Chapter 4
The war against Britain had not turned out quite the way Hitler had planned but, nonetheless, he turned his attention towards a conquest in the east and war against the Soviet Union. In order to plan for such a mighty undertaking he did not want, nor could he really afford, distractions elsewhere but Hitler was more than irritated at the way his ally, Italy, had failed to achieve success in North Africa and in the Balkans. Furthermore, the strategic importance of Malta, a small island just sixty miles from the southern coast of Sicily and home to British air and naval bases, was becoming increasingly evident.
Malta was ideally situated to disrupt the Axis air and sea supply routes to the Italian colony of Libya as well as for providing vital air support to British naval units transiting through the Mediterranean. The Italian Regia Aeronautica had so far failed to neutralize the island’s airfields and harbours and Hitler realized that a successful campaign in North Africa could only be possible by eliminating Malta as a British base.
Hitler was initially reluctant to assist his ally but the Italian invasion of Greece, which had commenced in October 1940, had started to struggle and British determination not to give any ground in Egypt, followed by the subsequent advance against the Italians in North Africa, now made it obvious to Hitler that the Italian position in the Balkans, Central Mediterranean and North Africa would not improve without German intervention.
The Luftwaffe committed to the Mediterranean theatre in January 1941 when Hans Geisler’s X. Fliegerkorps, with more than 300 aircraft, was transferred from Norway to Sicily and Libya to support the Italians. Initially no single-seat fighters were sent to the Mediterranean as the bomber and dive bomber units were to be supported by Bf 110s of ZG 26, sent to protect the supply routes between Italy and North Africa and to conduct anti-shipping operations, as well as countering RAF reconnaissance and convoy patrols in the Mediterranean.
The first fighter unit to arrive in North Africa were the Zerstörers of III./ZG 26 under the command of Major Karl Kaschka. Arriving at Tripoli at the end of January, they were soon joined by Ju 87s and Ju 88s tasked to carry out dive bomber and air interdiction sorties in support of Erwin Rommel’s new Afrika Korps, which had been dispatched to North Africa as a matter of urgency to reinforce Italian forces and prevent an Axis defeat.
While it would be some time before the Bf 109 was introduced to the desert, 7./JG 26 was sent to Sicily during early February 1941. The Staffel was led by 22-year-old Oberleutnant Joachim Müncheberg, already a combat veteran and holder of the Knight’s Cross. Now with twenty-three victories and leading the only Bf 109s in the Mediterranean theatre, he faced an enormous challenge. His small unit would never exceed nine aircraft and its arrival at Gela coincided with a reduction in Luftwaffe forces in Sicily as more units were being deployed to Libya to support the Afrika Korps.
Under Müncheberg’s leadership the Bf 109Es of 7./JG 26 would make a significant contribution to the air war over the Mediterranean during the next four months, flying numerous sorties against Malta and causing havoc amongst its defenders. When the 109s first appeared over the island during the late afternoon of 12 February it came as a complete shock to the defenders. One flight of Hurricanes was scrambled to intercept what the pilots believed to be a handful of Ju 88s approaching Malta at 20,000 feet but they suddenly found themselves being bounced by three 109s led by Müncheberg. In the space of just a few minutes two of the Hurricanes were shot down, one by Müncheberg, and a third returned to Malta badly damaged.
It was much the same during the days that followed. The appearance of the yellow-nosed Bf 109Es of Müncheberg’s Staffel had an immediate and damaging impact on the morale of those defending Malta. The combat experience of men like Müncheberg was completely at odds with that of some of the Hurricane pilots who were experiencing air combat for the first time. The 109s were able to climb to altitude at leisure and arrive in the vicinity of the island at heights of 20,000 feet or higher where they could engage the defenders from a position of great advantage and with superior performance.
While the Hurricane had been a match for most Italian aircraft in the Mediterranean, it was outclassed when it came to countering Bf 109s. Furthermore, Malta had too few Hurricanes to mount regular patrols, the Hurricanes were of a lesser standard than those retained back in England for home defence and Malta’s isolation meant it was necessary for the RAF to conserve fuel and reduce flying time as much as possible. The Hurricanes generally operated in formations of three and there were often occasions when just six aircraft were scrambled to meet an enemy raid. Radar limitations and local operating procedures exacerbated the problem, which all resulted in there being insufficient warning time for the defenders to climb to the required height to engage the raiders before they hit their target. The Hurricanes would first have to climb to 20,000 feet to the south of the island and then turn northwards to try and engage the raiders on their way home.
