Chapter Seven
The battle for Iraklio in many respects reflects those fought elsewhere, including the fact that the Germans again grossly underestimated the Commonwealth Force that was garrisoning Crete’s main airfield, its largest town and its most significant commercial port. It was not just an underestimate of their enemy’s numerical strength but also of the quality of troops available in Brigadier Chappel’s reinforced 14th Infantry Brigade. The British battalions, typically 750 strong, had not suffered losses of men and equipment that the Australians and New Zealanders had in escaping from Greece.
The fertile coastal plain at Iraklio was generally wider than any other area and cultivated more intensely with a greater variety of produce. The success of agriculture in this area and hence trade made this the most prosperous part of Crete since the time of the Minoan civilisation. Brigadier Chappel forced a similar problem to that of Colonel Campbell at Retymno. He had to hold the airfield, three miles east of his other principal location, Iraklio and its port. In between was a beach where the threatened amphibious landing could take place. Consequently, Chappel’s defenders were spread along four miles of coast and extended almost two miles inland. Important pieces of terrain included AMES (Air Ministry Experimental Site (radar)) Ridge to the east of the airfield and, at its foot, the East Wadi. In the southern part of 2 Black Watch’s position East Hill was important, while in 2/4 Australian Battalion’s area there were two distinctive conical hills known as the ‘Charlies’, which the Australian official history confides to us is ‘the vernacular for breasts’. The Minoan palace of Knossos is three miles south of Iraklio.
Light tanks in rough terrain.
14 Brigade Group consisted of three Regular Army British battalions most of whom had been on Crete since January 1941, and the war-raised unit 2/4 Australian Infantry Battalion, which had been evacuated from Greece. The infantry was supplemented by the gunners of 7 Medium Regiment in the infantry role and three Greek regiments, of which two were little more than recruits. This force was supported by two of 7 RTR Matildas and six Light Tanks belonging to 3rd Hussars, along with twelve Bofors anti-aircraft guns and a mixture of thirteen 75mm and 100mm artillery pieces in a similar state of dilapidation as elsewhere.
14 Brigade had far more time than the New Zealanders and Australians elsewhere to prepare their positions, which formed a relatively tight perimeter. Brigadier Chappel’s HQ was sited in the area held by 7 Medium Regiment, with 2 Leicesters, the brigade reserve, holding only a very small part of the defensive perimeter, nearby. With a Complete Equipment Schedule of three battalions to share around, there were sufficient tools to dig proper defences and to build sangars from the copious quantities of loose rock but, as elsewhere, defence stores including mines and wire, were in short supply.
German Plans
Gruppe Ost was the responsibility of Generalleutnant Ringel; however, as a non parachute trained officer and so as not to dilute the airborne nature of the invasion, he was not to fly to Crete until X-Day plus 1. Consequently, Oberst Brauer would lead the assault, with Fallschirmjägerregiment 1 (FJR 1) reinforced by a fourth battalion, II/FJR 2. This force, dropping in the second or P.M. wave, was considered to be more than sufficient to seize the Iraklio airfield and port from 400 British troops plus ‘various Greeks’ assessed as garrisoning the area. They would be followed by one of the first amphibious convoys, who would land elements of 7th Flieger and 5th Gerbirgsdivisions in the port at Iraklio late on 20 May. They in turn would be followed by the majority of Ringel’s mountain troops by air and sea, who would deploy from the Iraklio lodgement to secure the central and eastern parts of the island.
In detail, two battalions of Gruppe Ost were to secure the airfield and the town/port, with the remaining two battalions being dropped to the east and west flanks. Responsible for seizing the airfield were II/FJR 1, by dropping at the eastern and western ends of the runway. III/FJR 1 would land around the town and secure the port. Of the two flanking battalions, I/FJR 1 was to jump two miles to the east where they were to take out the wireless station at Gurnes, in order to help isolate the Iraklio area, and to form an easterly flank. II/FJR 2, weakened by the Corinth Operation, were to be dropped four miles to the west as flank protection, but in the event only two companies, 7 and 8, jumped on X-Day due to aircraft losses in the first wave.
