Chapter 1. Introduction: Immigration and the Transformation of America
1. According to the 2020 Current Population Survey, immigrants and their US-born children numbered approximately 85.7 million people or 26 percent of the US population (Batalova, Hanna, and Levesque 2021). This figure includes about 44.9 million immigrants (Jeanne Batalova, personal communication).
2. Alba and Foner 2015; Alba 2020.
3. Gabaccia 2010; Jacobson 2006, 9.
4. According to Portes (2012, 566–67), the phrase “immigrants are transforming the American mainstream” is merely a rhetorical device and immigration has a limited transformative capacity: in the United States, “there have been adaptations responding to the needs and demands posed by a large foreign population in organizations like schools, the legal system, and the labor market but, by and large, the fundamental pillars of society, including its value-normative system and its class structure, have remained intact.”
5. Alba and Nee 2003.
6. Waters and Pineau 2015.
7. On immigration and the changing construction of race, see, for example, Alba 2009, 2020; Lee and Bean 2010. On immigration’s impact on the economy and the labor market, see, for example, Borjas 1999; Waldinger and Lichter 2003. On immigration and the changing religious landscape, see, for example, Eck 2001; Wuthnow 2005.
8. On New York, see for example, Foner 2013b, 2013c. On Miami, see, for example, Portes and Armony 2018. On Los Angeles, see, for example, Waldinger and Bozorgmehr 1996. On Nashville, see, for example, Winders 2013. On California’s Silicon Valley, see, for example, Jiménez 2017. A few edited collections examine how immigration has affected new immigrant destinations, or reshaped urban and metropolitan America more generally: Jones-Correa 2001; Massey 2008; Mollenkopf and Pastor 2016; Singer, Hardwick, and Brettell 2008; Vitiello and Sugrue 2017a; Waldinger 2001; Zúñiga and Hernandez-León 2005.
9. Huntington 2004; Brimelow 1995.
10. Foner 2000, 2005, 2006, 2013a, 2014, 2019; Foner and Lucassen 2012. This book looks broadly at the post-1965 period rather than a step-by-step chronicle of shifts during these years.
11. Chishti, Hipsman, and Ball 2015.
12. Chishti, Hipsman, and Ball 2015. An interplay of factors led to the 1965 act, including foreign policy pressures, ethnic lobbying, and concerns about the racial and ethnic biases of existing immigration law in the context of the civil rights movement (Alba and Foner 2015, 109; for a recent analysis, see Fitzgerald and Cook-Martin 2014).
13. Railton 2017. The number of Italians who entered annually between 1925 and 1930 was somewhat higher—for example, eight thousand in 1924—since wives and unmarried minor children of US citizens were exempt from the quota (Daniels 2004, 56–57; Ngai 2004, 66–67).
14. Bean and Stevens 2003, 17.
15. Batalova and Terrazas 2010. Following common scholarly practice, I use foreign born and immigrant interchangeably in this book. The official US census definition of the foreign born, all persons who are not US citizens at birth, includes lawful permanent residents, naturalized US citizens, refugees and asylees, people on certain temporary visas, and unauthorized immigrants (Batalova, Hanna, and Levesque 2021; Waters and Pineau 2015, 21).
16. Gelatt 2019. Lawful permanent residents are noncitizens who are lawfully authorized to live permanently in the United States; they can apply for US citizenship after five years, or three if they are married to a US citizen. The diversity visa program allocates up to fifty thousand visas annually through a virtual lottery of qualified applicants from underrepresented countries. Africans have been major beneficiaries, making up 40 percent of the lottery “winners” from 1995 through 2017, while Asians were 25 percent (Congressional Research Service 2019).
17. Alba and Nee 2003, 176. See also Alba and Foner 2015, 25–26.
18. Budiman 2020; Batalova, Hanna, and Levesque 2021. Asians include those from East and Southeast Asia, South Asia, and Central Asia.
19. Gonzalez-Barrera 2015; Massey, Durand, and Pren 2016; Budiman 2020; Zong and Batalova 2018.
20. Chishti, Hipson, and Ball 2015. See also Lee 2019.
21. Foner 1973.
22. Massey et al. 1993.
23. This subsequent legislation included the 1980 Refugee Act, establishing the criteria for admission of refugees and immigration based on humanitarian relief and giving presidents the authority to set annual ceilings for the number of refugee entries; the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act, providing a path to legalization for many (ultimately nearly three million) undocumented people; and the Immigration Act of 1990, raising the annual numerical limit on family-sponsored immigrant visas, creating the diversity visa lottery, and enacting new high-skilled visa categories (Waters and Pineau 2015, 65–66; see also Donato and Amuedo-Dorantes 2020). That congressional legislation since 1965 expanded the legal influx has a lot to do with what political scientist Aristide Zolberg (1999) calls the strange bedfellows of immigration politics: business interests eager for cheap and mobile labor combined with the work of ethnic and civil rights groups, religious bodies, and immigrant-rights organizations to promote the continuation of or growth in legal immigration levels.
24. Martin 2014; Donato and Amuedo-Dorantes 2020. One factor contributing to soaring immigration in the last half century is that the 1965 law and subsequent amendments exempted immediate relatives of US citizens (spouses, parents, and unmarried children under twenty-one) from the annual worldwide and per country numerical limits applying to other family as well as employment categories. This exemption helps explain why the number of green cards issued in many years has exceeded the annual flexible worldwide cap, which after a series of legislative modifications, stood at 675,000 at the beginning of the twenty-first century (for details on how the US legal immigration system works, see Gelatt 2019).
25. Donato and Amuedo-Dorantes 2020; Batalova, Hanna, and Levesque 2021; Chishti and Bolter 2020. The 1850 Census was the first to collect data on nativity.
