The view of the attack of the 7/East Yorks is probably best seen from the western lip of the Hawthorn Crater; that of the 6/Dorsets from the Newfoundland Park near Y Ravine and from the track that runs around to the west of it. Dispositions are clearly marked out on the map.
See Map 12
I consider this raid to have been very well prepared and carried out, and reflects great credit on the two Battalions.
13.6.18
J. Byng, General [commanding Third Army]
The spring of 1918 was a perilous one for the allies. The Germans launched a series of offensives on the Western Front, known collectively as the Ludendorff Offensive. In the area of the Somme, where the initial blow had been struck in late March 1918, the fighting brought the two sides back over the heavy fighting of 1916, and at Beaumont Hamel back to the trench positions of July 1st.
When the Germans failed to break through to Amiens, they switched their attention to Flanders; this attack was also to fail. But to the British it was far from clear that the German attack was over — they still had numerous divisions freed from the fighting on the Eastern Front (peace with Bolshevik Russia was signed at Brest-Litovsk in March 1918) — and no one knew where the next blow would come.
The 17th Division had ended up on the banks above the Ancre in the April of 1918. On May 27th they moved back into the line about Beaumont Hamel on the same day that the Germans launched their offensive against the French and some severely weakened British divisions in the area around Rheims. All was relatively quiet, then, for the men of the 17th (Northern) Division, enjoying a good summer in Picardy.
On the 4th June the Germans launched a raid on the brigade facing the Beaumont Hamel defences. It was short (ten minute occupation of the British trenches) and sharp; three strong parties entered the British trenches after a short ‘hurricane’ barrage that commenced at 2.30 am. The Germans succeeded in killing ten British troops, wounding twenty eight others and carrying off fifteen prisoners — or at least, fifteen men were posted as missing. The Germans made good their withdrawal, leaving no dead or wounded behind to be identified. It was an efficient and clinical raid.
50 Brigade, under the command of Brigadier General Gwynn Thomas had already been planning a large scale raid of their own; this was to be the biggest of its type attempted by the 17th Division. The objective of the raid was ‘to kill Germans, secure identifications, destroy defences and demolish dugouts’. It was to cover the area of the front running from the north (or left) of the Hawthorn Ridge mine crater to the left (northern) bank of Y Ravine, a front of about five hundred yards and was to go to a depth of some four hundred yards, getting through to the third line of German trenches.
This raid was to be one in force; the attack was to be by eighteen officers and five hundred men from both 7/East Yorks and 6/Dorsets — a total of over a thousand men in the attack. They were to be supported by a range of artillery from heavy howitzers to 18 pounders — 107 artillery pieces in all. These would provide both a creeping and a box barrage. The box barrage would cut off the Germans in the selected attack area from both reinforcement and retreat; the creeping barrage would keep them in their dugouts whilst the attackers advanced as closely behind it as they could. In addition to the artillery, the attacking force had the support of 35 trench mortars and the huge number of 96 Vickers machine guns.
The two attacking battalions came out of the line on June 1st, and returned to their billets at Acheux Wood. From late on 2nd June they practised their respective battalion drills for the attack; on 4th June, under the eagle eyes of their Brigade and Divisional (Major General Robertson) commanders, the battalions rehearsed the raid together over the practise ground on the west of the Acheux-Bertrancourt Road. Other arrangements included the issuing of maps of the ground to all Officers and NCOs, and the entire attacking force went to a ‘lantern slide’ exhibition showing aerial photographs of the raid area. Specialist sections were chosen to be trained in explosive techniques by Royal Engineers, and witnessed various ‘live’ demonstrations, to ensure that German dugouts were efficiently destroyed. On 6th June the battalions individually and then together rehearsed the raid. On 7th June they had a quiet day, carrying out final preparations, before moving up to the line at 9.30 pm. As many men as possible were concealed in dugouts, and the outward appearance of a low profile was maintained throughout the day of 8th June. A large number of gaps (some forty) were cut in the British wire, and a white board was placed in the trenches opposite each gap indicating exit routes to the troops.
Zero was at 10.05 pm.
7/East Yorks had the following targets for its attacking companies. Each company was some one hundred and twenty strong, each company consisting of four platoons.
‘D Coy (1st Wave) will attack, capture and destroy the 1st German Objective [ie German front line].
A Coy (2nd Wave) will pass through 1st and 2nd objectives [ie German front and second line of trenches], push straight forward closely behind creeping barrage & capture & destroy the 3rd Objective [ie third line of German trenches]. They will push out covering patrols & LGs [Lewis guns] as close to final barrage as possible.
C Coy (3rd wave) will follow A Coy through the 1st Objective to the 2nd Objective & will capture & destroy the latter.
B Coy (1st wave) will take & mop up the CRATER with the trenches on the Eastern Lip with two platoons advancing closely under the barrage. One half platoon will attack CRATER frontally, one half platoon will enter it from the NORTHERN edge, one half platoon will enter it from the Southern edge and one half platoon will enter the trench behind from the NORTHERN edge, and join hands with D Coy.
The platoon of B Coy with each of the 2nd & 3rd Waves will advance with their respective waves to protect the left flank throughout.’
In addition, there was a section of the Battalion HQ Lewis gunners attached to each wave to guard the right flank of the attack (ie that part adjoining the 6/Devons), whilst another section was to be rushed forward to the northern lip of the crater to guard the left flank if it was thought to be necessary.
The narrative of what actually happened is simple and straightforward.
