CHAPTER 2

THE PLAN TO ATTACK: ’A MOMENTOUS DECISION!’

"Split the British and American armies at their seam, then a new Dunkirk!" Adolf Hitler in the "Wolf’s Lair" on 16 September 1944.

After the daily military situation conference in the ’Wolf’s Lair’—Hitler’s secretly located Headquarters in a forest outside of Rastenburg in East Prussia—on Saturday 16 September 1944, the Führer asked a small group of men to stay a little while for a ’second conference.’

Generaloberst Alfred Jodl, chief of operations in the staff of the German Armed Forces (OKW), opened this by reviewing the relation of forces on the Western Front, but he was silenced by Hitler who cried, ’Stop!’¹

A moment of uneasy silence followed. The men in the room looked at each other. Some, among them General Werner Kreipe, chief of staff of the Luftwaffe that Hitler in recent times had lamented so much over, felt a strong discomfort. Finally Hitler spoke again.

’I have come to a momentous decision. I shall go over to the counterattack!’²

Hitler rose from his chair and walked over to the large wall map, took the ruler from Jodl and banged the edge of the ruler against the Ardennes on the map, as he clarified, ’That is to say here, out of the Ardennes, with the objective Antwerp!’³

The Ardennes—the hilly and forested area in eastern Belgium and northern Luxembourg, the place where German troops had launched their great offensives in the West at every previous occasion: This had been done by the Prussian Army in 1870, by the Kaiser’s Forces in 1914, and by Hitler’s armored spearheads on 10 May 1940. Each time their opponents had allowed themselves to be caught off guard because the Germans had chosen this area with its rough terrain.

Would the enemy fall for the same trick a fourth time? The assembled generals looked at each other. But Hitler was certain that it would work. The attack, he explained, was to be led by von Rundstedt and would be launched around 1 November. Recent events on the Western Front, he said, had shown that the the German defense positions were strong enough to withstand the numerically superior Allied armies until the attack was launched. He continued:

’The present front can easily be held! Our own attacking force will consist of thirty new Volksgrenadier divisions and new panzer divisions, plus panzer divisions from the Eastern Front.’⁴

According to German intelligence reports, U.S. First Army, grouped in the Ardennes sector, consisted of eight infantry and three armored divisions, but the bulk of these were concentrated to the Aachen area. A sixty-milewide sector between Monschau (at the present German-Belgian border) and Echternach (on the border between Germany and Luxembourg further to the south) was held by only four American divisions, and this was where the Germans were going to strike. Moreover, the wooded Eifel area offered good opportunities to to conceal the German assault force. Once a breakthrough had been achieved, the troops would strike towards the northwest, through the Ardennes, to cross River Meuse between Liège and Namur, with Antwerp as the objective.⁵ If this was accomplished, Hitler expected that between twenty and thirty Allied divisions would be cut off and annihilated to the east of Antwerp. ’Split the British and American armies at their seam, then a new Dunkirk!’ he enthusiastically exclaimed.⁶

Those present were just as astonished at Hitler’s suddenly regained energy at the bold plan. Generaloberst Heinz Guderian, acting chief of staff for the German Army Staff (OKH), objected by asking whether the difficult situation on the Eastern Front really admitted such a concentrated effort on the Western Front.⁷ Hitler replied that the Russians would have to pause for several months before they were able to resume their great offensive—an assessment which proved to be correct—and that the Germans had to act within that period.

Jodl referred to the great air superiority of the Western Allies—would that not render such a venture impossible? Hitler countered by requesting that the Luftwaffe concentrate 1,500 aircraft to the Western Front on 1 November. Furthermore, he explained, the attack would be launched in a period of bad weather, and added acidly—clearly addressing Kreipe:

‘In bad weather the enemy’s air force does not either fly!’

While the generals’ objections were restricted to a strictly military viewpoint, Hitler proceeded from a broader perspective. Chester Wilmot interprets and summarizes the Nazi dictator’s reasoning:

[Hitler] realized that he had neither the forces to inflict a serious defeat on the Red Army, nor the petrol to maintain an advance deep enough to deprive Stalin of any essential resources. His best opportunity of regaining the initiative lay, he decided, in the West. Here with smaller forces and less petrol he might capture an objective of critical significance. In addition, it appeared to him that the Western Allies were more vulnerable and less tenacious than the Russians. He believed that the British were nearly exhausted and that the Americans had no real interest in the war against Germany. Lacking the toughness and the incentive of the Russians, American troops would quickly lose heart in adversity. Their victories had been won, so he thought, only by air-power, but, once winter deprived them of their customary air support, the Americans would collapse under the impact of a powerful assault.⁸

Hitler felt quite assured that if the Western Allies were dealt such a devastating defeat—whereby half their military force in the West would be obliterated in a single strike – public opinion in the USA would enforce a separate peace with Germany. And even if this result was not achieved, such a victory would afford Hitler with what he needed most of all, time. It would grant him time to, covered by the bad winter weather, rebuild his destroyed factories, so that his new, superior ’wonder weapons’ could be produced in large numbers. With great quantities of jet planes, V 2s, and the new ’electric submarines’ he assumed that he would be able to drive the British-American armies off the Continent. Then he hoped he would be able to concentrate almost the entire German Armed Forces to the Eastern Front in order to attain at least a stalemate against the Soviets. It was, he admitted, a clutch at straws—but from his perspective it was the only possible way out.

Hitler also had thought about how the attack would be militarily feasible. Hence, he for instance ordered the armored units I. SS-Panzerkorps and II. SS-Panzerkorps, with the 1., 2., 9., and 12. SS Panzer divisions, and the Panzer Lehr Division, to be immediately withdrawn from the front line and to regroup to the rear area east of the Rhine river. There, under the supervision of Generalfeldmarschall Model, they would be replenished for the upcoming offensive.⁹ The Nazi dictator had a special confidence in the Waffen SS—the armed wing of the Nazi SS. Although Waffen-SS was operationally subordinated to the Wehrmacht, the recruitment of its personnel was handled by SS-Reichsführer Himmler’s SS, which also took care of the training. Another speciality of the Waffen-SS was its very own military ranks.

A prerequisite for the success of the operation, Hitler declared, was that the enemy would be taken by surprise. Therefore, preparations were to be surrounded by a particularly strict secrecy. Percy E. Schramm, responsible for the war diary of the German Armed Forces High Command (OKW), referenced Hitler’s continued briefing, ’If these measures succeeded, the leadership and the troops were to be guided by the single principle of both thrusting deeply into the enemy zone of operations and refusing to be diverted from their original objective by counter-attacks against their flanks. Only then could the offensive be completely successful. Any tendency of turning against the flank of the enemy forces, such as those around Aachen, had to be strictly opposed from the onset, because the German forces thereby would only run into the enemy’s strongest forces, and would never again be able to obtain a complete success.’¹⁰

Under oath not to divulge a word to anyone, the men left the conference room. Jodl’s task was to prepare a first draft of an operations plan according to Hitler’s guidelines.

Without doubt, Hitler had drawn many vital conclusions from the past three months of warfare. The assessment that the Red Army was too powerful to allow any similar offensive on the Eastern Front was correct. From a military strategic point of view, it was entirely proper tostrike against the weakest enemy, the Western Allies, and this at the spot where they were weakest. Some particular observations that had been made during the operations on the Western Front between June and September 1944 seemed to justify a certain optimism regarding the planned attack.

The first of these was the Allied dependence on the ports on the English Channel for the supply of their armies. Therefore it was only logical that the attack was aimed at reaching Antwerp, whereby large Allied forces would be encircled, while at the same time the other Allied forces in the area would be deprived of their main supply port.

Concerning the battlefield, the most important realization was that the attack under no circumstances should be launched in a situation where the Allied aviation could operate freely. Already on the third day after the Allied landing in Normandy in June 1944, the diary of the High Command of the German Armed Forces noted that the fighting was ’dominated by the enemy aviation, which covered the battle area and a large portion of the rear area and thus could stifle [German] armored attacks already at the onset, strike [German] headquarters and sever lines of communication to the front,’ all of which had an ’absolutely crucial impact on the combat’¹¹ On 22 July 1944, the supreme commander on the Western Front, von Kluge, reported, ’ In face of the enemy’s complete command of the air, there is no possibility of finding a strategy which will counter-balance its truly annihilating effect’¹²

An American report established that ’a fighter-bomber attack concentrated on close-in enemy positions was worth more than any artillery preparation, if the air attack was followed immediately by a determined infantry attack.’¹³ According to a compilation of Allied battlefield analyses made by military historian Ian Gooderson, the effect of fighter-bombers on German combat spirits quite often was higher than what could be achieved by artillery shelling.¹⁴

While the Luftwaffe on the Eastern Front even by this time could be regarded as an élite force, with a cadre undoubtedly belonging to the most experienced combat fliers of the entire war, the German aviation in the West was almost completely broken, and by all means in no shape to challenge the Allies for aerial superiority. Incredibly costly air combats against large formations of American heavy bombers with a steadily growing number of escort fighters had bled the German Air Force in the West white—to a point where it, by late summer 1944, ceased to be an opponent which the Allies could expect to meet regularly. Following the devastating aerial battles over Normandy between June and August 1944, the Luftwaffe almost completely vanished from the skies in the West.

