CHAPTER 8
BY EARLY JULY, THE COMMISSION HAD ANSWERED MOST OF THE SEVENTY-two questions before it, and the staff was revising draft chapters based on those decisions. During July and August, both commission members and staff evaluated innumerable drafts of each chapter. The testimony of additional witnesses and investigation of critical factual issues expanded the commission’s record. Changing publication dates complicated our lives, but when the commission in August requested additional time to complete its report, the White House readily agreed. By the end of August, we were confident that the report would be ready for submission to President Johnson on schedule.
Mark Lane, the New York lawyer who by this point was making quite a good living lecturing around the world on Oswald’s innocence, appeared before the commission for the second time on July 2. We were faced with an unexpected hitch when Lane was stopped by immigration authorities on his return from a European lecture tour and asked whether he had ever traveled to Cuba. Lane was outraged to learn that his name was on a “stop” list. At Rankin’s request, I learned from the FBI and INS that the request had been made by an unidentified federal agency. Based on this information, I assured Rankin that the commission had nothing to do with Lane’s stop at the border.1
Although we knew he would relish this opportunity to again trumpet his views, the commission had asked Lane to appear because he had still not produced documents he repeatedly claimed to have. Rankin asked Lane to bring all records in his possession pertaining to the assassination of Kennedy, the killing of Tippit, and the killing of Oswald, including a recording of conversations between Lane and Helen Markham, the eyewitness to the shooting of Officer Tippit. Once again, however, Lane produced no records. During the session Warren suggested that the commission had every reason to doubt his truthfulness—a statement that was widely publicized.2
Lane had previously testified under oath that Helen Markham had told him that the gunman was “short, a little on the heavy side and his hair was somewhat bushy.” This description did not fit Oswald. In March, Joe Ball questioned Markham in a hearing before the commission. Markham denied describing the gunman in this manner to Lane or anybody else. She testified that the gunman “wasn’t too heavy” and that his hair “wasn’t so bushy. It was, say, windblown or something.” Markham said she had never met Lane and did not know who he was. When presented with two photographs of Lane to refresh her recollection, she said, “I have never seen this man in my life.”3
When questioned by the commission, Lane denied that he had recorded any interview with Markham or knew of anyone doing so. Lane later reconsidered and wrote Rankin for assurances that neither he nor anyone else would be prosecuted under state laws prohibiting the recording of conversations without consent, if he provided the tape recording of his conversation with Markham. With Warren’s approval, Rankin provided Lane with the requested assurances of immunity if he produced the recording.4
The FBI transcribed the tape subsequently produced by Lane. It turned out that he had never met with Markham, but had recorded a telephone conversation with her. A transcription of this conversation was published by the commission and illustrated Lane’s persistent efforts to put words into Markham’s mouth and her refusal to allow him to do so. As David Belin later appraised the conversation: “Try as he could, Mark Lane, legally trained, sought in vain to lead a relatively uneducated person into saying that the man she saw kill Officer Tippit was short, stocky, with bushy hair.”5
Changing Publication Dates
By the beginning of July, we still lacked even a tentative publication date for the commission’s report. After our memorable discussion with Warren in late June, the commission acknowledged that its assignment would require more time than the members had anticipated. Our lawyers and historians were determined to proceed carefully and thoughtfully, well aware that each statement in the report would be scrutinized for decades. It is certainly true—as observed by many future commentators—that the staff worked under pressure. The pressure, however, came not from the White House (or the Justice Department) but from the demanding nature of this unique assignment and the standards of care, judgment, and professionalism that the staff brought to the task.
The media and other commentators constantly pressed the commission about the projected publication date, particularly given the upcoming political conventions. One well-known writer asked Rankin to make the report available to the press before its public release, so that the initial coverage could be better informed; he suggested it not be released during the Republican Convention in San Francisco when the press would focused on that event. When Robert Kennedy asked me on July 7 about the timing of the report’s release, I told him we hoped it would be done before the Democratic Convention in August.6
Later in the month, two target dates for publication emerged from White House meetings. After one session with McGeorge Bundy on July 14, Rankin advised me the report would be published on Monday, August 10. Although Rankin knew this was completely unrealistic, he was unable to influence the decision. At that time, Bundy held the position of assistant to the president for national security affairs and chaired the National Security Council, comprising the secretaries of Defense, State, and Treasury and the attorney general.7
By this time, commission crises had become routine. Rankin would take from his desk drawer “a yellow pad of paper and start listing things that remained to be done;” Redlich and I would decide which jobs we should undertake and which could be assigned to others on the staff. In light of the new—and impossible—deadline, we agreed that Redlich and I should not do any original writing but concentrate instead on editing. We decided that Goldberg should undertake drafting of the appendix dealing with rumors and allegations, and that Belin and Specter would be asked to take on new writing assignments. We undertook to recruit additional people from the Government Printing Office for technical editing and two Justice Department lawyers for source checking.8
Reports of discussion about the publication date found their way into the newspapers. A Los Angeles Times article on July 23, under the headline “Kennedy Death Report Split Told,” reported that Warren “is pressing vigorously for publishing findings early next month”—a view reportedly shared by commission members Dulles and Ford. The article reported President Johnson was urging the report be released before the Democratic Convention in late August. However, the article detailed the contrary views of Senator Cooper, very likely the primary source for the story. Described as “[t]he quiet-mannered but firmly decisive veteran of General Patton’s famed Third Army,” Cooper was quoted as asking “Why the rush?” and stating that he knew of no deadline the commission had to meet. The article indicated that Senator Russell shared Cooper’s view on the timing issue, but had attended only a few commission meetings—in part because he was the “leader of the Southern bloc during the historic ten-week Senate battle over the new civil rights law.”9
During the next week, Redlich and I made every effort to complete our own projects and to check with our colleagues about their writing assignments. The period was “one of considerable pressure, aggravation and fatigue” during which I worked on several chapters, some of which had substantial problems. Redlich and I needed to raise the publication-date issue again with Rankin. On Monday, July 20, when Rankin returned from New York, Redlich and I confronted him. I opened the conversation and suggested that “the only problem was when Norman and I should tell him that it was hopeless and impossible to meet the deadline.” We reported that the writing and rewriting was taking much longer than was anticipated.10
The next day, Rankin had another meeting at the White House with Bundy and representatives from State, the United States Information Agency, and the Government Printing Office. A new publication date was fixed—September 14, the first Monday after Labor Day. According to Rankin, these factors influenced the decision: “(1) The difficulties encountered by the Commission in putting the report in final and accurate form; (2) the problems of printing, particularly in light of White House requests that at least half of the available copies be bound in hard covers and the possibility of repagination of a substantial number of pages; and (3) the problems with getting the most favorable press distribution and reception until after the Democratic Convention and Labor Day.” Rankin was quite clear: the decision was not based on any political considerations. The White House “requested only that the report be as good as it possibly can be.”11
At least one commission member was unhappy with this new target date. When I was at the Justice Department the next day advising Katzenbach of the changed date, McCloy joined us. When I told him of the new date, he was “not particularly pleased and made a comment to the effect that we had not been very well organized over here. I suggested to him that a lot of people had worked very hard and he shouldn’t have a mistaken idea about the amount of work that had been done.” I doubt that my defense of the staff persuaded McCloy.12
In early August, the commission faced a proposed date of September 1 for submitting the report to President Johnson, which would give him two weeks for review before making it public on September 14, as agreed earlier. Under this arrangement, everything had to go to GPO by August 20. While the staff had been struggling with these deadlines for some time, in mid-August the commission members had to face reality. On August 14, the commission discussed this timetable. Senator Russell “made a strong presentation to the effect that he could not spend sufficient time on the materials to see that they got to the President in page proof form by September 1.” He referred to his various responsibilities during the past eight months, particularly his work on the appropriations bills, and said “this was why he urged the President not to appoint a Senator, or, in fact, the Chief Justice, to the Commission.” Based on Senator Russell’s presentation, the commission decided to request two additional weeks for its report.13
Rankin discussed this extension a few days later with the White House staff, placing the responsibility for the delay on Senator Russell and the other congressional members of the commission. Bundy had no problem with an extension of two weeks. He did indicate his special interest in the chapter dealing with presidential protection, emphasizing the need for the president to be fully informed so that he could respond satisfactorily to whatever recommendations the commission made on this subject. Rankin told me after this discussion with Bundy that the commission had already decided not to give the White House any galley proofs or other advance knowledge of the report’s recommendations, thereby demonstrating that the commission’s recommendations reflected its own judgment without any influence from the White House.14
Although the White House had occasionally expressed its interest in early publication of the commission’s report, no one there ever insisted that the report be produced by a certain date. As reflected in Rankin’s discussions with Bundy, the White House deferred to the commission’s judgment about a feasible publication date. In short, the commission produced the report on its own schedule, after determining that the investigative work was completed satisfactorily and that the members had sufficient time to review and finalize the report.
Organizing Our Presentation of the Facts
We had been revising our outline of the report since our historian, Al Goldberg, produced the first version in mid-March. By early July, we needed to establish our final structure for the chapters and decide how to present the evidence in each chapter. Some of the proposed chapters fell neatly into the outline used for our investigation, but some did not. As was inevitable, the drafting of the individual chapters did not proceed at the same pace. Some chapters were easier to write; some required more investigation; others required more collaboration within the staff; and some received extra commission attention.
At meetings on June 29 and July 2, the commission considered the seventy-two questions that Warren wanted discussed. The members evaluated each question in light of the testimony they had heard or read and the draft sections of the report prepared by the staff. Of course, the commission reserved final judgment on its conclusions until it saw the proposed final version of the entire report, which was still some distance down the road. However, after these meetings we had our marching orders and it became the staff’s job to present the evidence on which the commission’s tentative conclusions were based in the most persuasive way that we could fashion.
Persuasion depends on clear organization and good writing. The commission members knew that their report would be long and complicated. Many of the facts that supported one conclusion were interwoven with facts supporting another conclusion. For example, some of the evidence supporting the commission’s finding regarding the source of the shots that hit Kennedy and Connally was also pertinent to the identification of Oswald as the assassin. Any long document confronts problems of duplication, contradiction, and error. We had to find a way to minimize all three.
