sense, and it created no new capabilities for cavalry, but rather only enhanced capabilities already long established.