Notes

1: DECEMBER 1963: THE NATION RESPONDS

1. President’s Commission on the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy, Report of the President’s Commission on the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1964), 3–4 (hereafter cited as Warren Commission and Warren Report).

2. Warren Report, 5–6.

3. Ibid., 5–9.

4. Robert Caro, The Years of Lyndon Johnson: The Passage of Power (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2012), 329.

5. Warren Report, 4.

6. CIA to Warren Commission, memorandum, March 23, 1964, entitled “Rumors About Lee Harvey Oswald,” 2, RIF 104-10302-10025 (hereafter cited as CIA Memorandum).

7. Warren Report, 17–18.

8. Robert H. Estabrook, “Europeans Skeptical on Kennedy’s Death,” Washington Post (December 17, 1963), p. A18; CIA Memorandum, 6–7.

9. United States Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, The Investigation of the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy: Performance of the Intelligence Agencies, bk. 5 of Final Report (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1976), 33–34 (hereafter cited as Church Committee and Church Committee Report).

10. Ibid.

11. When the commission historian, Dr. Alfred Goldberg, recommended in February 1964 that keeping a journal would be useful, I went to my files for November, December, January, and early February to write entries in my journal for those weeks. My first entry for November 1963 reads: “For several days after November 22, 1963 none of us in the Department had any role to play in the investigation of the assassination of President Kennedy. There was, as a result, a general feeling of impotence and lethargy. Not even the Criminal Division, with all of its experienced and investigation attorneys was involved in any way in assisting the Federal Bureau of Investigation in any of the work.”

12. The American Civil Liberties Union also responded quickly on November 24, 1963, to deny the published report that Oswald was a member of the organization. See “Commission Exhibit No. 2213,” Warren Commission, Hearings before the President’s Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy, vol. 25, Exhibits 2190 to 2651 (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1964), 100 (hereafter cited as Warren Commission Hearings, with volume number).

13. Katzenbach to Bill Moyers, memorandum, November 25, 1963, in Select Committee on Assassinations of the US House of Representatives, Investigation of the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy, vol. 3 of Hearings (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1979), 567–68 (hereafter cited as HSCA and HSCA Hearings, with volume number).

14. Journal, Events of November 1963; Herbert J. Miller Jr., interview by the author, transcript, Oral History Project of the Historical Society of the District of Columbia Circuit, 1998, 105–6, available at http://www.dcchs.org/OralHistory.asp?OralHistoryID=29&Menu=Documents.

15. Ibid., 105–07.

16. Ibid., 107–08.

17. Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, Some of It Was Fun: Working with RFK and LBJ (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2008), 133; Max Holland, The Kennedy Assassination Tapes (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2004), 93; HSCA Hearings, vol. 3, 644.

18. Holland, The Kennedy Assassination Tapes (2004), 90.

19. Ibid., 89–96.

20. Church Committee Report, 34; Warren Commission Hearings, vol. 5, 103.

21. Exec. Order No. 11,130, 3 C.F.R.795 (1959–63).

22. Earl Warren, The Memoirs of Earl Warren (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1977), 356.

23. Ibid., 357–58.

24. Holland, Kennedy Assassination Tapes, 150–52, 195–206; Caro, Passage of Power, 443–49.

25. Caro, Passage of Power, 442.

26. HSCA Hearings, vol. 3, 603.

27. Roscoe Drummond, “The Assassination Probe: Doubts Raised about Makeup of Commission,” Washington Post (December 15, 1963), E7; Walter Trohan, “Report from Washington: Wisdom of Kennedy Death Probe Policy Is Questioned,” Chicago Tribune (December 4, 1963), 4.

28. Journal, Events of December 1963.

29. Ibid. I believe that Katzenbach, Miller, and Ed Guthman also got copies at this time. Ed Guthman was the Department’s public information officer and a close confidant of Robert Kennedy. Guthman was a Pulitzer Prize–winning reporter for the Seattle Times who had met Kennedy for the first time in late 1956 when Kennedy was exploring the possibility of Senate hearings dealing with labor racketeering. Evan Thomas, Robert Kennedy: His Life (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000), 74.

30. FBI, report, “Investigation of Assassination of President John F. Kennedy November 22, 1963,” Warren Commission Documents 1 (hereafter cited as JFK Summary Report). A similar report dealing with Jack Ruby entitled “Investigation of Killing of Lee Harvey Oswald Dallas, Texas November 24, 1963” was delivered to the department and to the Warren Commission at a later date.

31. Journal, Events of December 1963. Many years later, the transcripts of all the commission meetings were declassified in their entirety and I have read them all in the course of writing this book.

32. HSCA Hearings, vol. 3, 646–47. In interrogating Lee Rankin about this refusal by the FBI to attend the commission’s first meeting, Congressman McKinney asked in desperation: “Wasn’t any attempt made at that point, with this sort of dramatic refusal, to have anyone in a higher position in Government such as the Attorney General or the President of the United States, turn around to Mr. Hoover and say cooperate? In the terms of at least sending a liaison person? That is the one question here.” Rankin responded: “I don’t know in my experience with Government that anybody ever did that with Mr. Hoover during his lifetime.” HSCA Hearings, vol. 3, 633. The memorandum that the committee had was from Belmont to Tolson, December 3, 1963. HSCA Hearings, vol. 3, 672–73.

33. Warren Commission, “Executive Session Transcript, December 5, 1963,” 3–4, 26, RIF 179-10001-10000.

34. Ibid., 26–29, 33–34. Robert Storey of Dallas was the retired dean of the Southern Methodist University Law School and former president of the American Bar Association and Leon Jaworski of Houston was a former president of the Texas State Bar. This prompted some discussion of exactly what “cooperation” meant in the context of the commission’s investigation; it was agreed that the commission would not release the FBI report to the Texas authorities after the commission received it. Ibid., 34.

35. Ibid., 8.

36. HSCA Hearings, vol. 3, 648.

37. DeLoach to Mohr, memorandum, December 12, 1963 in HSCA Hearings, vol. 3, 594–95; DeLoach to Mohr, memorandum, December 17, 1963 in HSCA Hearings, vol. 3, 596–98; HSCA Hearings, vol. 3, 576.

38. Included as an exhibit in HSCA Hearings, vol. 3, 677.

39. Warren Commission, “Executive Session Transcript, December 6, 1963),” 14–18, RIF 179-10001-10001.

40. Senate Joint Resolution 137, Pub. L. 88-202, 77 Stat. 362 (1963).

41. Olney’s ancestry placed him firmly within the “California establishment,” of which the chief justice was also a member. Olney’s grandfather was a well-known lawyer who helped form the Sierra Club and served at one time as mayor of Oakland. His father, also a lawyer, served on the Supreme Court of California. The candidate himself had served in the Eisenhower administration as the assistant attorney general of the criminal division—the same job that Jack Miller currently held—and had worked with the chief justice in many different capacities over the years, including his present position as director of the Administrative Office of the Courts.

42. Warren Commission, “Executive Session Transcript, December 16, 1963,” 11–12, RIF 179-10001-10002; JFK Summary Report 1, 18.

43. Ibid., 14.

44. CIA Memorandum, 11. A strong statement of the John Birch Society’s position appeared in the February 1964 issue of its monthly American Opinion.

45. Ibid., 8.

46. Richard Warren Lewis, “The Scavengers,” New York (the World Journal Tribune magazine), January 22, 1967, 5, 8.

47. CIA Memorandum, 8–9.

48. Warren Commission, “Executive Session Transcript, December 16, 1963,” 21–22.

49. Ibid., 24–25.

50. Ibid., 43–44.

51. Church Committee Report, 48.

52. Ibid., 47; HSCA Hearings, vol. 3, 481, 491–92, 495.

53. Journal, Events of December 1963.

54. Ibid.

55. Ibid. This entry refers to “my files.” It is almost a reflexive habit with lawyers in private practice to keep detailed files on every matter they handle. I brought this training to the department and the commission. I kept the originals or copies of virtually every piece of paper that I prepared or received, including memos “for the record” or “to the files,” primarily to keep track of important discussions, events, or decisions that might not find their way into the official files of the organization or law firm where I was working. I have relied on these files and memos in writing this book. The National Archives has a vast collection of documents relating to the Warren Commission and, more generally, the Kennedy assassination. With few exceptions, I have relied on my own journal and files. I expect that most of the documents cited in this book are in the National Archives, with some exceptions that may not have ended up in the commission’s official files. I have identified these as from the “author’s personal files” in the endnotes to this book.

56. FBI, “Investigation of Killing of Lee Harvey Oswald Dallas, Texas November 24, 1963,” Preface, vol. 5 of Warren Commission Documents 1 (hereafter cited as Ruby Summary Report).

57. Journal, Events of December 1963. Less substantive, but still important, administrative tasks included setting up procedures for handling citizen mail, handling correspondence with various government agencies, arranging for necessary secretarial services, getting extra copies of the basic reports, and arranging for a “clipping service,” which would, for a fee, collect newspaper or other articles from around the country (or the world) on any subject requested. We collected this material assiduously because we believed that the commission needed to be current about what was being said and done about the assassination as reported in the press.

58. Arlen Specter and Charles Robbins, Passion for Truth: From Finding JFK’s Single Bullet to Questioning Anita Hill to Impeaching Clinton (New York: William Morrow, 2000), 43–44.

2: JANUARY 1964: DISTRUST OF THE FBI GROWS

1. FBI, “Investigation of Assassination of President John F. Kennedy, November 22, 1963: Supplemental Report, January 13, 1964,” 66–67, Warren Commission Documents 107 (hereafter cited as JFK Supplemental Report).

2. FBI, “Investigation of Killing of Lee Harvey Oswald, Texas November 24, 1963: Supplemental Report, January 13, 1964,” 24, Warren Commission Documents 107.1 (hereafter cited as Ruby Supplemental Report).

3. JFK Supplemental Report, 2.

4. Warren Report, 88–89.

5. Ibid., 90-91.

6. Author to Rankin, memorandum, December 30, 1963, “Tentative Outline of the Work of the President’s Commission.”

7. Earl Warren for Members of the President’s Commission, memorandum, January 11, 1964, “Progress Report,” 4.

8. Burt Griffin, interview by the author, December 5, 2011.

9. David Slawson, interview by the author, December 15, 2011.

10. Rankin to the Staff, memorandum, January 22, 1964, “Compensation.” We paid the senior lawyers $100 per day, and the junior lawyers $75 per day. In addition, they received living expenses and reimbursement for other commission-related expenses.

11. Rankin to the Staff, memorandum, January 13, 1964, 1.

12. Specter, Passion for Truth, 46; Slawson, interview by author, December 15, 2011.

13. Shaffer, interview by the author, November 30, 2011.

14. Ibid.

15. Ibid.

16. Author to Rankin, memorandum, December 28, 1963, “Assignments and Work Product of Commission Staff.”

17. Roscoe Drummond, “The Warren Commission …: The Task is Broadened,” Washington Post (January 4, 1964), A9.

18. Ibid.

19. Anthony Lewis, “New Look at the Chief Justice: Ten Years on the Bench […],” New York Times (January 19, 1964), SM9.

20. Specter, Passion for Truth, 55.

21. Author, memorandum for the record, January 21, 1964, “Staff Meeting of January 20, 1964,” author’s personal files.

22. Rankin to Staff, memorandum, January 22, 1964, “Statement of Objectives” (hereafter Rankin staff memorandum “Statement of Objectives”). In a later memorandum to the staff, Rankin indicated that the next meeting of the commission might be as early as the following Monday, January 27. Rankin to Staff, memorandum, January 24, 1964, “Meeting of the Commission, January 21, 1964” (hereafter Rankin staff memorandum, “Meeting of the Commission, January 21, 1964”).

