EVEN BEFORE THE END OF THE POLISH CAMPAIGN, THE 3RD CORPS WAS TRANSFERRED TO THE WEST, AND AT THE BEGINNING OF OCTOBER WE ARRIVED IN THE SECTOR NORTH OF TREVES. MY SECOND BROTHER, WHO IN PEACETIME WAS A HIGH-RANKING OFFICER IN THE FORESTRY DEPART- MENT, WAS SERVING AS A PLATOON COMMANDER IN A RESERVE DIVISION NEAR SAARBRILCKEN, AND I WAS ABLE TO VISIT HIM. THIS GAVE ME AN OPPORTUNITY OF INSPECTING THE FAMOUS WEST WALL, OR SIEGFRIED LINE, AT FIRST HAND.
I soon realized what a gamble the Polish Campaign had been, and the grave risks which were run by our High Command. The second-class troops holding the Wall were badly equipped and inadequately trained, and the defenses were far from being the impregnable fortifications pictured by our propaganda. Concrete protection of more than three feet was rare, and as a whole the positions were by no means proof against heavy caliber shelling. Few of the strongpoints were sited to fire in enfilade and most of them could have been shot to pieces by direct fire, without the slightest risk to the attackers. The West Wall had been built in such a hurry that many of the positions were sited on forward slopes. The antitank obstacles were of trivial significance, and the more I looked at the defenses the less I could understand the completely passive attitude of the French. Apart from sending some local patrols into the outlying areas (very "outlying") of Saarbriicken, the French had kept very quiet and left the West Wall alone. This negative attitude was bound to affect the fighting morale of their troops,, and was calculated to do much more harm than our propaganda, effective though it was.
When Hitler's peace proposals were rejected in October,1939, his immediate reaction was to force the issue by launching another blitzkrieg. He feared that with every month of delay the Allies would grow stronger; moreover, no one really believed that our pact with Russia would last. Already she had followed up her advance into Poland with the occupation of the Baltic States; in November the Red Army attacked Finland. The menacing shadow in the East was an added inducement to seek victory in the West.
Fig Panzerkampfwagen III Ausf M Pz.Regt 3
It was originally planned to launch our offensive in November, but bad weather grounded the Luftwaffe and forced repeated postponements of D day. The army spent the winter in carrying out intensive training and in large-scale maneuvers. I was transferred to the 297th Infantry Division as chief of staff (la); the division trained in the Posen area in bitterly cold weather. We continued our maneuvers and field-firing exercises in temperatures of twenty to thirty degrees below freezing point, and training from platoon to divisional level never knew any interruption.
In March, 1940, the division was inspected by the famous General von Manstein, then corps commander, who actually designed the plan of attack in the West which was to lead to such undreamed of success.2 Manstein had the best brain in the German General Staff, but his manner was blunt; he said what he thought and did not attempt to disguise his opinions even when they were not flattering to his superiors. In consequence he had been "put into cold storage" and was allotted a relatively minor part in the campaign which he had so brilliantly conceived.
My own experience of the French campaign was confined to Lorraine, and I did not take part in the great drive across northern France to the English Channel. Nevertheless I propose to discuss the main campaign, because it is of such significance in the development of armored warfare.