26. American Immigration Council 2020; Budiman 2020; Blizzard and Batalova 2019b; Gelatt 2019; Waters and Pineau 2015, 130–31.
27. This figure does not include tourists or other short-term visitors (Batalova, Hanna, and Levesque 2021).
28. Donato and Amuedo-Dorantes 2020; Blizzard and Batalova 2019b. Exchange visitor visas are for those approved to participate in work-and-study-based exchange visitor programs.
29. Alba and Foner 2015, 32–33; Batalova, Blizzard, and Bolter 2020; Bier 2020; Blizzard and Batalova 2019b; Pierce and Gelatt 2018; Waters and Pineau 2015. In recent years, roughly half the green cards issued annually have gone to immigrants already in the United States who have adjusted from another status such as temporary worker or international student (Gelatt 2019).
30. Warren 2017, 2019.
31. Capps et al. 2020; Batalova, Hanna, and Levesque 2021.
32. Waters and Pineau 2015, 43.
33. Zolberg 2006, 240, 264. After 1917, a literacy test was required of all immigrants over sixteen at Ellis Island, reading thirty to forty words in English or their native language, although it had little impact on the admission of European immigrants.
34. In addition, most people fleeing their home countries are unable to access humanitarian protection such as refugee or asylum status (American Immigration Council 2019).
35. Gelatt 2019.
36. Krogstad, Passel, and Cohn 2019.
37. Massey, Durand, and Pren 2016; Alba and Foner 2015, 38–39.
38. De Genova 2004; Massey, Durand, and Malone 2002; Massey and Pren 2012; Sandoval- Strausz 2019, 132.
39. Capps et al. 2020.
40. Waters and Pineau 2015, 36.
41. Batalova, Hanna, and Levesque 2021; Foner 2013a.
Chapter 2. The Racial Order
1. Passel and Cohn 2008.
2. In using the term “race,” I refer to the belief that visible differences or putative ancestry define groups or categories of people in ways that are seen to be innate or unchangeable. Ethnicity is more about differences based on culture and a sense of common origins, and is often characterized as optional for most Americans (Foner and Fredrickson 2004; Foner, Deaux, and Donato 2018; Cornell and Hartmann 2007; Waters 1990).
3. This chapter draws on my earlier publications and collaborations, especially Foner, Deaux, and Donato 2018. See also Alba and Foner 2015; Foner 2000, 2005.
4. Fox and Guglielmo 2012, 334. See also Perlmann 2018, 67–68.
5. López 1996.
6. Fox and Guglielmo 2012, 343.
7. Jacobson 1998, 6; Lee 2019, 114; Alba 2020.
8. Perlmann 2005, 11.
9. Lee 2019, 125, 134; Ross 1914, 95; Grant 1916.
10. New York: A Collection from Harper’s Magazine 1991, 304.
11. Cited in Jacobson 1998, 178.
12. Barker, Dodd, and Commager 1937, cited in Fitzgerald 1979, 79–80.
13. Alba 2009; Foner 2000, 2005.
14. Alba 2009, 75.
15. See, for example, Guterl 2001.
16. Alba 2009, 80; DeParle 2019. See also Gerstle 2001.
17. Abrajano and Hajnal 2015, 54.
18. Espiritu 1997, 109.
19. Wollenberg 1995.
20. Lee 2019, 181. See also Kraut 2016.
21. Lee and Zhou 2015.
22. Krogstad and Radford 2018.
23. Lee and Zhou 2014, 8; Lee and Zhou 2015. See also Tran, Lee, Khachikian, and Lee 2018.
24. Alba and Foner 2015, 210.
25. Kambhampaty 2020; Zhou 2004.
26. Feinberg 2020; Chishti and Bolter 2020.
27. Chinese American woman quoted in Zhou 2004, 35; Wu 2013, 2; Tuan 1998.
28. Budiman and Ruiz 2021; Kasinitz 2021.
29. Lee and Zhou 2014, 8.
30. Okamoto 2014, 43–46, 48. See also Espiritu 1992; Lee and Ramakrishnan 2020.
31. Okamoto 2014.
32. Fischer 2014.
33. Brown 2014; Cohn 2010; Flores, Lopez, and Krogstad 2019; Frey 2015; Haub 2012; Rumbaut 2006, 2011. In this book, I use the terms Latino and Hispanic interchangeably. About a third of Hispanics in the United States are immigrants, and two-thirds are US born (Batalova, Hanna, and Levesque 2021).
