CHAPTER ONE
The Plan in Outline
The Allied armies that had invaded Europe across the Normandy beaches on 6 June 1944 had broken the German Army in France by early August. By 25 August they had entered Paris, by 3 September Brussels had been liberated. Everywhere, great armies were pushing the Germans back to their own borders. However, the Allies had not been successful in capturing the Channel ports. All supplies had to come across the invasion beaches or through Cherbourg, the latter having been severely damaged and lying some 400 miles from the forward fighting elements. This all created a significant logistic challenge, and impacted severely on the ability of commanders to conduct effective operations. The British capture of Antwerp on 4 September should have made all the difference, but did not go far enough. Major General Roberts’ 11th Armoured Division captured the port itself, as he had been instructed to do, but did not pursue the Germans onto and beyond the north bank of the River Scheldt. By allowing the Germans to retain their domination of the north bank Antwerp’s use as a port was denied to the Allies. It was a significant strategic error, denying the Allies the opportunity greatly to shorten their lines of communication and to deliver the logistic resources necessary to allow their fighting elements to pursue the Germans.
The German Army had suffered what were considered by the Allies to be crippling defeats. ‘It would all be over by Christmas.’
Field Marshal Montgomery, commanding the British 21st Army Group, believed strongly that the key to success was for a thrust involving forty-two divisions to drive through the Ruhr and head for Berlin. To be successful it would require the dedication of almost all the logistic support available to the Allied Armies in Europe, and would bring those not involved in the thrust, principally the Americans to his south, to a virtual standstill. This was the infamous ‘broad front against narrow’ argument that raged among the various senior Allied commanders. Broad over narrow was something of an exaggeration, as Montgomery was wont to point out after the war. A force of forty-two divisions was, in his view, hardly a needle-like thrust. Montgomery viewed it as the ‘knock-out blow’ that was required to beat the Germans once and for all and to bring the war to a speedy close. This was especially important to a nation, the United Kingdom, which was rapidly approaching the stage where it would be demographically incapable of prosecuting the war at the same level of intensity given that it was also having to support a number of other theatres, principally the Far East.
Eisenhower did not agree with Montgomery’s idea and resolved to stick to his broad front approach, employing all his armies at the same time. He was concerned that the offensive might run out of steam with the length of the logistic tail, and be heavily counter-attacked; an undertaking at which the Germans were past-masters. Were that to happen he would have nothing in reserve to mount a rescue or to reinforce. Furthermore, logistic shortages elsewhere would render the rest of his forces unable to fight, and therefore prone to German counter-attacks and outflanking movements.
However, by the end of the first week in September 1944 things were happening that caused Eisenhower to adjust his position. Already deeply concerned by the impact of logistic shortages on his overall advance and under pressure from Montgomery, he also had, sitting in the UK, 1st Allied Airborne Army. It was a highly trained, very expensive asset, and it was doing nothing. He was under considerable political and military pressure to make use of it. It was, in a sense, an Army looking for a role, but could only be of use provided a worthwhile operation could be found for it. What finally tipped the balance, however, was that on 8 September V2 rockets, very much more potent than their V1 predecessors, began to land on London from launch sites in Holland. The impact was not just to inflict fear on the civilian population, it was also placing the future of Churchill’s government at risk. Therefore, when Eisenhower met Montgomery at Brussels airport on 10 September 1944 and was shown the concept for the use of a corps of airborne soldiers in the Netherlands, he was readily persuaded that it was a risk worth taking.
Lieutenant General Frederick ‘Boy’ Browning.
The plan was that 1st Airborne Corps, commanded by Lieutenant General Frederick ‘Boy’ Browning and comprising three airborne divisions, would drop along the main highway leading from the Belgian border into Holland to the Dutch town of Arnhem on the lower Rhine, through Eindhoven and Nijmegen. They were to lay a ‘carpet’ of airborne troops, taking all the bridges along the route, over which the British XXX Corps would roll. Once taken, with the ‘corridor’ secure, the crossing over the Rhine at Arnhem would allow the British to break out into the North German Plain; to isolate Germany’s industrial heartland in the Ruhr; to take Antwerp from the north; and to reach the V2 launch sites on the Dutch coast.
However, because of the distance and the numbers of troops available, there would be quite significant gaps between each of the airborne divisions through and across which the enemy could roam. It was much less a carpet and more a series of rugs. The US 101st Airborne Division would take the bridges north of Eindhoven, the US 82nd Airborne Division those in the Nijmegen area and the 1st British Airborne Division, reinforced by the 1st Independent Polish Parachute Brigade, was to take and hold the road bridge over the Lower Rhine at Arnhem. The operation was code-named MARKET GARDEN: MARKET for the airborne element and GARDEN for the ground forces.
