Chapter 1
In time of war a nation needs its heroes and the fighter pilot has always held a fascination that has captured the imagination of his public at home. The first fighter aces appeared over the Western Front during the First World War and, ever since, history has tended to judge the fighter pilot by the number of victories achieved in the air rather than by flying skills or leadership in combat. But these qualities often go hand-in-hand. A pilot with few flying skills was unlikely to survive for very long, let alone become an ace, and those who led in combat were often best placed to influence an aerial encounter and to achieve success in the air.
Those destined to be successful in air combat soon learned that it was not all about dashing around the sky as fast as possible taking on anyone and everyone – those who elected to choose this method were destined not to survive – but they did require a unique combination of flying and personal qualities to succeed: excellent aircraft-handling skills; a good understanding of his own aircraft’s performance and that of his opponent; quick reactions; good eyesight; anticipation; patience; courage and self-control to name but a few and, of course, they needed to be good shots.
The air campaigns fought by the Luftwaffe on all fronts during the Second World War, and specifically those fought by the fighter pilot, the Jagdflieger, were amongst the most intense in the history of air warfare but what stands out most is the number of aerial victories achieved by the high-scoring fighter pilots, the Experten, who totally eclipsed their Allied counterparts.
The successes of German air power did not come overnight and while it could be argued that its origins lie with its infancy during the First World War, the Luftwaffe was born following Adolf Hitler’s rise to power. Although the Treaty of Versailles was still in effect, and had restricted Germany’s construction of new aircraft types, the treaty had never been meticulously observed and Germany’s interest in aviation had gone from strength to strength with various clandestine methods of training aviators in Russia and a number of undercover air squadrons being set up in Germany. While the strength and capabilities of these squadrons did not amount to much, their existence, particularly as far as trained pilots was concerned, provided a nucleus for the creation of a new and powerful air force.
On achieving power Hitler appointed Hermann Göring, a highly respected fighter pilot of the First World War, as deputy leader of his Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiter Partei (the Nazi Party) and Reichskommissariat für die Luftfahrt (Reich Commissioner of Aviation). The official formation of the Luftwaffe was still two years away but Göring, as Hitler’s deputy, had many responsibilities and so had little time for building a new air force. The task, therefore, was left to Erhard Milch, the former Commercial Director of Germany’s national airline Lufthansa and now Göring’s own deputy as the Nazis’ first State Secretary for Aviation.
More so than Göring, Milch deserves the credit for the initial formation of the Luftwaffe, although he never held any great respect for Göring. Milch set about his task by dividing the Reich Aviation Ministry, the Reichsluftfahrtministerium (RLM), into a number of offices. The most important sub-division was the Air Command Office, as this would effectively become the General Staff, and he also set about expanding the German aviation industry and building new facilities for the training of aircrew, albeit secretly, to create a new air force.1
The Luftwaffe officially came into existence on 1 March 1935 with some 20,000 personnel and nearly 2,000 aircraft. It was never going to be possible to keep the build-up of an air force secret and so the following week Hitler announced its existence to the world and a week later he renounced the military clauses of the Treaty of Versailles. Selected to be its first Chief of the General Staff was Walter Wever, an infantry officer by background but a man of great vision and a great strategist. Aware of Hitler’s intentions, Wever was led to conclude that Germany’s main enemy in any future conflict would be the Soviet Union. His thinking, therefore, was to produce an air force to take on the might of Russia while concurrently waging a war of revenge against France and possibly Britain. He was also astute enough to know that air superiority would probably be an elusive goal and so he believed it would be easier to defeat an air force on the ground at its sources, by attacking aircraft factories and industrial plants, rather than to try and defeat it in the air. His desire was for a bomber force capable of reaching the heart of Russia’s industrial cities and beyond, and so his concept of a four-engine strategic aircraft, known as the Ural Bomber, led to the design and construction of two prototypes.
Amongst Wever’s other strengths was his ability to work with and manage the expectations of difficult men such as Göring and Milch. He found them both, at times, equally difficult. Göring seemingly had little time for the new Luftwaffe while Milch had risen to the top very quickly, with Wever believing that his military rank of General der Flieger had been given rather than earned.