34. Itzigsohn 2004, 199. See also Rumbaut 2006.
35. Mora 2014, 16.
36. Foner, Deaux, and Donato 2018; Itzigsohn 2004.
37. Rumbaut 2011.
38. See Kibria, Bowman, and O’Leary 2014, 129; Fox and Guglielmo 2012.
39. Roth 2012, 64.
40. Foner 2005, 24.
41. Kibria, Bowman, and O’Leary 2014, 126.
42. Telles and Sue 2019, 2; Noe-Bustamante, Flores, and Shah 2019.
43. Ortiz and Telles 2012; Pew Research Center 2015b.
44. Fox and Guglielmo 2012, 367.
45. Cited in Fox and Guglielmo 2012, 367.
46. The discussion in this and the following paragraph draws on Alba and Foner 2015, 107.
47. Jiménez 2010.
48. Dowling 2014; Pew Research Center 2019b. See also Valdez and Golash-Boza 2017.
49. López and Stanton-Salazar 2001, 75.
50. Hamilton 2019.
51. Vickerman 2001, 237, 242; Hamilton 2019, 193.
52. Anderson and López 2018; Hamilton 2019.
53. Vickerman 2001, 255.
54. Anderson 2015; Vickerman 2001; Hamilton 2019. In only three of the ten metropolitan areas with the largest Black populations were Black immigrants a double-digit share of the overall Black population in 2013. Following Miami–Fort Lauderdale–West Palm Beach and New York–Newark–Jersey City, the Washington, DC, metropolitan area was in third place, with 15 percent of the area’s Blacks being foreign born. In the other seven metropolitan areas, Black immigrants’ share of the Black population was much smaller, such as 8 percent in the Atlanta area, 4 percent in Chicago, and only 1 percent in Detroit (Anderson 2015). On Somalis in Lewiston, Maine, see Anderson 2019; Besteman 2016. On East Africans in Minneapolis, see Chambers 2017; Guenther, Pendaz, and Makene 2011. On Africans in Fargo, North Dakota, see Erickson 2020.
55. Clerge 2019, 17, 197, 209–10.
56. Kasinitz 1992. This first wave began around 1900 and ended in the mid-1920s. By 1930, a little under a hundred thousand foreign-born Blacks lived in the United States, with the vast majority coming from the Caribbean; in 2016, around two million Black immigrants from the Caribbean lived in the United States (Kasinitz 1992; Anderson and López 2018).
57. Vickerman 2001, 254.
58. Portes and Armony 2018, 156–57. See also Etienne 2020; Stepick et al. 2003.
59. See, for example, Waters 1999.
60. Batalova and Feldblum 2020, based on an analysis of 2018 Census data.
61. Vickerman 2016, 77; Sall 2020.
62. Vickerman 2016, 77; 2013.
63. Hamilton 2019, 72–73; Waters and Kasinitz 2015.
64. Alba and Foner 2015, 75–80. As a large literature demonstrates, confinement to predominantly, often virtually all-Black or racial minority neighborhoods in the United States limits, among other things, access to good schools while increasing exposure to crime and reducing informal contacts with Whites.
65. Clerge 2019, 231.
66. Alba and Foner 2015, 209–10, 104; Hamilton 2019, 221–22.
67. Hamilton 2019, 214.
68. Foner 2018; Foner, Deaux, and Donato 2018; Waters 2014; Pager 2007.
69. Waters 2001, 213. See also Clerge 2019, 143.
70. Vickerman 2016, 77.
71. Vickerman 2016, 78.
72. Foner 2018.
73. Bashi Bobb and Clarke 2001, 233; Foner 2018.
74. Quoted in Imoagene 2017, 142.
75. See Waters 1999; Foner 2001.
76. According to an analysis of national surveys spanning the 2010–16 period, about 30 to 40 percent of White Americans have a strong racial identity, and 20 percent have a strong level of group consciousness as Whites as well as feel a sense of discontent over the status of their racial group (Jardina 2019, 261–62). In this book, I use the terms Whites and non-Hispanic Whites interchangeably. The term Hispanic on the Census has given rise to the category non-Hispanic White, which is used frequently in government reports and academic studies. It is a catchall category for all those who identify as Whites but whose ancestry does not include a Spanish-speaking nation (Foley 2004, 341).
77. McDermott and Samson 2005.
78. Alba 2020, 25.
79. Hochschild 2016; Alba 2020.
80. Painter 2016; Jardina quoted in Chotiner 2019.
81. Craig and Richeson 2018.
82. Political scientist Deborah Schildkraut quoted in Edsall 2020. See also Alba 2020.
83. Jardina 2019, 3–4.
84. Quoted in Jiménez and Horowitz 2013, 859. See also Jiménez 2017.
85. Quoted in Chow 2017. See also Tehranian 2009.
86. Quoted in Wiltz 2014.
87. Alba 2009, 217.
88. Alba 2020, 6; 2009. For alternative predictions about the future of the racial order, see Bonilla-Silva 2004; Gans 2012; Kaufmann 2019; Lee and Bean 2010; Marrow 2011.
89. On the early twentieth-century period, see Ngai 2004, 3. Before World War I, as Ngai (2006) notes, statutes of limitations of one to five years meant that even those in the United States unlawfully did not live forever with the specter of deportation.
90. Alba 2020, chapter 7.
91. Alba 2020, 2009; Alba and Foner 2015.
92. Alba 2020, 184. The study analyzes those in the top quartile of jobs, ranked in terms of their median earnings.
93. Alba and Nee 2003, 132.
94. Alba and Foner 2015. For a personal account of multiethnic and multiracial mixing in colleges and neighborhoods, see Mehta 2019, 236–42.
95. Cornell and Hartmann 2007, 257.
96. Alba 2020, chapter 4.
97. Jilani 2020. See also Törngren, Irastorza, and Rodríguez-García 2021.
98. Alba 2020, chapter 4.
99. Williams 2012, 2019; Friedersdorf 2019; Gans 2012, 268.
100. Alba 2020.
101. Lee and Bean 2010.
102. Pew Research Center 2015b.
103. Pew Research Center 2015b, 58.
104. Alba 2016, 2020; Myers and Levy 2018.
105. Alba 2016, 2020.
Chapter 3. Changing Cities and Communities
1. These figures, from the New York City Planning Population FactFinder, are for the Auburndale neighborhood based on 2013–17 American Community Survey data.
2. Singer 2004, 2015.
3. Foner 2013b; Singer 2004.
4. Foner 2013c; Sandoval-Strausz 2019, 12.
5. Singer 2015.
6. Singer 2015.
7. Singer 2004, 2015; Wikipedia 2020.
8. Singer 2013, 80.
9. Singer 2013, 87, 89; Frey 2015, 164.
10. Singer 2013, 87. This represented a change from 1980, when similar shares of immigrants lived in the cities and suburbs of the largest metropolitan areas in the United States.
