CHAPTER FIVE
The German 2 Panzer Division boasted a proud military pedigree. Initially the units of the division had come from garrisons in central Germany but from the autumn of 1938 its recruits were drawn mainly from Bavaria and Austria. As the division’s HQ was in Vienna it became known in Army circles as 2 (Wiener) Panzer Division. General Heinz Guderian himself had been its first commanding officer from the division’s formation in October 1935 until February 1938 when he moved on to take command of XIX Korps and handed the reins of command to Generalleutnant Rudolf Veiel. Veiel had served in 2 Panzer Division under Guderian as the commanding officer of 2 Schützen Brigade so he was well aware of his superior’s philosophy of mechanised warfare and deployed his forces in two ‘combat groups’ for the assault on Boulogne.
Generalmajor von Prittwitz takes the salute of the motorcycle battalion of 2 Panzer Division before the war. Courtesy Franz Steinzer
Generalleutnant Rudolf Veiel Commander of 2 Panzer Division
Oberst von Vaerst Commander of 2 Schützen Brigade Courtesy Franz Steinzer
From their positions on the line of the Canche, Veiel ordered Combat Group von Prittwitz, (commander of 2 Panzer Brigade), to advance up the coast road via Etaples and attack the southern quarters of Boulogne, west of the River Liane. Combat Group von Vaerst, (commander of 2 Schützen Brigade), was to advance up the N1 from Montreuil to Samer and thence to Baincthun in the hope of encircling Boulogne from the east and north-east.
The columns began their advance at noon and three hours later it was the Irish who first saw isolated scout vehicles of Combat Group von Prittwitz on the high ground south of Outreau opposite the forward platoon of 4 Company under Lieutenant Peter Reynolds holding the area around la Tour de Renard. The German advance had not been without incident however, for both columns had suffered casualties due to a combination of Allied air raids and desperate French resistance. Major M Baron von Sußkind-Schwendi, commanding Tank Destroyer Battalion 38, had one company attached to Combat Group von Prittwitz and the rest advancing towards Samer with Combat Group von Vaerst. On the road between Montreuil and Samer he received news of the destruction of his entire battalion staff.
‘Near Samer, along the street of advance, abandoned French, Belgian and Dutch military vehicles of all kinds were packed together with civilian cars between them. The Staff of the battalion was stopped in Fliegermarchtiefe [air raid marching order] in the street. At the head of the advancing division fighting had broken out; the units following had to stop. On a motorcycle with sidecar I had driven to the front to see the situation and to prepare should any parts of the battalion be brought into action. Some kilometres off I saw a close formation of planes flying in the direction of our advance. Because we had hitherto only seen our own planes in close formation I thought them to be friendly too. Shortly after having seen them another commander came from behind and told me, as he overtook me, that the whole Staff of Tank Destroyer Battalion 38 had fallen victim to an enemy air attack. Because the situation ahead had been cleared I immediately returned…A lot of motor vehicles, among them my command car, were still burning. Bombs had hit enemy cars at the roadside and their ammunition and fuel were set on fire and partly exploded. There were bitter casualties; fifteen dead and thirteen wounded of the staff and signals platoon. On my return the wounded were already bandaged and one man was digging the graves for the fallen comrades.’
Major M Th. Freiherr (Baron) von
Sußkind-Schwendi, OC 38 Tank Destroyer
Battalion, 2 Panzer Division.1
A squadron of Blenheim bombers in tight formation. Attempts to slow the German Blitzkrieg by air attacks proved fruitless.
RAF Fairey Battles shooting up a German column during the advance westward in May 1940.
Major Freiherr von Sußkind-Schwendi Commanding Panzer Jäger Battalion 38. Courtesy Franz Steinzer
The RAF was doing its utmost to hinder the German advance on Boulogne. Fighters were patrolling the coastal zone and during the course of the day eleven Westland Lysanders were in action, along with seventy light bombers of which twelve were Fairey Battles and fifty-eight were Bristol Blenheims. Four British aircraft were lost whilst the Luftwaffe recorded twenty-four machines destroyed and six damaged during 22 May.
