Part One
1
With the onset of modernity and establishment of new systems and structures, new challenges simultaneously emerged. Perhaps the biggest challenge with which modern individuals were required to contend was the freedom which ensued from the collapse of pre-modern hierarchies. Those who perceived this as progress pursued freedom fervently as a rational end. However, the unforeseen consequence of the unbridled pursuit of autonomy was the ironic restriction of freedom, the very thing which propelled their efforts. The failure to establish a rational end led subsequent theorists to form a counter-discourse, rejecting the continuation of the attempt to provide a rational foundation for human existence. Those who opposed the Enlightenment recognized that the rejection of absolute values, upon which to orientate oneself, led to the concern of nihilism, that life is fundamentally meaningless. The focus of this chapter will be to present that which we intend to engage with within this monograph. Rather than focusing on modernity as a problem, namely, what modernity is, and whether this has ended and we are now living within a postmodern era, we will concern ourselves with the philosophical implications of the onset of modernity. Specifically, the aim will be to determine the problems that modernity poses with regard to freedom and meaning.
In order to achieve our aim, we will begin with a brief analysis of modernity, articulating that which early modern thinkers believed themselves to be attempting to achieve (Section 1.1). Here we will discuss the intellectual developments which separate modernity from pre-modernity and focus on that which MacIntyre has termed the ‘Enlightenment project’ (2010: 36). We will then turn our attention to determining the key concepts which came to be indicative of modernity (Section 1.2). Focusing specifically on the philosophical programmes of Immanuel Kant and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, it will be illustrated that the concepts of maturity and autonomy are those which defined the Enlightenment project. Having provided an overview of modernity, attention will then be turned towards the negative consequences of the Enlightenment (Section 1.3). Here two specific problems will be raised and elucidated. The first problem, as explicated by Friedrich Nietzsche, is that of nihilism, that life is fundamentally meaningless. The second problem, which is raised by Max Weber, is disenchantment, which was a consequence of increased rationalization, which decreased the individual’s ability to actualize their freedom. Having determined the problems which modernity poses, with regards to freedom and meaning, we will then articulate the approach to modernity which will be upheld in this book (Section 1.4). Here we will note that our particular disposition will be one of acceptance, that is, rather than attempt to explain away the problem, we will confront it directly.
1.1 What is modernity?
In order to address the problem of modernity it is necessary to first provide a context within which to situate our investigation. Historically, modernity is understood by its distinct division from the medieval era. As Robert Pippen explicates, ‘Modernity, as the name suggests, implies a decisive break in an intellectual tradition, an inability to rely on assumptions and practices taken for granted in the past’ (1991: 10–11). In this preceding period, the social system was feudal, the economy agricultural and the countries were controlled by monarchs or emperors. However, each of these components was gradually replaced. Society became capitalist, the economy industrial and the policies of state eventually came to be determined by democratic vote. With the implementation of these institutions, practices and traditions, the modern age was essentially born. The establishment of each of these elements, however, was not simply a matter of replacing one theory with another. On the contrary, what we now recognize as the ‘modern world’ is the result of 300 years of enquiry and development in various fields of science, economics and philosophy. Western modernization is a complex process, and as such there exist various historical narratives that account for its emergence and development. Furthermore, the attempt to offer a linear account of the intellectual developments which shaped contemporary society would be a considerable undertaking, and one best left to historians.1
However, in order to proceed, a rough historical account must be given to contextualize our investigation and determine the problems which modernity poses with regards to freedom and meaning. Recognizing the restrictions which are imposed by a philosophical enquiry, the account offered here will be limited to that of the Enlightenment. The reason for restricting our enquiry to this concrete historical event is because the Enlightenment came to define the modern era, intellectually. Although there were various Enlightenments, both regionally and within the various disciplines, in what follows, we will offer a précis of the key ideas and historical events which came to define the modern age.2
One underlying belief which resonated throughout Enlightenment thought was that the expansion of knowledge via reason and scientific understanding would lead to epistemological progress. This perspective was a result of the likes of Francis Bacon, who in his Novum Organum (1620) advanced an alternative to the ‘stagnant’ Aristotelian method. In his own words, Bacon claimed, ‘knowledge must be sought from the light of nature, not fetched back out of the darkness of antiquity’ (2009: I.CXXII). Bacon’s development of the inductive method was designed to reap truth and enable humankind to understand God’s creation. This was further fortified by Isaac Newton, who in his Philosophiæ Naturalis Principia Mathmatica (1687) suggested that nature was governed by laws and that the natural world could be explained and understood through rational principles such as cause and effect.3 Within his scientific tour de force, Newton claimed ‘the economy of nature requires us to make gravity responsible for the orbital force acting on each of the planets’.4 Believing that the world was rational and beneficent, and that nature was essentially good, the idea spread that people possessed the potential to improve themselves and their environment. The outcome of this social awakening was that for the first time in history, individuals not only expected their future society to be significantly different to that in which they were raised but also actively worked towards achieving this ideal.5
The Enlightenment was achieved not solely through advancements in science but also in politics.6 In France, men of letters, such as Diderot, Voltaire and Rousseau, collaborated in order to compose the Encyclopédia ou dictionnaire raisonne des sciences, des arts, et des metriers. 7 The aim of their collective effort was to increase public understanding and produce a more virtuous and happier population.8 Not only did these free thinkers seek to enlighten citizens, but they also drew awareness to corrupt institutions such as the then-repressive Catholic Church, their ineffective monarchy and the officials in charge who abused their positions. Advocates of the Enlightenment believed that it pointed the way towards political reform and sought to establish a system based on its principles. The Enlightenment thus culminated with the French Revolution in 1789, which ‘replaced a decaying and obsolete social and political order with rational institutions’ (Mah 1990: 4). By applying these scientifically derived principles to society, it was believed that human civilization would progress towards a more liberal state.
From the accounts thus far discussed, what can be determined is that the Enlightenment was the consequence of a dual process. First, there is the scientific sense of having a veil removed from one’s eyes. In this account, the Enlightenment sought to obtain a greater understanding of the universe. This was achieved by Francis Bacon, who established induction as the scientific method, and Isaac Newton’s discovery of natural laws. Here the belief in progress spurred on the increased ‘rationalization’ of the natural world, that is, the demystification of nature, and how one ought to understand it (Weber 2005: 30). Secondly, there is the ethical and political sense, in which one was enlightened insofar as one had a burden lifted from one’s shoulders. Through historical movements, such as the French Revolution, political enlightenment brought about the realization of a free legal, political and personal order, within which people were encouraged to live mature, individual lives. Thus, through the dual process of scientific and political enlightenment, what occurred was the erosion of the feudal–social hierarchy and creation of the de jure free individual. This in turn led to the loss of a stabilizing sense of tradition through the development of science and rationalization. Having defined modernity in terms of the Enlightenment, we will now turn our attention to determining the key philosophical concepts which came to be indicative of modernity.
