CHAPTER THREE
Duration – Two hours by car
Distance – 7.4 miles or 11.9 Kilometres
Set the trip meter once more to zero and from the car park behind the Kleyn Hartensteyn move to Utrechtseweg, turning right this time to the crossroads 100 metres away and then left, following the signs to the Commonwealth War Graves Commission cemetery. This is Stationsweg. As you drive along the British ‘front line’ was, largely, in the houses on your left, and the Germans’ on the right. Distance is again a feature of our tour, for the ranges and fields of fire along here, as in so many other places, were incredibly short.
Note again the fences and hedges, seriously limiting movement for both sides. Street fighting is always an intense, difficult and dangerous undertaking; and here it was made all the more so by the inability tactically to deploy easily outside the houses. Think also of the men defending the buildings to your left. As you pass Paul Krugerstraat on your left the next few buildings were held from Wednesday afternoon by 156 Parachute Battalion, by then down to less than fifty men and commanded by Major Geoffrey Powell. On beyond that, around Cronjéweg, the Reconnaissance Squadron was defending the perimeter.
From this point on the edge of the perimeter begins to move away from Stationsweg to the left forming the curve around the northern edge of what was called by some the ‘Oosterbeek Thumb’, with its base on the north bank of the Rhine. Very shortly you will cross the Oosterbeek railway bridge, known in 1944 as Oosterbeek Hoog. Ignore, for the time being, the right turn to the Cemetery, for we shall return here later. Opposite that road, on your left, is a minor road, almost a track, leading away to the west. That is Johannahoeveweg, and you will remember entering at the other end when visiting the Reconnaissance Squadron ambush and the ‘10 Para Culvert’. Had the Reconnaissance Squadron been able to proceed unhindered they would have emerged along that track. It is here also that C Company of 3rd Parachute Battalion emerged on the first night, following the line of the railway on their way into Arnhem. Today it is no longer possible to cover the whole of the route as it is blocked in the middle.
Drive straight on up the main road, now called Dreijenseweg. It is along here that SS-Sturmbannführer Spindler had begun to form one of his blocking positions as early as the evening of Sunday 17 September, holding the ground and the houses to the right of the road. Ahead you can see the road flanked by woods, but before you enter the trees glance to your right and note that the ground slopes upwards. The hill about 500 metres to the right is the Lichtenbeek feature, and was 4th Parachute Brigade’s initial objective. Once secured it would provide a base for its advance on Arnhem.
As you enter the darkness of the wood remember to abide by the local traffic advice and use dipped headlights, even on the brightest day. Imagine the situation on 19 September, when 4th Brigade bumped Spindler’s blocking line in its attempt to reach the first objective. The Germans were dug in on the right, among the trees and uphill from the advancing paratroopers. The airborne, on the other hand, advancing from your left and from lower down the slope, were exposed to a well armed, well supplied, well supported enemy who had been granted the opportunity to entrench a strong position, with infantry supported by heavy machine guns, mortars and armoured vehicles.
Just over one kilometre from the railway bridge, with the trip meter reading 1.5 miles/2.4 kilometers, you will see ahead of you the traffic lights on the junction with the main Ede-Arnhem road. About twenty metres before it there is on the left a minor road, Sportlaan, signed to St Jozefhuis Mill Hill. Turn left and find a place to park a couple of hundred metres down this road, allowing plenty of room for the odd passing car. In doing so you will have the woods on your right, with the Ede-Arnhem road beyond them; and you will be able to hear the traffic noise. On your left will be a large open expanse with a line of woods on the far side. Looking ahead you will be able to make out the end of this open area by the line of trees along a road that marks its western end. The scene of the Reconnaissance Squadron ambush is about two kilometres beyond that line of trees, almost exactly due west of where you are positioned. In this area we shall be examining the fate of three infantry battalions, beginning with 7 KOSB.
Drive along the road towards the western end of the open area. At the end is a crossroads faced by a high fence and a gate. Park safely wherever you can.
Facing the fence and the line of the track leading through it, LZ ‘L’ is just on the other side of the trees, slightly to your right. It is an area currently occupied by a sports complex and golf club.
Having completed its task of defending South Ginkel Heath for the 4 Brigade drop, 7 KOSB moved off in the evening of 18 September onto its next task: protection of LZ ‘L’ in anticipation of the landing of gliders with the Polish heavy equipment on 19 September. As they moved along Johannahoeveweg, B Company was in the lead. Look up to the left, as if you had turned left at the crossroads where you are standing, and you will see Johannahoeve Farm, now occupied by the Mill Hill Fathers. B Company came along the track leading in to the farm area from your right and then made its way along the edge of the wood leading away to your left towards Dreijenseweg about one kilometre away. Looking along the line of the wood you will see some white farm buildings about half way down.
B Company of 7 KOSB had orders to proceed to a point, 54.2, some 500 metres beyond the Dreijenseweg, which seems odd when the battalion’s role was protection of the LZ just near you. However, the white farm buildings mark the rough area that was about as far as they got in the dark of the Monday night. Major Michael Forman was the Company Commander:
‘...we came under heavy and close range fire in complete darkness. The grounds on the left of the track and in front of us were open and we deployed to the right side of the track. Further Spandau and 20mm machine-gun fire came from the Dreijenseweg in front of us. We were pinned down in a fierce firefight which must have lasted three-quarters of an hour in a sea of brushwood from recently felled pine trees. We were then ordered...to withdraw to Johannahoeve Farm, which we did under uncomfortable fire as it was by then getting light. Regrettably, Donald Murray and some three or four others were killed in this encounter. Corporal McCleary stayed to the last to cover our withdrawal with a Bren gun and we ran back together encouraged by 20mm tracer bullets. We dug in at Johannahoeve Farm crossroads and along the track to the north and were duly mortared by the enemy but without casualties, as we had our breakfast.14’
That crossroads, more of a cross track, is up by the farm buildings which are south of where you are standing and Michael Forman’s company was strung out, dug in, with all four platoons on either side of the narrow road leading away from you towards the farm. C Company was in the woods beyond the farm. If you look the other way, as if you had turned right at the crossroads, you will see a bend in the road about 500 metres away. It is here that D Company was dug in. Beyond D Company’s position, roughly in line with where you are standing, A Company was in a position on the main Ede-Arnhem road, and you can hear the traffic from where you are. You will remember A Company was isolated at Planken Wambuis during the defence of DZ ‘Y’; and here it was, isolated again.