11. Rothstein 2017.
12. Price and Singer 2008. On immigration’s role in the changing racial and ethnic composition of suburban Dallas, see Brettell 2008.
13. Odem 2008, 110–18. See also Waters and Pineau 2015, 218–19.
14. Vitiello and Sugrue 2017b, 3; Frey 2019a; Eltagouri 2017.
15. Quoted in Dickey 2007. See also Waters and Pineau 2015, 326–32.
16. Sampson 2017, 12–13.
17. According to one analysis, the decline in the murder rate between 1980 and 2010 was greater in metropolitan areas with a high percentage of foreign born than in those where the foreign-born share was small. The result was that in 2010, homicide rates were higher in the metropolitan areas with small foreign-born populations (Adelman et al. 2017, 67).
18. Sampson 2017, 19–20; Waters and Pineau 2015, 330–32. See also Rumbaut, Dingeman, and Robles 2019; Adelman et al. 2017. One study concludes, on the basis of an analysis of Census data, that the neighborhood segregation of immigrants has a protective effect on violent crime in places that have structural resources such as low poverty rates and educational opportunities (Feldmeyer, Harris, and Scroggins 2015).
19. Kallick 2015. See also Fiscal Policy Institute 2012.
20. Orleck 1987, 2013; Sandoval-Strausz 2017, 137–38; Emmanuel 2015.
21. Porter 2018.
22. Lichter 2012, 4. One study shows that the influx of Hispanics in nonmetropolitan areas has mostly slowed, not reversed, population loss. Only about one in ten (nearly two hundred) of the nonmetropolitan counties in this analysis grew in 2010–17 because Hispanic increases offset non-Hispanic population declines (Lichter and Johnson 2020).
23. Carr, Lichter, and Kefalas 2012.
24. See, for example, Parrado and Kandel 2008.
25. Vezner 2017; Mathema, Svajlenka, and Hermann 2018; Lichter 2012, 10, 14.
26. Carr, Lichter, and Kefalas 2012, 42–43.
27. In 2010, Whites remained a majority—68 percent—of suburban residents, but this was a drop from 93 percent in 1970. For the changing racial composition of central cities and suburbs, 1970–2010, based on an analysis of 287 metropolitan statistical areas, see Massey and Tannen 2018, 1600–601. See also Batalova, Hanna, and Levesque 2021.
28. Foner 2013b; Sandoval-Strausz 2019, 180; The Economist 2017.
29. Frey 2015, 159.
30. Frey 2015, 54.
31. The 1960 figures are from Miami-Dade Department of Planning and Zoning, “Demographic Profile, 1960–2000.”
32. Portes and Armony 2018; Portes and Stepick 1993; City of Los Angeles, Department of City Planning 2015; Schneider 2008.
33. Wikipedia 2021. Hialeah and Miami, Florida were also among these cities.
34. Frey 2015, 54–55.
35. On Winston-Salem, North Carolina, see J. Jones 2019. On Nashville, see Winders 2008, 257. On Charlotte, see Jones-Correa 2016.
36. Frey 2015, chapter 5.
37. Anderson 2015; Anderson and López 2018.
38. Rischin 1962, 76; Hapgood (1902) 1967, 113; Odencrantz 1919, 12; Luconi 2001, 27.
39. Zukin 2010.
40. Foner 2000.
41. Price and Singer 2008, 149–50.
42. Alba and Foner 2015, 71.
43. Moore 1981; Goldstein 2006; Gans 1957.
44. Matsumoto 2018.
45. Zhou, Chin, and Kim 2013, 373.
46. Jiménez 2017, 20.
47. Fong 1994; Zhou, Chin, and Kim 2013, 370–79.
48. The discussion of the decline of all-White neighborhoods draws on Alba and Foner 2015, 93–94. On contemporary super-diversity, see Foner 2017; Foner, Duyvendak, and Kasinitz 2019.
49. Alba 2020, 192.
50. Logan and Zhang 2010. See also Zhang and Logan 2016.
51. The twenty-four metropolitan regions included many of the largest metropolises: New York (plus Newark, Jersey City, Bergen-Passaic, and Trenton), Chicago, and Los Angeles; San Francisco, Sacramento, San Diego, Bakersfield, Oakland, Riverside, Stockton, and Vallejo; Dallas, Fort Worth, Houston, College Station, and Galveston; and Miami, Denver, Colorado Springs, and Las Vegas (Logan and Zhang 2010, 1080–82).
52. Alba and Foner 2015, 94. According to a recent analysis, the average White resident in the hundred-largest metropolitan areas lived in a less White neighborhood in 2014–19 than in 2000, although Whites almost everywhere continued to live in mostly White neighborhoods (Frey 2021a).
53. Putnam 2007.
54. Carr, Lichter, and Kefalas 2012; Hirschman and Massey 2008.
55. Pettigrew and Tropp 2006.
56. Wessendorf 2014.
57. Alba and Foner 2017; Sandoval-Strausz 2019, 317.
58. See, for example, Menjívar 2003.
59. Foner 2013b. Over one hundred Chicago-area Catholic churches, by one account, now offer Spanish-language Mass to congregants (on the history of Mexicans’ involvement in the Catholic church in Chicago, see Kanter 2020).
60. Pew Research Center 2017b, 2015a; Alba and Foner 2015, 131. A small proportion of Muslims, about one in seven, are African Americans.