The Plan
In November, 1939, the German plan of attack in the West was very
similar to the famous Schlieffen plan of World War I, i.e. the Schwerpunkt 3 was to be on the right wing, but swinging a little wider than in 1914 and including Holland. Army Group B (Colonel General von Bock) was entrusted with this operation; it was to include all our ten panzer divisions, and the main thrust was to be delivered on both sides of Liege. Army Group A (Colonel General von Rund-stedt) was to support the attack by crossing the Ardennes and pushing infantry up to the line of the Meuse, while Army Group C (Colonel General von Leeb) was to stand on the defensive and face the Maginot Line. Doubts arose regarding the advisability of this plan. General von Manstein, then chief of staff of Army Group A, was particularly opposed to making our main effort on the right wing, which he thought would lead to a frontal clash between our armor and the best French and British formations in the Brussels area. Merely to repeat our strategy of 1914 would mean throwing away the prospect of surprise, always the surest guarantee of victory. Manstein produced a subtle and highly original plan. A great, attack was still to be made on our right flank, Army Group B was to invade Holland and Belgium with three panzer divisions 4 and all our available airborne troops. The advance of Army Group B would be formidable, noisy, and spectacular; it would be accompanied by tne dropping of parachute troops at key points ia Belgium and Holland. There was little doubt that the enemy would regard this advance as the main attack and would move rapidly across the Franco-Belgian frontier in order to reach the line of the Meuse and cover Brussels and Antwerp. The more they committed themselves to this sector, the more certain would be their ruin. The decisive role was to be given to Army Group A. This was to comprise three armies—the Fourth, Twelfth, and Sixteenth—and Panzergruppe Kleist. Fourth Army, which included Hoth's Panzer Corps,5 was to advance south of the Meuse and force a crossing at Dinant. The main thrust was to be delivered on the front of our Twelfth Army by Panzergruppe Kleist. This comprised Reinhardt's Panzer Corps (the 6th and 8th Panzer Divisions), Guderian's Panzer Corps (1st, 2nd, and 10th Panzer Divisions) and Wietersheim's Motorized Corps (five motorized divisions). They were to cross the difficult terrain of the Ardennes—very unsuitable tank country and presumably inadequately guarded—and force the crossing of the Meuse at Sedan. They were then to sweep rapidly west and push far behind the flank and rear of the enemy's forces in Belgium. Their left flank was to be covered initially by Sixteenth Army.
Such was the plan adopted by the German High Command, on the advice and inspiration of Manstein. It must be admitted that Manstein's proposals met with considerable opposition, and the scales were only tilted in their favor by a curious incident. In January, 1940, a German courier aircraft lost its way and landed in Belgian territory. The officer on board had a copy of the original plan in his pocket, and we could not be certain whether it had been destroyed. Therefore it was decided to adopt Manstein's plan, to which Hitler was particularly attracted because of its originality and daring.
Sedan
At 0535 on 10 May 1940 the spearheads of the German Army crossed the frontiers of Belgium, Luxembourg, and Holland. As in Poland we enjoyed the advantage of air superiority, but no attempt was made to interfere with the British and French columns streaming into Belgium and southern Holland. The German High Command was delighted to see the enemy responding to our offensive in the exact manner which we desired and predicted.
The key to the offensive rested with Panzergruppe Kleist which plunged into the wooded hills of the Ardennes and headed for the Meuse. I must emphasize that the German victories of May, 1940, were due primarily to skillful application of the two great principles of war—surprise and concentration. The German Army was actually inferior to the Allied armies, not only in numbers of divisions but particularly in numbers of tanks. While the combined Franco-British forces had about 4,000 tanks, the German Army could field only 2,800. Nor did we have any real advantage in quality.
Map Sedan May 13-14 1940
The Allied tanks, and especially the British Matilda, had stronger armor than our own, while the 37-mm gun on our Mark III—the principal German fighting tank—was inferior to the British 2-pounder, But the decisive factor was that for the breakthrough between Sedan and Namur we had massed seven of our ten panzer divisions, of which five were concentrated in the Sedan sector. The Allied military leaders, and particularly the French, still thought in terms of the linear tactics of World War I. and split up their armor among the infantry divisions. The British 1st Armored Division had not yet arrived in France, and the setting up of four French armored divisions was only in the initial stage. Nor did the French contemplate using their armored divisions in mass. By dispersing their armor along the whole front from the Swiss frontier to the English Channel, the French High Command played into our hands and have only themselves to blame for the catastrophe which was to follow. 6
Panzergruppe Kleist met no resistance in Luxembourg, and in the Ardennes the opposition of French cavalry and Belgian chasseurs was rapidly broken. The terrain was undoubtedly difficult, but carefully planned traffic control and farsighted staff work smoothed the approach march of armored divisions and motorized columns moving in echelons sixty miles deep. The enemy was unprepared for a massive thrust in this sector, his weak opposition was brushed aside, and on the evening of 12 May the advance guard of Panzer Corps Guderian had reached the Meuse and occupied the town of Sedan. Kleist decided to force a crossing of the Meuse on the afternoon of the 13th with the leading elements of the Panzer Corps, Infantry divisions would have been more suitable, but it was vital to take advantage of the enemy's confusion and give him no opportunity to regain his balance. Very powerful Luftwaffe formations were available to support the crossing.
