Chapter 5
While Hitler had been occupied with waging war in the west, he could do so in the knowledge that he would not have to fight a second front with the Soviet Union because of the non-aggression treaty signed with Stalin before the war. But as German forces were making advances in the west, Stalin had been busy in the east and had absorbed the three Baltic states of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia into the Soviet Union, as well as annexing large parts of Finland and occupying part of Romania; in the first year of the Second World War, 175,000 square miles of territory and 20 million people had been brought under his rule. Stalin clearly wanted more and by the end of 1940 Hitler felt convinced that the Soviet Union posed a real threat to his own plans and so ordered an invasion of the Soviet Union. The plan, called Operation Barbarossa, was to use similar Blitzkrieg methods as before and would result in a campaign unparalleled in both scale and ferocity.
As far as the Luftwaffe’s High Command was concerned, thoughts and opinions about the invasion were divided. Jeschonnek, for example, felt that Germany was at last about to embark on a proper war and was in favour of an invasion but others, of whom Göring was the most notable, were clearly against the idea. Göring felt his units had not been given a chance to rest or recuperate since the invasion of Poland. He was already fighting a war in the west and had now become increasingly involved in the Mediterranean, the Balkans and North Africa. Further more, neither aircraft production nor the development of new fighters was progressing as well as he had hoped. The Luftwaffe had made little progress in the year since the campaign against France and Göring was not convinced the Soviet Union could be quickly defeated. He tried several times to persuade Hitler not to continue with his plan but it was no good. In the end he simply gave up and went on leave.
Given no option but to prepare for war on the Eastern Front, the Luftwaffe made available as many assets as it could. According to Hitler, the Soviet Union would be defeated in weeks and so the Luftwaffe was expected to defeat the Soviet Air Force, both in the air and on the ground within that time, while also providing valuable support to German ground forces advancing east. These were standard Blitzkrieg tactics but in the event of a prolonged campaign in the east it was already clear that the lack of a four-engine heavy bomber would restrict operations of a strategic nature.
The Luftwaffe was able to commit three air fleets to the opening phase of the campaign, some 3,000 aircraft, of which just over two-thirds were combat aircraft, and this mass aerial force amounted to about 60 per cent of its total strength at the time. The plan was for Luftflotte 1, under the command of the energetic Alfred Keller, to support Army Group North. Its fighter component consisted of Bf 109Fs from JG 54 initially based at four airfields – Lindental, Rautenberg, Trakehnen and Blumenfeld – and a single Gruppe of JG 53 at Neusiedel, with the entire fighter force placed under the command of the very capable and popular Major Hannes Trautloft.
The strongest of the three air fleets with nearly 1,200 aircraft, of which more than 350 were Bf 109s, was Luftflotte 2, commanded by Kesselring. Luftflotte 2 was to provide air support to Army Group Centre and gain air superiority over the Eastern Front. For this task Kesselring had available to him nine Gruppen of Bf 109s: two from JG 27 and a single Gruppe of JG 52, a mix of E and F models based at Sobolevo and Berzniki, and all under the command of Major Wolfgang Schellmann; four Gruppen of JG 51 with Bf 109Fs based at Siedlce, Staravis, Halaszi and Crzevica, under the command of Oberstleutnant Werner Mölders; and two Gruppen of JG 53, also equipped with Bf 109Fs based at Crzevica and Sobolevo, led by Major Günther Freiherr von Maltzahn. Also available to Kesselring were two Gruppen of Bf 110s of ZG 26 to provide long-range fighter cover.
Alexander Löhr’s Luftflotte 4 was tasked to support Army Group South. Löhr had seven Gruppen of 109s available to him: three from JG 3 were equipped with Bf 109Fs and based at Hostynne, Dub and Modorovka, under the command of Major Günther Lützow; a single Gruppe of Bf 109Fs of JG 52, under the command of Major Gotthard Handrick, was based at Mizil/Pipera; and two Gruppen of JG 77 plus another Gruppe, I(J)./LG 2, all equipped with Bf 109Es, were based at Bacau, Roman and Janca, and were all under the command of Major Bernhard Woldenga.
The Luftwaffe had assembled a very capable force, including nearly 800 Bf 109s, but it was a smaller force than had been deployed either for the initial Blitzkrieg at the start of the war or at the height of the Battle of Britain. Hitler was about to embark on his most ambitious undertaking yet but he would do so with fewer combat aircraft than his previous campaigns in the west.