61. Berglund 2015.
62. Waters and Pineau 2015, 318.
63. Wuthnow 2005, 217–20.
64. Hamilton 2019, 70. See also Pew Research Center 2017b.
65. See, for example, Bilici 2012; Pew Research Center 2017b; Karam 2020; Waters and Pineau 2015, 323.
66. Pew Research Center 2017a.
67. Pew Research Center 2017b; Eck 2001, 232; Chappell 2018.
68. Pew Research Center 2017b.
69. Alba and Foner 2015, 134.
70. Gerstle 2015, 37.
71. Alba and Foner 2015, 134–35.
72. Gerstle 2015, 50.
73. Custodio 2010; McDonnell and Hill 1993; Gershberg, Danenberg, and Sanchez 2004; Harrington 2018.
74. Zhou and Kim 2006; Yin 2017.
75. Salomone 2010, 23, 25. See also Baker 2011.
76. Foner 2000, 207.
77. Salomone 2010, 157–58.
78. Suárez-Orozco, Suárez-Orozco, and Todorova 2008, 370.
79. Salomone 2010, 190–91; Salomone 2021.
80. Foner 2000.
81. Moore et al. 2017, 126; McGuinness 2013.
82. Quoted in Bell 2017; Eldred 2018; Brenner et al. 2018.
83. de Graauw 2015.
84. See de Graauw 2014.
85. Provine et al. 2016, 1–2, 13, 148. See also Golash-Boza 2011.
86. Provine et al., 2, 30, 113. The national surveys were conducted in 2007–10.
87. Provine et al., 80–88.
Chapter 4. The Economy
1. American Immigration Council 2017; Batalova 2020.
2. Blau and Mackie 2017, 6.
3. Batalova, Hanna, and Levesque 2021. The civilian labor force is comprised of civilians sixteen and older who were either employed or unemployed, but looking for work in the week prior to participation in the American Community Survey or decennial Census.
4. In the period from 2003 through 2013, the employment rate (percentage of individuals employed during the week they were surveyed by the Current Population Survey) for all foreign-born males was 86 percent, 83 percent for second-generation males, and 82 percent for males in the third and higher generations. The average employment rate of foreign-born men with less than twelve years of schooling exceeded that of men in the second generation by 21 points and men in the third and higher generations by 26 percentage points. Among women, immigrants had a lower employment rate (61 percent) than the native born (roughly 72 percent for both the second generation and the third and higher generations) (Waters and Pineau 2015, 264–65).
5. Bennett 2020; Waters and Pineau 2015, 266; Bean et al. 2014.
6. DeSilver 2017. See also Eckstein and Peri 2018.
7. Eckstein and Peri 2018, 5–6.
8. Gonzalez-Rivera 2016.
9. Jacoby 2012.
10. Waldinger and Lichter 2003.
11. Foner 2005, 171–72; Foner 1973.
12. Foner 1994; Kolker 2018.
13. Hagan, Hernández-León, and Demonsant 2015.
14. Hondagneu-Sotelo 2001, 8.
15. Hondagneu-Sotelo 2001, 8; Garip 2017, 76; Milkman 2020, 113–14.
16. Hondagneu-Sotelo 2001, 8.
17. Kaufman 2000, 364.
18. Batalova 2020.
19. Ortman, Velkoff, and Hogan 2014.
20. Cortés and Tessada 2011.
21. Batalova, Hanna, and Levesque 2021. This figure (35 percent) refers to those ages sixteen years and older.
22. Kallick 2013, 76–77.
23. Batalova 2020; American Immigration Council 2018.
24. In 2018, 22 percent of foreign-born physicians and surgeons were Indian, followed by those from China / Hong Kong (6 percent) (Batalova 2020).
25. Myers and Pitkin 2013.
26. Sturtevant 2017.
27. Porter 2019; Siniavskaia 2018. In 2016, according to a home builders’ association study, immigrants accounted for one in four construction workers in the country; in some jobs like roofing, the share of immigrants was over 40 percent.
28. Kerr and Kerr 2018.
29. Kosten 2018; Kerr and Kerr 2018; Hathaway 2017. See also Kallick 2015.
30. Waldinger 1986, 268.
31. Kallick 2015, 2, 9, 34.
32. Hirschman and Mogford 2009, 917.
33. Hirschman and Mogford 2009.
34. Florida 2017.
35. Anderson 2018.
36. Eckstein and Peri 2018, 10.
37. Eckstein and Peri 2018, 11. According to a recent study, nearly half of the CEO founders of New York City’s high-tech firms were immigrants or second generation, with a robust Asian and western European presence (Nee and Drouhot 2020).
38. Hunt and Gauthier-Loiselle 2010; Blau and Mackie 2017, 255–58.
39. Blau and Mackie 2017. See also Peri and Sparber 2020.
40. Portes and Armony 2018, 67, 11.
41. Waldinger 1996, 12.
42. Hilgers 2014; Liang and Zhou 2018; Liang et al. 2018.
43. Eckstein and Nguyen 2018; Eckstein and Peri 2018.
44. Eckstein and Nguyen 2011; Min 2013. By 2016, according to the Census Bureau, New York City alone had over four thousand nail salons (Kim 2020).
45. Eckstein and Nguyen 2011, 645.
46. “Meat, Beef and Poultry Processing Industry in the US” 2019.
47. Hirschman and Massey 2008, 9.
48. Parrado and Kandel 2008, 106.
49. Milkman 2020, 84–96.
50. Milkman 2020, 94–95.
51. Parrado and Kandel 2008; Fremstad, Rho, and Brown 2020. Both studies are based on analysis of data on the animal slaughtering and processing industry (William Kandel, personal communication).
52. Milkman 2020, 84–85, 128.
53. Milkman 2020, 129, 142, 144–51. Contemporary worker centers, Milkman notes, have parallels with late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century labor reform groups and settlement houses.
