CHAPTER 3

THE OPPONENTS: COUNTDOWN TO THE GREAT BATTLE

"The conduct of war is an art, depending upon free, creative activity, scientifically grounded." Field Manual of the German Armed Forces, Truppenführung: Heeresdienstvorschrift 300.

Most of the German senior military commanders in the Ardennes Offensive can be counted among the war’s most professional and accomplished military leaders. They had a first-class training and were raised in an environment which provided them with the best of both a lengthy military tradition and the radical new ideas which were the fruit of a combination of the lessons learned by the defeat in World War One, and the fact that Germany after this war had been forced to concentrate only the absolute élite of its military commanders, since the country was only allowed to maintain an Army of 100,000 men. It certainly is not the author’s intention to glorify these military commanders, who served the most inhumane political system the world has ever seen, Nazism, but the fact remains that these German commanders appear in pretty stark contrast to their counterparts on the Allied side. This insight is relevant to an understanding of the events before, during, and after the Ardennes Battle.

That the British tabloid press almost from the onset came to call this the ’Rundstedt Offensive’ hardly was far-fetched. Generalfeldmarschall Gerd von Rundstedt, the Supreme Commander on the Western Front, was one of the German field marshals that the Allies had the greatest respect for. ’He was looked upon as one of the most brilliant strategists in the Heer, and according to some evaluations, he was rated superior to the Generalfeldmarschalls von Manstein and von Kluge,’ wrote Percy E. Schramm at the OKW.¹

Karl Rudolf Gerd von Rundstedt was born on 12 December 1875 into a family of the German noblility with military roots going back to Medieval times. His father, Gerd Arnold Konrad von Rundstedt, had served as a major general in the Franco-German war of 1870-1871. After primary school, von Rundstedt junior was accepted at a so-called military cadet school at the age twelve, and he would remain in the military until the end of World War II in May 1945. When the Great War broke out in 1914, von Rundstedt had graduated from General Staff Training at the famous Prussian War Academy in Berlin, and served with the rank of a captain (Hauptmann) as the operations officer in an infantry division.

In the Reichswehr—the small 100,000-man army allowed to Germany by the Versailles Treaty—von Rundstedt advanced rapidly, and when Hitler seized power in 1933, he was a Generalleutnant and commanded the troops in the whole of eastern Germany. According to Percy E. Schramm, von Rundstedt can be described as the ’personification of that tradition which the German General Staff had inherited from Moltke and Schlieffen,’ whose ’significance—apart from inborn gifts which can never really be replaced by education and training—was methodical cultivation of the power of thinking and, by that means, a special faculty of seeing and judging which maintains a distinct ratio between imagination and sobriety.’²

Shortly before the outbreak of World War II, von Rundstedt retired from the Army with the rank of Generaloberst, but he returned to active duty in August 1939 and led the German Southern Army Group during the invasion of Poland. His chief of staff by that time, Generalleutnant Erich von Manstein, describes von Rundstedt as ’an operationally brilliant soldier. He always took note of what was essential and concentrated fully on that. He was absolutely indifferent to all trifle matters. His personality was one that can be described as a chevalier of the old school.’³

In May 1940 von Rundstedt led Heeresgruppe A which carried out the great breakthrough in the Ardennes, and then in just ten days advanced to the coast of the English Channel to surround the Allied armies, and forcing them to undertake the evacuation at Dunkirk. Thus, his army group laid the foundation for one of Germany’s most brilliant military victories. After the surrender of France he was himself, in July 1940, promoted to the rank of field marshal. One year later, von Rundstedt led Heeresgruppe Sud in the invasion of the Soviet Union, and in the double envelopment battles at Uman and Kiev he won the war’s greatest victories in numerical terms, with the result that most of the Ukraine fell into German hands, together with 665,000 Soviet prisoners of war.

Being a self-conscious conservative military commander, von Rundstedt frequently was at odds with Hitler—concerning anything from opposition to the appointment of von Reichenau to Chief of the General Staff in 1934, to criticism of the invasion of the Sudeten area in 1938, the ousting of an Einsatzgruppe from von Rundstedt’s sector in southern Poland, and the unauthorized retreat during the Red Army’s counter-attack at Rostov in November 1941. The latter resulted in von Rundstedt getting dismissed by Hitler—and it would not be the only occasion. But von Rundstedt’s high capacity as a military commander over and over again forced Hitler to turn to him and ask him to reassume his former command, which the faithful nationalist von Rundstedt always accepted. As early as in March 1942, he was appointed Supreme Commander in the West, OB West. In this position he encountered the Allied landing in Normandy on 6 June 1944, a day when he was up at three in the morning to lead the defensive battle.

Von Rundstedt’s experience told him that if the Allied bridgeheads were not wiped out by the end of the first day of the Invasion, the battle would be lost, which indeed proved to be a correct assessment. Having permitted an armored force to withdraw out of the range of the Allied naval artillery at Normandy, in clear defiance of Hitler’s instructions, von Rundstedt was yet again dismissed from his post. But as we have seen, Hitler had him reinstated as OB West in September 1944. By that time, von Rundstedt was an aged man—he was about to turn sixty-nine—but as it would prove, his military capacity was unimpaired. The weaknesses resulting from von Rundstedt’s relatively advanced age were offset by his young and energetic chief of staff, Siegfried Westphal, who at the age of only 42 was a general.

Von Rundstedt’s counterpart on the Allied side, the American four-star General Dwight D. Eisenhower—Supreme Commander of the Allied forces in Northwestern Europe, Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF)—was different from the aged nobleman von Rundstedt in several respects. To begin with, Eisenhower was twenty-five years younger, and grew up in a poor Kansas family in the ’Wild West Era’ at the end of the Nineteenth Century. At twenty-one, ’Ike,’ as he was called already by then, began his studies at the U.S. Military Academy West Point. English was his best subject, but otherwise there was nothing special about his study results.⁴

When Eisenhower in November 1942 was appointed Supreme Commander of Allied Forces of the North African Theater of Operations, he neither had any combat experience, nor any previous experience commanding a larger military unit. Throughout World War One, he had served as a troop trainer in the USA, and in 1918 he was promoted to the rank of major, a rank he would keep for sixteen years. In the years between the wars he served as a staff officer under several generals, including Douglas MacArthur in the Philippines and the future Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, George C. Marshall. But during the fourteen years that preceded America’s entry into World War II in December 1941, Eisenhower had spent no more than nine months as a commander of a military unit, an infantry regiment during training.

In December 1941, recently promoted to Brigadier General, Eisenhower was posted to the General Staff in Washington, where he was charged with the responsibility for creating major war plans against Japan and Germany. The talent he displayed during this work led Marshall to appoint him Commanding General, European Theater of Operations. In June 1942 he was sent to England to prepare the invasion of France. Shortly afterward, he also was appointed to become Supreme Commander of the Allied Force of the North African Theater of Operations. In this theater of war, a counter-attack by Rommel in February 1943 dealt the U.S. Army a stinging defeat. Although Eisenhower had his merits when it came to selecting skilled staff officers and subordinate commanders, the ability to develop budding talents was not his forte. ’Subordinate commanders and staff had to perform or leave. When an officer disappointed him, he immediately asked Marshall for a replacement.’⁵ Eisenhower dismissed the commander of the Army Corps that had sustained the hardest blow from the Germans, and re-organized the troops, but the turning point in North Africa was more due to a growing Allied superiority—not least in the air.

In early 1944, Eisenhower reassumed command of the military forces in England, and in February 1944 was officially designated as the Supreme Allied Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF)—the position where we shall find him during the Ardennes Battle. Chester Wilmot describes Eisenhower as ’the most successful commander of Allied forces in the history of war.’ ⁶ Omar Bradley, commanding U.S. 12th Army Group, nevertheless felt that ’Ike’s African record clearly demonstrates that he did not know how to manage a battlefield.’ ⁷ British Field Marshal Montgomery wrote in his memoirs:

It was always clear to me that Ike and I were poles apart when it came to the conduct of war. My military doctrine was based on unbalancing the enemy while keeping well-balanced myself. I planned always to make the enemy commit his reserves on a wide front in order to plug in holes in his defences; having forced him to do this, I then committed my own reserves on a narrow front in a hard blow. […] Eisenhower’s creed appeared to me to be that there must be aggressive action on the part of everyone at all times. Everybody must attack all the time. ⁸

American military historian Steven Metz concludes his analysis of Eisenhower as a strategist: ’As a product of the American strategic tradition Eisenhower was imminently comfortable with the direct, linear, materialistic mode of warfare mastered by Grant.’ Metz also opines that Eisenhower ’was cautious, sometimes to the point of debility,’ which partially was due to ’a desire to minimize Allied casualties,’ but possibly also ’a lack of confidence in untested American troops and leaders.’⁹ One of many harsh—if also laced—assessments made by Montgomery on Eisenhower’s military capacity, was: ‘Nice chap, no general.’¹⁰ Nevertheless, as we shall see, Eisenhower’s strategic overview was no worse than that it would play a decisive role to the Allied victory in the Ardennes Battle; a truly weak and incompetent Supreme Commander would rather have panicked and become paralyzed, which is the direct opposite of ’Ike’s’ own reactions during the first days after the German breakthrough.

Something that everyone seems to agree on is that one of Eisenhower’s strongest sides was his ability to reconcile the British and the Americans, which, during the prevailing circumstances, was absolutely invaluable. According to Stephen Ambrose, who has written an extensive biography of him, ’Eisenhower’s emphasis on teamwork, his never-flagging insistence on working together, was the single most important reason for his selection [to Allied Supreme Commander], much more important than his generalship, which in truth had been cautious and hesitant.’¹¹ This actually is well in line with the German file on Eisenhower during World War II, which reads, ’His strongest point is said to be an ability to adjust personalities to one another and smooth over opposite viewpoints.’¹²

Three of the key figures on the American side during the Ardennes Battle: From left to right, Lieutenant General Omar N. Bradley, the supreme commander General Dwight D. Eisenhower, and Lieutenant General George S. Patton. Bradley advanced to become the Chairman of the NATO Military Committee after the war. He passed away in 1981 at the age of 88. Eisenhower made a post-war political career as the Republican Party’s presidential candidate, and was the president of the United States in 1953-1961. Eisenhower passed away in 1969. Patton was killed in a car crash in Germany a few months after the war ended in 1945. (NARA, US Signal Corps 199996)

In some respects, Generalfeldmarschall Walter Model, the commander of German Army Group Heeresgruppe B, had more in common with Eisenhower than with his superior von Rundstedt. Model and Eisenhower were of almost the same age. As the son of a humble music teacher in a small German town, the former was quite far from the spheres of the Nobility. Just as Eisenhower, Model was a devout Christian, and there also was a certain similarity in appearance between them. But apart from their military careers, the similarities between the two end there.

Model’s merits on the Eastern Front rendered him the nickname of ‘the Führer’s Fire Soldier,’ and Hitler described him as ‘my best field marshal.’ Walter Model was one among very few men who were able to subdue Hitler. It has been said that during a heated discussion between the two on a tactical matter on the Eastern Front, Model looked Hitler straight in the eyes and said, ‘Who is actually in command at the Front—you or I, mein Führer?’ —whereafter Hitler backed down.

Model’s military career began as a staff officer during World War One and in the Reichswehr. Early in World War II he served as chief of staff in the 16. Armee, and during the invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941 he advanced from a divisional commander to a corps commander, and in January 1942 was appointed to lead the 9. Armee. In this position he contributed most decisively to overcome the German crisis caused by the Red Army’s great Winter Offensive. Model’s character has already been described in the previous chapter. However, it must be added that it has been asserted that he was at his best on the defensive. After all, he had utterly failed when in July 1943 he had attacked the Red Army north of Kursk, but on the other hand the opponent he was up against in the Ardennes in December 1944 was not as powerful as his enemy on the Eastern Front had been eighteen months earlier.

Omar Nelson Bradley, commanding U.S. 12th Army Group which stood against Model’s forces, was born in 1893, also as the son of a school teacher. ’Brad’ Bradley graduated with the score ’Excellent’ at West Point in 1915, in the so-called ’Class the stars fell on,’ to which not only Eisenhower, but also several among the future commanders in the Ardennes Battle belonged. He never participated in World War One, but in the inter-war years he studied at the War Academy at Fort Leavenworth, and served as a troop trainer at the Infantry School at Fort Benning. In North Africa in 1942 he was Eisenhower’s closest associate, and he commanded U.S. II Corps during the final battle of Tunisia in the spring of 1943 and the invasion of Sicily.