The plan called for the first landings to take place on Sunday 17 September 1944, just seven days after Eisenhower had given his assent. This was the third Sunday in the month, the day on which Battle of Britain Sunday is now commemorated annually. On the same day the ground forces would commence their move up the single narrow road that was the sixty-five mile corridor to Arnhem. Montgomery’s promise to Browning was that he would be in Arnhem in two days to relieve the paratroopers. Browning expressed the view that they could hold for four, and it was at this stage he is said to have made his remark about it being possibly a bridge too far.
Operation Market Garden: The Plan.
The reality is that any forces crossing the River Waal at Nijmegen are encased between the sea to the west, the Waal running through Nijmegen and the lower Rhine in Arnhem. They are on an island, called in Dutch The Bettuwe, and the only way off the island is to cross the Arnhem Bridge or retrace one’s steps back south of Nijmegen. Strategically, therefore, it was two bridges too far. It is unclear if Browning ever used the words attributed to him, but if he did his paratroopers kept their word – and held his Bridge for almost four days. It was not their fault that it turned out to be one bridge too many.
1st Airborne Division
Commanded by Major General Roy Urquhart, the Division comprised three brigades each of three battalions, supported from within the division by some specialist troops: artillery, engineers, communications, medical and logistic units. These are known under the collective title of divisional troops. Two of the brigades were parachute brigades, although they each had an element, almost entirely where vehicles or heavier equipment such as artillery, were taken into battle by glider. The other brigade was airlanded, transported to battle entirely by glider. For divisional troops, including logistic and support elements, the majority were gliderborne, with just a few parachuting in.
For each of the brigades and divisional troops, a large slice of the logistic support came overland. These units, collectively called the Seaborne Echelon, had to take their place on the corridor leading to Arnhem from the Belgian border. They only managed to reach as far as Nijmegen; just in time to help their comrades who were by then, withdrawing south across the Rhine. Until the seaborne logistic support caught up with them, the paratroopers would have to survive with the two days of supplies they took in with them by air, supplemented by aerially delivered stocks courtesy of the Royal Air Force.
There were significant differences between the structures of the infantry battalions in the parachute and airlanded brigades. Each parachute battalion comprised three rifle companies, each of three platoons. Their integral support weapons were limited to a platoon of six 3”-mortars and a platoon of eight Vickers .303” belt-fed machine-guns. Their only anti-tank capability lay with the PIAT, a weapon with a range of significantly less than 100 metres and with limited capability to damage a tank. Parachute battalions relied for their heavier anti-tank capability on a Royal Artillery anti-tank troop being attached to them. These small sub-units brought with them six 6-pounder guns. The guns used solid shot to destroy tanks by punching a hole in them, but there was also a high explosive round available, giving them additional capability against personnel and buildings. It is unclear if this latter nature of ammunition formed part of the gun load at Arnhem.
1ST AIRBORNE DIVISION
PIAT (Projector Infantry Anti-Tank).
Two British Infantrymen prepare to fire the PIAT.
It is worth noting that there was additional anti-tank capability at Arnhem, with the presence in each of the two Airlanding Anti-Tank batteries of two troops of four 17-pounder guns. Flown in complete with their Morris Convertible towing vehicle as a single load in a Hamilcar Glider, their presence came as a great shock to the Germans who had no idea that the British had the capability to transport them by air. They were very much more potent than the smaller 6-pounder and tended to be held in reserve above battalion level.
A 17-pounder anti-tank gun exhibited beside the Hartenstein museum.
Vickers medium machine gun.
Airlanded battalions had four rifle companies, each with four platoons. The platoons were smaller than those in a parachute battalion, twenty-six strong so that each platoon comprised a Horsa glider load. For support weapons integral to the battalion they had a very powerful package. In the battalion support group there were two platoons each of 3”-mortars, Vickers machine-guns and 6-pounder anti-tank guns, a total of twelve mortar tubes, sixteen machine-guns and eight anti-tank guns, the latter being in addition to the PIATs carried throughout the rifle platoons. Parachute battalions deployed to Arnhem with some 550 men, airlanded battalions approximately 750.