Wever’s limited experience as a pilot cost him his life in June 1936 when he crashed his Heinkel He 70 during take-off. He was replaced by Albert Kesselring, a strong supporter of Hitler and the Nazi regime but another high-ranking officer without any aviation combat experience. Crucially, Kesselring decided to cancel development of the Ural Bomber because of its cost in raw materials to build2 and because of its high fuel consumption, which he felt Germany could ill afford given its lack of oil resource. While Kesselring cannot solely be held to blame for this decision, the Luftwaffe would now never have an effective long-range strategic bomber during the Second World War.
The loss of Wever had created a further problem as Kesselring and Milch seemed unable to get on. Göring could have dealt with the matter but chose not to and the internal wrangling would never really go away. Kesselring would later resign to be replaced by the extremely bright Hans-Jürgen Stumpff as Göring continued to make further changes to the hierarchy, seemingly not for the better, as aircraft and armament production fell behind. Hitler now made the Luftwaffe’s expansion programme a priority as it transitioned towards a new generation of aircraft with the emphasis being on large numbers to impress Hitler who, in turn, wanted to impress the world.
Despite the continuing wrangles at the higher levels, the Jagdflieger prepared for hostilities that would inevitably come. The teaching was based on perfecting basic fighter manoeuvres, consisting of various turns and rolls, to position the fighter pilot behind his opponent. One of the earliest manoeuvres taught was the barrel roll in which an aircraft makes a complete rotation on its longitudinal axis while following a helical path and maintaining its general direction and height.
While pure flying skills would help a pilot learn how to master his aircraft in the sky, it was not the only important factor in learning how to become a good fighter pilot. Additional factors such as his aircraft’s design, specifically its speed and ability to turn hard, were vital. The faster the aircraft then the greater the radius of turn and the less its rate of turn became in degrees per second. The ability to turn hard in combat also depended on the aircraft’s wing loading and where all other factors were equal, the pilot flying the aircraft with the lower wing loading would be able to out-turn his opponent. However, hard manoeuvring would reduce the aircraft’s speed. Speed could be maintained by losing height but height was also important because an aircraft with height advantage could be hard to see and height could always be turned into speed, either to reduce the range to the target or to help make an escape.
The easiest way to shoot down an opponent was to get line astern of the target, where there would be little or no deflection, and where a pilot could manage his closing speed to give him the maximum time possible to shoot an opponent down. The closer he could get then the easier it would be to hit his opponent whereas firing at excessive range meant the bullets were subject to the effects of ballistics, such as gravity drop, and a heavily manoeuvring target would be harder to hit because of the amount of lead required in the aim.
As far as a defending pilot was concerned, it was all a matter of whether he could see his attacker; if not, he could not react and often stood little chance. Once seen by his opponent, the attacking pilot could then have the problem of having too much speed, particularly if attacking from a higher position. If too fast, the attacker could not maintain a position inside a turn and would overshoot to the outside, and once the attacker was forced to overshoot then the defender had the opportunity to reverse his direction of turn back towards his opponent. This would often lead to a series of turn-reversals, known as scissors, with each pilot trying to get on to the tail of his opponent. A pilot could elect to keep his speed higher than his opponent so that he could change direction during a reversal by rolling more quickly. However, it was not advisable for a pilot in an aircraft with lesser performance than his opponent to generate a scissors manoeuvre in combat because his opponent would eventually force him out ahead, thereby gaining the opportunity to bring his guns to bear. Any speed advantage over an opponent also gave a pilot the option to pull up and convert his excess speed into height, then use aileron to turn in the desired direction and then to pull out and roll the aircraft upright in a manoeuvre known as the Immelmann Turn (named after the First World War pilot, Max Immelmann, who had created the manoeuvre), so that he could reposition himself without too much horizontal displacement or dive away and disengage from the fight.
There was much to learn but the low engine power of aircraft during the 1930s and the design techniques at the time restricted the number of offensive manoeuvres that could be carried out. There was also the fact that the fighter tactics being taught were still based on those adopted during the First World War as many instructors were often quick to exert authority based on their own experiences many years before. These included men like Theo Osterkamp with thirty-two victories from the First World War who would become the first commander of Jagdfliegerschule 1, one of seven fighter pilot schools eventually established, although the Luftwaffe was not alone in this ideology as many European air forces were doing the same.