14 Brigade’s Positions at Iraklio and Locations of FJR 1’s Drop.
The Initial Drop
As at Rethymno the plan for the pre-drop bombardment by von Richthofen’s aircraft was dislocated by delays caused by clouds of dust and refuelling of the transports. Australian infantryman Dick Parry, however, recalled:
At 1600, one of the worst imaginable blitzes started. From a careful distance, no less than 300 aircraft fell upon us at the same time. They were flying at between 50 and 200 feet.
Our sector was as big as a handkerchief and they could not miss us. They appeared to have thrown in every type of German and Italian aircraft: Me-110s, Dorniers, Junkers, Heinkels, etc.; in fact any plane capable of carrying bombs or firing a machine gun. Many of these planes had shark’s teeth painted on their noses, which made them more terrifying.
They flew so low that the engines threw up clouds of dust into our trenches. Meanwhile, they dropped hundreds of bombs and fired hundreds of bursts. The sound was deafening and we could not see further than ten yards because of the big clouds of dust and smoke.
Fallschirmjäger emplaning on their Ju-52.
If the defenders could not see nor could the pilots and again the bombardment was largely ineffective. The German fighter aircraft remained above the target for as long as possible to support the drop but, eventually, they were running low on fuel and had to head back to their airfields in Greece. Dick Parry continued:
The planes slipped away and the smoke dispersed. Suddenly, somebody shouted:
‘Look at the sea!’
And what froze us was the sight of transport planes, dozens of them, enormous lumbering Ju-52s, each as big as a ballroom approached slowly at 50 mph at an altitude of 100-150 feet above the sea. They approached in waves of eight, ten and fifteen machines. We counted sixty or seventy and they continued to come. They were above the aerodrome and seemed to hang there when the first paratroopers jumped.
The anti-aircraft gun crews that had been driven to ground by the bombing had now recovered from its effects and opened fire, without fear of attack by enemy dive bombers. The guns were well sited and the aircraft dropping in the area of the airfield bore the brunt of the fire from the well sited guns. Another Australian infantryman, Private Harry Wheeler, had a grandstand view of half of II/FJR 1 jumping directly in front of him. ‘It was at that moment that hell gave all that it had. The AA guns opened up and many planes were hit whereas we let loose with our rifles and machine guns.’
Corporal Johnson wrote:
I was spellbound by the futuristic nature and the magnificence of the scene before me … They were about 100 feet above the water and rose to about 250 feet as they came over the coastline … I saw many Huns dropping like stones when their parachutes failed to open. I saw one carried out to sea trailing behind the plane with his parachute caught on the tail. One plane caught fire as the paratroopers were jumping, and each dropping parachute vanished in a little puff of smoke, its passenger hurtling to the ground.
More than one Scot from the Black Watch has confessed that he ‘… lived with the horror of that scene etched on my mind’, while others scoffed at the PWs’ notion that it was ‘unsporting to shoot at paratroops who had not yet reached their weapons’.
Ju-52s under repair between sorties.
It is estimated that approximately two hundred Fallschirmjäger were hit during the drop, which left the enemy reasonably concentrated around their drop zones. Reports are all adamant that no enemy actually dropped onto the airfield.
About fifteen of the 240 Ju-52s were brought down over Iraklio and there were further losses to damaged aircraft on the return journey and on landing. The delay in launching the squadrons accounts for the relatively high aircraft casualties, as the anti-aircraft gunners were able to concentrate their fire on the waves of aircraft that came in between 1700 hours and 1920 hours when the last of the outer or flank battalions were dropped.
Gruppe Ost had dribbled in to Iraklio, not at all like the anticipated ‘clap of airborne thunder’, minus six hundred men for whom there were no serviceable aircraft. If the Fallschirmjäger’s chances of overcoming a numerically superior force were slim, now they were virtually non-existent and they themselves were vulnerable to destruction. However, one Fallschirmjäger landing near 14 Brigade lobbed a grenade into the HQ building and temporarily prevented the staff from conducting the battle.