1.2 Enlightenment: Maturity and freedom
Perhaps the best expression of the moral–ethical attitude that permeated Enlightenment thought is to be found within the work of Immanuel Kant. In his short essay, ‘An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?’9 Kant offers a reflective account which seeks to understand this intellectual movement from within the confines of its own framework. The importance of this short text, and the precision with which Kant succinctly expressed the Enlightenment ideal, is recognized by not only the advocates of the Enlightenment but also its critics.10 Here Kant famously claimed that enlightenment is ‘man’s emergence from self-incurred immaturity’ (2009: 1). In order to appreciate the significance of this claim, it is important to understand that which is inferred by ‘immaturity’. Within his essay, Kant employs this term in a dual sense. First, on an individual level, from the literal definition of one who is emotionally and intellectually undeveloped. Here one’s immaturity is a result of one’s choice to remain dependent upon others. Secondly, Kant’s understanding operates on the social level, which is explained with the figurative notion of a paternal society. In this sense, one does not necessarily choose to remain dependent, but is provided for by one’s society and has no need to use one’s understanding and no occasion to think for oneself. Kant claims that we no t only depend upon such authorities for guidance and direction, but these very authorities, which he refers to as ‘guardians’, portray maturity as troublesome and dangerous. The guardians, by whom he means elders of the church, officers in the military and governmental civil servants, thus make themselves necessary to the masses by controlling them through fear.11 For these reasons, Kant claims, it is difficult to extricate oneself from immaturity. Furthermore, it is difficult for one to think for oneself if one has never before been afforded the opportunity to do so. There are, however, a few individuals who through ‘their own cultivation of their spirit’ have liberated themselves from dependence upon others (2009: 2). Kant states that, as a result of these independent thinkers’ influence, it is inevitable that the public will eventually begin to think for themselves. Like the slave liberated from Plato’s cave who returns in order to enlighten the others, independent thinkers who have matured will also want the masses to think for themselves.12 However, he warns us that, if influenced by guardians who are incapable of enlightenment, the public may impede their own progress by maintaining these social, political and cultural beliefs, and cause themselves to remain immature.
Due to the guardians, who uphold traditional values and introduce these to the masses, the process of enlightenment is a slow, gradual one. Furthermore, Kant claims that it cannot be achieved by social revolution. He urges that although a revolution may displace despotism, avarices and oppression, it is incapable of imparting thought. It will simply replace the prejudices which harness the great unthinking masses.13 The only way for enlightenment to be achieved, in his account, is for individuals to challenge conventions and teach the masses to think for themselves. The motto of the Enlightenment, he claims, is ‘Sapere aude! – Have courage to make use of your own understanding’ (2009: 2). The goal of the Enlightenment, for Kant, is thus to mature intellectually by liberating ourselves from social authorities. The process of Enlightenment is therefore a dual one, necessarily depending first upon individual and then social pursuit. Whilst it is the individual’s responsibility to free themselves, in order for society to advance towards greater freedom, this self-liberation must also be embraced by society as a whole.
It has been illustrated that Kant’s understanding of the Enlightenment was the personal and political acquisition of maturity. However, maturity is not only an end in itself but also a means to an end. By taking personal responsibility he believed that society would progress towards an end goal. The telos towards which he envisioned the Enlightenment to be orientated was one of increased freedom or autonomy. As Pippen makes explicit, ‘the modern question of independence became itself a philosophical issue in Kant, the reflective attempt by reason to determine the rules of its own activity, to set for itself its ends, to determine its own limits’ (1991: 118). This, it was believed, was the end which was inherent in human civilization itself. Kant, however, did not believe that he lived in ‘an enlightened age, but an age of enlightenment’, within which this process of maturity was simply underway (2009: 2). In order to hasten an enlightened state, his essay not only offered an explanation but also proposed what he believed to be the means to maturity. According to Kant, the necessary condition for the Enlightenment of the masses is freedom to make use of one’s reason, which he believed would enable both the individual and society to cultivate increased freedom.
Although Kant proposes maturity as a means to autonomy, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel takes this one step further, claiming that autonomy is the rational end of human civilization. In his Philosophy of History, Hegel presents an account of the historical development of human consciousness as a highly complex, yet rational process.14 In his thought, the attainment of freedom in the modern world is the end goal of history, though more importantly for Hegel, this is a result of the temporal unfurling of what he refers to as ‘absolute Spirit’. He explains this concept in relation to matter, which is logically that which it is furthest removed from. He states that ‘just as gravity is the substance of matter, so also can it be said that freedom is the substance of Spirit’ (2001: 31). However, since Spirit in itself is universal and abstract it cannot emerge in existence through its own efforts. The emergence of existence’s actualization rather depends upon man’s will. Although ‘World Spirit’ seems to suggest an otherworldly being, Stephen Houlgate claims it ‘is not some cosmic consciousness beyond our own that uses us for its own ends; it is simply humanity itself coming to a clean understanding of its own freedom and transforming the social and political world in the process’ (2008: 28).
In the Philosophy of History, the dialectical development of freedom is explained alongside corresponding historical epochs.15 Each of these contains a certain level of freedom, which is brought forth through the actions of a specific group of people. Hegel names these vehicles of Spirit ‘world historical individuals’. And although these heroes of history strive towards their own ends, Hegel claims that they unconsciously do so on Spirit’s behalf. As pawn pieces upon Spirit’s chessboard, they are subjected to what Hegel calls ‘the cunning of reason’ (2001: 105). It is thus as a result of the individual’s implementation of new political and social institutions that Spirit becomes actualized and human freedom increases. In other words, ‘the more people develop spiritually, the more they become conscious of themselves; and the more they become conscious, the more they become free’ (Luther 2009: 70). In his account, Hegel divides history into three specific stages, the childhood of the Oriental world, the adolescence of the classical and medieval eras, and the maturity of the modern age.
In the Oriental world, consciousness was unreflective insofar as individuals were unaware of themselves as autonomous. Only one person possessed subjective freedom, the ruler, before whom everybody else was equal in servitude. This early stage is the childhood of history in two senses: chronologically, it is the infancy of history in the modern conception; and figuratively, because the ruler fulfils a paternal role in relation to his subjects, ‘who like children [. . .] can gain for themselves no independent and civil freedom’ (2001: 123). Thus, ordinary subjects in the Oriental world possess neither political freedom nor rational thought. In Hegel’s account, China and India are considered to be ‘stationary’, standing outside of history, and it is in Persia where world history first begins. In China and India, the rulers were considered to be deities, and as such, the subjects were obedient to their divine laws. In Persia, however, the laws were based on the teachings of Zoroaster, which meant that both the ruler and his citizens were subjected to the same rules and principles. This then provided the potential for freedom, but since consciousness only existed in one individual this could not be realized. Thus, because political liberty, moral freedom and consciousness were absent, society could not progress.