Urquhart’s Plan for the Assault
Major General Urquhart was forced into a three-phase assault on his key objective from landing and dropping zones that were some eight miles from the Arnhem Bridge. The three phases were because there were insufficient aircraft to lift the entire force of two American divisions and one British airborne division, and it would have to be done in three waves; one per day over three days. The distance from the objective was the result of Air Force insistence that dropping any closer would hazard too many aircraft from anti-aircraft batteries on and around the bridge itself, and at Deelen airfield to the north of the town and over which aircraft would have to fly if they dropped their loads at or near the bridge.
All sorties were to be in daylight. This was partly due to the lack of time properly to train transport aircraft crews, particularly American crews, in night formation flying on that scale. There were, however, other reasons: pin-pointing dropping and landing zones would be easier, the very real menace of German night fighters would be eliminated and since the anti-aircraft guns were controlled by radar they were as effective by night as by day – so ran the logic.
The pathfinders preceded the main drop, with 21st Independent Parachute Company dropping some thirty minutes ahead of the main body in order to mark out the DZs and LZs. Then, in his first wave, Urquhart went in with the forward elements of his divisional headquarters, together with 1st Parachute Brigade that was to make its way to the bridge and secure it. On its way the brigade was also to secure a railway bridge and a pontoon bridge, both spanning the river to the west of the main road bridge. He was made aware of a ferry operating across the Lower Rhine at Heavadorp near a hill feature called the Westerbouwing, but ignored it as it was not included in his orders.
Major General Roy Urquhart standing in the grounds of the Hartenstein hotel.
Also included in the first wave was the 1st Airlanding Brigade. Its task was to guard the dropping and landing zones for the second phase that would land the next day. This would be the whole of 4th Parachute Brigade, together with more divisional troops and artillery.
On the third day the last wave would be 1st Independent Polish Parachute Brigade, with their heavy equipment landing north of the river and the rest of the brigade parachuting in near the southern end of the main road bridge. This meant his division would not be complete until two days after the initial landings. This, coupled with the distance he had to cover to reach the bridge, eliminated any chance of him gaining the upper hand from the greatest attribute possessed by airborne troops: the ability to achieve total surprise.
The Brigades’ Objectives
1st Airlanding Brigade would be the first to land, bringing its three battalions into LZ ‘S’. Gliderborne troops were able to concentrate very much more quickly than their parachuting colleagues who tended to disperse after they had exited the aircraft. They would, therefore, be able to move swiftly to their allotted tasks defending the three areas on which the division was due to arrive over the next two days. The 2nd Battalion the South Staffordshire Regiment (2 South Staffords) was to remain on LZ ‘S’ to secure it in anticipation of the balance of the Airlanding Brigade arriving the next day. The principal element of this second lift would be the two companies the South Staffords had left behind due to a shortage of towing aircraft for the thirty-five gliders required to carry two companies of infantry. It is perhaps a coincidence that thirty-five towing aircraft were what was required to bring in Browning’s Corps HQ in the 82nd Airborne Division area on that first day. With no communications, a half-formed HQ and no mobility it remains to this day hard to see what he felt he might have achieved on the ground in Holland that he could not have achieved very much more effectively by remaining in the United Kingdom. At least he would then have seen where he would be best placed and could have deployed accordingly, but as it was he had three divisions with which he virtually had no contact each fighting separate battles along a road occupied by elements of an Army Group with which he had no clear command relationship.
The 7th Battalion the King’s Own Scottish Borderers (7 KOSB) was to move off north-west to secure the landing zone at South Ginkel Heath for the 4th Brigade drop the next day. Subsequently, their task would be to move, for the third day, to secure the LZ for the Polish heavy equipment due to arrive in gliders on LZ ‘L’. The 1st Battalion the Border Regiment (1 Border) had the task of defending what was on D-Day DZ ‘X’, but which on D+1, 18 September 1944, would become LZ ‘X’ and on which 4th Brigade’s gliders were to land. Once all these tasks were complete the brigade was to move to its position defending the western edge of the perimeter which Urquhart planned to throw around the Arnhem Bridge.
1st Parachute Brigade, comprising 1st, 2nd and 3rd Parachute Battalions, was to move directly from the DZs into the town. Conscious of the limitations imposed by the speed at which his marching infantry could cover the ground, especially with the heavy loads they carried, Urquhart chose to use his reconnaissance squadron, commanded by Major Freddie Gough, to rush as swiftly as it could to seize both ends of the bridge in a coup de main operation, and then to await the arrival of the infantry. This would involve the use of three of the squadron’s four troops, each troop comprising three sections of two jeeps, each of which was fitted with a Vickers K machine gun and crewed by five men of the Reconnaissance Corps. It was a task to which the Reconnaissance Squadron was ill-suited. Its role, training and equipment were tailored to a reconnaissance role, and not to defensive or offensive operations against opposition of any significance.
