23.
ALTHOUGH CHARIOTS WERE extensively used by Egypt, Mesopotamia, and other states from about 1800 to at least 1200 BCE, then continued on in a more limited role, their combat effectiveness in China and the West has come into question.1 The chariot embodied power and mobility, but the limited numbers employed in the Shang probably served as command and archery platforms rather than assault vehicles or blocks deployed with overwhelming impact. Nevertheless, certain problems described in the historical and theoretical military writings must have negatively impacted every form of employment, limiting their possible utilization and modes of combat.
Apart from the control issues inherent in employing willful creatures in a synergistic mode, any exploitation of the chariot for martial purposes invariably entailed a number of maintenance, logistical, and environmental problems. Moreover, as chariot operations increased in importance, so did the army’s dependency and vulnerability. Horses might be struck by arrows, cut down with hooking and piercing weapons, disabled by pits and traps, enervated by thirst, or slain by poisoning their water supplies.2 Even when not adversely affected by inclement weather, temperature, excessive humidity, overuse, poor food, bad water, or routine injuries, they required proper provisions, constant care, periodic rest, and especially the disposal of massive amounts of potentially dangerous waste when encamped. Being easily incapacitated both on the march and in battle, their losses could quickly become insurmountable.
Even when the horses were protected with armor and their health otherwise ensured, the chariot’s many components, being fabricated from bronze, leather, and wood with dissimilar material characteristics, frequently failed in both routine use and battle. No literary evidence that artisans and engineers accompanied field forces appears until the Warring States period, yet these and other specialists must have assumed a critical role early on, because expeditionary campaigns subjected the chariots to prolonged use under harsh conditions even before their failure rates soared in battle.3Low-ranking personnel had to be assigned to ongoing maintenance tasks, whereas skilled craftsmen such as metalsmiths, carpenters, joiners, tanners, wheelwrights, and others were required to undertake the more complicated repairs stemming from component fatigue and catastrophic breakage.4
The durability of moving parts, particularly the ability of the wheels to revolve on the axle without binding due to friction, adhesion, grooving, and other forms of damage, was also questionable. Before the invention of ball bearings the areas of contact within the wheel hub at the bottom, where it sustained the axle’s weight and where the revolving hub constantly pressed against the cap and interior mounting, must all have been large. Bronze fittings reinforced many other contact points, and lubricants were employed in the hub or nave, but none eliminated the wood-towood contact that produced the greatest destructive wear. Furthermore, neither bronze nor brass, probably the best material for moving fittings but unavailable at any time during the chariot’s fluorescence, was yet employed inside the nave. Therefore the slightest deviation from the requisite component profiles could quickly doom a Shang chariot.
Axles and spokes were also known to snap, wheels sometimes came off in the heat of combat, glue joints failed, speed and bumpy conditions caused structural breaks, and leather bindings tore. In one case a charioteer boasted that his surpassing skill alone had allowed him to keep the traces intact during the day’s combat, a claim that was subsequently supported when they snapped upon simply driving over a piece of wood.5 In another Spring and Autumn incident, a chariot threw its axle mount, disabling it.6
Battlefield encounters resulted in various degrees of irrecoverable damage and destruction. Collisions, whether accidental or the result of deliberate action, inflicted a heavy toll. Crushing blows sometimes sundered major chariot components, attesting to their ferocity as well as to the fragility of wooden structural members,7 and a crossbar reportedly broke when a soldier was hurled against it during the Battle of Yen-ling.8 At the end of the Spring and Autumn period Sun-tzu estimated that six-tenths of a state’s resources would be consumed in a normal expeditionary campaign9 and therefore advised seizing and incorporating opposing chariots whenever possible, thereby “conquering the enemy and growing stronger.”10
Minor variations in the terrain, particularly sharp depressions, pits, and holes, not only caused difficulty, but frequently halted or even disabled chariots. Heavy vegetation and the boundaries between cultivated fields would be expected to impede progress—after vanquishing Ch’i at the Battle of An, Chin insisted that Ch’i should henceforth orient the boundaries between their fields to run from east to west, presumably to facilitate operations as they invaded from the west11—but even shrubs, tree roots, and fallen limbs could prove surprisingly problematic. In one Spring and Autumn incident a chariot hit the root of a cassia tree and overturned while the occupants were charging forward and shooting their arrows, resulting in the charioteer being slain.12 During the Battle of An in 589 BCE, when the Chin commander Hsi K’o complained that he had been badly wounded but was carrying on, his spearman noted that he had frequently gotten down and pushed the chariot on difficult terrain.13
An incident in which a chariot got caught in some sort of depression a few years earlier preserves evidence of the taunts and repartee hurled between opposing fighters:14
Among the Chin forces there was a chariot that sank down in a depression and was unable to advance. A soldier from Ch’u sarcastically advised him to remove the crossbar for the weapons. The chariot was able to advance somewhat but the horses wanted to turn about. He again sarcastically advised removing the pennant staff and throwing it across, after which they got out. Turning about the Chin charioteer said “I am not as experienced as your great country in frequently fleeing!”
