Nanno Marinatos
Abstract
The object of this chapter is to discuss Thucydides’ presentation of the Trojan War in the so-called archaeology and argue that he analyzes it from his own distinctive perspective as an Athenian general. He explores the reasons for the failure of Agamemnon to capture Troy in his special way and decides that he did not act swiftly and efficiently and lacked provisions and money (χρήματα). By so doing and by raising issues of strategy, Thucydides indirectly compares the Trojan campaign to the Sicilian expedition. His reflections on the Trojan siege will thus hopefully shed some new light on his views about the Sicilian campaign and the military strategies used there, specifically the siege of Syracuse of 415/414 BC.
Thucydides Reads the Trojan War from the Perspective of an Army General
One first observation is that Thucydides is concerned about the nature and constitution of the united Achaean army and the role of their leader, Agamemnon, whom he assumes to have been not a mere general but also the head of an empire who practically forced islanders to submit to him (1.9.3–4). This, of course, immediately brings to mind the Athenian empire. By reading the Iliad closely, Thucydides thinks that Agamemnon’s troops constituted the largest force (δύναμις) of Greece until the poet’s time because the leaders of each contingent had been recruited from various parts of the land. An analogy between the Iliad book 2 and Thucydides book 7 is evident when the historian lists the multiple states and nations which came together against Syracuse (ἒθνη γὰρ πλεῖστα δὴ ἐπὶ μίαν πόλιν … ξυνῆλθε; 7.56.4). Indeed, the comparison between Troy and Syracuse has not gone entirely unnoticed.1 He implicitly makes the further point that, large as it was, Agamemnon’s dynamis did not compare to the dynamis of Athens of his times which had not only greater manpower at its disposal but also plenty of money (1.2).2
A second point concerns Thucydides’ evaluation of Agamemnon’s tactical errors. His major mistake, he writes, was that he did not concentrate on the siege but dispersed his forces for many years by sending them to raid other towns for the procurement of supplies (βιοτεύσειν, 1.11). Had he intensely concentrated on Troy, Thucydides suggests, he might have captured it faster and with less trouble and the Trojans would not have withstood the siege as long as they did (ἀντεῖχον πολιορκίᾳ, 1.11.2). Agamemnon was practically forced to make further mistakes because of the aforementioned lack of money since provisions could not be purchased, mercenaries could not be procured, and the only source of income was raids and looting. Of course, this was not his fault since money was not available during his times; nevertheless, Thucydides feels, lack of it was an almost fatal disadvantage to Agamemnon’s expedition (Thuc. 1.11):
αἴτιον δ᾽ ἦν οὐχ ἡ ὀλιγανθρωπία τοσοῦτον ὅσον ἡ ἀχρηματία. τῆς γὰρ τροφῆς ἀπορίᾳ τόν τε στρατὸν ἐλάσσω ἤγαγον καὶ ὅσον ἤλπιζον αὐτόθεν πολεμοῦντα βιοτεύσειν, ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἀφικόμενοι μάχῃ ἐκράτησαν δῆλον δέ: τὸ γὰρ ἔρυμα τῷ στρατοπέδῳ οὐκ ἂν ἐτειχίσαντο, φαίνονται δ᾽ οὐδ᾽ ἐνταῦθα πάσῃ τῇ δυνάμει χρησάμενοι, ἀλλὰ πρὸς γεωργίαν τῆς Χερσονήσου τραπόμενοι καὶ λῃστείαν τῆς τροφῆς ἀπορίᾳ. ᾗ καὶ μᾶλλον οἱ Τρῶες αὐτῶν διεσπαρμένων τὰ δέκα ἔτη ἀντεῖχον βίᾳ, τοῖς αἰεὶ ὑπολειπομένοις ἀντίπαλοι ὄντες. περιουσίαν δὲ εἰ ἦλθον ἔχοντες τροφῆς καὶ ὄντες ἁθρόοι ἄνευ λῃστείας καὶ γεωργίας ξυνεχῶς τὸν πόλεμον διέφερον, ῥᾳδίως ἂν μάχῃ κρατοῦντες εἷλον, οἵ γε καὶ οὐχ ἁθρόοι, ἀλλὰ μέρει τῷ αἰεὶ παρόντι ἀντεῖχον, πολιορκίᾳ δ᾽ ἂν προσκαθεζόμενοι ἐν ἐλάσσονί τε χρόνῳ καὶ ἀπονώτερον τὴν Τροίαν εἷλον. (my emphasis)