At an air base in Belgium in the fall of 1944, Lockheed P-38 Lightning fighter-bombers from U.S. 9th Air Force’s 370th Fighter Group are parked in front of the wrecks of German aircraft previously destroyed during Allied air raids when the airfield was in German hands. The Allied air superiority was one of the main reasons for concern on the German side when the Ardennes Offensive was planned. (NARA, 3A-5150)

Almost without exception, each aerial encounter resulted in terrible German losses while the Allies sustained no more than marginal losses. These losses forced the Germans to radically shorten their pilot training, which increased the already quite wide gap regarding quality between their aviation in the West and the Western Allied aviation. By this time, German fighter pilots arrived at first-line units after just 110-125 flight hours at the flight training schools. The Americans, who had far greater opportunities to replace their own losses, still were able to provide their fighter pilots with 340 to 400 flight hours of training.¹⁵

In the fall of 1944, the German Air Force took to the air in the West more or less only when the Allies directed large-scale air attacks against the Achilles heel of the German war economy, the hydrogenation plants where synthetic fuel was produced. On 11 September, 305 German fighter planes went into battle in order to defend one of these plants. One hundred and ten of these were shot down. Of 1,131 U.S. heavy bombers and 440 escort fighters that had taken off from England, forty bombers and seventeen fighters were lost. The attacked ground targets were severely damaged. This in turn contributed to a further reduction of German pilot training; whereas the Luftwaffe’s chief of staff Kreipe reckoned that flight schools would need between 60,000 and 80,000 tons of aviation fuel per month to be able to replace the losses, only 6,300 tons could be allocated in September 1944.¹⁶ Nevertheless, by intensifying the efforts to repair the bomb damage on the hydrogenation plants as quickly as possible, the Germans were able to increase the production of aviation fuel from 6 percent of the original capacity in September 1944 to 29 percent in November. Production of aviation fuel rose from 10,000 tons in September to 49,000 tons in November.¹⁷ Meanwhile the aviation in the West was spared from combat missions inasmuch as possible. This created the conditions for the large-scale operation by the Luftwaffe during the Ardennes Offensive as prescribed by the attack plane.

Hitler however had completely lost confidence in the Luftwaffe on the Western Front, and for that reason he decided to wait to launch the offensive until weather reconnaissance could foresee a long period of bad weather that would keep the Allied aircraft grounded.* This perhaps was the most important lesson from the fighting on the Western Front after the Allied landings in Normandy.

Another observation made by the Germans, one which also had to do with the aviation, was that the efficiency of the Allied ground troops appeared to be dependent on the scale of air support that they received. ’The morale of the enemy infantry is not very high,’ a report by the 10. SS-Panzer-Division stated. ’ It depends largely on artillery and air support. In case of a well-placed concentration of fire from our own artillery the infantry will often leave its position and retreat hastily. Wherever the enemy is engaged with force, he usually retreats or surrenders.’¹⁸Generalmajor Friedrich Wilhelm von Mellenthin, chief of staff in Heeresgruppe G, described the behavior of U.S. ground troops in combat as ‘cautious and hesistant.’¹⁹

The numerous errors made by the Allied military command, as depicted in the previous chapter, of course also contributed to Hitler’s feeling that there might be some justification to expect success for a concentrated attack in the Ardennes. The conflict between the Americans and the British also was no secret to the Germans. Moreover, an observed general slowness in the response of Allied ground forces to rapid changes in the situation on the battlefield gave the Germans further reason to expect their attack to be at least initially quite successful. A German military report found that ‘in contrast to the Eastern theater of operations, in the West it was possible to still straighten out seemingly impossible situations because the opposing armies there […] despite their enormous material superiority, were limited by slow and methodical modes of combat.’²⁰

On 11 October, Generaloberst Jodl presented Hitler a first draft of the attack plan. According to this, the main thrust would be undertaken by the newly formed 6. Panzerarmee —with a spearhed consisting of four SS panzer divisions -on the right flank, while the 5. Panzerarmee would attack further to the south—with a spearhed consisting of four panzer divisions—and the southern flank covered by the 7. Armee with six infantry divisions. The two panzer armies would also be assigned five and three infantry divisions respectively.²¹ The 6. Panzerarmee would be tasked to cross River Meuse at Liège, and, with its northern flank covered by the Albert Canal, to continue towards Antwerp. The 5. Panzerarmee was supposed to advance along a twenty-mile wide front mainly through northern Luxembourg, seize the important road junction Bastogne in southwestern Belgium (slightly to the west of the frontier with Luxembourg), cross the Meuse at Dinant and Namur, bypass Brussels from the south, and link up with the 6. Panzerarmee at Antwerp.

The 6. Panzerarmee was a most special creation. This army—or rather, its headquarters, Armeeoberkommando 6. Panzerarmee—was formed on 14 September 1944 to assume command of the two SS panzer corps that were pulled behind the Rhine in order to replenish their strength. It was placed under the command of a rough SS general who, owing to political reasons, was among Hitler’s favourites, SS-Oberst-Gruppenführer Josef ‘Sepp’ Dietrich. Since this army was led by an SS general and consisted of a nucleous of SS panzer divisions, Sepp Dietrich sought and received Hitler’s permission to design it as the 6. SS-Panzerarmee.²² Formally, however, it remained registered as a Wehrmacht army up until April 1945, when it was officially designed an SS Panzer Army.²³ In different sources it is interchangeably referred to as the 6. Panzerarmee or the 6. SS-Panzerarmee. Because it essentially acted with the character of an SS Army, the designation 6. SS-Panzerarmee will be used here.

Jodl’s draft also involved the southernmost army corps of the 15. Armee (grouped immediately to the north of the sector where the 6. SS-Panzerarmee would launch its attack); this corps would attack in order to cover the northern flank of the breakthrough.

Just as the Red Army had done during the opening phase of Operation ’Bagration,’ the attack would not be initiated according to the classic approach with massive waves of tanks, but instead the first attack wave was to be comprised of infantry groups supported by assault guns and artillery. It was only when these had accomplished gaps in the American defense lines that tanks would be deployed massively—just as the Soviets had done in ’Bagration.’ Another important part of the plan was that the attack would not be launched until the weather prospect forecasted a period of ten to fourteen days of such bad weather that the Allied aviation could not be deployed.

On the whole, Hitler agreed with Jodl’s draft. However, he was of the opinion that the proposed attack front—from Monschau to the confluence of the rivers Our and Sauer at the German border with Luxembourg forty miles further to south—was too narrow. Therefore, he ordered the attack to be extended southwards, so that the U.S. troops in the ’wedge’ between Echternach and Wasserbillig also could be encircled and destroyed. This was intended to reduce the American opportunity to strike against the 7. Armee’s southern flank.²⁴

Moreover, Hitler emphasized how important it was that all artillery and rocket artillery units were to be organized with scrutiny, so that the artillery fire could be opened exactly at same time, in order to achieve a maximum effect. He also said that both panzer armies had to be supplied with ’experienced senior artillery commanders, who were to coordinate all the artillery forces, flak units, and rocket launchers for the purpose of a sudden concentration.’²⁵ Hitler also requested that the troops tasked to carry out the initial attack would be selected with particular care, and he stressed the importance of the assault troops being properly equipped with engineer equipment, particularly for mine clearing. He also felt that the greatest menace to the offensive would come from the enemy units concentrated in the Aachen area, only a dozen miles north-northwest of Monschau. Therefore, he ordered that ’only the best German divisions were to be committed in this area.’ He specified this to the 3. and 5. paratroop divisions and the 12. Volksgrenadier-Division, which had distinguished themselves quite well during the Battle of Aachen. Furthermore the 6. SS-Panzerarmee received priority in the allocation of the new tank destroyers.²⁶

Once again the Führer repeated that the 6. SS-Panzerarmee’s armor on no conditions should allow itself to be ’be diverted by or involved in fighting on their right flank.’²⁷ Finally he gave the plan a code name, ’Wacht am Rhein.’ This was taken from a popular patriotic song on how the Germans stood on guard against the enemy (implicitly the traditional enemy France) at the Rhine, but the name (’on guard at the Rhine’) also implied that it was a defensive plan, which was part of the cover.

Both Jodl and Hitler felt that the attack could be launched no sooner than 25 November. They also agreed on the strictest secrecy surrounding the plan, whereby not even Model or von Rundstedt would be privy to it for some time; they would be told that the build-up of forces only aimed at the creation of a powerful defensive reserve.

In the following days Jodl drafted a plan for the groupment of the assault forces in anticipation of the attack date: They were to be deployed in such locations that they would give the impression of a defensive reserve, ready to be brought into action in the event of an enemy breakthrough. No earlier than two days ahead of the attack should any of these units be transferred to the front. This called for a march to the first line proceeding quickly and smoothly, and without being noticed by the Allied air reconnaissance. In response to this, exact march routes for each unit were determined, and along these, facilities necessary for the marching units were placed. This plan was completed and approved by Hitler on 21 October.

Meanwhile a number of special operations were added to the attack, which gradually developed into one of the most carefully prepared military operations of the entire war. On the afternoon of 22 October 1944, a 6’3” tall, strongly built man strode into Hitler’s ’Wolf’s Lair.’ A fencing scar ran the length of the blond giant’s left cheek down to his chin. It was SS-ObersturmbannFührer (lieutenant colonel) Otto Skorzeny, a man that Hitler held in the greatest regard.

Born in Vienna in 1908, Skorzeny had joined the Austrian Nazi Party at the age of twenty-two. After Anschluss, the absorption of Austria into the Third Reich in 1938, Skorzeny became an officer candidate in the SS-Leibstandarte, Hitler’s personal bodyguard. There he soon displayed his talent for ’special operations.’ When Hitler invaded the Soviet Union in 1941, Skorzeny was appointed to lead an SS force tasked to seize the Soviet Secret Police’s headquarters Lubyanka in Moscow. Nevertheless, the German attempt to capture the Soviet capital failed utterly, and shortly afterward Skorzeny was wounded by shrapnel.

During his hospital stay in Vienna he read all he could lay his hands on about secret military operations, and he bombarded the SS High Command with ideas on commando operations. Skorzeny’s superiors in the SS were most attentive to his proposals, not least because the Army’s commando force, the so-called Brandenburgers, by that time superceded the SS by a wide margin regarding such ventures. In 1943 Skorzeny was appointed to command the new SS commando force, SS-Sonderverband z.b.V. Friedenthal. The Zenith of his career was reached in September 1943, when he led the airborne operation to rescue the toppled Italian dictator Mussolini.