To help with orientation, Sportlaan runs east-west and the road to the right at your present position leading to D Company’s position faces northwards.
At 0740 on 19 September Brigadier Hackett informed the KOSB CO, Lieutenant Colonel Robert Payton-Reid, that his battalion was now under his command as part of 4 Brigade. His orders were that the Battalion had to hold a firm base on its present position and carry out its pre-arranged task of protecting LZ ‘L’. He was also informed that 156 Parachute Battalion would advance through his left southern flank, and 10th Parachute Battalion along the right northern flank. To secure the position Payton-Reid moved B Company from the area in which you are standing and sited them about 700 metres due west in order to protect the south and west sides of the LZ.
As you imagine them around you, sorting equipment, checking guns and preparing for their move on foot, return to your car and drive back towards the Dreijenseweg. Shortly before you reach the end of the woods, a couple of hundred metres, you will see a track leading into the woods to your left, with an electricity transformer about 50 metres into the trees. Park here, and position yourself by the fence on the right where you can obtain a good all-round view.
Hackett’s plan for 4 Brigade was to advance on the morning of Tuesday 19 September, with 156 Battalion on the right assaulting the enemy. The Battalion had tried to get through the night before, as had 7 KOSB, but had also been pushed back by German resistance in roughly the same area. Moving forward again, its objective was to take a piece of high ground near the corner of the woods just as you entered them in your car driving up from Oosterbeek. From where you are this is on the other side of the woods immediately to your front on the other side of the field, and we shall take a closer look later on. By the time it made its second attempt at 0700 on the Tuesday, the Germans had withdrawn and the objective was clear. Geoffrey Powell’s C Company occupied it without resistance. The plan then was that the other two companies would move to the left, through the woods whose edge you see from where you are standing, across the Dreijenseweg to your left and on to the high ground some 500 metres on the other side.
The 10th Parachute Battalion was to hold a firm position on the main Ede-Arnhem road. If you turn round and face the road, beyond the woods slightly to your right are the traffic lights near where you turned into this minor road. Sweeping round to the left imagine about three-quarters of a mile from there along the road and that is where they were supposed to be. However, Lieutenant Colonel Smyth, having reached that point by about 10.00 am, began to move towards Arnhem through the woods immediately in front of you and approaching from the left of where you are standing. When picturing the area in 1944 remember that the Ede-Arnhem road, called Amsterdamseweg, was then only as wide as a single carriageway on the modern road, and that it was the part nearest to you that was built up after the war. The woods in front of you were, therefore, a little more extensive in those days.
Brigadier Shan Hackett.
The German Spandau or MG 34 machine-gun. It was one of the most rapid firing and reliable guns of its time. It featured an air cooled barrel and was belt fed with up to 250 rounds of 7.92 mm bullets in a belt.
D Company, commanded by Captain Mike Horsfall, was in the lead. It was in the woods just to the right of where you are standing that they hit Spindler’s line, and in particular an array of machine-guns and armoured vehicles clustered in the area of De Leeren Doedel, the restaurant by the petrol station at the traffic light. His immediate reaction, and in accordance with the standard procedure, was to return enemy fire as hard as he could, whilst seeking to outflank the opposition from within his company’s resources. He sent a platoon across Amsterdamseweg, but the platoon commander could not cope with the opposition. Lieutenant Colonel Smyth in battalion HQ soon realised what was happening and sought permission from Hackett to try outflanking with a larger force. For some reason he was limited by Hackett’s headquarters to using no more than a company. With two rifle companies now closed up on each other and, under fire in the woods right in front of you, he chose Captain Lionel Queripel’s A Company at the rear and furthest from the enemy. Queripel was to base himself around the pumping station north of the main road and from there to turn what Smyth hoped was the German right flank and open the way for his battalion to move on towards Arnhem. However, Spindler’s blocking line extended further north than had been thought and once again the Battalion’s advance was repulsed.
Captain L. E. Queripel
During this action Lionel Queripel displayed the courage that would eventually lead to him becoming one of the five Arnhem VCs, and one of the decoration’s four posthumous recipients. He demonstrated tremendous leadership, crossing and re-crossing the main road, once carrying a wounded sergeant, and always in the forefront of everything. The firepower being used against the lightly armed paratroopers was horrendous. In particular, the Spandau machine-gun, also called the MG34, was used to great effect. Long, grazing bursts were constantly fired mostly between knee and hip height, thereby keeping heads, and just about everything else, well down; and the Germans appeared to have a limitless supply of ammunition. The paratroopers, on the other hand, only had what they could carry.
As you can see from where you stand, the battalion was hemmed in to a narrow strip of woodland. To move out across either Amsterdamseweg or the road on which you are standing, was to attract a storm of fire that made any such moves dangerous in the extreme. Then, at 2.00 pm, and not having had any success in outflanking the Germans and wondering what his next move might be, the CO was ordered by Brigade HQ to withdraw back towards the Wolfheze level crossing. The reason was that a German force, Division von Tettau, was pushing hard from the west and there was a risk that the level crossing at Wolfheze would be taken. The railway embankment was, as you saw at the site of the Recce Squadron ambush, a real barrier, especially to vehicles, and with the Germans in possession of the only crossing point Hackett’s brigade would be cut off. Since progress forward appeared unachievable he felt his only recourse was to withdraw south of the railway line.