The assessments of Bradley differ quite substantially. Eisenhower called him ’the greatest battleline commander I have met in this war.’¹³ On the other hand, the American general Patton characterized Bradley as ’insufferably cautious, predictable and orthodox.’¹⁴ However, it should be kept in mind that the difference in temper hardly could be greater than between the choleric and flamboyant Patton and the more phlegmatic, and quiescent Bradley. Chester Wilmot is of the opinion that Bradley was a skilful tactician but less able in the strategic field. Wilmot wrote, ’[Bradley] was successful in conducting operations so long as someone else was controlling the battle as a whole, preserving the balance of the force, maneuvering the enemy into a vulnerable position and then developing the concentration necessary for a decisive stroke. Bradley could deliver the stroke but he was less able to create the opportunity for it. The basic difference between Bradley and Montgomery was that, whereas Bradley moved at the dictates of the situation responding tactically, Montgomery endeavoured to mould situations to his will acting strategically.’¹⁵

Field Marshal Bernard Law Montgomery, the commander of the British-Canadian 21 Army Group, was born in 1887 as the son of a clergyman. His grandfather was a well-known British colonial administrator in India. Having graduated from the Royal Military College, Sandhurst in 1908, Montgomery junior served as an officer in India, and in World War One on the Western Front, where he was highly decorated for bravery in combat. After studies at the Staff College, Camberley, he held various positions, among them as the commander of an infantry brigade which fought the Irish Rebellion in the 1920s. Early in World War II he commanded first a division, and then an army corps which was evacuated at Dunkirk in 1940. However, owing to his outspoken and fearless candor, it took quite some time before he was promoted again.

His victory against Rommel at el-Alamein in 1942 decided Montgomery’s continued military career as well as his obituary. Montgomery undoubtedly was one of the most able among the Allied senior commanders.* In the Ardennes Battle in the winter of 1944/1945, he was without question the most experienced allied senior commander. Chester Wilmot summarizes the difference between Montgomery and the American generals in the conduct of military operations as: ’Montgomery’s approach was scientific; theirs [the American generals] was emotional.’¹⁶Patrick Delaforce describes Montgomery as ’the master of the totally planned battle, usually with attritional artillery, tank and air support.’¹⁷ The file on Montgomery in von Rundstedt’s headquarters agrees that he was ’very systematic,’ adding—perhaps not without bitterness—‘which is all right if you have sufficient resources and sufficient time.’¹⁸

Military historian John Ellis is strongly critical of Montgomery, who, according to Ellis, ’relied, like a latter-day Verdun [the notorious battle of attrition during World War One] on brute force and sheer material preponderance.’¹⁹ Ellis is of the opinion that Montgomery’s ’aggressiveness was that of the energetic fencer, not that of the general who annihilates enemy armies, of Napoleon, of Grant, of Moltke.’²⁰ On Montgomery’s accomplishments during the sweep through France and Belgium in August 1944-1945, Ellis writes, ’Just as with Patton during the dash to the Meuse, the advance to Antwerp was simply a case of the British taking up the slack as the Germans withdrew. The hallmark of the good mobile commander would have been to catch the Germans rather than simply to plough along in their wake. And surely even a moderately competent commander would have put the lid on the [German] Fifteenth Army Kessel around the Scheldt Estuary.’²¹ Moreover, Ellis asserts that the failure of Operation ’Market Garden’ showed ’Montgomery and the army he had created in the worst possible light, revealing serious lapses in planning as well as severe shortcomings in operational and tactical command.’²²

Montgomery indeed made a number of mistakes, particularly so during the pursuit operation in late summer of 1944, but the ’caution’ he often is accused of also can be regarded as an expression of a realistic assessment of the ability of his own troops against their German opponent, as we shall see in conjunction with Montgomery’s counter-offensive in the Ardennes further on. It also is the author’s opinion that the criticism voiced by Ellis against Montgomery during the Ardennes Battle is exaggerated and fails to take take some vital conditions into consideration. More on this later.

The flamboyant George Smith Patton, Jr., born on 11 November 1885, commanded U.S. Third Army in France and belonged to Montgomery’s harshest antagonists. Patton was both eccentric and exhibitionistic, and became famous for his outspokenness. Patrick Delaforce describes him as ’a swashbuckling aristocrat, egotistical, bombastic and frequently reckless, […] nevertheless a brilliant armored formation commander.’²³ As an athlete—he represented the United States in modern pentathlon at the Olympic Games in Stockholm in 1912—Patton had a remarkable physical and mental energy. His indomitable energy, fighting spirit and optimism were invaluable when it came to instilling courage and motivation in his troops—who knew him as ’Ol’ Blood and Guts.’ None of the other American generals in the Ardennes Battle could compete with Patton in that regard. He was born in an American family with strong military traditions; his grandfather—after whom Patton Junior received his name—had fallen as a Confederate colonel in the American Civil War. Having participated in the ’punitive expedition’ against Mexican rebel leader Pancho Villa, Patton Junior took part in the fighting on the Western Front during World War One, as the first officer of the new U.S. Armored Corps.

Stationed in Hawaii during the inter-war years, Patton drafted a defensive plan that foresaw the Japanese air attack on Pearl Harbor—ten years before this took place, which says quite a lot about Patton’s strategic ability. Patton also pioneered the development of armored warfare doctrine in the USA, and with the rank of a major general he commanded the U.S. troops that landed in Morocco in November 1942. During the subsequent invasion of Sicily—where he with the rank of a lieutenant general commanded U.S. Seventh Army—his brusqueness came into the limelight through a couple of incidents. Ahead of the invasion, he encouraged his men not to show the enemy any mercy. This was taken too literally by some of his soldiers, resulting in the infamous ’Biscari Massacre,’ when American soldiers killed a number of prisoners of war. In his diary, Patton described this as ’a great error,’ and he wished the officers to ’certify that the dead men were snipers or had attempted to escape or something, as it would make a stink in the press.’²⁴ To the German Army, such events were commonplace, at least on the Eastern Front—Model, for instance, was described as ’undeniably harsh in his dealings with Russian civilians’²⁵—but the American Army claimed to serve a Democracy, and also was scrutinized by a relatively free press. When Patton a few days later assailed a U.S. soldier who had been admitted to medical care because of post-traumatic stress, the press got wind of it, with the result that he was deprived of his command.

Patton’s rivalry with Montgomery has been discussed earlier.** According to Wilmot, one of the main differences in the way the two Allied commanders led military operations lay in how they regarded reserves. ’Patton took the view that, since attack is the best method of defense, all the forces at a commander’s disposal should be employed in the line, and, if possible, aggressively. […] Montgomery, on the other hand, believed in Wellington’s precept that reserves are the foundation of victory.’²⁶

American myths have been woven around Patton, in particular after his tragic death in a car accident in Germany only a few months after the end of the war. The fact remains that Patton’s Third Army achieved great victories on the Western Front in 1944-1945, but in his analysis of Patton, John Ellis arrives at the conclusion that his greatness mainly came from being ’a masterly logistician who could do things on a limited road net that most formations would require a computer to work out,’ but Ellis also argues that Patton was ’not a particularly successful combat commander.’²⁷ This of course is quite controversial, but Ellis explains, ’General Patton should always be remembered as one of the best traffic policemen in the history of warfare, but in no other way does his advance really stand up as a significant military achievement,’ since ’throughout the whole pursuit [through France in August-September 1944], indeed, except for a few scattered outposts, the Germans remained just out of Patton’s reach’—which Ellis does not hesitate to characterize as ’an American failure.’²⁸ He describes Patton’s ’tremendous talent for probing into a disintegrating defence,’ but adds that this was coupled with ’a much less sure grasp of the attack proper.’²⁹

Asked after the end of the war to review Patton’s armored tactics, SS-Brigadeführer Max Simon (who commanded the XIII. SS-Korps against Patton in Lorraine in November 1944) compared this to ’breaking down a wall by taking out one brick at a time.’ Simon said that Patton spread out his tanks ’among several local attacks instead of being concentrated at one point,’ and added that ’had you made such attacks (an attack of 5-20 tanks accompanying the infantry) on the Eastern Front, where our anti-tank guns were echeloned in depth, all your tanks would have been destroyed.’³⁰As we shall see further on, such assessments of the enemy nevertheless must be regarded with some skepticism, and Ellis might be too harsh in his review of Patton. Indeed, Patton made some tactical and strategic errors, but he also achieved some of the American Army’s greatest victories in Europe during World War II, and beyond all doubt Patton’s personality played a significant role to the U.S. troops on the Western Front in 1944-1945.

A comparable role to the Germans during the Ardennes Battle was played by General von Manteuffel, the commander of the 5. Panzerarmee. Hasso-Eccard Freiherr von Manteuffel was born on 14 Januari 1897 in an old Pomeranian noble family with military traditions. Although short-statured—he measured only five foot two—he enjoyed a tremendous respect. Like so many sons of the German nobility, von Manteuffel began his military career in the cavalry. He participated in World War One, where he was wounded. After the war he was tempted to join the new armored force, starting with officer training in Heinz Guderian’s 2. Panzer-Division and advancing to become a professor at Panzer Training School II.

At the outbreak of World War II, he had reached the rank of an Oberstleutnant. Two years later he applied to be transferred to a first-line unit, and commanded a batallion of the 7. Panzer-Division during the invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941. Being a lower ranking officer of the German nobility, he was like a red rag to his superior on the Eastern Front, Walter Model. The relation between these two diametrically opposed personalities reached its lowest ebb when von Manteuffel on one occasion refused to comply with Model’s order to carry out an attack which he felt was suicidal. If it had not been for the intervention of a superior, von Manteuffel would have been court-martialed.

Having led an armored force against the Americans in Tunisia in the spring of 1943, von Manteuffel returned to the Eastern Front to lead at first the 7. Panzer-Division, and then the crack division Grossdeutschland. In 1943 and 1944, von Manteuffel conducted several impressive counterattacks against the Soviets in the Ukraine, Moldova, and Lithuania. In February 1944 he was awarded the Swords to the Knight’s Cross with Oak Leaves—as one of at that time only fifty German soldiers. Even though von Manteuffel never attempted to hide his contempt for the Nazi ideology, he became one of Hitler’s favourites, and in September 1944 the Führer promptly promoted him to the rank of General der Panzertruppen and assigned him to command the 5. Panzerarmee on the Western Front.

General der Panzertruppen Hasso von Manteuffel commanded German 5. Panzerarmee during the Ardennes Battle. After the war, von Manteuffel made a political career in the German liberal party FDP, which he represented in the German Bundestag from 1953 to 1957. In early 1953, he played an important role when the West German Bundeswehr was formed. Von Manteuffel passed away in 1978. (BArch, Picture 146-1976-143-21)

When von Manteuffel reported to Model, his superior on the Western Front, there was a palpable tension in the air. Model watched him coolly and said, ’We had our differences on the Eastern Front.’ Von Manteuffel nodded. ’Well, it is a closed chapter,’ Model continued, ’now we have a common task and have to get along.’ Thus the conflict was removed from the face of the earth. It was an expression of the professional attitude of the two commanders. In his new assignment, von Manteuffel would decisively contribute to the stabilization of the German Western Front.

The contrast between von Manteuffel and the commander of 6. SS-Panzerarmee, Josef ’Sepp’ Dietrich, could not have been larger. Born out of wedlock by a working class woman in Bavaria in 1892, Dietrich was a butcher’s apprentice in his early teens. Having participated as a Gefreiter and Unteroffizier in World War One, he joined a right-extremist militia, one of the so-called Freikorps, and took part in the crushing of the Bavarian Soviet Republic in 1919. Dietrich migrated from one job to another—including waiter, farm laborer and customs officer—and joined the Nazi Party in 1928, where he rose to become the commander of Hitler’s personal bodyguard. Without any real officer training, Dietrich was appointed to command the first front-line unit of the SS, Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler, which became notorious for a row of bestial encroachments. On Hitler’s birthday on 20 April 1942, Dietrich was promoted to the rank of an SS-Oberst-Gruppenführer (the equivalence of the Wehrmacht’s Generaloberst).

’Ordinarily, he would make a fair sergeant major, a better sergeant and a first-class corporal,’ was the assessment on Dietrich by the SS general Paul Hausser, who served with Dietrich on both the Eastern and the Western fronts.³¹ SS-Obergruppenführer Wilhelm Bittrich, who commanded one of the panzer corps in Dietrich’s 6. SS-Panzerarmee, related to one less flattering incident regarding his superior: ’I once spent an hour and a half trying to explain a situation to Sepp Dietrich with the aid of a map. It was quite useless. He understood nothing at all.’³² Model and von Rundstedt were quite concerned that Hitler on mainly political and sentimental grounds had appointed a man deccribed by von Rundstedt as ’decent but stupid’ to command the most powerful panzer army of the Ardennes Offensive.³³ At this time, Dietrich was also only a shadow of his former energetic self. Percy E. Schramm relates how Dietrich by this time mostly engaged in ’noisy parties with plenty of drinks […] he had meanwhile lost his enthusiasm for self-sacrifices. Now, he first considered himself and his family. He was therefore also no longer capable of inspiring his divisions with the enthusiasm which had formerly emanated from him.’³⁴

Lieutenant General Courtney Hodges, the commander of U.S. First Army, which would take the brunt of the German attack, differed from all of these commanders. Born in 1887, Courtney Hicks Hodges neither was particularly well-educated, nor a colorful personality. He has been described as a quiet and withdrawn man. Bewhiskered and with a sad, almost pessimistic facial expression, he had the appearance more of a traveling salesman than an Army general. As a commander he was ’little known to his troops despite significant efforts to enhance his image and popularity.’³⁵Hodges was accepted at the Military Academy West Point in 1904, but failed to graduate because of poor test scores.³⁶ In 1906 he enlisted in the U.S. Army as a private, served under Patton in Mexico and was highly awarded and promoted for bravery in combat during World War One. In the inter-war years, Hodges worked his way up ’the long way’ and was promoted to major general in 1941. When Bradley in August 1944 was assigned to lead the 12th Army Group, Hodges took over the vacant post as the commander of U.S. First Army.