Hitler did not hesitate to initiate the loyal Skorzeny into the plan for ’Wacht am Rhein.’ This he did by assigning Skorzeny the task of forming a special force composed of English-speaking commando troops who, dressed in American uniforms and supplied with captured American equipment, would infiltrate the enemy lines to capture vital bridges across the Meuse, spread confusion in the Allied camp, and undertake reconnaissance.*

This was supposed to be just one among several special operations in support of Operation ’Wacht am Rhein.’ Alongside with Skorzeny’s infiltrators, a paratroop unit would be airdropped behind the Allied lines on the night before the attack. The objective of this operation was to take and hold the strategically important crossroads Baraque Michel, seven miles to the west of Monschau on the northern flank of the German attack. The aim was to prevent the Americans from regrouping forces from Aachen against the northern wing of the 6. SS-Panzerarmee.

Several other special operations were undertaken in order to reinforce or support Operation ’Wacht am Rhein.’ What has been overlooked in many depictions of the Battle is the contribution given by German submarines. Operating far out in the Atlantic, some of these wired regular weather reconnaissance reports to the German High Command. Due to these weather reports, the German Weather Service managed to spot an extensive low pressure area that would cover the entire region during the first days of the offensive, thus creating the indispensable prerequisite for success. Other submarines entered the English Channel, where their sinking of Allied troop transport ships considerably reduced the flow of reinforcements to the Ardennes Front once the German offensive had been launched—more on this later. In additon to this, the brand new electric two-man midget submarine XXVII B Seehund would enter combat against Allied shipping on the way to Antwerp, this also in support of the Ardennes Offensive.²⁸

Antwerp and the Allied headquarters in Liège would be subject to a massive air offensive by flying bombs—V 1s and V 2s. Against the City of Luxembourg—where e.g. the headquarters of Bradley’s 12th Army Group was located—another of Hitler’s latest ’wonder weapons,’ the ’super gun’ V 3 (Vergeltungswaffe 3) would be employed. With its 160 ft long barrel—along which multiple propellant charges were fired as the shell passed in order to provide an increased muzzle velocity—it had a greater range of fire than any other artillery piece, over 100 miles. When the first V 3 shells began hitting Luxembourg during the Ardennes Offensive, it evoked a panic which was added to the general uneasiness caused by the German attack.

Many more of Hitler’s so-called ’wonder weapons’ would see their baptism of fire or be employed in large scale for the first time during the Ardennes Offensive. The Luftwaffe’s only jet bomber wing—Kampfgeschwader 51, equipped with Messerschmitt 262s which easily could outrun any Allied fighter plane—was prepared to support ’Wacht am Rhein.’ The Arado 234 would also see its operational debut as the world’s first regular jet bomber in support of the Ardennes Offensive.

Moreover, the Wehrmacht’s new Volksgrenadier divisions in ’Wacht am Rhein’ were to be equipped with the revolutionary new assault rifle Sturmgewehr 44 as their standard hand gun. According to issued directives, two-thirds of the companies in these divisions were to be fully equipped with StG 44s. Furthermore, numerous soldiers in the panzer divisions were equipped with this firearm —hence, on 1 December 1944, the 1. SS-Panzer-Division mustered 418 of these automatic guns.

The Sturmgewehr 44 is considered to be the first modern assault rifle, and would have a wide-ranging effect on post-war arms designs. With a rate of fire of 550-600 r.p.m., an effective range of 1,800 feet (900 feet at automatic fire) and a 30-round box magazine which could be easily and quickly detached, this 7.92mm assault gun was totally superior to the hand guns of all other armies at that time. The U.S. Army’s semi-automatic M1 Garand rifle with its eight-round bloc clip could not be fired at a rate higher than about 30 rounds per minute.

Two special devices that made the StG 44 even more revolutionizing was the so-called Krummlauf and Zielgerät 1229. The former (’curved barrel’) was a bent barrel attachment which, along with a periscope sighting device allowed shooting around corners. Zielgerät 1229 was an active infrared device for night fighting. However, it is uncertain whether Zielgerät 1229 actually was produced in time to be brought into action during the Ardennes Offensive, although this was the intention.

Infrared night fighting devices—totally revolutionizing by that time—also were developed for German tanks. One of these, Fahrgerät FG 1250, could be mounted on Panther tanks. This could be supplemented with a larger infrared ’searchlight’ with a 600mm diameter which was attached to an accompanying half-track vehicle. This system was called ’Uhu’ (eagle-owl). However, although the Americans believed so, no infrared night fighting dervices were used by German tanks in the Ardennes.*

The German industry that the Western Allies leaders at the same time were discussing the dismantling of after the war, meanwhile managed to maintain an astonishing high level of arms production, in spite of intense Allied bombings. This can be explained by several factors. The dominant reason was that the industry steadily was increasing the war production at the expense of production of civilian goods, which further aggravated an already serious shortage of ordinary consumer goods in German civil society. In addition to this, not least due to Armaments Minister Albert Speer, an extensive rationalization and streamlining of the military production was effectuated—including an increase of the working week from 48 to 60 hours. Furthermore, a relocation of the production from large plants, vulnerable to aerial bombing, to a multitude of smaller, well-masked locations was carried out at a rapid pace. ’It was an absolute miracle,’ recalled the Inspector of the German fighter aviation, Generalleutnant Adolf Galland. ’Having been concentrated to twenty-seven large facilities, the German aircraft production was relocated to more than seven hundred smaller plants—in unused tunnels and mine shafts, deep in dense forests, in valleys and small villages. The most astonishing of it all is that under these circumstances production volumes even could be increased.’²⁹ In 1944 German military production reached its highest level during the entire war, nearly three times as high as in early 1942.³⁰ Through 1944, the ammunition industry produced 108 million cartridges and grenades, as compared to 93 million in 1943.³¹

The accumulative effect of an increased bomber offensive and the loss of vital areas where raw material was produced led to a certain decrease during the third and fourth quarters of 1944, but ahead of the Ardennes Offensive, between September and November 1944, Speer used the reserve stocks to maintain the high level of production.

In September 1944, a total of 4,103 combat aircraft were manufactured, the highest monthly figure throughout the war (about twice the average monthly figure for 1943), and during the following three months another more than 10,000 German combat aircraft left the production lines.³² Output of the tanks Panther, Panzer IV, and Tiger nevertheless dropped from the all-time high figure of 2,438 during the period June-August 1944 to 1,764 between September and November.³³ This chiefly was due to Allied bombing raids that destroyed 48 percent of the factory space at the Henschel Works where the Tiger was manufactured. The average monthly production of Tiger tanks dropped from 622 during the first six months of 1944 to just 380 in the period July-December.³⁴ However, the effect of this could to some extent be balanced by an increased production of tracked tank destroyers (Panzerjäger). These were manufactured at plants in Czechoslovakia, which due to the large distance from Allied air bases were damaged by bombing only to a limited extent. During the last three months of 1944, more German tracked tank destroyers were produced than during all of 1943. Thus, a large part of the shortage of tanks in the units earmarked for the Ardennes Offensive could be covered by tank destroyers.

In the long term, however, German industry was in a steep decline. A large number of strategic raw material, such as oil, rubber, manganese, tungsten, chromium, nickel, copper, and zinc, became increasingly difficult to obtain. Steel production fell from 9.2 million tons in the first quarter of 1944 to 3.9 million tons during the last quarter.³⁵ To a decline in the quality of the produced military materiel which was the result of strategic metals being replaced with substitutes of lesser quality, was added the effects of deliberate sabotage by foreign slave workers; the latter came to play an increasingly important role in German industry when a growing share of the German working class was mobilized for military service. The deepened crisis in civilian production also had the effect that the military fatigues had to be made of artificial fibre, which did not give the same protection against cold as ordinary wool or cotton, a fact that would have severe repercussions for the German soldiers during the Ardennes Battle. The declining food production-further aggravated in the fall of 1944 through the loss of previously occupied farmlands outside of Germany, along with an intensified Allied air offensive against German communication routes-also had a long-term effect on the physical condition of the German soldiers.

THE MORGENTHAU PLAN

Combat morale among the German soldiers on the Western Front was restored in September 1944, not least through Generalfeldmarschall Model’s harsh methods to halt the disorderly retreat. This made it possible to halt the Allied advance, which in turn further reinforced the German morale. In addition, the expectations elicited on the first so-called ’wonder weapons’—jet planes and V weapons—contributed to give the battered front soldiers hope.

Involuntarily, and through an incomparable tactlessness, the Allies themselves helped to strengthen the German will to resist against the Western Allies. At the Western Allied war conference in Quebec on 14-16 September 1944, U.S. President Roosevelt and Treasury of the Secretary Henry Morgenthau persuaded British Prime Minister Winston Churchill to sign a memorandum on the fate of Germany after the war which in essence was based on a plan created by Morgenthau.¹ According to this memorandum, the Allies would de-industrialize Germany after the war and convert it into ’a country primarily agricultural and pastoral in its character.’²

Morgenthau himself had previously studied the fairly detailed information that at this time was available on the Nazi Holocaust of the Jews, and had reacted strongly on this. Meanwhile Roosevelt expressed a desire to somehow neutralize Germany for a long time to come. Professor of Sociology and History at the University of Virginia, Jeffrey K. Olick, who has studied the background of the Morgenthau Plan, concludes that these were the grounds upon which Morgenthau appointed the committee to start drafting the plan.³

Along with Secretary of State Cordell Hull, Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson and Roosevelt’s close associate, Harry Hopkins, Morgenthau was included in the U.S. government committee that was appointed to coordinate the various U.S. government agencies’ proposals in relation to Germany after the war. When Stimson on 23 August 1944 was introduced to Morgenthau’s plan, he protested vigorously. He argued that such a plan could have worked in 1860, when Germany had only 40 million inhabitants, but that now, in the 1940s, it would mean ’the removal of a large number of people from Germany.’⁴ But Roosevelt went into polemics against Stimson, and two days later he told him in a letter that he considered it to be of the utmost importance that every individual in Germany is made to understand that Germany this time is a defeated nation. It was not his intention that the Germans would starve, but he said that ’if they need food … they can be fed three times a day with soup from Army soup kitchens,’ so that ’they will remember that experience the rest of their lives.’⁵

In addition to the de-industrialization of Germany, the plan was that Germany would lose the Saar region, the areas between rivers Rhine and Moselle, southern Silesia, and East Prussia. Furthermore, the Rhineland, Westphalia, the North Sea coast and the Kiel Canal area would form an international zone, and with Austria separated again, what remained of Germany would be divided into two smaller states.