I am fortunate in possessing a firsthand account of the battle written by the commander of the 1st Rifle Regiment of the 1st Panzer Division, Lieutenant Colonel Balck. 7 On the evening of 12 May his regiment had reached the Meuse south of Floing and stood rea'dy to attack. Officers and men knew exactly what was expected of them; for months they had practiced this attack and studied maps and photographs of the terrain. Our Intelligence had obtained exact details of the French positions even down to the individual bunkers. Nevertheless on the morning of 13 May the situation seemed ominous to the staff of the 1st Rifle Regiment. The French artillery was alert and the slightest movement attracted fire. The German artillery was held up on congested roads and could not get into position in time, and neither the engineers nor the bulk of their equipment had reached the fiver. Fortunately the transport carrying the collapsible rubber boats had reached the Rifle Regiment, although the troops had to handle this equipment without help from the engineers.8 Colonel Balck sent a liaison officer to corps headquarters to request maximum Luftwaffe support and to point out that the attack could not hope to succeed unless the French artillery was eliminated. The enemy's fire was making all movement impossible.
At about noon the Luftwaffe began its attack, using up to a thousand aircraft in dense formations. The Stuka onslaught completely silenced the French artillery which never recovered from the blow. Colonel Balck has the impression that the crews deserted their batteries and could not be induced to go back to the guns. The complete cessation of French fire had a remarkable effect on the morale of the Rifle Regiment. A few minutes before everyone was seeking refuge in slit trenches, but now nobody thought of taking cover. It was impossible to hold the men. The collapsible boats were driven up to the river bank and offloaded in full view of the French bunkers fifty yards away, and the troops crossed the river under cover of an air attack so overpowering that they did not even 'notice that they had no artillery support whatever. Once across the river everything went like clockwork, and by sunset the regiment had secured the commanding heights along the south bank of the Meuse. The French seemed stunned by the air attack and their resistance was feeble; moreover every unit under Balck's command had practiced and rehearsed its role for months.
That evening Colonel Balck decided to enlarge the bridgehead and push on to Chemery, more than six miles south of the Meuse. It was a very bold decision. Neither artillery, armor nor antitank guns had yet come forward, and bridge-building over the Meuse was proceeding slowly in the face of continuous and determined air attacks. But Balck feared that a small bridgehead would be easily sealed off and, in spite of the exhaustion of his men, he decided to push deep into French territory. After a night march of six miles Chemery was occupied without opposition.
The morning of 14 May brought the crisis which Balck had deliberately courted; a French armored brigade counterattacked with the support of low-flying aircraft. Fortunately the French found it difficult to improvise such an attack at short notice; their tanks moved slowly and clumsily and by the time they got into action, our antitank guns were arriving, as were the first elements of the 1st Panzer Brigade. The action was short and sharp; although the French attacked courageously they showed little skill, and soon nearly fifty of their tanks were burning on the battlefield. The signal arrangements in the French armored brigade were poor, and the up-to-date wireless equipment of our armored units gave them a clear advantage in maneuver. The obsolete French aircraft suffered heavily from the machine gun fire of the Rifle Regiment.
During the battle - and also during the crossing of the Meuse the previous day - General Guderian was well ward and Balck was able to consult him in person.
The Battle of Sedan has an important place in the development of armored warfare. At that time it was customary to draw a sharp distinction between rifle units and armored units. This theory proved unsound. Had Colonel Balck had tanks under his command during the Meuse crossing, things would have been much easier. It would have been possible to ferry single tanks across the river, and there would have been no need to send the troops forward without any tank support on the night 13/14 May. If the French had counterattacked more promptly the position of the Rifle Regiment would have been very critical, but at the time it was thought to be unwise to attach tanks to the infantry—the panzer brigade was to be kept intact for the decisive thrust. From Sedan onwards armor and infantry were used in mixed battle groups. These Kampfgruppen embodied a principle as old as war itself—the concentration of all arms at the same time in the same area.