In planning his route into the town Brigadier Gerald Lathbury, commanding 1st Parachute Brigade, chose to send his three infantry battalions along separate routes. He reasoned that they would arrive in force more quickly than if they formed a single column strung out for miles across the Dutch countryside. In so doing he was sacrificing control in order to gain speed and hence time to concentrate his force quicker on the objective. The risk was that in the event of serious opposition he would not be able to concentrate sufficiently quickly in order to overcome it. However, given the intelligence picture he rightly considered it a risk worth taking.
Lieutenant Colonel J D Frost.
The 2nd Parachute Battalion commanded by Lieutenant Colonel J D Frost was to take the most southerly route, along a minor road running close to the Rhine. With it, in the same column, were Lathbury’s brigade headquarters with its signallers and clerks; 9 Field Company Royal Engineers (RE); 16 Field Ambulance Royal Army Medical Corps (RAMC), which was to drop off at the St Elizabeth Hospital a mile or so west of the bridge; the 3rd Parachute Platoon RASC, from 250 Airborne Light Company RASC, carrying the brigade’s reserve of two days’ ammunition; and a party of an officer and five soldiers of the Royal Army Ordnance Corps (RAOC) from the divisional Ordnance Field Park who were to secure storage sites by the bridge. In addition to securing the main Arnhem Bridge, Frost was tasked with capturing the railway bridge and pontoon bridge across the Rhine en route to his main objective.
Lieutenant Colonel J A C Fitch’s 3rd Parachute Battalion was to follow the middle route, passing through the centre of Oosterbeek to go direct to the bridge with no intermediate objectives. On the northern route, Lieutenant Colonel D T Dobie’s 1st Battalion was to move to secure an area of the town to the north of the bridge to protect against potential incursion from the north.
Feldmarschall Model. Were the British paratroopers assigned to capture or kill him? At first he seriously considered that possibility.
On the second day, Brigadier J W Hackett’s 4th Parachute Brigade was to secure the area to the north of the bridge, having moved along the line of the Ede-Arnhem road from its dropping zone on the South Ginkel Heath – the furthest dropping zone of them all from the objective. On the third day the Poles would land on the polder just south of the bridge to secure the eastern edge of the divisional perimeter, with 1st Parachute Brigade responsible for the southern part. The Polish heavy equipment was to be brought in by glider to LZ ‘L’ on the same day.
The Germans
Arnhem was very much a rear area in the German deployment in that part of Europe. The units were involved in training and low-level garrison duties; some were Dutch SS. However, shortly before the airborne landings Feldmarschall Model had ordered II SS Panzer Corps into the area north-east of Arnhem to rest and refit. Comprising the 9th SS (Hohenstaufen) and 10th SS (Frundsberg) Divisions, it was a force that had been gravely battered in the fighting in France in July and August 1944. However, despite limitations in equipment and in manpower it was a potent threat, with advantages of firepower, locally available logistic support and communications that the lightly equipped paratroopers who were to land at Oosterbeek to assault the Arnhem Bridge simply did not possess.
There were a number of key factors which impacted upon the German reaction to the airborne landings, and which were to have such a profound effect on Urquhart and his men. However, one rumour can easily be dispelled: there is no evidence whatsoever that the Germans were expecting the attack. There is no suggestion that they possessed prior intelligence, either from their own sources or provided by disaffected pro-German Dutch. They were taken completely by surprise.
Three important points favoured the Germans:
Firstly, the presence of Feldmarschall Model in Oosterbeek as the landings took place. One of Germany’s most able Army commanders, he was perfectly placed to coordinate German defensive activity, which included operations against the Americans in Nijmegen as well as the British in Arnhem and Oosterbeek.
Secondly, SS-Gruppenführer Wilhelm Bittrich and the two divisions (9th SS (Hohenstaufen) and 10th SS (Frundsberg)) of his II Panzer SS Corps just to the north-east of Arnhem, placed there in order to refit.
Thirdly, SS-Sturmbahnführer Sepp Krafft and his SS Training Battalion operating in the woods around Wolfheze, just to the east of the British dropping and landing zones. They would be on hand to respond swiftly to the early landings, and having trained earlier that year in countering landings by airborne troops they knew precisely what to do. Relatively small in number the Battalion’s actions were to have a disproportionate effect on 1st British Airborne Division.