It did not take many days before the plan was leaked to the media. On 23 September 1944, it was published in great detail in the Wall Street Journal, which ran the front-page headline ‘Department of the Treasury plans Division of Germany, Dismantling of Heavy Industry.’

The Germany Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels could not have received a better gift. Three days after publication in the Wall Street Journal, the front-page headline of the Nazi party newspaper Völkischer Beobachter read, ’Roosevelt and Churchill made Judaism’s murder plan their own.’ The German propaganda claimed that the purpose of the Morgenthau Plan was to ’surrender 30 million Germans to starvation.’ Goebbels linked the Morgenthau Plan with a book published in 1941, Germany must Perish, by the American businessman Theodore N. Kaufman, who argued that ’sterilization of the German people cannot but be considered a great health measure promoted by humanity to immunize itself forever against the virus of Germanism.’⁶ In a radio speech on 4 October 1944, Goebbels set the tone by stating that ’hatred and vengeance of character the Old Testament characterizes this plan, created by the American Jew Morgenthau. The industrialized Germany will be literally turned into a gigantic potato field.’

The fact that Roosevelt, following the revelations in the press, on 27 September publicly distanced himself from the plan, did not help. During the remainder of the fall of 1944—during the preparations for the Ardennes Offensive—what the Nazis called the ’Jewish murder plan’ became a constantly recurring theme in the German propaganda against the Western Allies. For instance, in the journal Das Reich on 21 October 1944, Goebbels wrote, ‘It does not matter if the Bolsheviks destroy the Reich in their own way, or if the Anglo-Saxons do it their way. They both agree on the goal: to annihilate thirty to forty million Germans.’

It was with this in mind that the German soldiers at dawn on 16 December1944 pounced on the American positions to launch the Ardennes Offensive. A few days earlier, the American intelligence agent William Donovan sent President Roosevelt a memorandum from Bern apropos the Morgenthau Plan. There he quoted the Swiss Neue Zürcher Zeitung:

’The conviction that Germany had nothing to expect from defeat but oppression and exploitation still prevails, and that accounts for the fact that the Germans continue to fight. It is not a question of a regime, but of the homeland itself, and to save that, every German is bound to obey the call, whether he be Nazi or member of the opposition.’⁷

1 Suggested Post-Surrender Program for Germany av Henry Morgenthau jr. docs.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/psf/box31/a297a01.html. 16 April 2014.

2 Olick, In the House of the Hangman: Th e Agonies of German Defeat, 1943-1949, p. 84.

3 Ibid., p. 77.

4 Ibid., p. 79.

5 Blum, Roosevelt in Morgenthau, p. 575-577; op. cit. in Olick, p. 78.

6 Germany must Perish by Th eodore N. Kaufman. en.wikisource.org/wiki/Germany_Must_Perish. 16 April 2014.

7 Memorandum for the President av William Donovan, 11 December 1944. docs.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/psf/box32/a298m03.html. 16 April 2014.

Jodl estimated that 17,000 cubic meters of fuel and 50 train loads of ammunition would be required for Operation ’Wacht am Rhein.’ These amounts could be obtained by using up supply stocks to compensate for what German industry was not able to produce, and the quantities needed were estimated to be ready well before the attack.³⁶ This would rather, in view of the damages wrought upon the German railway net by Allied bombings, depend on whether it would be possible to bring forward these quantities to the front area.

In the fall of 1944, most major cities in western and central Germany lay in ruins after extensive Allied bombing. (US Army)

On Tuesday, 28 October 1944, Generalmajor Siegfried Westphal, chief of staff at von Rundstedt’s Oberbefehlshaber West Headquarters, and Generalleutnant Hans Krebs, chief of staff in Model’s Heeresgruppe B, were summoned to Hitler’s headquarters where they were duly informed of the attack plan. Hitler opened by telling them that ’Germany could not remain on the defensive, or else her collapse would be inevitable.’ ³⁷ The aim, he explained, was ’the destruction of the bulk of the Allied Western armies’ and to render a new Allied landing in France impossible.³⁸ Having gone through the main outlines of the plan for the offensive and the units which were supposed to be assigned to Heeresgruppe B, Hitler proceeded to describe the support the ground troops were to receive. The two generals were informed that the Luftwaffe would support the offensive with ’incessant waves of 4,000 of the newest type fighter planes,’ where ’each plane will fly two sorties daily to gain aerial superiority over the battlefield and the rear operational area.’³⁹ Furthermore, V weapons would be launched ’in larger numbers than in the past, against Antwerp and Liège.’⁴⁰

Concerning ammunition, he promised two consumption units in the first line from the first day of the attack, and the troops would then be provided with another three consumption units during the course of the offensive. Regarding fuel he guaranteed three consumption units in the first line on the day the attack opened, followed by a continuous supply. Additionally, 17,000 cubic meters of fuel from the OKW reserves had been stockpiled at the Rhine. A pipeline would even be constructed across the river.⁴¹

Percy E. Schramm, secretary at the High Command of the German Armed Forces (OKW), noted that these two experienced generals both were in favour of the offensive plan; the only objection they voiced was that the proposed attack date, 25 November, seemed to be a bit too early to allow all the necessary preparations to be made.⁴² The operations officer in Heeresgruppe B, Oberstleutnant Reichhelm, also reacted with enthusiasm when he was informed of the plan.⁴³ Reichhelm nevertheless admits that Generalfeldmarschall Model’s first comment was more restrained. ’To me,’ he said, ’the entire thing seems to stand on damned wooden feet.’⁴⁴

Two days later, Jodl sent field marshals von Rundstedt and Model written information on the plan. This was supplemented with the additional information that Heeresgruppe H also would participate.* This would take place either in the form of an attack by the 15. Armee from the Sittard area (northwest of Aachen), and directed southwards, in conjunction with the 6. SS-Panzerarmee’s push towards the west, to envelop the Allied troops in the so-called ’Maas Wedge’ at Maastricht and Aachen right in the seam between Heeresgruppe B and Heeresgruppe H. Or it could be launched from Venlo, twenty miles farther to the north, directed towards the west or the southwest. According to the plan, the progress of the offensive would decide which of these two alternatives would be chosen.⁴⁵ Nevertheless, Heeresgruppe H would not go into action until the 6. SS-Panzerarmee had achieved an operational breakthrough.

Von Rundstedt and Model immediatley called for a conference to discuss the proposed plan at the headquarters of Heeresgruppe B east of Krefeld.** At this meeting, which took place on 2 November, the forty-seven-year old commander of the 5. Panzerarmee, General der Panzertruppen Hasso von Manteuffel, would become something of the main character. Since Model’s army group would carry out the main onslaught, von Rundstedt declined to utter any opinion on the matter until he had heard what Model had to say, and Model in turn decided to wait until the highly experienced von Manteuffel had spoken.

Following a short introduction by von Rundstedt, Krebs gave the assembled men more details on the plan. Among other things, he informed them that the attack was to be launched sometime between 1030 and 1100 hrs, following a two-hour artillery preparation by all armies of Heeresgruppe B. This artillery preparation would, in combination with air attacks, be launched exactly simultaneously all along the front line.⁴⁶ When Krebs had finished talking, von Manstein took the floor. ’Only on the condition that the following “promises” are met,’ he said, ’will I be able to reach and cross the Meuse,’ and then he listed what he considered to be the basic conditions:

First of all, a local air supremacy over the front area as well as the supply bases and the supply routes must be ensured as soon as the bad weather period in which the offensive shall be launched has ended. Furthermore, the assault units must have full strength, be rested and be in place in their points of departure in due time before the attack. In addition to this, the mobility of the motorized units, of the reconnaissance units of all divisions, of the artillery, the anti-aircraft and the bridge construction units had to be ‘decisively’ improved. Moreover, the aim of having the needed quantities of ammunition, communication equipment, fuel, oil, spare parts, etc at the direct disposal of the first-line units no later than on the attack day, must be fully reached.⁴⁷ Should not all these conditions be met, von Manteuffel maintained, the assault units would be able to reach ’no further than the Meuse, and establish bridgeheads there.’⁴⁸

The commander of 6. SS-Panzerarmee, the main assault force, SS-Oberst-Gruppenführer Sepp Dietrich, remained silent.⁴⁹ Model, who had been listening with the greatest attention, asked for a follow-up meeting with von Manteuffel. This took place that same afternoon, with von Manteuffel, Model, and Krebs present.