The Hunt
Immediately the first sticks of Fallschirmjäger were down the British and Australian battalions, who had suffered negligible casualties, were deployed to destroy the dispersed enemy before they could organise themselves. The first action, as elsewhere, was to clear the defended areas. The soldiers, well briefed on the drills for dealing with parachutists, needed few orders.
Private Logan of B Company 2 Black Watch was at the far end of the airfield on the lower slopes of East Hill:
They came down in front of us mostly in the dead ground but we had a darn good shoot at the closest ones. I don’t know how many we hit but we were out of our trenches to get the bastards before the rest could get their weapons, which came down in containers on white parachutes. There were groups of Huns scattered all over the place, some shot at us with pistols and others threw grenades but they were soon out of ammunition and easy to finish off. We killed a few of the nasty little bastards and the others soon started to surrender. The young ones were frightened and thought that we would kill them. The older ones, when they realised that we weren’t, got cocky and told us that they wouldn’t be PWs for long.
Ju-52, well alight, comes down over one of the Charlies.
Adolf Muller, of 8 Kompanie II/FJR 1, was one of the lucky ones. He explained:
The signal came to jump …the container had not been placed correctly to get it out quickly. Time was wasted and we found ourselves beyond our planned zone. It was all shit down below! The delay saved our lives. Few of the 2nd survived: they landed on barbed wire and were mown down by enemy fire.
The Black Watch and Australians cleared most of the perimeter of the airfield, with the exception of some Fallschirmjäger who had dropped into the Greek barracks near the airfield, and with elements of B and A Companies, advanced down into East Wadi or the ‘Gorge’. The remnants of 5and 8 Kompanies were driven east to cover by this move, to where just 60-70 shocked survivors waited for the I Battalion.
In the centre where 6 and 7 Kompanies dropped the destruction was even greater, as the Fallschirmjäger had the misfortune to drop in the centre of 14 Brigade’s position around Buttercup Field. C Company of the Black Watch 2/4th Battalion and 7 Medium Regiment were all immediately in action. Australian Dick Parry was with 2/4th:
As they landed, the earth seemed to disgorge men – they appeared from everywhere, firing running and falling on the parachutists, who had been dropped right into the middle of a hail of fire.
There was another surprise for them, two tanks which had started when the paratroopers had been dropped and were now firing in all directions. One of them was just under the drop zone and was turning in all directions, crushing a good number of those who had landed.
About twenty landed in a crop field on the edge of the aerodrome. It was set on fire; the tanks …picked them off as they escaped from the fire. No quarter was asked neither for nor given; we didn’t have time to keep prisoners nor what was more we did not have anywhere to put them.
According to 7 RTR’s after action report, the fleeting targets proved to be too much for the tanks’ various machine guns’ limited arcs of fire and slow traverse. Consequently, tracks were used as weapons by default.
For Brigadier Chappel it was an easier decision to deploy his Matildas at the initial stages of the drop on Iraklio, as he had six Light Tanks in reserve. As described above, and confirmed by the Fallschirmjäger, the tanks had a decisive effect. Oberjäger Franz Mitz, a veteran of the May 1940 invasion of Holland recalled:
Most of my section were replacements in their first battle. None of us were expecting panzers waiting for us on our landing zone. Those that were not hit landing were killed reaching the containers. With nothing but pistols, soldiers who tried to surrender were killed. I hid by a bank until the first killing fest was over.
The gunners of 7th Medium Regiment took to their unaccustomed infantry role well. Sweeping through their area towards the Buttercup Field, the unarmed men of 234 Battery gathered enemy weapons and used them ‘to collect a bag of 175 dead Germans’. Presumably some of these were jump casualties.
At the end of the ‘killing fest’ little remained of 6 and 7 Kompanies and the AA Machine gun Kompanie. As many as 300 Fallschirmjäger were killed and most of the remaining 100 were wounded, with only a few going to ground and making a nuisance of themselves by shooting at the careless. The price of a reckless determination to get into battle based on wholly inadequate information was being, as usual, paid by the ordinary soldiers.