23. Author, memorandum for the record, January 29, 1964, “Staff Meeting –January 28, 1964,” author’s personal files.

24. Slawson, interview by the author, December 15, 2011.

25. Eisenberg, memorandum for the record, February 13, 1964, “Second Staff Conference, January 24, 1964,” author’s personal files.

26. Rankin staff memorandum, “Meeting of the Commission, January 21, 1964.”

27. Warren Commission, “Executive Session Transcript, January 27, 1964,” 1–2.

28. Ibid., 137.

29. Ibid., 11–13.

30. Ibid., 129–32.

31. Ibid., 137–38.

32. Hoover to Rankin, January 27, 1964, quoted in HSCA Hearings, vol. 11, 41.

33. HSCA Hearings, vol. 3, 640.

34. Hoover to Rankin, February 10, 1964, concerning interview of District Attorney Wade; Hoover to Rankin, February 11, 1964, concerning interview of Lonnie Hudkins; Hoover to Rankin, February 12, 1964, enclosing ten affidavits and referring to his letter of February 6, 1964, which enclosed his own affidavit.

35. The chronology of events is set forth in a memorandum from me to Rankin dated February 10, 1964, in preparation for a staff meeting on the subject.

36. HSCA Hearings, vol. 3, 563.

37. Ibid., 602–03.

38. HSCA Hearings, vol. 11, 349.

39. Specter, Passion for Truth, 56.

40. Warren Commission, “Executive Session Transcript, January 27, 1964,” 169.

3: FEBRUARY 1964: THE SEARCH FOR EVIDENCE BEGINS

1. “Security Tie in Oswald Quiz Hinted,” Boston Globe (February 4, 1964), 13; Vincent Bugliosi, Reclaiming History: The Assassination of President John F. Kennedy (New York: W. W. Norton, 2007), Endnotes, 133–35 (hereafter cited as Reclaiming History (text) or Endnotes (separate endnote file)).

2. “The Whole Truth,” Baltimore Sun (February 5, 1964), 14.

3. “Assassination Data Sought,” Christian Science Monitor (February 20, 1964), 3; Minority of One, M. S. Arnoni, ed., “An Open Letter to Chief Justice Earl Warren, Chairman of the Presidential Commission to Investigate the Assassination of President Kennedy,” New York Times (March 2, 1964), paid advertisement, 20; Drew Pearson, “Warren Report Won’t Satisfy All: Khrushchev’s Opinion.” Washington Post (June 26, 1964), B11.

4. Journal, February 3, 1964.

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid.

8. “Security Tie in Oswald Quiz Hinted,” Boston Globe.

9. William M. Blair, “Warren Commission Will Ask Mrs. Oswald to Identify Rifle Used in the Kennedy Assassination,” New York Times (February 5, 1965), 19.

10. At Redlich’s request, I asked the FBI to obtain their investigative reports on this subject. Journal, February 26, 1964.

11. Warren Commission, “Executive Session Transcript, February 24, 1964,” 1597.

12. Journal, February 27, 1964; HSCA Hearings, vol. 11, 126–27.

13. Warren Report, 187, 406.

14. Warren Report, 406.

15. Warren to Secretary of the Treasury Dillon, December 27, 1963.

16. Author to Rankin, memorandum, January 7, 1964.

17. Ibid.; Rankin to Rowley, January 10, 1964.

18. Rankin to Rowley, January 15, 1964.

19. Dillon to Warren, January 28, 1964.

20. Ibid.; Dillon to Rowley, memorandum, December 20, 1963, “Study of Procedures for Protecting the President.”

21. Warren to Dillon, draft letter prepared by Stern, February 18, 1964, author’s personal files; Journal, February 27, 1964.

22. Warren Commission, “Executive Session Transcript, February 24, 1964,” 1598–99; Warren to Dillon, March 2, 1964.

23. Author to Rankin, memorandum, February 25, 1964.

24. Author, memorandum for the record, February 12, 1964, “Staff Meeting February 11, 1964,” author’s personal files. The chronology of events is set forth in a memorandum from me to Rankin dated February 10, 1964, in preparation for a staff meeting on the subject.

25. Ibid.; Rankin to Hoover, February 20, 1964.

26. Hoover to Rankin, February 27, 1964, with enclosed affidavits of FBI agents Gemberling and Kesler; Church Committee Report, 46.

27. HSCA Hearings, vol. 11, 112.

28. HSCA Hearings, vol. 3, 625, 632–33.

29. Rankin to Lane, January 23, 1964.

30. Warren Report, xiv.

31. Author to the Deputy Attorney General, memorandum, February 12, 1964, author’s personal files.

32. Warren Report, xiv; Warren Commission, “Executive Session Transcript, February 24, 1964,” 1600–01.

33. Journal, February 25, 1964.

34. Author, memorandum for the record, February 25, 1964, author’s personal files; Warren, Memoirs, 322, 325–29.

35. Author, memorandum for the record, February 25, 1964, author’s personal files.

36. Bugliosi, Reclaiming History, 351. According to Bugliosi, Craig “could have performed the function of a responsible devil’s advocate, asking key Warren Commission witnesses questions that a competent defense attorney would have, but he failed abysmally in this effort and, through no fault of the Warren Commission, turned out to be mere window dressing for the expressed goal of helping to guarantee that a deceased accused be treated fairly and objectively.” Ibid.

37. Rankin to Stern, memorandum, March 6, 1964, “Treatment of Lee Harvey Oswald by Dallas Police.”

38. Stern and Ely to Rankin, memorandum, March 24, 1964.

39. Author to Rankin, memorandum, March 27, 1964; Warren Report, 196–208, 231.

40. Alfred Goldberg, interview by the author, January 19, 2012.

41. Journal, February 24, 1964; Goldberg, interview by the author, January 19, 2012.

42. Richard Mosk, interview by the author, December 11, 2011.

43. Journal, February 27–28, 1964. This entry also reports that we sent a letter to Mark Lane on February 28, 1964, inviting him to testify before the commission.

44. David W. Belin, November 22, 1973: You Are the Jury (New York: Quadrangle, 1973), 13-16.

45. Ibid., 16-17.

46. Warren Report, 560–62.

47. This was the conclusion reached by Edward Epstein in his 1966 book, Inquest, and discussed by Belin in the first chapter of his book entitled “And My Husband Never Made Any Sound.” Epstein ignored the contrary testimony of the other four witnesses. Belin, November 22, 1963: You Are the Jury, 5–8.

48. William T. Coleman (with Donald T. Bliss), Counsel for the Situation: Shaping the Law to Realize America’s Promise (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2010), 175.

49. Slawson, interview by the author, December 15, 2011.

50. Journal, February 24, 1964.

51. Warren Report, 309. This letter is discussed on pages 309–10.

52. Journal, February 24, 1964.

53. Specter, Passion for Truth, 49–51.

54. Specter to Rankin, memorandum, February 28, 1964, “Written Material Requested in Your Memorandum of February 25, 1964.”

55. Journal, February 26, 1964.

56. Burt Griffin, interview by the author, December 5, 2011.

57. Author to Ball and Belin, memorandum, March 3, 1964, author’s personal files.

58. Journal, February 24, 1964.

59. Robert E. Thompson, “Warren Commission Faces ‘Sidetrack’ Peril,” Los Angeles Times (February 26, 1964), A4.

60. Wesley Liebeler, Thoughts on the Work of the Warren Commission and the House Select Committee on Assassinations as to the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy (unpublished manuscript, 1996) (hereafter Liebeler, Thoughts), 110. After the House Select Committee filed its report in 1979, Liebeler wrote this manuscript comparing the findings of that committee to our commission’s report. He died before he could publish the work, but his widow has provided me with a copy of the manuscript, which I have used on several occasions in this book.

61. Belin, November 22, 1963: You Are the Jury, 304, 306.

4: MARCH 1964: OUR INVESTIGATION EXPANDS

1. Rankin to Lane, February 28, 1964.

2. Journal, March 4, 1964.

3. Rankin to Members of the Commission, memorandum, March 6, 1964, 7–8.

4. Journal, March 5, 6, and 7, 1964.

5. Journal, March 2, 1964.

6. Ibid; Liebeler to Rankin, memorandum, March 4, 1964, “Report of Committee on Rules for the taking of testimony of the staff (sic);” Redlich to Rankin, memorandum, March 4, 1964, “Report of the Chairman of the Committee on Rules for the Taking of Testimony by the Staff.”

7. Ibid.

8. Ibid.

9. Ibid.; Liebeler to Rankin, memorandum, March 4, 1964.

10. Author to Rankin, memorandum, March 5, 1964, “Proposed Rules for the Questioning of Witnesses by Members of the Commission Staff.”

11. Rankin to the Staff, memorandum, March 12, 1964; Journal, March 9–10, 1964.

12. Ibid.

13. Ibid.

14. Ibid.

15. Warren Report, 315–18, 646.

16. Journal, March 9–10, 1964.

17. Warren Commission Hearings, vol. 2, 295–337.

18. Warren Report, 129–30.

19. Journal, March 11, 1964; Warren Report 130.

20. Journal, March 12, 1964; Rankin to Members of the Commission, memorandum, March 12, 1964, “Testimony before the Commission (March 16–19)”; Rankin to Members of the Commission, memorandum, March 18, 1964, “Schedule of Testimony before the Commission”; Rankin to Members of the Commission, memorandum, March 30, 1964, “Testimony before the Commission (March 31–April 3).”

21. Eisenberg to Rankin, memorandum, March 4, 1964.

22. Journal, March 13, 1964.

23. Journal, March 12, 1964.

24. Journal, March 16–20, 1964; Specter, Passion for Truth, 88–90.

25. Ibid., 90.

26. Author to Rankin, March 14, 1964.

27. Journal, March 16–20, 1964; Author to Rankin, memorandum, March 18, 1964; Rankin to Curry, March 18, 1964.

28. Jim Lehrer, Dallas Times Herald, March 19, 1964.

29. Warren Report, 41.

30. Author to Rankin, memorandum, March 23, 1964.

31. Jim Lehrer, Dallas Times Herald, March 20, 1964.

32. Belin to Rankin, memorandum, September 19, 1964, “Empty Cartridge Case Experiments at TSBD Building,”1.

33. Ibid. Belin reported that this experiment was repeated on two other occasions, with the result that all seven members of the commission had an opportunity personally to determine whether the depository employees could have heard the cartridge cases falling on the floor above them on November 22. Belin concluded that the commission could properly rely on the March 20 experiment, as well as the others, for two reasons. First, the similarity in sound between the falling of the empty cartridge cases and the live ammunition supported the validity of the March 20 experiment. Second, the key witness (Norman) told Belin that at the time of the March 20 experiment there was a train going over the triple overpass and also trucks going along the street which, Norman advised him, created greater outside noise than existed on November 22. Ibid., 2.

34. Journal, March 23, 1964.

35. Journal, March 24–26, 1964.

36. Griffin to Rankin, memorandum, undated, “Memorandum for the Record of Interview with Dean.”

37. In that connection, he wrote that “I took considerable pains to explain to Dean that I felt that I understood why he was coloring his testimony and that I believed him to be a basically honest and truthful person and I thought that he was probably an excellent police officer.” Griffin to Rankin, memorandum, April 1, 1964, “Letter of Henry Wade dated March 25, 1964 Concerning Sgt. P. T. Dean,” 1–2.