During the early afternoon of 26 February the Axis launched one of its biggest raids on Malta with a force of seventy aircraft – a mix of Ju 87s, Ju 88s, He 111s and Do 17s – attacking the airfield at Luqa.17 Escorting the attacking force were Müncheberg’s Staffel and Italian Macchi C.200s and while the main bomber force arrived over the airfield virtually unscathed, four of the defending Hurricanes were claimed by the Bf 109s, including two by Müncheberg. The attack proved devastating. A number of RAF Wellingtons were destroyed on the ground and there was extensive damage to hangars and other technical buildings on the airfield.
Müncheberg’s Staffel was joined briefly by the Bf 109Es of I./JG 27, led by Hauptmann Eduard Neumann, which stopped off in Sicily on the way to Libya to support the Afrika Korps. During their brief stay in Sicily, Neumann’s 109s twice joined Müncheberg’s on operations over Malta. The first occasion was during the late afternoon of 5 March when the Bf 109Es escorted sixty bombers.18 Once overhead the island the 109s engaged the defending Hurricanes and also carried out strafing attacks against targets of opportunity. During the raid Müncheberg added another Hurricane to his total, and another Hurricane was claimed by Leutnant Willi Kothmann of JG 27; the unit’s only claim over Malta during its stay. With the Luftwaffe continuing to build up its forces in Libya, most of its units had left Sicily by the middle of March, leaving only Müncheberg’s Bf 109Es to carry out nuisance raids against Malta.
Hitler’s planning for the invasion of the Soviet Union was further interrupted when a change of government in Yugoslavia meant that the country abandoned proposals to side with Germany. Fearing an Allied presence in Yugoslavia or Greece would threaten his attack on the Soviet Union, Hitler decided to secure the Balkans.
Alexander Löhr’s Luftflotte 4 was tasked to support the German invasion of Yugoslavia and Greece, and so VIII. Fliegerkorps, under the command of Wolfram von Richthofen, a cousin of the famous Red Baron, Manfred von Richthofen, gradually assembled in Romania and Bulgaria. As a long believer in close air support, Richthofen had much to prove as the Ju 87 Stukas had suffered badly over southern England. By early April 1941 he had under his command some 600 aircraft within 200 miles of Belgrade, the Yugoslav capital, of which over half were bombers and dive bombers located in Bulgaria. The rest, a mix of fighter and reconnaissance aircraft, were located in western Romania.
The Balkans campaign began on 6 April when a force of 150 bombers and dive bombers, mainly He 111s and Ju 87s, escorted by fighters, bombed Belgrade. Fighter units assigned to support the campaign included Bf 109Es of two Gruppen from JG 54 and a single Gruppe from each of JG 27 and JG 77. While the Yugoslav Air Force tried to intervene, its relatively modest force of 400 inferior aircraft was immediately overwhelmed. Many Yugoslav aircraft were destroyed on the ground and there was only ever brief fighter-to-fighter air combat over Yugoslavia.
With the air threat neutralized, Richthofen’s units provided support to the German ground forces attacking Yugoslav defensive positions. The campaign was over within days and by 18 April the last pockets of Yugoslav resistance had disappeared. Müncheberg’s 7./JG 26 was one of the fighter units involved in the brief campaign, having temporarily left Sicily on the opening day of the campaign for a new base at Taranto to operate over southern Yugoslavia.
Müncheberg had again proved to be a great leader and was inspirational to the other young men of his Staffel. Many learned from him, including one young pilot, 22-year-old Leutnant Klaus Mietusch, who had flown alongside Müncheberg as his deputy. Mietusch had joined 7./JG 26 at the outbreak of war and had served with the unit during the campaign against France. His first victory, a Hurricane over Dunkirk, came at the end of May 1940 and he added a second victory before the end of the year. While operating from Sicily he added three more to his total before claiming his sixth victory, a Hawker Fury biplane of the Royal Yugoslav Air Force over Podriga during the opening day of the campaign. Müncheberg was also credited with a Fury over Yugoslavia during the brief campaign before his Staffel returned to Sicily to resume its battle against Malta.
While the campaign in Yugoslavia had been quick and straightforward, the campaign in Greece would prove much harder. Codenamed Operation Marita, the German invasion of Greece also started on 6 April to coincide with the attack on Yugoslavia. Greece had already been at war for some time and its mountainous terrain made close air support much harder. There was also the fact that Britain had provided support to Greece – mainly Hurricanes, Blenheims and Gladiators – and so the attacking German forces came up against a more capable opposition.
The bulk of the Greek Army was on the Albanian border in action with Italian forces and the German invasion through Bulgaria now provided a second front. The Greek Army was soon overrun and the British reinforcements retreated towards the Isthmus of Corinth as the decision was made to abandon mainland Greece. Despite some resistance by the small number of Hurricanes, the Jagdwaffe soon enjoyed air supremacy over the region. One to achieve much success during the campaign was Oberleutnant Gustav Rödel, Kapitän of 4./JG 27, who achieved six victories over Greece; three Greek fighters on 15 April and three RAF Hurricanes five days later. German forces reached the city of Athens on 27 April and by 1 May the last Allied units had evacuated the Greek mainland. Although the Luftwaffe had not had it all its own way in the Balkans, more than a hundred Yugoslav, Greek and British aircraft were destroyed, twice its own losses.
