The archetypal nomadic peoples of the eastern end of the steppe world, the east Asian equivalent of the Scythians, are the Xiongnu. Our knowledge of the Xiongnu comes mostly from Chinese sources. The very name “Xiongnu” comes from the name given by the Chinese of the Zhou (1050-256 bce) and Han (206 bce-220 ce) periods to all the nomadic peoples who inhabited the Mongolian region. The term literally means “Savage (or Violent) Slaves,” and according to the Chinese, the Xiongnu traced their ancestry to a king of the mythical Xia period of Chinese history. Populating the mostly arid lands of the northern Ordos region near the loop of the Yellow River, Xiongnu customs and religious practices were typical of the steppe nomadic peoples of the day. They practiced Shamanism and the ritual sacrifice of horses on special religious occasions—but in the distinctive Xiongnu version, the sacrificial horses had to be white. The Xiongnu allegedly first made their appearance as opponents of the settled Chinese civilization in the early eighth century bce. However, only in the third century bce do the Xiongnu show up in the records as horse-riding archers who regularly plundered the lands of the Chinese.
There was a traditional story told about Maodun, unifier of the Xiongnu tribes: According to the Han dynasty Chinese historian Sima Qian, the Xiongnu were in a state of constant training when not in the field. Maodun supposedly had his personal command trained so well that they would, at a word, immediately shoot arrows at whatever target Maodun chose. One day in 209 bce, he decided to impress his father, the Shanyu (great leader) of the tribe, and, in rapid succession, he had his men shoot at his horse, his favorite wife, and his father’s horse. He executed those who were too slow. Maodun then suddenly pointed his bow at his father, who was immediately pierced by several arrows. Thus had Maodun secured for himself the rulership of the Xiongnu. We also see once again the precariousness of rulership in Inner Asia.
Maodun’s control of the Xiongnu confederation adheres closely to the model of Inner Asian leadership. After eliminating his father, he killed a brother who was a rival, as well as his brother’s supporters, and then spent the next few years cementing his authority in a series of battles against Xiongnu and other nomadic tribes. Following victory, he divided any captured flocks with his supporters, proving to them his ability both to lead in battle and to provide loot, and not coincidentally firming up their loyalty to him. He then immediately turned his attention to raiding into China. The Han dynasty, after several embarrassing defeats at the hands of Maodun (see Chapter 2), agreed to provide large quantities of tribute in return for a pledge to refrain from raiding. Maodun, then, was able to obtain the fruits of raiding without actually having to raid. This enabled him to focus on subjugating nomadic tribes and strengthening his personal control of the Xiongnu confederation. Maodun died in 174 bce. His successors reestablished similar relations with Han China, but not before leading raids of plunder as Maodun had, proving their fitness to lead in combat (see the Highlights box “Xiongnu Raiding”).
As long as the Xiongnu had a military advantage over the Chinese, they could count on the receipt each year of vast quantities of silk, iron, and other goods. The distribution of these goods ensured the loyalty of the subordinate tribes, but the Shanyus (roughly translated as “undisputed leaders”) also kept their warriors busy fighting with neighboring nomadic tribes. The large cavalry armies the Xiongnu could put into the field made them without rival on the steppes. Only when the Chinese succeeded in outflanking Xiongnu territory by cutting off their major source of foodstuffs did the confederation’s unity become fragile. A series of defeats at the hands of the Chinese in the 80s and 70s bce also led to a loss of prestige by not only the Shanyu but the Xiongnu in general. The Xiongnu then became engaged in quelling a chain of rebellions by subjugated tribes, further weakening the confederation leader’s ability to supply his subordinates with loot. In 60 bce, the Xiongnu confederation was ripped apart by civil war, though some form of Xiongnu military alliance would remain in place through the first century CE.
As with all the nomadic societies discussed in this chapter, the Xiongnu saw all able-bodied males as liable to military service. In fact, martial duties were for the most part the sole occupation of Xiongnu males. When not on campaign, a good portion of their time was taken up with training and perfecting their skills. In preparation for an adult life of combat and combat training, Xiongnu boys as young as 3 were taught to ride sheep and handle a bow, shooting at birds and rats; later, they would learn to ride ponies and shoot at larger game. Group effort was also emphasized, so that the Xiongnu warrior who faced settled opponents had already undergone years of training and discipline.