So it was, unplanned and in great haste, that the 10th Battalion began that most difficult of military operations: a withdrawal in contact with the enemy. Most thinking people were aware of the difficulties this would cause, and the adjutant, when the orders were received, shouted to the CO:
‘We can’t withdraw from here – the Jerries are all around us.’
His CO’s response was brisk and to the point:
‘We’ve got our orders – let’s get going.’
The route they were to take led across the fields from all around where you are standing, in the direction of Johannahoeve Farm and to its west, across the area of LZ ‘L’. Imagine them running out from the woods and trying to make their way in small, uncoordinated groups across the open fields. For the German gunners, well dug in and with plentiful supplies of ammunition, it was a field day. Before long the open space in front of you and away beyond the crossroads where you last parked your car, was littered with dead and wounded paratroopers; and with the weight of fire many of those wounded and seeking still to get away were wounded two or three times, and sometimes even more. It was carnage, and it was during this withdrawal that Lionel Queripel won his VC, sacrificing his life that others might escape.
And just as they were in the middle of all this the Polish equipment gliders landed on LZ ‘L’, just beyond the crossroads where you were parked a few moments ago. Yet further chaos, as non-English speaking men in grey hats appeared amongst a Scottish Regiment defending their LZ and across which a parachute battalion, based, historically at least, on a Royal Sussex battalion was attempting to withdraw; and all of them being attacked by Germans. The gliders carried the Polish heavy equipment, such as their anti-tank guns. It was all supposed to marry up with the Polish parachute brigade due to land that day on the southern end of the Bridge in Arnhem. The brigade was delayed by bad weather that would keep it in England for another two days, so they were separated from their equipment. It didn’t matter; most of it was destroyed in the chaos of the landing.
The other two battalions also withdrew, and in the process A Company of 7 KOSB was surrounded and made prisoner, less one platoon which managed to dodge away through the woods, but which fell into enemy hands the following morning.
We can now move to see the other ‘half’ of 4 Brigade’s battle, to where 156 Parachute Battalion was engaged in the woods on the other side of the open space. Go back onto Dreijenseweg and turn right back towards Oosterbeek. Proceed to the edge of the woods and as you are about to exit into the open you will see a marker post on the right, a memorial to the events that happened here. Your trip meter should read some 3.5 miles/5.6 kilometers. Pull over and stop beside the marker, there should be ample room to park.
Trying to describe the battle that took place here is beset with all the problems of describing any other action in battle. The historian is reliant upon the impressions of those present and they vary with perception and the passage of time. There are several accounts of what happened here, and they actually accord quite well as to the sequence of events and the outcome. However, precisely where it all happened is less clear and distances may be adrift by some tens of metres, extending to a hundred or so metres. This account is based for position around the only good map available, provided by Harry Bankhead of 156 Parachute Battalion as part of his book, to which a number of references are made in this guide. In seeking to describe events as many accounts of the action as possible have been incorporated.
Stand on the corner of the wood beside the road at a point where a track emerges onto the road from the west alongside the edge of the wood. Looking down Dreijenseweg towards the railway station there is a field in front of you to the right of the road. Look now to the right along the track as it follows the line of the wood to where it bends left after about 100 metres. From a point about half way round the bend in the track imagine a right turn, straight into the woods. Penetrating about 300 metres there is a knoll with another marker on it; and you can walk to it if you feel you have time. Allow a comfortable twenty minutes.
This was the 156 Parachute Battalion firm base occupied by C Company early on the morning of Tuesday 19 September 1944, and it was taken with barely a shot fired. Those Germans in the woods the night before, a sort of piquet line, had played their part by halting the advancing British in the dark of the previous night and had withdrawn behind the line of the Dreijenseweg to await their next attempt. With Geoffrey Powell’s C Company secure Lieutenant Colonel Richard des Voeux pushed A Company around to its left to begin the assault on the high ground 500 metres beyond Dreijenseweg that was the Battalion’s objective.
Walking carefully back up Dreijenseweg in the direction of the 10th Battalion battle you will come to a track on your left, after about 200 metres. Move a few metres into the woods and stand facing the German positions in the trees on the other side of the road. This track was the axis of advance for A Company. The commanding officer’s plan was that it would break through across the Dreijenseweg to capture the Lichtenbeek feature just 500 metres beyond the road. B Company would then move on to reinforce the position followed by C Company and the rest of the battalion thereby providing a firm position upon which the balance of the Brigade’s advance to the next feature, called Koepel, and about 1,000 metres further on, would be based. From here it would launch itself onto its objectives in the north of Arnhem some three kilometres yet further on.
The company advanced at 8.30 am with one platoon out in front. The basic theory was that the lead platoon would run into any enemy and set about fighting hard to dominate the area; a process known as ‘winning the fire fight’. Whilst the fire of the lead platoon was suppressing the enemy one or both of the other two platoons, depending on the size of the opposition, would seek to carry out a flanking attack.
Let us assume that the company was at reasonable strength, and therefore the forward platoon would be about thirty strong, with a section of eight either side of the track and the third section in reserve. Given the five metres between each man they had learnt in training, but accepting that woods and proximity to the enemy drive men closer together, we can presume a section frontage of about thirty metres on either side of the track. As they approached the road they came under fire from the enemy to their front, and from two half-tracks from just where your car is parked. Major John Pott had little choice but to try and outflank the Germans to the left, avoiding the open ground and half-tracks to his right. However, he was at some disadvantage. Back on the DZ his No 3 platoon had been left behind to guard prisoners and the wounded, and had been substituted by a platoon composed of Glider Pilots. This was a normal use of Glider Pilots in the British Army, for they were all trained as infantry and could give a good account of themselves. However, they had not worked previously with the company and had not been trained in its drills and procedures. Quite why they could not have guarded the prisoners and No 3 Platoon been left in its proper place does not appear ever to have been explained.