The cause of the inferiority was not so much the want of men as the want of money; the invading army was limited, by the difficulty of obtaining supplies, to such a number as might be expected to live on the country in which they were to fight. After their arrival at Troy, when they had won a battle (as they clearly did, for otherwise they could not have fortified their camp), even then they appear not to have used the whole of their force, but to have been driven by want of provisions to the cultivation of the Chersonese and to pillage. And in consequence of this dispersion of their forces, the Trojans were enabled to hold out against them during the whole ten years, being always a match for those who remained on the spot. Whereas if the besieging army had brought abundant supplies, and, instead of betaking themselves to agriculture or pillage, had carried on the war persistently with all their forces, they would easily have been masters of the field and have taken the city; since, even divided as they were, and with only a part of their army available at any one time, they held their ground. Or, again, they might have regularly invested Troy, and the place would have been captured in less time and with less trouble.3
In the above passage, Thucydides makes an important inference which is based solely on reason: the Achaeans must have won a victory at first. They clearly did, he writes, for otherwise they could not have fortified their camp. Once they won, they could have persisted instead of dispersing their forces. In short, Agamemnon’s trouble was rooted in lack of provisions and dearth of money but also in his failure to take advantage of his first and successful assault.
Analogy between Troy and Syracuse
The siege of Syracuse must have been foremost in Thucydides’ mind when he was writing about Troy not only because of the geographical analogy between the two cities (Syracuse was situated in another land and across the seas) but also because of the inherent difficulties caused by the siege of a major fortified city lying across the sea. If Troy and Syracuse constitute symmetrical historical events, the historian must also have made an implicit comparison between the generals of the respective armies. The equivalent to Agamemnon in the Athenian army was the senior Athenian general Nicias, the son of Niceratus, especially after his co-generals, Lamachus and Alcibiades, were eliminated. Alcibiades was recalled to Athens to stand trial, whereas Lamachus fell in battle. The comparison between Agamemnon and Nicias will throw some new light on the merits of the latter’s siege-techniques in Syracuse and will challenge the judgment of most modern historians that Nicias was an inadequate general.4
The comparison between Agamemnon and Nicias must start with Nicias’ realization that the expedition would require substantial provisions and money on which subject he has identical ideas with the author. As we have seen, the latter writes in the archaeology that Agamemnon’s siege was lengthy and ineffective because he lacked provisions and money, and this is the issue Nicias addresses in the Athenian assembly in 415 when he tells the people that the army must have enough supplies of food, equipment and money. He also argues in detail that a number of specialists ought to be included in the expedition: hoplites, archers, peltasts, cavalry, technical experts, bread-makers and wall builders.5 He also stresses self-sufficiency (Thuc. 6.22):
ὁπλίτας τε οὖν πολλούς μοι δοκεῖ χρῆναι ἡμᾶς ἄγειν καὶ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων, τῶν τε ὑπηκόων καὶ ἤν τινα ἐκ Πελοποννήσου δυνώμεθα ἢ πεῖσαι ἢ μισθῷ προσαγαγέσθαι, καὶ τοξότας πολλοὺς καὶ σφενδονήτας, ὅπως πρὸς τὸ ἐκείνων ἱππικὸν ἀντέχωσι, ναυσί τε καὶ πολὺ περιεῖναι, ἵνα καὶ τὰ ἐπιτήδεια ῥᾷον ἐσκομιζώμεθα, τὸν δὲ καὶ αὐτόθεν σῖτον ἐν ὁλκάσι, πυροὺς καὶ πεφρυγμένας κριθάς, ἄγειν, καὶ σιτοποιοὺς ἐκ τῶν μυλώνων πρὸς μέρος ἠναγκασμένους ἐμμίσθους, ἵνα, ἤν που ὑπὸ ἀπλοίας ἀπολαμβανώμεθα, ἔχῃ ἡ στρατιὰ τὰ ἐπιτήδεια (πολλὴ γὰρ οὖσα οὐ πάσης ἔσται πόλεως ὑποδέξασθαι), τά τε ἄλλα ὅσον δυνατὸν ἑτοιμάσασθαι, καὶ μὴ ἐπὶ ἑτέροις γίγνεσθαι, μάλιστα δὲ χρήματα αὐτόθεν ὡς πλεῖστα ἔχειν. τὰ δὲ παρ᾽ Ἐγεσταίων, ἃ λέγεται ἐκεῖ ἑτοῖμα, νομίσατε καὶ λόγῳ ἂν μάλιστα ἑτοῖμα εἶναι.