The Luftwaffe was given the opportunity to test its capabilities in a combat arena when the Spanish Civil War broke out in 1936. The war between the Nationalists and the Republicans had started when dissatisfied Spanish generals, led by the pro-Fascist General Francisco Franco, launched a coup against the Spanish government in Madrid. The attempt only achieved limited success and so Franco appealed to Hitler and the Italian leader, Benito Mussolini, for help.3
Luftwaffe fighter units were asked for volunteers to join an expeditionary force and the first batch included a cadre of six fighter pilots to fly the Heinkel He 51 biplanes sent to Spain.4 The volunteers were not authorized to enter combat and so the pilots took on a training role but as Soviet support to the Republican cause increased, Milch and, to a lesser extent, Göring were in favour of providing Franco with more support. Hitler agreed and so activated the Legion Condor, led by Hugo Sperrle. More He 51s bearing Spanish Nationalist insignia followed and by the end of the year thousands of men and tons of equipment had been shipped to Spain with a fighter group, Jagdgruppe 88 (J./88), being established under the command of Hauptmann Hubertus Merhardt von Bernegg.
Those who volunteered for Spain were very capable pilots but they soon found they were up against a stronger force, both technically and numerically, with the He 51 biplane proving inferior to the Soviet Polikarpov fighters; the I-16, in particular, as a monoplane design was arguably the most modern and most capable fighter in the world at that time. The Jagdflieger quickly learned that he could not afford to become fixated on his own target but instead had to observe the overall situation and assess the risks, while maintaining a three-dimensional awareness of what was going on around him, and all while flying in a highly dynamic and changing environment.
Although the He 51 was technically inferior to the Soviet fighters, Sperrle did have the better quality pilots who quickly developed new tactics. One of those pilots was Oberleutnant Adolf Galland who arrived in Spain during the early summer of 1937. Galland was twenty-five years old and already an experienced pilot having gained previous flying experience prior to joining the Luftwaffe. Now leading the third Staffel of J./88 based at the Valencia-Ebro front, Galland displayed a unique style of leadership. He quickly proved to be an inspirational leader and a great analyst by paying particular attention to the tactics being employed and then analysing the results of each mission before adapting his tactics for future missions.
As far as countering the Soviet fighters was concerned, one of the most successful tactics employed by the Legion’s pilots was to ensure they had superior numbers. This not only offered tactical advantage but also caused the Russian fighter pilots to increase their fuel consumption and eventually forced them to land. Then, once they were back on the ground, the Legion’s bombers, which would be airborne in the vicinity, would attack the Russian fighters on the ground. While this tactic offered some success, the fact remained that the Luftwaffe’s fighter force, the Jagdwaffe, was equipped with biplanes that were little better than the fighters of the First World War.
The ongoing conflict in Spain provided the ideal opportunity to introduce the new fighter, the Messerschmitt Bf 109, into combat. The 109 had first flown in 1935 but design had begun in secrecy the year before to meet a future requirement for a single-seat daytime fighter armed with machine guns that was capable of reaching an operational ceiling of 33,000 feet, with an endurance of an hour, and was also capable of maintaining a speed of 250 mph for up to twenty minutes at 20,000 feet. The new aircraft-design techniques included a semi-monocoque fuselage with an enclosed cockpit and cantilever wings with a retractable undercarriage. The aircraft initially produced by Messerschmitt was designated the Bf 108, a quite different aircraft, but many of its design features were included in the prototype for the Bf 109. Its advanced wing, with slots and trailing edge flaps, gave it an unmatched manoeuvrability.
The Bf 109 was introduced into service in 1937 and soon started to equip J./88 in Spain. Powered by a Junkers Jumo 210 engine, the Bf 109B represented the cutting edge of aircraft technology. Armed with two MG 17 7.9 mm machine guns its introduction proved to be an immediate success and the Bf 109B quickly proved to be a better fighter than the I-16. However, the build-up of numbers of 109s in Spain was slow and so the pilots of J./88 had to improvise. Instead of adopting a formation of three aircraft, called a Kette, the 109 pilots chose to base their tactics on a two-aircraft formation, called a Rotte, to give more flexibility.