The French resistance along the Meuse now collapsed. Their positions on the river bank were held by second-line troops with few antitank guns, and their morale seemed to go to pieces under dive-bombing. To the north of Mezieres General Remhardt's two panzer divisions crossed the Meuse at several places, and Hoth's Panzer Corps took the French completely by surprise at Dinant. On 14 May Guderian's Panzer Corps enlarged the bridgehead south and west of Sedan and beat off various counterattacks by the French 3rd Armored Division. The fighting here was very stubborn, and the most important heights changed hands several times. On 15 May the German High Command developed "nerves" and forbade any further advance by the panzer corps until the infantry divisions of the Twelfth Army, which were plodding along behind Panzergrappe Kleist, were ready, to take over protection of the southern flank. But the com-manders of the panzer corps and panzer divisions, judging the situation, at the front, saw clearly that a gigantic victory, was in the offing if only the westward drive was kept going and the enemy was allowed no time to develop counter-measures. In view of their strong protests, permission was given to "enlarge the bridgeheads," and on 16 May Panzergruppe Kleist broke clean through the French front west of the Meuse and set out on its drive to the sea.
The Debacle
While the French center was being pierced at Sedan a violent tank battle developed in Belgium on 13 and 14 May. Hoppner's Panzer Corps advancing north of the Meuse ran into French armored forces of superior strength near Gembloux. But with their thorough training and excellent signals service Hoppner's panzers outmaneuvered the French and drove them back across the Dyle. Hoppner was ordered to avoid a direct thrust at Brussels, and make his main effort along the line of the Sambre in order to keep close touch with the panzer corps advancing south of the river.
Guderian's drive along the line of the Somme developed with astonishing speed. By the evening of the 18th he was in St. Quentin, on the 19th he crossed the old Somme battlefield, and by the 20th his vanguard had reached Abbeville and the English Channel the Allied armies had been cut in two. Such a rapid advance involved grave risks, and there was much anxiety about the security of the southern flank. Tenth Panzer Division, Wietersheim's Motorized Corps, and the infantry divisions of Sixteenth Army were successively committed to building up a defensive line along the Aisne and the Somme. The crisis came on 19 May when the French 4th Armored Division under General de Gaulle counterattacked at Laon and was severely repulsed. It was typical of French strategy to throw away their armor in this piecemeal fashion their 3rd Armored Division had been flung away at Sedan on 14/15 May, and their 4th Armored Division suffered the same fate at Laon on the 19th. Even after our initial breakthrough at Sedan the French would still have had a fighting chance if their High Command had not lost its head and had refrained from counterattacks until all available armor had been assembled for a decisive blow. 9
Strongly pressed by Army Group B, the Allied forces in Belgium had fallen back from Brussels to the line of the Scheldt, with their southern flank at Arras only twenty-five miles from Peronne, on the banks of the Somme. If the Allies could close the gap Arras-P6ronne they would cut off our panzer divisions which had penetrated to the sea. On 20 May Lord Gort, the commander of the British Expeditionary Force, issued orders for a local counterattack at Arras to be carried out on the 21st; attempts were also made to enlist French support in a larger,operation to close the vital gap.10 The French declared that they could not attack until the 22nd, but units of the British 50th Division and 1st Army Tank Brigade went into action south of Arras on the morning of the 21st. The forces employed were too small to achieve any decisive result, but they did inflict severe casualties on Rommel's 7th Panzer Division. Our 37-mm antitank gun was too light to stop the heavy British Matilda tanks, and it was only by committing all his artillery, and particularly the heavy 88-mm antiaircraft guns, that Rommel brought the British thrust to a halt.