From early July, when the commission settled tentatively on its main factual determinations, through the end of August, the chapters in the report gradually took shape. Although we had been working for six months, a great deal of work remained. We needed to decide which facts should be in the main report and which in appendices. Warren requested that the staff submit draft chapters in sequential order for consideration by the members, who had complained of the difficulty in determining where a chapter would be placed in the report. Although this request prompted some grumbling among the staff, including me, Rankin insisted we alter our writing schedules to accommodate this request. A description of each chapter individually assists in understanding each chapter’s evolution and the substantive issues that need further development.15
CHAPTER 1: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This chapter had three sections: a narrative of the events in Dallas, the commission’s conclusions, and its recommendations. Several of us had worked on the narrative of events, which had to reflect both the substance and the language that was used in later chapters of the report. It was my responsibility, along with Redlich, to revise this section and provide it to Rankin for his approval before it went to the commission. In early July, Redlich and I prepared a draft set of conclusions and recommendations for the chief justice, who wanted to review it before he left the country a few days later. We managed to meet his schedule and his resulting comments reflected a careful reading of the draft. About half of his suggestions related to the section on presidential protection, dealing with the performance of the investigative agencies and the preliminary decision of the commission not to address the question of removing this responsibility from the Secret Service.16
At its meeting on August 11, the commission considered a new draft of Chapter 1 but decided to postpone any decision on this chapter until the remainder of the full report had been considered. Although there was by now little debate about the narrative section of the chapter, the substance and wording of the commission’s conclusions required careful consideration of the evidence dealing with the key issues—the shots from the depository, the evidence identifying Oswald as the assassin, the evidence about Ruby, and the evidence regarding possible conspiracies. The draft chapters dealing with these issues had not yet been approved.17
CHAPTER 2: THE ASSASSINATION
This chapter had been tentatively entitled “The Trip to Dallas,” but was renamed over the summer. Here we discussed the planning and advance preparations for the trip; publicity in Dallas before the visit; the president’s visits to San Antonio, Houston, and Fort Worth before going to Dallas; the arrival at Love Field near Dallas; the organization of the motorcade; the drive through Dallas; the assassination; the events at Parkland Memorial Hospital; the swearing-in of the new president, the return to Washington, DC; and the autopsy. Specter’s first draft was supplemented by material from other areas, reorganized, and substantially edited by Belin and me. The chapter’s description of the Secret Service functions and reactions at the assassination scene came from Stern’s work on presidential protection.18
The commission concluded that the first nine questions on its list were addressed satisfactorily in a June draft of this chapter. These were:
(1) What was the purpose of the trip?
(2) Who participated in the planning of the trip?
(3) When was it decided to visit Dallas?
(4) What was the purpose of the motorcade?
(5) Who planned the motorcade route?
(6) Why was this route chosen?
(7) Why did the motorcade turn from Main Street and pass the intersection of Elm and Houston?
(8) When was the route announced to the public?
(9) What time was the president assassinated?
The commission discussed an additional seven questions addressed in this chapter:
(10) How fast was the car going?
(11) Did the car slow down after the first shot?
(12) What treatment was given President Kennedy at Parkland?
(13) What wounds were observed by the doctors?
(14) What treatment was given Governor Connally?
(15) When and where did President Johnson take the oath of office?
(16) What wounds were observed at the autopsy?
The notes from the commission meeting on July 2 reflect its conclusions that the car was going “between 11 and 12 miles per hour” and that the treatment of questions 11 through 16 in the proposed draft was satisfactory.
After receiving the commission’s conclusions, we prepared another draft. Goldberg, who was familiar with the facts about the Dallas trip, suggested a new organization for the chapter and provided editing suggestions. Both Stern and Specter participated in rewriting sections of the chapter and providing the needed footnotes. I finished working on a new draft on July 21, and it was distributed to the commission that day.
At its August 11 meeting, the commission approved a revised draft with only minor suggestions and authorized its printing. After implementing the commission’s suggestions and clarifying its discussion of a few points, I delivered the chapter to GPO on August 20.19
CHAPTER 3: THE SHOTS FROM THE TEXAS SCHOOL BOOK DEPOSITORY
When we decided tentatively in early June to have a separate chapter consider the shots from the depository, I prepared an initial draft. I used material from the reenactment project prepared by Specter, supplemented by the discussion of eyewitness testimony and ballistics evidence written by Ball and Belin. My draft was circulated to the commission and staff in mid-June.
Questions 17 through 27 on the commission’s list related to the shots fired at the president. The commission’s answers to the questions and assessment of the draft chapter were brief and straightforward:
(17) How many shots were fired? “A preponderance of the evidence indicates that there were 3 shots fired.”
(18) How many times was the President wounded? “Twice.”
(19) What was the course of the bullets through his body? “Treatment [of this subject in the proposed draft] satisfactory.”
(20) Were both shots lethal? “First shot not necessarily lethal; second shot unquestionably lethal.”
(21) How many times was the Governor wounded? “One.”
(22) What was the course of the bullets through his body? “Treatment … satisfactory.”
(23) Where did the shots come from? “It was agreed that all of the shots came from the Texas School Book Depository Bldg. and the treatment in the proposed draft is satisfactory.”
(24) Did they all come from one place? “Treatment … satisfactory.”
(25) Is there any evidence that the shots came from the Triple Overpass or any other place in front of the car? “Overwhelming weight of the evidence is that the shots did not come from the Triple Overpass (commission indicated that in referring to the three railroad crossings at that point on Elm Street, reference should be uniformly by the name ‘Triple Overpass’).”20
(26) What damage was done to the windshield of the Presidential car? “Treatment in draft satisfactory, but make certain that there is a comment that there was no penetration of the windshield and also that there was no roughness that could be felt on either side of the windshield.”
(27) From what kind of gun were the shots fired? “Treatment satisfactory.”
The commission’s conclusion that the treatment of a subject was “satisfactory” meant only that it accurately reflected the commission’s answer to the relevant question. It did not amount to an endorsement of either the organization of the chapter or the staff’s presentation of the evidence bearing on the question. The commission members always made suggestions, both large and small, for the staff to consider in preparing the next draft. That was especially the case with this chapter, where McCloy and other members made several suggestions. I am not sure that even Rankin knew what to expect from the chief justice’s decision to proceed in this manner, but after these meetings we all concluded that the process successfully engaged the members individually in deciding the key questions, while enabling the staff to exercise its judgment in organizing the chapter and presenting the evidence on each issue.
The commission’s review of a draft chapter frequently highlighted the need for further investigation on specific factual issues. In this instance, we asked the FBI to address a specific question about the Zapruder film as to the time that elapsed between frame 313 and the moment when Secret Service agent Hill first reached the back of the presidential limousine. We also asked the bureau to obtain the original tapes of the radio transmissions from Channel 1 and Channel 2 of the Dallas Police Department radio station for specified hours on November 22 and November 24, 1963, and provide new transcripts based on these tapes.
Rankin also authorized Specter to take five additional depositions in Dallas on July 16, including two witnesses who might have information regarding what we called the “missing bullet.” The commission had decided that “a preponderance of the evidence” indicated that three shots had been fired. However, we could account for only two of those bullets—one nearly whole bullet found on the hospital stretcher that had carried Connally and the other included the two larger bullet fragments recovered from the vehicle. We could not find the third one, and no one ever has.21
Based on the comments received and the results of further investigation, I put together another draft that now included discussion of the expert examination of rifle, cartridge cases, and bullet fragments; the bullet wounds; the trajectories of the two bullets; the number of shots; the shot that missed; and the time span of the shots. After reviewing the draft, Mosk recommended that he and Arthur Marmor, our second historian on loan from the State Department, sit down with the authors of the earlier drafts so that the text and footnotes could be edited to reflect the authors’ intentions more accurately. In the course of undertaking this chore, Marmor advised Redlich that important information provided by a deputy sheriff had not been used in the chapter. This prompted an immediate request from Redlich to Liebeler, who was then in Texas, to take the deposition of this deputy sheriff and others.22
After further revision the commission considered Chapter 3 again on August 14. I rewrote the section dealing with the missed shot to reflect the testimony of James Tague and James Altgens. Altgens, a photographer for the Associated Press, took a widely circulated photograph that showed President Kennedy reacting to the first of the two shots that hit him. Altgens testified that he took the picture “almost simultaneously” with hearing a shot that he was confident was the first one fired. Tague, who was located at a position near the Triple Underpass, was hit on the cheek by an object during the shooting and shortly thereafter a deputy sheriff located a mark on the south curb of Main Street where it appeared that a bullet fragment had hit the cement. I was concerned that the current draft did not sufficiently reflect the Altgens and Tague testimony and other gaps in our knowledge.23
Chapter 3 was approved by the commission later in the month and, by the end of August, the chapter was ready for printing. The commission reached two conclusions in this chapter that have been challenged by critics—the number of shots fired and the probability that the bullet that pierced Kennedy’s throat also caused Connally’s wounds. The commission did not reach a conclusion on the second issue—the single-bullet theory—until its final meeting on September 18.
In considering the number of shots fired at the president’s limousine, we began with the proposition that the physical and other evidence compelled the conclusion that at least two shots were fired. In particular, the commission report referred to the nearly whole bullet discovered at Parkland Hospital and the two larger fragments found in the presidential automobile. All three were identified as coming from the assassination rifle, and “came from at least two separate bullets and possibly from three.” The report acknowledged that witnesses at the scene had varying opinions regarding the number of shots—ranging from two to six—but concluded that “the consensus among the witnesses at the scene was that three shots were fired.”24
The commission found “the most convincing evidence relating to the number of shots was provided by the presence on the sixth floor of three spent cartridges,” which were fired by the same rifle that fired the bullets causing the wounds. The commission recognized the possibility “that the assassin carried an empty shell in the rifle and fired only two shots” and that the “eyewitness testimony may be subconsciously colored by the extensive publicity given the conclusion that three shots were fired.” Nevertheless, the evidence, in particular the three spent cartridges, led the commission to conclude that three shots were fired. This conclusion of three shots, coupled with the physical evidence, indicated that one of the three shots missed the automobile and its occupants. Chapter 3 discussed which of the three shots might have missed, but did not offer any conclusion on this question.25
Absolutely no factual evidence of additional shots has come to light since 1964. No witness has come forward who saw a person with a rifle on the overpass, or the grassy knoll, or anywhere near the assassination site. No rifle was found around the assassination site except the rifle on the sixth floor of the depository building. No bullet, other than the two that killed Kennedy and wounded Connally, hit the vehicle. The relatively minor damage to the inside of its windshield was readily attributable to fragments from one of the two bullets that hit its occupants. This lack of factual evidence to refute our findings after nearly fifty years adds further credence to the commission’s conclusion.26
CHAPTER 4: THE ASSASSIN
This chapter produced unanticipated drama in July. Ball and Belin concentrated their investigative efforts in the area initially called “Oswald as the Assassin,” which mostly ended up in Chapter 4. Ball was back in California by this time and Belin was in Iowa, resuming their law practices. After we decided to move the discussion of the shots from the depository to a separate Chapter 3, Redlich prepared a new draft of Chapter 4. Eisenberg helped out with various scientific issues, Specter polished up the discussion of Oswald’s rifle, and we included some of Ely’s earlier work on Oswald’s experience in the Marines and his post-arrest treatment by the Dallas police. Redlich’s first draft of the revised chapter was circulated to the commission and staff late in June with a comment that it was incomplete.