Efforts were therefore sometimes made to prepare the battlefield and smooth the area of an expected clash by at least filling in the largest holes. Water, however, posed an additional problem, and though a sprinkle might improve dusty fields and roadways, significant rainfall would prove inimical:15
Marquis Wu asked: “When it has been continuously raining for a long time so that the horses sink into the mire and the chariots are stuck while we are under enemy attack on all four sides and the Three Armies are terrified, what should I do?”
Wu Ch’i replied: “In general, desist from employing chariots when the weather is rainy and the land wet, but mobilize them when it is hot and dry. Value high terrain, disdain low ground. Whether advancing or halting, when racing your strong chariots you must adhere to the road. If the enemy arises be sure to follow their tracks.”
This was a lesson that Sisera and his 900 iron chariots painfully learned in a famous historical battle when a downpour muddied the terrain, hampering their mobility and making them vulnerable to Israelite infantry attacks under Barak.16
Being confronted by more permanent bodies of water, including wetlands that might initially seem conducive to mobile operations, required abandoning chariot warfare altogether:
Marquis Wu inquired: “If we encounter the enemy in a vast, watery marsh where the chariot wheels sink down to the point that the shafts are under water; our chariots and cavalry are floundering; but we haven’t prepared any boats or oars so we cannot advance or retreat, what should we do?”
Wu Ch’i replied: “This is referred to as water warfare. Do not employ chariots or cavalry, but have them remain on the side. Mount some nearby height and look all about. You must ascertain the water’s condition, learn its expanse, and fathom its depth. Then you can conceive an unorthodox stratagem for victory. If the enemy begins crossing the water, press them when half have crossed.”
Sun Pin similarly advised “making the infantry numerous and the chariots few” in aquatic warfare,17 while the Liu-t’ao warned against undertaking operations on wet terrain (in passages already cited). Although it was never explicitly discussed and generally not insurmountable, compelling reluctant horses to cross rivers and streams was another campaign problem frequently encountered.18
This fear of wetlands, no doubt derived from extensive experience with unfathomably deep and extensive quagmires, is historically attested by a few Spring and Autumn incidents, including one that occurred at the famous Battle of Yen-ling (575 BCE) between Chin and Ch’u.19 Because they had initially deployed with a mire or swampy area in front of them, Chin divided their chariots into two groups intended to maneuver around the outer edges. Somehow the commander’s chariot failed to clear the muck and sank in, forcing the warrior on the right to dismount and raise it up sufficiently to lurch forward. Fortunately, Chinese chariots were light enough that one man alone could lift them.
As a result of painful experience it was quickly realized that except on the grassy steppe, open plains, well-developed roads, or other easily traversed ground—what the Ar t of War terms “accessible terrain”—chariots would not convey any operational advantage. Furthermore, efforts to surmount the difficulties caused by the ground could only add to the battlefield’s inherent chaos, making awareness of inimical terrain paramount. Thus, within the pronounced thrust initiated during the Spring and Autumn to categorize different configurations of terrain and develop tactical measures for exploiting them, outlining the parameters for chariot operations seems to have been focal.20
The first known discussion of maps, preserved in the Kuan-tzu, states: “Now the army’s commander-in-chief must first investigate the maps and thoroughly know the tortuously winding constricted areas, rivers that will overflow chariots (attempting to ford), famous mountains, traversable valleys, key rivers, and where the plains are marked by mounds and hillocks, what areas are heavily vegetated by reeds, grass, and water rushes, whether the road is distant or near, the size of interior and exterior walls, famous and decrepit towns, and difficult and fertile terrain.”21 It was so widely recognized that chariots get entangled and obstructed that in recommending a commander Kuan Chung reportedly said, “In keeping the chariots from being bound up in their tracks or the troops from turning about on their heels [out of fear], beating the drum so that the warriors of the Three Armies regard death like returning home, I am unequal to Wang-tzu Ch’eng-fu. I request that you make him Minister of War [Ta Ssu-ma].”22
Chariots require extensive space to maneuver because of their fixed axles and the inability of the horses to move laterally when harnessed to the draught pole. Conversely, noting that chariots are hampered by constricted terrain, the military writings frequently suggested exploiting it whenever infantry forces found themselves confronted by chariot contingents:23
“Suppose our army encounters the enemy and both establish encampments. Our men and weapons are numerous but our chariots and cavalry are few. If the enemy’s men are ten times ours, how should we attack them?”