The advance of Combat Group von Vaerst. Top : wrecked Allied vehicles line the road near Samer. Right: burning vehicles of the staff of Panzer Jäger Battalion 38. The losses amounted to 15 dead, 13 wounded. Courtesy Franz Steinzer
The advance of Combat Group von Prittwitz. The crossroads at Neufchâtel. A panzer MkIII receives a direct hit from a French gun. Courtesy Franz Steinzer
On the coast road too the Germans had run into trouble. Oberleutnant Rudolf Behr’s platoon of panzers was one of the leading elements of the southern column.
‘The advance continues…A look at the map tells me that we approach a little town Nesles-Neufchâtel. Soon we arrive at the first houses. A long street opens itself when, 300 metres away we see the lightning of a muzzle flash. A split second later we are ready for action. The “car” [panzer] stands, the shot is heard, the shell hits the target, the shield of a French 75mm howitzer, and breaks a piece off. Still movements are seen. A second shell against the gun crew. A third scores a direct hit on the muzzle. The barrel is ripped open. We are approaching the town centre, an open square which five streets run into. Again barricades are to be seen; Frenchmen running up and down. Our leading panzer “Jochen II” fights a duel with an anti-tank gun and I aim at a French 75 mm field gun. In the mean time the leading panzer has advanced to the open square, standing there shooting; my panzer is ten metres behind. Shooting from left, dust from right, ahead I see a muzzle flash. Which target to aim for first? Where are they, the small, well-camouflaged anti-tank guns of the French? There’s no time for long consideration. While I feverishly try to discover the positions of the anti-tank gun I see a little cloud of dust and smoke rise up from the panzer ahead. That was a hit! Next moment the hatches are opened, the panzer commander drags himself out and falls down to the rear and remains on the ground at the cross roads. Two other men of the crew dismount and run behind my “car”. In the next second my panzer is trembling from a hard metallic blow, the combat compartment is full of sparks as from a rocket during a firework display. The driver is slumped downward his head hangs forward. In the gloom and still dazed I perceive blood running over his face. There is nothing for it but to get out. The gun aimer though wounded too still has the presence of mind to crank the turret to the side so that the hatch is turned away from the enemy. I call to the driver, he does not move. We dismount raked by hostile MG fire. We take cover behind the panzer. The crossroads becomes an inferno. Again, MG fire. Into a shed. A few hundred metres behind I meet the battalion commander. I report the resistance on the crossing and the loss of my vehicles…I borrow a pistol and stalk ahead. It is impossible to approach the crossroads. It is totally swept by fire but my wounded are still lying there. The rear companies are deployed in outflanking and the tenacious resistance is broken after more than an hour. We are at our disabled cars. My brave driver, the best and most plucky driver of the company is still sitting on his seat as we have left him. In the foremost panzer, an Obergefreiter is lying dead; the wireless operator has lost one foot and is heavily wounded in the leg. The vehicle burns. A corporal manages the near impossible: with a gas mask he enters the crew compartment and pulls out the wounded wireless operator. The “car” is lost. Every attempt to extinguish the fire fails. With enormous crackling of exploding ammunition the panzer burns out, with the dead gun aimer in it, whom we could not save. For him in the real sense of the word his panzer became his iron grave. We bury our dead in a garden a few metres from the place where they had fallen.’ Oberleutnant Rudolf Behr.2
With two of his three panzers written off, Behr’s third ‘car’ led the advance when it resumed. Eleven kilometres further on lay the suburb of Manihen just south of Outreau. In the centre of Manihen the road forked to left and right. The left fork led uphill towards the centre of Outreau itself whilst the right fork funnelled traffic along the low road close to the banks of the Liane, hemmed in by a steep ridge to the west and the railway line to the east. It was the only road direct to the harbour on the west bank of the Liane with little possibility of manoeuvre for tanks once they were moving along it. Watching, waiting and listening round one of the bends on that low road and intermingled with sections of the forward platoon of 1 Company, lay Sergeant Arthur Evans and the crew of his anti-tank gun. On reaching the fork in the road in Manihen just one kilometre away from Arthur Evans, Rudolf Behr would give the order for his leading panzer to turn right.