While the opposing armies on the ground might at first glance have appeared relatively evenly matched, with nearly 150 divisions available to either side, the composition of a German division compared to a Russian division was different, particularly when it came to armoured units, with the Red Army enjoying a considerable advantage in the number of tanks. As far as the air war would be concerned, German intelligence had estimated the total strength of the Soviet Air Force to be in the order of 8,000 aircraft but this would prove to be a significant underestimate. In reality the Red Air Force could muster between 12,000 and 15,000 aircraft, of which about half, including 3,500 fighters, were concentrated in the west of the Soviet Union.19
Soviet front-line combat aircraft were organized into air divisions, with the basic flying component of the Red Air Force being the regiment, consisting of about sixty aircraft, with each regiment being made up of squadrons along the same lines as the RAF and with numbers similar to those of a Staffel. Tactically, the Russian pilots flew in three aircraft ‘vics’ and, generally, the quality of Soviet pilot training had produced an inferior opponent to the Jagdwaffe. Amongst the adversaries would be the Ilyushin Il-2 Sturmovik ground-attack aircraft, which would become the single most produced aircraft in history with more than 35,000 built, and the Polikarpov I-16, the world’s first low-wing cantilever monoplane fighter with a retractable undercarriage and the backbone of the Soviet Air Force.
The Red Air Force was, however, in the process of converting to new single-engine fighters to match the ability of the Bf 109E. One was the Yak-1, a fast, manoeuvrable and reasonably well armed fighter. It was aerodynamically well designed and similar in size to the Bf 109, and in terms of performance was the best of the new breed of Russian fighters, although the latest variants of the Bf 109 were quicker, particularly at heights up to 15,000 feet, and could climb slightly faster. The Yak also suffered from relatively poor firepower and the pilots lacked training in air-to-air gunnery. Nonetheless, when in a position of numerical advantage, and in the hands of a dogged and determined Russian defender, the Yak-1 would prove a very capable adversary and was the first of a series of Yak fighters that would eventually see a combined production of 37,000 aircraft. Two other Soviet fighters to enter service, both similar in size and performance to the Yak-1, were the Mikoyan and Gurevich MiG-3, designed more as a high-altitude fighter and built in increasingly large numbers during 1941, and the Lavochkin–Gorbunov–Gudkov LaGG-3. Both aircraft lacked manoeuvrability and were relatively unforgiving when in the hands of a novice pilot. The LaGG-3, in particular, suffered from poor acceleration and was hard to handle in combat, and the MiG-3, despite having the streamlined appearance of a modern fighter, proved sluggish in the air when up against a high-class opponent and its long nose reduced forward visibility when on the ground and for deflection shooting during air combat.
As far as the Soviet Air Force was concerned it was all about numbers. Quantity was considered more important than quality and it would be these four Soviet fighters – the Polikarpov I-16, the Yak-1, the MiG-3 and the LaGG-3 – that would bear the brunt of the early fighting on the Eastern Front. While individually these four fighters would prove little match for the newer Bf 109F, the Red Air Force had the benefit of large numbers. Soviet aircraft production was exceeding 1,000 aircraft per month and the Russians would soon receive large numbers of fighters from the Allies – British Hurricanes and Spitfires, and American P-39 Airacobras and P-40 Tomahawks – supplied under a Lend-Lease agreement designed to bridge the gap between the initial onslaught of Barbarossa and the Soviet’s industrial machine spooling up to full capacity. By the end of the war some 10,000 fighters would be delivered to Russia under this agreement and there would be times when the Jagdflieger would find he was outnumbered by more than five to one.
The Luftwaffe went into Barbarossa knowing that the Soviet Air Force enjoyed similar numerical superiority in the air to the Soviet forces on the ground but was confident the speed of the German attack and its advance on the ground would soon outweigh any numerical disadvantage. Furthermore, the belief was that the Luftwaffe’s capabilities in the air were far greater than what it would face.
Hitler eventually launched Operation Barbarossa during the early hours of 22 June 1941. The early artillery barrage signalled the start of events as the air offensive got under way with every available combat aircraft involved. It was still dark when the Luftwaffe units got airborne as any delay waiting for dawn would have given the Soviet Air Force vital time to respond to a warning of attack.
The first kill on the Eastern Front was credited to Oberleutnant Robert Olejnik, Kapitän of 1./JG 3, who was flying a reconnaissance mission along the Russian border when he spotted a pair of Russian I-16 fighters getting airborne in the semi-darkness below and promptly shot one down as the second disappeared. Whether this was the first kill on the Eastern Front is uncertain, however, as this act occurred about the same time as Leutnant Hans Witzel of 5./JG 27 was shooting down two Russian I-15 biplanes. Either way, it was still not even 04.00 and the 109s had already made their mark.