South of the Somme nothing happened at all—the French troops assembling for counterattack were subjected to continuous bombing by the Luftwaffe. The British official history remarks11 that "At this most critical juncture the French High Command proved unable to exercise effective control." There were many conferences, discussions, and directives, but little or no positive action. Our Fourth Army struck back, captured Arras, and pushed the British farther north. The situation of the Allies in Belgium and northern France soon became catastrophic.
Guderian advanced northwards from Abbeville and on 22 May attacked Boulogne; Reinhardt's Panzer Corps moving on his flank captured St. Omer on the 23rd. Thus the leading panzer divisions were only eighteen miles from Dunkirk, and were much nearer to the port than the bulk of the Anglo-French forces in Belgium. On the evening of 23 May General von Rundstedt, the commander of Army Group A, ordered his panzer divisions to close up on the 24th along the line of the canal between St. Omer and Bethune. General von Brau-chitsch, commander in chief of the army, considered that the operations against the Allied armies in the north should be directed by a single commander and, moreover, that the encircling attacks against them should continue without respite. Accordingly he ordered on 24 May that Rundstedt's Fourth Army, which included all the panzer divisions of Army Group A, should come under command of General von Bock's Army Group B, which was attacking the Allied salient from the east. On 24 May Hitler visited von Rundstedt's HQ. and countermanded the orders of Brauchitsch.12 On his departure Rundstedt issued a directive which read: "By the Führer's orders . . . the general line Lens—Bethune—Aire—St. Omer—Gravelines (canal line) will not be passed." When Hitler ordered Rundstedt to resume the attack on the 26th it was too late to achieve decisive results, and the British were able to execute a fighting withdrawal to the Dunkirk beaches. 13 But if Dunkirk was not the triumph which the German Army was entitled to expect, it was none the less a crushing defeat for the Allies. In Belgium, the French Army had sacrificed most of its armored and motorized formations, and was left with barely sixty divisions to hold the long front from the Swiss Frontier to the English Channel. The British Expeditionary Force had lost all its guns, tanks, and transport, and little support could now be given.to the French on the line of the Somme.14 At the end of May our panzer divisions began to move southwards, and preparations were made to mount a new offensive as rapidly as possible against the so-called Weygand Line. 15
Fig Panzerkampfwagen IV Ausf H Pz.Regt 3
The plan of the German High Command for the last phase of the French campaign envisaged three main attacks. Army Group B with six panaer divisions was to break through between the Oise and the sea and advance to the lower Seine in the area of Rouen. A few days later Army Group A with four panzer divisions was to attack on both sides of Rethel and penetrate deep into France with the Plateau de Langres as its objective. When these attacks were well under way, Army Group C was to assault the Maginot Line and aim at a breakthrough between Metz and the Rhine.
At the beginning of June the German armor was grouped as follows. Panzer Corps Hoth, with the 5th and 7th Panzer Divisions, was in the Abbeville sector, under command of Fourth Army. Panzergrappe Kleist, stood between Amiens and Peronne, with Panzer Corps Wietersheim (9th and 10th Panzer Divisons) and Panzer Corps Hoppner (3rd and 4th Panzer Divisions). The panzer divisions in the Rethel area formed a new Panzergruppe under Guderian—Panzer Corps Schmidt (1st and 2nd Panzer Divisions and 29th Motorized Division) and Panzer Corps Reinhardt (6th and 8th Panzer Divisions and the 2Qth Motorized Division).
Early in June the enemy weakened his armor still further by some illadvised attacks on our bridgeheads at Abbeville and Amiens. On 5 June Army Group -B opened its attack, and Hoth's Panzer Corps penetrated deeply into the hostile positions. The enemy Was unable to hold us in the Abbeville bridgehead, and the 7th Panzer Division under General Erwin Rommel drove rapidly towards the Seine. By 8 June he was in Rouen, and taking advantage of the complete confusion of the enemy he swung round towards the sea and cut off the British Highland Division and considerable French forces at St. Valery.