The Greeks and 2 York and Lancs were well placed to take the sting out of the attack by III/FJR 1, whose drop was ‘late and well extended’. The Greeks mopped up most of those who landed in the open fairly quickly and effectively. The medical officer of III Battalion, Doctor Eiben, had landed on his own south of Iraklio and managed to evade the initial sweep but:
Suddenly, I heard the sound of engines and tracks. A group of 39 or 40 Greeks were approaching. An officer gave orders and I had to go back. After 40 metres, I was in front of barbed wire. In spite of the concentrated fire, I overcame that obstacle…
Some Fallschirmjäger who had dropped near the walls of Iraklio forced their way through the north and west gates and into the town.
Throughout the night there was bitter fighting in the streets, the Greek soldiers and civilians alike, attacking the invaders with any weapons that came to hand. The Greeks were reinforced by a detachment of the York and Lancs. By 2230, however, a party of Germans had reached the quay, and by morning others had dug in at the southern edge of the town.
The remainder of III Battalion, under Major Schultz, were unable to break through the Greeks and into the city, so withdrew to the west and dug in. Meanwhile, II/FJR 2 landed further to the west of Iraklio, with only two companies and made no contact with 14 Brigade.
Attack and Counter-Attack
The initial battle resolved itself within an hour of the landing. During this time, the respective commanders, Chappel and Brauer, were both out of the action; the former thanks to the enemy grenade in his HQ and the latter because of delays in taking off due to refuelling and dust on the airfields.
As a measure of the Commonwealth control of the situation, at 1815 hours, Brigadier Chappel had only to order a small counter-attack by elements of his reserve, the Leicesters, to clear groups of enemy from the Buttercup Field area, immediately west of the aerodrome. The Leicester’s Carrier Platoon supported a platoon of the York and Lancs and by 2130 hours the area was clear.
Oberst Brauer and his HQ did not drop until 1940 hours and then they were mis-dropped well to the east. Reaching the battle, Brauer found the situation in his command was ‘unsatisfactory’ but he believed that the airfield at least had been taken by II/FJR 1. He took Oberstleutnant Count Blucher and a detachment from the three companies of I Battalion that had been dropped very late, several miles to the east of the airfield in the growing darkness. According to the German report:
About 12.40 a.m. he reached the eastern slope of the airfield plateau and to his surprise, encountered strong enemy fire from the Black Watch. During the night Blucher and one platoon reached the high ground east of the airfield.
With the airfield and most of Iraklio in Commonwealth hands, the Australian official history reported: ‘All night there was intermittent rifle and machine gun fire throughout the eastern area and much firing of flares by groups of Germans trying to assemble their scattered men.’ Summing up the situation at Iraklio, the British July 1941 report recorded that the 2,000 Fallschirmjäger that dropped on X-Day had failed badly. Significant groups of Germans were, however, to the east and west of the town/airfield, while small groups were holding out at the port, in the Leicesters’ QM’s store and in the Greek Barracks. The Black Watch’s historian recorded that the Battalion was ‘tired but delighted with themselves and with the feeling that months of heartbreaking preparation, the digging, the incessant improvement of position had been utterly worthwhile’.
Subsequent Days
The first night was relatively quiet but in a ‘letter from the front’, reproduced in a British Army training publication, an officer complained,
During the night they filtered down into Bn HQ Officers’ Mess, which was outside the perimeter [east of East Hill]. They had the neck to sleep on my bed, pinch my shaving kit …and put a bullet through the heart of two of my jackets which were hanging up under a nearby olive tree. Next morning we blew them to bits with our mortars.
For the most part 21 May was devoid of major activity. The number of enemy air sorties increased and started to make life difficult for 14 Brigade. Numerous air re-supply drops were mounted by the Luftwaffe, with the Commonwealth troops, as usual, securing a proportion of the stores. The Greeks, who were running out of ammunition, particularly benefited from unwitting German largess and fought the remainder of the battle with enemy arms and equipment, including a light artillery piece, which was regularly re-supplied with ammunition!
Around dawn, the Black Watch platoon guarding the radar unit on AMES on the ridge, to the south-east, helped the technicians complete the destruction of their equipment and withdrew to the battalion perimeter. The ridge was subsequently occupied by the Fallschirmjäger.