Major Pott had only the briefest time to give his orders, calling to the lead platoon by the road where you are standing to be the ‘fire platoon.’ This gave them the role of keeping up an intense fire on the enemy positions to permit a left-flanking attack by the rest of the company. Ordering 4 Platoon and the Glider Pilots to go ‘left flanking’ they attacked, which would have put 4 Platoon some fifty to 100 metres away from you, with a frontage of some sixty to eighty metres. This is a considerable distance in woodland, and John Pott records that the Glider Pilot platoon had not appeared, having been held up in more open ground to the left. They would have been some distance away from where you now are, and possibly exposed to the open ground where the 10th Battalion battle was fought, the southern edge of which is 400 metres away.
The officer commanding 5 Platoon was killed, shortly followed by his counterpart in 4 Platoon, to be followed by the second-in-command of the Glider Pilot platoon, whilst the Glider Pilot platoon commander was wounded. Captain Terry Rogers, who had brought up a 6-pounder and tried to take on the armoured vehicles with it, was fatally wounded. Major Pott, determined to make every effort to speed the path to assist his brother-in-law, John Frost, at the Bridge, drove through the enemy with very few men left. He paused at one stage to pray, standing in the open, over some of his worst wounded soldiers before pressing on.
However, although he got to the objective it was with only six men. Out of ammunition and hit in the thigh and hand there was nothing he could do when, at about 2.30 pm, his position was taken by a German platoon whose commander remarked in perfect English: ‘Sorry we can’t see to you now, but your chaps will be back soon anyway.’ He was to lay there for a long time, eventually being taken prisoner, the only officer of A Company to survive the battle.
As the A Company battle was going on the CO ordered Major John Waddy’s B Company, at about 9.00 am, to attack on the same alignment, citing as his reasons the need to drive on and the fact that the opposition appeared to be limited to snipers. Given the volume of fire that was churning up the ground, smashing through the trees and exploding overhead just where you are standing it remains difficult to understand how he formed this conclusion. On his way to form up for his assault Major Waddy passed an entire platoon headquarters from A Company lying dead on the track.
However, Major Waddy took his company into the assault on a two-platoon frontage. They came under intense fire, much of which was from 20mm cannon. The important thing about 20mm ammunition is that it is the smallest round into which high explosive can be filled and for which a fuze could be made. Consequently, when it hit the target it detonated. If the target was a man, he exploded. If it was a tree the shards of metal from the detonating round and splinters from the tree flew everywhere, causing terrible injuries. If the hit was high on the tree then the effect was similar to an airburst, which meant that men lying down trying to take cover from direct fire were exposed to the risk of wounding from above. It was a nightmare. Private Ron Atkinson was in the thick of it all:
‘We heard the clatter of tank tracks to our front and flank using the narrow paths among the trees. They let off everything they had at us: small arms, armour-piercing shells, high explosive, the lot. We advanced at the double, since it was pointless waiting to be massacred. Our section sergeant was hit, and while assisting to place him on a stretcher I was hit at the back of the neck by a tree-burst. My hands and tunic sleeves were covered with blood.15’
Major John Waddy’s description of events happening all around where you are standing is equally graphic:
‘German armoured vehicles were moving along the Dreijensche (sic) Weg firing madly at my company. A twin-barreled 20mm anti-aircraft gun on the road opened up, firing high-explosive shells that burst in the trees and flung out deadly splinters. Several men crawling on the ground were killed or wounded. As both leading platoons were held up I crept forward with some soldiers to knock the gun out. We got within ten paces... the man on my right was about to throw a phosphorus grenade when he was drilled through the head by a man sitting in a tree above the gun. Instead of the German Schmeisser I normally carried on this morning I had only a pistol. I missed with my first shots, and then he hit me. I collapsed and started to crawl out. Our mortars were now firing on the road. A figure burst through the bushes saying: “come on, sir, let’s get you out of here.” It was Ben Diedricks, a 6’4” Rhodesian miner. By then the battalion attack was stalled.16’
An example of a German 20mm anti-aircraft gun mounted on a halftrack.
With A and B Companies destroyed, Lieutenant Colonel des Voeux sought to recover something from the situation by pulling together HQ and Support Companies into a fighting element under Major Michael Page. However, their attempt, at around 10.30 am, to break through was beaten back, with considerable loss.
In the early afternoon the battalion was withdrawn as part of the Brigade withdrawal back to Wolfheze, with only C Company left as a cohesive fighting sub-unit. The move was made at the same time as 10th Battalion and marked the end of any attempt to reach the Bridge in Arnhem. As they withdrew they could see supply aircraft dropping their loads on areas which it was planned they would have occupied beyond the Dreijenseweg, but which the Germans still held.
Before you leave, thinking perhaps that the 4 Brigade task had been hopeless and that they had no chance of ever really reaching their objectives, it is worth calling to mind SS-Sturmmann Alfred Ziegler. He was standing next to his battlegroup commander, SS-Hauptsturmführer Bruhns, after the early attacks by the two British battalions when his officer confided: ‘if we do not get any reinforcement soon we shall have to withdraw when the next attack comes’;17 and this despite German superiority in men and weapons.
The German position was showing the first signs of cracking when their reinforcements arrived in the shape of a company of self-propelled anti-aircraft artillery, with the addition of a battalion of twin and quadruple 20mm anti-aircraft guns mounted on half-tracks which just appeared out of the blue. The firepower of these additions was phenomenal, and they turned the tide. But be in no doubt, they were hard and resourceful men those British paratroopers and had they not been completely outgunned, and then only at the last minute by men who themselves were top grade soldiers, they would have prevailed.
Return to your car and drive down the hill towards the railway bridge. Immediately before it there is a left turn signed to the Airborne Cemetery. Turn down here and stop on the right as soon as it is safe and convenient to do so. Leave your car, return to the Dreijenseweg, cross the road and stand at the entrance to Johannahoeveweg where you can look due south down Stationsweg on the other side of the bridge and due north up Dreijenseweg. We are here at the scene of an ambush involving 2nd Parachute Platoon, 250 Airborne Light Company RASC. Just where you are standing was a signal keeper’s house during the war.