54. Krogstad, Passel, and Cohn 2019.
55. Orrenius and Zavodny 2009; Milkman 2020.
56. Moyce and Schenker 2018.
57. Molteni 2020.
58. Gelatt 2020, 6, 11.
59. Quoted in Hoban 2017.
60. Blau and Mackie 2017, 5.
61. Peri 2017.
62. Blau and Mackie 2017, 6.
63. Blau and Mackie 2017, 5–6, 228.
64. Lim 2001; Waldinger and Lichter 2003.
65. Waldinger and Lichter 2003, 208–9.
66. Giovanni Peri and Chad Sparber cited in Porter 2017. On native workers’ shift out of low-wage and precarious jobs in fields such as meatpacking that used to have high wages, health coverage, benefits, and employment security in the context of employer efforts to weaken unions, deregulation policies, and subcontracting, see Milkman 2020. As many US-born workers abandoned the degraded jobs and sought employment in more desirable sectors, they were replaced by immigrants.
67. Hirschman and Mogford 2009.
68. Roberts and Wolf 2018. High-tech industries were those having high concentrations of science, technology, engineering, and mathematics occupations.
Chapter 5. The Territory of Culture: Immigration, Popular Culture, and the Arts
1. Lee 2008, 25–26.
2. Lee 2008, 9, 26. The process in which elements from immigrants’ home country cultures and those of the long-established native born blend into something new in the US social, economic, and political context is often labeled creolization (Foner 1997; Gabaccia 1998). Another view, associated with new assimilation theory, stresses how mainstream American institutions and customs expand to accommodate cultural alternatives, usually after being “Americanized” to some extent (Alba and Nee 2003).
3. Ray 2016, 106, 109.
4. Gabaccia 1998, 148.
5. Gabaccia 1998, 3; Butler 2018.
6. Nathan 2008; Gabaccia 1998, 4.
7. Gabaccia 1998, 4–5.
8. Nathan 2008.
9. “Consumption of Bagels in the U.S. 2020” 2020.
10. Ray 2016, 105.
11. Ray 2016, 108.
12. Lee 2008, 10; Coe 2009; Hayford 2011.
13. Chen 2014; Liu 2015.
14. Lee 2008, 257, 82–83; Liu 2015.
15. Guest 2011; Hilgers 2014; Liang and Zhou 2018.
16. Liu 2015.
17. Pierson 2015.
18. Liu 2015, 138; Goldfield 2020, 13.
19. Arellano 2012, 269; Ray 2016, 93.
20. Gabaccia 1998, 165; Arellano 2012, 202, 221; Hyslop 2017.
21. Quoted in Friesen 2012. See also Pilcher 2012.
22. Arellano 2012, 150, 145–46.
23. Arellano 2012, 4, 2.
24. Ray 2016, 107.
25. Gabaccia 1998, 202–3.
26. Shah 2020.
27. Halter 2000, 9.
28. Gabaccia 1998, 226.
29. League of American Orchestras 2016; Paarlberg 2012.
30. Roth 1959; Bellow 1953; Jen 1991; Díaz 2007; Lahiri 2003.
31. Hunt, Ramon, and Tran 2019, 21.
32. Chin et al. 2017; Force 2018; Smith, Choueiti, and Pieper 2016.
33. Laurino 2000; Alba and Kasinitz 2006.
34. Kasinitz 1992. On the San Francisco Carnival, representing Afro-Caribbeans, Brazilians, and Latin Americans, but targeted at a predominantly White audience, see Hintzen 2001, 46.
35. Jiménez 2017, 82.
36. Shutika 2011, 31; personal communication from Shutika, January 3, 2021.
37. Jiménez 2017, 85.
38. French 2005.
39. Portman was born in Israel, while Sheen is the grandchild of immigrants. The five earlier era film stars mentioned, with one exception (Bancroft, the granddaughter of Italian immigrants), were children of immigrants.
40. “ ‘Big Sick’ Creators Nanjiani and Gordon on Turning Their Courtship into a Movie,” NPR, June 23, 2017.
41. Wides-Munoz 2010; González 2013.
42. Nussbaum 2015.
43. Chiang 2018.
44. “Comic Ramy Youssef on Being an ‘Allah Carte’ Muslim” 2019.
45. Mora 2014; Krogstad and Lopez 2017; Valdes 2015; Business Wire 2019.
46. Like O’Neill, celebrated American playwright Arthur Miller was the son of an immigrant father—in Miller’s case, from eastern Europe.
47. Lahiri 2003; Díaz 2007; Nguyen 2015; Adichie 2013.
48. Witchel 2012.
49. See, for example, Beah 2014; Lai 2011; Nguyen 2015; Jin 1999, 2004.
50. Grande 2006; Mbue 2016; Ko 2017. See also Alvarez 2020; Bulawayo 2013; Urrea 2018.
51. See, for example, Adichie 2013; Danticat 1994; Gyasi 2020.
52. Marshall (1959) 1981; Sandomir 2019.
53. See, for example, Díaz 2007; Jen 1991; Lahiri 2003; Lee 2007. On the second generation, see Foner and Dreby 2010; Kasinitz et al. 2008.
54. Kasinitz 2014, 266–75.
55. Study in Royal Society Open Science reported in Thompson 2015. Rap is one of the elements of hip-hop. In addition to music, hip-hop often refers to a cultural form including, among other things, dance, poetry, clothing styles, and graffiti art (Kasinitz 2014, 280).