The main attacks followed, just as dawn was breaking, and caught the Soviet Air Force completely by surprise. At many airfields the Russian aircraft were lined up wing-tip to wing-tip, as if preparing for a parade, making it easy for the bombers to cause havoc, and when day-light came the attacking aircraft were able to strafe along the lines.
The plan worked well. Very few Soviet aircraft were encountered in the air and the attack took the Red Air Force completely by surprise. The first wave was then followed up by further attacks against more airfields during the day. Many Jagdgruppen were employed primarily on ground-attack missions because the Luftwaffe did not have enough bombers and dive bombers to mount large-scale raids against the high number of Russian airfields along its western border. For this role the 109s carried the SD-2 Splitterbombe, a fragmentation device weighing just 2 kg and designed to explode either on impact with the ground or just above. Each Bf 109 could carry dozens of these small devices, carried in four bulky panniers, and when dropped in sufficient numbers they could cause severe fragmentation damage to aircraft parked on the ground. Unfortunately, though, the SD-2s had to be dropped from low level where the Bf 109s were susceptible to ground fire and there were a number of occasions when the devices were known to hang up, often resulting in accidents when aircraft landed back at their airfields.
The Luftwaffe recorded just thirty-five losses on the opening day of Barbarossa but amongst those were Major Wolfgang Schellmann, Kommodore of JG 27 and holder of the Knight’s Cross with twenty-five victories, and Oberleutnant Willy Strange, Kapitän of 8./JG 3. Both came down behind Russian lines and fell into the hands of Soviet troops; neither survived. Despite these losses, the opening day had overwhelmingly belonged to the Luftwaffe as it claimed 300 Russian aircraft shot down and another 1,500 destroyed on the ground.20
Many Jagdgruppen made claims, including JG 54 in the northern sector, led by Hannes Trautloft, which claimed forty-five aircraft on the opening day, and in the central sector two Gruppen from JG 53 accounted for more than sixty enemy aircraft with Wolf-Dietrich Wilcke, Kommandeur of III./JG 53, becoming the Jagdwaffe’s first ace on the Eastern Front having claimed five Russian aircraft during the first day.
Another unit to achieve considerable success in the central sector was JG 51, which claimed nearly seventy aircraft destroyed on the opening day, with Werner Mölders personally accounting for five: four Tupolev SB twin-engine bombers and an I-153 fighter. Mölders had now become the highest-scoring fighter pilot in history having been credited with his eighty-seventh victory and surpassing the achievement of Manfred von Richthofen during the First World War. Later that day came the announcement of the Swords to his Knight’s Cross with Oak Leaves, making Mölders only the second recipient of the Swords after Adolf Galland, an award which had been announced just the day before.
A technique used by Mölders against many of his victims, particularly when attacking Sturmoviks, was initially to position off to one side and at a distance from where he could carefully observe the enemy formation. He would then turn in and use his excess speed to get close very quickly, offset at an angle typically of 30 degrees, and when in range he would aim towards the central part of his target where the cockpit compartment was located. From such a close range it would prove lethal and many of his victims were shot down without having seen their attacker.
During the opening days of Barbarossa the bomber and dive-bomber crews flew up to six sorties a day as the fighters strove for air superiority from the outset. Soviet airfields were pulverized and aircraft destroyed on the ground. Kesselring’s Luftflotte 2 attacked every Soviet airfield within a 200-mile radius of the front line and claimed to have destroyed 2,500 aircraft in the first week. There were similar successes all along the front and by the end of the first week German intelligence estimated that 4,000 Soviet aircraft had been destroyed for the loss of just 150 of its own; a staggering ratio of 27 : 1. While this very high ratio attracted some questioning within the German High Command, not least by Göring, the evidence seemed to support this success-rate and some even believed that the Jagdwaffe had under-claimed.
While German intelligence suggested that the Soviet Air Force was being wiped out in the opening days of the campaign, the fact that the Russians continued to fly thousands of sorties – more than 6,000 on the opening day alone21 – implied otherwise. Even at the end of the first week the Soviet Air Force was still able to mount large-scale bombing raids. One example was on 30 June when waves of Russian bombers carried out heavy raids in the central sector, although this only provided JG 51 with more opportunities to add to its score. The unit promptly accounted for more than a hundred aircraft during the day to become the first Geschwader to reach 1,000 aerial victories. Mölders alone destroyed five Tupolev SB bombers in the Bobruysk area during the day, bringing his personal total to fourteen since the opening of the campaign.