[Sun Pin replied]: “To attack them you should conceal yourselves in the ravines and take the defiles as your base, being careful to avoid broad, easy terrain. This is because easy terrain is advantageous for chariots while ravines are advantageous to infantry. This is the Tao for striking chariots.”
The climate in the south, especially in the increasingly semitropical areas, historically posed nearly insurmountable problems for horses, particularly those acclimated to steppe temperatures and humidity. In the imperial period northern invaders such as the Khitan and Jurchen would often find themselves compelled to retreat with the onset of spring or be decimated as their horses fell ill and died. Knowing of this vulnerability, when preparing to conquer the still-obstinate state of Ch’en south of the Yangtze River, the Sui tricked them into misdirecting their defensive resources and acquiring large numbers of horses that quickly weakened and perished.24
Not surprisingly, the extremely wet terrain in the southeastern states of Wu and Yüeh generally deterred Wu from adopting the chariot, despite the Duke of Shen’s advisory mission undertaken at Chin’s behest in 584 BCE. Perhaps somewhat successful in improving Wu’s military organization and training, he reportedly failed to convince the leaders to adopt the chariot despite bringing thirty horses because of the problems posed by riverine warfare.25 Wu and their nearby nemesis Yüeh therefore stressed infantry and naval forces and developed weapons for close combat, particularly swords that became famous throughout the realm and still retain their sharpness and surface qualities when unearthed today.
At the same time the commonly expressed view that the south’s wetness completely precluded the chariot’s adoption is erroneous because Wu subsequently relied on them to invade Ch’i to the north and Ch’u to the southwest, adroitly ferrying them upriver wherever necessary when mounting the major thrust that carried them to Ch’u’s capital in 506 BCE. However, because heavily watered terrain would always convert chariots into a liability, their utilization had to be judiciously planned.
Requiring chariot and cavalry operations to “adhere to the road” not only constrained their freedom of movement but also made their routes predictable. Insofar as roads in the Shang and even early Chou were minimal, often just unimproved narrow trails that meandered along higher terrain, their speed of advance would have been severely curtailed. Only on the broad roadways that gradually developed in the later Western Chou and Spring and Autumn and on the flat, open plains and nearby steppe would the swiftness discussed in the theoretical manuals ever be attained, with somewhat reduced effectiveness inevitably being experienced whenever they crossed fields of millet or other dry crops.
Much in accord with the emphasis on identifying basic topographical features and developing appropriate tactics for them, the Liu-t’ao eventually delineated what might be termed ten inimical terrains—actually combinations of environmental factors and tactical situations—“upon which death is likely” for chariot forces. Despite being compiled from a millennium of experience, insofar as they are founded on the idea that “chariots value knowing the terrain’s configuration,” they provide insights into the operational problems that Shang forces certainly would have encountered:26
Terrain on which there is no way to withdraw after advancing is fatal for chariots. Passing beyond narrow defiles to pursue the enemy some distance is terrain that will exhaust the chariots.
Terrain on which advancing to the front is easy but to the rear is treacherous will cause hardship for the chariots. Penetrating into narrow and obstructed areas from which escape will be difficult is terrain on which the chariots may be cut off.
If the land is collapsing, sinking, and marshy, with black mud sticking to everything, this is terrain that will labor the chariots.