When the three men met, Model opened by saying that he basically agreed with von Manteuffel, but that he wished him to develop his ideas further. To what he had previously said, von Manteuffel now added the importance of the reserves arriving in due time, thus preventing any interruption in the advance, and ’an immediate and highly prioritized’ assignment of additional motor vehicles to the first-line units.⁵⁰ But first and foremost, he stressed that a local air supremacy over the entire are, extending from the battlefield and back to River Rhine, was the prerequisite for any success at all.⁵¹

Von Manteuffel also had objections against the use of the preparatory artillery fire. First of all, he said, the proposed time for the opening of the attack, between ten and ten thirty in the forenoon, was far too late in the day, since it meant that the assault forces would have no more than seven hours of daylight during the first day of the attack. Furthermore, a two-hour artillery preparation was too long and would unnecessarily alert the Americans.⁵² Von Manteuffel was opposed to a ’general’ artillery fire. Instead he advocated a flexible use of artillery against enemy points of resistance, but only when assaulting units requested so. He said that he might consider ’doubtlessly identified strong [American] points of resistance and artillery positions’ to be ’occasionally shelled by artillery at a time that had to be decided upon in advance—on the condition that the caliber of their own artillery pieces, the supply of ammunition, and the terrain made it possible to expect success from such an artillery fire.’ But even such a use of artillery had to be restricted to no more than 45 minutes. ’In general,’ von Manteuffel said, ’we must strive as far as possible to attack without any “spectacular fireworks”.’ He would rather see a ’hunter’s stealth’ toward the American positions, without—as he expressed it—any ’awakening with music.’ ⁵³

Von Manteuffel also suggested that the time for the launching of the attack would be moved back to 0530 hrs, combined with an initial infiltration of the American lines while it still was dark, on a wide front and conducted by small assault units, before any artillery fire at all was opened.* The latter, he added, was ’a method that both we and the Red Army has used with great success on the Eastern Front’—it was to the letter the method the Soviets had used in order to puncture the German defense lines when Operation ’Bagration’ was launched on 22 June 1944.⁵⁴ He also argued that the attack date should be moved forward from 25 November until no sooner than 10 December, in order to grant the preparatory work sufficient time.

Model wanted to sleep on it, and when the three men met again on 3 November, this time at one of the corps headquarters in the 5. Panzerarmee, he expressed his support for all of von Manteuffel’s proposals.⁵⁵ During the continued discussion, Model and von Manteuffel agreed on an alternative operational plan: Instead of advancing across the Meuse, once the operational breakthrough had been achieved, the two panzer armies would turn north, with their left flank protected by the Meuse and the 7. Armee covering the southern flank. Simultaneously, the 15. Armee would strike from the Sittard area in the southeasternmost corner of the Netherlands, and linking up in the Tongres area northwest of Liège in eastern Belgium, the two attack forces would trap between twenty and twenty-five British and American divisions. Which step to take next was left open, depending on how the battle developed, but both commanders could imagine a resumed advance towards the west, with the objective of reaching Antwerp once the enveloped enemy forces had been annihilated.⁵⁶ They called this the ’small solution,’ opposite to the original plan, which they referred to as the ’big solution.’** Nevertheless, in his reply to Jodl’s proposed offensive plan which the supreme commander in the West, Generalfeldmarschall von Rundstedt, sent Hitler on 3 November, there was no hint of any questioning of Antwerp as the prime target. Quite to the contrary, von Rundstedt declared that he ’basically was of the same opinion as the High Command.’⁵⁷ However, he did suggest that the northern pincer attack would be launched simultaneously with the main attack, which might be regarded as a kind of combination of the ’small’ and the ’big’ solutions. But this, as well as the ’small solution,’ was turned down by Hitler, who argued that it would mean that the spearhead of the German attack prematurely would become sucked into costly fighting with strong Allied forces.

Percy E. Schramm, in charge of the war diary in the headquarters of the German Armed Forces (OKW) between 1943 and 1945, characterizes the differences between the military commanders and Hitler in this regard as a meeting of different approaches.⁵⁸ On one hand, Model, von Manteuffel, and von Rundstedt represented the scientific approach—the science called art of war, and which includes a falsification of the hypothesis which each military plan actually can be described as. This ’cooler’ scientific approach, deriving from a strictly military viewpoint, met Hitler’s thinking, which can be described as both holistic and idealistic (here in contrast to materialistic), as well as strongly emotional. Hitler had grown accustomed to regarding his generals as overly cautious and narrow in their thinking. After all, the Nazi dictator’s personal experience—his almost unequalled political career from his time as a member of an inconspicuous political sect in 1919 to becoming the Leader of one of the world’s most powerful states fourteen years later—seemed to indicate that ’the impossible was possible’ for a man with ’a will of steel.’

Not without reason, Hitler felt reassured because there had been a similar disagreement between him and his generals before the previous great offensive in the West, the one which was launched on 10 May 1940, ending in Great Britain’s expulsion from the Continent and total victory over France. When Hitler on that occasion ordered preparations to be made for the great offensive in the West, the commander of the German Army at that time, von Brauchitsch, and his chief of staff, Halder, had expected the German offensive to become ’stalled at the Franco-Belgian border, where a positional war of attrition would ensue.’⁵⁹ The army group commanders on the Western Front also had submitted their misgivings in writing, and this was distributed to the commanders of all armies.⁶⁰ Then, when a bold lieutenant general by the name of Erich von Manstein in the fall of 1939 suggested that the attack was to be launched in the Ardennes, which won Hitler’s appreciation, the Army High Command had dismissed the idea of ’an attack through the Ardennes, poor in adequate roads, broken by deep valleys running in a north-southerly direction’ as something completely impossible.⁶¹ And still, it would be precisely this plan which just a few months later resulted in one of the brightest victories in military history.

However, it would be an error to think that Hitler was totally insusceptible to objections from the military commanders—after all, he held many of them in the highest regard, not least of whom was Model. On 5 November 1944, the Führer ordered the assault force to be reinforced, much in line with von Manteuffel’s proposals. According to the original draft of 11 October, the attack force would consist of twenty-three divisions with another seven held in reserve; this force now was expanded to thirty-eight divisions, including fifteen panzer or panzer grenadier divisions.⁶² And although Hitler did not immediately agree to move forward the attack date as far as von Manteuffel and Model requested, on 10 November he decided to postpone the date until 1 December. Eight days later, when he issued modified instructions, he also had restricted the preparatory artillery fire to one hour.

Hitler’s promise that the offensive would be supported by ’incessant waves of 4,000 of the newest type fighter planes’ may have sounded as merely an expression of wishful thinking, but as a matter of fact, this assertion was based on actual strength reports from the Luftwaffe. As we have seen previously, German aircraft production reached its peak in September 1944, when over four thousand aircraft were manufactured. Following the retreat from France that same month, the Inspector of the German Fighter Aviation, Generalmajor Galland, had accomplished a great work in the rebuilding of the Luftwaffe’s fighter force. By the formation of new fighter wings, tucking away several units to the reserve, and strictly limiting the combat operations of those remaining in first-line service, Galland was on 12 November 1944 able to report a never hitherto seen strength of the German fighter force: 3,700 aircraft and pilots. To this figure should be added around twelve hundred night fighters, of which several would be used as night attack aircraft during the Ardennes Offensive, plus nine hundred ground-attack aircraft (of which the bulk served on the Eastern Front) and over five hundred bombers.⁶³ Hence, in total, the Luftwaffe disposed around 6,500 aircraft by that time.*

Generalfeldmarschall Walter Model (left), Generalfeldmarschall Gerd von Rundstedt (center), and Generalleutnant Hans Krebs (chief of staff in Model’s Heeresgruppe B) study the map over the Ardennes during a conference at von Rundstedt’s headquarters on the Western Front in November 1944. (BArch, Bild 146-1978-024-31)

On 14 November, the C-in-C of the Luftwaffe, Reichsmarschall Hermann Göring, presented the outlines for the Luftwaffe’s participation in Operation ’Wacht am Rhein.’⁶⁴ In September 1944, Generaloberst Hans-Jürgen Stumpff’s Luftflotte Reich, responsible for the air defense of the Reich, also took command of Luftwaffenkommando West, which organized and led air operations in the West.* Luftwaffenkommando West, which on 16 November was subordinated to Generalleutnant Josef Schmid, was tasked to despatch the fighter and ground-attack units of the II. Jagdkorps, as well as the bombers, night ground-attack, and night fighter aviation of the 3. Flieger-Division to the support of ’Wacht am Rhein.’

The II. Jagdkorps (Generalmajor Dietrich Peltz), with its subordinate 3. Jagd-Division, Jagdfliegerführer Mittelrhein (Fighter Command Middle Rhein), and 5. Jagd-Division, would be used to neutralize the menace from the Allied aviation and provide the advancing ground units with close air support. The 3. Jagd-Division (Generalmajor Walter Grabmann)—consisting of Jagdgeschwaders 1, 6, 26, and 301, plus the ground-attack wing Schlachtgeschwader 4—was tasked to lead the air operations over the Netherlands, the German territory just to the east of the Netherlands, and the northernmost part of Belgium.**

The bulk of the units in II. Jagdkorps—Jagdgeschwaders 2, 3, 4, 11, 27, 53, and 77—were stationed in the area from the Bonn region and southward, operating directly under Jagdfliegerführer Mittelrhein (Oberstleutnant Hans Trübenbach) in the north, and the 5. Jagd-Division (Generalmajor Karl Hentschel) in the south.

The 3. Flieger-Division (Generalmajor Sigismund Freiherr von Falkenstein) was assigned with the task of providing air support at night: Twin-engine Junkers Ju 88s and Junkers Ju 188s of I. Gruppe/ Kampfgeschwader 66 and Lehrgeschwader 1, Me 262jet planes from Kampfgeschwader 51, and Arado 234s from Kampfgeschwader 76 were to carry out bombing attacks against lines of communication in the Allied rear area. The night ground-attack groups Nachtschlachtgruppe 1 and 2 (equipped with old Junkers 87 dive bombers) and NSGr 20 (Fw 190) were to strike at night against Allied airfields and troop concentrations. The night fighter wing Nachtjagdgeschwader 2 (Ju 88) would also be deployed in these operations, but its main task was to cover the German troop assembly areas against Allied air attacks during the hours of darkness. Furthermore, the special unit III. Gruppe/Kampfgeschwader 66 (incorporated into Kampfgeschwader 200) was supposed to launch so-called ’Mistel’ planes against particularly important bridges in the Allied rear area.***

On 16 December 1944, a total of 1,492 fighters, 171 bombers, 91 ground-attack aircraft, and 40 reconnaissance aircraft were ready to support the Ardennes Offensive.⁶⁵

The cooperation between air and ground forces was carefully prepared. Each of the army divisions that would take part in the offensive was assigned with an air surveillance unit, and strong efforts were made to secure a smooth direct radio connection between the various headquarters of the first-line Army units, the Luftwaffe liaison officers assigned to ground units, and the Luftwaffe’s various operational headquarters.