Farther east, however, the German offensive did not go so smoothly. Panzergruppe Kleist tried in vain to break out of the bridgeheads at Amiens and Peronne; the French troops in this sector fought with extreme stubbornness and inflicted considerable losses. On 9 June Army Group A launched its offensive; the first objective was to secure bridgeheads south of the Aisne. The task was entrusted to the infantry of Twelfth Army, and although they failed to force a crossing near Rethel they did secure three bridgeheads west of the town. On the night of 9/10 June a bridge was built, and the tanks of Schmidt's Panzer Corps crossed the Aisne. There was fierce fighting on 10 June; the country was difficult with numerous villages and woods which were strongly held by the French. These were left to the rifle regiments, while the panzer units bypassed opposition and pushed as far south as they could. On the afternoon of the 10th French reserves, including a newly formed armored division, counterattacked from Juni-ville against the flank of our panzers, and were driven off after a tank battle lasting two hours. During the night 10/11 June Guderian moved Panzer Corps Reinhardt into the bridgehead, which was now twelve miles deep. On 11 June Reinhardt beat off several counterattacks by French armored and mechanized brigades.
The success of Guderian and the failure of von Kleist were the result of a difference in methods. The attacks of the latter from the Amiens and P6ronne bridgeheads demonstrate that it is quite useless to throw armor against well-prepared defensive positions, manned by an enemy who expects an attack and is determined to repulse it. In contrast Guderian's tanks were not committed until the infantry had made a substantial penetration across the Aisne.
After Kleist's repulse on the Somme, the German High Command showed its versatility by switching his Panzergruppe to the Laon area. Here Kleist met with immediate success, and thrusting forward against slight opposition his vanguard reached the Marne at Chateau Thierry on 11 June. The following day Guderian's tanks reached the river at Chalons. Eight panzer divisions, firmly controlled and directed, were thrusting forward on both sides of Reims and the enemy had nothing to stop them.
In contrast to 1914, the possession of Paris had no influence on strategic decisions. The city was no longer a great fortress from which a reserve army might sally out and attack our communications. The French High Command declared Paris an open city, and the German High Command virtually ignored the place in its calculations—the entry of German troops on 14 June was a mere incident in the campaign. Meanwhile, Hoth's Panzer Corps was thrusting into Normandy and Brittany, Kleist's Panzergruppe was directed towards the Plateau de Langres and the valley of the Rhone, and Guderian's Panzergruppe swung eastwards into Lorraine in order to take the Maginot Line in the rear;
On 14 June the Maginot Line was penetrated south of Saarbriicken by the First Army, under Army Group G. French resistance dissolved along the whole front, and the pace of the German advance was only limited by the distance the panzer divisions could cover in a day—the infantry formations were left far behind along the dusty roads. On 16 June Kleist's tanks rattled into Dijon, and on the 17th Guderian's spearhead reached the Swiss frontier at Pontarlier and completed the envelopment of the French armies in Alsace and Lorraine. On 18 June Hitler and Mussolini met at Munich to discuss the French request for an armistice.
The closing stages of the campaign, with German tanks penetrating to Cherbourg, Brest, and Lyons, are strongly reminiscent of the French cavalry pursuit after Jena, which flooded over the plains of north Germany. The position of our panzers at the end of the campaign was very similar to that outlined by Murat in his message to Napoleon in November, 1806: "Sire, the fighting is over, because there are no combatants left."
In Lorraine
As I have already explained, my own part in this campaign was lim
ited to the fighting in Lorraine, where I served as chief of staff (la) of the 197th Infantry Division. It formed part of the First German Army which on 14 June attacked the famous Maginot Line at Puttlinger, south of Saarbriicken. I had a good opportunity of seeing the battle at first hand, although in our division only the artillery and an engineer battalion were engaged in the actual breakthrough.