The commission considered fourteen questions (28–41) addressed in this chapter and made these decisions based on Redlich’s new draft:
(28) Who owned the gun? “Lee Harvey Oswald.”
(29) Was Oswald at the window from which the shots were fired? “Treatment satisfactory except that it was suggested that in describing the cartons piled up near the window as a rest for the gun, there be a reference to the Rolling readers and their light weight.”27
(30) How did the weapon get into the building on November 22? “Treatment satisfactory.”
(31) Who fired the gun? “Treatment satisfactory.”
(32) How did Oswald leave the building? “Treatment satisfactory except the report should be explicit that he presumably left by the front entrance and that he had a Coke in his hand when he was seen by Mrs. Reed in the office.”
(33) What time was the building closed off by the police? “Treatment satisfactory.”
(34) Did Oswald kill Officer Tippit? “Yes.”
(35) What was Tippit’s record as a policeman? “Treatment satisfactory.”
(36) Was Tippit normally performing his duties? “Treatment satisfactory.”
(37) Was Oswald’s pistol the murder weapon? “Yes.”
(38) Are Oswald’s actions between the time of the assassination and the murder of Tippit consistent with his having committed both crimes? “Treatment satisfactory.”
(39) Did Oswald shoot at General Walker in April of 1963? “The answer should include statement that the overwhelming evidence established that Oswald shot at General Walker in April of 1963. The Commission also commented upon the fact that there should be a reference to the pictures of the Walker house that were found and the special book that Oswald had made up about the Walker affair which he later burned.”
(40) Did Oswald threaten to kill Nixon in April of 1963? “The Commission directed that in answering this question it be shown that in the original hearing Mrs. Marina Oswald was asked whether Oswald shot at any other person in high public office and that she answered ‘No.’ Furthermore, that the Commission questions whether the incident did in fact occur.”
(41) Did Oswald practice with his rifle during October and November of 1963? “This question should be answered by the statement that there is some evidence by reputable people that Oswald practiced with his rifle during October and November 1963 but this is a matter of their recollection without their having known Oswald, and the other circumstances tend to negate any such conclusions. There was some discussion at this point about the Irving Gun Shop incident and whether investigation had been sufficient to conclude that there was no other gun. The Commissioners commented that all the surrounding circumstances that they knew of caused them to question whether the testimony about the Irving Gun Shop incident should be believed, but they desired to have any additional, reasonable investigation made that might help to determine the matter.”
After the commission’s review of the chapter, we expanded the material supporting the conclusion that Oswald was the assassin. The chapter now addressed the ownership and possession of the assassination weapon, the rifle in the building, Oswald at the window, the killing of Patrolman Tippit, statements of Oswald during detention, Oswald’s prior assassination attempts, and Oswald’s skill with a rifle. In most of these areas, Redlich set forth the evidence and summarized the basis for the commission’s conclusion on each issue. Several members of the staff reviewed this draft to ensure we discussed the issues thoroughly and accurately.
Redlich’s revision prompted David Belin to renew his (and Joe Ball’s) opposition to a separate chapter dealing with the shots from the depository, rather than include this evidence to support the conclusion that Oswald was the assassin. In an impassioned letter to Rankin, he complained that he and Ball were not consulted about this proposed change. He told Rankin that the failure to consult with Ball “frankly shocks me; from my work with Ball I can honestly say that I have never met a lawyer who has better insight on the practical effectiveness of presentation of argument combined with an ability to understand and judge the heart of the testimony of witnesses.”28
Belin recognized, however, the lack of prior consultation was not the issue. “Rather, the sole question is what is the most effective way of presenting our findings.” Belin argued that “[t]he evidence on the source of the shots is among the strongest evidence there is to show that Oswald was the assassin” and therefore it should be included in the chapter dealing with Oswald as the assassin. He suggested that devoting an entire chapter to the shots was an “example of gilding the lily” and expressed concern that “the overproof in this type of a separate chapter serves as a contrast to point up the weaknesses of other aspects of other evidence showing Oswald was the assassin.”29
Belin was not one, then or later, to soften his arguments for diplomacy’s sake. “My frank opinion,” he wrote Rankin, “is that this report is far too much influenced by the short-range concern with Buchanan and Lane, et al. Writers of this ilk all center their attack on a claimed shot from the overpass. There can be absolutely no doubt about the source of the shots, and it does not take 68 typewritten pages to prove it. All Buchanan and Lane have succeeded in doing is to steer the Commission on the false course of meeting the short-range argument while undercutting the entire function of what should be the historical findings of fact that will serve for the next 100 years or more.”30
Belin’s argument highlighted an important difference of opinion within the staff. He and Ball had developed sufficient evidence that would likely have persuaded a jury to convict Oswald of the assassination. If Oswald had lived to be prosecuted in court, his defense counsel (putting aside any question of Oswald’s mental competence) would have tried to raise reasonable doubt about the prosecution’s case—through challenges to the physical evidence and cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses. In the absence of any credible evidence regarding another shooter, another weapon, another cartridge, or another bullet, an effective defense would be difficult. Because there was no such evidence, Ball and Belin reasonably concluded that there was no need for the commission report to do more than present the existing evidence—physical evidence, eyewitness testimony, and expert testimony—that proved Oswald was the assassin. They objected to the commission undertaking a rebuttal of possible alternative explanations of the crime.
Others on the staff, including me, had concluded that the Ball-Belin approach would not be sufficient to achieve the commission’s objectives. Instead, we thought it was necessary to anticipate criticism directed at the commission’s work. And to do that, we had to do just what Ball and Belin wanted us to avoid: marshal the evidence to rebut allegations or contentions that had been made or might be anticipated. That doesn’t mean we disagreed with Belin that there “can be no doubt about the source of the shots,” but we wanted to disprove to the fullest extent possible the suggestions that there were shots from the overpass, from the grassy knoll, or any source other than the depository.
Our effort to document critical facts in Chapter 4 prompted new investigative requests in July and August. While exploring a possible escape route for Oswald, we asked the Secret Service to provide additional information on city bus routes in Dallas and Greyhound bus routes southbound out of Dallas.30 We also asked the FBI in July to follow up on an alleged report that there was no palm print on the rifle and to obtain slides or originals of a picture taken by a photographer showing Oswald being removed from the movie theater by police officers.
In August, staff lawyers continued doggedly pursuing details on Oswald’s activities. New requests asked the agencies to confirm, clarify, or supplement earlier reports. Other requests sought appropriate documentation that could be used in the report. Still others pursued newly developed information. In a few instances, the requested investigation led to further testimony before the commission or by deposition.32
In late July, Redlich circulated another draft of Chapter 4 incorporating the suggestions of the commission and members of the staff. Several of us responded in early August with further comments on the new draft. There were forty-one suggestions in my memo, generally focusing on improving the clarity and persuasiveness of the presentation of the evidence demonstrating that Oswald was the shooter.33
I was concerned about how we used the testimony of Howard Brennan, an eyewitness standing on Elm Street directly opposite and facing the depository as the motorcade went by. Brennan testified that he had seen a slender man, about five feet ten inches tall, in his early thirties, take deliberate aim from the sixth-floor corner window and fire a rifle in the direction of the president’s car. We had relied on Brennan’s testimony in Chapter 3 to support the conclusion that the shots came from the depository, and I thought he was an accurate observer whose testimony should be relied upon in Chapter 4, even though he declined to make a positive identification of Oswald when he first saw him in the police lineup.34
Goldberg’s review of this draft chapter included general comments and fifty-one specific observations or questions. He wanted to put the discussion of Oswald’s movements after leaving the depository ahead of the section dealing with Tippit’s murder, which was implemented in subsequent drafts. He pointed out the need for more precision and clarity in the discussion of the critical evidence identifying Oswald as the assassin of Kennedy and the killer of Tippit—for example, the palm print on the rifle, the various descriptions of the suspect before the Tippit shooting, Oswald’s taking the rifle to the depository, the exact time of the Tippit shooting, and the eyewitness testimony regarding this event. These, too, were passed on to Redlich.35
We were under pressure to get a revised version of Chapter 4 back to the commission for its review. Redlich still had the editing responsibilities for the chapter and had to consider all the comments he had received about the last draft. In addition, the FBI was responding promptly to our requests and this new information had to be reflected in the next draft, which went to the commission on August 20.