The balance of air power in Spain soon tipped in favour of the Legion. The campaign also taught valuable lessons about other aircraft, such as discovering that the Ju 52 was unsuitable as a bomber. To be fair, the Ju 52 was never intended to be used as bomber, and was only ever considered as a stopgap, but its lack of performance in the role simply emphasised the urgency of replacing it with the new Heinkel He 111 twin-engine medium bomber and the single-engine Junkers Ju 87 Stuka dive bomber. The Legion also learned the value of close air support for ground forces as the capabilities of the Ju 87 won over some of its hardest critics, although its vulnerability to modern fighters would become evident later. The Heinkel He 46 and He 70 were also found to be unsuitable as reconnaissance aircraft and this led to the Dornier Do 17, which also had the capability to operate as a long range bomber.
With the successful introduction of the Bf 109, the He 51 was gradually withdrawn as a fighter but it did continue for the time being in the ground-attack role. By the end of 1937, J./88 had established air superiority over the battlefield. Since April the first Staffel had been commanded by Oberleutnant Harro Harder and by the time he returned to Germany in December, to be replaced by Wolfgang Schellmann, he had scored eleven victories during the year, for which he would later be awarded the Spanish Cross in Gold with Swords and Diamonds, the highest award for the campaign. Schellmann, too, would do well, outscoring his predecessor by one victory during his nine months in Spain, for which he would receive the same recognition. During the same period the second Staffel had been led by Oberleutnant Günther Lützow, who achieved five victories during the year, including the first recorded by a Bf 109, before he was replaced in September by Joachim Schlichting who would also go on to achieve five victories during his nine months in Spain. Both Lützow and Schlichting would later receive the highest recognition.
Small numbers of Messerschmitts were now able to roam over the front line and pounce on any enemy bombers before they could even reach their targets. The early Bf 109B did suffer from limited capability when escorting bombers, and so lessons identified in Spain led to the improved Bf 109C and Bf 109D with improved performance and armament, although these variants would not arrive in Spain until the following year.
Techniques continued to evolve in Spain but one young pilot, more than any other, helped to shape the tactics that would later bring the Jagdwaffe so much success during the opening months of the Second World War. Although he did not arrive in Spain until the spring of 1938, Werner Mölders would go on to become the Legion’s leading fighter ace of the Spanish Civil War with fourteen victories. When he arrived in Spain he was twenty-five years old and already an experienced pilot. Mölders was assigned to the third Staffel under the command of Adolf Galland at a time when the ageing He 51s were being replaced by the new Bf 109. Galland did manage to get ten flights in the new 109 before his tour in Spain came to an end and it impressed him to the point of persuading him that from now on he wanted to fly fighters rather than ground-attack aircraft.
With the departure of Galland, Mölders was given command of the third Staffel and he quickly set about re-shaping some of the Luftwaffe’s fighter tactics for the 109 that he believed would work well in Spain. These included development of the classic Schwarm of four fighters, a formation in the shape of the extended fingers of a hand, comprising of a pair of Rotten with the lead aircraft of each Rotte flying ahead of his wingman, known as his Katschmarek, who was positioned about 200 yards behind the leader with the task of protecting his tail. Each Rotte could either work independently or they could work together depending on the mission and threat. This not only gave the formation complete freedom to manoeuvre but it also meant that the pilots were able to concentrate on looking out for the enemy rather than the Katschmarek having to concentrate on maintaining close formation with his leader.
When operating as a Schwarm, the pair of Rotten would often be staggered in height with the second Rotte taking up a position higher and on the opposite side to the sun to increase the chances of spotting an aggressor by using the sun to their own advantage. The next step was soon adopted by using one large formation of three Schwärme; either in line abreast, stepped up in line astern or in a swept formation. But even operating as a Schwarm was not without its problems, mainly caused by the large frontage of the formation that could easily be in excess of 500 yards, as the task of manoeuvring was not always easy. Any sizeable heading change would cause the outermost aircraft to lag considerably behind its leader, even when allowing for changes in throttle settings between the leader, who would have to throttle back, and the outside man at full throttle. The solution was the cross-turn, a manoeuvre first used by the Royal Air Force at the end of the First World War, when the outside man pulled up and crossed over his leader onto the new heading and was then followed by his colleagues in sequence from the outside inwards; this ended with the Schwarm on its new heading and its formation intact with the members of the formation on the opposite side to that previously held.