38. Bugliosi, Endnotes, 941.

39. Griffin to Rankin, memorandum, March 31, 1964, “Off the Record Conversation with P. T. Dean,” 2.

40. Warren Commission Hearings, vol. 5, 258; Griffin later told me that he decided not to take any further depositions in Dallas in order to avoid any further controversy. Burt Griffin, interview by the author, November 28, 2012.

41. Bugliosi, Reclaiming History, 1077.

42. Goldberg to Rankin, memorandum, undated but probably around March 13, 1964, “Proposed Outline of Report of the Commission”; Rankin to Staff, memorandum, March 24, 1964; Journal, March 30 and 31, 1964.

43. Ibid.

44. Journal, March 24, 25, and 26, 1964; this decision was reflected in Rankin’s memorandum to the staff of April 7, 1964, entitled “Depositions and Testimony before the Commission.”

45. Author to Rankin, memorandum, January 15, 1964, “Meeting with Representatives of C.I.A. January 14, 1964.”

46. Ibid.

47. Helms to Rankin, January 31, 1964; Helms to Rankin, memorandum, February 21, 1964.

48. Rankin to McCone, February 12, 1964.

49. Coleman and Slawson to Rankin, memorandum, January 24, 1964, “Oswald’s Foreign Activities—Statement of Objectives and Problems Based on Review to Date of the Relevant Materials.”

50. Coleman and Slawson to Rankin, memorandum, February 24, 1964, “Oswald’s Foreign Activities: Oswald’s Trip to the Soviet Union and His Contacts with the State Department.”

51. Author to Rankin, memorandum, February 25, 1964; Guthrie to Rankin, March 7, 1964. John C. Guthrie was the director, Office of Soviet Union Affairs, Department of State.

52. Rankin to Chayes, March 23, 1964. Chayes was the legal adviser at State.

53. Hoover to Rankin, February 28, 1964, enclosing a four-page interview of Nosenko; FBI Memorandum of Nosenko Interview, February 28, 1964.

54. Ibid. He did testify before the House Select Committee on Assassinations in 1977–78. See chapter 10.

55. Author to Rankin, memorandum, March 3, 1964.

56. Slawson, memorandum, undated, “Conference with CIA on March 12, 1964.”

57. Ibid.

58. Journal, March 12, 1964.

59. The congressional investigations that disclosed this information in the 1970s are discussed in chapter 10; Slawson, interview by the author, December 15, 2011.

60. Journal, March 27, 1964.

61. Stern to Rankin, memorandum, March 27, 1964, “CIA File on Oswald.”

62. Journal, March 5, 6, and 7, 1964; Author, memorandum for the record, undated, probably March 7 or 8, 1964, “Area of Security Precautions,” author’s personal files.

63. Ibid. Treasury’s Belin was unrelated to the commission’s David Belin.

64. Ibid.

65. Journal, March 9–10, 1964.

66. Ibid.

67. Ibid.

68. Ibid.

69. Journal, March 11, 1964.

70. Ibid.

71. Ibid; author, memorandum for the record, March 13, 1964, “Memorandum of Conference.”

72. Journal, March 11, 1964.

73. Rankin to Rowley, March 24, 1964.

74. Journal, March 24, 25, and 26, 1964; Rankin to Hoover, March 26, 1964.

75. Church Committee Report, 49; Warren Commission, “Executive Session Transcript, December 16, 1963,” 24.

76. Hoover to Rankin, April 6, 1064.

77. Ibid.

78. Church Committee Report, 50.

79. Ibid.

80. Ibid.

81. Ibid., 51.

82. Ibid.

83. “Warren Report Believed Ready to Start on Report,” New York Times (March 30, 1964), 26; “One ‘Irrational’ Person Killed Kennedy, Warren Group Believes,” Washington Post (March 30, 1964), A3.

5: APRIL 1964: MEXICO AND THE CUBAN CONNECTION

1. Church Committee Report, 24–25, 27. This briefing did not include the agency’s plans to assassinate Castro because McCone did not know about those plans at the time. President Johnson did not learn of these assassination efforts until 1967. Holland, Kennedy Assassination Tapes, 418–19.

2. Church Committee Report, 27–29.

3. Ibid., 31.

4. David Slawson prepared a comprehensive memo on the Mexican trip and I have relied on that memo in my discussion of this trip. Slawson, memorandum for the record, April 22, 1964, “Trip to Mexico City,” (hereafter cited as Slawson Mexico Memorandum), 2–3; Church Committee Report, 29.

5. Slawson Mexico Memorandum, 5–6.

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid., 6–7.

8. Ibid., 8–9

9. Ibid., 10–11.

10. Ibid., 11–12.

11. Warren Report, 307–08.

12. Ibid., 301–04.

13. Slawson Mexico Memorandum, 19–20.

14. Ibid., 20–21.

15. Ibid., 23–24. The CIA identified the KGB agent with whom Oswald discussed his interest in a Soviet visa as Valeriy Vladimirovich Kostikov. Warren Report, 734.

16. Slawson Mexico Memorandum, 7.

17. Ibid., 26, 28.

18. Ibid., 26.

19. Ibid., 30–32.

20. Ibid., 33–35.

21. Ibid., 37–38.

22. Ibid., 38–39.

23. Ibid., 40–42.

24. Ibid., 40.

25. Ibid., 44–48.

26. Ibid., 58; Church Committee Report, 40–42.

27. Warren Report, 305; Warren Commission Hearings, vol. 16, 52.

28. Slawson Mexico Memorandum, 64–65.

29. Church Committee Report, 40 n102; 40–42.

30. Slawson Mexico Memorandum, 66.

31. Ibid., 67–68.

32. Journal, April 14–17, 1964. Later that week we sent a letter following up on the CIA’s investigation of the Alvarado allegation and asking for a detailed report from the expert who conducted his polygraph examination. Rankin to Helms, April 21, 1964.

33. Slawson, interview by the author, December 15, 2011; Slawson to author, January 9, 2013.

34. Journal, Week of April 20, 1964; Author, memorandum for the record with attached draft letter, April 28, 1964, author’s personal files.

35. Coleman and Slawson to Rankin, memorandum, undated, “Oswald’s Foreign Activities,” 107.

36. Ibid.

37. Warren Report, 410–12, 729.

38. Slawson, interview by the author, December 15, 2011.

39. Rankin to Hoover, April 23, 1964.

40. Rankin to Staff, memorandum, April 16, 1964.

41. Specter to Rankin, memorandum, April 16, 1964, “Remaining Work in Area 1.”

42. Hubert and Griffin to Rankin, memorandum, April 21, 1964, “re April 13 request.”

43. Journal, Week of April 20, 1964.

44. Ibid.

45. Journal, April 30, 1964.

46. Ibid.

47. Caro, Passage to Power, 537–45.

48. Journal, May 1, 1964.

49. Ibid.

50. Rankin to Connally, April 16, 1964.

51. Specter, Passion for Truth, 62.

52. Hubert to Rankin, memorandum, April 3, 1964, “Report on Depositions taken in Dallas.”

53. Ibid., 1–2.

54. Ibid., 2–3.

55. Hubert and Griffin to Members of the Commission, memorandum, April 1, 1964, “Possible Cuban Associations of Jack Ruby.” Although addressed to the commission members, I am certain that it went to Rankin instead.

56. Rankin to IRS, April 3, 1964; Rankin to Hubert and Griffin, memoranda, April 7, 1964 and April 8, 1964.

57. Rankin to Ball, memorandum, April 8, 1964; Rankin to Jenner and Liebeler, memorandum, April 14, 1964; Conroy and O’Brien to Rankin, memorandum, April 14, 1964, “Estimated Completion of Chronology.”

58. Rankin to Lane, April 30, 1964.

59. Rankin to FBI, Secret Service, CIA, State, and Justice, April 22, 1964. I sent a copy of the Robert Kennedy letter to Miller. Author to Miller, note, April 22, 1964, author’s personal files.

60. Ely to Jenner and Liebeler, memorandum, April 29, 1964, “Lee Harvey Oswald’s Marine Career Further Investigation”; Mosk to Stern, memorandum, April 7, 1964, “Legislation Making the Assaulting or Murdering of the President and Others a Federal Crime”; see, for example, Norman Mailer, Oswald’s Tale: An American Mystery (New York: Random House, 1995); Pollak, interview by the author, December 12, 2011.

61. Rankin to Hoover, April 22, 1964; Journal, April 27–29, 1964. This entry provides considerable detail about the FBI’s facilities and procedures.

62. Ibid.

63. Journal, April 30, 1964.

64. Warren Commission, “Executive Session Transcript, April 30, 1964,” 5853–57, 5862–63, 5879.

65. Ibid., 5880–84.

66. “Paper Reports F.B.I. Knew Oswald Peril,” New York Times (April 24, 1964), 16; “Asserts FBI Knew Oswald Posed Danger,” Chicago Tribune (April 25, 1964), 16; “Hoover Denies FBI Men Labeled Oswald Killer,” Hartford Courant (April 25, 1964), 13B.

67. Warren Commission Hearings, vol.4, 194, 196; Bugliosi, Reclaiming History, 134, 154–55, 192, 210, 221.

6: MAY 1964: CRITICAL DECISIONS

1. Warren Commission Hearings, vol. 4, 441–47.

2. Ibid., 447–48.

3. Ibid., 449–52.

4. Ibid., 450–51. The commission concluded that Marina Oswald, at her husband’s instruction, had copied down Hosty’s license number and surmised that the FBI office address could have been found in many public sources. Warren Report, 327.

5. Warren Commission Hearings, vol. 4, 453–54, 458–59. In general, the Trotskyites (adherents of theories of Leon Trotsky) believed that there would be a revolution in the Western capitalist countries led by the working class and that the international aspects of the revolution, not limited to the Soviet Union, would be of key importance.

6. Ibid., 459.

7. Ibid., 461–62.

8. Ibid., 463–64.

9. Ibid., 464–67.

10. Ibid., 473.

11. Journal, May 5, 1964; Warren Commission Hearings, vol. 5, 33–35.

12. Warren Commission Hearings, vol. 5, 39.

13. Ibid., 39–43.

14. Ibid., 43–44.

15. Rankin to Curry, May 22, 1964. The letter noted that the Revill report was apparently filed on April 27, 1964, rather than early in December 1963 as stated by Revill. Warren Report, 440–42.

16. Warren Commission Hearings, vol. 5, 112.

17. Church Committee Report, “The FBI and the Oswald Security Case,” Appendix A, 87–94. Fain also failed to “report Oswald’s refusal to be polygraphed when he testified before the Warren Commission on May 6, 1964, despite detailed questioning by Commission members Ford and Dulles as to the discrepancies in Oswald’s statements and Fain’s reactions to them.” Ibid., 88 n. 8.

18. Ibid., 96; Bugliosi, Reclaiming History, 124–25, 158–59, 302–03, 936, 967.

19. Church Committee Report, 96–97; Bugliosi, Reclaiming History, 1336.

20. The commentary on the applicable federal evidence rule states: “The theory of Exception [paragraph] (2) is simply that circumstances may produce a condition of excitement which temporarily stills the capacity of reflection and produces utterances free of conscious fabrication.”