No sooner had 1 Company arrived to fill the gap on the left of the Irish Guards line covering both roads leading from the fork in Manihen between the Liane and the right flank of 4 Company at the Tour de Renard, than the Germans arrived. It was half past three and Captain Conolly McCausland’s men, in advance of the rest of the battalion, had barely begun to break the ground for their trenches when the first shells began to land amongst them. The first desultory bombardment caused more discomfort than real damage – the German guns appeared to be searching for the other antitank gun covering the roads to the port, causing it to be moved to a less favourable position – but by 5.30 pm the Germans had hauled field artillery onto the hills to the south and put down a heavy barrage on 1 Company positions. Behind the curtain of shells along the low road from the direction of Manihen came light tanks with infantry in support.
The crossroads at Neufchatel. The panzer burns. Courtesy Franz Steinzer
‘All day we had heard the rumblings of gunfire but now – about 5.00 pm – it was growing much louder and nearer. Surprisingly, a private car containing some Frenchmen drove at speed past our position and round a bend towards the Germans. Perhaps we should have fired at it but it all happened so quickly. We soon had more serious maters to occupy our minds. The distinct rumbling of tanks could be heard approaching our position and, sure enough, one appeared unconcernedly round the bend and then stopped. I could clearly see the tank commander’s head above the open turret with field glasses to his eyes. We opened fire and the tank rocked as we scored two direct hits. The crew baled out and abandoned it. Soon a second appeared and that, too, was effectively disposed of.’ Sergeant Arthur Evans, 2 i/c Anti-Tank Platoon, 2 Irish Guards. Attached 20 Guards Brigade.3
‘In Manihen…hardly had the panzer turned out of a curve into a straight, when a flash erupts, a blow! Anti-tank gun strike! The panzer commander, a gefreiter, just having observed the well hidden anti-tank gun is willing to fire and orders the driver to stop. But the “car” rolls further on; rolls further on without the driving human hand because the driver is sitting below, dead from the first shell. His foot is lying on the pedal. A wall at the side of the road partly falls down because of the impact of the rolling panzer, but then the vehicle stops. Soon other shells hit the iron skin of the panzer, partially going through into the combat compartment. Dismount! Despite some wounds the men succeed in leaving the “car”, all except the wireless operator who has a stroke of bad luck. Almost out of danger, he is hit by a MG bullet. Head shot! He too is dead. My platoon is left mourning four dead, three heavily wounded and three lightly wounded this afternoon of 22 May. A painful balance sheet.’ Oberleutnant Rudolf Behr4
French troops manning a 25mm Hotchkiss anti-tank gun.
‘While congratulating ourselves on our success we came under fire – from motorcycle troops who had been accompanying the tanks. In my mind’s eye I can see them now…jumping over low stone walls about two hundred yards away. We exchanged fire with our rifles as well as the guns…A cause for concern was the sight of German infantry manoeuvring around our flanks. From the absence of defensive fire it appeared that we had no supporting troops either side of us. We were stuck out on a limb!’ Sergeant Arthur Evans, 2 i/c Anti-Tank Platoon, 2 Irish Guards. Attached 20 Guards Brigade.5
The Germans attacked the advance platoon of 1 Company on the low road at the same time as they moved towards Evans. The fighting in and amongst the back gardens and hedgerows was a chaotic and confused affair, which dragged on intermittently until nightfall as the Germans probed the left flank of the Irish line in an attempt to prise open the lower road into town. A little after 6.00 pm another platoon of 1 Company was attacked under cover of an air raid on Outreau and the Germans succeeded in effectively isolating the advance platoon on the low road from the remainder of the company. At this point the fighting died down for some two hours but the reason for this became apparent at about 8.15 pm when the Germans began a heavy bombardment of the entire battalion front which was to last well into the early hours of 23 May. After dark and towards 10.00 pm the Germans launched their third and final attack of the day on 1 Company positions and completely overran two sections of the forward platoon on the left flank causing heavy casualties. A third section led by Lance Corporal Mawhinney managed to extricate itself from under the nose of a panzer just thirty metres away, Guardsman Montgomery selflessly covering the withdrawal with his Bren gun. Mawhinney later received the Military Medal for his leadership during this action. Oberleutnant Künzel, a German motorcycle platoon commander, had been following the panzers towards Boulogne.