If any of the generals on the German side during the Ardennes Battle should be compared with Hodges’ relatively anonymous appearance, it would be General Erich Brandenberger, the commander of the 7. Armee on the southern flank. Balding and fitted with a pince-nez, fifty-two-year old Brandenberger corresponded to the stereotype of a German general staff officer. Having participated as a front soldier in World War One and a staff officer in the interim-war years, Brandenberger commanded an armored division on the Eastern Front. Prior to being appointed to command the 7. Armee, he had led an armored corps on the Eastern Front since 1943.

Percy E. Schramm depicts Brandenberger as ’the typical general staff officer, thoroughly trained and used to obeying orders; his features were somewhat similar to a scientist’s, and he corresponded to the type of the “working-bee.”’³⁷ But Brandenberger also was in continual contact with his first-line soldiers, had ’a good understanding of their worries and plight, and was recognized for his personal courage.’³⁸ However, to place a man like the scrupulous Brandenberger under the command of the brusque Field Marshal Model perhaps was not a very good choice; these two diametrically opposed personalities would soon clash, and the rising tension between them eventually led to Model’s dismissal of Brandenberger in February 1945.³⁹ Still, in view of the available resources, none of the other military commanders—on both sides—performed better than Brandenberger and his 7. Armee during the Ardennes Battle in 1944/1945.

On a Corps level the Germans also had gathered some excellent commanders for ’Herbstnebel.’ Forty-eight-year old General Heinrich Count von Lüttwitz commanded the XLVII. Panzerkorps on the 5. Panzerarmee’s southern flank. Embellished with a monococle in his right eye, he was a veteran of World War One and had served as the commander of various units—including the 2. Panzer-Division at Normandy in 1944—since the beginning of World War II. The LVIII. Panzerkorps, in the center of the 5. Panzerarmee’s front, was commanded by General Walter Krüger, of the same age and with a military career quite similar to that of von Lüttwitz. They had both been transferred to the 5. Panzerarmee on the request of von Manteuffel, who wrote, ’They were the most able panzer commanders on the Western Front, and they also brought along well-functioning staffs’⁴⁰

SS-Oberst-Gruppenführer Josef ’Sepp’ Dietrich, the commander of 6. SS-Panzerarmee, here along with some of his SS troops during the Ardennes Battle in the winter of 1944/1945. In 1946, Dietrich was sentenced to 25 years in prison for ordering the execution of prisoners of war. Released on parole on 22 October 1955, he was rearrested in 1956 and brought to trial for his participation in the Night of the Long Knives. He was sentenced to another 19 months in prison. Released from jail, Dietrich worked for the Hilfsgemeinschaft auf Gegensei-tigkeit der Angehörigen der ehemaligen Waffen-SS (HIAG; Mutual Help Association of Former Waffen-SS Members). He died of a heart attack in Stuttgart in 1966. (BArch, Picture 183-J28625/Roeder)

Ten years older General Walther Lucht commanded the LXVI. Armeekorps on the 5. Panzerarmee’s northern flank. Lucht served as an officer in the German General Staff in World War One, and participated in the Spanish Civil War in the 1930s as the Artillery Commander in the Condor Legion. In World War II he continued to serve with the Artillery until he was appointed to command an infantry division, whereby he distinguished himself during the defensive battle to the west of Stalingrad in the Winter of 1942/1943. The LXVI. Armeekorps previously had served as a reserve corps in southern France, under Lucht’s command since November 1943.

Immediately to the left (south) of von Lüttwitz’s Panzer Corps stood the northernmost Corps of the 7. Armee, the LXXXV. Armeekorps under General Baptist Kniess (Knieβ). In pure numbers, this corps, with its 24,000 troops, equalled just one and a half division in the U.S. Army. Fifty-nine-year old Kniess had a career quite similar to that of the corps commanders of the 5. Panzerarmee. Having led an infantry division in the West in 1940 and on the Eastern Front in 1941-1942, he served as a corps commander in occupied France. Neither was the LXXX. Armeekorps, the other Army corps in the 7. Armee and the southernmost attack force in ’Herbstnebel,’ composed of more than a pair of divisions. The Corps commander, fifty-two-year old General Franz Beyer, served as a Navy officer in World War One and advanced from regimental commander to corps commander on the Eastern Front between 1941 and 1944. His merits as a unit commander earned him the Knight’s Cross. In addition to these two corps, the 7. Armee had the LIII. Armeekorps in reserve. This was commanded by General Edward Graf von Rothkirch und Trach, whose accomplishments as a corps and divisional commander on the Eastern Front in 1942-1943 had gained him the appraisal of his superiors.

The front sector that the six army corps of these two German armies were assigned to attack was held by a single corps of U.S. First Army—the VIII Corps. The corps commander, fifty-five-year old Major General Troy H. Middleton—with his headquarters located at the Heintz Barracks in Bastogne—was a veteran from both the war against Pancho Villa and the Western Front during World War One. In 1937 he retired from the Army and instead became dean of administration at Louisiana State University. Nevertheless, he was recalled to military service in 1942, and commanded an infantry division on Sicily and in Italy in 1943-1944. When the commander of U.S. VIII Corps in England in March 1944 was demoted to the position of a divisional commander, Middleton was assigned to lead this corps, earmarked for the Normandy Invasion.*

Major General Troy Houston Middleton commanded the VIII Corps of U.S. First Army on the Western Front in 1944-1945. Here he is seen during an inspection tour in the Ardennes in January 1945. (NARA/ Mallinder, US Signal Corps)

The Commander of U.S. XVIII Airborne Corps, Major General Matthew B. Ridgway, who worked in close cooperation with Middleton during the Ardennes Battle, described him as ’a magnificent soldier with a wonderful combat record in two wars.’⁴¹ Patton is said to have characterized Middleton as ’a man who knows how to fight.’⁴² In April 1945 Patton sent Middleton a letter where he praised his contribution to the victory in the Ardennes. ’Your decision to hold Bastogne was a stroke of genius,’ wrote Patton, who also described Middleton’s decision to hold Bastogne’—which Patton himself at that time, in December 1944, failed to see the wisdom of—as an expression of ’tactical prescience.’⁴³

Without doubt, Middleton’s decision to hold Bastogne, in the face of the fact that several first-line units on this sector had been badly mauled, was one of the most important Allied decisions during the entire Ardennes Battle—in essence, it determined the outcome of the Battle. Later, Middleton would hand over direct command in Bastogne to Brigadier General Anthony McAuliffe of the 101st Airborne Division (which had been called in from U.S. XVIII Airborne Corps in the reserve)—a most able commander who would put his personal mark on the defensive battle.

However, some of the decisions made by Middleton as the commander of the VIII Corps were sharply criticised by his superior, Patton. Although Middleton’s corps formed the spearhead of the American Normandy breakthrough at Avranches in July/August 1944, and despite the fact that he had the two perhaps best armored divisions of the U.S. Army at his disposal—the 4th and the 6th—Patton found the way in which Middleton led the operation to be too cautious. On 1 August 1944 Patton wrote in his diary, ’I cannot make out why Middleton was so apathetic or dumb. I don’t know what was the matter with him.’⁴⁴ When Middleton shortly afterward halted the 6th Armored Division’s lightning advance towards the French port of Brest and instead directed it against against a German pocket of resistance at Dinan, 125 miles further to the east, Patton exploded with rage. ’Don’t take any notice of [Middleton’s] order,’ he told the commander of the armored division, Major General Grow. ’Get going and keep going until you get to Brest!’⁴⁵

According to one military analyst, Middleton was ’overwhelmed at times in command of the pursuit operation.’⁴⁶ Nevertheless, both Eisenhower and Patton testified to Middleton’s ’extraordinary abilities’ as a Corps commander. Following the Ardennes Battle he led the VIII Corps straight through Germany, whereby the corps reached one of the concentration camps at Buchenwald, the first of its kind to become liberated by U.S. troops. With 480 days in combat during World War II, Middleton held the record among all American generals in that war.

The commander of U.S. V Corps, Major General Leonard T. Gerow, perhaps was the most able among all senior commanders in the U.S. Army during the Ardennes Battle. Born in 1888, Gerow graduated as Number One in the class at the Advanced Course at Infantry School at Fort Benning in 1924.** Next, Gerow attended the U.S. Army Command and General Staff School (at the same time as Eisenhower), graduating in 11th position among 245 students.

Gerow played an important role in the planning of the Normandy Invasion, and on 6 June 1944 he was the first corps commander to set his foot on the landing beaches. Gerow had more service years than both Bradley and Eisenhower, and during the Ardennes Battle he displayed a military judgment which outmatched that of all his superiors. Still, he has been relatively neglected in American military history, and in his legacy, it seems as though his full military capacity has not been fully appreciated—which could be partly because he never won Marshall’s full approval, and besides neither bothered too much about his own publicity. However, in a personal letter to Gerow, Eisenhower wrote, ’In every respect you have deserved recognition far above myself.’⁴⁷

On the sector held by the V Corps, the northern flank of the Ardennes Front, the least able German commanders were also to be found. We already have dealt with the C-in-C of the 6. SS-Panzerarmee, Sepp Dietrich. SS-Gruppenführer Hermann Priess (Prieβ) commanded the I. SS-Panzerkorps—the incomparably strongest among the various corps launched by the Germans in Operation ’Herbstnebel.’ Forty-three-year old Priess had served for twelve years with the Reichswehr when in 1934 he joined the SS. Here, Priess commanded various Waffen-SS units in combat during most of World War II, and thus accumulated a considerable military experience.

However, he was restricted by his superior Dietrich. In a strongly critical report, Oberst Heinz Kokott, commanding the Wehrmacht’s 26. Volksgrenadier-Division during the Ardennes Battle, fumes at the ’total lack of discipline’ and pure ’stupidity’ that characterized I. SS-Panzerkorps.⁴⁸

The II. SS-Panzerkorps constituted the 6. SS-Panzerarmee’s reserve force. Its commander, SS-Obergruppenführer Wilhelm Bittrich, also was a veteran of World War One and the Reichswehr when he joined the SS. Sepp Dietrich had less influence on the II. SS-Panzerkorps once this was brought into action, since this panzer corps cooperated closely with von Manteuffel’s Army, whereby Model took a more active part in the coordination of the II. Panzerkorps’s actions with the 5. Panzerarmee. Partly because of this, Bittrich’s corps would operate with larger success than Priess’ SS corps.

Far to the north stood German LXVII. Armeekorps under Generalleutnant Otto Hitzfeld—another quite experienced and highly decorated German commanding officer. Nevertheless, this army corps would be neutralized by Gerow’s V Corps even before the German offensive opened, as we shall see later.

Having conducted a thorough-going analysis of the U.S. Army in World War II, military historian Martin van Creveld arrived at the conclusion that ‘the American officer corps of World War II was less than mediocre.’ He continues, ‘Owing partly no doubt to pressure of time, the methods used to select and train officers were none too successful. Far too many officers had soft jobs in the rear, far too few commanded at the front. Those who did command at the front were, as the official history frankly admits and the casualty figures confirm, often guilty of bad leadership. Between them and their German opposite numbers there simply is no comparison possible.’⁴⁹ Statistics show that during the Ardennes Battle, 40.7 percent of the officers of the American (ground) Army were to be found in the Army Services (Engineer Corps, Medical Corps, Signal Corps, Quartermaster Corps, Military Police, Chemical Warfare Service, and Transportation Corps), while the corresponding share in the Wehrmacht in 1944 was 17.4 percent.⁵⁰

This of course often resulted in a significant difference between both sides in combat, where the Germans often reacted with greater swiftness and efficiency than their American opponent. This was not only due to generally more qualified officers on the German side, but can also be explained by a superior German military doctrine. The military experiences of Prussia and Germany during the Eighteenth and Nineteenth centuries, led to the development of what was called Auftragstaktik (Mission Command), an expression coined in the 1890s.⁵¹ This does not refer to a special kind of tactic, but it should rather be understood as a leadership or command philosophy. The essence of Auftragstaktik is that the troops—including unit commanders at lower levels and even rank and file soldiers—are to be carefully informed about the purpose and objectives of a certain operative mission, and then the smallest unit on the front lines is relatively free to be flexible to achieve this objective in the way it sees fit. Basically, it relies on profound psychological and sociological insights, which quite interestingly is the basis for much of our time’s most advanced leadership philosophy.