21. Griffin, unpublished manuscript about the Warren Commission, chapter 2, 23. Bugliosi makes the same point. Bugliosi, Reclaiming History, 936.

22. Journal, May 4, 1964.

23. Goldberg to Rankin, memorandum, May 4, 1964, “Historical Context of the Report.” 1.

24. Ibid., 1–2.

25. Journal, May 6, 1964; Rankin to Goldberg, memorandum, May 7, 1964; Journal, May 7–8, 1964.

26. Author to Rankin, memorandum, May 4, 1964, “Right Wing Associations of Jack Ruby.”

27. Ibid., 2.

28. Journal, May 18, 1964.

29. Warren Commission, “Executive Session Transcript, May 19, 1964,” 6601–03.

30. Journal, February 27–28, 1964. At this time Rankin suggested to me that Redlich might wish to withdraw from the activities of some of the organizations identified by the congressional and other critics.

31. Wikipedia, “House Un-American Activities Committee.”

32. Warren Commission, “Executive Session Transcript, May 19, 1964,” 6605.

33. Ibid., 6606–12.

34. Ibid., 6614.

35. Ibid., 6615.

36. Ibid., 6617, 6630.

37. Specter, Passion for Truth, 48.

38. Liebeler, Thoughts, 102.

39. Journal, April 27–29, 1964.

40. Redlich to Rankin, memorandum, April 27, 1964.

41. Journal, April 27–29, 1964.

42. Journal, May 5 and 6, 1964.

43. Rankin to Hoover, May 7, 1964.

44. Ibid., 3.

45. Warren Report, 97.

46. Ibid., 106.

47. Ibid., 105.

48. Ibid., 106–07.

49. Ibid., 107–09.

50. Ibid., 98–105.

51. “New Theory on How Shots Hit Kennedy,” Boston Globe (May 30, 1964), 3; “New Evidence Reported in Kennedy Death,” Chicago Tribune (May 30, 1964), 2.

52. Warren Commission Hearings, vol. 4, 295–300, 302, 304.

53. Ibid., 312–14.

54. Warren Report, 31–32; Warren Commission Hearings, vol. 4, 318, 321, 324–27.

55. Ibid., 321–22.

56. Ibid., 328.

57. Ibid., 329.

58. Rankin to Dillon, May 5, 1964. Rankin hoped to persuade the commission to let Stern assist him in reviewing these studies. Journal, May 5, 1964.

59. Rankin to the Commission, memorandum, May 14, 1964, “Review of Secret Service Protective Measures,” 5–8, (hereafter Rankin memorandum, “Review of Secret Service Protective Measures”).

60. Rankin memorandum, “Review of Secret Service Protective Measures,” 3.

61. Ibid., 3–4.

62. Ibid., 9.

63 Rankin to Staff, memorandum, April 1, 1964, “Depositions”; Journal, May 7–8, 1964.

64. Rankin to Commission, memorandum, May 12, 1964.

65. Ibid.; Stern to Rankin, memorandum, March 25, 1964, “Obtaining Television Tapes of Assassination Events,”

66. Goldberg to Rankin, memorandum, May 25, 1964, “TV Tapes and Films.”

67. Rankin to Commission, memorandum, May 13, 1964, “Additional Testimony before the Commission and by Deposition,” 2.

68. Ibid., 2–3.

69. Kashner, “A Clash of Camelots,” Vanity Fair, October 2009, 1.

70. Journal, Week of May 18, 1964.

71. Ibid.

72. Kashner, “A Clash of Camelots,” 1, 8.

73. Rankin to Chayes, May 1, 1964.

74. Rankin to Chayes, May 14, 1964.

75. Rankin to Hoover, May 19, 1964.

76. Slawson to Rankin, memorandum, May 20, 1964, “Personal Check on State Department Files.”

77. Journal, Week of May 18, 1964.

78. Slawson, interview by the author, December 15, 2011; Slawson HSCA Testimony, vol. 11, 183–84.

79. My journal entry states: “I took violent issue with Mr. Griffin in the morning and with Mr. Hubert in the afternoon and enjoyed myself thoroughly in the process.” My use of the words “violent” and “enjoyed myself” may be misleading. We had a vigorous argument along the lines summarized here, but we recognized the need for such a discussion and were pleased when we found common ground for moving forward with the investigation. Journal, Week of May 11, 1964.

80. Hubert and Griffin to Rankin, memorandum, May 14, 1964, “Adequacy of Ruby Investigation.” [Version 1]; author to Rankin, note, February 26, 1964; Shaffer to Rankin and author, memorandum, March 5, 1964; author to Rankin, note, March 24, 1964. By the end of March, Shaffer had returned full-time to the Justice Department.

81. Hubert and Griffin to Rankin, memorandum, May 14, 1964, “Adequacy of Ruby Investigation.” [Version 2]

82. Hubert and Griffin, May 14 memorandum [Version 1], 8.

83. The “twist board” was a piece of exercise equipment that consisted of a platform on ball bearings that spun back and forth as the user rotated his or her midsection while standing on the board. The device never sold during Ruby’s time, but decades later, well-known fitness equipment manufacturers would market and sell a product based on the same concept.

84. Hubert and Griffin, May 14 memorandum [Version 2], 2–4.

85. Ibid., 4.

86. Ibid., 5.

87. Rankin to Hoover, May 29, 1964; Rankin to Hoover, May 26, 1864.

88. Hubert to Sorrels, May 23, 1964; Rankin to these individuals, May 28, 1964.

7: JUNE 1964: CRUCIAL WITNESSES

1. Anthony Lewis, “Panel to Reject Theories of Plot in Kennedy Death: Warren Inquiry Is Expected to Dispel Doubts in Europe that Oswald Acted Alone,” New York Times (June 1, 1964), 1.

2. Warren Commission, “Executive Session Transcript, June 4, 1964,” 652–62.

3. PhilipWarden, “Report Move to Rig Assassination Study,” Chicago Tribune (June 6, 1964), 6.

4. Journal, June 4, 1964.

5. Author, draft statement for R. Kennedy, undated but either June 1 or 2, 1964, author’s personal files.

6. Author to R. Kennedy, memorandum, June 2, 1964, “Interview of Mrs. John F. Kennedy by Representatives of the President’s Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy,” author’s personal files.

7. Specter, memorandum, undated but filed in early June 1964, “Outline of Proposed Questions for Mrs. Jacqueline Kennedy,” author’s personal files.

8. Journal, June 4, 1964.

9. Ibid.

10. Author, draft letter to R. Kennedy from Warren, June 2, 1964, author’s personal files.

11. Author, draft letter from R. Kennedy to Warren, June 2, 1964, 1, author’s personal files. In the final version of the letter, signed on August 4, 1964, Kennedy stated: “In response to your specific inquiry, I would like to state definitely that I know of no credible evidence to support the allegations that the assassination of President Kennedy was caused by a domestic or foreign conspiracy.” I had no personal knowledge then or now of what Robert Kennedy knew, or did not know, of the CIA’s plans for covert activity against Castro, including his assassination. This subject was explored by the Church Committee in 1975–76 and is discussed in chapter 10.

12. Journal, June 4, 1964.

13. Ibid.

14. Journal, Week of June 8, 1964; author to Katzenbach, memorandum, June 12, 1964, “Proposed letter to the President’s Commission,” author’s personal files.

15. Specter, Passion for Truth, 106–08.

16. Ibid., 106.

17. Ibid., 107.

18. Warren Commission Hearings, vol. 5, 178–81.

19. Ibid., 180.

20. Ibid.

21. Ibid.

22. Ibid., 181.

23. Ibid.

24. Specter, Passion for Trust, 107.

25. Journal, June 17, 1964.

26. Specter to Rankin, memorandum, April 30, 1964, “Autopsy Photographs and X-rays of President John F. Kennedy,” in HSCA Hearings, vol. 11, 92-93.

27. Specter to Rankin, memorandum, May 12, 1964, “Examination of Autopsy photographs and X-rays of President Kennedy,” in HSCA Hearings, vol. 11, 93.

28. Journal, June 17, 1964.

29. Belin, November 22, 1963: You Are the Jury, 345–47.

30. Specter, Passion for Truth, 86–88.

31. HSCA Hearings, vol. 11, 140.

32. HSCA Hearings, vol. 3, 618.

33. Warren Commission Hearings, vol. 5, 213–54. Both Goldberg and Griffin prepared questions for Rankin to use with Wade. Goldberg to Rankin, memorandum, June 5, 1964, “Questions for District Attorney Wade.” Griffin to Rankin, memorandum, June 7, 1964. “Questions for Henry Wade.”

34. Warren Commission Hearings, vol. 5, 213–17.

35. Ibid., 220–23.

36. Ibid., 232, 235.

37. Ibid., 254–58.

38. Ibid., 258.

39. Ibid., 266.

40. Ibid., 267–71, 273–76.

41. Ibid., 274, 276–78, 282–86.

42. Ibid., 291.

43. Ibid., 300–04.

44. Ibid., 319–22.

45. Ibid., 306, 319–322.

46. Ibid., 354, 356–58.

47. Ibid., 372–73, 378. Knight described the massive files at her office and identified some categories of people who might not be granted a passport. For example, she testified that individuals may be classified under category “R” as “individuals whose actions do not reflect credit to the United States abroad,” but this category “is very narrowly construed in view of the hundreds of American citizen bad-check artists, the drunks, the con men, the psychotics who travel worldwide, and so forth.”

48. Ibid., 307–11, 328–29, 342–43.

49. Ibid., 333.

50. Ibid., 364.

51. Ibid., 364–65. Secretary Rusk dismissed speculations that any dissident elements in the Soviet Union could have been responsible for the assassination, expressing doubt that they could have achieved their objectives through such an action and observing that such elements are under rather strict scrutiny in the Soviet Union. Ibid., 365.

52. Ibid.

53. Ibid., 367.

54. Ibid., 388.

55. Ibid., 387–88.

56. Ibid., 389–90.

57. Ibid., 391–92.

58. Ibid., 393–94.

59. Ibid., 396.

60. Ibid., 401–02.

61. Ibid., 405–07.

62. Ibid., 414–16.

63. Hubert and Griffin to author, memorandum, April 4, 1964.

64. Author to Rankin, note, April 6, 1964, author’s personal files.

65. Hubert and Griffin to Rankin, memorandum, April 23, 1964, “Considerations re Polygraph Tests.”

66. Belin, November 22, 1963: You Are the Jury, 431–33.

67. Warren Commission, “Executive Session Transcript April 30, 1964,” 5879; Rankin to Tonahill, May 5, 1964.

68. Hubert to Rankin, memorandum, June 1, 1964, “Conversation with Phil Burleson, attorney for Jack Ruby”; Hubert to Rankin, memorandum, June 1, 1964, “Deposition of Tom Howard.” Burleson and Tonahill decided for similar reasons that they could not ethically provide some of their original notes of conversations with Ruby to the commission. Hubert to Rankin, memorandum, June 1, 1964, “Statements made by Ruby to Burleson.”

69. Specter, Passion for Truth, 108–10.

70. Ibid., 111–12.

71. Ibid., 112–13.

72. Warren Report, 807.

73. Warren Commission Hearings, vol. 5, 198–200.

74. Specter, Passion for Truth, 115–16.

75. Laulicht, interview by the author, February 6, 2012.

76. Hubert to Rankin, memorandum, June 1, 1964; Hubert to Staff, memorandum, June 5, 1964; Rankin to Hubert, memorandum, June 22, 1964.