we must take with us a large heavy-armed force both of Athenians and of allies, whether our own subjects or any Peloponnesians whom we can persuade or attract by pay to our service; also plenty of archers and javelin-men to act against the enemy’s cavalry. Our naval superiority must be overwhelming, that we may not only be able to fight, but may have no difficulty in bringing in supplies. And there is the food carried from home, such as wheat and parched barley, which will have to be conveyed in merchant-vessels; we must also have bakers, drafted in a certain proportion from each mill, who will receive pay, but will be forced to serve, in order that, if we should be detained by a calm, the army may not want food; for it is not every city that will be able to receive so large a force as ours. We must make our preparations as complete as possible, and not be at the mercy of others; above all, we must take out with us as much money as we can; for as to the supplies of the Egestaeans which are said to be awaiting us, we had better assume that they are imaginary.6
Despite his elaborate precautions about supplies, Nicias is not optimistic that such a huge operation can be sustained in the long run but, since he is one of the three elected generals, he goes along.
How Does One Conduct an Optimal Siege?
From Thucydides’ point of view, a siege is a very complicated matter, of which the siege of Troy provides a good example. Being a general himself Thucydides had several examples from which to draw a lesson even within the short time span of the Peloponnesian War: Potidaea (which took almost three years to complete); two battles around Amphipolis; Mende; Torone; Cythera, Melos. As a rule, towns were taken swiftly only if the besieger exerted strong and steady pressure by burning the crops and thus intimidating the inhabitants to capitulate. As well, generals could secretly negotiate with a party within the town, which was friendly to the besieger, and then follow up by taking the city, when traitors from the inside opened the gates (Fifth Column strategy).7 If the town were close to the sea, the Athenian fleet stood by providing supplies to the besiegers whilst blockading the besieged.
In Troy, Agamemnon intimidated the Trojans by raiding surrounding territories but failed to blockade the town and force capitulation. The reason was that he did not deal efficiently with the Trojan allies inhabiting the plains whom Homer names excellent (πλεῖστοι καὶ ἄριστοι, 2.817): Lycians, Dardanians, Cicones and others. Thucydides infers that the Trojans relied on their allies for provisions: consider how Lycian Sarpedon reprimands Hector for not being at the forefront of battle and for relying on him (Sarpedon) who was a mere ally. Indeed, Hector is stung by Sarpedon’s words (Il. 5.471–493). The allies of the Trojans remained loyal which put the Achaeans at a great disadvantage for provisions forcing them to rely on distant raids, as noted above.