Fliegerführungstruppe 1, where Oberst Gordon Gollob led the fighter operations and Major Heinrich Brücker led the close air support, was to lead the direct air support of the 6. SS-Panzerarmee. The direct air support of the 5. Panzerarmee was led by Fliegerführungstruppe 2, where Oberstleutnant Karl-Gottfried Nordmann was in charge of fighter operations and Oberstleutnant Alfred Druschel directed the close air support.⁶⁶ These were well-versed and highly decorated air officers: Gollob was the first pilot of the war to reach 150 aerial victories, Brücker was one of the early Stuka and ground-attack fliers of the Luftwaffe, Nordmann had flown more than 800 fighter missions since 1939, and Druschel was the first and most experienced unit commander of the German ground-attack aviation, in action since 1938.

The Luftwaffe anti-aircraft corps III. Flak-Korps under General Wolfgang Pickert also was tasked to cover the attacking ground forces and their rear area against Allied air attacks. This AAA corps’ 2. Flak-Division (Oberst Fritz Laicher), with 35 heavy and 37 medium or light antiaircraft batteries, was assigned to the 6. SS-Panzerarmee; Flak-Brigade XIX (Oberst Paul Schluchtmann), with 20 heavy and 44 medium or light anti-aircraft batteries, to the 5. Panzerarmee; Flak-Brigade I (Oberst Oskar Schöttl), with 16 heavy and 15 medium or light anti-aircraft batteries, to the 7. Armee. Each of these anti-aircraft batteries was composed of two or three groups of eight guns apiece. Apart from the Luftwaffe’s anti-aircraft batteries, the various Army and SS units had their own air defense units. Moreover, three battalions of anti-aircraft searchlights were allocated to the Ardennes Offensive.⁶⁷

While the attack plans were developed and refined, the turn of events at the front would influence the German assault force as well as the German assessment of the chance the attack had to achieve success. Repeated attacks by U.S. First Army against the German city of Aachen, close to the location where Germany’s, the Netherland’s and Belgium’s (present) borders meet, provided the Germans with new and important lessons regarding their American opponent. To begin with, the object of the attack, Aachen, with its strong fortifications (the city had been incorporated into the West Wall), can hardly be regarded as a good choice: The German generals shook their heads in disbelief as they watched the Americans run headlong into this strong point in the German defense instead of simply bypassing the city to the south, where the defense was considerably weaker. In spite of their manifold numerical superiority, the Americans were pushed back with bloody losses when they assaulted the city in the second half of September.

Here another American weak spot became obvious. It turned out that they rapidly replaced their losses with insufficiently trained recruits and officers who displayed an amazing lack of tactical knowledge. On 1 October, U.S. 1st Infantry Division, which had been bloodied at Aachen, had been rebuilt to its assigned strength, but 70 percent of the troops were hastily trained recruits.⁶⁸ The Germans noted that the Americans were yet another opponent who seemed to favour quantity over quality. It was not until the Americans brought forward an entirely new army—the Ninth under Lieutenant General William Simpson—that they finally managed to squeeze the German defenders out of Aachen. On 21 October, the city was in American hands.

But the capture of Aachen was a hollow victory. The Ninth Army was unable to continue further into Germany because of the River Rur/Roer, which flows past in a northeastern direction to the east of Aachen, until four miles further to the north it joins the Maas/Meuse.* Since the Germans controlled the large Roer dams at Schwammenauel, about fifteen miles southeast of Aachen, they were in the position to let the Roer overflow its banks at any time. To save his troops from a veritable deluge, Lieutenant General Simpson had little choice but to hold back his forces.

In this situation, Lieutenant General Courtney Hodges despatched his U.S. First Army straight into the Hürtgenwald, a 50 square mile area of dense forests in a terribly rugged terrain half-way between Aachen and the Roer dams. Here the Americans got stuck in a battle lasting several months against a numerically inferior opponent who with utmost skill used the terrain to his own advantage. Military historian John Ellis is harsh in his judgement of this American operation:

Another fastness that the Americans would have done well to avoid was the Hürtgen Forest, just to the south of Aachen. The dense and dark terrain, worthy of the grimmest fairy-tale vision, formed a tactical quagmire for any attacking force. In September and October, however, the Americans insisted on plunging straight in, claiming that it represented a serious threat to their right flank. This was doubtful, as the Forest sheltered only one weak infantry division and was too dense to screen the assembly of a substantial force. By attacking into the Forest the Americans both multiplied the combat effectiveness of the incumbent division, fighting from strong prepared positions, and nullified the effects of their own aircraft, artillery and tanks.⁶⁹

Having been repulsed by the German defense force, including the 116. Panzer-Division, the Americans despatched 4,000 aircraft, of which 2,400 were heavy bombers, against Hürtgenwald on 16 November. Around 10,000 tons of bombs were dropped, which of course had a terrible impact on the German defenders. However, when this massed air effort was made, the U.S. ground troops had pulled back several miles, and when they finally were able to move forward across the cratered ground to attack the Germans, these had already managed to re-organize their defense positions. This led the Americans to the somewhat erroneous conclusions that not even the strongest air assault sufficed to break the defense of the Hürtgenwald. The Battle of the Hürtgenwald nevertheless provided the Germans with further lessons ahead of ’Wacht am Rhein.’ The OKW noted, ’The fact that an average of around 200 U.S. troops were captured each day, although we fought a defensive battle, is a clear evidence of the superiority of our own troops.’⁷⁰

The Battle of the Hürtgenwald ended with a German defensive victory that cost U.S. First Army at least 33,000 casualties, whereby two entire divisions were so badly mauled that they had to be pulled out of combat. One of these, the 28th Infantry Division, had sustained 7,500 casualties in only a few weeks starting on 2 November. The fact that the 28th Infantry Division on 28 November was regrouped to the south to man an important sector of the Ardennes Front, was a clear indication that the Allies might be running out of reserves.

But the Battle of the Hürtgenwald also had a strong impact on the forces intended for ’Wacht am Rhein.’ On 21 November, von Rundstedt reported that both the 9. and the 116. Panzer divisions, as well as the 3. and 15. Panzergrenadier divisions would be ’tied down for a long time’ by this battle; he also reported that the 47. and 340. Volksgrenadier divisions had been sucked into the battle, and that this might also apply to the 352. Volksgrenadier-Division; it was impossible to detach the 12. Volksgrenadier-Division from Hürtgenwald, and the 10. SS-Panzer-Division probably also would have to be committed.⁷¹ The situation was quite similar further to the south, where German 1. Armee was under heavy pressure since 7 November, when Patton’s Third Army had resumed its offensive. Meanwhile, the newly formed U.S. 6th Army Group was attacking from the south, ousting the Germans from Belfort on the 21st and Strasbourg on 23 November. In this sector, the Germans had no chance to release any forces for ’Wacht am Rhein’—quite to the opposite, on 21 November, when Metz was lost, one of the panzer divisions intended for the Ardennes Offensive, the élite Panzer Lehr, was employed in an effort to halt Patton’s offensive. But this met with little success, and Panzer Lehr soon was pulled back to the reserve again. Von Rundstedt’s report concerning this sector on 21 November, reads, ’At Heeresgruppe G it is impossible to release the 11. and 21. Panzer divisions, the 17. SS-Panzergrenadier-Division or the 21. Panzer Division’s task force. From this follows that about four Volksgrenadier divisions and perhaps nine motorized units will be unable to participate in the upcoming [Ardennes] offensive.’⁷²

American soldiers of the 110th Infantry Regiment, 28th Infantry Division during the bloody battles in the Hürtgen Forest in the fall of 1944. (NARC/G. W. Goodman, US Army Signal Corps)

With over 800 tanks and an overwhelming air support at his disposal, Patton steadily came closer to the German border.⁷³ German 1. Armee, which mustered not more than seventy-four tanks and tank destroyers, barely managed to check the American attack at the West Wall in the Saar area.⁷⁴But in mid-December, Patton prepared his army for a new great offensive into the Saar, ’the biggest blitz in the Third Army’s history,’ as the colorful General expressed it.⁷⁵ However, this was something that the German Ardennes Offensive would thwart.

The forces assembled for ’Wacht am Rhein’ also could have dealt a severe blow against the joint offensive which by the same time involved U.S. First and Ninth Army further to the north—with much more far-reaching consequences to the Americans. The American breakthrough at Aachen and Hürtgenwald had created a thirty-mile wide wedge into the German front lines between Monschau and Sittard in the north. The Germans estimated that their opponent had massed eleven infantry and three armored divisions in this sector. On 20 November, Model proposed the launching of the 15. Armee and the 6. SS-Panzerarmee ’in a pincer operation aimed at dealing a deadly blow against the tightly grouped enemy units.’ Thus, he argued, not only would the preconditions for a successful envelopment of U.S. Ninth Army and the closest elements of U.S. First and British 2nd armies be created, but this would also help facilitate a continued advance towards Antwerp.⁷⁶ Hence, this was a new combination of the ’small’ and the ’big’ solutions—or rather, the former’s successive transformation into the latter—and the idea immediately received von Rundstedt’s unreserved support. But the proposal was rejected already on 22 November by Hitler, who feared that anything similar would turn the offensive into ’a battle of attrition, which presumably would have spared so few of the reserve units, that the initial phase could not possibly be succeeded by a second one.’⁷⁷ Hitler’s reply also contained directives concerning further reinforcements to the forces which were being made ready for ’Wacht am Rhein,’ in order to compensate for the forces that had been tied down by the American offensives:

The 167. and 560. Volksgrenadier divisions and the 10. SS-Panzer-Division were to join the attack force during the first half of December. These were not expected to arrive in time to take part in the initial onslaught, but further reserves would be assigned, in part by pulling out units from other sectors of the Western Front, and in part by regrouping three Volksgrenadier divisions (79., 259., and 320.) and a mountain division (6. SS-Gebirgs-Division) from Norway. In addition to this, the first-line units in the Ardennes would be provided with a number of replacement battalions (so-called Marschbataillon) with altogether 50,000 recruits—20,000 men before 1 December, another 20,000 up until 8 December, and 10,000 more before 15 December.⁷⁸

On 26 November Jodl visited Generalfeldmarschall von Rundstedt at his headquarters in Ziegenberg outside of Bad Nauheim, around a dozen miles to the north of Frankfurt. Jodl stressed that the Führer irrevocably stood firm with ’the big plan.’ Jodl also had a further aim with his visit—to inspect the well-masked and heavily fortified castle Schloss Ziegenberg. Located just in the vicinity, this had been modified in 1939-1940 to serve as the ’Führer Headquarters.’ However, it was better known by its code name—Adlerhorst (’Eagle’s Nest’). Next day, Hitler announced that he accepted von Manteuffel’s and Model’s suggestion to move back the time for the launching of the infantry assault to some time between 0600 and 0630 hrs, following a preparatory artillery fire which had been further reduced to 30-60 minutes. Moreover, he postponed the attack date by another week to 7 December.⁷⁹ Shortly afterward, the decision was made to shift the attack date (Null-Tag) to 10 December.⁸⁰

On 29 November, Model issued the attack order, based on Jodl’s guidelines from 10 November. But he and von Manteuffel still wished to meet with Hitler at a conference in order to once and for all thoroughly analyze the pros and cons of the ’big’ and the ’small’ solutions, as well as to discuss a couple of practical details concerning the attack. Hitler agreed, and the conference was held in the Reich Chancellery in Berlin on 2 December. Present at this meeting were, apart from Hitler, the military commanders Model, von Manteuffel, and Dietrich, as well as around fifty other officers. Von Rundstedt was conspiciously absent. Model and von Manteuffel had visited the Western Commander in Ziegenberg in an attempt to win his support for the ’small’ solution, but by now von Rundstedt had no interest in yet another debate around the attack plan. He had himself represented at the conference in Berlin by his chief of staff Westphal.

At the conference on 2 December it was clear from the beginning that Hitler had no intention to abandon the ’big solution.’ He admitted, which von Manteuffel found to be quite remarkable, that the relatively distant objective Antwerp was a ’hazardous game,’ but he also said that the present situation made it necessary to ’stake everything on one card.’⁸¹ Continuing, the Führer stressed that immensely much was to be gained if the so-called ’big solution’ became a 100-percent success: Not only U.S. First and Ninth armies, but also British 21 Army Group would thereby become enveloped and annihilated. Hitler pointed at the disagreements between the U.S. and British military commands, and maintained that if the objective of the German offensive could be reached, these disagreements would deepen and even spread to the political level. ’Canada,’ he said, ’might even withdraw from the war for a prolonged time as a result of the loss of the main part of its armed forces in the battle of encirclement.’⁸²

Hitler also explained that the offensive had quite good opportunities to be successful; it would be launched in a sector where, bearing in mind the weak Allied forces, ’our available forces most certainly will achieve a breakthrough.’ Since the offensive also would be opened at a time when bad weather prevented the Allied aviation from interfering, a rapid breakthrough could be expected. ’Thus,’ he continued, ‘the armored units will have gained freedom of movement and will be able to surge forward rapidly to establish bridgeheads across the Meuse between Liège and Namur, after which they will continue to the northeast, bypass Brussels and reach Antwerp.’⁸³ Even if the offensive will be only partially successful, he said, it will force the Allies to postpone their own offensive plans by at least eight to ten weeks, which will provide Germany with a badly needed breather.⁸⁴

The result of the conference on 2 December was that the ’big solution’ remained the major attack plan. However, the difference of opinion between the advocates of the ’small solution’ and those in favour of the ’big solution’ should not be exaggerated. The difference was mainly of tactical nature: Those arguing for the ’small solution’ intended to create better conditions for the ’big solution,’ while Hitler believed that this threatened to wear down the German assault units—for an aim that still would be reached if the ’big solution’ was crowned with success. Still, according to Schramm at OKW, both ’sides’ agreed that ’the question of adhering to Antwerp as the objective could be shelved for the time being,’ since this would be decided only when and if the Germans crossed the Meuse.⁸⁵ In the event that it would be impossible to cross the Meuse, the advocates of the ’small solution’ expected that they would be allowed to carry out their alternative plan, i.e. a more restricted pincer operation, through which the conditions for a renewed assault towards the west could be created. As we shall see further on, they had all the reason to expect this, since Hitler, when it later on turned out that the Meuse could not be reached, promptly adjusted and modified the aim of the offensive. If, on the other hand, the Germans could succeed in pushing their enemy back across the Meuse, it would at that stage be easier to establish whether the available forces were strong enough for a continued thrust towards Antwerp. In consequence, the differing opinions concerning the operation never resulted in a command crisis. ’Besides,’ Schramm pointed out, ’insofar as Generalfeldmarschall Model was concerned, he approached the Führer’s point of view by his inclination of always demanding the impossible in order to obtain the utmost.’⁸⁶

Furthermore, Hitler met Model’s and von Manteuffel’s requests in several instances. By large, he undertook measures to satisfy the demands presented by von Manteuffel—with the support of Model—as preconditions for a successful offensive. Von Manteuffel’s top priority, that his supply lines under no conditions were to be disturbed by enemy air attacks, was met to the best of ability, partly placing the attack at a time of a prolonged period of bad weather, and partly by a maximum concentration of German aircraft to support the offensive.

Model and von Manteuffel had requested that the armored reserves were to be assigned to the 6. SS- Panzerarmee and the 5. Panzerarmee instead of, as the original plan envisaged, using them in the flank attack by the 15. Armee. Hitler, wrote Schramm, ’inclined towards the point of view of Generalfeldmarschall Model and General der Panzertruppen von Manteuffel, that it was preferable—once the offensive was progressing successfully—to bring up all available reserves behind the attack divisions in order to take advantage of the breakthrough, instead of unnecessarily using them up for unsuccessful containing attacks on other sectors of the front.’⁸⁷ Thereby, powerful second and third attack waves were created.

Model and von Manteuffel also asked for the first attack wave to be reinforced, which was approved by Hitler. Similarly, their proposal to postpone the attack date had gained Hitler’s acquiescence, and von Manteuffel had managed to restrict the timelength of the preparatory artillery fire.

At the meeting with Hitler on 2 December, von Manteuffel even was able to convince the Führer that the time of the attack should be moved back until 0530 hrs, and he gained Hitler’s support for the idea that the 5. Panzerarmee would open its attack through ’infiltration,’ without any preceding massed artillery fire. Nevertheless, SS-Oberst-Gruppenführer Sepp Dietrich did not believe in the latter, which is why the 6. SS-Panzerarmee would launch its attack in a more ’classic’ manner with an opening artillery barrage. In addition, von Manteuffel obtained permission to create a so-called ’artificial moonlight’ during the initial hours of the attack—anti-aircraft searchlights would be brought forward to the 5. Panzerarmee’s forward positions in order to illuminate the low clouds over the front area, whereby the own troops would be helped to locate the direction in the dark winter morning.

With the exception of a few minor adjustments which were made on 4 December, and another couple of small modifications made on Hitler’s demands on 9 December, the final attack plan now was established. In order to hide the intentions even further, Model changed—on 29 November—the operation’s code name from ’Wacht am Rhein’ to ’Herbstnebel’ (Autumn Fog).⁸⁸ The countdown to the attack had begun.

HIDE, MISLEAD, CONCEAL!

A prerequisite for the success of the operation was that the Germans managed to take the enemy by surprise, and because of that it was imperative that the preparations were surrounded with the strictest secrecy. This was emphasized by Hitler already at the conference on 16 September 1944, when the idea of an offensive in the Ardennes in 1944 was presented for the first time. Preparations were carried out with an extensive operation of the kind known in German as Verschleiung -which in a military context means to hide, mislead and conceal. To begin with, the attack plan was kept secret to everyone but a very small circle of initiates until the very last moment. Not even the Fighter General Galland had any idea of what was coming when he on 20 November was ordered to transfer large parts of his fighter force back to the Western Front.

Spreading the information on the plan of attack also took place in compliance with strict confidentiality, and in the following order:

16 September: At the Führer Headquarters near Rastenburg, Generalfeldmarschall Wilhelm Keitel, commander of the German Armed Forces High Command (OKW), Generaloberst Jodl, commander of the German Armed Forces’ Operations Command (Wehrmachtführungsstab), Generaloberst Guderian, commander of the German Army Staff, and, via his chief of staff, General Kreipe, the Luftwaffe’s C-in-C, Reichsmarschall Göring, are informed.

11 October: In conjunction with Generaloberst Jodl’s presentation of his first draft of a plan of attack, the personnel of the Wehrmachtführungsstab are also informed.

22 October: Hitler personally introduces SS-ObersturmbannFührer Otto Skorzeny into the fundamentals of the plan and instructs him to prepare his secret support operation with Germans in American uniforms.

28 October: Generalmajor Westphal, chief of staff of the Superior Command on the Western Front (OB West) and Generalleutnant Krebs, chief of staff in Heeresgruppe B, are introduced to the plan, and through them, also the C-in-C on the Western Front, von Rundstedt, and the commander of Heeresgruppe B, Model. In connection therewith, the commands of the relevant armies (6. SS-Panzerarmee, 5. Panzerarmee, 7. Armee, and 15.Armee) are also informed. In these armies, however, only the commander, the chief of staff, the operations officer (Ia), and one more particularly trusted officer are informed. The intelligence officer (Ic), the quartermaster, and the commanders of the engineer troops, and the signal and artillery units within each army are not briefed on the plan until it is absolutely necessary for the operation, and the Army Group has given its consent thereto.