Oberst Brauer, with I/FJR 1 and the remains of III Battalion, who had been halted the previous night coming up out of the East Wadi Gorge, renewed the attack. Brauer’s tactics were based on platoon infiltration under the cover of mortar fire. The small groups of Germans failed to make any progress against the Black Watch, and the lone enemy platoon on East Hill remained isolated.
While this was going on, a supply drop, including light guns and antitank guns (some of which were immediately taken into use against their providers) was in progress and a Ju-52 made an attempt to land on the airfield under cover of fighters strafing the surrounding area. This entirely speculative landing, ordered by Student’s HQ in Athens to take place at the same time as that at Maleme, resulted in the loss of another Ju-52.
Between 0900 and 1100 hours Brauer attempted a better coordinated attack. The operation was to start with bombing of the airfield by VIII Fliegerkorps which was followed by attacks from east and west. As the German account explains, III/FJR 1’s attack on the town from the west did not receive all the support it might have.
Schultz (III Battalion) did not receive Braver’s orders, but intercepted a signal from VIII Fliegerkorps that Iraklio was to be attacked from the air … and decided to follow up this bombardment by attacking Iraklio at 1030 hours. He asked Hauptmann Schirmer of the II/FJR 2 for assistance and Schirmer sent him a platoon and a section, but said that he could not spare more men for the task of protecting the force against attack from the west even though he was engaged there only with weak guerrilla forces. Schultz formed his force into two groups, one (Leutnant Becker) was to enter the town through the North Gate and occupy the harbour, the other (Leutnant Egger) would enter by the West Gate. Egger’s group forced its way into the town but Commonwealth counter-attacks thrust it north on to Becker’s force which succeeded in capturing an old Venetian fort in the harbour.
About 1700 hours, a major of the Greek Army offered the surrender of the town, but the British in the town forced the Greek officers to fight on and ‘advanced with strong forces from the east.’
The wavering Greeks had been stiffened by elements of 1 Leicesters and the York and Lancs and according to German sources, ‘Because of lack of ammunition the III Battalion was forced, under cover of darkness, to fall back to its starting place west of the town’.
To the east, Brauer’s force made up of the remnants of II/FJR 1 and most of I Battalion, for the third time attacked East Ridge with support of light guns and mortars, whose observers were now occupying useful positions on AMES Ridge. These attacks were again piecemeal in character, with small groups being thrown into battle against the entirely unshaken Black Watch. However, having performed well the previous day the Matildas were now engaged by enemy artillery and with an attack assembling at Rattling Bridge (in East Wadi), both vehicles were out of action by mid-day; one with broken traversing gear and the second’s engine seized when its cooling system was damaged by anti-tank fire.
Major Shultz, wearing his Knight’s Cross.
To the south, 2/4th Battalion had smaller parties of enemy to deal with. The battalion history records that:
… a patrol of the 2/4th moved out to Babali and drove off a small German force; a German party moving towards Iraklio along the Knossos road was repulsed with severe casualties.
The Australians also cleared the last enemy from the lower slopes of the Charlies and surrounded and destroyed the Fallschirmjäger in the Greek Barracks.
Some of the missing companies, principally from I/FJR 1, were dropped at 1705 hours in positions well to the east and west, representing a small but to Oberst Brauer a welcome reinforcement. However, he still lacked the combat power to achieve anything at Iraklio.
The following day, 22 May, it is reported that 950 German corpses were removed from the Commonwealth area and that a further 300 were piled in the Greek area. It is likely, however, that these figures are exaggerated but German casualties were without a doubt crippling and ground activity tailed off. Air raids however remained frequent.
On 23 May it became apparent that the enemy were concentrating in the east with the intention of securing the airfield, and a report was received that troop-carrying aircraft were landing east of East Ridge.
Two companies of the Leicesters who were sent east to make a raid in this direction returned in the evening with the news that the Germans there were not strong in numbers but had a large proportion of machine guns.
A broken down Matilda being inspected by a German soldier after the battle.