Compare now the Sicilian expedition as narrated by Thucydides. Nicias, in contrast to Agamemnon, planned his siege of Syracuse meticulously. At first, when the Athenian expedition had freshly arrived on the island, all three generals still being present, the first thing they did was to check how much money their allies, the Egestans had to offer. Once they realized that there was only a small amount and certainly not enough for conducting a war, Nicias reasonably suggested that the Athenians ought to display their huge force, sail around for show and then return home (6.47). His view was not accepted by the two other generals, however, and when a little later Alcibiades was recalled to Athens, Nicias and Lamachus remained alone. The historian focalizes on Nicias, who seems to have been the mastermind of the whole plan, a plan that entailed building up allies and then assaulting the town by a full force.8
The two generals scored their first victory against the Syracusans already during the first months of their sojourn, just like Agamemnon had scored a first victory (always according to Thucydides). However, Nicias chose not to persist and carry on the siege because winter was approaching and his army did not have enough provisions to continue such a complicated enterprise in bad weather.9 Another consideration of Nicias was the weakness of Athenian horsepower which had already failed to protect Athenian soldiers from Syracusan harassment. For this reason, he requested extra cavalry from Athens thinking that horsemen would be especially valuable to the Athenian masons during the building of the circumvallation wall because they would protect them against the Syracusan cavalry. While waiting for these supplies, Nicias and Lamachus withdrew their troops from Syracuse and spent the wintry period in the friendly town of Catana. This was not wasted time as it gave them time to build a broad coalition of Sicilian allies – what Agamemnon did not do. They also met their target of securing the desired provisions and cavalry which was sent to them from Athens and, having accomplished all these goals, they arrived back in Syracuse the spring to conduct the siege properly. In the passage below the phrases in italics explain the full reasoning behind Nicias’ plan of the siege of Syracuse as Thucydides narrates it (Thuc. 6.71):
καὶ τὰ τῶν πολεμίων σκῦλα ἔχοντες ἀπέπλευσαν ἐς Κατάνην: χειμών τε γὰρ ἦν, καὶ τὸν πόλεμον αὐτόθεν ποιεῖσθαι οὔπω ἐδόκει δυνατὸν εἶναι, πρὶν ἂν ἱππέας τε μεταπέμψωσιν ἐκ τῶν Ἀθηνῶν καὶ ἐκ τῶν αὐτόθεν ξυμμάχων ἀγείρωσιν, ὅπως μὴ παντάπασιν ἱπποκρατῶνται, καὶ χρήματα δὲ ἅμα αὐτόθεν τε ξυλλέξωνται καὶ παρ᾽ Ἀθηναίων ἔλθῃ, τῶν τε πόλεών τινας προσαγάγωνται, ἃς ἤλπιζον μετὰ τὴν μάχην μᾶλλον σφῶν ὑπακούσεσθαι, τά τε ἄλλα καὶ σῖτον καὶ ὅσων δέοι παρασκευάσωνται ὡς ἐς τὸ ἔαρ ἐπιχειρήσοντες ταῖς Συρακούσαις.
[The Athenians] … then taking with them the spoils of their enemies, sailed back to Catana. Winter had now set in, and they thought that before they could do anything more at Syracuse they must send for horsemen from Athens, and collect others from their Sicilian allies; without them they would be at the mercy of the Syracusan cavalry. They also wanted to obtain both in Sicily and from Athens a supply of money, and to gain over some of the Sicilian cities. These would be more willing to listen to them after their victory. They had likewise to provide supplies, and to make the other requisite preparations for attacking Syracuse in the spring. (my emphasis)10
It is worth repeating that winning over Sicilian allies was crucial to Nicias’ plan if the Athenians were to succeed in isolating Syracuse. The strategy of Nicias obviously contrasts with Agamemnon’s tactics of raids carried for nine whole years. The latter caused the in dispersal of forces and did not siege in building local coalitions. A further contrast with Iliad is that Nicias’ initial success was designed (among other things) to send a message to the Sicels that the Athenian conquerors were competent, experienced and well trained in battle; consequently, they were likely to be perceived as the future winners of the conflict which made the Sicels more willing to join them, or else stay neutral. In other words, the success of that first Athenian victory at Syracuse was an important aspect of Nicias’ long-term policy and part of his overall plan to conduct the siege systematically. By contrast, Agamemnon made no use of his first initial success – always according to Thucydides.