After the fall of the Persian Empire, historical Spirit passed from the vanquished into the consciousness of the victorious Greeks, who had defeated the Persians at the battle of Marathon. Here we find the first emergence of freedom, according to Hegel, which was dispersed through the medium of the democratic polis.16 However, although the Greeks enjoyed individual freedom, it was only the citizens of the polis who were reflected in public life, whilst foreign residents and slaves were excluded. Thus, in the Oriental world only one was free, but with the actualization of consciousness in Greece, some then became free. Subjective freedom thus appears for the first time in ancient Greece, but it remains unreflective insofar as the Greeks are unable to conceive of themselves apart from their polis. It is here that Hegel suggests the first actor on the world stage makes his appearance. Disrupting the harmony of the Greek polis, Socrates introduced reflection, and critical thought, turning attention away from the polis and towards universal truth.
The World Spirit then passed to Rome where, like Persia, the people are still subordinated to the sovereign will of the emperor. However, Hegel maintains that individual freedom is recognized and exists as a fundamental notion within the Roman political constitution. Thus, as the actualization of Spirit, the Greek concept of individuality lives on. It is here, for Hegel, that the first conception of the ‘person’ emerges, defined as the subject of rights. With the rights to property, for example, freedom becomes legal. Despite this, the individual freedom to form one’s own identity and ideas is suppressed by the Roman state. Due to this tension between the ideal of individuality and the absolute power of the government, citizens are only able to discover freedom through philosophical contemplation. Hegel makes reference to the philosophical systems of the Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics,17 which despite their metaphysical diversity all have ‘the same general purport, viz., rendering the soul absolutely indifferent to everything which the real world had to offer’ (2001: 318). This desire to retreat into oneself, to escape from reality, is a necessary consequence of the dominating external power of the state. What these contemplative philosophies achieve is freedom of thought; however, for Hegel this is a negative approach because thought made itself its own object and did not enable Spirit to advance.
In the medieval world, Hegel argues that Christianity provides the solution to this problem, of turning inwards to achieve freedom, offering a medium between the individual and the state. In his view, ‘since the emergence of Christianity, history has been a continuous unfolding of the principle of subjective freedom in the state’ (2001: 319). Individuals are trapped in the natural, material world, until they recognize themselves as spiritual beings which Christians understand to be their true nature. In Hegel’s account, the individual and the state first come to be reconciled through the world historical individual, Jesus. This is implemented by the community of his followers who came together to form the church. However, Spirit is unable to progress until the religious freedom of self-consciousness, as mediated through the church, becomes one with society. This, however, cannot be actualized in the Western Roman Empire, and passes into the Byzantine Empire, within which the church becomes a po litical power. This is a bipartite process, and is achieved ‘first [through] the settlement of doctrine; and secondly [by] the appointment to ecclesiastical offices’ (2001: 339). However, here Christianity becomes stagnant and remains so until the Byzantine Empire collapses, and the doctrine of Christ is adopted by the Germanic people.18
World Spirit reached maturity in the modern era beginning with the Protestant Reformation, which Hegel considers to be the first key event since the Roman age. Here the Germanic Spirit becomes the Spirit of the new world, as the bearer of the Christian principle. In the preceding period the Catholic Church had become internally corrupted, no longer treating God as a spiritual being, but as something material. This corruption was exemplified in the ‘remission of sins’ which Catholic priests had begun to offer in exchange for money.19 This was instrumental in causing Martin Luther to protest against the church, who by doing so recovered the spirituality of Christianity, according to Hegel. Moreover, the removal of the priest as a medium between the individual and God allowed the World Spirit to progress, to obtain consciousness of its own freedom, and create the modern conception of selfhood. As a result of this, obedience to the laws of the state became the principle of human conduct. This in turn led to the rationalization of the state. And since man’s consciousness had become rational, for Hegel, it was also necessary that institutions also become rational in order for individuals to freely accept and support them (2001: 441).
This principle of rationality was carried forth into the Enlightenment, where the empirical method created a new conception of man and nature. Through the advance of scientific reason the world came to be known as conforming to rational and law-governed principles. Initially, it was believed that God had created the world upon principles of reason, and as such, discovering rational explanations was an attempt to become closer to Him. However, as a consequence of the search for universal principles, the natural world became devoid of divine mystery, and the sole pursuit of human enquiry was reduced to scientific reasoning. This distance which was created from religion then in turn created the free will, which is ‘that by which Man becomes Man, and is therefore the fundamental principle of Spirit’ (2001: 443). However, although people became fully aware of themselves as individuals, they lost sight of the community. Merely concerned with individual liberation, people began to perceive of the world as nothing other than objects to be understood, rather than as the manifestation of reason. Thus, although free will emerged, it merely appeared as an isolated individual will (2001: 443).
The next major event in Hegel’s account was the French Revolution, which occurred as a result of the philosophes criticizing French social institutions. More specifically, they targeted the dominant class and their insatiable greed which was fuelled by government funding and public taxation. The significance of the revolution for Hegel was the emergence of ‘the recognition of the principle that Thought ought to govern spiritual reality’ (2001: 447). However, the revolution failed to empirically establish the subjective will of the many as that of the general will. The Revolutionary Terror then followed, in Hegel’s account, because abstract philosophical principles were put into practice without any regard for the people. The role of reason was misunderstood and applied in isolation from the community and its citizens. For Hegel, this problem of reconciling the community and the individual was one which he believed his contemporary time to be tasked with. He then concludes his history by reiterating that the path of history is none other than the unfolding of the concept of freedom, the prerequisites of which are self-governing according to conscience, and the rational order of social and political institutions.
What Hegel presents in his Philosophy of History is a historical narrative of subjective and objective freedom, emerging and unfettering themselves from the various bonds which ensnare and inhibit them. It expresses not only their emergence but also their development and intertwining through the course of history, the goal of which was to establish themselves in the unified state of what Hegel refers to as absolute freedom. Hegel thus follows from Kant insofar as he conceives of the world as becoming increasingly rational, with the end goal as human freedom.20 As previously discussed, for Kant the modern world was an age of Enlightenment, which had not yet reached its final stage of maturity. Hegel, however, takes the analogy of maturity one step farther, suggesting that the entire human history of the world has been a process of maturity towards the present. However, freedom is not a choice for Hegel, despite the individual’s effort, but a predetermined path, which world historical individuals advance on behalf of the World Spirit.