77. Author to Hubert and Griffin, memorandum, June 1, 1964; Hubert and Griffin to author, memorandum, June 1, 1964; Rankin to Hoover, June 1, 1964; Rankin to Hoover, June 11,1964.

78. For example, Richard Mosk asked the National Security Agency to examine materials relating to Oswald’s activities in Russia and Mexico to ascertain if they served some surreptitious purpose, such as the use of microdots. After examining the materials, the NSA reported that no such methods of deception had been used on those documents. Mosk to Slawson and author, June 5, 1964.

79. Journal, Week of June 8, 1964.

80. Ibid.

81. Redlich to Dulles, memorandum, June 12, 1964.

82. Author to Warren, memorandum, June 15, 1964, “Draft portions of the Report.”

83. Ibid.

84. Journal, June 16, 1964.

85. Journal, June 8, 1964.

86. Journal, June 16, 1064.

87. Ibid. “Dutch uncle” is a term for a person “who issues frank, harsh, and severe comments and criticism to educate, encourage, or admonish someone.” Wikipedia, “Dutch Uncle.”

88. Slawson to Coleman, memorandum, June 4, 1964, “Appendix on Lee Harvey Oswald in Mexico: Comments on First Draft,” 10; Rankin to Helms, June 19, 1964; Journal, June 16, 1964.

89. Church Committee Report, 63.

90. Ibid., 65.

91. Ibid., 64–65.

92. Ibid., 35–36.

93. Journal, June 16, 1964.

94. Ibid.

95. Warren Report, 293–97.

96. Warren Commission Hearings, vol. 5, 449–50.

97. Ibid., 451–53; Warren Report, 449–50.

98. Warren Commission Hearings, vol. 5, 458.

99. Ibid., 459.

100. Ibid., 462–64.

101. Ibid., 464–65.

102. Ibid.

103. Ibid., 466–67, 469–70.

104. Ibid., 480–81.

105. I sent Warren at Rankin’s request two drafts prepared by Coleman and Slawson—one on Oswald’s life in Russia and the other relating to his and his wife’s contacts with the State Department. Author to Warren, memorandum, June 19, 1964. Redlich sent Ford drafts of the proposed foreword, Chapters 2 and 3, a section on Oswald’s life through his military service, and a section on his life in the Soviet Union. Redlich to Ford, memorandum, June 19, 1964.

106. Should be “Surrey.”

107. Journal, June 20, 1964.

108. As for the other matters mentioned, we later arranged for the depositions of Mayor Cabell and his wife in July. Robert Surrey invoked the Fifth Amendment during his appearance before the commission on questions relating to the printing and distribution of a “Wanted for Treason” handbill on the streets of Dallas one or two days before President Kennedy’s visit. Warren Commission Hearings, vol. 5, 420–49. The handbill contained a photograph of the president “and set forth a series of inflammatory charges against him.” Warren Report, 298. Because the commission had obtained the testimony of Robert Klause, who actually printed the handbills, Surrey’s refusal to testify did not obstruct the commission’s investigation. Ibid., 298–99. I have discussed the Irving Sports Shop matter previously.

109. McCloy to Rankin, memorandum, June 24, 1964, enclosing eight pages of notes regarding draft chapters two and three. We learned at some point that he had an associate in his law firm, Patrick Burns, assisting him in reviewing commission drafts. Burns officially joined the commission staff later in the summer and helped us complete our work

110. These included the need for a letter to the FBI about the polygraph examination of Ruby, the service of a subpoena on Weissman, letters to various TV stations, the need to call Mayor and Mrs. Cabell, and Hubert’s willingness to take additional depositions in Dallas later in the week. Journal, June 22, 1964; Journal, June 24–26, 1964.

111. Ibid.

112. Ibid.

113. Ibid.

114. Ibid.

115. Ibid.

116. Ibid.

117. Author to Cooper, June 24, 1064, “Report of Commission”; author to Russell, June 24, 1964, “Report of Commission”; author to Boggs, June 24, 1964, “Report of Commission.”

118. Journal, June 24–26, 1964.

119. Journal, June 29, 1964.

120. Ibid.

121. Ibid. Rankin made notes of the meeting reflecting the decisions made, which he had transcribed and gave to Redlich and me. Ibid.

122. Ibid.

123. Bugliosi, Reclaiming History, 937.

124. Rankin to Hoover, June 30, 1964; “Commission Asks FBI to Probe Publication of Oswald Diary,” Hartford Courant (June 30, 1964), 6.

125. Ibid.

8: JULY–AUGUST 1964: A TALE OF TRAGIC TRUTH

1. Journal, July 1, 1964.

2. Rankin to Lane, June 19, 1964; Journal, July 2, 1964.

3. The pertinent portions of Markham’s testimony are set forth in Belin, November 22, 1963: You Are the Jury, 69–77.

4. Rankin to Lane, July 9, 1964.

5. Rankin to Hoover, July 16, 1964; Belin, November 22, 1963: You Are the Jury, 81.

6. Bartlett to Rankin, July 2, 1964; Journal, July 7, 1964.

7. Journal, July 14, 1964.

8. Ibid.

9. Robert S. Allen and Paul Scott, “Kennedy Death Report Split Told,” Los Angeles Times (July 23, 1964), A5.

10. Journal, July 15–21, 1964.

11. Ibid.

12. Journal, July 22, 1964.

13. Journal, August 14, 1964. Redlich and I did not initially regard this as good news, believing “it just seemed absurd for the Commission to state that they did not have time after 8 months to perform their responsibilities.” It seems evident in retrospect that we both overreacted to this development. Ibid.

14. Journal, August 21, 1964.

15. Journal, August 4, 1964. Redlich and I did not agree with Rankin that this was a particularly difficult assignment for the commissioners since they had an outline of the entire report and should be able to figure out where the particular chapter would eventually go. When we pursued this argument further with Rankin and took issue with his proposed use of our historians to edit draft chapters, Rankin “made the unfortunate slip of the tongue to the effect that if Mr. Redlich and I had our way we would produce the report ‘at our leisure.’” We were a little upset by this comment, which Rankin regretted soon after. Ibid.

16. Journal, July 3, 1964; Rankin to author, note, July 7, 1964, with attached five pages of comments; Goldberg to Rankin, memorandum, July 6, 1964, “Comments on Chapter 1.” Arthur Marmor, Goldberg’s fellow historian on the staff, also commented. Marmor to Rankin, memorandum, July 6, 1964.

17. Journal, August 11, 1964.

18. Belin to Rankin, memorandum, July 10, 1964, “Comments and Suggestions—Chapter 2—6/25/64 Draft.”

19. Journal, August 20, 1964.

20. I do not know why the commission preferred the term “Triple Overpass” rather than “Triple Underpass.” The latter was the more common usage in Dallas and is used in the commission’s report.

21. Rankin to Reynolds, Tague, Rackley, Altgens, and Zapruder, July 9, 1964.

22. Mosk to author, memorandum, July 17, 1964; Marmor to Redlich, memorandum, July 22, 1964, “Deputy Sheriff Eddie Raymond ‘Buddy’ Walthers”; Redlich to Liebeler, July 22, 1964. Specter, whose area of investigation had included both the medical testimony and trajectory of the shots, continued to be responsible for portions of this chapter. Specter to author, memorandum, July, 24, 1964, “Footnotes on Chapters 2 and 3.”

23. Journal, August 12, 1964; Warren Report, 112, 116. I was unable to complete the chapter on August 14 and it was scheduled for consideration by the commission during the next week. Journal, August 14 and 21, 1964.

24. Warren Report, 110–11.

25. Ibid., 110–17

26. As discussed in chapter 10, the acoustics evidence relied on by the House Select Committee on Assassinations in 1979 did not support the existence of a fourth shot fired from the grassy knoll.

27. The commission concluded that two small cartons marked “Rolling Readers” had been moved by Oswald to create “a convenient gun rest.” Instead of books, these boxes contained “light blocks used as reading aids.” Warren Report, 140.

28. Belin to Rankin, July 7, 1964, 2. He sent a copy of the letter to me with a short note indicating that he would review the materials that he had been sent, draft chapters 1, 2, 3, and 4, and be prepared to present his detailed comments when he arrived in Washington. Belin to author, July 7, 1964.

29. Belin to Rankin, July 7, 1964.

30. Ibid.

31. Rankin to Secret Service, July 11, 1964.

32. Rankin to Chief Curry, August 5, 1964 (requesting an affidavit clarifying whether a witness to the Tippit shooting had identified Oswald as the shooter); Rankin to Hoover, August 6, 1964 (requesting interviews of witnesses about the possibility that Oswald had a telescopic sight mounted on a rifle at the Irving Sports Shop); Rankin to Hoover, August 11, 1964 (requesting FBI experts to review several documents to determine if they were written by Oswald); Rankin to Hoover, August 21, 1964 (requesting the FBI to obtain affidavits from two witnesses who saw Oswald flee from the scene of the Tippit shooting); Rankin to Hoover, August 28, 1964 (requesting reinterview of Dallas rifle range operator where Oswald was alleged to have practiced); Rankin to Hoover, August 31, 1964 (requesting further investigation to resolve an apparent conflict between the testimony of an FBI agent and the Dallas policeman who had lifted a palm print from the barrel of the assassination weapon on November 22, 1963).

33. Author to Rankin, memorandum, August 8, 1964, “Chapter IV—draft dated 7/21/64”; Journal, August 17, 1964. Regarding Oswald’s fingerprints on the cartons near the sixth-floor depository window, I proposed that we evaluate other explanations for these fingerprints that would be consistent with Oswald’s innocence.

34. Because of his initial failure to make a positive identification, the commission decided not to base “its conclusion regarding the identity of the assassin on Brennan’s subsequent certain identification of Lee Harvey Oswald as the man he saw fire the rifle.” Warren Report, 146.

35. Goldberg to Rankin and Redlich, memorandum, August 7, 1964, “Chapter IV.” At my request, Stuart Pollak also commented on this draft. He thought that several sections were too long and that the lineups conducted by the Dallas Police Department should be discussed in more detail. Pollak to author, memorandum, August 11, 1964, “Comments on Chapter IV.” I passed his comments on to Redlich.

36. Journal, August 21, 1964. After the commission approved Chapter 4, David Belin responded to my earlier invitation to comment on this draft. Belin to author, August 26, 1964. In light of the previous controversy, I was very relieved to see that he thought the draft was “an excellent job” and proceeded to make thirty-four specific editing suggestions. I incorporated most of them into the chapter.

37. Rankin to Hoover, June 25, 1964.

38. Appendix XVII to the Warren Commission report describes the proceedings on July 18, 1964, the questions addressed to Ruby and his answers, and the interpretation of the results. Warren Report, 807–16. Specter to Rankin, memorandum, July 21, 1964, “Polygraph Examination of Jack Ruby on July 18, 1964.”

39. Ibid.

40. Ibid.

41. Ibid.; Dallas Times Herald (July 22, 1964); Washington Post (July 23, 1964), A3. Herndon advised Specter that there were numerous differences between the questions that he asked and those that appeared in the press. The source of the leak was never identified.

42. Warren Report, 809–14.

43. Warren Report, 815.

44. Specter, Passion for Truth, 117–18. Hoover had provided a more nuanced view of polygraph examinations in his testimony earlier before the commission. Then he referred to the allegation that a witness had seen money given to Oswald at the Cuban consulate in Mexico City, but that the witness agreed to take a polygraph examination and “[t]he lie detector test showed that he was telling a lie.” Hoover described the technique as “a contribution in an investigation, a more or less psychological contribution.” Warren Commission Hearings, vol. 5, 103.