The first week of Barbarossa had been a great success for the Luftwaffe. Although the Soviet Air Force had not been completely annihilated, as had perhaps been naively hoped, it had been wounded enough to allow the Luftwaffe to dominate the sky over the Eastern Front for some time. However, while thousands of Soviet aircraft had been destroyed on the ground the pilots were safe and this would make the task of forming new units much easier once aircraft had been replaced.
The Eastern Front soon stretched nearly 3,000 miles with conditions varying enormously from the cold Arctic wastes of the Barents Sea at the northern extremities to the warmer, almost subtropical shores, of the Black Sea in the south. With air superiority effectively in hand, the Luftwaffe was now able to turn its attention to providing air support to the advancing troops on the ground. The German army groups had made gains, although the Red Army was still occupying a vast pocket around Bialystok, which eventually fell on 1 July, and Minsk, which did not fall until 9 July. As German forces squeezed the Soviet troops within the pockets, many managed to escape but, nonetheless, some 600,000 Soviet troops were killed, missing, wounded or taken prisoner. This success was soon followed by victory at Smolensk, resulting in another 300,000 Soviet prisoners, leaving the door to Moscow, the key to victory in the east, seemingly wide open.
With little evidence of Russian resistance in the air, the 109s were able to enjoy freier Jagd sorties, giving them freedom to roam over the Eastern Front and to carry out attacks against targets of opportunity. When there were encounters in the air, much of the aerial combat took place at medium and lower levels where the Bf 109 enjoyed an advantage over its Soviet adversaries. The early battles had taken their toll on the Red Air Force and many Russians were thrown into the air war with barely adequate training.
The Luftwaffe also benefitted from mobile radar and a basic reporting system, which gave the Jagdgeschwader an advantage over the Soviet fighters. Confidence was understandably high as scores started to mount. By mid-July, JG 51 had destroyed 500 Soviet aircraft since the opening day of Barbarossa for the loss of just three 109s. Mölders personally passed a century of successes since the start of the war when, on 15 July, he claimed two victories during the day. Mölders had accounted for a staggering thirty-three Soviet aircraft in just over three weeks since the opening day of Barbarossa and later that day came the announcement of his award of the coveted Diamonds, the citation stating that the Führer had chosen this exemplar, the world’s most successful fighter pilot, to be the first recipient of Germany’s highest award.
The Eastern Front was proving to be a target-rich environment, almost a shooting gallery. In addition to Mölders, another to achieve great success was Leutnant Heinz Bär of 1./JG 51 who claimed fourteen Russian aircraft in the first two weeks of the campaign to add to his thirteen earlier in the war and earning him the Knight’s Cross in early July; Bär would add thirty-three more to his total during the next month for which he would be awarded the Oak Leaves.
JG 3 had also enjoyed much success, with three of its pilots standing out. One was Major Günther Lützow, Kommodore of JG 3, who had scored his first success on the Eastern Front during the opening day of Barbarossa before he was awarded the Oak Leaves on 20 July after achieving his twenty-fourth success of the campaign and with his overall total on forty-seven. Lützow then went on to score at a high rate. Three weeks later his total was sixty-one and by early October he would become the second to pass eighty victories. The second member of JG 3 to distinguish himself was Walter Oesau, Kommandeur of III./JG 3. On 15 July Oesau became only the third recipient of the Swords to the Knight’s Cross for his eightieth victory of the war, including forty-four Soviet aircraft in just five weeks, seven of which were claimed in one sortie on 12 July. The third was Gordon Gollob, Kapitän of 4./JG 3, who had also scored his first victory on the Eastern Front during the opening day of Barbarossa. Now promoted to Hauptmann and appointed as Kommandeur of II./JG 3, Gollob would add a further eighteen victories during August to bring his overall total to forty-two and earn him the Knight’s Cross.
As German forces advanced on the ground, Mölders was able to move his JG 51 forward to airfields in the vicinity of the city of Bobruysk and then handed over command to Oberstleutnant Friedrich Beckh as Mölders was to be prevented from flying further combat missions for propaganda reasons. Mölders had proved to be a great leader and had earned the nickname Vati (‘Daddy’) from his men in recognition of his paternal attitude towards them and the care he had always shown towards their welfare. A devoutly religious person, he was always insistent that any Allied aviators captured by those under his command should be treated well. He was even known to have dined with some.