When the terrain is precipitous on the left but easy on the right and there are high mounds and sharp hills, it is terrain contrary to the use of chariots. Terrain in which luxuriant grass runs through the fields and there are deep watery channels throughout thwarts the use of chariots.
When the chariots are few in number, the land easy, and you are not confronted by enemy infantry, this is terrain on which the chariots may be defeated.
When water-filled ravines and ditches lie to the rear, deep water to the left, and steep hills to the right, it is terrain upon which chariots will be destroyed. If it has been raining day and night for more than ten days without stopping and the roads have collapsed so that it’s not possible to advance or escape to the rear, it is terrain that will sink the chariots.
Chariot operations were thus known to be severely impeded on any but ideal terrain unbroken by woods, furrows, cultivation, irrigation ditches, shrubbery, and other obstacles. Although fewer in number, certain conditions in the enemy and types of terrain “upon which victory can be achieved” were correspondingly envisioned as highly suitable for chariot utilization.27 However, as those considered conducive to victory reflect deficiencies in the enemy’s condition rather than optimal topographical and environmental conditions, they need not be reprised here.28
The difficulty of coordinating chariots with each other and any accompanying infantry required advancing at a measured pace, just as mandated by King Wu in his preconquest instructions reputedly preserved in the Shih Chi and Ssu-ma Fa.29 Observing these constraints would have severely tempered an assault’s maximum speed and allowed enemy infantry to surround, overturn, or otherwise obstruct the chariots. Slow rates of movement necessitated by adverse conditions would have also made them vulnerable to spears being inserted into the wheels, stopping them from turning or causing the spokes to break and the wheels to fail.30
As the battle with the peripheral peoples initiated by Shang suppressive campaigns continued through the early Chou into the Spring and Autumn, highly illuminating asymmetrical clashes arose when Chinese chariot contingents encountered purely infantry-based forces. An incident that unfolded in 714 BCE suggests the chariots normally proceeded so slowly that they became vulnerable to being outflanked by infantry, causing commanders to fear them: “When the Northern Jung mounted an incursion into Cheng, the Duke of Cheng actively resisted them. However, troubled by the Jung army he commented, ‘it is composed of infantry whereas we are on chariots. I am afraid that they will maneuver around behind us and launch a sudden attack.’”31
The commander’s belief is really astounding, because speed and maneuverability are defining operational characteristics for chariots and cavalry, not infantry. Ultimately he prevailed in this clash through an imaginative, unorthodox combination of feigned retreat and ambushes. 32 Nevertheless, another famous confrontation between unsupported Chinese chariot forces and a large steppe infantry contingent on constricted terrain in 541 BCE reaffirms this concern:33
Hsün Wu of Chin defeated the Wu-chung and several other Ti tribal peoples at T’ai-yüan by stressing foot soldiers. When they were about to engage in battle Wei Shu advised, “They are composed of infantry forces and we will be encountering them in a narrow pass. If they encircle each of our chariots with ten men, they will certainly overcome us. Moreover, since the narrowness of the pass will put us in difficulty, they will again be victorious. I suggest that we all act as foot soldiers, beginning with me.”
He then discarded their chariots in order to form ranks of infantry with the staff from every five chariots making up three squads of five. One of Hsün Wu’s favorite officers who was unwilling to serve as an infantryman was executed as an example to the others. They then deployed into five dispositions, forming a deer like configuration with two contingents in the front, five to the rear, one at the right point, three at the left, and a narrow force acting as the vanguard in order to entice the enemy. Laughing, the Ti failed to deploy, allowing Hsün Wu to mount a sudden attack and severely defeat them.
Although the meaning and significance of the terms for the various contingents in the deployment would occasion much debate over the centuries, it appears that Hsün Wu came forth with a fast, roving force similar to the large chariot expeditions mounted against the Hsien-yün by the early Chou. Lacking infantry to protect the chariots from disabling multisided attack, they would have been doomed without Wei Shu’s suggestion. Since their highly unorthodox deployment was essentially a chariot formation best suited for open terrain, the arrangement, limited numbers, and decision to fight dismounted prompted derisive laughter among their opponents, providing a momentary opportunity for the unexpected Chin assault that swiftly vanquished them.