Mölders claimed his first victory in Spain, an I-15, on 15 July 1938. Within four days he had taken his score to three, having added another I-15 and an I-16, and by October his total was thirteen. His tactics had worked well and had enabled other young pilots, such as Horst Tietzen and Wolfgang Lippert, to develop under his command; both achieved success during the same period with seven and five victories respectively. Mölders was promoted to Hauptmann in October, after which he claimed his fourteenth and final victory of the campaign – an I-16 near Molar on 3 November – before he returned to Germany the following month to develop fighter tactics within the RLM in Berlin.
The Spanish Civil War ended in March 1939 when Republican resistance collapsed and the government finally surrendered to Franco. The Legion Condor, nearly 20,000 strong, had made a significant contribution towards Franco’s success in Spain and had demonstrated the vital importance of air power in supporting any land campaign. It had unleashed the Luftwaffe in a combat arena for three years and the war had proved invaluable for the development of new fighter tactics and formations.
The visionary tactician, Werner Mölders, and the inspirational combat leader, Adolf Galland, were two of just twenty-eight members of the Legion to receive the Spanish Cross in Gold with Swords and Diamonds, the highest recognition for the campaign; eleven of them had served with J./88, including two men who would go on to achieve greater success during the Second World War – Leutnant Walter Oesau, who flew with the Stab of J./88 and scored nine victories, and Oberfeldwebel Reinhard Seiler who flew with the 2. Staffel and also scored nine victories.
In addition to those receiving the highest recognition, the campaign in Spain helped some 200 Jagdflieger receive their baptism of fire. By the end of the Spanish Civil War the Legion had accounted for nearly 400 aerial victories for the loss of seventy-two of its own aircraft. More importantly though, personnel had gained valuable experience of operating in conflict, particularly at night, and much had been learned about the technical aspects of the new Bf 109, He 111, Do 17 and Ju 87. The Legion also found that well-armed bombers could defend themselves against enemy fighters during daylight operations and most within the Luftwaffe’s senior ranks believed that close air support was the key to success; this led to further development of the role after Spain, although it would be at the expense of adopting a strategic role for air power and this would ultimately contribute to Germany’s defeat in the Second World War. But for now, the campaign in Spain had enabled the Luftwaffe to gain a significant advantage over its potential foes in Europe.
The Luftwaffe was now expanding rapidly. There were already more than 600 Bf 109s in service – a mix of B, C and D variants. However, the new He 111 bombers entering service had priority on the supply of Daimler-Benz engines, rather than them going to the fighters, and this delayed the introduction of the latest fighter variant, the Bf 109E ‘Emil’, until early 1939 when it arrived for the final days in Spain.
The Emil was the first major re-design of the Bf 109 and would become the first mass-produced variant. It quickly proved to be an excellent fighter with unmatched performance in the climb with its engine, the improved DB 601A, featuring variable-speed supercharging and the introduction of fuel-injection rather than using a carburettor. This would give the 109 pilot a huge advantage during air-to-air combat as fuel could still be fed to the engine during manoeuvres of ‘negativeg’ by being injected; under the previous design of using a carburettor the fuel flow was often starved and could cause the engine to cut out.
The Bf 109E was an excellent aircraft to fly in terms of its handling qualities at slow and medium speeds, where it was responsive and lacked any tendency to spin, but it did take some getting used to when manoeuvring at higher speeds; this was due to the heaviness of the controls and the lack of a rudder trimmer, which meant the pilot was constantly required to apply rudder when flying straight at high speed. However, when operating on and near the ground, the 109E was described by many of its pilots as rather unforgiving. It could be a difficult aircraft to manage during take-off and landing because of its narrow track and less than robust undercarriage design, and because of the torque produced by the power of its engine.
Although the Luftwaffe had continued to struggle to sort out its higher levels of command, it did sort out its combat units at the tactical level and the structure put in place would remain essentially unchanged throughout the Second World War. The largest fighting unit, the Geschwader, consisted of a hundred or more aircraft. These were effectively wings with aircraft of the same type and role, and were designated accordingly; a Jagdgeschwader was a fighter wing and a Kampfgeschwader a bomber wing, with each given a number, for example Jagdgeschwader 1 (abbreviated to JG 1) and Kampfgeschwader 51 (KG 51).