Göring appointed Mölders as his first General der Jagdflieger (Inspector-General of Fighters) but Mölders’s life would soon come to an end, not in air combat but in a flying accident. On 22 November he was travelling to Berlin as a passenger in an He 111 when the aircraft encountered bad weather and suffered engine problems. As the pilot attempted to make an emergency landing the aircraft crashed and amongst those killed on board was Mölders; he was just twenty-eight years old. Werner Mölders was given a state funeral in Berlin the following week and buried at the Invalidenfriedhof, the traditional burial ground for distinguished Prussian military personnel, alongside Ernst Udet22 and Manfred von Richthofen. Göring gave the eulogy and amongst the guard of honour were some of the Luftwaffe’s finest, including Günther Lützow, Walter Oesau, Joachim Müncheberg and Adolf Galland, who would now succeed Mölders.
By the beginning of September 1941 the German Army was within touching distance of Kiev and was preparing for its supposed final assault on Leningrad, which commenced on 9 September. Within ten days the German forces were within a few miles of the city but progress thereafter was slow. Hitler ordered Leningrad to be placed under siege so that he could divert vital resources, particularly Panzers, to support his central push towards the strategic target of Moscow, which commenced on 2 October. The Red Army had been heavily depleted but still had 800,000 troops to defend Moscow and occupied a series of elaborate defence lines, which advancing German forces would first have to overcome.
Supporting the advancing troops on the ground had created problems in the air. Not only were the Jagdgeschwader at the end of a lengthening supply line, making it harder for the provision of fuel, ammunition and spares, but the amount of ground gained now meant the Luftwaffe had become thinly spread. There had also been an increasing number of 109s damaged or written off through accidents on the ground as a result of operating from poorly prepared airstrips or through pilot fatigue, and these losses were not always being replaced. Furthermore, resources were needed elsewhere, such as in the Mediterranean and North Africa, and this resulted in a dilution of effort for the Jagdwaffe at a time when the Red Air Force was becoming stronger by the day.
The Luftwaffe had now become overstretched and Hitler was racing against time. If his forces could not conquer the Soviet Union before the onset of winter then the Red war machine would be able to recover. It was also becoming evident how much the Luftwaffe lacked a strategic heavy bomber as its medium bombers did not have the range or capability to inflict significant damage further to the east. Soviet industry had been hit hard but it had not been destroyed. Too much time had been spent supporting the army groups on the ground instead of taking the opportunity to attack Soviet aircraft and tank factories within range of its twin-engine bombers, and so the Soviet engineers had been able to continue moving industrial machinery further east where it could be reassembled behind the safety of the Ural Mountains.
Nonetheless, the Luftwaffe had performed magnificently during Barbarossa. Many were recognized for their achievements during the campaign, including Günther Lützow, who, on 11 October, became only the fourth recipient of the Swords for his leadership of JG 3 and for his ninety-seven victories. He would become a centurion the following day with his final twenty-two victories up to that point coming in just seven days.
By December 1941 the campaign was already in its sixth month. The combination of conducting operations over a long period, often from inadequate Soviet airfields, and deteriorating weather conditions, with all the associated aircraft maintenance and logistical problems, was taking its toll. Temperatures had plummeted to –40 degrees and ground crew were having quickly to learn how to improvise cold-weather techniques, such as adding fuel to engine oil to thin the mixture so that it would not freeze and to light fires beneath aircraft engines at night to prevent them from freezing up.
Those units operating from former Soviet airfields were able to make best use of any hangar space available but, unlike the Russians, the Luftwaffe was neither equipped nor prepared for a winter campaign. The Jagdwaffe had lost 2,000 aircraft with many losses occurring as a result of the harsh operating conditions rather than due to the Soviet Air Force. While replacements were getting through in high numbers, serviceability was now proving a significant problem with less than 50 per cent of fighters being available at any one time.
As the winter weather set in, the ground offensive against Moscow slowed. The German Army was not equipped for a harsh winter campaign either and a Soviet counter-attack along the entire front during early December pushed the invaders back 200 miles. The situation was particularly desperate in the central region where the onset of winter had coincided with Kesselring’s Luftflotte 2 being transferred to the Mediterranean, leaving only Wolfram von Richthofen’s VIII. Fliegerkorps along the central part of the Eastern Front.
Germany’s invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941 cost its Army over 200,000 killed and missing with a further 600,000 wounded. Operation Barbarossa had been the largest military operation in history in both manpower and casualties but with Germany having suffered its heaviest losses of the war, it signalled the beginning of the end of the Third Reich. For its part, the Luftwaffe had fought and won the tactical air battle but it would now be engaged in a prolonged campaign on the Eastern Front that had become increasingly more strategic in nature. The Luftwaffe was unable to fight such a campaign.