45. Belin, November 22, 1963: You Are the Jury, 443 (italics in original).

46. I have listed these investigative requests in a separate document.

47. Rankin to Hubert, memorandum, July 8, 1964; Griffin to author, memorandum, July 9, 1964; Rankin to Hubert and Griffin, memorandum, July 18, 1964; Rankin to Specter, memorandum, July 31, 1964.

48. Goldberg to Rankin, memorandum, July 10, 1964; Rankin to Niederlehner, July 8, 1964. Niederlehner was acting general counsel of the Defense Department.

49. Goldberg to Rankin, memorandum, July 13, 1964, “Showing of TV Tapes and Films”; Rankin to Hoover, July 14, 1964. Pierce was assigned to drive the “lead car,” which was to be followed by the armored truck containing Oswald. Chief Curry approved a change of plans at the last moment, deciding that the armored truck would serve as a decoy and Oswald would be moved instead in an unmarked police car driven by a police officer. Warren Report, 215.

50. Warren Commission, “Executive Session Transcript, June 23, 1964.”

51. Ibid., 7641–44.

52. Ibid., 7644–46.

53. Ibid., 7647–49.

54. Journal, July 13, 1964.

55. Griffin to Rankin, memorandum, September 21, 1964.

56. Journal, August 17, 1964.

57. Journal, August 20, 1964.

58. Warren Report, 322.

59. Rankin to Hoover, August 28, 1964. Rankin sent a follow-up letter seeking further information about available bus service between New Orleans and Houston as of September 24–25, 1963. Rankin to Hoover, September 5, 1964. Warren Report, 321–25.

60. Warren Report, 323–24. In his examination of this matter, Bugliosi acknowledged the logic and evidentiary support for the commission’s conclusion, but went on to reason that the “very absence of any witness or record that Oswald used commercial transportation out of New Orleans is itself at least some circumstantial evidence that he did not do so and goes in the direction of supporting the conclusion that Oswald left New Orleans with the two Latins, and was at Odio’s door on the evening of September 24 or 25, 1963.” Bugliosi, Reclaiming History, 1312.

61. Griffin to author, memorandum, August 14, 1964, “Memo on Ruby Conspiracy Portion of Chapter VI,” 4.

62. Pollak to Redlich, memorandum, August 22, 1964; Slawson to Rankin, memorandum, August 28, 1964, “Questioning of Marina Oswald by Senators Russell and Cooper and Yourself.” Griffin to author, memorandum, August 20, 1964, “Oswald Portions of the Foreign Conspiracy Chapter.” He also thought we had devoted too much space to the possible involvement of the Soviet Union and Cuba in a conspiracy with Oswald, rather than focusing on individuals whom Oswald may have met after his return to the United States.

63. Warren Report, 274.

64. Warren Report, 309.

65. Warren Commission Hearings, vol. 5, 365; Slawson, interview by the author, December 15, 2011. Neither Slawson nor Coleman was shown or told about any transcripts, although they were told that the CIA had information indicating that Castro was genuinely shocked and surprised when he heard of President Kennedy’s assassination. Slawson to author, January 9, 2013.

66. Walter Pincus and George Lardner, “The Trust Was Secondary: The Warren Commission’s Real Mission Was to Avert Public Hysteria,” Washington Post (November 22–28, 1993), National Weekly Edition, 6. The article is also indexed as Walter Pincus and George Lardner, “Warren Commission Born Out of Fear; Washington Wanted to Stop Speculation,” Washington Post (November 14, 1993), A1. I disagree, of course, with their contentions regarding the creation of the commission or its “real mission.”

67. Ibid.

68. Liebeler to author and Redlich, memorandum, August 27, 1964, “Conspiracy.”

69. Warren Report, 376. See also Warren Commission Hearings, vol. 1, 22.

70. Warren Commission Staff, outline, “Oswald’s Life for Discussion with Psychiatric Consultants on July 9, 1964.”

71. Warren Commission Staff Member (Unnamed), memorandum, July 9, 1964, “Thoughts and Questions for Discussion with Psychiatric Consultants on July 9, 1964,” which included a summary of the observations of the consultants during the discussion.

72. Early in August, Pollak, at my request, looked at Liebeler’s current draft. Pollak to author, memorandum, August 3, 1964. He commented on the challenge of determining how best to discuss Oswald’s personal characteristics and his political views in a way that would help a reader understand the range of possible motives. He proposed a reorganization of the chapter, which Liebeler used in subsequent drafts.

73. Journal, August 21, 1964.

74. Warren Commission Hearings, vol. 5, 104.

75. Ibid., 110, 113.

76. Church Committee Report, 51.

77. Warren Report, 24.

78. McCloy to Rankin, July 8, 1964.

79. Journal, July 2, 1964.

80. Dulles to Rankin, July 13, 1964. He recognized that the staff draft had proposed a new body at the cabinet level to oversee presidential protection but suggested that using the established NSC structure and staff would be preferable.

81. Journal, August 17, 1964.

82. Weinreb to author, memorandum, August 12, 1964, “Chapter 8”; Journal, August 20, 1964.

83. Journal, August 19, 1964.

84. Ibid; Warren Report, 455–56.

85. Author, memorandum for the record, August 24, 1964, “Meeting with the Chairman,” 2.

86. Journal, August 20 and 21, 1964.

87. Warren Commission Staff, “Outline of the Report of the President’s Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy,” July 21, 1964.

88. Goldberg to Rankin, memorandum, July 21, 1964, “Appendix on Allegations, Theories and Rumors”; Rankin to Hoover, July 24, 1964.

89. Goldberg to Staff, memorandum, July 24, 1964, “Allegations.” I made two general suggestions and nine specific comments about particular allegations. Author to Goldberg, memorandum, July 27, 1964, “Appendix on Allegations.” Alfredda Scobey, who helped Senator Russell with his commission duties, responded with a memo in which she politely pointed out several areas where the proposed answer did not accurately reflect the evidence. Scobey to Goldberg, memorandum, July 27, 1964, “Your Memorandum Concerning Allegations.”

90. Laulicht, interview by the author, February 6, 2012.

91. Journal, August 19, 1964. We were advised, for example, that the National Archives would not release any FBI investigative reports in its possession without the bureau’s consent. Ibid.

92. Journal, August 21, 1964.

93. In 1992 Congress enacted a law providing for further disclosure of the commission’s records and those of the House Select Committee on Assassinations. President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992, Pub. Law No. 102–526 (1992).

94. HSCA Hearings, vol. 3, 564, 560, 599–600.

95. Ibid., 601.

96. HSCA Hearings, vol. 3, 615; HSCA Hearings, vol. 11, 141.

97. HSCA Hearings, vol. 3, 615; HSCA Hearings, vol. 11, 81–82. All of us on the staff who were asked these questions gave the same answers.

9: SEPTEMBER 1964: THE LAST DEBATES

1. Warren Report., 19.

2. Holland, The Kennedy Assassination Tapes, 248–51 (italics in the original).

3. Rankin to Hoover, September 3, 1964; Liebeler to author, memorandum, September 2, 1964, “Relevant Property Remaining in the Possession of Marina Oswald as of August 26, 1964.”

4. Liebeler. memorandum, September 6, 1964, “Galley Proofs of Chapter IV of the Report.” No recipients are indicated on the memorandum in my possession, but I am certain that it went to Rankin, Redlich, and myself.

5. HSCA Hearings, vol. 11, 212–56.

6. Jenner to Henry, US attorney, Denver, CO, September 3, 1964; Jenner to George, US marshall, Eastern District of Illinois, September 5, 1964, 1; Warren Commission Hearings, vol. 15, 709–44. The article was in American Opinion, published by the John Birch Society.

7. Ibid., 710; Jenner to Unger, counsel for Oliver, September 21, 1964.

8. Liebeler to Rankin, memorandum, September 4, 1964; Warren Commission Hearings, vol. 5, 588–620.

9. Ibid., 589–90.

10. Ibid., 590.

11. Ibid., 591–92.

12. Ibid., 593, 595.

13. Ibid., 594, 596–97.

14. Ibid., 601–02.

15. Ibid., 605–08, 611; Warren Report, 387–88.

16. Warren Commission Hearings, vol. 5, 614–15.

17. Rankin to Commission members, memorandum, September 1, 1964; author to Jenner, Liebeler, Coleman, Slawson, Griffin, and Laulicht, memorandum, September 4, 1964, “Chapter VI: Investigation of Possible Conspiracy.”

18. Liebeler to author, memorandum, September 14, 1964.

19. In five cases, I cannot now check whether I made the change he proposed because I do not have the galley proofs containing his suggestions.

20. Warren Report, 328; Liebeler to author, memorandum, September 1, 1964, 8. This citation is to the original memorandum and not to the single-spaced version of this (and other) Liebeler memoranda that have been circulated among interested parties. HSCA Hearings, vol. 11, 258.

21. Liebeler to author, memorandum, September 15, 1964, “Chapter VI.”

22. Liebeler’s memorandum contained fifty-five numbered paragraphs on the draft chapter, but some of the paragraphs contained more than one suggestion. The paragraph numbered fifty-five did not comment on the chapter but reflected his intention to send the memo to Pollak.

23. Liebeler to author, memorandum, September 15, 1964, “Chapter VI.” A few of Liebeler’s proposals in this memorandum were rejected for reasons that are not readily apparent. These included a few proposed minor editing suggestions, such as the substitution of the word “or” for “nor” (¶ 22) or the use of the abbreviation “C” (¶ 9). It also included a few suggestions for changes in language that probably should have been made, eg. clarification of Marina Oswald’s testimony regarding her husband’s job in the Soviet Union to make clear that she was testifying based on what her husband had told her rather than based on her firsthand knowledge. Ibid., ¶ 26.

24. Liebeler to author, memorandum, September 16, 1964, “Chapter VI.”

25. HSCA Hearings, vol. 3, 590; Warren Report, 374. In the “Conclusions” section of chapter one, the commission stated that “the commission has found no evidence that either Lee Harvey Oswald or Jack Ruby was part of any conspiracy, domestic or foreign, to assassinate President Kennedy.” Ibid., 21. I believe that the absence of the word “credible” was inadvertent and that the commission would have added it if this inconsistency had been brought to its attention in a timely manner.

26. Warren Report, 22, 374.

27. Kennedy to Warren, August 4, 1964.

28. Warren Commission Hearings, vol. 5, 99–100.

29. HSCA Report, 164–65.

30. HSCA Hearings, vol. 11, 371–72.

31. Ibid.

32. Cameron to Liebeler, September 9, 1964, 1.

33. Liebeler to author, memorandum, September 15, 1964.

34. Warren Report, 381.

35. Ibid., 391.

36. Liebeler to author, memorandum, September 15, 1964, “Letter of Dr. Howard P. Rome, dated September 13, 1964”; Warren Report, 383.

37. Warren Report, 463-69; Warren to Dillon, September 9, 1964; Dillon to Warren, undated but filed as though September 9, 1964.

38. Warren Report, 467–68.

39. Although the commission heard ninety-four witnesses, the commission usually heard more than one witness at a hearing. The figures show that Russell heard only six witnesses, Boggs heard twenty, and Cooper heard fifty. Warren heard all the witnesses; Ford heard seventy, and Dulles heard sixty. According to Bugliosi, McCloy heard thirty-five, which was less than Cooper. Bugliosi, Reclaiming History, 455, note.