56. Kasinitz 2014, 280–82; Rubin and Melnick 2007; Vickerman 2013.
57. Quoted in Okura 2013.
58. Public Broadcasting Service 2017. Puerto Ricans who move to the mainland United States, it should be noted, are migrants, not immigrants; those born in Puerto Rico are US citizens by birth. For a critical view of corporate influences on Latino/a performers who have been marketed as global icons of Latinidad and subject to demands to make their music more palatable to wider audiences, see Cepeda 2014; Dávila 2014.
59. “Carlos Santana Biography,” n.d.
60. Purdum 2018a, 2018b.
61. Purdum 2018a.
62. Kasinitz 2014, 282.
63. Kasinitz 2016, 3.
64. Piepenburg 2016.
65. Brantley 2015.
66. Gabaccia 1998, 228, 230–31.
67. Czekalinski and Nhan 2012.
68. Hirschman 2013, 42.
69. Hirschman 2005; Kasinitz 2014; Kasinitz et al. 2008.
Chapter 6. Electoral Politics
1. Dawsey 2018.
2. Meyerson 2002, 23.
3. Sides, Tesler, and Vavreck 2018, 13, 26. Whites in this chapter, to emphasize, refer to non-Hispanic Whites.
4. Abramowitz 2018, 58.
5. Abrajano and Hajnal 2015.
6. Sterne 2001, 59; Gerstle and Mollenkopf 2001, 26.
7. Abramowitz 2018, 18; Meyerson 2002, 23; Sterne 2001, 59.
8. Schickler 2016; Meyerson 2002.
9. Starr 1997; Meyerson 2002; Abramowitz 2018, 22, 25.
10. Sides, Tesler, and Vavreck 2018; Abramowitz 2018.
11. Abrajano and Hajnal 2015, 80–81; Sides, Tesler, and Vavreck 2018, 26. In the 2019 Pew Research Center (2020) survey, non-Hispanic White registered voters identified with or leaned Republican by a substantial margin, 53 percent, vs. 42 percent who leaned Democratic.
12. Pew Research Center 2020; Abrajano and Hajnal 2015, 6, 11, 42.
13. Pew Research Center 2020; Sides, Tesler, and Vavreck 2018, 26. The Pew survey data refer to Democratic and Democratic-leaning as well as Republican and Republican-leaning registered voters.
14. Abramowitz 2018, 13.
15. Abramowitz 2018, x.
16. Alba and Foner 2017; Alba 2020, 30–33.
17. Pew Research Center 2020.
18. Pew Research Center 2020; Budiman, Noe-Bustamante, and Lopez 2020. See also Frey 2015, 2018.
19. Griffin, Frey, and Teixeira 2020; Pew Research Center 2020.
20. Batalova, Hanna, and Levesque 2021.
21. Batalova, Hanna, and Levesque 2021; Passel and Cohn 2019.
22. Waters and Kasinitz 2015.
23. Ngai 2004.
24. Chavez 2008.
25. Brown, Jones, and Becker 2018.
26. Jardina 2019, 267.
27. Hochschild 2016, 143, 137–39.
28. Sides, Tesler, and Vavreck 2018, 8.
29. Alba and Foner 2017. See also Norris and Inglehart 2019.
30. Abrajano and Hajnal 2015, 27.
31. Jardina 2019, 222–28.
32. Abramowitz 2018, 140; Sides, Tesler, and Vavreck 2018, 90–93.
33. B. Jones 2019. Only 11 percent of the Democrats viewed immigrants as a burden. The survey combines Democrats and Democratic-leaning respondents, on the one hand, and Republicans and Republican-leaning respondents, on the other.
34. Jardina 2019. See also King and Smith 2020.
35. Lee 2019, 7–9.
36. Sandoval-Strausz 2019, 335.
37. Boissoneault 2017; Daniels 2004; Kraut 2016; Lee 2019; Zolberg 2006.
38. Daniels 2004; Lee 2015; Foner 2005.
39. Daniels 2004, 52.
40. Abrajano and Hajnal 2015, 2; Hernández 2006.
41. Massey, Durand, and Malone 2002.
42. Klein 2018; Anderson 2020.
43. Cited in Matthews 2015.
44. Fuchs 1990.
45. Foner 2000, 165–66.
46. López 2015, 4; Baker 2018; Withers 2018.
47. President George W. Bush, remarks on signing the Immigration Act, 1990; President Bill Clinton, commencement address at Portland State University, 1998; President Barack Obama, remarks in an address to the nation on immigration, 2014.
48. During Trump’s presidency, the US Citizen and Immigration Services even removed a passage from its official mission statement that described “America’s promise as a nation of immigrants.”
49. Edsall 2019; see also Lee 2019, 323.
50. Bouie 2019; Leonhardt and Philbrick 2018; Silva 2018.
51. See, for example, Glazer and Moynihan 1970; McNickle 1993; Mollenkopf 2014.
52. By 1890, the Irish had captured most of the Democratic Party organizations in northern and midwestern cities; an 1894 list of Irish party bosses includes John Kelly and Richard Croker in New York City, Hugh McLaughlin in Brooklyn, Mike McDonald in Chicago, Pat Maguire in Boston, William Sheehan in Buffalo, and “Little Bob” Davis in Jersey City (Erie 1988, 4, 2).
53. Erie 1988, 51–53.
54. Quoted in McNickle 1993, 9.
55. McNickle 1993, 2; Mollenkopf and Sonenshein 2009, 77; Foner 2014, 38–39.
56. In 1910, Jewish and Italian immigrants together accounted for nearly a fifth of the city’s population; by 1920, foreign-born Jews and Italians along with their US-born children made up about 43 percent of the city (Foner 2000).
57. McNickle 1993, 34; Erie 1988, 12.
58. Mollenkopf 2014, 225.
59. NALEO 2019.
60. Portes and Armony 2018, 196.
61. Mollenkopf and Sonenshein 2013.
62. In 2019, 10 percent of House lawmakers were Hispanic at a time when Hispanics represented 18 percent of the nation’s population.