Without an accompanying contingent of protective infantry, the chariot’s occupants were thus seen as susceptible to the piercing and slashing weapons wielded by ground forces. The traditional historical writings preserve a few examples of chariot commanders being slain by spear thrusts34 and their comrades being struck by arrows, cut down by dagger-axes, or having an arm or leg severed.35 There are even incidents of foot soldiers grabbing the occupants, wresting them out of the chariot by hand, and throwing them down onto the ground or taking them prisoner.36 For example, at the Battle of Yen-ling in 575 BCE, one warrior suggested some reconnaissance troops attempt to intercept an enemy fleeing in a chariot so that he could pursue and pull him down from behind, making him a prisoner.37 To defend against these ground attacks, the warrior on the right, who was entrusted with primary responsibility for wielding the piercing and crushing weapons, seems to have frequently descended to repel attackers. Ancient Western armies sometimes attached skirmishers or runners to the chariots for protection, as well as to dispatch warriors from disabled enemy chariots.
If both sides commit to chariots, they become a weapon of choice rather than just a delivery system, but if one side opts not to become so entangled, the chariot can become a liability. The Liu-t’ao notes that the chariot is useless when not in motion, not even as effective as a single infantryman, presumably because of the difficulty of defending it. Although Warring States military writings attributed surpassing power to the chariot, it was conceded that infantry forces could still prevail by executing appropriately conceived tactics, implementing defensive measures that emphasized solidity, and exploiting constricted terrain:38
When infantry engage chariots and cavalry in battle they must rely on hills and mounds, ravines and defiles.39 Long weapons and strong crossbows should occupy the fore, short weapons and weak crossbows should occupy the rear, with them firing and resting in turn. Even if large numbers of enemy chariots and cavalry should arrive, they must maintain a solid formation and fight intensely while skilled soldiers and strong crossbowmen prepare against (attacks from) the rear.
Tactics for employing the chariots, particularly the larger specialized vehicles, in defensive situations developed during the Warring States period. Although a complete examination must necessarily be deferred to the tactical portions of a subsequent book, it should be noted that the more common include intercepting the enemy, blocking and thwarting them, and cobbling together temporary ramparts by deploying them without their horses in either a circular or square formation.40 When operating in mountains, special measures had to be implemented to avoid being trapped high up and cut off from water supplies, but contingents fighting in confined valleys merely had to rely on the solidity of their chariot formations.41
The problems posed by natural undulations, pits, and holes prompted the realization that deliberately excavated and well-concealed ditches, holes, and other traps could cause the horses to stumble and break their legs. Although probably neither invented nor deployed before the end of the Spring and Autumn period, several devices designed to impede the passage of chariots and the more mobile cavalry by incapacitating the horses are known to have been employed in the Warring States period. With little effort, pointed devices ranging from the complicated tiger drops described in the Liu-t’ao through the easily dispersed caltrops—metal pieces with four points shaped like jacks—could quickly be scattered about the terrain.42
Fighting from a moving chariot would have been difficult at best, given the bumping and jarring, not to mention the fleeting moment when a shock weapon could be brought to bear against nearby fighters on the ground or used to strike warriors in an oncoming vehicle. Thus the exceptional accomplishments attributed to racing archers may have been preserved precisely because of their uniqueness. Furthermore, even if the chariots merely served as transport to the point of conflict, fighters manning the compartment would have suffered the discomfort of confinement.
Though seemingly spacious, the approximately 32-by-48-inch compartment turns out to be highly limiting when occupied by three warriors bearing weapons and garbed in rudimentary protective leather armor. Experiments conducted over several years with martial artists well trained in such traditional weapons as long- and short-handled halberds, battle axes, daggers, and swords prove that they would have lacked the freedom of maneuver required to fend off, let alone vanquish, attackers. The driver, who faces no threat from the front where the horses block access, is mainly vulnerable to an oblique attack. However, being pinned in the center with the horses and shaft protruding in front of him, he is unable to contribute much to either the attack or defense, whether in motion or at rest. But the other two combatants are exposed from about 45 degrees right around to 180 degrees dead center at the back, where neither shields nor any other form of protection was ever affixed.
If the archer positions himself somewhat laterally on the right side so that his shooting stance puts his arm toward the outside of the chariot rather than to the inside against the driver, he can fire toward the front or out to the sides with little interference.43 However, swinging around to shoot to the rear is virtually impossible. Conversely, an archer standing on the left, reputedly the normal Shang position, is badly hampered by the driver (even if the driver is kneeling) as he tries to fit an arrow to his bow and fire in any direction. Shots to the rear become possible if he stands laterally facing outward and thus draws his bow on the exterior side of the compartment, in mirror image to an archer positioned on the right side aiming forward.