The company’s role was to supply ammunition fuel and food to each of the Brigades, and it had one platoon for each of the three brigades. The balance of the company, including the company commander, was in the Seaborne Echelon; that element of the Division comprising some 2,200 logistic and administrative vehicles and 1,100 men that could not be airdropped or airlanded for one reason or another and was making its way up the corridor behind the XXX Corps’ thrust. They would only ever get as far as Nijmegen.
The Divisional Administrative Area (DAA) in which two of the platoons were located was on the triangle of land on the other side of Utrechtseweg from the Hartenstein Hotel. If you look along Stationsweg you will remember that the Hartenstein is to the right of the crossroads at the bottom of the road and in your mind’s eye should be able to position their location, about 800 metres south-west of where you are standing. The third platoon was already in Arnhem at the Bridge with those elements of 1st Parachute Brigade that had made it that far.
The Royal Army Service Corps.
You will remember that as the soldiers of 156 Parachute Battalion were withdrawing in midafternoon on 19 September they reported seeing resupply flights overhead. These aircraft were seeking to drop onto the open ground beyond the Dreijenseweg, about a kilometre north-east of your present position, although a number of parachutes with supplies landed around where you are standing and further up the Dreijenseweg. Down in the DAA these drops could be seen, and Captain Desmond Kavanagh of the RASC, commanding 2nd Parachute Platoon, was sent out to collect in what he could.
Each RASC platoon had five jeeps, each capable of towing two trailers. There are differing accounts of how many jeeps were in Kavanagh’s party, anywhere between three and five. However, Driver Ron Pearce probably clarifies the matter in his description of what happened:
‘Captain Kavanagh said there were two jobs, one lot to go to recce the DZ to look for supplies, and one lot with shells to the bridge. He disappeared with three jeeps. The team that went for the bridge took one jeep with two trailers and got as far as the St Elisabeth Hospital. Here we were stopped by an officer who asked what we were doing. On hearing he told us we should go back, we wouldn’t get 300 yards.’
Corporal Burnham Blaxley indicates, however, that there may have been more jeeps:
‘Captain Kavanagh detailed me to prepare my section for immediate departure to pick up these newly dropped supplies. On this occasion I decided to take only one trailer per jeep; this would provide extra mobility. I left one man, Driver Stevens, to guard the remaining trailers. Captain Kavanagh occupied Jeep Number One, driven by Driver Thomas. I followed in Jeep Number Two driven, I believe, by Driver Doherty. The remaining jeeps took up position behind me, supervised by Lance Corporal J Syme. Sergeant McDowell was with the Platoon Scout Section who spread themselves out among the convoy.’
Looking down Stationsweg you would have seen the small convoy racing up the road towards where you are standing at around 3.00 pm. Paddy Kavanagh and his men headed towards the supply dropping zones, passing as they did so a burning Bren carrier with the crew all dead around it. Given this gruesome sight, and the noise from the battle that had been going on most of the day just beyond the bridge they were approaching, some caution might have been appropriate. Captain Kavanagh, however, was not a cautious officer and he led his jeeps, at speed, straight across the bridge. In those days the bridge was very much more of a ‘hump-backed’ construction than is the case with the current structure. Consequently, their view of the ground beyond it was limited.
Corporal Burnham Blaxley RASC. Collection F R Steer
An example of a British Bren gun carrier and crew.
It was just a few metres away from you, opposite the second house on the right up Dreijenseweg, that a German gun further up the road stopped the lead Jeep with a shell through the front. Up went the bonnet; the vehicles behind were going at such a rate they telescoped into each other and men leapt out to the left and right. Captain Kavanagh went to the left into the ditch you can see running beside the road, leaving his dead driver in the Jeep. Driver Ken Clarke with his Bren gun leapt from the trailer of the second vehicle and went down into the ditch just near where you are standing. He began at once to fire his gun underneath the jeep and trailer at Germans in the houses and gardens opposite. Meanwhile, Burnham Blaxley was otherwise engaged on the right of the road:
‘I dived from the jeep into a hedge and then into a garden where two of our men, both severely wounded, were already taking cover. They were Percy Batsford and Wilfred Bennet, who later died of his wounds and is buried in an unknown grave.’
The Kavanagh
Ambush
The ambush scene, taken by a German photographer shortly afterwards and after the vehicles had been cleared away. Bundersarchiv Bild 101 1/2KBK 771/18
The ambush scene as it is today looking south. Courtesy Drs Robert P G A Voskuil
Captain Desmond Kavanagh RASC. Collection F R Steer
Paddy Kavanagh, realising his position was untenable, knew the only escape route lay back over the railway near the bridge they had just crossed. He decided on bold course of action, involving Ken Clarke and his Bren gun:
‘He exchanged his Sten for my Bren and said: “When I stand up you all run back over the bridge.” This he did, standing in the road and obviously diverting attention to himself.’
Of course, having taken Ken Clarke’s Bren gun, Desmond Kavanagh had his pouches full of Sten magazines with their 9mm ammunition. Ken now had a Sten gun with his pouches stuffed with Bren magazines containing .303-inch ammunition. In making the change Paddy Kavanagh had limited both men’s firepower to only the thirty rounds or so they each had in the magazine on their weapon.
The .303 Bren gun. It weighed 22.5lb with a rate of fire of up to 500 rounds per minute from a 30 round box magazine.
The 9mm Sten machine gun. It was cheap to produce and with a 32 round box magazine, was a useful close-quarter weapon. The airborne version shown here was a much prized capture by the SS, who preferred it to the Schmeisser as it was much easier to fire from the prone position.