Thus, what we can conclude from our exchange with Kant and Hegel is that the key philosophical concepts which came to define the Enlightenment were maturity and autonomy. It is particularly the latter concept, autonomy, which came to encapsulate the moral–ethical attitude of advocates of Enlightenment. What this entails, according to Pippen, is ‘the possibility that human beings can regulate and evaluate their beliefs by rational self-reflection, that they can free themselves from interest, passion, tradition, prejudice and autonomously “rule” their own thoughts, and that they can determine their actions as a result of self-reflection and rational evaluation, an evaluation the conclusions of which ought to bind any rational agent’ (1991: 13). Having determined that it was ultimately autonomy as an end, which is definitive of modernity, we will now turn our attention to the negative consequences, as outlined in the counter-discourse. Here we will illustrate that the unforeseen consequences of the project of modernity were that it restricted the freedom it promised and resulted in the loss of personal meaning.
1.3 Counter-Enlightenment: Nihilism and disenchantment
In Nietzsche’s account, the yearning for maturity and freedom which underpinned Enlightenment philosophy was frustrated by the course of modernity. Whilst his contemporaries hailed their era as one of immense progress, Nietzsche rhetorically questions, ‘is the nineteenth century, especially in the closing decades, not merely a strengthened, brutalised eighteenth century, that is to say a century of decadence?’ (1971: 103). Moreover, aside from rejecting that the Enlightenment had achieved that towards which it had focused its effort, Nietzsche rejected the concept of progress itself.21 In his perspective, rather, ‘“mankind” does not advance, it does not even exist. The overall aspect is that of a tremendous experimental laboratory in which a few successes are scored, scattered throughout all ages, while there are untold failures, and all order, logic, union, and obligingness are lacking’ (1968: §90). Thus, whilst his contemporaries were preoccupied with determining the rational end towards which human civilization was naturally inclined, Nietzsche saw their acts as none other than exercises in futility. Although cultural criticism is a theme which pervades his entire oeuvre, his critique of modernity is perhaps best expressed with a famous parable from The Gay Science.
The passage begins with the tale of a madman who, during daylight, runs to the marketplace with a lit lantern and incessantly announces his search for God. However, as those around him lack faith in God’s existence they ridicule his search and sarcastically mock him. In reaction to this, the madman meets their condescending gibes with the disdainful exclamation not only that is God dead but also that we have killed Him. He then launches into a seemingly absurd stream of consciousness, quizzing their motives for unchaining the earth from the sun and demanding to know our destination.22 Here he is making an obvious allusion to the Baconian Project and scientific desire to know all of nature completely. After this abrupt outburst, the madman ends his spiel by shattering his lantern on the ground, symbolically suggesting that we remain in the dark. Having regained composure he expresses the prematurity of his announcement and warns them that they are not yet aware of the consequences of their act: ‘I come too early’, he then said,
my time is not yet. This tremendous event is still on its way, wandering; it has not yet reached the ears of men. Lightning and thunder need time; the light of the stars needs time; deeds need time, even after they are done, in order to be seen and heard. This deed is still more remote to them than the remotest stars – and yet they have done it themselves! (1991: §125)
Although many commentators have focused on the proclamation of God’s death, it is not this which ought to be the primary feature and focus of the parable. This is evident when one considers the madman’s confrontation with those who do not believe in God. If his intention was to simply advocate atheism, then surely, he would address theists rather than atheists, to whom God’s existence had not lost all validity. As such, the madman’s claim, that God is dead, is clearly intended to be understood as a cultural reflection rather than a crusade against Christianity. The secularization of society is therefore something which Nietzsche here recognizes rather than advocates. As Albert Camus eloquently puts it, ‘Nietzsche did not form a project to kill God, he found Him dead in the soul of his contemporaries’ (2004: 37). The most important aspect of the parable, rather, is that which the madman seeks to convey to the crowd – namely, the unforeseen consequence of their rejection of religion.
In an attempt to illustrate the logical implications of the death of God, Nietzsche asserts ‘now that this faith has been undermined, how much must collapse because it was built on this faith, leaned on it, had grown into it – for example, our entire European morality’ (1991: §343). His claim, precisely, is because Western ethics is grounded upon Christian precepts, the rejection of religion necessarily entails the loss of morality. This critique also includes Kant’s attempt to construct an autonomous ethical ideal based upon freedom and maturity. In targeting those whose scientific convictions rendered their acceptance of religion as untenable, yet who continued to live according to Christian laws, Nietzsche can thus be seen to undermine Kant and his fellow advocates of Enlightenment.
This is further evident in Twilight of the Idols, where Nietzsche elucidates by explaining ‘when one gives up Christian belief one thereby deprives oneself of the right to Christian morality. [. . .] Christianity is a system, a consistently thought out and complete view of things. If one breaks out of it a fundamental idea, the belief in God, one thereby breaks the whole thing to pieces’ (1971: 69). The madman’s intention is thus to illustrate that those who believe it possible to be moral without being religious either are self-deceived or have failed to systematically evaluate their own values. More importantly, that behind this façade, European culture lacks a sound moral foundation. The implication of this for the Enlightenment is that any attempt to construct a modern moral theory is destined to fail.
In Nietzsche’s prognosis, the ultimate consequence of the cultural death of God was the advent of nihilism. This refers to the belief that human life is fundamentally meaningless. Upon accepting that European morality is without foundation, one comes to the realization that existence is absurd, and that there is no purpose to life. Thus, the liberation promised by the Enlightenment delivered all too well on its promise for Nietzsche. That is, although it ach ieved the freedom it sought, this freedom undermined the ability to live ethically. His thoughts on nihilism are assembled in The Will to Power, which is a compendium of notes initially intended to form a monograph, but hastily assembled with little academic merit by his sister.23 Here Nietzsche notes that one of the key advantages of Christian morality was that ‘it granted man an absolute value, as opposed to his smallness and accidental occurrence in the flux of becoming and passing away’ (1968: 9). Thus, in providing human existence with a natural teleology, Christian ethics also granted meaning to human existence. However, to depart from God’s moral law is to forgo natural teleology and, subsequently, a meaningful life. Thus, in rejecting Christianity, the ultimate consequence of the atheism of those in the marketplace was the onset of European nihilism.