Elsewhere the Brigade extended its area of control. An Australian platoon occupied Apex Hill, ‘a high knoll overlooking Babali’ and more than a mile outside the perimeter, and from there watched ‘the movement of German troops in the hill country through which they might be switched from one flank to another’.
See map page 155
About mid-day two Matilda tanks arrived from the south coast on the way to Souda, having fought their way through Fallschirmjäger blocking positions at Kaireti Farm. They brought with them the news that the 1 Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders (1 A&SH) were on the way from Tymbaki on the south coast and the South coast to Iraklio. The two tanks and the only Matilda of the 14 Brigade that could be repaired to running order, along with two 75mm field guns, were loaded on a naval lighter and dispatched onwards to Souda Bay. This was, however followed by an unfortunate event.
Early in the afternoon six Hurricanes arrived overhead from Egypt, but the naval anti-aircraft guns [Royal Marines], mistaking them for Germans, fired and shot two down. Three then returned to their base, but the sixth landed. Later, during a particularly heavy raid by about fifty German aircraft, chiefly on the town itself, six more Hurricanes arrived, fought the attacking aircraft and finally landed on the field, four of them with damaged tail wheels. Thus few remained serviceable out of these two flights sent from Egypt to attack transports arriving at Maleme.
After a heavy air raid on Iraklio, the enemy to the west sent a message that the town would be destroyed unless the Greeks surrendered, which was rejected. Because of the mounting civilian casualties and the threat of further bombing, Brigadier Chappel ordered all civilians to leave town, with the York and Lancs taking over its defence, with two companies in the town itself and a road-block to the west. The Greeks, reorganised into two battalions, were concentrated around Arkhania.
The Break in of 1st Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders
In early May, the Argylls were in the Western Desert on guard duty when they were warned for Crete. Their initial tasks on the South coast were:
(a) The defence of Messara Plain and its preparation as an emergency landing-ground for the RAF.
(b) To watch for possible parachute landings on Nida Plateau, in the hills north-west of Ay Deka.
(c) The defence of the beach we landed at, as it was expected to land further reinforcements at the same place.
Operations of 2 Argyle and Sutherland Highlanders 19-25 May.
Arriving with only a part of its stores, plus some RAF stores, the battalion was ashore on the south coast of Crete at Kokkinos Pyrgos, near Tymbaki on the morning of 19 May. By 21 May the majority of the battalion and the two additional Matildas already referred to, were at Agh Deka, with the news that the direct route to Iraklio was cut at Kaireti Farm by II/FJR 1. The battalion set about the task of preparing an emergency landing ground.
The regimental historian commented that ‘No attack had been made on us at Agh Deka, and it is doubtful if our presence on the south coast was known’. In these circumstances and with little information to go on, as the battalion had not made radio contact with 14 Brigade at Iraklio, Lieutenant Colonel Anderson took action on his own initiative:
After all the information had been sifted and considered the CO decided on a change of plan. It looked to us as if the whole weight of the German attack was to be concentrated on the northern ports, and that not until Iraklio was taken was an extension southwards probable. It looked as if we were wasting our time sitting guarding a plain which was not likely to be required by British aircraft. The CO decided, therefore, that on the following day, 23rd May, we should make an attempt to clear up the German positions near Kaireti Farm and so open up the main road into Heraklion. He was influenced in making this decision by the fact that HQ 16 Brigade and the Queen’s were expected to land at Tymbaki during the early hours of the 23rd May, and he thought that if he could open the road it would give 16 Brigade Commander more freedom for any action he thought necessary.
Suffice it to say, 16 Brigade could not get to Crete due to the rapidly deteriorating naval situation. On the morning of 23 May the Argylls’ Carrier Platoon carried out their recce of the enemy at Kaireti Farm. At 1000 hours, they reported that they believed a single company, supported by the carriers, could deal with the enemy. A Company were selected and moved off at 1100 hours but with battle procedure (recce, orders and briefings) to complete on arrival it was anticipated that H-Hour would not be until late afternoon. The first objective was Kaireti Farm and the second, a II/FJR 1 blocking position, a little to the north of the farm near the coastal road. According to the Regiment:
The attack went in at 1700 hours and made good initial progress by capturing the first objective. When about half-way between the two objectives an untoward event occurred. The Germans called up more paratroop reinforcements, about 200 of whom were dropped in the nick of time just behind the second objective. With this extra padding they staged a counter attack, which forced A Company back through its first objective to its starting point, where it was finally held. At dusk A Company had established itself on high ground west of the road and overlooking Kaireti Farm, and the Germans were holding their initial positions. Casualties had not been heavy. But for the last minute intervention of the German parachute reinforcement, A Company would, in all probability, have succeeded in its task.