Corporal Dennis Cutting remembers the officer shouting to Sergeant McDowell to get them out, referring to his men. As they were running back Ken Clarke was ordered to cover the withdrawal with his newly acquired Sten gun, and he did so from the corner of the railway bridge right where you are standing. He was the last to leave as the others ran down the embankment to the railway, and was quite sure he knew at that stage that his Captain had been killed. After a short pause to regain their breath, they made their way up the other side of the embankment and sought to escape back to the DAA, although it was not easy, as Corporal Dennis Cutting explained:
‘Three of us threw ourselves onto the barbed wire and the others ran across our bodies and pulled us off. We got into a row of houses and were arguing which way was best to go, because the Germans were all over the place. Across the road a door opened and this huge chap, skinny as a rake, appeared with a little girl. He could not speak English, but she could, and said she would lead us out. She went down the road and beckoned us one by one.’
Driver Ken Clarke RASC. Collection F R Steer
Corporal Dennis Cutting (left) RASC. Collection F R Steer
As for Burnham Blaxley, he was taken prisoner:
‘I defended myself and my wounded until, whilst changing my magazine, I was ordered to put down my weapon and stand up. Looking over my shoulder I saw a German lieutenant speaking excellent English and aiming a long barreled Luger directly at me. I had no choice but to obey. I was instructed to find a jeep that worked which, eventually, I did and put my two wounded in it. The German officer put his wounded in alongside and, accompanied by the officer, I drove the jeep back behind German lines. It was then I saw the German armoured vehicles and self-propelled guns and realised there was no hope whatsoever of any recovery being made with our inadequate resources. We were sitting ducks.’
Prior to moving off with his wounded, and whilst searching for a useable jeep, Burnham saw the body of Desmond Kavanagh propped up by the bonnet of the first vehicle, showing all the signs of having slithered down by his jeep. His weapon was on the ground beside him. Burnham was in for another shock just a few minutes later. Whilst helping one of the wounded to the only useable jeep left in the small column he was forced by a 6-inch mortar barrage directed onto the road itself to take cover in a German slit trench, with Germans still in it. Initial concerns at the possible implications of this were soon dispelled when the Germans burst into laughter at the situation in which they all found themselves.
The Air Despatch memorial. Behind, in the field, is where Harry Simmonds’ load landed.
Back in the Seaborne Echelon Lt R G Adams RASC commanded one of the platoons in 250 Airborne Light Company. He went on in later life to write his masterpiece, Watership Down, basing it on the battle in Oosterbeek and with many of the characters loosely drawn from men in the company. Only two of the characters were directly based on individuals, and Desmond Kavanagh was Bigwig.
Return to your car and proceed to the cemetery. This may be the time when you decide to make your visit, but however you choose to do so you should, at some stage, drive on past the cemetery entrance about 200 metres to the Air Despatch Memorial and park. Here you can look across the fields behind the memorial at the Dreijenseweg and see it from the German perspective; and see just how much space they had to manoeuvre and re-deploy to meet any 4 Brigade threat.
Soldiers of the RASC rig parachutes to panniers ready for loading onto a Dakota or a Stirling bomber. TAYLOR LIBRARY
Driver Harry Simmonds RASC. Collection F R Steer
The Air Despatch memorial commemorates the names of seventy-nine air despatchers who died attempting to deliver re-supply by air to the men of Arnhem. Soldiers of the RASC, they were responsible for packing the panniers and containers containing supplies, rigging them for parachuting, loading them onto the aircraft and then despatching them over the dropping zone. If you look into the field behind the memorial it was here that Driver Harry Simmonds was to help despatch a load of sixteen panniers from a Dakota on what was to be his only trip over Holland.
‘The manifest for the drop showed compo in all panniers, but when we got to the airfield we were switched to another aircraft carrying plastic explosive and petrol. Approaching the DZ there was a great bang and a tracer came through the fuselage and jammed in one of the rollers where it burnt itself out. Our crew commander, a dour Yorkshireman, stood in the doorway and shouted: “Bloody ‘ell, there’s a hell of a battle going on down there.” Then a tracer bullet came through the open door. “Bloody cheek, they’re shooting at us”!’
The battle they were witnessing was the final stage of the 4th Parachute Brigade action, with the Germans by this time chasing the withdrawing paratroopers. This would have allowed the anti-aircraft guns and other heavy weapons in Spindler ’s force to bring all their weight to bear on the slow-moving re-supply aircraft. Harry’s load fell among the Germans in the field just behind the memorial, and perhaps we might wonder if it was the sight of those parachutes, among others, that attracted Desmond Kavanagh’s fatal expedition to this area.
There are many stories of courage and devotion to duty by air despatchers and RAF aircrew over Arnhem; many more than can be properly told in this short book. There have been many epitaphs, but probably Major General Urquhart, writing of the demise of Dakota KG-374 whose pilot, Flight Lieutenant David Lord, was to be one of the Arnhem VCs, sums them all:
‘One Dakota was hit by flak, and the starboard wing set on fire. Yet it came on, descending to 900 feet. It seemed that every anti-aircraft gun in the vicinity was sighted on the crippled aircraft. With its starboard engine blazing, it came through to the dropping zone. At the end of the run the Dakota turned and made a second run to drop the remaining supplies. From foxholes and slit trenches and from the restricted spaces to which we were trying to attract the pilots; from blasted buildings and ditches and emplacements of rubble and earth, the eyes of hundreds and probably thousands of careworn soldiers gazed upwards through the battle haze. We were spellbound and speechless, and I dare say there is not a survivor of Arnhem who will ever forget, or want to forget, the courage we were privileged to witness in those terrible eight minutes.18’
There were others who saw what happened to Lord’s aircraft. Lance Corporal C Marshall RASC of 63 Airborne Composite Company RASC had friends in the air despatch crew on the aircraft:
‘Approaching the Dutch border Phil Nixon’s plane was hit and the starboard engine was out of action. His Dakota, on my port side, lost altitude and was lost to my view as it veered underneath us. I was hoping he would bale out, but he was not a trained parachutist. Either that, or he and the flight crew were adamant in attempting their despatching. Whatever it was, they were forced to make a second pass over the DZ and this allowed Phil to despatch his load just before the “Dak” exploded. The pilot, Flight Lieutenant Lord, received the VC for his bravery. Whether Phil’s bravery was cited for “sticking to his guns” I’ll never know. His wife had recently given birth to Brenda who I believe was six weeks old. I cannot say whether Phil had seen her before he was killed. Fifty years later, at a lunch with the Princess Royal in Wellington Barracks, my eyes met another pair across the room. “You’re Mickey Marshall, aren’t you; my Dad’s best friend.” She was the spitting image of Phil.’