In order to determine who this charge is aimed towards, it is necessary to question who the atheists in the marketplace are supposed to represent. In Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Nietzsche discusses a group of individuals whom he refers to as the ‘last men’. They are given this title due to their belief that humanity had reached its end. However, drawing attention to the loss of natural teleology, Zarathustra attempts to inform them that ‘man is something that shall be overcome’, and that ‘what is great in man is that he is a bridge and not an end’ (1996b: 12–15). Here Nietzsche is referring to the thinkers of the Enlightenment who advocated that humanity had an end goal and that this had been achieved. This is further elucidated in The Genealogy of Morals where Nietzsche emphasizes ‘our faith in science is still based on a metaphysical faith – even as we knowers of today, we godless anti-metaphysicians, still take our fire from the blaze set alight thousands of years ago, that faith of the Christians, which was also Plato’s faith, that God is truth, that truth is divine’ (2008: 112). However, as evident in Nietzsche’s critique of modernity, the freedom that the Enlightenment so deeply desired, and achieved through the rejection of religion, has had profound implications on modern society.
The same critique can be held against the atheists of the marketplace who reject religion, believing they had acquired greater freedom. In both cases that with which Nietzsche is engaging is the negative consequence of freedom – namely, freedom from all values and the descent into nihilism. The claim that the thinkers of the Enlightenment caused the problem of meaninglessness is further suggested with his claim that ‘the faith in the categories of reason is the cause of nihilism. We have measured the value of the world according to categories that refer to a purely fictitious world’ (1968: 13). Here he can been seen to be blaming the thinkers of the Enlightenment for the onset of nihilism, who believed reverently in the fiction of progress and advocated that the end goal towards which human civilization is orientated was one of autonomy. However, in their pursuit of freedom they rejected religion, which had provided the pillars of ethics and purpose. In Nietzsche’s critique of modernity, the problem of nihilism is therefore a consequence of the freedom pursued by the Enlightenment, which increased freedom at the expense of human meaning.
A further consequence of the dogmatic pursuit of autonomy as a rational end is explicated in the thought of Max Weber. Whilst Weber’s account of modernity contains a degree of pessimism, to categorize it as such would be to misrepresent his perspective. His perspective of modernity, rather, is more accurately defined as one of deep ambivalence.24 Although he is usually placed on the negative scale of the dichotomy between cultural pessimism and optimism, it does a severe injustice to his thought to apply such a simplistic label. Whilst Weber’s writings do indeed display a degree of disdain for certain modern practices, he also acknowledges that modernity offers various redeeming features which previous eras could not. He notes, for example, the modern development of rationalization – which will be discussed in greater detail later – is capable of providing increased autonomy to the individual. Thus, whilst there is a loss of unity, there is also an increase of personal freedom, though only for a lucky few. Weber’s multifaceted understanding of modernity is encapsulated in his concepts of ‘rationalization’ and ‘disenchantment’ and as such, it is to these concepts which we will now turn.
In The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, Weber focuses on three forms of rationality.25 The first of these, substantive rationality, refers to goal-orientated rational action in the context of ultimate ends. The second, theoretical rationality, refers to mastery of reality through abstract concepts. The third, formal rationality, relates to the domination of life spheres through rational organization of life according to uniform rules and principles, such as economics, law and science. It is the latter of these, however, which is the most important for Weber and upon which he fixes his gaze. Within his enquiry, he notes that formal rationality has come to dominate Occidental culture and sets his sights on determining the reason for this. This process of ‘rationalization’, however, despite its promise, resulted in the subsequent denial of freedom.
In order to determine why, Weber analysed the Protestant work ethic, the remnants of which he claimed still dominated everyday life. In his analysis, Weber revealed that the ascetic attitude of the Puritans, that ‘every hour lost is lost to labour for the glory of God’, caused them to naturally amass substantial sums of capital (2005: 104). The psychological attitude which perpetuated this perspective was the fear of damnation. Although Lutherans and Calvinists believed that they were predestined to go to heaven or hell, they continued to labour reverently, as a sort of psychological shield. That is, since salvation came through God’s grace, their labour in the service of God had no bearing upon their fate. This belief in pre-destination also espoused cont emptus mundi, or contempt for the world, because it was believed that the Puritan’s true calling was spiritual. However, despite the decline of Christianity, the spirit of Protestantism came to define modern capitalism and the modern social order, leading individuals to labour with the same intensity and fervour, but with the sole end of capital acquisition. In Weber’s own words, ‘the search for the Kingdom of God commenced gradually to pass over into sober economic virtue; the religious roots died out slowly, giving way to utilitarian worldliness’ (2005: 119).
That is, the ascetic accumulated material wealth as a consequence of proving one’s devotion to God, but when the religious role receded, the accumulation of wealth became an end in itself. As Weber beautifully puts it, ‘the care for external goods should only lie on the shoulders of the “saint like a light cloak, which can be thrown aside at any moment”. But fate decreed that the cloak should become an iron cage’ (2005: 123). Through this notion of an ‘iron cage’, Weber metaphorically encapsulates the consequence of increased rationality upon modern society.26 Namely, the outcome of a social order bound to technical and economic conditions of machine production, which has led to ‘mechanized petrification’ and determines the lives of individuals within it, leading to a growth in senseless bureaucracy and consumerist hedonism. Weber quotes Goethe in relation to the latter two effects upon individuals, whom he understands as ‘specialists without spirit, sensualists without heart’ (1991: 124). Thus, unlike Puritans, who wanted to work in a calling, we are forced to work in a calling which is limited to specialized work. It is for these reasons that the primary assertion of The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism is that this Protestant work ethic became the essential feature of the modern economic structure.
Although Weber offers a genealogy of the rise of the modern economic and social order, what is important for our inquiry is his description of the rational process which Occidental society underwent. What Weber revealed was that the Puritan belief that everyone has a calling, and that one must labour in order to earn God’s grace, espoused a form of rationality absent in previous Christian denominations. This widespread practice and hostility towards more mystical-based belief then opened the flood gate to increased rationality in religion. Ironically, whilst religion supported rationalization, it was this very ideal that would lead to religion’s eventual demise. As religion is inherently irrational in character, from a scientific perspective, the demand for increased formal rationality began to corrode its very core. What then ensued was an iron cage of capitalism and bureaucracy – namely, ‘when asceticism was carried out of monastic cells into everyday life, and began to dominate worldly morality, it did its part in building the tremendous cosmos of the modern economic order’ (1991: 124).