After the commission met on August 21, I was surprised to learn that a few members had already returned the latest draft of Chapter 4, which had gone to them the day before. According to Rankin, one of the commissioners had said that the chapter “was all factual and that therefore there was not much controversy in it.” To the contrary, most of the staff anticipated that this chapter would be of the greatest interest to the critics such as Mark Lane and the broader audience in the United States and Europe waiting to see exactly what we had to say about Oswald’s involvement in the assassination. Despite all the later controversy about the commission’s report, the commission members and staff believed then and now that the evidence identifying Oswald as the assassin was overwhelming and convincing.36
CHAPTER 5: DETENTION AND DEATH OF OSWALD
The most dramatic—and potentially significant—development about Ruby in July was his polygraph examination. Rankin wanted the FBI to handle the examination, but Hoover resisted. He was reluctant to advertise that the FBI made use of this investigative tool. Rankin assured the director that the commission was not endorsing polygraph examinations, but emphasized Ruby had requested it. Rankin agreed with Hoover that the polygraph technique was not sufficiently precise to permit absolute judgment of guilt or innocence. Rankin stressed that the commission would avoid any interference with the pending proceedings in Ruby’s criminal trial. Hoover relented.37
The examination took place on July 18. It was delayed a few days to resolve a dispute whether anyone from the sheriff’s office could be present. Sheriff Decker told Specter he had been criticized because no one from his office had been present when Ruby testified before Warren and Ford. The sheriff insisted that Allan Sweatt, his chief criminal deputy and a polygraph operator, retain custody of Ruby during the examination. Unless Specter agreed, the sheriff said that Specter would need a court order to examine Ruby. Specter retreated, but still objected to Sweatt because he was a polygraph operator who might seek to interpret the polygraph results. The sheriff became “vitriolic” in opposing Specter’s position but, after District Attorney Wade intervened, Specter and Decker agreed that Chief Jailer Holman, rather than Sweatt, would be present during the examination.38
After Ruby entered the room at about 2:00 P.M., Specter advised him that the commission was responding to his request for a polygraph examination and asked whether he still wanted it. Ruby stated that he did. Specter advised him of his rights, as did Ruby’s counsel, Clayton Fowler, who also reiterated his view that Ruby should not take the test. Ruby’s other counsel, Joe Tonahill, had previously told Specter that “he was personally glad that we had come to administer the polygraph and that Jack Ruby very much wanted to take the examination.” The examination lasted until approximately 9:30 in the evening with several breaks to enable Ruby to rest, including one break lasting an hour and forty minutes. Specter later reported: “Mr. Ruby was very cooperative and, as the record will show, suggested a number of questions that he wanted to be asked in addition to the ones which we had planned. We accommodated him and asked all those questions.” Bell Herndon, the expert FBI agent conducting the investigation, asked fifty-five questions.39
The proceedings concluded with testimony from William Beavers, a psychiatrist who had previously evaluated Ruby’s mental state. When questioned by Specter, Beavers said Ruby was “in touch with reality and understood the questions asked and was responsive in almost all instances, except for questions which related to whether Mr. Ruby’s family had been harmed as a result of Mr. Ruby’s shooting Oswald and another question as to whether Mr. Fowler was in danger because of his representation of Mr. Ruby.” Although Ruby before testifying had expressed concern that his family and attorney were in danger, he refused to answer these questions during the examination. Beavers testified about those questions: “Ruby’s delusional state took hold so that his response there, in effect could not be counted against him.” He went on to say that the examination did not damage Ruby’s mental state and that the test was “fairly administered with adequate rest periods for Ruby.”40
When questioned by Tonahill, Beavers testified that Ruby was psychotic—a conclusion that Specter thought differed from the answers the doctor had previously given him. Specter thought that Beavers and Tonahill were “trying to ride two horses: If the results of the polygraph examination were helpful to Ruby, then they would like to contend that he understood the questions and knew the nature of his replies. If the examination should be unfavorable, they wanted to have room to fall back on the fact that Mr. Ruby is psychotic so that the test could have no validity.” A few days later, newspapers in Dallas and Washington published stories that included questions and answers from Ruby’s polygraph examination.41
FBI examiner Herndon “concluded that the absence of any physiological response on the relevant questions indicated that there was no deception.” According to Herndon, the examination showed that Ruby was telling the truth when he denied ever knowing Oswald before November 22, 1963, when he denied assisting Oswald in the assassination, when he denied shooting Oswald because of any foreign influence, when he said that he shot Oswald in order to spare Mrs. Kennedy the ordeal of a trial, and when he said that everything he told the commission in his earlier testimony was the truth.42
The commission members knew that such examinations were not infallible measures of a person’s truthfulness. In addition, Hoover advised the commission not to rely on the examination. He stated: “In view of the serious question raised as to Ruby’s mental condition, no significance should be placed on the polygraph examination and it should be considered nonconclusive as the charts cannot be relied upon.”43
Specter, who had participated in both interrogations of Ruby, believed “that the most reliable assessment came from Herndon before he consulted any of his superiors. Herndon, a top polygrapher, not only had Ruby’s readings but also could see Ruby’s reactions—his frowns, smiles, gestures—as Ruby fielded the questions.” Specter believed that Herndon was correct in accepting the polygraph’s validity, and he was surprised when Hoover overruled him.44
In his 1973 book, Belin raised an intriguing hypothetical about the Ruby polygraph. “[T]he Warren Commission could very well afford to say that they did not rely on the lie detector test where the results of the test showed that Ruby was telling the truth on these important matters,” he wrote. “But suppose that the polygraph examination had showed that Ruby lied on any one of these matters. Do you think that the Warren Commission could have summarily dismissed the results of the test?” Belin emphatically answered his own question: “Of course not.” He knew “there was always a tremendous risk in giving that test”—the risk that a polygraph examination would indicate that Ruby had lied even though he was not involved in any conspiracy. Regardless of the risk, Belin was determined “to leave no stone unturned in an effort to arrive at the truth” and believed that “the story behind the polygraph examination of Jack Ruby is further evidence of the fact that we lawyers performed our work with a ‘total dedication to the determination of the truth.’”45
The Hubert/Griffin investigation provided much of the substance of Chapter 5, which discusses Ruby’s entrance into basement of police headquarters and murder of Oswald. Some of the Hubert/Griffin material belonged in Chapter 6, dealing with the possibility of a domestic conspiracy, and the detailed biography should be in an appendix, as was Oswald’s.
The commission considered seven questions (57–63) on its list relating to Ruby’s killing of Oswald. These were the questions and the commission’s conclusions:
(57) Were the security precautions adopted by the Dallas Police adequate? “No.”
(58) How did Ruby get into the basement? “Treatment satisfactory.”
(59) Did he have help from inside the Police Department? “The answer should be that there is no evidence of that.”
(60) Did he have any other domestic or foreign conspirators? “Same as 59.”
(61) Did Ruby know Officer Tippit? “Same (but here there was a further comment about the mind reader on TV who claimed to have seen Oswald in Ruby’s Carousel [Club] and the fact that this should be checked out.)”
(62) Was there any connection between Ruby and Oswald? “There was no evidence of that.”
(63) What was Ruby’s probable motive? “Commission does not wish to answer this question as to the probable motive of Ruby.”
The Hubert/Griffin team continued to seek information on Ruby’s background, associations, and recent contacts that might produce leads indicating that his murder of Oswald was part of a conspiracy. In June, they made thirty-four requests for more investigative work, principally to the FBI. In July, they sent an additional thirty-one requests.46
The Ruby team took more depositions during July to explore Ruby’s alleged presence at Parkland Hospital on November 22; his presence at the Dallas Police Department on November 22; his activities late Saturday night, November 23; more about his childhood and parents; and more about his telephone calls during the November 22–24 weekend. Hubert went to Dallas and took depositions of twenty witnesses. He took two more in Washington, DC, and then he and Griffin deposed an additional twenty witnesses in Chicago and Dallas. Rankin authorized Specter to take four additional depositions in early August at Griffin’s request—two in Las Vegas and two in Los Angeles. We had FBI interviews of most of these witnesses, but needed to get their sworn testimony to resolve questions relating to Ruby’s activities during the November 22–24 period and to explore his background more fully. None of these depositions produced any indication that Ruby knew Oswald or that he was part of a conspiracy to kill Oswald.47
Meanwhile, our historian, Al Goldberg, was working on another angle in the Ruby investigation. He recognized that the tapes and films generated by the media and, in some instances, by private parties were an important historical resource that should be accumulated and preserved. Goldberg wrote to the leading TV stations and networks, radio stations, magazine publishers, and newspapers to obtain their photos and other materials for the commission’s review. He contacted both NBC and CBS to arrange for the commission’s inspection of the footage resulting from their coverage of the events in Dallas during November 22 to November 24, 1963. Goldberg arranged that all these important materials be stored and preserved by the Army Photographic Agency of the Department of Defense.48
On July 11, Goldberg arranged for the Ruby team to see videotapes from three Dallas television stations before their trip to Dallas. They found significant information recorded by the media concerning Ruby’s presence on the third floor of police headquarters on the evening of November 22, his departure from the assembly room in the headquarters basement about an hour and a half later, and his presence in the basement on Sunday morning five or ten seconds before his shooting of Oswald. In addition, studying these materials enabled them to make more precise judgments of the timing of critical events, such as the departure of the car driven out of the Main Street entrance by police officer Rio Pierce, the arrival of the armored truck at headquarters to transport Oswald, and the interviews given by police officials and others. Some of the interviews of police officers contained information that had not been mentioned by them either to the FBI or in their depositions by our lawyers. Based on this review, Griffin prepared a three-page letter to the FBI requesting its investigation of various questions arising from the tapes and films.49
Griffin continued to work on Chapter 5 throughout July. Other staff members, including Goldberg, Stern, Pollak, and Ely, produced sections of the chapter. By early August, Chapter 5 began to take shape this way: treatment of Oswald in custody (a chronology of what happened, interrogation sessions, Oswald’s legal rights); activity of newsmen (on the third floor); Oswald’s exposure to the press during his custody at police headquarters; the activity related to the proposed transfer; possible assistance to Jack Ruby in entering the basement; adequacy of security precautions; news coverage and police policy; and responsibility of news media. I do not recall any serious concerns about the organization and substance of this chapter in August.
CHAPTER 6: POSSIBLE CONSPIRACY
By July we had made substantial progress on the section dealing with the possibility of a foreign conspiracy, based largely on the work done by Coleman and Slawson. In June they had sent Dulles at his request a memo dealing with the possibility of a foreign conspiracy and delivered to the commission two other drafts—one dealing with Oswald’s life in Russia and the other on the Oswalds’ interactions with the State Department and the INS.