Wielding the era’s preferred shock weapon, a dagger-axe with a three-foot handle, is easily accomplished on the right side, particularly for blows directed to the front or somewhat alongside, but when swinging outward to counterattack perpendicular to the chariot’s forward orientation, care has to be taken to avoid striking the archer standing on the opposite side on the backswing. Blows directed to the rear that require swinging around prove impossible without dramatically modifying the motion, as well as fruitless because potential attackers, already at the limit of effective range, can easily dodge any strike.
Even if solitary attackers might be thwarted, multiple attackers, especially those bearing five-foot-long spears, would have been easily able to slay the chariot’s occupants without being endangered, unless the archer employed his bow at point-blank range. Whether armed with long or short weapons, multiple attackers create chaos because the heavily confined chariot crew, standing back to back and arm to shoulder, are unable to dodge, bend, or deflect oncoming blows and can only rely on any shields they may have carried or the protection offered by early body armor. Vulnerability would therefore have been especially acute to the rear, though presumably somewhat mitigated by the chariot’s forward battlefield motion.
A single occupant wielding a full-length saber or long two-handed weapon fared far better in these admittedly static tests. Two men, though sometimes impinging on each other or even colliding, still had sufficient freedom of maneuver to fight effectively, even if the archer occupied the left side as traditionally portrayed. Three men suffered the difficulties noted; four became an example of “close packing,” all four being totally incapable of wielding any sort of crushing weapon.
These problems apparently prompted the development of very longhandled spears and dagger-axes in the Spring and Autumn that were presumably intended for battling similarly equipped warriors in enemy chariots. However, for the three chariot occupants this additional length simply exacerbated the lack of maneuverability, particularly because the weapons tended to be held at least a quarter of the way up the shaft rather than at the very butt. (Grasping with two hands increases the power and control, but at the sacrifice of maneuverability.) Even with these longer weapons, two warriors riding fast-moving, converging chariots would only have had a moment to strike each other—making it not impossible but highly unlikely to significantly contribute to the battle’s effort.44 Rather than as conventionally depicted in contemporary movies, the drivers probably slowed, even halted, to allow the occupants to clash.
Experiments also revealed the height of the compartment to be not just a detrimental factor but also highly puzzling. A horizontal pole or rim that falls somewhere around the middle of the upper thigh provides adequate stabilization for a warrior to maintain a fighting stance and would have prevented falling over in sudden motion, but to provide real functional support the height should rise approximately to a man’s waist. However, though not entirely useless, Shang chariot walls would have risen to just above knee level, a height that tended to cause modern fighters to lose their balance and tumble out because the rail effectively acted as a fulcrum.
The axle’s high placement in a relatively lightweight vehicle would have resulted in a high center of gravity, making stability a crucial issue for any occupants trying to employ their weapons at speed. In addition, there were no springs or any sort of suspension mounting for the chariot box, even though late Shang models apparently began to employ the cantilevered wooden junction called a “crouching rabbit,” which was obviously designed to reduce the effects of the wooden wheels bouncing over the terrain through its tensing and bowing action. The horses loosely coupled to the front shaft and the weight of the three-man crew would have stabilized the vehicle somewhat, but the traditional chariot would certainly have been inherently unstable and rocked jarringly from side to side on the uneven terrain of natural battlefields, just like a modern lightweight SUV.
The straw and moss padding spread on the compartment’s wooden floor to provide additional damping proved to be minimally absorptive while inducing further instability, just as sponge padding might on the floor of an open pickup truck. (Comfortable when stationary, spongelike substances tend to exhibit less desirable properties when the vehicle is in motion or the fighter is active.) In some cases the floors were fabricated by interweaving leather thongs, but their effectiveness in reconstructive experiments was decidedly poor, particularly after they lost their initial tension, and they could even result in the fighter’s stance becoming more tenuous. The use of interior straps and efforts to improve the battlefield in the Spring and Autumn period confirm that stability continued to be a problem: the warriors were jostled about as the chariot moved at speed across the terrain.45