‘Late in the afternoon we are…in Outreau. The tanks ahead closely followed by the motorcyclists. Suddenly the advance stops. From ahead a vicious sound of fighting can be heard; the sharp bark of our 20mm guns and furious machine-gun fire from the tanks. In between there are dull, heavy thuds. An enemy anti-tank gun? Soon a dispatch rider dashes up. “Motor cyclists forward.” In a flash we dismount and are worming our way forward under cover on both sides of the houses. About twelve metres ahead the road bends sharply to the left. There stand two of our own tanks, hit by the enemy anti-tank gun. A tank Leutnant explains the situation: round the bend are two anti-tank guns lying in ambush which cover the whole road and which cannot be put out of action by direct fire. We shall and must capture these guns, so that the advance may go on…The Company Commander puts one platoon in on the left of the road and one on the right, to take the enemy gun from both sides at once…No. 3 platoon vanishes into the houses on the right, and for us the job begins with getting through a thick hedge. In two minutes we have got through, one by one; and we deploy for an attack. We creep unseen almost to the ridge – just in time to see the flash of a shot from the direction of the enemy’s position…did that one catch No. 3 platoon which had a shorter journey than we? Section No. 1 gets its machine-gun into position and fires a burst. At that moment the fat is in the fire. The houses ahead of us and the little wood are occupied by the enemy…Burst after burst of machine-gun fire comes whipping into the long green grass. We fall flat in the thorns and nettles while the bullets whistle over us. Where are the bastards? We can’t find where the shots are coming from. It seems to be a field fortification, as if there were not enough to deal with already! We have found that a direct attack on the enemy anti-tank guns is impossible. Meanwhile it has grown dark. Every attempt to get within grenade throwing distance fails because of his defensive fire. Corporal B. is killed in trying to locate the enemy machine-gun…The enemy is shooting too damned well. We manage twice more to get in a series of shots at the anti-tank position, when suddenly we hear several sharp explosions and shouting. Then all is quiet at the gun position. I shout across to find out if No. 3 Platoon has reached the objective. Sergeant H. replies that it has been taken. The enemy’s left flank was weakly protected, but in our sector he had dug strong defences. The men of No. 3 Platoon had managed to get unseen within grenade throwing distance and to capture the two anti-tank guns. In doing so Leutnant B. was severely wounded.’ Oberleutnant Künzel6
Arthur Evans also recalled the events of those last few moments as resistance was suddenly brought to a dramatic conclusion.
‘There was a deafening explosion, the blast from which knocked me to the ground. My first thought was that one of our guns had blown up. But then I noticed the ‘potato mashers’ – German hand grenades – sailing through the air towards our position. We were in imminent danger of being surrounded; so I gave the order to disable the guns and withdraw…Dusk was approaching as we crept silently over fields and allotments towards the port, never once meeting any of our own troops. All was quiet. The firing had stopped. Towards midnight we arrived at a large shed and bedded down until daylight. A sentry system was organised. For the past hour or so I had become aware of a pain in my left ankle which was rapidly worsening. I assumed my foot may have been struck by loose pebbles when I was knocked to the ground. On removing my boot my hand came away covered in blood. My sock was soaked. For the moment there was nothing for it but to replace the boot, which was a problem for my ankle had swollen.’ Sergeant Arthur Evans, 2 i/c Anti-Tank Platoon, 2 Irish Guards. Attached 20 Guards Brigade. 7
With the capture of the two anti-tank guns and the virtual destruction of the forward platoon of 1 Company the low road into Boulogne had been partially opened. Lieutenant Colonel Haydon had every reason to expect that the Germans would attempt to press their advantage and move men through the breach in the Irish line under cover of darkness rather than wait until dawn and risk coming under fire from the remaining platoons under Captain McCausland’s command. There was little doubt that the Irish position was precarious. Haydon’s main priority was to restore his left flank but he knew he would not be able to get a true picture of the position until daylight. Even so, he also knew that he would have difficulty in rectifying the situation. His front was so extended that all four rifle companies were in the front line and he had already ordered the carrier platoon, the only mobile element of his force, up into Outreau to block all roads behind 1 Company to counter any German infiltration. Haydon’s only ‘reserves’ were units such as the mortar platoon and signallers whose specialised training made them unsuitable for use in a counter-attack and who were anyhow employed in defending Battalion HQ. In any event there were no field guns, mortars or aircraft to support such a venture so the Irish could do little but wait anxiously for the Germans to renew their onslaught. Thankfully, they didn’t. Oberleutnant Künzel for one was exhausted as were the rest of his men. They spent a ‘restless’ night in a ‘most unfavourable position close to the enemy.’ Apart from some desultory shelling the sounds of fighting died away from about 11.00 pm but for the Irish, too, the night was uncomfortable and restless. As one day passed into another, Haydon ordered his men to ‘stand to’ from 2.30 am to 4.30 am in readiness to meet a dawn attack. Crouched in their trenches, fingers on triggers, the Irish waited. Dawn came and the sky lightened. Still the Irish waited. The Germans would come again, of that there was no doubt. It was just a matter of time.