However, the U.S. Army never developed anything similar to the Auftragstaktik. Martin van Creveld points out that ‘America, after all, was the home of Taylorism; a system of management that tried to foresee and dictate the operative’s every movement with the aim of turning him into a human machine as reliable as the mechanical ones he attended.’⁵²

The thinking which formed the foundation of Auftragstaktik permeated the German Army Field Manual, Truppenführung (Heeresdienstvorschrift 300), which set the tone already in the introductory paragraph, ’The conduct of war is an art, depending upon free, creative activity, scientifically grounded’⁵³ The U.S. equivalence of Truppenführung (Heeresdienstvorschrift 300) was U.S. Army Field Manual FM 100-5, which was published in 1941 and revised in June 1944. Indeed, the latter version of FM 100-5 declared that ‘every individual must be trained to exploit a situation with energy and boldness and must be imbued with the idea that success will depend upon his initiative and action’⁵⁴ This was clearly inspired by, although not as clearly expressed as in Truppenführung, which emphasized that ‘independence of action, properly used, is often the basis of great success’⁵⁵ But FM 100-5 also clarified that decision-making was a matter for the commander and only the commander: ‘Decision as to a specific course of action is the responsibility of the commander alone. While he may accept advice and suggestions from any of his subordinates, he alone is responsible for what his unit does or fails to do’⁵⁶ FM 100-5 of 1941 had exactly the same wording.⁵⁷ In contrast, Truppenführung stressed that ‘the commander must permit freedom of action to his subordinates’⁵⁸

American soldiers and a Sherman advance in a Belgian town in September 1944. (NARA, 111-SC-193903/ Spangle)

The German Army encouraged individual initiatives on the grounds of the shifting situation on the battlefield to a degree that even refusal to follow orders was encouraged, which English and Gudmundsson comment on: ’To a degree unheard of in other armies, the German soldier was expected to do whatever the situation required. […] In extreme cases, this philosophy required that a soldier disobey orders that were inconsistent with the situation.’⁵⁹ For example, this meant that German ‘units which encountered resistance […] were expected to leave their own assigned sector and follow in the wake of whatever neighbor was making better progress’—which, English and Gudmundsson point out, ’in other armies might result in a court martial.’⁶⁰

This nevertheless does not induce any dissolution of command; these individual initiatives were unconditionally required to fit within, and promote, the general objective. Truppenführung is quite clear that the commander must permit freedom of action to his subordinates only ’insofar that this does not endanger the whole scheme’ and emphasizes that the commander ’must not surrender to them those decisions for which he alone is responsible.’⁶¹ Truppenführung also gives emphasis to the commander’s role of ‘a leader and a master,’ and urges the commander to seek to gain the confidence of his subordinates not only through ‘his superior knowledge and experience, his earnestness, his self-control and high courage,’ but also by understanding and paying attention to the ’feelings and thoughts’ of his subordinates, and ’through never ceasing care of their needs’⁶² A key sentence reads, ’Mutual trust is the surest basis of discipline’⁶³

After the end of the war, a group of German senior officers led by Franz Halder, previously the Chief of the German Army’s General Staff, made a comparative analysis of U.S. FM 100-5 and the German Field Manual. They arrived at the conclusion that ‘as compared to the German conception of war, the American regulations display a repeated tendency to try and foresee situations and lay down modes of behavior in great detail. This procedure limits a commander’s freedom of action and, by rendering him incapable of handling in accordance with the actual situation, robs him of a very important prerequisite for victory’⁶⁴

American military historian Steven Metz selfcritically asserts that ‘Americans tend to associate strategy with a formal plan. They see it as something that emerges from a byzantine process of coordination and review to be approved by appropriate authorities, assigned a document number, and distributed. Lower echelons then take the newly sacrosanct document, craft miniature replicas, and apply them. This attitude clearly reflects our political culture and our bureaucratized approach to planning in general.’⁶⁵

Indeed, U.S. FM 100-5 speaks of ‘a willingness to accept responsibility’ as ‘the foremost trait of leadership’⁶⁶ But the German Army raised its soldiers, NCOs, and officers to what was called ’readiness/joy to take responsibility’ (Verantwortungsfreudigkeit), which can be described as a permanent readiness to take a personal responsibility for the situation on the battlefield.⁶⁷ German ’NCOs received training that, in other armies, was usually associated with junior officers. This included the playing of tactical decision games, shot scenarios that forced the player to quickly assess the situation, make a decision, and promulgate that decision in the form of orders’⁶⁸

Comradeship in the primary group was the alpha and omega of the German armed forces. It also was one of the reasons for the endurance of many German units during World War II. (Krigsarkivet)

In general, the German soldier training and the treatment of the individual soldiers derived from psychological insights to a far greater extent than what was the case in the U.S. Army. Sociological studies have shown that soldiers tend to fight more for their comrades in the next foxhole than for ‘higher’ objectives such as Nation or Ideology. Hence, the German Army emphasized more than any other army the importance of creating so-called primary groups of soldiers. As far as possible, it was sought to bring together soldiers from the same region into the same unit. In contrast, U.S. military units were composed of, in the words of van Creveld, ‘men called up from any part of the nation’s 3,615,000 square miles without regard to geographical origin’⁶⁹ Having completed their military training, German recruits were grouped together in up to one thousand-men strong so-called March Battalions (Marschbataillon), each of which was intended for one and the same division. To maintain the primary groups, the Germans even allowed the strength of their first-line units to drop far below the assigned strength before they replaced the losses by sending in another march battalion. This then became the subject of a careful process of integration into the first-line unit. Ideally—and this surprisingly often also was achieved—a sense of ‘family membership’ was sought to be created in the German soldier groups.

In the U.S. Army, things looked quite different, as described in a critical American report after the war, ‘Replacements arrived in divisional and regimental areas tired, bewildered and disheartened, after having been shunted from one replacement depot to another, led by officers temporarily appointed for convoy or escort purposes who themselves were more or less bewildered. Field train bivouacs usually were within the sound of guns, and the replacements were acutely and nervously aware that their entry into combat was imminent. They frequently did not know how to take care of themselves’⁷⁰

The different ways in which the recruits were treated was directly reflected in the mental health of these. Between June and November 1944, twenty-six percent of the soldiers in the U.S. first-line units were subject to psychiatric treatment. In the German Army on the Western Front during the same period, the share of soldiers treated for psychological disorders was only one-tenth as large.⁷¹ A large portion of the American soldiers treated for psychological problems were recruits who broke down within the first five days of their arrival at the front.

The German recruits not only received a better military training than their American opponents, but just like the soldiers of the Red Army, they also had a thorough ideological education. This ideological education was not just apprehended as empty phrases, which one may believe if it is looked upon through the spectacles of today’s society; quite to the contrary, it imbued the young recruits with a sense of what they put their lives at risk for. After growing up in a totalitarian society where a conformistic school and Hitler Jugend formed their mindset according to Nazi guidelines, many German teenagers were more than susceptible to the Call of the Front.

‘Ideology, idealism, and firsthand experience was a potent contribution to the extraordinary endurance of the [German soldier], as many […] believed that they were fighting for the very existence of the German community,’ wrote Stephen G. Fritz.⁷² The young German boys were inculcated that they belonged to ’a selected generation’ which would lay the foundation for an almost Messianic Thousand-Year Realm. Shortly before the Ardennes Offensive, an examination among German soldiers in American captivity showed that two-thirds of them still expressed an unbroken confidence in Hitler.⁷³ Taken together, this contributed to an endurance—even under extremely harsh circumstances—that their opponents often regarded as quite inconceivable.*

By the time of the Ardennes Offensive, the German soldiers were significantly affected by years of inadequate nutritional supplements—a result of Germany’s isolation—and this had a long-term impact on their physical strength and health conditions.⁷⁴ Bad soldier’s tobacco, coffee surrogates, uniforms made of artificial fiber that neither lasted nor protected against cold, as well as other defective facilities created a grim ’crisis awareness’ among the German soldiers. In quite a sharp contrast to this situation, the U.S. soldiers were more accustomed than the troops of any army to ample rations, cigarettes of the best quality, genuine coffee, and uniforms of the highest quality.

But the ordeals of the German soldiers—the Landser, as they were called—helped to bolster their need for the fellowship of the primary groups. Numerous testimonies show that the morale on the German side was sky high in December 1944—even ’better than at the beginning of the war,’ according to Oberst Joachim Gutmann of the 2. Panzer-Division.⁷⁵ For several days, the operations officer of the headquarters of Heeresgruppe B, Oberstleutnant Reichhelm, carried out an inspection of all corps and division staffs, and even some regiments and battalions, in Heeresgruppe B, and found that ’the determination of the leaders and the troops to force a decision, now or never, was present to the greatest degree and the morale of the attack divisions was outstanding.’⁷⁶

The commander of the 5. Panzerarmee, von Manteuffel, hardly can be accused of harboring any sympathies for the Nazi ideology; he showed his opposition to those ideas already during the war, and after the war’s end he joined the German Liberal Party FDP. In a report on the Ardennes Offensive issued after the war, he testified to the fact that the average Landser by the time of the Ardennes Offensive was fully convinced that ’Hitler somehow would “solve the matters”.’⁷⁷ Von Manteuffel proceeded:

’To some extent, this owed to the official communiques, which constantly kept talking about the new weapons, about a massive use of new Germn aircraft types and large numbers of U-boats on the oceans, of growing production figures of the German Industry, and so forth. Moreover, he—the simple soldier—had nothing more to lose. In the fall of 1944, hardly any German family had been spared the loss of at least one of their kin. The simple soldier believed in the propaganda that said that it was virtually certain that the German people would be enslaved in the case of an enemy victory. As far as own sacrifices were concerned, the man at the front did not wish to be any worse than the Home Front, where young and old daily made great sacrifices in the foulest conditions—at the cost of their health and sometimes even their lives.’⁷⁸

However, the ordinary American soldier—G.I.*, as he called himself—had no such clear, at least not commonly held, perception of just why he put his own life at risk in the war with Germany. The concept that the Americans fought mainly in order to liberate Europe from the Nazi yoke, to a large extent is a post-war invention.

Paul Fussell, who served as a soldier on the Western Front in 1944-1945, asserts that to the average ‘G.I. Joe,’ the war simply was ‘a bad job that had to be got through.’⁷⁹ This was particularly valid when it came to the war against Germany. ‘To most Americans soldiers and sailors the United States,’ Fussell proceeds, ‘at least, was pursuing the war solely to defend itself from the monsters who had bombed Pearl Harbor without warning. […] For most Americans, the war was about revenge against the Japanese, and the reason why the European part had to be finished first was so that maximum attention could be devoted to the real business, the absolute torment and destruction of the Japanese.’⁸⁰ This led many to regard the enemy ‘simply as an impediment to returning home.’⁸¹

HOW YOUNG WERE THE SOLDIERS?

One concept of the soldiers in the Ardennes Battle that has become entrenched in the public awareness, is that of inadequately trained German teenage soldiers—many of whom were sixteen to seventeen years old—pitted against well-trained and more mature U.S. soldiers. To some extent, this is true regarding the combat fliers (although there hardly were any German airmen below the agee of eighteen), but as far as the ground troops are concerned, this must be dismissed as a myth. The German soldiers in the Ardennes definitely were not younger than their opponents, but many among them were of ‘normal’ soldier’s age. A random sample of 440 German soldier graves at the war cemetery at Recogne north of Bastogne, where 6,807 fallen German soldiers are buried, shows the following:

No one was under the age of 17 6.4 per cent were born in 1927 (i.e. 17 years old in 1944) 17.3 per cent were born in 1926 8.6 per cent were born in 1925 Thus, 32.4 percent of these fallen German soldiers were teenagers at the age of between 17 and 19 131 of these 440 fallen soldiers—29.8 percent—were 30 or older (born in 1914 or earlier, the oldest born in1897) The largest group of fallen soldiers, about 38 percent, were 20-29 years old (born between 1915 and 1924).