The commander of each Geschwader, the Geschwaderkommodore, varied in rank from Major to Oberst. The Geschwader was sub-divided into three or four Gruppen (groups), with each Gruppe consisting of approximately thirty aircraft and commanded by a Gruppenkommandeur typically at one rank lower than the Kommodore, with an additional staff flight called a Stab. Gruppen were allocated roman numerals, for example the third Gruppe of JG 1 was designated III./JG 1, and each Gruppe was further sub-divided into typically three Staffeln (similar to squadrons) with each given an arabic designation; for example, the second Staffel of JG 26 was designated 2./JG 26.
Notwithstanding the lack of a strategic bomber, which, incidentally, no air force in Europe possessed in 1939, the Luftwaffe would enter the Second World War with an impressive array of aircraft, both in terms of capability and numbers, with some 3,000 aircraft, of which two-thirds were allocated to the Eastern Front. The He 111 would remain at the centre of the bombing campaign throughout the war but while it had been considered virtually invincible when it first rolled off the production line in 1937 the reality would soon prove different. The other mainstream medium bomber, the Do 17, could also be used as a long-range reconnaissance aircraft and a newer aircraft, the twin-engine Junkers Ju 88, was now appearing. The Ju 88 had originally been intended to be a long-range bomber but changes to its design, brought about because of the desire also to employ the aircraft as a dive bomber, led to an increase in its weight and this, in turn, would impact on its range, speed and handling. Completing the bomber force were the Ju 87 dive bombers that had performed so well in Spain.
As for the fighters, twenty-eight Jagdgruppen were equipped with the Bf 109, ranging from the earliest B variant to the most advanced Emil. The 109 would prove to be the Luftwaffe’s most important fighter during the early years of the war but if it had a weakness at all it was its limited endurance, which meant it lacked the ability to escort bombers over long distances. As the concept had been for medium bombers to defend themselves, this gap in capability would have to be managed by the twin-engine Messerschmitt Bf 110 Zerstörer, which had been designed for long-range escort and was now available in considerable numbers.
Powered by two DB 600 engines, the Bf 110 was a heavily armed aircraft with a battery of two MG FF 20 mm cannon plus four MG 17 7.9 mm machine guns mounted in the nose. A second crew member managed the radio communications and acted as the rear gunner, although all the aircraft had to protect its rear was a single MG 15 7.9 mm machine gun. As more DB 601s became available this engine was preferred for later variants, making the 110 capable of 330 mph at 20,000 feet and giving the aircraft a ceiling in excess of 32,000 feet but its size and weight meant it was far less manoeuvrable and slower to accelerate than the 109.
While new aircraft appeared in large numbers, the previously territorial nature of the Luftwaffe’s organization meant that its structure was not suitable for highly mobile operations in the future and so it reorganized into four Luftflotten, each consisting of a mix of fighters and bombers, with the emphasis being on a lightning war of speed, rather than a war of attrition. There were further high-level changes as the Luftwaffe was re-organized yet again during 1939. Hans Jeschonnek succeeded Stumpff as Chief of the General Staff, but Jeschonnek was arrogant and short-sighted and did not get on well with Milch. Jeschonnek also struggled to get on with many of Göring’s closest associates, none of whom seemed to like either Jeschonnek or Milch, and so Jeschonnek’s appointment only added to the fragmentation that had been a long time coming in the highest levels of command.
As Germany approached war in Europe, Göring seemingly did not have the ability to lead the enormously expanded Luftwaffe and Milch had become isolated from the centre of power while other key leaders, such as Jeschonnek and Kesselring, did not have the strategic insight of Wever.5 The Luftwaffe was simply reacting to the day-to-day political pressures from Hitler but Jeschonnek, as a strong supporter of the Führer, believed that Hitler could achieve his political and military objectives in Europe without waging war against Britain. Jeschonnek had not particularly planned for a war against Britain, because few believed that Britain would be as bold as to declare war on Germany, but he was preparing for war on a large scale as Germany had already annexed and occupied both Austria and Czechoslovakia.
The fragmentation that had developed between the most senior commanders may well have resulted in Hitler entering the Second World War unaware that the Luftwaffe had any weakness at all. How much Jeschonnek consulted with Göring and how much Göring chose to share with Hitler is unclear. If Göring did perceive there to be any concerns, and if he did share those with his Führer, then Hitler clearly decided to ignore them. Equally, it may well be that all three saw the Luftwaffe as a war machine of the greatest military strength and none saw any weaknesses at all but the fact remains that it entered the Second World War ready to commit its resources to a tactical conflict rather than a strategic one.