The Maginot Line was widely believed to be impregnable, and for all I know there may still be those who think that the fortifications could have resisted any attack. It may be of interest to point out that the Maginot defenses were breached in a few hours by a normal infantry attack, without any tank support whatever. The German infantry advanced under cover of a heavy air and artillery bombardment in which lavish use was made of smoke shell. They soon found that many of the French strongpoints were not proof against shells or bombs, and moreover, a large number of positions had not been sited for all-round defense and were easy to attack from the blind side with grenades and flamethrowers. The Maginot Line lacked depth, and taken as a whole the position was far inferior to many defense systems developed later in the war. In modern war it is in any case unsound to rely on static defense, but as far as the Maginot Line was concerned the fortifications had only a moderate local value. After the breakthrough the 197th Infantry Division followed up the retreating enemy by forced marches—the troops gladly submitted to tramping thirty-five miles a day as everyone wanted "to be there." On reaching Chateau-Salins we were ordered to turn left and advance into the Vosges Mountains, with Donon, the highest peak in the northern Vosges, as our objective. At dawn on 22 June we passed through the front of a division which had been pinned down with heavy losses and fought our way forward through densely wooded hills. The enemy had blocked the roads by felling trees, and his artillery, snipers, and machine guns took full advantage of the excellent cover. In slow, bitter fighting our division fought its way towards Donon, and at nightfall on the 22nd was only a mile from the summit.
Fig Leichter Schützenpanzerwagen 2nd Reconnaissance Battalion
On the evening of 22 June I received a telephone call from Colonel 16 Speidel, the corps chief of staff, who informed me that the French Third, Fifth, and Eighth Armies in Alsace-Lorraine had capitulated unconditionally. He directed that a parlementaire should be sent to the enemy to arrange a ceasefire. At dawn on the 23rd our intelligence officer made contact with the French troops on our front, and during the morning I travelled with the divisional commander, General Meyer-Rabingen, to the headquarters of the French 43rd Corps. Passing through our forward positions, we had to drive over half a mile before we reached the French outposts— they had already removed the road blocks. French troops "fell in" and saluted in true peacetime fashion, French military police in short leather jackets gave permission to proceed, and French guards presented arms. We arrived at the villa "Chez nous," where General Lescanne had his headquarters. The corps commander was a man of about sixty; he received us surrounded by his staff. The old man was clearly at the end of his tether, but he was polite—the terms of the surrender were quietly discussed as between officers and gentlemen. Lescanne and his officers were accorded full military honors.
On 24 June a communique from the Fiihrer's headquarters announced that the enemy surrounded in the Vosges Mountains had surrendered at Donon. The communique reported the capture of 22,000 prisoners, including a corps commander and three divisional commanders, together with twelve artillery battalions and a vast quantity of stores and equipment.
Conclusions
What were the causes of the rapid collapse of France? I have already dealt with most of them in my account of the operations, but it may be of value to touch again on the salient points. Although political and moral factors were undoubtedly of great significance, I shall confine myself to the purely military aspect of the collapse.
There is little doubt that the German armor, brilliantly supported by the Luftwaffe, decided the campaign. This opinion does not belittle our infantry divisions whose quality was to be fully proved in the terrible campaigns in Russia. But in the blitzkrieg in France they had little opportunity to demonstrate their prowess.
The whole campaign hinged on the employment of armor, and was essentially a clash of principles between two rival schools. The Allied military leaders thought in terms of World War I and split their armor in fairly even proportions along the entire front, although their best divisions took part in the advance into Belgium. Our panzer leaders believed that armor should be used in mass, with the result that we had, two panzer corps and one motorized corps with the Sckwerpunkt at Sedan. Our theory of tank warfare was far from being a secret to the Allies. Writing in 1938 Max Werner pointed out that "German military theory sees only one use for the tank its concentrated employment in great masses." 17 The French and British generals not only refused to accept our theory, but failed to make adequate dispositions to meet it.
Even after our breakthrough on the Meuse the French generals seemed to be unable to concentrate their armor, and on the field of battle French tank tactics were far too rigid and formal. Our panzer corps and divisions not only had the advantage of excellent training and communications, but the commanders at every level fully appreciated that panzer troops must be commanded from the front. Thus they were able to take immediate advantage of the rapid changes and opportunities which armored warfare brings.
Perhaps I should stress that although we attached the greatest importance to armor, we realized that tanks cannot operate without the close support of motorized infantry and artillery. Our panzer division was a balanced force of all arms —that was a lesson which the British did not learn until well into 1942.