In fact, the average American soldier in the Ardennes was younger than his German opponent. A statistical study of the personnel of U.S. 75th Infantry Division in the Ardennes Battle shows that no less than 65 percent of the soldiers were teenagers, aged between 18 and 19.⁸² Michael Collins, author of the book Voices of the Bulge and the documentary with the same name, summarizes the situation in the Ardennes: ‘Twenty-year-old Americans led platoons of 18-and 19-year-old soldiers through the cold and fog.’⁸³

Nor were the American soldiers better trained than their German enemies. Up until 1943, recruits in the U.S. Army received no more than thirteen weeks of military training before they were sent to the front. The training of the German infantrymen was not only of a higher quality, but during most of the war it also was longer than that in the U.S. Army. Only in 1944 was it reduced from sixteen to between twelve and fourteen weeks, but in the Panzer troops it remained at a level of twenty-one weeks throughout the war. On top of this, the recruits received additional training by front veterans in the replacements battalions before they were sent to the frontline.⁸⁴ However, it is an inescapable fact that a large part of the German infantry in the Ardennes Battle was inadequately trained, but the situation was even worse on the American side.**

In the USA, the ambition was to increase infantry training to seventeen weeks, but this was not of the same quality as the German training; according to van Creveld it aimed at producing ’men who could serve their weapons automatically, without thought.’⁸⁵ Throughout the war, the American Army emphasised quantity rather than quality.*** One effect of this was that American infantrymen, according to a survey made by the U.S. Army, ‘in the great majority, continued to hold a low opinion of the importance of their own branch.’⁸⁶

Moreover, the American Army lacked a regular infantry reserve, as pointed out by military historian S.L.A. Marshall.⁸⁷ The increasing losses at Normandy in the summer of 1944 and at the West Wall during the following fall compelled the Americans to shorten the infantry training. This in turn produced absolutely disastrous results, and at no other time was this more evident than during the Ardennes Battle, where four-fifths of the American soldiers were young recruits with often nothing more than a rudimentary infantry training.⁸⁸ George Wilson, who served as a lieutenant and company commander with U.S. 4th Infantry Division during the Ardennes Battle, recalls that on one occasion he received one hundred recruits, none of whom had been at the shooting range more than once, and all of whom lacked experience on how to throw grenades or fire a bazooka, a mortar or a machine gun.⁸⁹ Belton Cooper, a captain in U.S. 3rd Armored Division, meanwhile received a batch of recruits that had been categorized as ’tank crews,’ but where the majority never even had been in or even close to a tank.⁹⁰

Paul Warp, who later servedinfhe 6th Armored Division and participated in the Ardennes Battle in the winter ^1, during his basic military training in the United States. (The Paul Warp Collection)

Taken together, all of this resulted in a certain difference between the soldiers on the battlefield. To the experience the German soldiers had of their opponent at the front, the effect of the Nazi propaganda on the German soldiers’ self-image and image of their opponent should be added. Throughout World War II, the perception thrived within the German Armed Forces that the German soldiers more or less by nature were superior to their opponents. Personal experience on the battlefield, but also ideological indoctrination gave the German soldiers some respect for the British, but for the Americans—Amis, as they called them—very little, according to Paul Fussell.⁹¹ This also is expressed in several German accounts, as the one below, which is taken from the Ardennes Battle:

When it came to a fight, the American soldier undoubtedly fought with great tenacity. But he also was well aware that his side disposed over a tremendous material superiority, on the ground as well as in the air. In addition to that, he was, contrary to the German soldier, rested and his physical condition was on the same level as had been the case with the German soldiers during the war years of 1939-1941—most of whom had fallen by this time. The American soldier often acted according to the principle of ‘better safe than sorry’—which meant that when he had no tank support, a few German assault rifles would sometimes suffice to make entire companies take cover until a wall of fire had driven off the Germans.⁹²

Such statements always have to be taken with a grain of salt, since they actually tell us more about the German attitudes than about the actual character of their enemies. The German soldiers were both exposed and susceptible to a heavy political indoctrination that made them feel superior to their opponents, whom they were taught to look down upon—even in an exaggerated manner.*

Certainly, because of the above-mentioned differences in military training, there was a certain difference between German and American soldiers, particularly regarding the recruits, but after some time in the field, these differences tended to be equalized. The fact that the American soldiers often became less willing to put their lives at risk during the fighting at the West Wall in September 1944—which gave rise to the German soldiers’ self-glorifying myths—in fact is not particularly remarkable. It is a well-known phenomenon that soldiers who feel that their own side more or less has victory in the war secured, will be less willing to expose themselves to risks than otherwise. The German Army suffered from the same phenomenon in front of Moscow in the fall of 1941.

In reality, the ordinary American soldier was just as brave as anyone else during circumstances that demanded so—which we shall see in the account of the Ardennes Battle. In particular, he was dutiful and excellent at following orders to the letter; when instructed to hold a certain position, he usually did so until all possibilities were exhausted. This was something the Germans would become painfully aware of already on the first day of ’Herbstnebel.’ The underestimation of the opponent created by German propaganda, led some German units to excessive losses during the Offensive’s first day.

One must remember that World War II took place at a time when centuries of slave trade and colonialism had created a whole series of racist clichés, which inspired the modernist stereotypes of diverse ’national characters.’ Any conflict between two groups of people—where war is the ultimate consequence—naturally creates and reinforces certain stereotypes of ’the Other.’ During World War II, as in all wars, clichés of the opponent were created by—and for—the ordinary soldiers. Even the Americans had their cliche of their German opponent, or Kraut as they condescendingly called him: ’a perverse type, cold, diagrammatic, pedantic, unimaginative, and thoroughly sinister,’ according to Paul Fussell’s decription of the general stereotype image.⁹³ Another common concept was that the ’instinct for discipline’ made the German soldiers ‘especially dangerous,’ and that their ‘admitted distinction in technology made their cruelty uniquely effective.’⁹⁴

In organizational terms, the two armies were quite similar. The basic unit was the division, which usually was divided into three regiments (’Regiment’ also in German)—or three Combat Commands in most American armored divisions—as well as various support units. In most cases the U.S. division was significantly stronger than its German counterpart. The assigned strength of a U.S. infantry division was 14,253 troops, while the German divisions in the Ardennes usually consisted of ten to twelve thousand men. In addition, the U.S. infantry division, unlike its German counterpart, usually had an armored battalion with 76 tanks at its disposal.

THE GERMAN RAILWAY MIRACLE

Among those who contributed most to the German Ardennes Offensive was General der Infanterie Rudolf Gercke, the German Army’s transport chief. Everything basically depended on the ability to bring all that was required for the offensive to the Western Front, and for this purpose no other transport means than railway trains could come into question. Therefore, Gercke was one of the first to be informed of the attack plan.

His task was really delicate. A quarter of a million troops, and thousands of vehicles and artillery pieces, as well as huge amounts of fuel, ammunition, spare parts and rations had to be brought forward to a relatively small area immediately behind the Western Front. And this at a time when a massive Allied air campaign was directed against the German railway network, and train services constantly were exposed to attacks by fighter-bombers who in the hundreds swept the skies above the German countryside. As early as on 17 September 1944 Gercke began to reorganize the road and rail network in Germany. A large emergency system was created, and an extensive network of traffic control and repair stations was formed.

Since River Rhine separated the frontal area at the Ardennes from the rest of Germany, Gercke began, already in September, to mobilize thousands of construction workers to reinforce the bridge piers and bridge railings to make these more resistant to bombs. Each bridge was fitted with a repair force, and bridge spans and other repair equipments were placed nearby, allowing for damaged bridges to be rapidly restored. Several bridges were fitted with rails. In October, many bridges were reinforced to carry 70-ton heavy Königstiger tanks. Twelve river ferries also were rebuilt to carry locomotives across the river. Gercke even planned to extend two mining tunnels that ran under the Rhine so that troops would be able to cross the river through these. On the Rhine’s eastern riverbank, numerous well masked army supply stores were established.

Experience showed that Allied fighter-bombers often managed to halt trains by killing or wounding the crew of the locomotive with their machine guns, while the locomotive itself escaped with fairly light damage. Therefore, armor plates were mounted around the locomotive cabs, which quickly had the desired effect. Additionally, hundreds of opensided rail wagons were equipped with rapid-firing light anti-aircraft guns.

The rail traffic control system also was considerably enhanced, and was linked to the air surveillance services. Thus, as soon as Allied aircraft were reported in the vicinity, trains could rapidly be led into cover in railway tunnels or onto sidings where they could be masked. In addition, most rail traffic within a distance of 100 to 125 miles from the front was restricted to the hours of darkness or days with bad flight weather. Even the most insignificant German railway station in the area was continuously supplied with weather reports, so that it would be possible to quickly take advantage of rapidly deteriorating weather to put the trains in motion. In clear weather during daytime, the trains stood in places where they were hidden from detection from the air, and positioned with precise calculation, so that at night and on days with poor visibility they could be deployed at high speed and according to an extremely tight schedule. Lines with double tracks were systematically utilized for running trains in parallel in the same direction—all in order to exploit the absence of Allied aviation to a maximum.

Between 9 September and 15 December 1944, Allied aviation caused 125 breaks on rail lines leading to the deployment area in front of the Ardennes, including 60 in the key area between Koblenz and Cologne. In spite of this, Gercke’s transport apparatus was able to bring 1,500 troop transport trains and about 500 trains with nearly 145,000 metric tons of supplies and 7,500 cubic meters of fuel to the offensive’s deployment area until 11 December. Gercke’s railway organization was so effective that some army divisions even could disembark at railway stations just a couple of miles from the front.

In close cooperation with Jodl, Keitel and armaments minister Albert Speer, Major General Alfred Toppe, the Army’s general quartermaster, accomplished greatly in raising the necessary quantities of ammunition and fuel. The 50 railway trains with ammunition that was calculated to be needed for the offensive were delivered on time.¹ On 13 December, Generalfeldmarschall Keitel reported that 15,099 metric tons of ammunition had been delivered, and that an equal quantity was en route.²

Concerning engine fuel for the Ardennes Offensive, this is a topic that has been clouded by many misconceptions and myths. It is often argued that the offensive was ’doomed in advance,’ because the units are supposed not to have been provided with the required quantities of fuel —estimated at 17,000 cubic meters—and that the attack plan was based on the necessity to capture Allied fuel. Nothing of this holds true.

That the German plan was built on the premise that U.S. motor fuel or ammunition dumps were captured, has been dismissed as a myth by von Manteuffel: ’The notion that captured fuel should have been part of the plan is not true, because our experience from the Eastern Front, Africa, Italy, etc. showed how quickly such dumps could be destroyed by the opponent. In addition, we did not know the whereabouts of such depots.’³

Moreover, significant quantities of fuel were delivered. In fact, on the evening before the attack, 12,000 cubic meters of fuel had been received by the assault units.⁴ Another 8,000 cubic meters was about to be delivered, and the OKW had assigned 3,000 cubic meters from its reserve stock. It was estimated that it would require between 12,000 and 15,000 cubic meters to advance from the Meuse to Antwerp.⁵

General Horst Stumpff, inspector of the armored troops in the German Ersatzheer, confirmed after the war that the German units that began the Ardennes Offensive were supplied with ’enough gasoline to carry us a considerable distance, three consumption units per tank’⁶ This was exactly the OKW’s objective when the attack plan was prepared in October 1944.⁷ SS-Brigadeführer Fritz Kraemer, chief of staff of the 6. SS-Panzerarmee, confirms that the Germans had ’sufficient gas for an initial advance of 200 kilometers [125 miles]’⁸

But owing to both the effort to conceal the attack preparations, and the danger of Allied air attacks, most of the propellant was stored along the Rhine river. The Achilles heel of the German supply system was that all maintenance—particularly fuel—had to be transported to the front from the unloading stations in the rear area with trucks on small roads through the hilly terrain. Von Manteuffel said that ’it was not primarily the fuel as such that was lacking [in sufficient quantities], but the inadequate transport facilities’⁹

After the war, SS-Brigadeführer Kraemer told his American interrogators, ’The gas was not all with the divisions; it was partly in dumps west of the Rhine, and partly on the way […] We expected to receive one new consumption unit per day from our own depots. […] Actually, we did not get this additional consumption unit per day because of your air force, road conditions, and other difficulties’¹⁰ General Stumpff added, ’Once it snowed, [the fuel reserves] could not be brought up because of the intolerable road conditions. For this reason, we could only use a small number of the tanks available to us, and, in addition, lost many of our tanks through lack of fuel; however, our plans did not contemplate the use of captured gasoline’¹¹

But the German Army High Command did not fail to raise the required quantities. ’It was after all possible to accumulate the 17,000 cubic meters [of fuel] which had been promised in the beginning,’ confirms Percy E. Schramm, in charge of the OKW war diary.¹² As late as on 19 January 1945, the German Wehrmacht High Command’s war diary spoke of the ’large gasoline storages available’¹³

1 Schramm, The Preparations for the German Offensive in the Ardennes (Sep to Dec 1944). A-862, p. 237.

2 Toland, Battle: The Story of the Bulge, p. 22.

3 von Manteuffel, Die 5. Panzer-Armee in der Ardennen-Offensive (16. Dezember 1944 bis 25. Januar 1945). B-151, p. 130.

4 Schramm, A-862, p. 241.

5 Ibid.

6 Stumpff, Tank Maintenance in the Ardennes. FMS #61, p. 2.

7 Reichhelm, Report of Colonel (GSC) Reichhelm of the General Staff, concerning his activity as operations officer of Army Group B during operations in the West from fall 1944 to Spring 1945. A-925, p. 12.

8 Kraemer, Sixth Panzer Army in the Ardennes. ETHINT-021, pp. 4-5.

9 von Manteuffel, B-151, p. 128.

10 Kraemer, ETHINT-021, pp. 4-5.

11 Stumpff, FMS # 61, p. 2.

12 Schramm, A-862, p. 240.

13 Schramm (red.), Kriegstagebuch des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht, Vol. 8, p. 1024.

A German military train in the vicinity of the Ardennes. Painting by German artist Horst Helmus, who served as a soldier in the 26. Volksgrenadier-Division during the Ardennes Offensive.

HOW MUCH DID THE ALLIES KNOW?