Flight Lieutenant David S. A. Lord DFC.
Here, men in Oosterbeek unpack one of the wicker panniers. TAYLOR LIBRARY
Harry Simmonds was lucky. Despite the attentions of the German flak units, and just about anyone else who could fire a weapon skywards, his aircraft completed its mission and returned safely to base. Others were not so fortunate. Corporal Jack Sales was a crew commander in 253 Company. He cannot remember all the details or dates for his drops. Sticking in his mind, however, was the young despatcher who made the mistake of wearing his parachute whilst despatching and was caught up by a disappearing pannier and was carried to his death. Air despatchers had a parachute available in the aircraft, which was known as an observers’ ’chute, and was worn on the chest and not the back. Wearing them during despatching could be dangerous, as witness Corporal Sales’ example, and was not normally encouraged.
One of Harry Simmonds’ friends was killed that day – Harry tells the story:
‘Norman Enderby was on the same mission as me, on the same day. He had made the drop and was returning to the coast when they were hit. He was married, and his wife was pregnant with triplets. He has no known grave.’
Norman’s aircraft, a Stirling, was hit by flak over enemy-held territory, and crashed in the municipality of Aardenburg, diving nose first into the ground. It was completely compressed, and when the wreckage was recovered in 1945 it was impossible to identify any of the occupants.
There was one survivor from Lord’s aircraft, the navigator, Flight Lieutenant H J King RAF. In describing his feelings about the air despatchers from his own aircraft he summed them all:
‘These men were not volunteers like aircrew. They received no flying pay, yet were, without doubt, superb in their fulfillment of duty...’
This is a proud heritage, carried today in the modern British Army by 47 Air Despatch Squadron of the Royal Logistic Corps.
Returning to your car drive back to the scene of Desmond Kavanagh’s ambush, turn left over the bridge and then immediately right into Nico Bovenweg whereupon you should try to stop on the right of the road. You will see that you are on a kind of roundabout arrangement of roads and you will shortly be taking the second right down Graaf van Rechterenweg before returning later to proceed along Nico Bovenweg. The purpose of this short halt is to give you a moment to reflect on the areas of fighting you have just visited and the fact that running down Stationsweg on this side of the road was what would become the front line of the eastern edge of the Oosterbeek ‘Thumb’. You may remember when you drove up Stationsweg to visit this area you passed the houses that were occupied by 156 Parachute Battalion. In fact, all that was left by then was mainly C Company, finishing up just a few hundred metres from its battle in the woods, a little way off to the north of where you are parked, having got there via a withdrawal to the area of Wolfheze and yet another battle in the woods, of which more later.
The ‘White House’, Hotel Dreijeroord. Courtesy Drs Robert P G A Voskuil
Drive into Graaf van Rechterenweg and follow it just a few metres to its junction with Van Dedemweg on the left.
On the south-west corner of this junction stands a hotel, the Dreijeroord. Every member of the KOSB, knows this, from its colour, as the ‘White House’, for this was the area of the perimeter they eventually occupied and defended. This was the northernmost part of the ‘thumb’. And the defensive posture of the KOSB was itself thumb-shaped. Walk or drive the few metres to the next junction, with Karel van Gelderlaan, and you are where C Company held the western edge of the battalion area down Karel van Gelderlaan, and part of the northern and southern boundaries.
21 Independent
Parachute
Company to late
Thursday
21 September
1944
By 20 September, when this area was occupied by the KOSB, C Company was the strongest left in the battalion. D Company held the remainder of the northern end, along which you have just walked from the hotel; its area of responsibility included the hotel itself, which dominated the area. B Company, very much its remnants with three-quarters having been taken prisoner near Wolfheze, and with a party of Glider Pilots from F Squadron under command, held the remainder of the southern edge of the area along Cronjéweg. A Company was no more, having been taken prisoner on 19 and 20 September.
Men of 1 Border manning a 6-pounder anti-tank gun on the western perimeter. The gun’s name ‘Gallipoli’ can be seen on the shield. TAYLOR LIBRARY
A Vickers machine-gun team keeping watch. Although the gun was accurate and reliable, the major problem was a lack of ammunition as re-supply drops were falling into enemy hands. TAYLOR LIBRARY
They were in a reasonable position for a battalion so badly battered. They had five of their eight anti-tank guns left, and with them were able to cover every road. The remaining 3˝-mortars they pooled centrally, and what Vickers medium machine-guns there were the CO placed with D Company. They were, however, somewhat exposed, as their nearest friendly unit was the Reconnaissance Squadron on Stationsweg and there was a gap of 200 metres on the left before reaching the 21st Independent Parachute Company.