Back in February, the FBI had provided a short memo summarizing its interview of Soviet defector Nosenko. He claimed that he would have known if Oswald was a Soviet agent, yet had seen no evidence of such a relationship. Therefore, Nosenko concluded that the Soviets were not using Oswald in such a capacity. Based on the CIA’s uncertainty whether he was a true defector, the commission decided not to rely on Nosenko’s statement. The issue arose again in late June because we gave the commission a draft section of the report dealing with Oswald’s life in the Soviet Union that had several references to Nosenko.50
Ford, who had paid close attention to this line of the investigation, was concerned by these references and strongly opposed any reliance on Nosenko. He was skeptical about using the information even if Nosenko was a true defector, which was far from certain; no one knew for sure if he was a defector or a Soviet Union plant. Warren recalled that CIA Director McCone had told the commission “off the record” that the agency could not vouch for Nosenko’s credibility, to which the Warren had responded that he was “allergic to defectors.” All three members present (Warren, Ford, and Dulles) agreed that Nosenko’s information should not be relied upon. Dulles reported that he had talked to his former CIA colleagues over the weekend and learned that they still couldn’t determine whether Nosenko was a real defector.51
Rankin thought that the commission should indicate for the historical record what information it had received from Nosenko, but had elected not to use because of the CIA’s inability (or reluctance) to verify his credibility. Rankin was also concerned that this information had come to the commission from the FBI rather than the CIA. He reported that CIA deputy director Helms had just called him and was concerned that the commission had seen any report on Nosenko because of the risk of disclosure to the public. Rankin told Helms that it might be useful for the CIA director to write a letter to the commission expressing the agency’s view that this source of information should not be relied upon.52
Warren, Ford, and Dulles remained concerned, however, about having important information in the commission’s possession but being unable to even comment on it because of the defector’s uncertain status. They asked Rankin to have the staff review information about Oswald from all sources other than Nosenko to determine to what degree the Nosenko report added to this information. If Nosenko added nothing new, their decision would be easy.53
At its meetings on June 29 and July 2, the commission answered nine questions (42–50) dealing with the possibility of Oswald being involved in a conspiracy:
(42) Did Oswald have any accomplices at the scene of the assassination? “This should be answered by stating that all of the evidence the Commission has, indicates that Oswald was alone at the scene of the assassination.”
(43) Did Oswald have any accomplices in shooting Tippit? “Same as in 42.”
(44) Is there evidence that anyone helped Oswald from assassination to arrest? “The commission thought that the testimony of the one witness that someone looking like Oswald was taken away from in front of the Depository Bldg. in a station wagon should be referred to with the additional statement that the evidence shows conclusively that Oswald was on the bus (and the other places that he was during the purported time of the station wagon incident) and therefore the Commission concludes that the witness must be mistaken.”
(45) Was any private conveyance used during that period? “Treatment in proposed draft satisfactory, except for matters referred to in answer to 44.”
(46) Is there evidence of any domestic left wing conspiracy? “The answer should be that there is no present evidence available to the Commission, etc.”
(47) Is there evidence of any domestic right wing conspiracy? “Answer same as 46.”
(48) Is there evidence of any foreign conspiracy? “The Commission reserved its answer on this question and said that this would be answered later.”
(49) Is there anything in Oswald’s relationships with the Soviet Union which suggests that Oswald was an agent? “Answer reserved. Same as in 48.”
(50) What do the investigative agencies conclude on the subject? “Treatment in proposed draft satisfactory. Commissioners all agreed that the agencies uniformly said that Oswald was a ‘loner.’”
After the commission discussed the Nosenko issue and answered these questions, we revised the foreign conspiracy section of the chapter and prepared it for another review by the commission.54
Chapter 6 raised perhaps the commission’s most difficult challenge—was there any credible evidence of a conspiracy involving either Oswald or Ruby? We all knew the difficulties inherent in trying to prove a negative proposition—in this case that there was no conspiracy. We were now completing an extensive investigation of the background and associations of both Oswald and Ruby. The only logical approach to address this question in Chapter 6 was to present the facts developed by the investigation in a way that would persuade readers that our investigation was sufficiently thorough that the conclusion finding no credible evidence of any conspiracy was a fair and reasonable one.
We decided to report our findings in Chapter 6 by discussing a few broad areas of investigation where evidence of a conspiracy might have been found. We began with an analysis of the specific circumstances surrounding the assassination event itself: the selection of motorcade route, Oswald’s presence in the depository building, his bringing the rifle into the building, potential accomplices at the scene of the assassination, and his escape from the building. Next, we needed to explore Oswald’s personal contacts in search of relationships that might suggest a conspiracy. This discussion would explore his residence in the Soviet Union, associations in the Dallas–Fort Worth community, political activities upon return to the United States, contacts with the Cuban and Soviet embassies in Mexico City and the Soviet embassy in Washington, DC, Oswald’s contacts with the US government, and his finances. Last, we needed to discuss any possible conspiracy involving Jack Ruby, which led to an examination of Ruby’s activities from November 21 to November 24, 1963; whether Ruby and Oswald were acquainted; and Ruby’s background and associations. This chapter required close coordination among five different teams: Ball and Belin, together with Specter (the assassination); Jenner and Liebeler (Oswald’s background and domestic associations); Coleman and Slawson (Oswald’s foreign activities and associations); Hubert and Griffin (Ruby’s background and associations); and IRS agent Philip Barson (Oswald’s finances).
The open-ended nature of our investigation of a potential conspiracy—requiring a far-reaching investigation of the possible associations of Oswald and Ruby and exploration of allegations and hypotheses—raised the fundamental question: When could the commission responsibly decide that sufficient investigation had been done to support a conclusion there was no credible evidence of a conspiracy? We knew that not only President Johnson but also the entire world were looking to the commission for a definitive finding on this subject.
Hubert and Griffin may have been satisfied with the evidence developed on Ruby’s entry into the basement and his shooting Oswald, but Griffin now worried about whether he had sufficient evidence to judge whether Ruby was involved in a conspiracy of some kind. He continued to investigate Ruby’s background, associations, and activity in the weeks before the assassination. These are a few of his Ruby-related requests to the FBI during August:
· Letter asking for further investigation of Mark Lane’s allegation that on November 14, 1963, there was a two-hour meeting at the Carousel Club among Bernard Weissman [drafter and signer of November 22 newspaper advertisement], officer Tippit, and Jack Ruby.
· Letter requesting interview of a witness who may have received a letter from a former secretary to Ralph Paul [Ruby acquaintance] about a conversation between Paul and Ruby on November 23, 1963.
· Letter requesting location and interview of a Dallas garage attendant who may have witnessed an hour-long conversation on November 23 that Ruby had with two witnesses deposed by commission staff.
· Letter requesting that a witness previously interviewed by the bureau be shown pictures of various persons who he might have seen at the Carousel Club and resembled Oswald.
We all recognized that Ruby was a shadowy figure, with a range of business and personal associations that demanded full investigation by the commission. To accomplish this, Griffin and Hubert had made more than one hundred investigative requests to the FBI and deposed dozens of witnesses in the search for one shred of incriminating evidence. We found none. Near the end of the commission’s work, Griffin reported: “I have personally examined all reports of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for the Dallas and Fort Worth areas pertaining to subversive activities during 1963 and have found no reports identifiable with Jack Ruby or any of his known associates.”55
The commission’s investigation pursued a “ground up” approach that focused on the background, associations, and activities of Oswald and Ruby to unearth clues of possible conspiracies. You need evidence—not speculation—before concluding that a conspiracy existed. One can speculate about the “possibility” of a conspiracy directed by one of the many groups that had reason to dislike the president’s (or his brother’s) policies or programs. If such a conspiracy existed, however, it eventually had to manifest itself in some manner through contacts with Oswald or Ruby relating to their actions in November 1963. If, for example, the national syndicate of organized crime had decided to assassinate President Kennedy and had elected to use Oswald as their chosen assassin, there would be evidence somewhere that someone on behalf of the national syndicate enlisted Oswald for this purpose and likely (but not necessarily) assisted Oswald in some aspect of the assassination.
I spent time on Chapter 6 in early August, working with Slawson and Griffin. Because Griffin had been left alone working on all the remaining issues in the Ruby area, I asked Pollak to assist him. I was aware that the investigation of the Ruby area had proved more extensive than anticipated, and that Griffin could use some help. We managed to produce a complete draft chapter for consideration by the commission at its August 14 meeting, when we decided to seek an extension of time from the White House.56
The adequacy of the commission’s investigation of a possible conspiracy was the subject of much debate among our lawyers. Several, including Liebeler and Griffin, thought that we had not adequately investigated the possibility of a conspiracy and referred specifically to unresolved issues raised by the “Sylvia Odio story.” Others thought that the commission needed to have a section in its report dealing with Marina Oswald’s credibility.57
The Sylvia Odio story involved an allegation made by Sylvia Odio, a fervent anti-Castro expatriate who was a member of the Cuban Revolutionary Junta (JURE) and whose parents were political prisoners of the Castro regime. She testified that in late September 1963 three men came to her apartment in Dallas in the evening and asked her to help them prepare a letter soliciting funds for JURE activities. She said that two of the men appeared to be Cuban (or perhaps Mexican) and that the third man, an American, was introduced to her as “Leon Oswald” and described as someone interested in the Cuban cause. After the assassination, Sylvia Odio was certain that this man was Lee Harvey Oswald, and her sister, who was with her at the time of the meeting, also believed this to be the case. She testified that the other two men did not give her their full names, but one of them called her the next day to tell her that it was his idea to introduce the American into the underground “because he is great, he is kind of nuts,” had been in the Marines, was a good shot, and believed that some Cubans should have assassinated President Kennedy after the Bay of Pigs.58
Although she initially stated that the meeting took place on either September 26 or September 27, we considered the possibility that the date was September 25, because we knew that Oswald crossed the border into Mexico on September 26. This allegation was of particular importance to Slawson and Liebeler, who took her deposition in Dallas on July 22, 1964. When the transcript of that deposition became available, we sent a detailed four-page letter to the FBI requesting an investigation of all aspects of the matter. This included examining the possibility that Oswald may have left New Orleans on September 24 rather than September 25, the identification of other persons who might have met with Odio and been introduced as “Leon Oswald,” and alternative means of transportation, if any, that Oswald would have had available to make his trip to Mexico if he had been in the meeting with Odio.59