Many Jagdgruppen involved in the Balkans campaign were now transferred to the Eastern Front but III./JG 27, led by Hauptmann Max Dobislav, moved to Sicily to provide some welcome support for Müncheberg’s Staffel who had now been operating alone for nearly three months without a rest. On 6 May Dobislav’s 109s joined Müncheberg’s in a substantial attack against Malta during which III./JG 27 made its first claim over the island. The successful pilot was 23-year-old Oberleutnant Erbo Graf von Kageneck, Kapitän of 9. Staffel, and the Hurricane he claimed over Malta was his fifteenth success of the war. Kageneck added three more victories before III./JG 27 left Sicily later in the month for the Eastern Front but he would later be killed in North Africa after sixty-seven victories for which he was awarded the Oak Leaves to his Knight’s Cross.
The successful campaign in the Balkans had coincided with gains in North Africa and so the stage was now set for the invasion of Crete, which, like Malta, occupied a position of strategic importance. While an island of barren and mountainous terrain with limited lines of communication might not appear to be of any great value, the side occupying Crete could control the eastern Mediterranean by sea and from the air. As long as Crete was held by the British, the Allies were in a position to mount raids against the Balkan countries and the vitally important Romanian oilfields at Ploesti, Germany’s main source of petroleum.
All Luftwaffe assets in Greece were made available for the invasion of Crete and with two air corps under his command – Richthofen’s VIII. Fliegerkorps and XI. Fliegerkorps under the command of Kurt Student – Löhr had available to him an aerial force of 650 aircraft: nearly 450 bombers and dive bombers, a hundred Bf 109Es and a hundred Bf 110Cs. It was a formidable force against which the Allies on Crete could deploy fewer than thirty defensive fighters.
The German invasion of Crete, codenamed Operation Mercury, commenced on 20 May with an airborne assault consisting of gliderborne and parachute troops. Richthofen’s task was to establish air supremacy over Crete as soon as possible and, although the Allied pilots enjoyed considerable success against the vulnerable Ju 52 transport aircraft, the 109s soon overwhelmed the defenders.
But on the ground the situation was quite different. The British fully intended to hold the island for as long as possible and so fighting soon developed into several small and uncoordinated actions as the Germans found the Allies well and truly dug-in. As more German reinforcements arrived, the Allies were eventually forced to fight a series of rearguard actions as they retreated south across the island from where an evacuation commenced.
While the battle on the ground raged, Richthofen turned his attention to attacking the British Mediterranean Fleet and to clearing the sea lanes to Crete. An example was on 22 May when the 109s of 7./JG 77, including Leutnant Wolf-Dietrich Huy, attacked British warships off Crete and during the course of the day inflicted serious and fatal damage to a number of ships. Huy would later be awarded the Knight’s Cross, principally for his exploits during the Crete campaign, and was eventually credited with forty victories.
Crete was ultimately a lost cause for the Allies and on 1 June the remaining Allied troops on the island surrendered. While the battle for Crete did not overly delay Hitler’s planned invasion of the Soviet Union, the campaign had proved costly and put an end to any idea of a similar airborne assault against Malta.
By now, most Luftwaffe units had already left Sicily for the Eastern Front and finally it was the turn of Müncheberg’s 7./JG 26 to leave but unlike other units destined for the east, the Staffel moved to North Africa instead. While operating from Sicily, Müncheberg’s small force had claimed nearly fifty victories, twenty of which had been credited to him to bring his overall total to forty-three, without a single loss, bringing Müncheberg a well earned Oak Leaves to his Knight’s Cross.
It had been a monumental effort by the pilots of 7./JG 26, although many would not survive the war. Klaus Mietusch would be killed during the final defence of the Reich in September 1944 and others to later fall in combat included Hans Johannsen (killed in March 1942 with eight victories), Karl-Heinz Ehlen (killed in April 1942 with seven victories), Melchior Kestel (also with seven victories and killed in June 1943) and Karl Laub (seven victories and killed in December 1944).
The Luftwaffe’s departure from Sicily left the Mediterranean air war temporarily in the hands of the Italian Regia Aeronautica and coincided with changes in command on the island of Malta, as well as the arrival of reinforcements. The RAF was now able to assume a more offensive campaign against Axis supply shipping operating between Europe and North Africa and by November 1941 the Allies operating from Malta were sinking three-quarters of supplies destined for Rommel’s Afrika Korps.