‘ZERO was 10.5 pm & 30 seconds before this hour & before the artillery really opened out, our Machine Gunners commenced putting down their barrage. The sections rapidly filed through the gaps, lined up outside the wire & each wave shook out into its two lines as they moved forward. The enemy barrage came down at ZERO + 1 minute on our Front line & Support but all troops had got quite clear & missed the barrage entirely. They moved straight up to the [British] barrage & under its protection went to the attack. The 1st Wave entered and captured the 1st Objective at ZERO plus five minutes thirty seconds & the other two waves moved through them closely following the barrage, the 2nd WAVE going straight ON to the 3rd Objective. There was some slight delay in getting onto the 3rd Objective in the centre owing to the Artillery barrage remaining too long on this point, otherwise the whole raid went absolutely like clockwork. All objectives were gained, Lewis guns were pushed out in front of the final objectives & close up under stationary Protective [Box] Barrage and Lewis Rifles (sic) were also disposed in depth on the outside of the Left Flank, each objective having one L.G. on its left flank with one in front and 3 L.G.s took up flank positions between our Front Line & 1st Objective.
Panorama from near the German Front Line on Hawthorn Ridge.
At ZERO + 50 minutes a signal of a volley of 12 green Very lights was sent up by my orders & the companies from the 1st and 2nd objectives withdrew according to plan. This signal was further helped by a Bugler sounding a “G” on his bugle upon the signal [this was done, presumably, to prevent any confusion that might be caused by the Germans coincidentally firing similar coloured flares].
The 1st Objective was held until all troops in front had passed back & at ZERO plus 80 minutes a signal of a volley of 12 white Very lights was sent up by my orders, upon which a Bugler again sounded a “G” & the troops withdrew and reoccupied our original Front Line and held until relieved by troops of the 51st Brigade who were in readiness.’
7/East Yorks suffered eighty casualties in the attack, and given its scale this was ‘acceptable’. They captured 28 Germans, killed or wounded many more. The report states, rather ominously, ‘A good number more were captured, but on the way back they became obstinate & were dealt with.’ Their fate does not require much imagination. The Battalion captured machine guns, destroyed some trench mortars and their emplacements, six dugouts were bombed and then completely destroyed and others were set on fire by the use of phosphorous bombs.
As far as the CO, Lt Col Gilbert East King, DSO, was concerned, the ‘chief result is that the morale of our attacking troops, many of whom are latest recruits & have never been over before, has been raised to the highest pitch, & they treat the fighting Hun with supreme contempt.’ This was despite the fact that the prisoners, ‘were all of good physique and were of 1st class type. They were very quiet and very subdued.’ The CO was to get a DSO for his efforts; his citation in the London Gazette for 24th September reads: “For conspicuous gallantry and devotion to duty during a raid made by two battalions into the enemy’s lines. His utter disregard for personal danger, skill and cheerfulness throughout, inspired all under his command and proved him to be a leader of a high order. Throughout the raid he remained exposed to enemy fire in an advanced position which would enable him to control the operations, which he did extremely well. It was due to his indomitable example that his battalion was imbued with a fighting spirit which nothing could daunt.’
The Trench Raid – perhaps as it was hoped that they would turn out!
The story of 6/Dorsets is broadly similar, although they faced a more complex problem — the infamous Y Ravine. It was outside the scope of the Raid proper, but its defences, and the potential for the Germans to use it as a rallying point and a springboard for a counter-attack, meant that considerable precautions to guard the right flank had to be made These are illustrated on the map. The raid was a ‘great success — the Battalion killing many Germans in hand to hand fighting, capturing about forty prisoners and 4 machine guns.’ The Battalion suffered over 150 casualties, of whom thirty or so were killed, a large number of which had to be left behind the German lines. One of those who survived was Capt GT Morris, commanding D Company. Soon after the company went over the top, he was seen to go to ground. A voice called out, The Captain’s hit’, to which he replied, ‘The captain isn’t hit, he’s dropped his pipe!’ Two officers, 2/Lts EJ Leate and LW Forde, were killed — they are commemorated on the Pozieres Memorial. They were members of B Coy, whose objective was the final one, the German third line of trenches. It was in this area that the bulk of the Dorsets casualties took place. Several of those killed in the action, including one of the ‘originals’, Sgt WT Gerrard, were buried at Acheux Military Cemetery.
The battalion won numerous awards for the action (although the CO was not to get a DSO until 1919); two bars to MCs, three MCs, one DCM and thirteen MMs. The Regimental history commented, ‘It was fierce and murderous work of not an hour’s duration: one of three definite occasions when blood was hot for killing, and the Dorsets showed their fangs in real anger and slew their enemies face to face.’ It was estimated that some one hundred and fifty Germans were killed. The heavy casualties that the battalion suffered were largely due to German gunfire from the right. It meant that the Medical Officer had a busy time in the aid post — by the end of it he was covered in blood.
At 8 am the officers of the battalions gathered together with their Brigadier at Acheux for eggs and bacon, coffee and rum in place of the hoped for champagne, which failed to materialise.
The raid was important — it helped to dispel the notion that German troops (and those facing the 17th Division were good) were invincible, and it marked a return to the attack; although expensive in casulaties, the planning had gone very well in execution, and the large number of new drafts that had come out since the March Retreat had been bloodied in a successful action.
There were fears over the next days that the Germans would be launching a further assault in the Somme area; but nothing materialised. In fact for some weeks both the British and German armies suffered from the epidemic of influenza that was to have such fatal consequences for many of the civilian populations of Europe. The tide began to turn against the Germans when the French launched the first of a series of counter-attacks on the Marne; whilst the 17th Division began its own part in the great Advance to Victory on August 21st. As far as the men of 7/East Yorks and 6/Dorsets were concerned, their ‘advance’ had begun on June 8 1918.
Late August 1918 was to be the last time that the village — the pulverised remnant — of Beaumont Hamel was to feature in the communiques of the Great War.