Although the investigation was not finished when the commission issued its report, the commission concluded that “the evidence was persuasive that Oswald was not in Dallas on September 25” when Sylvia Odio said that she met with him. The commission acknowledged that no evidence had been developed that showed exactly how Oswald left New Orleans—by air, bus, or private car—and then (after a meeting with Odio) traveled from Dallas to Houston in time to take the bus that left Houston for Laredo at 2:35 A.M. on September 26. The commission had circumstantial evidence that Oswald took this bus from Houston, which was consistent with the Mexican immigration records showing the time he entered the country. The possibility that Oswald, whose pro-Castro sentiments were well known in New Orleans, would be able to persuade two fervent anti-Castro supporters to drive him from New Orleans to Dallas for a meeting with another such supporter, and then to Houston after the meeting with Odio, seems most unlikely, but not impossible. I think the commission was justified in reaching its conclusion based on the evidence before it, among other reasons because Liebeler, after taking her deposition, told me that he thought Odio was a credible witness but was wrong in her recollection of this alleged meeting with “Leon Oswald.”60
Griffin agreed with the proposed conclusion about Ruby in Chapter 6 “that our investigation into the question of whether or not there was any conceivable tie-in between Ruby and the assassination is adequate to conclude that there was no tie-in” and that “there is insufficient evidence to conclude that any particular person assisted Ruby” in the shooting of Oswald. After discussion with him, Rankin, and Redlich, we agreed that Griffin would be responsible for further work on this section of the chapter.61
The commission lawyers differed on the appropriate treatment of Marina Oswald. Griffin thought that “Marina Oswald’s possible function as a Soviet agent deserves particular attention, and her conduct deserves treatment in a single subsection.” Pollak advised Redlich that not including a subsection on Marina Oswald’s possible involvement in the conspiracy chapter “is an exceptionally obvious and glaring gap in the chapter as it now stands.” Slawson, in response to an invitation by Rankin, wrote a memo recommending that Marina Oswald be called back to testify before the commission on the subject of Oswald’s job at the Minsk Radio Factory, his activities in Moscow in 1959, Marina’s exit interview with Soviet authorities in 1961, and the similar interview that she and her husband had in 1962. Three commission members—Russell, Cooper, and Boggs—were accompanied by Rankin and went to Dallas in early September to explore these, and other, issues with Marina Oswald.62
In the end, the commission’s report did not include a separate subsection discussing Marina Oswald, her credibility, and her possible role as a Soviet-sponsored conspirator with her husband. There were two reasons for this. First, the commission found that “Marina Oswald’s lack of English training and her complete ignorance of the United States and its customs would scarcely recommend her to the Soviet authorities as one member of an ‘agent team’ to be sent to the United States on a difficult and dangerous foreign enterprise.” Second, I believe that the commission, after hearing her on three occasions and becoming more familiar with the facts of the investigation, concluded (after some initial misgivings) that she was a credible witness who did not know of, and certainly did not participate in, her husband’s plans to assassinate Kennedy. I believe the commission was right on both points.63
Although we debated how much information was needed in our report and where to include it, there was agreement among the staff that the commission was correct to conclude that there was no evidence implicating either the Soviet Union or Cuba in a conspiracy to assassinate the president. Coleman and Slawson had done all that was feasible in exploring Oswald’s activities in Mexico with the assistance of the FBI and CIA officials there. As for Oswald’s conversations with Duran at the Cuban Consulate, the commission stated that it “has been advised by the CIA and FBI that secret and reliable sources corroborate the statements of Senora Duran in all material respects, and that the Cuban Government had no relationship with Lee Harvey Oswald other than that described by Senora Duran.”64
Secretary of State Rusk testified that after the assassination “there was very considerable concern in Cuba as to whether they would be held responsible and what the effect of that might be on their own position and their own safety.” Slawson told me recently that some of the confidential sources on which Rusk may have based this assessment were still undisclosed as of December 2011. In the Warren Commission files at the National Archives there is a folder of materials from the CIA. Under a cover sheet identifying certain transcripts of the intercepted calls from the Russian and Cuban embassies in Mexico City, the folder contains the transcripts that the commission had seen and relied upon. Next in the folder there is a cover sheet entitled “Transcript of telephone calls between two high officials of the Cuban Government.” Under the cover sheet, there is no transcript. Whether these telephone calls related to Cuba’s reaction to the assassination or some other matter remains unknown in the absence of the transcript. Whatever agency concluded that these transcripts remain classified should have been more careful and removed the cover sheet from the folder as well.65
In an article written on the thirtieth anniversary of the assassination, in 1993, two of the most experienced and well-connected reporters with the Washington Post—Walter Pincus and George Lardner Jr.—wrote that no high-level United States officials believed that the Soviet Union was behind the assassination because it “simply had too much to lose from the repercussions of such an act, and were as mindful of the delicate balance of superpower relations as the Americans.”66 They went on to say: “Top-secret intercepts by U.S. and allied eavesdropping agencies reassured them. Communications between Moscow and the Soviet Embassy in Washington and between Moscow and Havana showed surprise and alarm over what had taken place, according to Warren Commission lawyers who were given access to the records.”67 I doubt that Coleman and Slawson (or any other commission lawyers) were given access to such intercepts if they existed but, if they did see them, such information would not have been shared with anyone else on the staff except Rankin. I am confident that they would not have given this information to any reporters.
As the end of August approached, Norman Redlich and I were disappointed with the status of Chapter 6 and the inherent problems in supporting our conclusion that there was no conspiracy. We unwisely vented our frustrations in a meeting with Jim Liebeler, suggesting that he was partially responsible for our lack of progress in dealing with possible domestic conspiracies. He got upset and wrote a memo challenging our statements. He gave us a little history lesson regarding the allocation of work between him and Jenner, reminding us that as of two months ago Jenner was to be responsible for the handling of any domestic conspiracy, whereas Jim was going to concentrate on Oswald’s motive. Liebeler said: “I am more than willing, if able, to accept my full share of responsibility for the work of this staff. I cannot, however, leave myself in the position implied by the above-described oral statements made by both of you which I hope you both will admit, upon reflection, are false and unfair.” He was right. We were wrong. Both of us apologized on the spot.68
CHAPTER 7: OSWALD’S BACKGROUND AND POSSIBLE MOTIVES
By July, the Jenner/Liebeler team had completed most of its investigation, including a large number of depositions in Texas, New Orleans, New York, and elsewhere. The commission discussed Liebeler’s memo “Possible Personal Motive” at meetings in late June and early July and addressed six questions:
(51) Was Oswald’s act the act of a psychotic individual?
(52) Was Oswald motivated in part by his adherence to Castro’s regime?
(53) Was Oswald motivated in part by his adherence to Marxism or communism? If so, how?
(54) If Oswald was not politically motivated and if his act was not psychotic, what are the factors which may have contributed to his act?
(55) Is it possible that any specific events in his life shortly prior to November 22 may have contributed to his acts, e.g. his relationship with Marina, the rebuff in Mexico City, etc.?
(56) What was Oswald’s possible motive in shooting at General Walker and does this shed light on his motive to commit the assassination?
After reviewing Liebeler’s memo and these questions, the commission found the Liebeler draft well written but shied away from assigning any particular motive to Oswald or getting involved in psychiatric theories or terminology. Instead, they wanted these six questions to be answered by presenting all the essentials of Oswald’s life that might have contributed to his motivation to kill Kennedy. They thought their report might suggest various motives that may have influenced Oswald, but not attempt to identify any of greater importance.
The commission members did question one aspect of Liebeler’s draft: they thought it was soft on Oswald, too sympathetic. They thought it didn’t adequately reflect the strength of his character, which they considered “steely” as demonstrated by some of his actions. They also were struck by Marina Oswald’s observation that her husband’s unhappiness in the various countries in which he lived—Russia, United States, and even Cuba if he could reach it—suggested that he would be happy “only on the moon, perhaps.”69
We began reworking the chapter in light of the commission’s comments. Meanwhile, we asked the FBI in July to run down some additional details regarding Oswald’s political activities and associations. We asked for further investigation of a report identifying a witness who saw a young man in New Orleans in or about June 1963 distributing Fair Play for Cuba Committee leaflets to a crowd waiting to board a US aircraft carrier and in checking the deposition testimony of a witness who claimed that he saw Oswald in the Habana Bar in New Orleans on or about August 9, 1963. Following up on all such possibilities was essential to our consideration whether Oswald could possibly have been involved in a conspiracy to kill President Kennedy.
We also decided to seek the assistance of experts in examining Oswald’s motives and on July 9 met with Dr. Dale C. Cameron, superintendent, St. Elizabeths Hospital, Washington, DC; Dr. David A. Rothstein of the Medical Center for Federal Prisoners; and Dr. Howard P. Rome from the Mayo Clinic. In advance, we provided the psychiatrists with a detailed memo summarizing key facts from Oswald’s life, together with the depositions of his mother, brother, and experts who had examined him earlier in his life, a set of his known writings, including some letters, and a copy of his “Historic Diary.”70
The consultants declined to advance any firm opinions about Oswald’s personality and motives based on these materials. One or two commented on the desirability of more information about his military service and his stay in Russia. Nonetheless, their discussion identified some of the factors which were included in the final paragraph of Chapter 7: Oswald’s overriding hostility to his environment, his inability to establish meaningful relationships with other people, his perpetual discontent with the world around him, his expressions of hatred for American society and his actions in protest against it, his doomed search for a perfect society, and his desire for recognition as a “great man.” These professional insights gave most of us additional confidence in our assessment that this tragic event was a random act of violence by a lone assassin.71
Chapter 7 was divided into these sections: the early years, New York City, return to New Orleans and joining the Marine Corps, interest in Marxism, defection to the Soviet Union, return to the United States, personal relations, employment, attack on General Walker, political activities, interest in Cuba, possible influence of anti-Kennedy sentiment in Dallas, and his relationship with his wife. Most of the investigative work was done by the Jenner/Liebeler team, with some overlap with the Coleman/Slawson foreign affairs team. The extensive investigation of Oswald’s entire life was necessary to enable the commission to address two distinct questions: (1) Was there credible evidence in Oswald’s background and associations indicating his assassination of Kennedy was part of a conspiracy? (2) In the absence of such a conspiracy, what motivated Oswald to assassinate the president?
After the commission’s discussion of the issue, Liebeler continued to investigate aspects of Oswald’s life and associations trying to discern his motivation for shooting Kennedy in the absence of any conspiracy. The public wanted to know “why” in 1964 and still does to this day.72
Rankin, Redlich, and I met with Liebeler on August 20 to discuss our differences about how to assess the importance of Oswald’s Marxist views in the chapter on motive. Liebeler’s current draft stressed Oswald’s Marxist views and, by this stage of our investigation, he believed that there was a conspiracy among the staff to downplay the fact that Oswald was a Marxist. On the other hand, Rankin seemed principally concerned about what “the Far Right would do with any such discussion in our report rather than by what the facts actually show.” This debate continued into September, until Chapter 7 was finally sent to the printer.73
CHAPTER 8: THE PROTECTION OF THE PRESIDENT
The commission had two major decisions to address in this area: (1) Should the FBI have informed the Secret Service of the information in its possession before November 22, 1963? and (2) Should any of the functions of the Secret Service be transferred to the Justice Department? The commission heard from FBI director Hoover in May and had received draft sections of this chapter before its meetings in late June and early July.