The skillful use of surprise was a very important factor in our success. Rather than forfeit the opportunity of surprise, von Kleist forced the crossing of the Meuse on 13 May without waiting for his artillery; the successful co-operation between the Luftwaffe and the panzer corps on this occasion was duplicated later on during the pursuit in central and southern France. Time and again the rapid movements and flexible handling of our panzers bewildered the enemy. The use of our parachute troops in Holland also illustrates the paralyzing effect of a surprise blow.
The German High Command comes out well from the campaign, and in general its strategic handling of the armor was bold and confident. There were only two serious flaws in the conduct of our High Command the order to the panzers to mark time after the forming of the Sedan bridgehead, and the particularly tragic decision to halt the panzer divisions when they had Dunkirk at their mercy.
To sum up: The Battle for France was won by the German Wehrmacht because it reintroduced into warfare the decisive factor of mobility. It achieved mobility by the combination of firepower, concentration, and surprise, together with expert handling of the latest modern arms—Luftwaffe, parachutists, and armor. The series of disasters in subsequent years must not be allowed to obscure the fact that in 1940 the German General Staff achieved a military masterpiece, worthy to rank beside the greatest campaigns of the greatest generals in history. It was not our fault that the fruits of this tremendous triumph were wantonly thrown away.
In 1943 the 2nd Panzer Division took part in Operation Citadel, fitted in the XLVII Panzer Corps of the 9th German Army of Army Group Centre. The German offensive was stopped by the Soviets, who began pushing the German army back. The 2nd Panzer conducted a fighting retreat where it suffered heavy losses.
Fig Schwerer Panzerspähwagen (5cm) 2nd Reconnaissance Battalion
Germany
Completely dismantled, the Division was sent to Bitburg in Germany to be reorganized again, absorbing the few remnants of the 352. Infantry Division. Due to the shortage in material resources which afflicted the Third Reich, was significantly reduced its complement of tanks, some of their companies with only assault guns. although a battalion received Panzer V Panther tanks.
Executive order to invade Poland
The Supreme Commander Berlin, 31.8.39
of the Armed Forces
OKW/WFA Nr. 170/39 g.K. Chefs. LI
Top Secret
Directive No. 1 for the prosecution of the war
1. Having exhausted all political possibilities of rectifying the intolerable situation on Germany's eastern frontier by peaceful means, I have decided to solve the problem by force.
2. The attack on Poland is to be carried out in accordance with the plans laid down for Case White, as modified by the fact that meanwhile the army has almost completed its deployment.
Allotment of tasks and operational objectives remain unchanged. Date of the attack 1 September, 1939.
Hour of the attack 04.45 hrs.
This hour applies equally to the launching of the operations GdyniaGulf of Danzig and Dirschau Bridge.
3. In the West the problem is unambiguously to saddle England and France with the responsibility for opening hostilities. Any insignificac: violation of the frontier is for the time being only to be dealt with purdy by means of local counter-measures.
We have guaranteed the neutrality of Holland, Belgium, Luxembourg and Switzerland and their neutrality is to be strictly observed. At no point is the western land frontier of Germany to be crossed withe™ my explicit approval.
At sea this also applies to all warlike actions, or actions that might be construed as warlike.
The defensive measures of the air force are for the time being to consis: solely in repelling enemy air attacks within the borders of Germany; so far as possible the frontiers of neutral states are not to be crossed when repell^ attacks by single aircraft or by small formations. Only in the event of larsr formations of French and English aircraft flying across neutral states towards German territory and thus endangering our western air defences will ow defensive forces be free also to fly over neutral soil.
It is particularly important that the OKW be informed with all speed n the event of our Western enemies violating the neutrality of any other country.
If England and France open hostilities against Germany it is the task of those elements of the armed forces operating in the West by the employee* of minimum forces to ensure the maintenance of conditions which «• permit a victorious conclusion to the operations against Poland. As of this task maximum damage is to be inflicted on the enemy forces on his sources of economic strength. I retain in all cases the right to decide when offensive operations may be initiated.