When Nicias began the serious siege of the town in the spring, he took the Syracusans by surprise. The Athenians sailed secretly by night and landed unobserved north of the city at a location specified by Thucydides as Leon. The soldiers literally ran from the coast up to the high plateau of Epipolai which bordered the city to the west towering over it. They climbed along a pass called Euryalos. Once the plateau was taken by this sudden attack, the Athenians immediately built forts to secure their position and guard their supplies. Masons were put to work, extra horsemen were received from the Athenian allies and very soon the circumvallation of the city began before the Syracusans had time to catch their breath. Thucydides relates (6.98.1–2):
καὶ οὐ πολλῷ ὕστερον αὐτοῖς ἦλθον ἔκ τε Ἐγέστης ἱππῆς τριακόσιοι καὶ Σικελῶν καὶ Ναξίων καὶ ἄλλων τινῶν ὡς ἑκατόν: καὶ Ἀθηναίων ὑπῆρχον πεντήκοντα καὶ διακόσιοι, οἷς ἵππους τοὺς μὲν παρ᾽ Ἐγεσταίων καὶ Καταναίων ἔλαβον, τοὺς δ᾽ ἐπρίαντο, καὶ ξύμπαντες πεντήκοντα καὶ ἑξακόσιοι ἱππῆς ξυνελέγησαν.καὶ καταστήσαντες ἐν τῷ Λαβδάλῳ φυλακὴν ἐχώρουν πρὸς τὴν Συκῆν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, ἵναπερ καθεζόμενοι ἐτείχισαν τὸν κύκλον διὰ τάχους. καὶ ἔκπληξιν τοῖς Συρακοσίοις παρέσχον τῷ τάχει τῆς οἰκοδομίας … ;
Not long afterwards the Athenians were joined by three hundred Egestaean horsemen, and about a hundred more furnished by the Sicels, Naxians, and others. They had two hundred and fifty of their own, for some of whom they received horses from the Egestaeans and Catanaeans; other horses they bought. The whole number of their cavalry was now raised to six hundred and fifty. They placed a garrison in Labdalum and went down to Syce, where they took up a position and immediately commenced building a wall around the city. The Syracusans were amazed at the celerity of the work. (my emphasis)11
In this way, the wall around Syracuse was almost finished in record time exemplifying the great skill, speed and experience of the Athenian army.
Next, Nicias ordered the huge Athenian fleet to enter the Great Harbor of Syracuse and thus solidified his blockade by sea. Simultaneously, he destroyed the water supplies. How long did the siege take? From the first battle to the almost complete circumvallation of the town it took less than a year. The effort was sustained and coordinated. The Syracusans, of course, put up resistance and tried building cross walls to interrupt the Athenian enterprise, and it was during one of these battles around the walls that the second general, Lamachus, was killed leaving Nicias on his own (6.103.3); still, he managed almost to complete the circumvallation and blockade the Syracusans by land.
But this was not all. While he was conducting operations, Nicias kept seriously negotiating with the pro-Athenian party inside Syracuse, inducing them to open the gates. This policy of taking the city from the inside (the Fifth Column strategy) was the most effective tool of the besieger, as already noted. After all, even Agamemnon took Troy by stratagem ultimately, although this is not related in the Iliad.
Nicias’ plan worked perfectly because, as Thucydides reports, the Syracusans were almost ready to capitulate as soon as they realized that the circumvallation wall was about to be completed (6.103.3). But then something unexpected happened: Gylippus, the Spartan, suddenly arrived with a Spartan fleet accompanied by a Corinthian one and broke the blockade. At this point, the initial advantage of Athens over Syracuse was annihilated and the besiegers became the besieged since they were themselves surrounded. Nicias had now two armies to fight at once: the encircled Syracusans and the Spartans/Corinthians. All of his plans had to be re-configured: in one sentence, the siege was impossible to maintain.