It is not uncommon to see literature on the Ardennes Battle make extensive lists of supposed ’early warnings’ of the impending attack that the Allied commanders are reproached for having ’ignored.’ Examples of such are the information provided to Allied troops by a handful of German POWs, deserters and civilians, of ’an imminent offensive’ in the days preceding 16 December 1944, and/or of the assembly of strong German Army units at the Ardennes Front. However, the fact that the Allied headquarters refused to be affected by this to regroup reinforcements to the Ardennes, is not particularly noteworthy; the planting of false reports by ’deserters,’ false ’attack plans,’ etc are legion in war. From the Allied commanders’ horizon, it was quite logical that the Germans tried to trick them to transfer units from the north and the south, where the Germans found themselves under heavy pressure from Allied attacks.

Next to Pearl Harbor in December 1941, the Ardennes Offensive in December 1944 is to be regarded as the intelligence failure that had the greatest impact on the U.S. Armed Forces during World War II. Therefore, it should not surprise that efforts have been made after the war to give the image of Allied intelligence organizations ’really’ discovering what was coming, and that it ’only’ was due to the Allied commanders’ ‘failure to listen’ to the warnings that things got out of hand. This kind of reasoning, however, ignores a number of important facts and circumstances, the most important of which is this: One of the major tasks of military staffs is to discuss the enemy’s possible options, and in any case it would be inconceivable that Allied military staffs in late fall and early winter of 1944 would not have devoted some attention to the possibility of a German attack in the Ardennes. But these thoughts were just a small part of all Allied assumptions of German alternative courses of action at this time. Overall, there actually were not very many visible signs from the German side that prior to 16 December 1944 could have given the Allies reason to regroup forces into the Ardennes.

It is often pointed out that Eisenhower, when he noticed the thinly held American positions during a car drive through the Ardennes on 7 December 1944, expressed concern that the VIII Corps could run into ’a nasty little Kasserine,’ alluding to the defeat the Americans were inflicted at that place in Tunisia in February 1943.¹ But there is nothing to suggest that this was more than a spontaneous and transient reflection. After all, we have to consider that Eisenhower—who had all the power thereto—took no action that would suggest any real concern about this prior to 16 December.

That the Germans pulled out a number of panzer divisions from the front line could not be hidden from the Allies. Major General Kenneth W. Strong, chief intelligence officer of the Allied Supreme Headquarters in northwestern Europe (SHAEF), concluded that these could be used in one of three ways: They could be sent to the Eastern Front, they could be used defensively against an Allied breakthrough, or they could be used for a ’relief attack in the Ardennes.’ But this was not a particularly dramatic insight; Strong stated the probabilities of these in the above order, and therefore assumed that they most likely would be shifted to the East. The assumption that they would be used defensively was just what the Germans wanted the Allies to believe. What Strong assumed to be the least likely option, a relief attack in the Ardennes, was by definition something different than Hitler’s and von Rundstedt’s mighty offensive. As we shall see, it was precisely the rejection of the German offensive as ’merely a relief attack’ that caused the Allied headquarters to react so slowly during the first day of the offensive.

Lieutenant General Bradley, the commander of U.S. 12th Army Group, said that he was aware that the Germans could attack in the Ardennes, but dismissed it as unlikely. ’When anyone attacks,’ he said, ’he does it for one of two reasons. Either he is out to destroy the hostile forces or he is going after a terrain objective,’ and he expressed the opinion that neither of these could be attained in a ’broken, relatively roadless country’ such as the Ardennes.²

In Situation Report No. 18 of 12 December 1944, the intelligence officer in Bradley’s staff, Brigadier General Edwin L. Sibert, spoke of the German infantry divisions’ ’deathly weakness,’ which he said could lead to an early breakdown of the German army in the West. The conclusion he presented, was this: ’With continuing Allied pressure in the south and in the north, the breaking point may develop suddenly and without warning.’ Continued Allied pressure in the south and in the north may collapse come suddenly and without warning.’³ The success of the German Verschleiungs operation can not be more clearly expressed.

The efforts made after the war to argue that the Allied ’really’ knew that a German offensive was impending, are mainly based on a report despatched on 10 December 1944 by U.S. First Army’s intelligence officer, Colonel Benjamin A. Dickson. In this, Dickson made the assessment that the German strategy to defend the Reich was ’based on the exhaustion of our offensive to be followed by an all-out counter-attack with armor, between the Roer and the Erft, supported by every weapon he can bring to bear.’⁴ This single sentence has been taken as evidence that the Allies actually were warned in advance, but this conclusion ignores some basic facts.

Firstly, Dickson’s assessment was just one out of several, and nothing gave the Allied generals any reason to measure Dickson’s report as one of particular importance. (On the contrary, Dickson had compromised himself when he in September 1944 burst into Hodges’ bedroom with the ’great news’ that von Rundstedt had staged a coup against Hitler and the SS; actually, what Dickson had heard was a false Allied radio broadcast intended to sow confusion on the German side.) But above all, what Dickson ’foresaw’ was not the German Ardennes Offensive—the area where he assessed that an attack could take place, is located west of Cologne, between fifty and fifteen miles north of the section where the Germans unleashed their attack on 16 December 1944.

On 14 December, Dickson noted that several German POWs had talked of an attack that would be launched ’between 17 and 25 December,’ but many of these claimed that the offensive was intended to ’retake Aachen as a Christmas gift for the Führer’—therefore once again in a section to the north of the Ardennes.⁵ The report Dickson drafted on the following day gives no sign of any great concern for a German offensive. Although he mentioned the possibility of a German ’limited scale offensive,’ he also said that such an attack probably only would have a propaganda purpose—to raise the morale of the civilian population. The only thing he mentioned about the Ardennes, was that the reports of German troop movements received from the first line probably concerned nothing but ’a very recently arrived Volksgrenadier Division coming in to relieve 212 Volksgrenadier Division.’⁶ Furthermore, Dickson’s worries were no greater than to allow him to set off for a four-day leave in Paris on that same day.

At the Ardennes Front, tU.S. VIII Corps meanwhile had—in a report dated 9 December 1944—estimated the German troop strength at only 24,000 men. The intelligence officer of the VIII Corps, Colonel Andrew R. Reeves, wrote, ’The enemy’s present practice of bringing new divisions to receive front line experience and then relieving them out for commitment elsewhere indicates the desire to have this sector of the front remain quiet and inactive.’⁷

It may be objected that the Allies should have realized that the Germans could be expected to strike against such a weakly manned sector as the Ardennes, and therefore should have taken steps to be able to quickly transform such a venture to a great victory. In fact, among the Allied commanders, Lieutenant General George Patton was the only one who—with the aid of his brilliant intelligence officer, Colonel Oscar W. Koch—drew that conclusion. On 24 November, he wrote in his diary that ’the First Army is making a terrible mistake in leaving the VIII Corps static, as it is highly probable that the Germans are building up east of them.’⁸

Alongside the success of the German Verschleiungs operation, the Allies’ own superiority made them blind to the approaching storm. Through ’Ultra,’ the British had been able to decrypt German radio broadcast messages since the beginning of World War II. But this backfired when, owing to the strict German radio silence concerning the upcoming Ardennes Offensive, no messages that indicated an impending attack were intercepted. This led the Allied to the erroneous conclusion that the absence of such messages meant that there probably was no reason for any anxiety.

In fact, an American deceptive operation backfired against the Allies themselves. In early December 1944, the U.S. special unit 23rd Headquarters Special Troops was tasked to give the enemy the impression that the 75th Infantry Division was regrouped to Luxembourg, in order to discourage the Germans from sending reinforcements from the Ardennes to the Roer area, where the Americans fielded a new attack.* Code-named ’Koblenz,’ this operation only led the Allies to regard the shifting of German assault troops to that section of the Ardennes as the Germans having allowed themselves to be duped by the 23rd Headquarters Special Troops. Jonathan Gawne, who has written a study on the 23rd Headquarters special Troops, describes operation ’Koblenz’ as ’one of the more embarrassing operations of the war.’⁹ In actual fact, the Germans never were taken in by Operation ’Koblenz,’ but realized that the alleged grouping of the 75th Infantry Division in Luxembourg was just a scam.¹⁰

Finally, the German capacity to build up large fuel stocks for the assault force—which was totally ruled out by the Allies—is a vital key to the fact that the Allies actually were taken by such surprise by the Ardennes Offensive. Forrest C. Pogue, one of the U.S. Army’s official historians, noted that ’the Allied intelligence chiefs clearly assumed that, since the Germans knew of the Allied intention to push toward the Ruhr, they had built an armored force to cope with it. Anxieties about the strength of a counterstroke were dispelled by the belief that bad weather and fuel shortages would interfere with anything more serious than a spoiling attack.¹¹

1 The 23rd Headquarters Special Troops, ’the Ghost Army,’ was a secret American unit, consisting of 1,100 men, who with the help of audio recordings of motor vehicles, inflatable tanks, fake radio messages, etc, sought to give the false impression of the existence of strong U.S. military units in order to mislead the Germans on the Western Front. The unit’s existence was kept secret until 1996, and part of its activities during World War II still remains classified. A documentary about the unit, ’The Ghost Army,’ premiered in 2013.

1 Pogue, United States Army in World War II: European Th eater of Operations: Th e Supreme Command, p. 361.

2 MacDonald, A Time for Trumpets, p. 71.

3 Ibid., p. 73.

4 FUSA G-2 Estimate 37, 10 Dec 44; Pogue, p. 366.

5 MacDonald, p. 76.

6 Ibid.

7 Ibid., p. 74.

8 Blumenson, Patton Papers 1940-1945, p. 582.

9 Gawne, Ghosts of the ETO: American Tactical Deception Units in the European Th eater 1944 – 1945, p. 165.

10 Ibid., p. 175.

11 Pogue, p. 364.

An ordinary American armored division typically consisted of three armored battalions, three battalions of armored infantry, and four field artillery battalions, and one each of an engineer battalion, an anti-tank battalion, an anti-aircraft artillery battalion and a reconnaissance battalion—with an assigned strength of 10,500 men and 263 tanks (177 Shermans and 86 Stuarts). However, most of the armored divisions in the Ardennes had been expanded to number about 12,000 men. Moreover, in the Ardennes the Americans were able to field two so-called heavy armored divisions, each consisting six armored battalions and an infantry regiment with a total of 14,000 men and 390 tanks (including 252 Shermans).

Each German panzer division in the Ardennes consisted of an armored regiment, two panzer grenadier regiments, an artillery regiment, and one each of an engineer battalion, an anti-tank battalion, an anti-aircraft artillery battalion and a reconnaissance battalion—with a total strength varying from 14,400 (2. Panzer Division) to more than 21,000 men (1. SS-Panzer-Division). The number of tanks in a German panzer division was lower than that of its American counterpart. Thus, at dawn on 16 December 1944, the three panzer divisions of the 5. Panzerarmee mustered a total of only 212 tanks (125 Panthers and the remainder Panzer IVs)—not even the equivalence of a common American armored division.

However, regarding the equipment, the German tanks—the heavy Königstiger (Tiger II) and the medium Panther and Panzer IV—were quite superior to the American M4 Sherman, the standard medium tank in the U.S. Army at the time. Both sides had excellent tracked tank destroyers; some of the German types were significantly better than their American counterparts, especially M10, but the American M18 Hellcat and M36 Jackson were, in their field, more than one step ahead of the Sherman tank. A specific characteristic of the German tank destroyers was that they had no turrets and thus were equipped with a fixed gun, while the American tank destroyers had turrets that were open at the top. M36 Jackson distinguished itself from the other two American tank destroyers M10 and M18 through its powerful armament (a 90mm 3.5inch gun) and a stronger armor; otherwise the American tank destroyers were lighter armored and faster than their German counterparts.

Hand guns have already been discussed—the German assault rifle Sturmgewehr totally outperformed the American hand guns. Concerning anti-tank guns, the German 88mm and the American 3.5-inch guns were more or less equal—they were readily able to knock out any enemy tank. Each side also had their own man-portable recoilless antitank rocket launcher weapon. Model M9 of the American Bazooka could penetrate a 120 to 126 mm thick armor plate sloped at 30 degrees from the vertical with an M6A3 rocket. The German Panzerschreck rocket launcher (Raketenpanzerbüchse 54) could knock out a Sherman at a distance of up to 650 feet. This could be supplemented with the disposable preloaded launch tube Panzerfaust, which actually had a bigger impact (200 mm of armor) than the bigger tubes, but with a range of normally just 60 yards. However, the new and improved Panzerfaust 100, with an increased range to over 100 yards, arrived just in time for the Ardennes Offensive.

Regarding the artillery—the strongest single asset of the U.S. Army—the Americans were significantly superior to their German opponent. The U.S. 155mm (6.1inch) so-called ’Long Tom’ simply had no counterpart in the Wehrmacht. In addition, the Americans had a highly developed artillery technology—including shells equipped with proximity fuses that made them explode just above the ground, and the so-called Time-on-Target method whereby all shells hit the target simultaneously. American military historian Richard C. Anderson, Jr. is not without reason when he describes the American artillery during World War II as ’the best in the world.’⁹⁵ However, to some extent the Germans could compensate for this by their Nebelwerfer rocket artillery, whose psychological impact was at least as great as its physical effect.