This was an area of terrible fighting. Just to the north was the railway embankment across which Germans could easily approach and in cover. Initially, the KOSB covered the area, including the gaps with flanking units, with standing patrols, but as their casualties grew worse and worse this became impossible. They suffered mortaring and artillery fire, some of the latter directly from marauding self-propelled guns; they were sniped at constantly from the trees and from buildings occupied by the Germans; and the machine-gun fire seemed never ending. However, the KOSB anti-tank gunners gave a good account of themselves until their ammunition ran out, PIATs were found to be useful in dislodging snipers, the mortars and machine-guns were well used, and some aggressive patrolling meant that the Germans did not have an easy time of it, even though they were forcing the KOSB constantly to shorten their line. Lieutenant Erskine Carter, a Canadian officer on loan to the KOSB, was involved in one particular incident:
‘From the vicinity of the White House numerous heavy calibre machine-guns chattered supporting fire and more than a hundred shouting SS troopers charged over the forty yards towards our positions. Our front position casualties were heavy and we fell back fifty yards, but the Vickers gunners stuck to their guns. Reorganised by the Colonel, who ran ahead tossing grenades and supported by our machine guns, whose devastating fire kept the Jerry machine-gun replies to a minimum, we fixed bayonets and went after the Hun. It was a costly business, enemy bullets ripped around us, but still we pressed on. After covering about half the distance to the enemy, the Colonel ordered us to the ground and the Vickers swept the woods to our front. Many German soldiers elected to stay in their trenches and fight to the end and their trenches were filled with dead Germans. Soon the whole area, which we had to give up at various stages in the previous twelve hours, was in our hands. We quickly consolidated and then we attended to our wounded...there were about fifteen dead and many more wounded. Some of our bravest had died leading the charge.19’
German snipers caused numerous casualties. Here an example from elsewhere shows their sniper rifle and camouflage.
It is perhaps worth remembering that 7 KOSB was a Territorial Army battalion, the only one at Arnhem, and the CO had been considered too old to command a regular battalion.
Drive back the way you came, and turn left down Nico Bovenweg. Driving along beside the railway gives you a feel for the area, on your left and right, through which the Germans had to make their way in order to assault the KOSB and those other units in the northern part of the perimeter. With the trip meter by now on 5.8 miles/9.3 kilometers you will be at a junction on your left with Valkenburglaan; and it is also signed as part of the marked cycle route around the battlefield. Proceed down Valkenburglaan to 6.4 miles/10.3 kilometers on the trip meter and turn right into Sportlaan, where you should park as soon as you safely can. Leave the car and then carry on, walking, along Valkenburglaan to a marker post about fifty metres further on. You are now by what is known by some as the ‘4 Brigade Hole’ and by others as the ‘Hollow’.
Walk along the track which heads west alongside the edge of the wood in which is the large dip in the ground in which the remnants of 4 Brigade spent a large part of 20 September 1944. Look, as you do, at the trees: much smaller in 1944 they still bear the scars of the battle that took place here. Remain on the track or make your way down into the dip. If you face west, along the line of the track, Bredelaan is about 1,000 metres away, and you will remember having parked your car in it on the first tour. Early on the morning of 20 September the remnants of 4th Parachute Brigade, comprising the HQ and what was left of 156 and 10th Battalions, were moving down Bredelaan with a view to getting to Utrechtseweg and making their way eastwards into the perimeter. They were hit by Germans positioned on the junction of Utrechtseweg and Bredelaan and had to abandon that idea. Moving back the way they had come for a short distance, Brigadier Hackett ordered 10th Parachute Battalion to make its own way into the perimeter, taking a more northerly route, whilst he went with 156 Battalion further to the south. Standing where you are, and facing north back the way you came along Valkenburglaan, the 10th Battalion would have crossed, left to right, some two-thirds of the way back to the railway line and entered the perimeter in the area occupied by 21 Independent Parachute Company, half of 4 Parachute Squadron RE and some Glider Pilots. They were in by about 1.00 pm on 20 September, and the Commanding Officer reported to Major General Urquhart on his arrival, with just 60 men from the battalion that had left England complete two days earlier.
The ‘4 Brigade Hole’ or ‘Hollow’. Courtesy Drs Robert P G A Voskuil
Brigadier Hackett’s group were forced by German infantry armed with machine-guns to take cover in the ‘hole’. There were a few German soldiers in it when the paratroopers arrived, but they were all quickly killed or made prisoner. By now Brigadier Hackett’s direct command, which had been some 2,500 men only three days earlier, was down to 150; and all in one large hole in the ground. Major Geoffrey Powell, C Company Commander, was now commanding 156 Parachute Battalion, Lieutenant Colonel des Voeux having been killed earlier on the way to the ‘hole’.
German SS captured near Wolfheze. Sgt Joe Kitchener of the Glider Pilot Regiment (arrowed) is one of their guards. Taylor Library
The 4 Brigade Withdrawal
20 September 1944
The Germans were determined not to let the paratroopers escape and maintained an intense fire on them. Several hours after they had arrived, and just as darkness began to approach, Brigadier Hackett decided he would have to break out. The situation was desperate, and half of the 150 had been killed or wounded.
View of the open area east of ‘Hackett’s Hollow’, looking south-east in the direction of the Sonnenburg, visible in the distance. A Company 1 Border was in trenches in the centre of the picture and had been since 19 September. Courtesy Drs Robert P G A Voskuil
Return now to the marker post, stand facing Valkenburglaan at right angles and then turn about 20 degrees right. You are now facing Sonnenberg; the area on the perimeter’s edge occupied by A Company the Border Regiment that had taken up the position in the afternoon of 19 September 1944.
In a single body, screaming like banshees, Brigadier Hackett led his remaining men in a charge 300 metres to get into the British position. As they stopped, exhausted, in the relative safety of the perimeter, a Border Regiment captain in whose area they halted invited Geoffrey Powell to ‘take away this filthy lot before they contaminate my men!’20
The consolidated strength of 4th Parachute Brigade that evening, including what was left of 11th Battalion, was probably no more than 500 men. The Brigade was given the responsibility for defending the eastern side of the perimeter – nearest to Arnhem.
As you drive back you might go to the car park by the Schoonoord Restaurant at the Oosterbeek crossroads. Between this car park and the Hartenstein there is a large, detached house and then there is the church, where the coaches park. Brigadier Hackett’s HQ was in a house very similar to the first one, but on the site next to the church which is a post-war construction. Time now for refreshment, before the next tour.