Here, then, is a lesson which Thucydides draws from history. A general must plan well and meticulously, and this is something Nicias did whereas Agamemnon did not. But there can never be a complete guarantee of success because unexpected factors may influence the outcome of events: for this reason, Greeks generally called their military successes good fortune (εὐτυχία). In the end, Nicias’ excellent plan was subverted by the unforeseen arrival of Gylippus which could not have been predicted since Athens was in a peace treaty with Sparta at the time (the peace of Nicias had been signed only six years before).
Agamemnon, Nicias and Empire
To return to Agamemnon now, Thucydides notes some of his other deficiencies as a general, flaws that have less to do with his planning and more with his style of rulership and personality. The historian writes somewhat surprisingly: “Agamemnon’s rule was based on fear rather than charis” (οὐ χάριτι τὸ πλέον ἢ φόβῳ, 1.9.3).
It is worth dwelling on charis (‘grace’) at this point in order to investigate what exactly Thucydides had in mind when he attributed its lack to Agamemnon. Charis may be defined as a gift freely given by a ruler to the ruled or bestowed by a commander of a large coalition of subjects or allies. ‘We make friends, Pericles says in the Funeral Oration, ‘not by receiving charis but by bestowing it on others’’ (2.40.4). What Pericles means here is that the stronger partner bestows benefits instead of showing force to the weaker partner, and this act forges a strong bond between the two despite discrepancy in the hierarchy of power. Perhaps what Pericles means is that the bond of charis evokes the selfless love of a parent to his/her child. The giver is invested in maintaining the goodwill of the taker, whereas the taker is bound by gratitude to return his debt. In Thucydidean Pericles’ view, charis is not only a token of Athenian magnanimity but a sign of dedication to individual freedom (2.40.5). The English rendition of charis as grace evokes the notion of the Grace of God, which may also be defined as a gift freely given.12
In practical terms, Athenian charis towards its allies/subjects may have meant the reduction of tribute, or the guarantee of security, or protection against pirates, or perhaps financial benefits.13 The important point here is that Thucydides characterizes Agamemnon as lacking charis and using fear and force instead. By so doing, he juxtaposes two kinds of empire-ruling, one based on fear, the other on mutual benefits. Why did Thucydides think that Agamemnon ruled on the basis of fear? He must have inferred this from the first two books of the Iliad where Agamemnon mistreats Chryses and the seer Calchas, insults Achilles and mishandles the situation with his army inducing his men almost to rebel. Surely it had been demoralizing to the Achaean army to see their general quarrel with Achilles, and surely they felt ready to board the ships and return home once they heard Agamemnon say (Il. 2.110–115):
Ζεύς με μέγα Κρονίδης ἄτῃ ἐνέδησε βαρείῃ,
σχέτλιος, ὃς πρὶν μέν μοι ὑπέσχετο καὶ κατένευσεν
Ἴλιον ἐκπέρσαντ᾽ εὐτείχεον ἀπονέεσθαι,
νῦν δὲ κακὴν ἀπάτην βουλεύσατο, καί με κελεύει
δυσκλέα Ἄργος ἱκέσθαι, ἐπεὶ πολὺν ὤλεσα λαόν. 115
Zeus, son of Cronus has seriously deluded me,
a crushing blow. That perverse god once solemnly assured me
that we would sack Ilium with its fine walls and return home;
but now his advice turns out to be an evil deception, and he is telling me
to return home to Argos in disgrace, with half my army lost.14 115
By contrast, Thucydidean Nicias exudes confidence at Athenian excellence and skill as he addresses the troops and allies of Athens. He deals with the latter with exceptional sensitivity saying (Thuc. 6.68.1–2):