Another area where the American equipment was superior was the Army’s transport capacity. The U.S.Army was completely motorized, mustering a formidable vehicle fleet, while the Wehrmacht to a large extent still was horse-drawn. Thus, for example the 26. Volksgrenadier-Division needed five thousand horses for its transports.⁹⁶ Moreover, the American trucks generally were better than the German ones.

In the air, the Americans were qualitatively superior to the Germans in all respects—with the exception of the few German jets. Their four-engine B-17 Flying Fortress and B-24 Liberator heavy bombers had no equivalence in the Luftwaffe. For several months, the American P-47 Thunderbolt and P-51 Mustang singleengine fighters had proved to be quite superior to the German standard fighters Messerschmitt Bf 109 G and Focke Wulf 190 A. The fact that the German bombers had been pushed back to the hours of darkness, while the twin-engine B-26, A-20 and A-26 bombers and attack bombers of U.S. 9th Air Force were able to operate freely in broad daylight, speaks volumes. The new German Focke Wulf 190 D-9 (the ’Long nose’), which entered service in late 1944, could compete with the best Allied fighter aircraft, but by then the difference in pilot quality between the German and the Allied air forces had become too large. When the Ardennes Offensive was launched, the Luftwaffe on the Western Front was strategically defeated since six months back.* When the weather forecast for 7 December 1944 suggested a few days of cold and pretty clear weather, Hitler once again decided to postpone the attack date, this time to 13 December.⁹⁷ This proved to be the right decision. On 10 December, the previous attack date, U.S. fighter-bombers were very active along the whole front, despite the overcast, and one hundred and thirty B-26 Marauder bombers from the 9th Air Force attacked two fortified German cities. On 11 December, a cloudy but cold day, Hitler moved into the so-called ’Eagle’s Nest,’ Adlerhorst, at Schloss Ziegenberg, just west of Bad Nauheim, where he intended to supervise the offensive personally.

A crew member paints an M36 Jackson white during the Ardennes Battle in the winter of 1944/1945. The U.S. tank destroyer M36 Jackson was developed to meet the threat from the new heavily armored German tanks. Armed with a 90mm gun, the M36 entered combat in September 1944. (US Army)

He immediately summoned the commanders of all units that would participate in ’Herbstnebel,’ from corps level and above, as well as several staff officers. These were divided into two groups, with the first arriving for the Führer’s briefing on 11 December and the other group the next day.⁹⁸The first group was brought by bus in the early winter darkness to a place unknown to them, where they were led into some kind of a barracks where Hitler received them. ’He slowly entered the conference room and immediately took place at the table,’ Oberst Ludwig Heilmann, the commander of the 5. Fallschirmjäger-Division, wrote.⁹⁹ Von Manteuffel recalled how shocked he was to see Hitler’s transformation since their previous meeting just slightly more than a week earlier: The senior commanders met a broken man, with a pathologically pale face and a completely slumped posture.¹⁰⁰

Hitler sank down into a chair behind a table, with Generalfeldmarschall Keitel to his right. He put on a pair of glasses, and with trembling hands picked up a manuscript and started to speak. This was no inflammatory speech to rouse his audience, but a low-key attempt to convince the military commanders of the necessity of the coming offensive. SS-SturmbannFührer Hein Springer, Generalfeldmarschall Model’s escort officer, recalled that Hitler, ’began, as so often when he held his lectures, by wandering far into history,’ this time by talking about Frederick the Great’s famous victory at the Battle of Leuthen in 1757, when a Prussian force utilized mobility to defeat a numerically superior Austrian army.¹⁰¹ Next he spoke of the ’incredible sacrifices made by the German people, and the brave posture of the Home Front, particularly the women,’ and declared that the German people had proven its greatness by resisting all the great powers of the world for five long years. He explained that the war years neither had gone by him personally unnoticed—they had strongly affected his own health, but he would ’serve his people to the last breath.’¹⁰²

Then Hitler went on to talk about the offensive, which he said might lead to a turning point of the war if Antwerp could be seized. Hitler acknowledged that the participating divisions were of widely varying quality, but on the other hand, the opponent had just as battered divisions. He proceeded to describe his vision of the attack: ’Once the enemy lines have been breached, we won’t encounter anything in the enemy’s rear area than American officers who are nothing but uniformed bank clerks. We hardly need to fear that the enemy will be able to deploy their reserves so soon.’ Hitler continued, ’If we will succeed in advancing through Belgium, I will find new reserves—there still are some viable divisions in Norway—to march on towards France.’¹⁰³

A precondition for the attack was the element of surprise and bad weather, he explained. Therefore he stressed the necessity of the strictest secrecy. The bad weather, he said, would prevent the enemy air force from operating, while the German soldiers, who had endured fighting during the Russian Winter, would cope with the Winter Campaign in Belgium and France far better than their American enemies. However, the Luftwaffe would only be employed in concentrated attacks against critical spots, but it would be preferable if it could be spared during the initial phase, ’so that it can be employed with greater force at a later date.’ Hitler also envisaged the deployment of jet aircraft on a large scale. ’The German war industry,’ he said, ’has been working for several months at the expense of the Eastern Front for this venture alone,’ but to produce all this equipment a second time would hardly be possible.¹⁰⁴

The Führer declared that if the offensive succeeded, he would give the generals the full credit. Otherwise, he would take full responsibility upon himself. He ended his lecture with some fateful words: ’Gentlemen, if the breakthrough over Liège to Antwerp will not succeed, we will meet a very bloody end of the war. The time is not working for us but against us. This really is the last chance to turn the fortunes of war to our favor. I thank you, gentlemen.’¹⁰⁵

Generalfeldmarschall von Rundstedt stood up and declared with a loud voice, ’We stake our last card, and we cannot fail!’¹⁰⁶ Hitler withdrew to a smaller conference room with von Rundstedt, Model, the army commanders and their chiefs of staff. There Sepp Dietrich asked for yet another postponment of the offensive, in order to allow the forces to replenish sufficiently. Hitler agreed to postpone the attack until 15 December. Oberst Heilmann remembered how he caught a final glimpse of Hitler in the conference room, and how he was struck by the contrast between the vigorous generals and the ailing dictator: ’Among the strong soldier heads, Hitler gave the impression not only of a sick man, but in him I could see a mass murderer whose face reflected the soul.’¹⁰⁷

Next day, when the weather forecast from—among other sources—the weather reconnaissance U-boats far out on the Atlantic suggested frost and fairly clear weather on 15 December, followed by several days of really bad weather, Hitler decided to postpone Null-Tag one last time—until 16 December 1944.¹⁰⁸

When the German commanders returned to their headquarters, the successive transfer of the assault units to their points of departure was in full swing. In order not to reveal their intentions for the opponent, the Germans moved the assault forces forward to their points of departure only at the very last moment.¹⁰⁹ Hence, the panzer divisions were located between thirty and forty miles away from the front, but on 8 December the artillery started to move forward. All movements were made only at night, while observing the greatest silence. No lights were used and not a word was uttered. The artillery pieces were pulled to their positions with horses—this for dual reasons: to save fuel and so that no engine noise would warn the Americans. So far, no motor vehicles were allowed closer to the front than ten kilometers (six miles). A group of soldiers followed close behind each carriage, carefully covering ruts in the mud and snow on the little forest roads with brooms and shovels. When the carriages approached the front area, the wagon wheels were draped in cloth and straw to dampen the sound of the movement. The ammunition was driven to a distance of eight kilometers (five miles) from the main line. Then German soldiers carried it by hand the final stretch. This of course was quite strenuous, but ‘the soldiers willingly performed this duty,’ according to Percy E. Schramm.¹¹⁰

On 13 December, almost all of the artillery had been moved into its well-masked positions. Then the next phase in the moving forward commenced. During the bitterly cold night between 14 and 15 December, the panzer units moved to a distance of some ten miles from the frontlines, while the infantry marched to a distance of between three and five miles from the first line.¹¹¹ This massive movement proceeded without any lights and was carried out with an astonishing efficiency. The difficulties that could have arisen because the 5. Panzerarmee’s divisions were deployed to the 7. Armee’s rear area, while this army’s units moved westwards, were smoothly resolved through close cooperation between the staffs of the two armies. Traffic order was upheld by an extensive traffic control organization. Repair and salvage units were deployed everywhere along the transport routes, allowing for vehicles that stopped due to mechanical failure or other reasons to be whisked away from the roads before sunrise. Any motor vehicle that failed to reach its destination before sunrise, was put away in carefully masked positions. Specially selected officers were responsible for the masking of such vehicles. The large forests in the area facilitated the accommodation of the tens of thousands of soldiers and the concealement of the heavy equipment while it stood waiting for the next nocturnal march. A Tarnmeister (masking officer) was stationed in every village in the area, and among other things he supervised that the ban on making fire was followed.

Total radio silence had been commanded, and civilian telephone lines across the area were scrupulously monitored. No street signs that could show the way or indicate phone or radio stations were allowed. In addition to the military police company that was included in each corps and each division, each panzer army was equipped with an MP regiment of three hundred men apiece, and these patrolled the area, halting all civilian road traffic that was not absolutely necessary.

On 15 December, the weather cleared up slightly, and American fighter planes roared past above the thousands of German soldiers and combat vehicles that were hidden in the woods, small villages and valleys in the region—without even a single pilot noticing anything of particular interest. When the sun sank below the treetops at 1639 hrs, an extensive low pressure—the largest in a long time—began to settle over the area. While a light, cold rain seeped into the collars and made the soldiers’ uniforms drenched, the attack forces assumed their final starting positions. Meanwhile Luftwaffe planes flew at low altitude over the area to hide the sound of tank engines. Moreover, giant chunks of corduroy, covered with thick layers of straw, were laid across the roads to dampen the sound of the tank tracks.

While this took place, engineers silently brought forward mobile ramps to the tank obstacles—the ’dragon’s teeth’—of the West Wall, so that these could be crossed by the vehicles. The movement forward was mainly completed by midnight on 16 December 1944.

At the same time another deployment to the same area, but on the other side front, took place. This began in October 1944, when the newly formed U.S. 106th Infantry Division started to be shipped across the Atlantic. The vanguard, led by Colonel Thomas J. Riggs, commander of the 81st Engineer Combat Battalion, embarked on the famous ocean liner RMS Queen Elizabeth in the port of New York on 8 October. After crossing the Atlantic Ocean at full speed while zig-zagging to avoid U-boats, the venerable British ship entered the port of Greencock in Scotland four days later. Meanwhile, on 10 October, the remainder of the engineer troops, the artillery, the reconnaissance troops and other maintenance troops were packed into the American troop transport ship USS Wakefield in Boston, and were shipped to Liverpool, where the ship arrived on 17 October. By that time, the Queen Elizabeth had returned to New York, where she on 14 October took the 423rd Infantry Regiment and elements of the 424th on board. The ship was unable to sail for three days, but on 22 October she arrived at Gourock in Scotland. On 20 October, the last elements of the 424th Infantry Regiment, and the entire 422nd, embarked the RMS Aquitania —another of the world-famous British Atlantic liners—in New York, and eight days later the seasick young men staggered ashore in Greencock.

The 106th Infantry Division was one among ninety new units that hastily had been formed for overseas service. The Division was assigned the name ’the Golden Lions,’ and a round emblem with a yellow lion’s head against blue background, surounded by a red edge, was sutured to the soldiers’ uniform sleeves. The divisional commander, Major General Alan W. Jones, was a forty-seven-year old, slightly tubby ’West Coaster’ with a thin moustache above the lip. Jones, who could be described as an average American senior military commander, had served on the Western Front during World War One, and spent the interim-war years in various staff positions. His son, Captain Alan W. Jones, Jr., served as operations officer in one of the battalions of the division’s 423d Infantry Regiment.

After acquainting themselves with the damp British autumn, the division was shipped from Liverpool, Weymouth, and Southampton on 1 December. High seas forced the ships to lay bobbing about in the English Channel for three full days. Many of the soldiers were badly worn out when they finally docked at Le Havre in France. There they immediately were driven out to some large, open fields, where they set up their army tents and bivouacked. The weather was raw, and cold rain sprinkled down during their first night on the European continent.

On 6 December, the division was instructed to regroup to Sankt Vith in eastern Belgium. A seemingly endless truck column drove up, the soldiers were ordered up on the tarp-covered loading platforms, and then the long trip began. In pouring rain and decreasing temperatures, the trucks bumped across eastern France. The trip took two whole days, during which many of the young men went down with illness because of the cold weather and that they were so tightly packed on the loading platforms. The soldiers’ gallows humor soon re-baptized the division to ’Hungry and sick’—a pun on the divisional number 106.