40. Rankin to Commission Staff, memorandum, September 21, 1962, “Final Responsibilities.”

41. Author to Rankin, memorandum, September 21, 1964, “Miscellaneous Affairs.”

42. Ibid., 3.

43. Edward T. Folliard, “LBJ Gets Warren Report,” Boston Globe (September 25, 1964), 1.

44. “Warren Hands President Report on Assassination,” Hartford Courant (September 25, 1964), 17D; Folliard, “LBJ Gets Warren Report,” 1.

45. Holland, Assassination Tapes, 254.

46. Johnson to Warren, September 24, 1964.

47. Johnson to Rankin, September 24, 1964.

48. Anthony Lewis, “New Panel Plans to Act Speedily on Warren Data,” New York Times (September 29, 1964), 1.

49. “Detective Effort Termed ‘Massive,’” New York Times (September 28, 1964), 17; Associated Press, “Comment Favors Report with Few Exceptions,” Los Angeles Times (September 28, 1964), 6; Jerry Kluttz, “The Federal Diary: Praise Is Voiced for Staff Engaged on Warren Report,” Washington Post (September 29, 1964), B1; Chris Perry, “Attorney Mark Lane Blasts Warren Commission Report: Feels That Group Has Answered Few Questions and No Doubts,” Philadelphia Tribune (September 29, 1964), 1; “Mrs. Oswald Spurns Finding on Her Son,” Chicago Tribune (September 28, 1964), 14.

50. “Robert Kennedy Says He Won’t Read Report,” New York Times (September 28, 1964), 17.

51. “All Tips Run Down by Warren Panel: Doubts May Remain Despite Checking of Plot Theories,” New York Times (November 25, 1964), 19.

52. Ibid.; “Collectors Shun Warren Volumes,” New York Times (November 29, 1964), 63; Goldberg, interview by the author, January 19, 2012.

53. Holland, Assassination Tapes, 254–55.

54. Ibid., 256–57, 259.

55. “Associated Press, “Johnson Names 4 to Act on Report,” New York Times (September 28, 1964).

56. Holland, Assassination Tapes, 259–61. Katzenbach had never been dean of a law school.

57. Lewis, “New Panel Plans to Act Speedily on Warren Data”; The National Security Archive, “Kennedy Sought Dialogue with Cuba” (posted November 24, 2003).

58. Robert B. Semple Jr., “Secret Service Is Reorganized: Changes Result from Study by Warren Commission,” New York Times (November 11, 1964), 1; Felix Belair Jr., “Panel Opposes New F.B.I. Role in Johnson Guard,” New York Times (November 22, 1964), 1.

10: AFTERMATH

1. The saying “Three persons can keep a secret, but only if two are dead” is originally attributed to Benjamin Franklin in the July 1735 issue of Poor Richard’s Almanac. Bartlett’s Familiar Quotations, 16th ed., 309. Bugliosi subscribes to this belief as well. Bugliosi, Reclaiming History, xxx.

2. Church Committee Report, 53–54.

3. Ibid., 52–53, 55, 57.

4. Mary Pakenham, “Hoover Calls Rev. King Liar: Hits Warren Report and Soft Judges,” Chicago Tribune (November 19, 1964), 1; “Warren Report Unfair to FBI, Hoover Quoted,” Hartford Courant (November 19, 1964), 38. Hoover included these comments in an interview with eighteen female reporters where he also criticized Supreme Court justices as “bleeding-heart judges” for their recent rulings and called Dr. Martin Luther King “the most notorious liar in the country.” President Johnson was reportedly very disturbed by Hoover’s comments, in particular those about Dr. King which coincided with a previously scheduled meeting on civil rights matters between the president and a group of black leaders. David Kraslow, “Johnson Reported Upset at FBI Chief’s Remarks: President Said to Have Reacted Sharply to Criticism of Dr. King, Supreme Court,” Los Angeles Times (November 20, 1964), 5; Church Committee Report, 55– 56.

5. Associated Press, “Comment Favors Report with Few Exceptions,” Los Angeles Times (September 28, 1964), 6; “Report Dominates World’s Press as Comments Differ,” Washington Post (September 29, 1964), A15.

6. Ibid.; “Warren Data Stir Europe: Newspapers Split on Proof Furnished by Report,” Baltimore Sun (September 29, 1964), 5; Max Frankel, “Oswald Findings Doubted Abroad: U.S. Reports Many Papers Reject the Conclusion That Assassin Acted Alone,” New York Times (October 3, 1964), 1. One of England’s most distinguished historians, Hugh Trevor-Roper, claimed that the commission had not found any “positive evidence’ that Oswald was the assassin and that the report was a “smokescreen.” He was “severely taken to task by a number of critics in both the United States and Britain” but adhered to his views after admitting to one slight mistake in his analysis. “Warren Findings Again Questioned: But Trevor-Roper Concedes an Error on One Point,” New York Times (January 4, 1965), 30; “The Warren Report Stands as Written: Danger of Infestion,” Washington Post (January 17, 1965), 92.

7. “Study Says 2 Men Shot At Kennedy: 51 Witnesses Linked Firing to Knoll, Writer Finds,” New York Times (March 1, 1965), 17. This conclusion was offered by Harold Feldman, writing in The Minority of One, which called itself an “independent monthly for an American alternative.”

8. Richard Harwood, “An Inquest: Skeptical Postscript to Warren Group’s Report on Assassination,” Washington Post (May 29, 1966), A1.

9. Claudia Casssidy, “On the Aisle: Preview of Mark Lane’s ‘Rush to Judgment,’ an Inquiry into the Evidence’s Other Side,” Chicago Tribune (May 23, 1966), C5; Mark Lane, Last Word: My Indictment of the CIA in the Murder of JFK (New York: Skyhorse, 2011).

10. Harwood, “An Inquest”; “Warren Report on Assassination Challenged Again,” New York Times (June 5, 1966), 42. Several forensic scientists by this time had publicly criticized the autopsy conducted on the president and the absence in the commission’s records of the full set of autopsy X-rays and photographs. Ronald Kotulak, “Hits Autopsy On Slain J.F.K. as Inadequate: Doctor Assails Those Who Conducted It,” Chicago Tribune (February 26, 1966), C7; “Experts Find Gaps in Warren Report,” New York Times (February 26, 1966), 9.

11. Epstein, Inquest, 79; Eisenberg, interview by the author, December 13, 2011; Asbury, “Former Kennedy Aide Suggests Panel to Check Warren Report,” New York Times (July 24, 1966), 25.

12. C. J. Earl Warren, The Memoirs of Earl Warren (1977), 363; Eric Pace, “J. A. Ball, 97, Counsel to Warren Commission,” New York Times (September 30, 2000), A18.

13. Robert J. Donovan, “Kennedy Death Report Backed by 2 Panelists,” Los Angeles Times (October 6, 1966). 1.

14. Gene Blake, “Warren Report under the Microscope at UCLA: Professor Directs Massive Analysis of Challenged Findings on Assassination,” Los Angeles Times (October 21, 1966), A1.

15. “Johnson Backs Warren Report as Thorough and Reasonable,” New York Times (November 5, 1964), 11; John Atticks, “Yale Law Professor Picks Flaws in Warren Commission Finding,” Hartford Courant (November 6, 1966), 29A; Peter Kihss, “Warren Panel, under Attacks, Stands Firm on Its Findings in Kennedy Death 3 Years Ago,” New York Times (November 22, 1966), 22.

16. Ibid.

17. “The Warren Report: A Panel Discussion,” Los Angeles Times (November 27, 1966), F1.

18. Ibid.

19. “Commissioner Says New Probe Useless without New Evidence,” Boston Globe (November 23, 1966), 24. Four years later, in a series of taped television interviews, Senator Russell reiterated his belief that that Oswald did not act alone in the assassination. Due to his doubts, he stated that he insisted on a disclaimer in the Commission’s report emphasizing the difficulties of proving a negative proposition to a certainty and stating that, if there was any such evidence of a conspiracy, “it has been beyond the reach of all the investigative agencies and resources of the United States and has not come to the attention of this commission.” Don Oberdorfer, “Russell Says He Never Believed Oswald Alone Planned Killing,” Washington Post (January 19, 1970), A3.

20. Peter Kihss, “Warren Panel Member Suggests Independent Group Study Kennedy X-rays,” New York Times (November 28, 1966), 29; “Heartsick Atmosphere Led to Some Warren Report Omissions,” Boston Globe (June 27, 1967), 46; “The Autopsy: The Warren Commission Did Make a Mistake. It had Compassion.,” Washington Post (June 25, 1967), C3.

21. “A Warren Lawyer Says Ruby’s Death Can’t Alter Report,” New York Times (January 4, 1967), 20; “1968 Panel Review of Photographs, X-Rays, Films, Documents and Other Evidence Pertaining to the Fatal Wounding of President John F. Kennedy on November 22, 1963 in Dallas, Texas,” available as Assassination Records Review Board Medical Document 59. This panel is commonly known as the “Clark Panel.”

22. This development and its consequences are discussed in Holland, Assassination Tapes, 414–28.

23. Ibid., 414, 416.

24. Ibid., 415, 417–18.

25. Eisenberg, interview by the author, December 13, 2011.

26. Specter, Passion for Truth (2000), 124.

27. Griffin, interview by the author, December 5, 2011.

28. Slawson, interview by the author, December 15, 2011.

29. See, for example, Richard M. Mosk, “The Warren Commission and the Legal Process,” Case and Comment 72 (May–June 1967): 13–20; and, Alfredda Scobey, “A Lawyer’s Notes on the Warren Commission Report,” American Bar Association Journal 51, no. 1 (January 1965): 39–43.

30. C. J. Warren, Memoirs (1977), 364–67.

31. Alfred Goldberg, “Conspiracy Interpretations of the Assassination of President Kennedy: International and Domestic” Security Studies Paper no. 16 (University of California, Los Angeles, 1968), 15.

32. Ibid., 28–29.

33. Belin, You Are the Jury, xiii.

34. He tried the Stockton–Palliko case, in which Judy Palliko’s husband killed Henry Stockton and Stockton’s wife killed Judy Palliko, leaving only wisps of evidence that there was any connection between the two homicides. Bugliosi prosecuted the case successfully on mostly circumstantial evidence and then wrote Till Death Us Do Part in 1978.

35. This discussion is based on his talk at the San Diego Library on August 9, 2007, which can be heard at the following site: http://www.americanbooktour.com/.

36. Ibid.

37. Ibid.

38. Ibid.

39. The members were: John T. Connor (former secretary of Commerce), C. Douglas Dillon (former secretary of the treasury), Erwin N. Griswold (former solicitor general and dean of the Harvard Law School), Lane Kirkland (secretary-treasurer of the AFL-CIO), Lyman L. Lemnitzer (former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff), Ronald Reagan (former governor of California), and Edgar F. Shannon (professor and former president of the University of Virginia). Commission on CIA Activities within the United States, Report to the President by the Commission on CIA Activities within the United States (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1975), x.

40. Belin, Final Disclosure: The Full Truth about the Assassination of President Kennedy (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1988), 80–82.

41. Belin did not participate in the investigation of these allegations because of his previous position with the Warren Commission. Ibid., 178.

