Chapter 22

In This Chapter

Running on hope: Hood’s dream of a new invasion

Missing an opportunity: Schofield nearly trapped

Losing it all: The disaster at Franklin

G eneral John B. Hood had earned his reputation for fighting as a Brigade and Division Commander in Lee’s army, had been given command of the Army of Tennessee after President Davis relieved General Joseph E. Johnston before the beginning of the siege of Atlanta. Hood had mismanaged the defense of Atlanta, by first wasting his men in fruitless attacks, and then by letting his army be nearly trapped during a siege when Union General William T. Sherman maneuvered south to cut off the Confederate main supply line to the city. Hood evacuated Atlanta, but he was not finished. While Sherman struck out toward the coast on his soon-to-be famous (or infamous) march, Hood marched his 40,000-man army northward, seeking to find the opportunity to change the course of the war. He had a vague notion of an invasion, winning victories that would lead the Union to give up the fight and secure Southern independence.

Hood, however, was neither a strategist nor a tactician. His badly managed battles at Franklin and Nashville were disasters that doomed the Confederacy. On the Union side, General George H. Thomas would launch one of the best-planned attacks of any officer of this war, achieving decisive results and winning the war in the Western Theater.

Hood Moves North

Although Confederate General Hood seemed to have gained the initiative from Union General Sherman, this was not the case. Hood’s supply lines were even more difficult to support than Sherman’s. Also, the weather turned bad, making the roads impossible to travel on. This gave Union forces scattered throughout Tennessee a chance to unite, with General George H. Thomas in charge. Major General John M. Schofield’s army of 35,000 men, detached from Sherman’s army, now had to delay Hood’s advance and allow Thomas the time to assemble an adequate defense.

Schofield almost forgot one of the most important rules about delaying a numerically stronger enemy: Remain mobile. Don’t stay in one place too long, or the enemy will cut off your line of retreat and trap you. Schofield moved almost too late from his position at Columbia, Tennessee and was almost trapped a few miles north at Spring Hill. But hard, almost desperate, marching by the Union and Hood’s contradictory orders to the Confederate troops saved the Union troops from near disaster. At Spring Hill, Hood fully expected to see the Union army surrounded by his forces the next morning — but the Yankees had quietly marched northward overnight on the main road past sleeping Confederates not more than 100 yards away. Hood had not made his instructions clear, and the road was left unguarded. Thus Hood’s best opportunity to affect the campaign slipped away. For if Hood had caught Schofield and beat his army, chances are that Hood may have been able to move north, pulling forces away from Sherman and Grant to deal with the threat posed by the Confederate army.

Running quietly: Schofield on the lam

Schofield made it safely to Franklin, but the bridges that crossed the Harpeth River were gone. He had asked Thomas for pontoons from Nashville, Tennessee to build a bridge, but they had not arrived. Schofield was in a tight spot. His troops were very tired, having spent several days and nights in hard marching; the Confederate army was coming up fast, and he was outnumbered; finally, his back was to a river he couldn’t cross. These three things add up to a disaster of major proportions for a commander. He did the only thing he could do — offset the enemy’s strength in numbers by putting his own army in entrenchments to buy time until he could cross the river safely. When Hood arrived outside of Franklin, Tennessee, on November 30, 1864, he found the enemy dug in and waiting for him.

Upon seeing the Yankee defenses, Hood ordered a frontal attack on the enemy line. From the very beginning, the attack made no sense. All the troops available to him at the time were two of his three corps, and almost all of his artillery had not yet arrived on the battlefield. Thus, he was negating any advantage he had in numbers, especially against an entrenched enemy. The charge was as magnificent as any charge launched in history — but it was hopeless. Men and bayonets were no match for modern artillery and modern rifles fired by veterans (standing in ranks four deep in some places) protected by breastworks. One Confederate officer said later: “It seemed to me that hell itself had exploded in our faces.” Nevertheless, the Confederates somehow managed to break the Union line, but were stopped by a Union reserve force. Despite the clear failure of his attack, Hood threw part of his third corps at the Union trenches, in a futile, senseless assault. The fighting didn’t stop until 9 p.m. that night. The next morning with his entire army (or what was left of it) and artillery on the field, he did what he should have done the previous day: He began a heavy bombardment of the Union entrenchments. Hood quickly discovered, however, that he was firing at empty positions. Schofield had crossed the river that night and was headed for Nashville, where he linked up with Thomas, who now had 55,000 men.

The magnitude of Hood’s disaster

Franklin cost the Army of Tennessee 6,000 casualties, twice the loss of men as Pickett’s Charge at Gettysburg. The army lost 53 regimental commanders. Six general officers (including the incomparable Patrick Cleburne) were killed, one was captured, and five others were wounded. No army can withstand such leader losses and still function. Nevertheless, Hood continued his pursuit of Schofield all the way to Nashville.