When Hoover appeared before the commission, he strongly defended his bureau’s handling of Oswald before the assassination. Referring to the three interviews of Oswald by FBI agents, Hoover told the commission that the bureau’s motive was to find out whether he had been recruited by the Soviet Union intelligence services. He stated: “We found no indication at all that Oswald was a man addicted to violence. The first indication of an act of violence came after he, Oswald, had been killed, and Mrs. Oswald told us about the attempt on General Walker’s life by Oswald. No one had known a thing about that.” Under the criteria then in force at the FBI, Hoover told the commission that the FBI had no obligation to provide Oswald’s name to the Secret Service.74
Hoover advised the commission that he changed the FBI criteria in December 1963 following the assassination to provide that “all defectors automatically go on the list to be furnished to the Secret Service. There are thirty-six defectors that we know of in this country who have been under investigation. Some of those men may have changed their views sincerely. Some of them may not have. But as a matter of general precaution, as a result of the Oswald situation, we are seeing that all go to the Secret Service.” With respect to the original criteria, “which we felt were sound and sufficient and which we felt no one, not even the most extreme civil rights proponent could take exception to, we limited the furnishing of names to [the Secret Service] to persons potentially dangerous to the physical well being of the President. We included emotionally unstable people who had threatened the President or Vice President.”75
What Hoover did not tell the commission was that in December 1963 he had disciplined seventeen FBI agents and officials for their mishandling of the Oswald case and their failure to refer his name to the Secret Service. As discussed earlier, these actions came to light during the Church Committee investigation in 1976. Directly contrary to his commission testimony in 1964, Hoover had concluded a few months earlier that Oswald did fall within the criteria in place at the time and proclaimed, “Certainly no one in full possession of all his faculties can claim Oswald didn’t fall within this [sic] criteria.”76
Notwithstanding Hoover’s vigorous (and dishonest) defense of the FBI’s actions regarding Oswald, the commission concluded that the FBI should have done more with the information in its possession about Oswald. The commission report stated:
Although the FBI, in the normal exercise of its responsibility, had secured considerable information about Lee Harvey Oswald, it had no official responsibility, under the Secret Service criteria existing at the time of the President’s trip to Dallas, to refer to the Secret Service the information it had about Oswald. The Commission has concluded, however, that the FBI took an unduly restrictive view of its role in preventive intelligence work prior to the assassination. A more carefully coordinated treatment of the Oswald case by the FBI might well have resulted in bringing Oswald’s activities to the attention of the Secret Service.77
If Hoover had disclosed his disciplinary actions in 1963 to the commission as he should have, the commission could have explored in more detail exactly what the disciplined agents and officials had done, and not done, in the course of the Oswald investigation. It might have led to the commission learning about the Oswald note to Hosty, which was unknown to Hoover and had been destroyed after Ruby’s killing of Oswald. Knowing about the disciplinary actions would have certainly resulted in more complete and stronger commission findings about the FBI’s performance before the assassination.
The members considered six questions relating to presidential protection (64–69), but the notes prepared by Rankin reflected their responses at this point to only the first two. The commission’s report reflected its decisions on the remaining questions as summarized here:
(64) Were the advance preparations for the Dallas trip adequate? “The answer is ‘No, they were not. They were much too casual.’”
(65) Should the Secret Service have known about Lee Harvey Oswald? “The answer here is that under the criteria of the Secret Service they could not be expected to know about Lee Harvey Oswald although the Commissioners thought the criteria should have been such that they would have been informed about him.”
(66) What did other agencies know about Oswald?
The commission reviewed in its report the information about Oswald possessed by the FBI and the CIA and concluded that the agencies failed to share this information with the Secret Service.
(67) What criteria were applied by the Secret Service prior to November 22 in defining persons who present a threat to the President?
The commission heard testimony regarding the criteria in effect on November 22 as well as the revisions adopted by the Secret Service during the commission’s investigation.
(68) Did the Secret Service adequately fulfill its protective responsibility during the trip? (a) in San Antonio, Houston and Fort Worth? (b) in Dallas?
The commission report addressed the service’s performance only in Dallas and specified several serious shortcomings in its advance planning and performance of the agents during the motorcade.
(69) What recommendations does the commission wish to make in this area on such matters as federal legislation, a Board of Overseers, intelligence criteria, use of the presidential car, etc.?
The commission did make recommendations on all these subjects in its report.
The last three of the seventy-two questions (70–72) considered by the commission were labeled “Miscellaneous Questions” and the commission’s conclusions as of early July can be readily inferred:
(70) Was Lee Harvey Oswald an agent or informant of any federal agency?
The commission concluded that there was no evidence of any such relationship.
(71) Were the decisions made by the State Department with respect to Lee and Marina Oswald appropriate in light of existing law and practice?
The commission concluded that the State Department had acted properly and legally in its dealings with the Oswalds.
(72) Did the Dallas law enforcement authorities adequately meet their responsibilities during the period of November 22–24, 1963?
The commission’s answer was no, and its report details the many shortcomings by Dallas law enforcement personnel in its handling of Oswald.
After revising the draft chapter in accord with the commission’s comments, we submitted another draft to the members. McCloy responded promptly with detailed comments regarding the staff’s discussion of the protective measures taken in advance of the trip and the information available to the FBI about Oswald that was not communicated to the Secret Service. McCloy wanted the report’s comments about the Secret Service and the FBI to be both more specific and more critical.78
At its July 2 meeting, the commission discussed the broader issue whether any presidential protection responsibilities should be shifted from Treasury to the Justice Department. I learned from Rankin that Dulles and Ford were the only two members supporting a transfer of some protective duties to the Justice Department, but that Warren believed the commission should disavow its competence to address this question.79
Although this question was considered at later meetings, the two proponents of transfer gained no additional support. After the July 2 meeting, Dulles wrote a memo to Rankin explaining why he thought more radical measures were required than his commission colleagues. Dulles believed that one of the most important functions involved in the protection of the president was to provide “high-level guidance” defining “the general nature of the dangers in the world of today in both the domestic and foreign areas which affect Presidential security.” He concluded that this and the other important functions “can only be fulfilled through high-level direction from an office or a body having great prestige” and proposed that these duties be assumed by the National Security Council. He suggested that the NSC allocate to the Secret Service “all of the physical measures for the protection of the President” but that the “task of pinpointing the suspects as potential assassins would be assigned to the FBI.” Under this approach, Dulles anticipated that the FBI “would then take over full responsibility for the human detection analysis in consultation and collaboration with local police authorities in any areas the President might visit in the USA, with the CIA performing somewhat parallel duties, in consultation with local security and protective agencies, in any friendly foreign countries the President may visit.”80
On July 13, Stern sent me sections of the chapter dealing with the evaluation of protective measures followed in Dallas, and I worked with him on these and other portions of Chapter 8 during the remainder of the month. When we were finished, this chapter had sections on the nature of the protective assignment, evaluation of presidential protection at the time of the assassination of Kennedy (intelligence functions relating to presidential protection at the time of the Dallas trip, liaison with other government agencies, other protective measures and aspects of Secret Service performance), and recommendations (making assassination a federal crime, creating a committee of cabinet officers to oversee the presidential protection function, responsibilities for presidential protection, general supervision of the Secret Service, preventive intelligence, liaison with local law enforcement agencies, inspection of buildings, Secret Service personnel and facilities, and manpower and technical assistance from other agencies).
At a commission meeting in August, Dulles campaigned for more than an hour to persuade the other members to adopt his proposal or some similar approach that might improve the quality of presidential protection. He was not successful. Although the Dulles proposal seems attractive in retrospect, the commission’s failure to recommend a transfer of presidential protection duties was understandable. As earlier pointed out by Secretary Dillon, the executive order creating the commission did not expressly direct it to consider this issue. Of more importance was the concern that careful examination of this transfer question would have involved issues unrelated to the assassination—including statutory, budgetary, and organizational questions affecting the departments involved. Of course, the commission was well aware of the strong opposition of the Treasury Department and J. Edgar Hoover to any transfer of responsibilities to the FBI. With these considerations in mind, the commission decided that the matter was best left to the executive branch and the Congress.81
In August, I asked Lloyd Weinreb, our newest “associate,” to review the draft and propose any editing changes. Weinreb was a classmate of Stuart Pollak at Harvard Law School, had just completed his Supreme Court clerkship, and was planning to join the criminal division at the Justice Department as a special assistant to Jack Miller. Weinreb provided a new, much improved draft to me on August 12. I made only a few changes, the most important being an effort to clarify the section dealing with the relocation of the Secret Service’s responsibilities. This draft was delivered to the commission on August 19. After the draft was delivered to the commission, but before its meeting, Redlich and I were summoned to meet with Warren at his office.82
It was by far the most pleasant meeting with the chief justice that I had during my commission assignment. He was very cordial and began the meeting by stating that he was pleased with the current draft of Chapter 8. He offered a few suggestions for improving the draft and then turned to the two major questions that had likely prompted the meeting.83
First, he suggested that the proposal making assassination a federal crime should not explicitly provide for the death penalty. He told us that he “did not have strong views one way or the other on capital punishment” but did not wish to involve the commission in this controversial subject. He suggested that it might be sufficient for the commission to describe the need for, and the scope of, the proposed legislation and not address the issue of punishment. Redlich and I agreed that this could easily be done, either by referring to other federal statutes that could serve as models for this one or by leaving the question of punishment open for congressional decision. The commission’s final report makes no reference to the punishment that might result from violation of the proposed federal law.84
Second, Warren thought the last paragraph of Chapter 8, which was the last paragraph of the report, was “too much of an admonition” to future presidents to be more conscious of security risks. He suggested that it “should be addressed more to the people of the United States than to the President.” I told the chief justice that an earlier draft had referred to President Kennedy by name and expressed “the hope of the Commission that its work might minimize the dangers of another assassination” and that these sentiments seemed appropriate for the last paragraph in the report. Warren seemed amenable to revisions along these lines. With this encouragement, we redrafted the last paragraph to capture these suggestions.85
The commission discussed Chapter 8 on two consecutive days that week, with further consideration of the question of shifting the responsibility for presidential protection. After their deliberations on August 20, Rankin reported that the members “were pleased with the chapter although they were very methodically reviewing it page by page.” They finished with their review of the chapter the next day and McCloy undertook to draft some language that might bridge the gap between the members on the issue of transferring some duties to the Justice Department.86
THE APPENDICES
By mid-July, the commission had generally approved what material would be in the report itself and what would be relegated to appendices. We had tentatively designated about three hundred pages for the appendices, including a biography of Oswald, an analysis of his finances, an evaluation of the contacts between the Oswalds and the State Department, a biography of Ruby, a review of forensic tests (such as ballistics), a refutation of known rumors and theories, and a history of presidential protection. We had also decided to include in the appendices selected documents relevant to the investigation (such as the autopsy reports), and the documents relevant to the composition and operation of the commission. I wanted to get the appendices finalized because these materials, like the transcripts, could go to the printer well ahead of the report itself. The commission’s report ultimately included eighteen appendices, the last one listing the endnotes for the entire report.87
Appendix XII, “Speculations and Rumors,” was perhaps the most difficult appendix to write. Both the commission and staff had recognized from the beginning of the investigation that an appendix would be an appropriate place to address the most significant of the rumors and speculations, which were constantly increasing in number and intensity. But, as reflected in the debate about Chapter 4, we also wanted to rebut some of these allegations in the body of our report. Although I originally had an interest in drafting this appendix, we decided that Goldberg was the better candidate for this assignment.