63. Congressional Research Office 2020. These figures do not include nonvoting delegates or the resident commissioner of Puerto Rico.
64. Bloemraad 2013, 654.
65. Mollenkopf 2014; Moses 2018.
66. Bloemraad 2013, 655; Alba and Foner 2015, 149–50.
67. Mollenkopf 2014.
68. Wilson 2010; Wallace 2014.
69. Quoted in Molotsky 1988. The first Asian American senator, Hiram Fong, the Hawaii-born son of Chinese immigrants, served in the Senate from 1959 to 1977; Daniel Inouye, the first Japanese American senator, also from Hawaii and the son of a Japanese immigrant father, was first elected to the Senate in 1962. Matsunaga, the son of Japanese immigrants, like Inouye, had served in the US House of Representatives before becoming a senator.
70. Abramowitz 2018, 120.
71. Judis and Teixeira 2002. See also Meyerson 2002; Starr 1997.
72. “American Election Eve Poll 2020” 2020 showed a rise from 18 to 27 percent. Edison Research exit polls put the 2020 Hispanic Trump vote at over 30 percent (Kaufmann 2021).
73. Kamarck 2019.
74. Frey 2019b; Pew Research Center 2019a. See also Greenberg 2019.
75. Abrajano and Hajnal 2015, 89, 213–16; Sargent 2018.
76. Alba 2020.
77. Griffin, Frey, and Teixeira 2020.
78. Frey 2021b. Turnout rates in the 2020 presidential election increased for Asian Americans (59 percent) and Latinos (54 percent) but still remained lower than for non-Hispanic Whites (71 percent) and Blacks (63 percent) (Frey 2021b).
79. Starr 1997. On political attitudes among Latino immigrants based on a survey conducted before and after the 2016 election, see McCann and Jones-Correa 2020.
80. Liptak 2013; Tucker 2019.
81. Klein 2020b, 255.
82. Klein 2020a. See also Tucker 2019.
83. Millhiser 2019; Collin 2016. In 2016, the winner-take-all feature of the electoral college in nearly all states was a factor in Trump’s victory since it gave the battleground states such as Wisconsin and Michigan, which he won, outsized importance (Collin 2016).
84. Smith 2020.
85. Abramowitz 2018, 120; Jardina 2019, 270.
86. Abrajano and Hajnal 2015, 216.
87. Sides, Tesler, and Vavreck 2018, 220.
Chapter 7. Conclusion: A Nation in Flux
1. Kennedy 2018, 4.
2. Alba and Foner 2015; Schultz 2011.
3. Hirschman 2005.
4. Feldstein 2017.
5. Correal 2018; Foner 2013b, 2013c; Liang et al. 2018.
6. Waters and Pineau 2015, 3.
7. Gans 1979.
8. “International Migrant Stock 2015” 2015.
9. Foner et al. 2014.
10. Alba and Foner 2015, 63–64; Kloosterman and Rath 2003.
11. Ali 2003; Smith 2001; Delhaye, Saharso, and van de Ven 2014; Kasinitz 2014; Kasinitz and Martiniello 2019.
12. Alba and Foner 2015.
13. See, for example, Rooduijn 2015.
14. Children of Native Americans governed by tribal legal systems were excluded from birthright citizenship until congressional legislation in 1924 (Waters and Pineau 2015, 160–61).
15. Epps 2018.
16. Britain, however, had a jus soli tradition that became slightly more restrictive in the wake of the large post–World War II immigration, and France long had (since the 1800s) what is known as double jus soli, automatic citizenship at birth for the third generation, along with easy access to citizenship for the second generation at age eighteen (Alba and Foner 2015, 145).
17. Mentzelopoulou and Dumbrava 2018.
18. Alba and Foner 2015, 145–47; Weil 2001.
19. See Alba and Foner 2015, chapter 5.
20. Alba and Foner 2015, 112.
21. European Commission 2018.
22. Alba and Foner 2015, 124–25; Laurence 2012; Laurence and Vaisse 2006; Joppke and Torpey 2013, 79–83.
23. Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life 2012.
24. Foner and Alba 2018; Mohamed 2018.
25. See Alba and Foner 2015. For an analysis of why Islam has become a more central divide between immigrants and the long-established population in western European societies than in the United States, see Foner and Alba 2018.
26. Alba and Foner 2015, 134.
27. Laurence and Vaisse 2006, 135.
28. Alba and Foner 2015; Bowen 2015.
29. Alba and Foner 2015.
30. US Census Bureau 2018.
31. US Bureau of Labor Statistics 2021.
32. Frey 2020b; Livingston 2019b.
33. Frey 2020a. Although the birth rate among foreign-born women (age fifteen to forty-four) declined substantially between 2000 and 2017, it was still significantly higher than for US-born women (Livingston 2019a).
34. Gelatt 2020; New American Economy 2020a, 2020b. At the time of the pandemic, immigrants were around a fifth of the nation’s nursing assistants, salespeople in retail businesses, and drivers transporting food and packages (Gelatt 2020).
35. Fremstad, Rho, and Brown 2020; Zallman et al. 2018.
36. Gelatt 2020.
37. Liang 2021.
38. See, for example, Donato and Hakimzadeh 2006; Orrenius and Zavodny 2009.
39. See Bagost 2020.
40. Stubbs 2021.
41. Bruni 2019.
42. Griffin, Frey, and Teixeira 2020.
43. Lee and Yadav 2020.
44. Waldman 2020.
45. Frey 2020a.
46. Handlin 1959, 202.