German infantry during the campaign in the West, May 1940.
Like the Irish, the Welsh got their first glimpse of isolated German vehicles of Combat Group von Vaerst during the afternoon, both on the crest of the Mont Lambert ridge and probing 1 Company positions from the north-east. 1 Company had arrived in Boulogne some four hours later than the rest of the battalion and it was Lieutenant Colonel Stanier’s intention that they move quickly to extend the left flank of the Welsh line from St. Martin towards the coast. Cyril Sutton had been a Welsh Guardsmen for just four months and almost the first thing he saw as he stepped off the boat was a French soldier, ‘lying in the gutter with his intestines in his hands’. That, and the fact that 1 Company had been strafed by Stukas whilst awaiting orders on the quayside, had provided Sutton with his ‘baptism of fire in spades!’ Cyril Sutton, Guardsman F E Smith and his comrades had then been marched up from the harbour to take positions on the left of 4 Company.
‘We moved into a lane at the back of some houses, with gardens leading down to the lane. Here, in the gardens, we had to dig individual dug-outs. Two of us then went back to the cookhouse to fetch a vat of tea. On coming back a German scout car appeared at the top of the lane, about 100 yards away. He didn’t stop many seconds and then he was gone.’ Guardsman F E Smith. 1 Company 2 Welsh Guards. 8
Scanning the eastern horizon and the ridgeline through his field glasses, Lieutenant Coloner Stanier was nudged by an excited Guardsman who exclaimed ‘I can see the enemy across the valley, I can see his face now!’ Shifting his viewpoint Stanier was amused to find that the ‘enemy’ was a French civilian squatting under a hedge with his trousers around his ankles answering a call of nature. The next image he saw, however, was not so comical. About one kilometre away he observed a German observing him.
‘I saw a chap in a hedge with his field glasses looking at us. We fired at him. He went away and then we saw others during the afternoon, odd ones, but jolly difficult to see, I mean they just came up to this hedge on the ridge. Then in the evening they came and probed a little bit with some light tanks. We fired at them and they went away. We think we hit one but I never saw it.’ Lieutenant Colonel Sir Alexander Stanier Bt., MC. OC 2 Welsh Guards.9
At around 6.00 pm German shells from artillery on the other side of Mont Lambert ridge began to fly over the heads of the guardsmen and register on the light railway line which snaked its way from Ostrohove to St. Martin some 500-750 metres behind the Welsh front, and on Boulogne itself. The first German attacks, which were little more than attempts to test the strength of the Welsh resolve and to establish their positions, began at around 7.00 pm and went on sporadically until dusk. 3 and 4 Companies bore the brunt of this initial confrontation.
Second Lieutenant Peter Hanbury saw a German tank come and ‘have a look’ at Second Lieutenant Eddie Bedingfield’s position 750 metres down the Desvres road from the church in St. Martin and then ‘clear off’. The tank approached to within 100 metres of Beddingfield’s road block using every scrap of cover and it was all the more disconcerting as it had apparently bypassed Guardsmen Arthur Boswell and Alf Logan of 8 Platoon who thought they were blocking the crossroads on the left of 3 Company’s line some 500 metres ahead. It was their turn next.
‘As the evening moved towards nightfall, a large tank appeared on the rise of the hill a little way in front with the turret open and the tank commander in clear view. “Look Alf”, I said, “It must be one of those big French tanks” – they were seen on the cinema news-reels before the war…but it turned out to be a German tank!! In a matter of seconds all Hell broke loose. The baptism of fire of the Twentieth Guards Brigade had begun in earnest! The tank withdrew as the light failed and after some sporadic gunfire an uneasy calm fell across the line.’ Guardsman Arthur Boswell. 8 Platoon, 3 Company, 2 Welsh Guards.10
Observing the defensive operations of the British.