The main business of the Xiongnu was warfare, normally directed in major annual campaigns of pillage against China. Following the typical pattern of leadership of Inner Asia, the Shanyu had full control of the tribes only during periods of warfare. When not on campaign, the various tribes and Xiongnu groups reverted to the control of their traditional leadership. Once the call to battle had been transmitted, the tribesmen normally gathered at Hehehot, a fairly fertile land where the men could find grazing land for their horses while awaiting the arrival of others.
Like most Inner Asian nomadic warriors, the Xiongnu were mounted archers. All warriors were armed with the composite bow. Other standard equipment included small swords and shields and various types of fighting knives. Many were also armed with lances and, during the centuries of warfare with China, many of the tribal leaders wore a kind of body armor. A great deal of the weaponry of the Xiongnu was produced by Chinese prisoners of war or other captured Chinese craftsmen, who were settled in small villages deep within Xiongnu territories.
The Xiongnu also acquired many of their weapons in battle with the Chinese. This was necessary since the Xiongnu lands were deficient in iron, and there were too few craftsmen who could produce iron weapons in the quantities needed by the Xiongnu warriors. After a victorious confrontation with the Chinese, it was not unusual for the Xiongnu to scavenge the field of battle for weapons. Large quantities of weapons were also often purchased by the Xiongnu from Chinese border guards, the persistence of which practice led to numerous Han dynasty edicts threatening harsh punishment for such actions.
The nomadic empires—such as those of the Scythians, Xiongnu, and Turks—were in reality confederations, with centralized control being either very loose or reliant on the personality and talents of a charismatic leader. Even then, successful continuance of the confederation depended on acquiring material goods and peoples of the sedentary lands. This usually took the form of raids for plunder, with the nomads sweeping into settled lands on their horses and ponies and departing with loot and slaves. Xiongnu raids were an integral aspect of the confederation’s political and social unity in its early years, and an examination of the raiding strategy and tactics of Maodun gives us a somewhat closer glimpse into the importance attached to this activity and its multiple goals.
Nomadic raids into China, of course, had the primary aim of acquiring quantities of loot. However, the large-scale raids, such as those organized and led by Maodun, served broader political and strategic goals as well. One of the largest of these raids took place soon after Maodun had militarily unified the steppe lands. Maodun expended considerable effort to subdue neighboring nomadic tribes, especially the powerful Yuezhi to his west. Once the Yuezhi had been pounded into submission (many fled westward, eventually terrorizing Persia and northern India), Maodun confiscated their flocks as a means of asserting control and providing rewards to those who had fought with him. Yet this was merely a temporary state of affairs, as there were few spoils to distribute among the loyalist tribes.
Within months, the remaining Yuezhi were made a part of Maodun’s nomadic confederation and included in a pillaging expedition into China. This expedition saw several tens of thousands of Xiongnu destroy numerous settled communities in north China. Jewelry, textiles, supplies of grain and wine, and implements and weapons made of iron were taken. In addition, slaves were acquired, often artisans and young women, but also some farmers who were to be used to till the small agricultural plots of the Xiongnu. All were packed up into confiscated carts and transported back to the Xiongnu lands to the north. Small Chinese military outposts or militia forces were destroyed, but, for the most part, the major military centers were avoided. When larger Chinese military units attempted to confront the Xiongnu, the nomads retreated—and lacking large cavalry forces, the Chinese could not pursue.
The degree of coordination involved in Xiongnu raids such as this should not be exaggerated. The purpose of these raids was not confrontation with the major military forces of China, and central command became involved only at the beginning and end of a raid. Division of the areas of attack was decided by Maodun and the tribal leaders, and the tribes then took off under their own direction. Unified action might have become necessary when determined resistance was encountered, in which case the role of Maodun and his successors as Xiongnu leader was quite important. When fleeing China with their loot, the relatively slow-moving Xiongnu became more vulnerable to attack, and here central direction of defense became necessary. In part to hinder pursuing Chinese forces, Maodun ordered destruction of croplands, requiring the Chinese to transport even more of their foodstuffs.
The destruction of crops—like that of the people and their settlements—served another interest as well. Maodun and his successors used raiding not only to acquire plunder but also to terrorize the Chinese into the payment of tribute. This tribute, unlike the spoils of raids, was indeed significantly under the control of the central Xiongnu leadership, enhancing and strengthening the personal authority of the ruler.