Πολλῇ μὲν παραινέσει, ὦ ἄνδρες, τί δεῖ χρῆσθαι, οἳ πάρεσμεν ἐπὶ τὸν αὐτὸν ἀγῶνα; αὐτὴ γὰρ ἡ παρασκευὴ ἱκανωτέρα μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι θάρσος παρασχεῖν ἢ καλῶς λεχθέντες λόγοι μετὰ ἀσθενοῦς στρατοπέδου. ὅπου γὰρ Ἀργεῖοι καὶ Μαντινῆς καὶ Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ νησιωτῶν οἱ πρῶτοί ἐσμεν, πῶς οὐ χρὴ μετὰ τοιῶνδε καὶ τοσῶνδε ξυμμάχων πάντα τινὰ μεγάλην τὴν ἐλπίδα τῆς νίκης ἔχειν …
What need, soldiers, is there of a long exhortation when we are all here united in the same cause? The mere sight of this great army is more likely to put courage into you than an eloquent speech and an inferior force. We are Argives and Mantineans, and Athenians and the chief of the islanders; and must not the presence of so many brave allies inspire every one of us with a good hope of victory?15
It is now time to summarize the results of Thucydides’ treatment of the siege of Troy. I accept the obvious proposition made eloquently by Jacqueline de Romilly and more recently by Lisa Kallet, that Thucydides’ view of the Trojan expedition addresses the lack of provisions and money (ἀχρηματία).16 But I have gone beyond that and have discerned in Thucydides’ interpretation issues of strategy and leadership which are not dependent on historical necessity but on individual choices made by the generals. Through his criticism of Agamemnon, Thucydides displays his understanding of how a siege is planned and exemplifies it by the counter-paradigm of Nicias’ careful preparation of the assault on Syracuse. Modern historians have paid less attention to this issue.
In the end, however, Thucydides’ message shows that even methodical planning did not (and could not) guarantee the capture of Syracuse because chance reversed the course of affairs and subverted the utterly rational plans of Nicias. No general can ever plan and calculate every possible eventuality: this is the tragedy of the human condition.17
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Notes
1
De Romilly (1967) 257–292; Hornblower (1991–2008) vol. 3, 654. Hornblower refers also to Dover’s commentary of the school edition of Thucydides.
2
De Romilly (1967) 276–278.
3
Transl. by Jowett (1930).
4
I note with interest that Finley (1942) 245–246 almost apologizes for any good trait he finds in Nicias saying that ‘such praise of Nicias may at first sight seem surprising, in view of Nicias’ obvious deficiencies as both a statesman and a general’. Westlake (1968) 173 considers him ‘cautious and unenterprising’; see also Connor (1984) 187; Kagan (2009) 181–183; Greenwood (2017) 167. It is quite common to state that Nicias was not only an inadequate general, but also that he failed to persuade: Holladay (1973) 421; Rawlings (1981) 127–160; Ober (1999) 107–108; Kallet (2001) 133–134; Stadter (2017) 283–299, esp. 289. Rood (1998) 160–161 argues persuasively that opportunities for victory may have existed but that the author seems to have downplayed them.
5
On the subject of money, see Kallet-Marx (1993); Kallet (2001); Kallet (2006) 358–359.
6
Transl. by Jowett (1930).
7
For the Fifth Column strategy in Classical Greece, see Losada (1972).
8
The suggestion to build up allies was made also by Alcibiades.
9
Note here how Thucydides brings provisions to the reader’s attention because he considers them important.
10
Transl. by Jowett (1930).
11
Transl. by Jowett (1930).
12
Herter (1968) 277, renders charis as ‘Wohltaten’; see also Scanlon (1994) 147, 153–154.
13
When the Corinthians request alliance from Athens, they assure the latter that Corinthians will owe them lasting (or secure) gratitude (charis): 1.32–33 with Scanlon (1994) 153.
14
Transl. by Rieu (2003).
15
Transl. by Jowett (1930).
16
De Romilly (1967) 266; Hunter (1982) 39–40; Kallet (2001).
17
As argued thoroughly by Stahl (2003) 173–191.