Although Weber notes that rationalization created the modern socio-economic conditions, what is more important is the consequence this process has had upon Occidental culture. In his short essay ‘Science as Vocation’, Weber addresses this issue much more fully. As science adhered to strict rational laws and principles it denounced that which did not conform to the scientific standards of empirical verifiability. This resulted in what Weber termed ‘the fate of our times [. . .] the disenchantment of the world’ (1991: 155). In an attempt to lay bare the fundamental facts of the universe, science accepted as true only that which could be proven by repeatable experiments. The result was that myths and cultural practices which did not possess scientific standards were either dismissed or replaced with reason and logic. By ‘disenchantment’, Weber means the unveiling and rejection of cultural practices which were often explained in terms of ‘magic’ and had remained shrouded in mystery. As Christianity was unable to conform to the level of rationality which it advocated, it was ironically unravelled by that which it had helped create. One consequence of the rational rejection of religion was the loss of a unifying ethic. Without this unity, human life became compartmentalized, with individuals fulfilling competing roles, leading to internal conflict due to an unstructured plurality of values. This is explained by Weber in terms of the growth of moral–ethical ‘polytheism’, which he likens to ancient Greece, within which one could choose from many causes and gods to follow.27
A further consequence of the loss of a unifying purpose for Weber was that it rendered human existence meaningless, a side effect which is also noted by Nietzsche. Weber gives the example of Abraham, who having obtained a sense of achievement through his actions could die happily. As Weber explains,
Abraham, or some peasant of the past, died ‘old and satiated with life’ because he stood in the organic cycle of life; because his life, in terms of its meaning and on the eve of his days, had given to him what life had to offer; because for him there remained no puzzles he might wish to solve; and therefore he could have had ‘enough’ of life. (1991: 140)
However, in a rationalized society that advocates a process of perpetual progress, one’s contribution can never truly be meaningful since all acts are means to an end rather than ends in themselves. That is:
Whereas civilized man, placed in the midst of the continuous enrichment of culture by ideas, knowledge, and problems, may become ‘tired of life’ but not ‘satiated with life.’ He catches only the most minute part of what the life of the spirit brings forth ever anew, and what he seizes is always something provisional and not definitive, and therefore death for him is a meaningless occurrence. And because death is meaningless, civilize d life as such is meaningless; by its very ‘progressiveness’ it gives death the imprint of meaninglessness. (1991: 140)
In science, for example, what one contributes is destined to be surpassed and made obsolete. In response to this, Weber questions, ‘why should one do something which in reality never comes to an end?’ (1991: 138). Thus, the consequence of disenchantment is a culture with no objective means to ground one’s convictions, which in turn had led to the loss of meaning for human life. As Keith Breen quite rightly notes, ‘Weber is concerned not just with the loss of freedom in modernity, but also with the meaninglessness of a rationalised world, its having become thoroughly disenchanted’ (2012: 13).
Like nihilism, disenchantment refers to the loss of meaning within European society. However, how these two concepts are demarcated is not immediately apparent. Thus, it is important to determine whether there is any substantial difference between these, or if they are simply two articulations of the same problem. The first thing to note is that both are the result of rationalization. For Nietzsche, the Enlightenment project led to the cultural death of God, which in turn undermined European morality and deprived modern life of meaning. Thus, for Nietzsche, nihilism is the logical consequence of the secularization of society. In Weber’s account, the application of rationality to culture not only undermined its Christian foundation but also led to the subsequent rejection of practices which did not conform to the empirical method. It was this sequence of events which Weber sought to categorize with the concept of disenchantment. Thus, rather than representing the same phenomenon, they allude to two separate events. Disenchantment refers to the event which Occidental culture has undergone, whilst nihilism is the consequence of that process. Nietzsche and Weber therefore offer two independent, but compatible, accounts of the consequences of rationality, which the Enlightenment advocated. Furthermore, for both thinkers, the negative consequences of the Enlightenment were a result of its misguided belief in progress towards the realization of real freedom.
Having determined the problems of modernity which have been induced by the pursuit of autonomy, we may now address the opening question: what problems does modernity pose with regards to freedom and meaning? What has thus far been determined from Weber’s account is that there are two main problems. First, the loss of meaning which is compounded by compartmentalization, or the growth of moral–ethical ‘polytheism’. Secondly, the promise and failure of formal rationalization to deliver individual freedom. Like Nietzsche, Weber believed that rationalism had caused the modern world to become objectively meaningless and dedicated his academic career to determining the reason for this. However, whilst Nietzsche traced the trajectory of the cultural death of God, Weber offered a genealogical explanation of the rationalization of religion itself.28 Both thinkers were also concerned with the consequences of the emergence of individual freedom. Whilst Nietzsche conceived of this as a vast open sea, Weber argued that although this is what rationality suggests in theory, what it offers in practice is an ‘iron cage’, within which one is confined to limited freedom, but freedom nevertheless.
1.4 Embracing one’s fate
The cover of this book is adorned with Friedrich Casper David’s Wanderer above the Sea of Fog.29 Perched upon an outward standing crag, the wanderer seems to have reached the end of his journey. It appears as though he has gone as far as he can go, unable to proceed despite having travelled such a long distance. His hair is windswept by the howling gusts at the peak, sending forth a chill from the summit. Clouds convey the great heights which he has ascended and those which he must descend in order to carry on. An uncertain path lies before him. The closest visible landmarks are further outstanding crags, offering no more vantage than his current location. There is no apparent end point, only a long and arduous journey. The multitude of peaks fades into the horizon, and if there is a final destination, it is far beyond, obscured from sight. Such an image portrays human insignificance and conjures forlorn hope and an air of abandonment. Nevertheless, the wanderer’s head is not lowered in defeat, but held high, facing forward. His posture – signified by his elevated leg and hand on hip – suggests determination and resolve. His walking stick symbolizes stability. The outcrop of trees is indicative of life and implies hope. One must imagine the wanderer’s gaze fixated on the vistas in his periphery and the determination to push forth regardless of the tumultuous task which awaits him.
Painted during the peak of romanticism in 1818, David’s wanderer symbolizes the key romantic tenants: individuality, turning one’s back on the scientific advances of the Enlightenment and the desire to return to nature. However, despite epitomizing the romantic ideal, this image also encapsulates the spirit of this book. The problem of freedom and meaning which will be addressed is symbolized by the wanderer himself and by the vast empty space which confronts him. That is, there is neither an established path, leading to a set destination, nor an end in sight. The wanderer is a solitary individual who must determine, chart and navigate his own course. Within a post-teleological context, where there is no natural teleology or objective moral values, we must decide for ourselves and bear responsibility for our choices. Our attitude towards the problem is also characterized by the wanderer’s posture; despite the colossal task that confronts us, we nevertheless possess the resolve to venture forth into unknown intellectual terrain. Thus, David’s wanderer has been chosen for the reason that he accurately conveys the leitmotifs of freedom and meaning, and the attitude towards them which will be endorsed herein.