42. Rockefeller Commission Report, 262. The three doctors on the panel “reported that such a motion would be caused by a violent straightening and stiffening of the entire body as a result of a seizure-like neuromuscular reaction to major damage inflicted to nerve centers in the brain.” Ibid. The commission discussed these conclusions in more detail at pages 262–64.

43. Ibid., 265.

44. Ibid., 267–68.

45. Belin, Final Disclosure, 86–91.

46. Ibid., 91–100. Belin reported that his inquiry was handicapped in two important respects. First, his commission did not have the power of subpoena and Congress rejected its request for such authority, in part because there was no member of Congress on the commission, as had been the case with the Warren Commission. Second, Congress was beginning its own investigation of the intelligence agencies and difficulties arose as to which committee should have the documents and decide whether to provide them to the commission. Belin did obtain the materials in March after meeting with the newly appointed staff of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence chaired by Senator Church of Idaho. Ibid., 96–102.

47. The CIA officials interviewed included McCone and Helms, as well as lower-level officials (Edwards and Harvey) personally engaged in the planning of such efforts. The high-level executive branch officials in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations interviewed included Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy, General Maxwell Taylor, and General Edward Lansdale. The two generals participated in a Special Group (Augmented) that was supposed to work with Attorney General Kennedy to implement a memorandum from President Kennedy to Secretary of State Rusk dated November 30, 1961, directing that the United States “use our available assets … to help Cuba overthrow the Communist regime.” Ibid., 124–26, 162.

48. Ibid., 163–65.

49. Ibid., 165, 173, 185.

50. The Church Committee report entitled Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders incorporated the work of the Rockefeller Commission and produced a detailed recital of the various plans of the CIA (supported by other agencies) during the 1960–63 period directed at Castro, including his assassination. Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, The Investigation of the Assassination of President J.F.K.: Performance of the Intelligence Agencies (1976) (hereafter Church Committee Report), 2.

51. Ibid. In evaluating the relationship between the Warren Commission and the two intelligence agencies, the Church Committee did not accurately portray the commission’s overall approach and its investigative capabilities. First, it incorrectly attributed to the Warren Commission a desire to complete the investigation promptly and to dispel all rumors regarding a conspiracy. Second, it erroneously concluded that the commission relied almost exclusively on the FBI and ignored the commission’s own investigation producing the testimony of 552 witnesses.

52. Ibid., 9–10.

53. Ibid., 11.

54. Ibid., 12–13.

55. Ibid., 36 and n 85.

56. Ibid., 37–38.

57. Ibid., 38–40.

58. Ibid., 7.

59. Ibid., 14. This interview appeared in the Miami Herald of September 9, 1963, 1A.

60. One witness before the Church Committee described the SAS as “sort of a microcosm of the Agency with emphasis on Cuban matters,” which had its own counterintelligence staff that coordinated with Angleton’s but was not subordinate to it. Ibid., 57–58, 60.

61. Ibid., 70–71.

62. Ibid., 59.

63. Ibid., 72, 74.

64. Ibid., 67. Although it is probable that Dulles knew of such efforts during his tenure at the agency, the record is unclear whether he knew of the plans, including AMLASH, that developed during the 1961–63 period. Bugliosi, Reclaiming History, 1343. As discussed earlier, Dulles’s successor as CIA director was not aware of these assassination plots until the Pearson story in early 1967and the internal CIA report that was used to brief President Johnson.

65. Church Committee Report, 67–68, 72–73. Whether Robert Kennedy knew about the CIA’s assassination plots in 1963 has been the subject of considerable, but inconclusive, examination. See, for example, Evan Thomas, Robert Kennedy, 145–59; Bugliosi, Reclaiming History, 1344; Bugliosi, Endnotes, 779–98. He and I never discussed the subject. Based on what I have read and been told, I believe the following: (1) Kennedy did not know of the CIA plot utilizing major criminal figures until the Justice Department was asked by the agency in April–May 1962 to dismiss the pending wiretap prosecution in Las Vegas; (2) memoranda of the May meeting prepared by the FBI and the CIA indicate that the attorney general told the agency to stop such activities; (3) notwithstanding Kennedy’s direction, the CIA continued to pursue other assassination plots (including AMLASH) until early 1963 without informing senior CIA officials or Kennedy; (4) after the Pearson story in March 1967, Kennedy told his staff that he had stopped such CIA plots; and (5) Jack Miller, who met with CIA General Counsel Houston in April 1962 on this subject, told me several decades later that, after reviewing extensive FBI reports, he believed that Kennedy had not authorized the CIA assassination plots. Herbert J. Miller Jr., interview by the author, transcript, Oral History Project of the Historical Society of the District of Columbia Circuit, 1998, 109–10, available at http://www.dechs.org/OralHistoryID=29&Menu=Documents.

66. HSCA Hearings, vol. 3, 648;

67. HSCA Hearings, vol. 3, 648; Slawson, interview by author, December 15, 2011.

68. HSCA Hearings, vol. 3, 649–50.

69. Holland, Kennedy Assassination Tapes, 428.

70. Griffin, interview by the author, November 28, 2012.

71. Bugliosi, Reclaiming History, 996.

72. Ibid., 371.

73. House Report No. 95-1828, Report of the Select Committee on Assassinations, US House of Representatives, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1979) (hereafter “HSCA Report”), 9.

74. HSCA Report., 260–61.

75. Ibid., 261.

76. “Lone Assassin Theory Buttressed,” Hartford Courant, (September 10, 1978), 9A; “New Evidence reported as Backing Warren probe of Kennedy slaying,” Chicago Tribune (September 8, 1978), 2; Curt Matthews, “Warren Unit Findings Get New Support.” Baltimore Sun (September 9, 1978), A1.

77. Liebeler, Thoughts, 45; HSCA Hearings, vol. 6, 35.

78. HSCA Hearings, vol. 7, 39, 41, 144.

79. Liebeler, Thoughts, 102.

80. HSCA Report, 129, 147 (emphasis added).

81. Chapter Six.

82. HSCA Report 501.

83. Ibid., 506.

84. Curt Matthews, “Acoustics Tests in Dallas Fail to Resolve How Many Shots Were Fired at Kennedy,” Baltimore Sun (September 12, 1978), 1.

85. Nicholas M. Horrock, “Tracing Any Kennedy Conspirator Is Given Little Chance by Officials,” New York Times (January 1, 1979), 1.

86. Ibid., 495.

87. HSCA Hearings, vol. 5, 587.

88. Ibid., 674.

89, HSCA Report, 1.

90. Ibid., 497.

91. Ibid.

92. Ibid., 492—93.

93. Ibid., 493.

94. Ibid., 93, 496.

95. Ibid., 498; Edgar, interview by the author, February 3, 2012. Edgar was then the chief executive officer of Common Cause in Washington, DC. He died in April 2013.

96. HSCA Report, 504.

97. Ibid., 505–06.

98. Ibid., 507.

99. Rogers Worthington, “16 Years after JFK’s Death, Probers Agree—But What Next?” Chicago Tribune (July 26, 1979), A1; Marjorie Hunter, “House Panel Reports a Conspiracy ‘Probable’ in the Kennedy Slaying,” New York Times (December 31, 1978), 1; John Herbers, “After 15 Years, Plot Theories Still Thicken,” New York Times (January 7, 1979), E5; Newsweek, quoted in Bugliosi, Endnotes, 174; Jerry Cohen and Mike Goodman, “Contrary Data Withheld From Assassinations Panel,” Los Angeles Times (January 27, 1979), A1.

100. Bugliosi, Reclaiming History, 377. Blakey elaborated on his personal conclusion in the book, The Plot to Kill the President (1981), which he and Billings wrote together.

101. The Ramsey report was delayed because of the desire of the committee’s members to consult informally with Barger about his work before reaching their own conclusions. According to Professor Ramsey, Barger was “quite defensive about his report” and did not wish to discuss his work with new committee. Ramsey to Belin, May 20, 1992.

102. Blakey to Stokes, November 24, 1981.

103. Blakey to Barger, May 17, 1982.

104. Ibid.

105. Bugliosi, Reclaiming History, 380–81; Bugliosi, Endnotes, 153–218. The Select Committee’s reliance on the acoustics evidence had been previously criticized in Belin, Final Disclosure: The Full Truth about the Assassination of President Kennedy (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1988), 190–97; Posner, Case Closed: Lee Harvey Oswald and the Assassination of JFK (New York: Doubleday, 1993), 235–40; and Liebeler, Thoughts, 193–254.

106. The law was entitled the President John F. Kennedy Records Collection Act of 1992.

107. Assassination Records Review Board, Final Report of the Assassination Records Review Board (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office,1998), 1–2 (hereafter “ARRB Report”).

108. Belin, “The Assassination of Earl Warren and the Truth,” address before the National Press Club, Washington, DC (March 26, 1992), 2–3.

109. Ibid.

110. Griffin, interview by author, November 28, 2012. The letter and statement are attached to my written statement before the Subcommittee of the House Committee on Government Operations on April 28, 1992.

111. 138 Cong. Rec. H1984 (March 26, 1992); ARRB Report, 2.

112. Legislation and National Security Subcommittee of the House Committee on Government Operations, Hearings before the Legislation and National Security Subcommittee of the House Committee on Government Operations (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1993), 89 (hereafter “Assassination Materials Disclosure Hearings”).

113. Ibid., 100; George Lardner, “The Way It Wasn’t; In ‘JFK’ Stone Assassinates the Truth,” Washington Post (December 20, 1991), D2.

114. Assassination Materials Disclosure Hearings, 159.

115. Ibid., 164.

116. When Belin testified before the Conyers subcommittee on July 22, he repeated the major points of his National Press Club speech about Stone’s film. In a characteristic show of bravado, he challenged the members of the subcommittee to ask him any question whatsoever about the Warren Commission’s findings and expressed his confidence that he could answer any such query. Belin took a position on the proposed legislation far beyond what I had advocated on behalf of the commission staff; he recommended that Congress mandate release of all—repeat all—assassination records regardless of any national security classification that they might have. Statement of David W. Belin, Former Counsel, Warren Commission, and Former Executive Director, Rockefeller Commission, before the Legislation and National Security Subcommittee of the House Committee on Government Operations (July 22, 1992).

117. AARB Report, 86–91.

118. Ibid., xxv–xxvii.

119. Bugliosi, Reclaiming History, 379.

120. ARRB Report, 8.

121. Assassination Materials Disclosure Hearings, 164.

122. Goldberg, “Conspiracy Interpretations of the Assassination of President Kennedy: International and Domestic” (Security Studies Paper Number 16, University of California, Los Angeles, 1968), 29.

POSTSCRIPT

1. Los Angeles Times (September 23, 2000).

2. New York Times (January 18, 1999), B8.

3. Lisa Trei, “Influential Law Scholar Dies at 64” Stanford Report (October 29, 2003)

4. Martin, “Nicholas Katzenbach 90, Dies; Policy Maker at ’60s Turning Points,” New York Times (May 9, 2012).

5. Washington Post (September 29, 2002), C6.

6. Grimes, “Herbert J. Miller Jr., Justice Dept. Leader, Dies at 85,” New York Times (November 21, 2009).

7. New York Times (June 11, 2011), D8.

8. Statement of President Obama, October 14, 2012.

9. Harvard Law Record, “Ten Professors to Take” (April 10, 2003), 2; http://www.gvpt.umd.edu/lpbr/subpages/reviews/weinreb805.htm.