Triumphing at Nashville: Thomas’s Brilliant Plan

George H. Thomas was never a man to be hurried. He never got excited and he never wasted men on needless attacks. But when he was ready, no one delivered combat power like the Rock of Chickamauga. So it was at Nashville. From Thomas’s perspective, Hood’s army represented no major threat to him. His army was protected by the strong fortifications around the city of Nashville, and Thomas’s men were well prepared to defend it. But Thomas needed time to prepare his army for offensive operations. He gave detailed instructions to his subordinate commanders, and he coordinated with the navy to secure the Cumberland River and prevent the Confederate army from crossing and bypassing Nashville. He waited for fresh horses to arrive for his cavalry. Finally, when his plan was ready, he had to postpone the attack to wait for a winter storm to pass.

Hood, upon arriving at Nashville, decided that he had learned his lesson at Franklin; he would not attack entrenched troops again. He had a novel approach as an alternative; he would set up in a defensive position with his force of about 23,000 men and wait for Thomas to attack him. Then Hood’s army would counterattack and capture the city. It was not much of a plan, but it was about all he could do at this point. He watched and waited for two weeks. Then he sent his cavalry and two infantry brigades away under Forrest to try and cut Thomas’s supply line and harass the Union garrison at Murfreesboro. His timing could not have been worse.

Not only had Union and Confederate troops been watching each other for two weeks at Nashville, but General-in-Chief Ulysses Grant and the politicians in Washington had been watching as well. Hood’s army outside of Nashville, no matter how inconsequential, was bad publicity for the administration. Grant felt pressured to prod Thomas into action, gently at first, then more insistently. He grew impatient with what he saw as Thomas’s slowness. Hood was right in front of him! Why didn’t he finish him off and get it over with? Thomas explained he was not ready yet, and he would deal with the Confederates when he was ready. This kind of attitude infuriated Grant. He threatened to relieve Thomas if he didn’t do something fast. Thomas waited for the weather to clear. Grant decided enough was enough and dispatched General John A. Logan to replace Thomas and clear the rebels out of Nashville. By the time Logan arrived, relief orders in hand, Thomas had cleared away the rebels in stunning fashion.

The Battle of Nashville

On December 15, the weather had cleared, and Thomas was ready to make his move. The attack was masterfully planned and brilliantly executed. Thomas launched a main attack on the Confederate left flank, while mounting a coordinated secondary attack on the right flank. He maintained a strong reserve to exploit success at either flank, and used his cavalry on the left flank to extend his attack in depth and simultaneously threaten the enemy’s rear. Hood’s men, outnumbered 2 to 1, half-starved and demoralized, were hit everywhere at once. For once, even entrenchments did not offer the defenders any advantages against the onslaught. Hood had no cavalry on the battlefield, and he had not done anything to enhance his defensive position. He had no reserve to speak of. All he could do was retreat to a secondary position 2 miles to the rear. The next day, Thomas’s attack was so overwhelming, hitting the Confederates on three sides that the army disintegrated. Thomas sent his cavalry in hot pursuit — in his plan he had envisioned the need for fresh horses to mount just such a pursuit and had been willing to wait for them. The cavalry did the trick. The Union army had lost 3,000 men, but captured 4,000 Confederates. No one knows how many Confederates were killed and wounded.

The Aftermath

Forrest’s cavalry battled constantly to save what was left of the Army of Tennessee as it retreated southward. The remnants of the Confederate forces were no longer an army, and assembled in Tupelo, Mississippi on January 10, 1865. Hood was relieved at his request, and about 5,000 men, all that were left, were shifted to defend North Carolina. No significant Confederate forces existed outside Virginia and North Carolina by early spring 1865.

Heroes and Goats

Victory usually makes heroes out of otherwise unnoticed men. Even in defeat, there are heroes, and the Confederate Army of Tennessee had many who deserved far better than they got.

Heroes

Following are the men who served with loyalty:

George H. Thomas: Almost relieved for being thought of in Washington as too slow. A brilliant officer and superb combat leader who had often been overshadowed by others in the Union army, he never complained or felt slighted. Yet when he had his chance, he took it and in one massive well-planned blow, shattered a Confederate army and, for all intents and purposes, ended the war in the Western Theater.

Patrick Cleburne: Dies a hero’s death at Franklin, leading a doomed charge against hopeless odds. One of the South’s finest soldiers is sacrificed foolishly.

The Army of Tennessee: Marching and fighting with only the most minimal support, they followed Hood through a disastrous campaign. Could braver or more dedicated soldiers have done what they were ordered to do at Franklin and Nashville? It is quite doubtful such soldiers have ever existed.

Goats

Well, there is only one.