The particular position which will be upheld is one which accepts the socio-historical conditions of modernity. That is, we will adhere to a realistic approach, of coming to terms with our existential condition and attempt to overcome it from within modernity itself. Our attitude is thus in contrast to the attempt to continue the project of modernity, to reject it completely and engage in postmodern discourse, or attempt to reinstate a premodern framework with which to undermine the problem. We will, however, explore these alterative attitudes in Part II of our investigation. Our particular approach is upheld by the likes of Nietzsche, Weber and the existentialists. Habermas sees Nietzsche as rejecting the Enlightenment project completely, and according to whom, ‘[Nietzsche] renounces a renewed revision of the concept o f reason and bids farewell to the dialect of enlightenment’ (1987b: 86). However, on this line of argument we will side with Robert Pippen, who claims that ‘Nietzsche is trying to hold the Enlightenment to its own standards, to share its own “self-contradiction”’ (1991: 84).
The Nietzschean response to the problem of modernity is an acceptance of what he terms the ‘horizon of the infinite’. That is, he does not deny the Enlightenment’s achievements, but acknowledges the consequence that one may no longer lay claim to that which came before. Nietzsche frames the freedom which the Enlightenment achieved as a directionless voyage in which one cannot return to one’s place of departure and in which there is no destination towards which one is orientated. As he exclaims, ‘we have forsaken the land and gone to sea! We have destroyed the bridge behind us – more so, we have demolished the land behind us!’ Even if it were possible to return, Nietzsche warns against over-idealized, romantic yearnings for a previous way of life, which are not what one may imagine them to be, as he continues, ‘woe, when homesickness for the land overcomes you, as if there had been more freedom there – and there is no more “land”!’(1991: §124).
The Nietzschean perspective thus suggests a realistic coming to grips with humanity’s existential condition. More than this, he asserts, ‘I want to learn more and more how to see what is necessary in things as what is beautiful in them - thus I will be one of those who make things beautiful. Amor fati: let that be my love from now on!’ (1991: §276). His position, therefore, is not only to accept one’s fate, but to love it. Nietzsche’s account is thus in contrast to that espoused by Habermas, who wants to continue the Enlightenment; Foucault, who sought to overcome it; and MacIntyre, who advocates returning to an ethical model which predated it. Nietzsche would associate each of these with the ‘last men’, whose response was one of self-deception, choosing to ignore the problem rather than embrace it. This is exemplified in a famous aphorism where he presents the Buddhist-esque concept of eternal recurrence.30 Here the reader is asked to imagine that a demon has cursed one to eternally relive one’s life and then asked whether one would be able to praise the demon as divine. It is the ability to say ‘yes’, to embrace the judgement upon one’s life and accept it wholeheartedly which Nietzsche deems the best response. As he rhetorically asks, ‘how well disposed would you have to become to yourself and to life to long for nothing more fervently than for this ultimate eternal confirmation and seal?’ (1991: §341). The Nietzschean response is to create a new goal beyond ourselves, rather than to restore and preserve that which went before.
Although Max Weber was ambivalent in regarding that which the Enlightenment had achieved, like Nietzsche, his response to modernity is one of acceptance. Weber understood that the unity of existence which pre-modern social order provided was no longer attainable. However, rather than attempting to re-establish unity he recognized that modern life was now defined by plurality and embraced this. What is meant by ‘plurality’ is aptly explained by a quote from a lecture which he presented at the German Sociological Association: ‘in comparison to men in other societies, modern man is a vereinmensch [formed by the many voluntary associations to which he belongs].’31 Although bureaucratization has come to impinge upon all aspects of social life, Weber determines a way in which the individual could exercise influence. In a social order of restricted freedom, Weber believed that it was still possible to find meaning through vocational specialization. What he is here pointing towards is the meaning one can derive by subjectively surrendering oneself to a cause.32
A similar attitude was advocated by the existentialists, who in reacting to the problem as outlined by Nietzsche, and how they themselves experienced it, sought to provide a response to the modern individual’s existential predicament. This is evident in Jean-Paul Sartre’s famous maxim, ‘existence precedes essence’ (2007: 20). What this meant is that, accepting the logical consequences of the predominant secularization of European society, there is no essential thing which human beings are. Moreover, if there is no God, no creator who designed us to fulfil a purpose, then it follows that there is no purpose to human existence. However, according to the existentialists, the loss of natural teleology does not necessitate that one’s life cannot be imbued with subjective meaning. Within each of these three responses to modernity underlies a courageous and confrontational attitude to modernity, one willing to not only directly engage with the problem but also embrace one’s fate, and it is this particular perspective which will underpin our approach.
1.5 Summary
Within this chapter, our intention was to determine what problems modernity posed with regards to freedom and meaning. We began with a brief synopsis of the intellectual developments which constitute modernity and narrowed our focus to the Enlightenment. We then turned our attention to the conceptualization of the aims of the Enlightenment, which we found inherent within Kantian thought. Here we determined the concept of maturity to be indicative of the project of modernity. Although Kant believed that the actualization of maturity would lead to increased freedom, Hegel took this line of argument one step further. His claim was that absolute autonomy was the implicit, rational end of human civilization. However, when we turned our attention to the counter-discourse of Nietzsche and Weber, we discovered that the modern disposition towards autonomy was decidedly more ambiguous and ironic than beneficial. Nietzsche recognized that the rejection of the pre-modern framework led to nihilism, and Weber discovered that rationalization resulted in unfreedom and disenchantment. We thus came to understand the modern predicament to consist in the restriction of freedom and the loss of meaning.
Although the primary focus of this chapter has been to elucidate the problems of modernity, we also expressed our particular approach to these predicaments. Our attitude towards the failure of the enlightenment project and subsequent restriction of freedom and loss of meaning was to embrace our fate. Understanding the problems in context, the responses elicited by the counter-Enlightenment, and positing our initial attitude then provides the necessary grounds for our discussion of authenticity in the following chapter. That is, by explaining the issues to be addressed, and the arguments, we have provided the general context for the concept of authenticity to have emerged and make sense. With our disposition made explicit, we will now turn to articulating our proposed approach.
Notes
1 For a well-developed historical account of the emergence of the modernity, see Jonathan Israel, A Revolution of the Mind: Radical Enlightenment and the Intellectual Origins of Modern Democracy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), and Norman Hampson, The Enlightenment: An Evaluation of Its Assumptions, Attitudes and Values (London: Penguin Book, 1990).
2 See Jonathan Israel, Democratic Enlightenment: Philosophy, Revolution, and Human Rights 1750-1790 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013) in particular, part II where Israel discusses the Scottish, Austrian, German, Italian and Spanish Enlightenments.
3 There is an anecdote that Edmund Hale y (who discovered the eponymous comet) asked Newton to calculate the path that an object (such as a planet) would follow under the influence of a force that moved as the inverse square of the distance from the centre, and that The Principa was the result of his calculation. See Peter J. Bowler and Rhys Morris, Making Modern Science: A Historical Survey (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 46.
4 The Principia: Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy, ed. I. Bernard Cohen and Anne Whitman (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1999).