The corps commanders were not briefed until the end of November 1944, and the divisional commanders only from 1 December 1944 onward—but in fact, for instance Bayerlein, C.O. of the Panzer Lehr Division, still had not been oriented about the impending attack as late as on 10 December. The regimental commander were notified of the imminent offensive only on 13 December, the battalion commanders on 14 December, and the company commanders not until the evening of 15 December—when the troops were oriented about what was coming. In certain units the men were not oriented until early on 16 December.¹

During the war, in a top-secret facility at Bletchley Park northwest of London, the British decrypted German radio broadcast messages that were encrypted with the help of Enigma cipher machines—one of which the Brits had come across a functional copy of. This was called operation ’Ultra,’ and it often played a crucial role on the battlefield. But ahead of precisely the Ardennes Offensive, the Allies did not have much use of Ultra, since Hitler prohibited his men to discuss anything relating to the coming offensive by phone, teleprinter or radio. In addition, all orders and messages concerning the Offensive were ordered to begin with the phrase ’in preparation for an expected enemy offensive…,’ and they could be passed on only personally by the initiates or well trusted officers. Couriers were not allowed to use aircraft.² During visits at the front, senior commanders were instructed not to wear their General’s Uniform, but had to carry a uniform with a lower-ranking officer’s insignias.³

Moreover, great efforts were made to hide, mislead and conceal the formations of the attack units, as well as their deployments. In order to release the staff of the 5. Panzerarmee (Panzerarmee-Oberkommando 5) for the preparatory work and the build-up ahead of the offensive, the staff of the 15. Armee was released from Heeresgruppe H in the Netherlands, and on 14 November assumed command of the sector which hitherto had been held by the panzer army. In order to mislead the opponent, the staff of the 15. Armee changed its designation to ’Gruppe von Manteuffel’—the name of the 5. Panzerarmee’s commander. On 16 November, the new 25. Armee—which was formed on 10 November through the redesignation of Wehrmachtbefehlshaber Niederlande in the Netherlands—was officially designated ’15. Armee.’ The real headquarters of the 5. Panzerarmee was transferred to the Eifel region in western Germany—i.e. the area bordering to Belgium and northern Luxembourg—and was assigned with the cover name ’Military Police Command for Special Purposes’ (Feldjägerkommando z.b.V.).⁴ The units that were withdrawn from the front in order to replenish their strength under the 5. Panzerarmee’s supervision, were carefully masked in the dense forests of the area. The troops were quartered in small and modest villages throughout the Eifel region. Any movement of troops intended for the offensive was allowed only with rigorous masking and in the hours of darkness. The air defense was ordered to under no circumstances fire at enemy aircraft at any greater extent than before. Total radio silence was ordered.

The staff of the new 6. SS-Panzerarmee was assigned with the name of ’Reconstruction Staff 16’ (Auffrischungsstab 16). The various units submitted to the 6. SS-Panzerarmee transferred to northwestern Germany, where they were officially designed ’construction staffs.’ or ’construction battalions’ while they had their strength replenished.⁵

Several false and misleading orders and directives were despatched. To simulate the assembly of the 6. Panzerarmee northwest of Cologne, radio messages were sent to give the impression of this, while conspicuous troop movements were carried out in this area during daytime.⁶ On 20 November a separate operation was initiated to create the impression that the 25. Armee grouped in the area around Cologne with ten divisions—including some of those who in fact were part of the 6. SS-Panzerarmee—for the alleged purpose to serve as a reserve against a possible Allied breakthrough at Aachen. Small groups of soldiers and radio stations worked frantically to reinforce this impression. Fictional troop quarters were established in villages in the area, and ditto directional signs were put up. In order to further mislead, large troop marches were also carried out a bit further north.⁷ On 7 December, a false rumor was planted that the 5. Panzerarmee would be deployed for an offensive at Trier in January-February 1945.⁸

The real deployment of the assault units to their starting positions for the attack took place only in the very last days and hours before the offensive. To reduce the risk that the march was revealed by deserters, all so-called ’Volksdeutsche’ (Polish Germans, Ukrainian Germans, etc., but primarily soldiers from the German-annexed areas of Belgium and Luxembourg and the former French Elsass/Alsace) were temporarily removed from the assault units, to be returned not before the offensive had begun. Moreover, Hitler demanded a special daily report from von Rundstedt about all deserters during the past 48 hours. As it would turn out, the number of deserters on the Western Front was surprisingly low—there were only five of them between 1 and 12 December 1944.

Altogether, these Verschleiungs operations resulted in the attack hitting the Allies with a total surprise at dawn on 16 December 1944.

1 Diary Horst Helmus, 26. Volksgrenadier-Division.

2 OB West Ia Nr 9548/44 g.Kdos. 25.10 1944; OKL Führungsstab Ia Nr 10321/44 g.Kdos. 10.11 1944; Jung, Die Ardennen-Offensive 1944/45, p. 126.

3 OKL Führungsstab Ia Nr 10320/44 g.Kdos 20.10. 1944; Jung, p. 126.

4 OB West Ia Nr 890/44 g.Kdos. 13.11 1944; Jung, p. 125.

5 Lehmann, ISS Panzer Corps (15 Oct.-16 Dec. 1944). B-577, p. 3.

6 Schramm, The Preparations for the German Offensive in the Ardennes (Sep to Dec 1944).A-862, p. 228.

7 Lehmann, B-577, p. 4.

8 Schramm, A-862, p. 227.

Reichsmarschall Hermann Göring, the Luftwaffe’s C-in-C, during an inspection tour in Germany. (Trautloft)

* On 23 August, Hitler dismissed the commander of German Luftflotte 3 on the Western Front, Generalfeldmarschall Hugo Sperrle. In early September 1944 Hitler was even prepared to dismantle the Luftwaffe on the Western Front altogether, and on 19 September he fired Kreipe, whom he characterized as as both ‘a defeatist and unreliable.’

* Before Skorzeny had the opportunity to execute this mission, he undertook another operation with at least as far-reaching consequences . Over the course of the summer of 1944 the German Eastern Front collapsed, and in this context Hitler lost his old ‘brothers in arms’ Rumania, Bulgaria, and Finland. Hungary seemed to be next in line. When Hitler learned that this country’s leader, Admiral Miklós Horthy, was holding secret negotiations with the Soviet Union, he summoned Skorzeny and asked him to ‘do something about it.’ Skorzeny went into action, as quickly as mercilessly. In the afternoon of 15 October 1944, Admiral Horthy had barely spoke on the radio, announcingHungary’s withdrawal from the war, when Skorzeny and his commandos assaulted the Presidential Palace and took the admiral as their prisoner. The plan was to force Horthy to accept that a Hungarian puppet government take over to continue the war on the German side. The admiral probably would have rejected this, had it not been for Skorzeny’s very special trump card: Just a few hours earlier, Skorzeny had tricked the Hungarian leader’s son into a trap, beat him unconscious and abducted him—wrapped in a Persian rug, like in a classic Agent movie. Fearing for his son’s life, Admiral Horthy signed the paper that guaranteed Hungary’s continued participation in the war on Germany’s side.

* The rumour that the 116. Panzer-Division received such equipment probably derives from the fact that this panzer division received a number of Panther tanks from Panzer-Regiment 24, which was due to receive night fighting devices.

* On 27 October an order was issued to form Heeresgruppe H under Generaloberst Student in order to organize the northern wing of the Western Front—the so-called Wehrmachts-Befehlshaber Niederlande (later 25. Armee), 1. Fallschirmarmee, and 15. Armee.

** Invited to this conference were, apart from the two chiefs of staff Westphal and Krebs, the commanders of the three armies in Heeresgruppe B as well as General Gustav-Adolf von Zangen and Generaloberst Kurt Student, the commanders of the two armies in Heeresgruppe H, 15. Armee and 1. Fallschirmarmee, that were supposed to take part in the pincer attack from the north.

* Von Manteuffel used the German expression einsickern, (‘seep into’) to express the infiltration of – or rather between – the American lines, and this quite vividly describes how he imagined this.

** In the headquarters these plans became known as Little Slam and Grand Slam from the card game bridge.

* Nevertheless, Hitler was a bit too optimistic regarding the possibilities to bring forward large quantities of the new jet planes within reasonable time; only 19 Messerschmitt 262s were produced in September, 52 in October, and 101 in November 1944, while at the same time 18 Arado 234s were produced in September and 40 each month October and November 1944. Still, the ‘stab-inthe- back myth’ concerning the Me 262, according to which the production of this aircraft was decisively delayed because of Hitler’s demand that it must be constructed with a bomb-carrying capacity must be dismissed as a pure myth. It was only in the winter of 1944/1945 that serious technical faults in the construction could be overcome, allowing serial production to commence. The Ar 234s that flew on operations in August and September 1944 actually were prototypes that had been sent into action. Even in December 1944 and January 1945, no more than 124 and 153 respectively Me 262s and 35 respectively 35 Ar 234s were produced. Production figures from Vajda and Dancey, German Aircraft Industry Production.

* Previously, Luftwaffenkommando West was designated Luftflotte 3, but was re-organized in conjunction with the discharge of its commander, Generalfeldmarschall Hugo Sperrle, because of the failure at Normandy in the summer of 1944.

** Schlachtgeschwader 4, equipped with the specially designed assault version of Focke Wulf 190, Fw 190 F-8, was assigned with the special task to operate over the Meuse river crossings.

*** ‘Mistel’ was the designation of a single-engine fighter of the type Messerschmitt 109 or Focke Wulf 190 which carried an unmanned twin-engine bomber with a warhead containing several tons of explosives. With the aid of the engines of both aircraft, this load could be carried at quite a high speed. At the target, the unmanned bomber was detached, directed as a missile against the target. Tests had shown that the ‘Mistel’ was able to penetrate even very thick armored concrete. However, due to various reasons, no ‘Mistel’ planes were used in action to support the Ardennes Offensive.

* The river is called Rur in Germany and Roer in the Netherlands, but to avoid a confusion with the Ruhr, the Dutch name will be used here.