Meanwhile, on 7 December, the leading Allied commanders on the Western Front met in Maastricht. As usual, the British and the Americans disagreed. Montgomery reiterated his demand for an assembly of forces for a concentrated drive towards the Ruhr industrial area, while Bradley wanted to go for a major breakthrough in the Aachen area, and Patton advocated a continued offensive into the Saar. In the end it was agreed to go for a combined attack against the Saar in the south and against the Ruhr area in the north. However, before that could take place, the Allies had to take control of the Roer dams, to prevent the Germans from flooding them to prevent any Allied advance in the north for the foreseeable future. Montgomery suggested that the bulk of resources should be invested in this venture, while other sections would economise the resources, but met American resistance. Eisenhower argued that the Allies should not ’sit still,’ but had to continue the offensive to the extreme limit of our ability.’¹¹²

On the same day Hodges, the commander of U.S. First Army, ordered Major General Gerow to launch his V Corps in a renewed effort to capture the Roer dams, located not far from (the present) German-Belgian border. The operation was planned as a pincer attack, from Monschau in the north and from the so-called ’twin villages’ Rocherath-Krinkelt ten miles further south. The 78th Infantry Division would carry out the northern attack, but on the southern flank Gerow only had the inexperienced 99th Infantry Division. Therefore, two units were brought from Middleton’s VIII Corps a little further to the south—the highly experienced 2nd Infantry Division, and Combat Command B of the 9th Armored Division.

Ever since the end of September, U.S. 2nd Infantry Division had held positions inside Germany, on the eastern side of the Our river, along a twelve-mile wide front between the communities Roth in the north and Grosskampenberg in the south, in the immediate vicinity of the point where the present borders of Belgium, Germany, and Luxembourg meet. Now, this division would be relieved by the newcomers in Sankt Vith.

At dawn on 9 December, the numb soldiers of ’Hungry and Sick’ were roused from their slumbers in the tents where they had bivouacked on the soaking wet fields alongside the road from Sankt Vith to Schönberg, seven miles farther to the east. During the following night, in blackout conditions and total silence, they took over the positions previously held by the 2nd Infantry Division.

The sparsely populated area where the 106th Division was grouped, was known as the ’Ghost Front,’ and this for two reasons—partly because it was militarily silent, and partly because it was dominated by large, dark and desolate spruce forests.

Colonel Francis H. Boos, one of the regimental commanders in the 2nd Infantry Division, left the commander of the 423rd Infantry Regiment, Colonel Charles C. Cavender, with the encouraging words, ’It has been quiet up here and your men will learn the easy way.’¹¹³ J. Don Holtzmuller, by that time a corporal in the 106th Infantry Division, recalls that this indeed seemed to be true, ’Everything was peaceful. We were told that this was a quiet sector and that we were just to get used to combat.’¹¹⁴

The 106th Infantry Division went into position with River Our in the rear. The 422nd Infantry Regiment established itself in the conquered West Wall pillboxes up on the Schneifel—a ten-mile long, wooded and completely uninhibited ridge that almost seemed to guard the Losheimer-Graben, the valley to the north and west which gave a free passage from Germany into Belgium. The regimental commander, thirty-five-year old Colonel George L. Descheneaux, Jr., was one of the most experienced officers of the division. Until recently, he had served on the Italian Front. To the south of the 422nd Infantry Regiment, the 423rd was grouped around the German village of Bleialf. Two miles southwest of Bleialf, from Grosslangenfeld and across the rolling fields that extend three miles down to Heckhuscheid in the south-southwest, the 424th Infantry Regiment occupied positions.

While Major General Jones established his headquarters in the Sankt Josef monastery in Sankt Vith, the men at the front made it as comfortable as possible in the positions abandoned by the 2nd Infantry Division. ’Most of the effort in the first few days after the regiment moved into the line was devoted toward making conditions more liveable rather than extensively reconnoitering positions, or sending out many patrols,’ said Major Douglas E. Post of the 422nd Infantry Regiment.¹¹⁵

History writing has emphasized the fact that the 106th Infantry Division was a ’green’ division, but Major General Jones and his regimental commanders were at least as well-trained as the commanders of most U.S. divisions in Europe at this time. A great advantage was that Jones had commanded the division for two whole years—the unit was officially formed in March 1943—and hence was well-acquainted with his staff. As far as the troops are concerned, they had received a training which was significantly better than that of most of the rudimentary trained recruits who by this time flooded ’more experienced’ American units. After completing a thoroughful basic training, they took part in the great military maneuvers in Tennessee between January and March 1944. Moreover, with a strength of 18,000 men, supported by 41 tank destroyers, 36 anti-tank guns, 86 armored cars, and 73 artillery pieces, the 106th Infantry Division was the numerically strongest division in the entire First Army. However, the fact remains that the division—with the exception of a handful of individuals—lacked battle experience.

While the men on the ’Ghost Front’ stared into the dark and desolate winter night, the storm broke loose in the north. On 13 December, the V Corps launched its pincer attack aimed at capturing the Roer dams. Both sides were locked into a terrible battle of attrition with nothing more than limited American territorial gains, but in the ’Eagle’s Nest’ Hitler grinded his teeth. Through this American attack, Generalleutnant Hitzfeld’s LXVII. Armeekorps with its 272. and 326. Volksgrenadier divisions became tied down in a defensive battle which prevented them from launching the attack which was supposed to cover the 6. SS-Panzerarmee’s northern flank. This was merely the first disappointment to the Germans in this sector.

Meanwhile the soldiers in the 106th Infantry Division’s first line noted some alarming signs. The night of 15 December was vibrant in a completely different way than any of the previous nights. In the darkness, engine noise and the clinking cries of metal against metal could be heard afield the German side of the front. But when Major General Jones reported this to the Corps commander Middleton, his observations were casually dismissed, ’Don’t be so jumpy, the Krauts are just playing phonograph records to scare you newcomers!’¹¹⁶ The following evening a German aircraft appeared in the air over the Americans—the first of its kind the men of the 106th had seen—and flew in a remarkable way, back and forth, back and forth, close above their heads, while the aircraft engines roared so that the men hardly were able to hear what they said.

On the other side of the frontline, sixteen German divisions with altogether more than 200,000 soldiers, 420 tanks and 282 tank destroyers and assault guns waited for the attack order. Already this first attack wave enjoyed a numerical superiority against its opponent by two to one in troops, and soon a second attack wave would follow with another eight divisions and two brigades, numbering over 100,000 soldiers, 469 tanks (70 Tigers, 218 Panthers, 180 Panzer IVs, and a captured Sherman), and 335 tank destroyers and assault guns. Hence, all in all a totally overwhelming force of 300,000 men and 1,500 armored vehicles.¹¹⁷ They would strike against the sector where the Allies were weakest and no one expected anything serious to happen. After the second attack wave waited a third wave, comprised of around a dozen more divisions—the exact number could not be established at this time since it was unclear if they would be needed in other sectors. Among these were at least five panzer or panzer grenadier divisions (the 11. and 21. panzer divisions, the 10. SS-Panzer-Division, the 25. Panzergrenadier-Division, and the 17. SS-Panzergrenadier-Division).¹¹⁸ These were estimated to contribute 500 more tanks, tank destroyers and assault guns.

At dawn on 16 December, Generalfeldmarschall Gerd von Rundstedt, Oberbefehlshaber West, issued the following order of the day to his men:

’Soldiers of the Western Front! Your great hour has arrived! Today, strong attacking armies have attacked the Anglo-Americans. I need not say more. You all feel that this is it! Consider the sacred commitment to give everything and to perform beyond human possibilities for our Fatherland and our Führer!’¹¹⁹

The American soldiers of the 106th Infantry Division knew nothing of what awaited them when they in December 1944 went into position on the so-called ‘Ghost Front.’ (US Army)

RELATIONS OF FORCES IN THE ARDENNES, 16 DECEMBER 1944

German troop strength in the first line ahead of operation ’Herbstnebel’ on 16 December 1944

Source: Dupuy, Bongard, and Anderson, Hitler’s Last Gamble.

U.S. troop strength in the first line ahead of operation ’Herbstnebel’ on 16 December 1944

Source: Dupuy, Bongard, and Anderson, Hitler’s Last Gamble.

* Transferred to VIII Corps on 16 December 1944.

German armored strength in the first line ahead of operation ’Herbstnebel’ on 16 December 1944

Source: Dugdale, Panzer Divisions, Panzer Grenadier Divisions, Panzer Brigades of the Army and the Waffen SS in the West Autumn 1944 —February 1945 – Ardennes and Nordwind—Their Detailed and Precise Strengths and Organisations, Volume I.

Since the German armored divisions had been equipped with tank destroyers as a substitute for an insufficient number of tanks, these have been included. Additionally, other German divisions mustered the following numbers of tank destroyers/assault guns in the first line on 16 December 1944: 12. Volksgrenadier-Division four; 277. Volksgrenadier-Division eleven; 18. Volksgrenadier-Division, 26. Volksgrenadier-Division, 62. Volksgrenadier-Division, and 352. Volksgrenadier-Division fourteen each; 5. Fallschirmjäger-Division thirteen; 212. Volksgrenadier-Division four. Thus, the German forces that stood in readiness for Operation ’Herbstnebel’ had a total of 277 tank destroyers/assault guns in the first line on 16 December 1944.

The American units reported the following numbers of tank destroyers on 16 December 1944: 106th Infantry Division 41; 28th Infantry Division 17; 9th Armored Division 129; 7th Armored Division 137; 99th Infantry Division 18; 2nd Infantry Division 22; 4th Infantry Division 46—in total 410.* However, this is not comparable to the number of German tank destroyers/assault guns, since the U.S. figures also include Stuart tanks. The discrepancy between the figures above and the table below is due to different sources of information. Overall, U.S. data on military equipment in the Ardennes Battle—particularly concerning own losses—are both fragmentary and contradictory, as will be discussed later.

* Source: Dupuy, Bongard, and Anderson, Hitler’s Last Gamble.

** Including one captured Sherman.

American armored strength in the first line ahead of operation ’Herbstnebel’ on 16 December 1944

Source: Richard C. Anderson Jr., historian and analyst working for the U.S. Government.

Note: In all, U.S. First Army mustered 937 Sherman tanks on 12 December 1944, but not all of these were included in the units that stood against the German units that attacked on 16 December.

* This however is far from uncontested. Montgomery was, and still is, a highly controversial character; the causes thereof will be discussed later.

** Occasionally this even had some humorous expressions, like when Patton one day in France 1944 exhorted one of his officers, ‘Take this 5-gallon gasoline can to Montgomery with this message: “Although I am sadly short of gasoline myself, I know your admiration for our equipment and supplies and I can spare you this 5 gallons. It will be more than enough to take you as far as you probably will advance in the next two days.”’ WW II Musings. Volume 2, Issue 7, Sep. 1994.

* According to Middleton’s biographer, Frank James Price, Patton dismissed the former Commander of the VIII Corps, Major General Emil F. Reinhardt because he lacked combat experience: ‘“Reinhardt?” Patton said. “Never heard of him. What’s his combat record?” Told that Reinhardt had none, Patton said, “Get rid of him. I want a man who knows how to fight. Get me Troy Middleton.”’ (Price, Troy Middleton: A Biography, p. 175.)

** Meanwhile, Omar Bradley graduated second in the class.

* Of course, not all German soldiers felt in that way. There also were those who had seen through the Nazi propaganda. ‘If this idiotic war would end!’ wrote Heinz Trammler of 18. Volksgrenadier-Division in his diary in December 1944. ‘Why should I fight? It only goes for the existence of the Nazis. The superiority of our enemy is so great that it is senseless to fight against them.’ (Annex No. 5 to G-2. Periodic Report No. 51 106th Inf Div. Translation of Diary captured by 424 Inf Reg 106 Us Inf Div. Vic Henumont (P-7297), 13 Jan 45.)

* This acronym—which actually can not be spelled out—originated from the equipment of galavanized iron, marked G.I. which was used by the U.S. Army on the Western Front in World War One.

** The training level on the German side was generally lowest within the Waff en-SS. According to what was reported by Sepp Dietrich, 60 percent of the men in the 6. SS-Panzerarmee had received less than six to eight weeks of training. (Dietrich, Sixth Panzer Army, Ardennes. ETHINT-015, p. 2.)

*** This was not least due to the rapid expansion of the American Army: Between 1940 and 1945 the USA developed from a country oriented towards peace and with an Army consisting of 243,000 offi cers and soldiers, to a country on war footing with over eight million men in the Army. (Van Creveld, p. 166.) In order to accomplish this huge growth, of which there was no experience in the USA, lessons were sought from the Industry with its assembly-line principles. Meanwhile, the German Armed Forces grew from 3.1 million men in 1939 to slightly above 6 million in 1940 and 9.4 million in 1944. (Van Creveld, p. 66.)

* After all, Nazism is based on a pseudo-scientific nonsense on race and ‘national character’ in general, as well as a romanticized glorification of the German nation in particular. Obviously, any statement made by German soldiers regarding their opponents—be it British, Americans, or Russians—during World War II, are often strongly affected by this Nazi propaganda (which, unfortunately, several military analysts and historians after the war apparently have failed to take into consideration).

* There was a dramatic difference in quality between the mostly inadequately trained German pilots on the Western Front and the veteran pilots on the Eastern Front - who in late 1944 undoubtedly were the most experienced and skilled fighter pilots of the entire World War II. Göring’s failure to shift this crack force in the East to the support of the Ardennes Offensive may decisively have affected the entire course of the battle to the German disadvantage.