5 For an excellent history of the development of modern science and its influence on technological developments, see Peter J. Bowler and Rhys Morris, Making Modern Science: A Historical Survey (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005).
6 See Stephen Eric Bronner, Reclaiming the Enlightenment: Toward a Politics of Radical Engagement (Columbia: Columbia University Press, 2004).
7 Encyclopaedia, or a Systematic Dictionary of the Sciences, Arts, and Crafts.
8 In the entry on encyclopaedia, Diderot himself defines ‘The aim of an Encyclopédia is to bring together the knowledge scattered over the surface of the earth, to present its overall structure to our contemporaries and to hand it on to those who will come after us, so that our children, by becoming more knowledgeable, will become more virtuous and happier; and so that we shall not die without earning the gratitude of the human race’. The Open University, The Enlightenment. Milton Keynes (The Open University, 2013), p. 13
9 Kant’s paper was published in Berlinische Monatsschrift in response to a question posed in a footnote of an article by Johann Friedrich Zollner, a pastor, theologian and educational reformer.
10 For example, see Michel Foucault’s What Is Enlightenment in the Foucault Reader, edited by Paul Rabinow (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984), 32–50.
11 This is a recurrent theme throughout the history of philosophy. Compare it, for instance, with Heidegger’s account of das Man in Being and Time, who control individuals through fear in order to preserve themselves. Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2010), 298. This concept can also be traced back to Plato, who advocates the ‘noble lie’ regarding the origin of social classes in order to ensure social harmony. See Republic Book 3 414e-15c.
12 Republic, trans. Robin Waterfield (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).
13 Ironically, this was written prior to the French Revolution, which many German intellectuals took to be the pinnacle of the Enlightenment. Furthermore, as Harold Mah argues, many Germans desired, ‘to incorporate Germany’s new cultural identity into a general discourse of modernity as defined by the French Revolution.’ (1990: 4) Although Kant later came to celebrate the French Revolution as an achievement in enlightenment, his perspective here can be understood as a result of his belief that one has a duty to uphold civil laws, which revolution directly violates. See Hannah Arendt, Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989).
14 Hegel’s lectures on the philosophy of history were presented at the University of Berlin between 1821 and 1831, the notes from which (including those of his students) were first published by Eduard Gans six years after Hegel’s death in 1837. See Charles Hegel’s Preface in Philosophy of History, trans. J. Sibree (Ontario: Batoche Books, 2001).
15 In each of Hegel’s systems, be it the philosophy of Phenomenology, Logic, or Right, dialectic is the means by which everything proceeds. Although the dialectic is often referred to as Hegel’s ‘method’, I side with Stephen Houlgate in the claim that it is not a method per se, since it is not something which Hegel himself employs, but rather a pattern which he observes as emerging immanently from considering pure indeterminate Being. See Houlgate’s Opening Hegel’s Logic, Ch. 2.
16 A polis is a small independent city-state, of which Hellenic (fifth century BC) Greece was constituted and to which its inhabitants pledged loyalty and claimed citizenship.
17 The inadequacies of these philosophical approaches are illustrated in Phenomenology of Spirit, wherein Hegel refers to them, in his discussion of the freedom of consciousness, as stages of the unhappy conscience. See Sections 197–207.
18 Timothy C. Luther, in Hegel’s Critique of Modernity, suggests that Hegel, ‘uses [the term] Germanic people very broadly, encompassing all the Christian nations of Europe’ (2009): 87.
19 ‘The remission of sins – the highest satisfaction which the soul craves the certainty of its peace with God, that which concerns man’s deepest and inmost nature – is offered to man in the most grossly superficial and trivial fashion – to be purchased for mere money.’ Philosophy of History (2001): 414.
20 Hegel and Kant’s concepts of freedom vary. In the Philosophy of Right Hegel provides a thorough analysis of existing concepts of freedom and outlines his own belief. For an in-depth analysis of the variance between Kant and Hegel’s notions of freedom, see Timothy C. Luther’s Hegel’s Critique of Modernity, Ch. 4; Alan Patten’s Hegel’s Idea of Freedom, Ch. 3; and J. P Stern’s Understanding Moral Obligation: Kant, Hegel, Kierkegaard.
21 In his middle period Nietzsche actually advocated Enlightenment as a remedy to romanticism; however, this greatly changed in his later thought. For a thorough account of the development of Nietzsche’s attitude towards the Enlightenment, see Graeme Garrard, ‘Nietzsche for and Against the Enlightenment’, The Review of Politics, 70, no. 4 (Fall 2008): 595–608.
22 This is clearly in reference to the Copernican Revolution, which saw the shift from a geo-centric model of the universe to a helio-centric one.
23 Although The Will to Power cannot be taken seriously in presenting any coherent overall argument, this does not detract from that which the aphorisms and passages themselves infer.
24 For an in-depth discussion of the debate, see Steven Seidman’s ‘Modernity, Meaning, and Cultural Pessimism in Max Weber’, Sociological Analysis 44, no. 4 (1983): 267–78.
25 See Stephen Kalberg, ‘Max Weber’s Types of Rationality: Cornerstones for the Analysis of Rationalisation Processes in History’, American Journal of Sociology 85, no.5 (1980): 145–79.
26 The standard translation of Stahlhartes Gehäuse as ‘iron cage’ by Talcott Parsons is that which English-speaking scholars have come to accept; however, a literal translation would be ‘shell as hard as steel’. See Peter Baehr, ‘The “Iron Cage” and the “Shell as Hard as Steel”: Parsons, Weber, and the Stahlhartes Gehäuse Metaphor in the Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism’, History and Theory 40, no. 2 (May 2001): 153–69
27 In ancient Greece almost every other day was a religious festival, dedicated to one particular deity. However, rather than participating in all of these festivities, one chooses whichever God’s one felt best represented oneself. See Michael H. Crawford and David Whitehead, Archaic and Classical Greece: A Selection of Ancient Sources in Translation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).
28 For an account of Weber’s method as genealogical, see chapters 5 and 6 of David Owen’s Maturity and Modernity: Nietzsche, Weber, Foucault and the Ambivalence of Reason.
29 The German title of the painting ‘Der Wanderer über dem Nebelmeer’ wanderer can also be translated as hiker.
30 For an examination of the comparison of Nietzsche’s eternal recurrence and the Buddhist concept of samsara, see Guy Welborn, The Buddhist Nirvana and Its Western Interpreters (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975): 187.
31 Quoted in Steven Seidman, Liberalism and the Origins of European Social Theory (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983): 267 from Gesammelte Aufsatze zur Soziologie und Sozialpolitik (Tubingen: Mohr, 1924): 442.
32 ‘Science as Vocation’, in From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991).