SS-Gruppenführer Wilhelm Bittrich
The refitting of Bittrich’s Corps was important for it would become a major asset in von Rundstedt’s armoury as he attempted to stem the invasion of Germany from the west by the Allies. A great deal of early work was already underway and officers and soldiers alike were striving to ensure that the work was undertaken swiftly. They were also determined to have available as much equipment as they could when the time came, once more, to fight. Consequently, when the 9th SS were ordered to hand all their fit equipment to the 10th prior to proceeding back to Germany to refit with new vehicles and weapons a number, commanders and soldiers alike, were reticent. They were delighted to be going back to Germany, for whatever reason, but were not prepared to be left, even for a very short while, without the means to fight given that the situation could change very suddenly. Therefore, a significant amount of the 9th’s stock of vehicles and heavy weapons were deliberately disabled so that they would not need to be handed over to the 10th SS, but were capable of regeneration within a few hours should the need arise.
Whilst II Panzer SS Corps was a potent weapon in the battle against the airborne soldiers at Arnhem and Oosterbeek, there were other German formations and units elsewhere in the Netherlands whose presence was also to have a profound effect on the eventual fate of the paratroopers who landed north of the Rhine.
Further south, on the Dutch/Belgian Border, Generaloberst Kurt Student was assembling a force known as 1st Parachute Army. It was an Army in name only, but it was stiffened with some first class fighting material drawn in from Germany. Student’s orders were to build a new front on the Albert Canal, and then to hold it at all costs. The German capacity for organisation and improvisation, especially under extreme pressure, was considerable and some of the units were actually in position and being equipped on the spot within 24 hours of Student receiving his orders on 4 September 1944 – the day Antwerp fell. Of the rest of his units, some comprised soldiers with disabilities and illnesses, but inadequate as they might have seemed this really was a case of all hands to the pump in order to keep the Allies from reaching and then crossing the German border. There were also some elements of experienced fighting formations joining in. And ‘joining in’ summed up the situation in many cases. For example, Generalleutnant Kurt Chill’s 85th Division had suffered heavy losses in France. On his move north away from the fighting and under orders to proceed to Germany he had picked up stragglers from other units. However, on his way to Germany he heard of the fall of Brussels and decided to stay. With the battlegroup he was able to form he was instrumental in repelling the first British attempts to cross the Meuse-Escaut Canal on the Dutch-Belgian border.
Also in the south, and actually south of Antwerp, was General von Zangen’s 15th Army, held against the coast by the advancing Allied armies. He was ordered to evacuate it across the River Scheldt and into the south of the Netherlands. In sixteen days he successfully moved the remnants of nine battered infantry divisions, completing the task on 21 September 1944. Two of these divisions became available to hold the line to the right of Student’s 1st Parachute Army, thereby completing a shaky, but gradually strengthening, barrier through which XXX Corps was going to have to break. They were plugging a gap which just a fortnight earlier had been there to drive through unopposed if only the Allies had possessed the wherewithal. These two formations would slow XXX Corps’ advance and impose part of the delay that would lead to their late arrival north of Nijmegen on the approaches to Arnhem.
Generaloberst Kurt Student.
Further north, with their demarcation line on the Rivers Maas and Waal, were the soldiers of Armed Forces Command in the Netherlands. Some were in a collection of formed units, some had a role in manning and looking after installations in what was the German rear area. Others were ad hoc groupings of men from those retreating from the fighting in France and Belgium. Others were training units and yet more were created from Luftwaffe personnel. Generalleutnant Hans von Tettau commanded just such a collection of units operating a screen on the River Waal. He also controlled the SS Panzer-Grenadier Depot and Reserve Battalion 16, already mentioned as being commanded by SS-Sturmbahnführer Sepp Krafft and located in Oosterbeek.
Somehow, this disparate collection of men, units and formations were going to have to work against the combined efforts of a 21st Army Group advance, spearheaded by XXX Corps and with its way paved by an airborne corps in what was to be the largest airborne operation ever undertaken, before or since. That they were able to do so effectively remains a testament to the professionalism and ability of German soldiers and officers, both on the staff and in command, and especially to the junior leaders in direct contact with the Allies.
Our story begins in Oosterbeek, from just beside the former HQ of 1st British Airborne Division at the Hartenstein Hotel; now the Airborne Museum ‘Hartenstein’.
The Hartenstein Hotel, Headquarters of the 1st British Airborne Division, taken after the batlle. Courtesy Drs Robert P G A Voskuil.