Corporal Joseph Bryan also saw his first German tank that afternoon.
‘Sergeant Green who had been supplied with field glasses, had really scanned the area very carefully and he reported, “Bryan there’s a tank down there coming down the valley”. The tank was fired on by all three of our A/T guns and as it came towards us it turned left travelling up the hillside and over the top of the hill out of our range. We didn’t see anything else that day.’ Corporal Joseph Bryan. 2 Welsh Guards attached 20 Guards Brigade Anti-Tank Company.11
Three tanks in all had probed 3 Company positions and what 2 Welsh Guards War Diary called a ‘sharp engagement’ took place, the Guardsmen being prodigal with both rifle and Bren gun ammunition. On 4 Company front too, there was further action as the light failed.
The heavier guns opened up, whilst small arms fire, now using tracer bullets, increased but there was no direct push towards us. As the evening grew darker the tracer bullets speeding towards our positions gave the impression of shooting stars, picturesque perhaps but much more deadly. Guardsman Charles Thompson 12 Platoon, 4 Company, 2 Welsh Guards.12
As soon as the Welsh returned fire any tanks which had appeared opposite them had appeared to withdraw and the guardsmen believed they were driving them off, but with the benefit of hindsight Lieutenant Colonel Stanier realised that all the Welsh had succeeded in doing was to give away their positions. ‘I learnt that lesson’ he was to remark at a later date, ‘That’s exactly what we did…we told them where we were.’
2 Company on the right flank had not been attacked directly but its proximity to the light railway line made for an uncomfortable afternoon and evening as the German guns registered their targets. From their positions the Guards looked down to where the main road to St. Leonard and Pont de Briques crossed a stream before rising over the shoulder of the Mont Lambert spur. At 6.30 pm Second Lieutenant J D Syrett had gone out beyond Pont de Briques with a party of 262 Field Company Royal Engineers (RE) in an attempt to blow up the bridge over the Liane at Hesdigneul les Boulogne eight kilometres to the south-east. The RE also helped 2 Company by cratering the road over the stream flowing down the Ravin de Pont Pittendal just in front of their line and ignited a gas main in the process, the flames from which flickered on their roadblocks throughout the night and created a wonderful marker for the German artillery.
At around 9.00 pm Colonel Deane VC, by then withdrawing from positions around Wimeruex due to reports of German patrols in the area, arrived at battalion HQ and offered the services of his men of the AMPC. In spite of the gesture his offer was not accepted with enthusiasm. The view of the Welsh ‘regulars’ was that the AMPC were on the whole, ‘old, disorganised, tired but keen,’ armed only with rifles and little ammunition and with no food of their own, ‘…their status in the front line was impossible.’ Some of the more able were used by Lieutenant Colonel Stanier later to defend Battalion HQ and others took up positions on the left of the Welsh line but the rest were seen as a liability during the dramatic events which were to unfold during the course of the next day at the harbour. Stanier did use 150 men – the exhausted remnants of 8 Durham Light Infantry retiring towards the coast after their battle with 7 Panzer Division at Arras on 21 May – as reserves behind Battalion HQ and 1 Company.
A panzer MkIV of 2 Panzer Division camouflaged against air attack.
As darkness deepened and the firing died down along his front Stanier decided, as a precaution, to move his HQ from the school house in Ostrohove to a cottage at the waterworks 400 metres or so to the rear. It was a move which did not endear him to the local populace. As he returned to the cottage at around 10.00 pm for some much needed supper he was met by his second in command Major John Vigor and the Adjutant Captain Robin Rose-Price both of whom appeared worried.