Goldberg made substantial progress during July. On July 21 he reported that he had collected between 125 and 150 allegations that should be addressed. He advised Rankin that answers to most of these could be found in the draft report and in other appendices. However, he identified for Rankin eleven allegations that were not presently considered in the report; so, we needed to decide whether, and where, each might be addressed. Acting on Goldberg’s suggestion that a few allegations needed further investigation, Rankin sent a letter to the FBI asking for its assistance on four allegations from Goldberg’s list: (1) it has been FBI policy for twenty years to report to employers those of their employees who are communists or suspected communists; (2) Patrolman Tippit violated a procedure covering radio cars when he failed to notify headquarters that he was stopping to question a suspect; (3) prior to the assassination Dallas police searched other buildings in the area of the Texas School Book Depository but not the depository building itself; and (4) precautions taken by the Dallas police on November 22 before the assassination included surveillance of many people, among them some who did no more than speak in favor of school integration. The FBI told the commission that none of these allegations had any factual support.88
Goldberg circulated a draft of the proposed rumors and speculation appendix to the staff on July 24. He proposed that the answers to the allegations be footnoted by references to the report, other appendices, and, if necessary, the transcripts and other commission documents. He asked for comments on recommended additions or deletions, the accuracy of the answers, and whether answers to some allegations should be incorporated into the report. Goldberg received numerous, and detailed, comments from the staff. With these and other comments in hand, Goldberg was able to produce another version of the appendix for the commission in August.89
Our Fact-Checker Corps
As a matter of policy, we required that each fact in our report come from sworn testimony, or from a document that we had verified for accuracy, or from scientific or technical testing for which we had verified results. As was customary, our lawyers used footnotes to identify the source for each fact. It was necessary, however, to have someone other than the drafters confirm the accuracy of the footnoting—a process called “cite-checking.”
In July and early August, we began to assemble a truly outstanding group of young lawyers to be our independent fact-checkers, whom we counted on to bring independent eyes and demanding standards to check the accuracy of our work. Drafted by Warren, they were, for the most part, recent law-school graduates who were incoming (or departing) law clerks for the Supreme Court justices. One of these was Stephen G. Breyer, a clerk for Justice Goldberg, who a few decades later returned to the Supreme Court as one of its justices.
As they arrived for work at our offices, we explained the materials they would be reviewing. By now we had more than 10,000 pages of transcripts, piles of test reports, a great many photographs and other exhibits, and a growing number of draft chapters that ultimately would amount to 469 pages with another 410 pages of appendices. Every fact in these materials would have to be checked to see if it was correctly supported by its footnote. Literally thousands of hours were spent on this task.
Murray Laulicht, also pressed into duty as a fact-checker, recalled an example of the importance of this process. He noted a comment in Chapter 4 that nine fingerprints on cartons surrounding Oswald’s “nest” on the sixth floor had not been “identified.” Other members of the staff, including Griffin and Liebeler, had also focused on this problem. They questioned whether the author meant “unidentifiable”—meaning that they had been examined but no conclusion could be reached as to their origin. Pursuing the matter, they learned that this was not the case—that in fact these prints had not been fully investigated. So we requested that these prints be compared with the prints of the local police officials or FBI agents or clerks who handled these boxes. The results showed that all nine sets of fingerprints belonged to state or federal officials and the text was accordingly modified to eliminate what otherwise would have been an unresolved issue. Dozens of such questions were raised on a daily basis during the nearly two-month period that this cite-checking took place.90
Publication of the Commission’s Underlying Investigative Materials
The commission had decided early on that it wanted to make all of its non-classified documents public. Warren had announced this policy shortly after his impromptu comments before Marina Oswald’s testimony in February, and it was repeated frequently in later statements by commission representatives. We had already decided to publish all of the transcripts of witness testimony and evidentiary statements, all evidentiary materials cited in the report, and our most important underlying investigatory materials.
During August, we consulted with the National Archives about the handling of the remaining materials. These were primarily correspondence, inter-office memos, drafts, TV films, radio recordings, newspapers and magazine articles, less important investigative reports, and miscellaneous materials that had been sent to us or collected along the way. I learned that under current National Archives policies the commission’s investigatory and other materials would not be made public—regardless of the commission’s desires. I reported this policy to Rankin and he raised it with the commission. I learned two days later that the commission had considered the matter.91
According to Rankin, the commission members thought “that it would be desirable if all the material of the Commission were not available to the public for a year or two after the report comes out.” Although some time delay was inevitable because of the required organization and screening of these materials, it appeared that their “principal interest here is making sure that sufficient time elapses before any real critics can get access to material other than those which the Commission desires to publish simultaneous with its report.” Rankin told me that the chief justice intended to talk with the National Archivist about its future handling of the commission’s documents that are not published simultaneously with, or shortly after, its report.92
I do not know whether Warren ever discussed this issue with the National Archivist. Even if he had expressed his (and the commission’s) view that all of the commission’s documents (except those with a national security classification) be made public after the necessary organization and screening of the materials, it is unlikely that the National Archives would have departed from its customary procedures. President Johnson took steps in early 1965 at the chief justice’s urging to ensure that most of the commission’s records would be made public after normal processing by the National Archives.93
The commission’s desire to defer access by “any real critics” to its unpublished materials for a limited time should be evaluated in light of its decision to publish promptly the commission’s most important evidentiary materials. This supplementary material ultimately filled twenty-six substantial volumes and was available to the public two months after the commission report was released by the president. I think it was a perfectly natural instinct for the commission members to hope that the evaluation of their work would initially be based on the contents of their report and the supporting materials in the twenty-six volumes. However, I know the members recognized that “real critics” would find reasons to challenge the commission’s conclusions regardless of the amount of supporting material eventually published.
Alleged Pressure from Outside
The repeated claim by critics that the White House, a federal agency, or unspecified powerful forces influenced the extent of the commission’s investigation or the content of its report is simply false. I am certain that no one attempted to persuade the commission members to alter the substance of their report to meet any allegedly overriding national interests. If there had been an effort to compromise the independence of the commission in this manner, I would have known about it. The commission members, although certainly not flawless in their attendance or decision making, were men of integrity and strength, and not lacking in a sense of self-importance. They would not have deferred to any such influences.
The commission’s lawyers who came from the private sector were instinctively more inclined to distrust—rather than trust—the federal government. They would not have acquiesced in an indefensible commission investigation and report and would have gone public with their disagreement if that became necessary. As the only assistant counsel who was on a government payroll, I served as a representative of the Justice Department and Robert Kennedy with only a single mission—to assist the commission in conducting a far-reaching and intensive investigation of the facts and in writing a report that would accurately reflect that investigation. We were none of us perfect, but it would have been difficult to deceive us individually, and impossible to do so as a group.
The commission members were steadfast in their defense of their schedule and independence. Gerald Ford testified later that the commission set “its own schedule for completion of its work” and pointed out that when the commission concluded that a July 1964 deadline was unrealistic, it extended the deadline as necessary. He understood why Katzenbach or others in the federal government might have wanted an early statement from the commission on its investigation as soon as possible. But Ford stated firmly that President Johnson, his associates in the White House, the Justice Department, or other federal agencies did not hurry the commission to conclude its work. Ford also denied that there were any political pressures influencing the substance of the commission’s work. Cooper agreed with Ford’s statement that the commission was not pressured by anyone.94
McCloy stated that the commission “came to a judgment in due course” although there were some “questions of style in regard to the preparation of the report” that required time to address. The earlier deadlines for June were abandoned, and the deadlines in July, August, and September were extended. The commission decided when it was ready to complete its work and no one pressured it to finish before then.95
The staff had the same perspective. Rankin acknowledged that there were time pressures because the country was anxious for answers to whether there had been any conspiracy. But he made it clear to the commission staff “that our only client was the truth” and he thought that “we never departed from that standard, any of the Commission or myself or the staff.” Rankin said that some commission members thought it would be better if our report came out before the November election, principally to avoid any suspicion that President Johnson for political reasons wanted to delay the report. But there were no pressures exerted from the White House or elsewhere on us to meet that, or any, deadline if it meant not completing the investigation or writing the report as we believed necessary. Redlich added that if any member of the staff had approached Rankin or Warren and said that the staff needed more time to complete the investigation, the additional time would have been provided. I agree with that assessment.96
Rankin rejected the suggestion that pressures were exerted on the commission “not to find a foreign conspiracy” and stated that the commission undertook an aggressive effort to discover whether any kind of conspiracy existed regarding the assassination of President Kennedy. Specter in his later testimony rejected any theory that the commission’s objectives included the allaying of public fears, the prevention of an international crisis, or the facilitation of a smooth transition in national leadership. No member of the commission or staff ever charged that we had been pressured in any way to limit the scope of our investigation or the substance of our report.97
Of course, we felt personally the incredible sense of national dismay and anxiety caused by the assassination of President Kennedy, followed by the assassin’s murder by Ruby. President Johnson’s decision to appoint a distinguished presidential commission—rather than rely on the normal processes of the Justice Department or the uncertain course of a congressional investigation—challenged the commission and its staff to address this national emergency in a professional manner so that the critical questions surrounding the assassination could be addressed in a timely and effective manner. I believe we met that challenge.
By the end of August, I was confident that we could finish our work on schedule in September. The commission was still deliberating on two major conclusions—the single-bullet theory and the phrasing of its conspiracy findings—and four of the eight chapters needed substantial editing, but the finish line was near.