‘The French managing director of the waterworks was apparently extremely angry and wished to see me. He was in a towering rage because, he said, my men had trampled all over his flower beds and rose garden. While he was declaiming loudly and at great speed about our sins, there was a big explosion; I thought we were being shelled but it was only a petrol cooker blowing up with my precious supper on it. Bray the Quartermaster, with great presence of mind, threw an old feather mattress on the flames, which gave off such fumes we had to put our gas masks on. The Frenchman did not have one so he fled, coughing and crying and was not seen again.’ Lieutenant Colonel Sir Alexander Stanier Bt., MC. CO 2 Welsh Guards.13
After this unwelcome diversion Lieutenant Colonel Stanier set out once more in his car at 11.00 pm and for the next two hours visited all his companies in the front line. It was a difficult journey, the roads being choked with columns of refugees who also caused much disruption at the Welsh road blocks. Sporadic machine-gun fire could be heard but nothing more and officer patrols were sent out by company commanders in order to establish just where the Germans had gone. Occasionally both sides sent up flares over the valley to the east of St. Martin in the hope of detecting movement. Second Lieutenant Peter Hanbury led one patrol out at around 10.30 pm, accompanied by ‘…nine good men, Eastment and Sergeant Walker in the rear.’
‘I had a feeling of real excitement as I thought we were to surprise a German patrol in the valley. Some rats on a rubbish dump gave us a jump, otherwise it was uneventful. On getting back I went to Co. HQ to report and had something to eat. I got back in time to do rounds at 1.30, and slept from 2.15 until stand-to at 3.30.’ Second Lieutenant Peter Hanbury OC 12 Platoon, 4 Company, 2 Welsh Guards.14
After some hours of cat napping in his cramped dug-out Guardsman Arthur Boswell was sent out before dawn with a Corporal and another guardsman to see if the Germans had occupied the nearby village of Mont Lambert one kilometre along the Desvres road. On the way back, Boswell’s patrol were creeping soundlessly along a grassy track which skirted a high stone wall when they heard the unmistakable sounds of movement.
‘Someone, or something, could be heard plainly, on the other side of the wall and moving in the same direction. A little way ahead a gap in the wall could be seen. The Corporal indicated “safety catches off” and for us to take up a firing position to take on whatever came through the gap. Three French soldiers, weaponless and dishevelled emerged and were very startled to be looking down the business ends of three rifles! The Corporal waved them on.’ Guardsman Arthur Boswell. 8 Platoon, 3 Company, 2 Welsh Guards.15
On returning to 3 Company lines the Corporal reported to Lieutenant Pilcher and Boswell resumed his stint in his trench.
Apart from the Frenchmen not another living soul had been seen by any of the Welsh patrols. The Germans it seemed had disappeared. They were not in Mont Lambert village nor had they been encountered creeping around the valley of St. Martin but nevertheless the men of Combat Group von Vaerst were out there and they were on the move. Already Oberleutnant Durkes had driven his 3 Company of 2 Motorcycle Battalion through the Forêt de Boulogne and into the village of la Cappelle on the St. Omer road. The speed of the German advance had so taken the Allies by surprise that just before dusk an extraordinary incident occurred. A car came motoring towards the Germans standing around in the centre of the village and when they halted it a British Major stepped out lightly and greeted them ‘cordially’.
‘At first we are startled but after a few words the reason for his cordiality becomes evident; he thinks us to be Dutchmen who have managed to struggle their way through to Boulogne! Not until we show our national markings with the swastika does he realise his error – and this vehemently ripens his disillusionment!’ Oberleutnant Durkes OC 3 Company, 2 Motorcycle Rifle Battalion, 2 Panzer Division.16
The armoured onslaught drives towards Boulogne. Courtesy Franz Steinzer
Following in the wake of these forward German units were others, such as Panzer Pioneer Battalion 38, which were moving up to villages like Baincthun to dismantle Allied road blocks and put up their own to cut off any means of escape.
The German probing during the afternoon and evening of 22 May had succeeded in making the Welsh show their hand. There was little need to attack the Guardsmen during the hours of darkness. They could wait until daylight. Until then von Vaerst could move more men across the face of the Welsh perimeter and swing them west towards the coast.
During the night the Germans moved around the northern suburbs of Boulogne in the direction of Wimereux but encountered stiff French resistance at Fort de la Creche, high on its lofty perch overlooking the harbour and most of the lower town of Boulogne from the north. The old fort, which dated from the nineteenth century, was a desirable prize for the Germans as it offered uninterrupted observation of the lower town right across to Outreau on the other side of the harbour. More importantly, it dominated the harbour and its seaward approaches. Just before midnight on 22 May Oberleutnant Durkes advanced from la Capelle to the northern suburbs of Boulogne where he received further orders.
‘On the map…about 3 or 4 kilometres away from us in the direction of the sea, an old fortress is drawn. Its present condition, armament and defence are unknown. We the leading company, with the escorting panzers, have to capture the fort by “coup de main”. A short briefing with the leader of the panzers and then we start. It is pitch dark. Now – behind a little rise – a dull glittering stripe: The Channel! It is calm and quiet; no breath of air is stirring. We stop and switch off our engines.’ Oberleutnant Durkes OC 3 Company, 2 Motorcycle Rifle Battalion, 2 Panzer Division.17
Unsure of the exact position of the fort Durkes decided to take Oberfeldwebel Forster and a handful of men forward on foot but first he arranged a series of signals with the rest of the company: on seeing three green flashes the rest of the company were to advance silently without the panzers and with hand grenades, if three red flashes were seen, however, the panzers were to race to Durkes assistance.
Carefully moving ahead Durkes came up against a barbed wire entanglement which turned out to be an abandoned anti-aircraft gun position. He pressed on and after a few hundred metres reached the railway cutting which, today, still splits the village of Terlincthun in two.
‘Close by to the right are the first houses of Terlincthun, so, half right ahead of us must be the fort. Still there is nothing to be seen; it is deadly silent. Now we must find the exact position of the fort; the only aid is the marching compass. Nestling closely to the railway embankment, hidden under thick shrubs, in scanty light, we fix the marching distance…only 300-400 metres. We advance, ever more cautious, ever more noiseless. Suddenly confused voices: we all take cover. We are lying on a meadow. Only a few paces off a group of soldiers is crossing our path, probably sentry relief from the fort.’
Whilst the Germans lay motionless a motorcycle started up, came towards them then turned off to their right. Further off a hubbub of voices and the clash of weapons could be heard. In the inky blackness more troops passed by just metres away. As Durkes pondered what to do next the angry growling of engines to his rear made his mind up for him.
‘The panzers left behind start their engines and drive in our direction; the rest of the company follows with the vehicles. The noise of the engines becomes louder and louder. Gradually to our right the enemy awakes. Well there is the fort! Now – whilst the vehicles are still some way off – a MG starts hammering. Two, three, five soon follow. The fat is in the fire. The panzers answer but it is too dark to deliver well-aimed shots. Moreover a wired earth bank, about four metres high, protects the fort…The enemy fire is growing heavier. Our situation is delicate. Surprise, our main weapon, is lost…we must retreat. Slowly we manage to turn back the motorcycles on the narrow road beside the earth bank. Forster orders the last few vehicles to be pushed back for some hundred metres with engines stopped. So, under covering fire from the panzers we disengage with difficulty. Losses are low, God be praised, but Unteroffizier. Wolf is mortally wounded by a bullet whilst turning his motorcycle.’
An armoured bridgelayer comes into action on the road to Boulogne. Courtesy Franz Steinzer
French civilians flee Boulogne along the Rue Porte Neuve in the face of the German advance.
Retiring towards the northern suburbs of Boulogne, Durkes reported the failure to take Fort de la Creche to Colonel von Vaerst personally. Von Vaerst informed Durkes that his company would be needed again to attack the fort early the next morning but this time with artillery support. Until then he was told to rest his men. Exhausted after a long day’s journey with some hard riding and hard fighting along the way, Durkes and his company lay down in a broad, straight avenue and within minutes were fast asleep.
The encirclement of the Boulogne garrison was now almost complete. General Heinz Guderian even made his way to the front to see the situation for himself and shortly before 2.00 am on 23 May he returned to the Pont de Briques from the HQ of a forward rifle battalion and sent out a message to 2 Panzer Division; ‘Panzer and riflemen secure south of Outreau.’ Before Outreau, against the Irish, the Germans had lost many comrades striking at the southern front. For some, their panzers had quite literally, to paraphrase the lyrics of a popular Panzer Lied of the time, become their iron grave. If Combat Group von Prittwitz could fight on and seal off Outreau the next day and if the tanks and mechanised infantry in the vanguard of Combat Group von Vaerst could overcome French resistance at Fort de la Creche and reach the coast north of Boulogne, then an iron ring would close around the town, the likely consequence of which would be the destruction of the Allied garrison.