The dropping of Fallschirmjäger on top of the Argylls’ attack was entirely coincidental but the result was a confusing battle and a boost to the Germans’ flagging morale.
Meanwhile, with the refusal to surrender Iraklio, waves of Germans bombers began their attempt to destroy the town. ACompany’s attack was under way, when Colonel Anderson was ordered to attack with not less than three companies. Consequently, with the CO’s recce group leading, two companies and Battalion HQ moved off but with little transport, by marching and running a transport shuttle, they were in the Forming up Place at 0445 hours.
After the experience of A Company during their recent attack, a frontal assault was ruled out, so it was decided that B Company on the right would attack east of and parallel to the main road, and that D Company would make a detour round the left, both companies to be guided by personnel of A Company who had already been over the ground. A Company was to remain in situ, but to be ready to exploit success on either flank. Such was the plan for what was going to be an unrecced night attack against opposition whose strength was unknown, and without the knowledge as to whether artillery support would be available or not. We were landed in this difficult position by the complete breakdown in communications.
Not only was there to be no artillery support but also no coordinated attack elsewhere on the Brigade perimeter to draw the enemy away from 1 Aand SH. Brigadier Chappel’s command was having the same communication problems as his opponent.
At 0500 hours on the 24th the attack commenced. It was important that we should succeed before 0730 hours, the normal hour the German Air Force started play for the day. At 0530 hours, very heavy German machine-gun fire opened on D Company’s front, but there was no sound from B Company axis of advance. At 0730 hours, when the air offensive opened up, D Company were still well short of their objectives, having encountered heavy fire from machine guns firing on fixed lines and located in the entrance to caves. A Company were also pinned down by heavy small-arms and mortar fire, and B Company had vanished into the blue, no message having been received from them since the attack had started. It soon became obvious that an all-day slogging match was in front of us, so a message was sent back to Agy Deka for the immediate dispatch of C Company and the mortar platoon.
Fallschirmjäger search an Argyle prisoner taken during their ‘break-in’ battle.
By 0830 hours some of B Company had been located, held up in line with A Company near Kaireti Farm, but:
At this hour complete disaster nearly overtook the Battalion. The Germans, as they had on the previous evening, again called up parachute reinforcements, and approximately a Battalion were dropped in front of, and to the left of D Company Those that fell in the rear of the Company were actually between the Company and Battalion HQ. The position of D Company was now hopeless. Heavily attacked on three sides by these new reinforcements and under heavy fire from the air, there was no way out, and it became a case of every man for himself. There was nothing for it now but to sit tight and try and hold on where we were. The intense air attacks over the whole battlefield made an attempt at movement impossible.
Again fortune was on the Germans’ side. II/FJR 1 had seen little action so far and the good fortune of an ad hoc battalion of Fallschirmjäger rear details dropping exactly when and where needed confirmed the situation. The lack of artillery or mortar support for the Argylls was also telling.
During the afternoon, a York and Lancs officer arrived from Brigade HQ, who had heard the sounds of battle. ‘He brought orders to the effect that we were to break off the battle forthwith and go to Iraklio by the cross country route he had used, guided by local Cretans whom he had brought.’
The first problem was to break off the action and withdraw to Gournies. The withdrawal was covered by C Company who had arrived from Agy Deka at 1800 hours. ‘The withdrawal went according to plan’.
Leaving a platoon, stretcher-bearers and the regimental Medical Officer at Gournies to collect the wounded and evacuate them to Agy Deka, the remainder of the Battalion prepared for what was expected to be a seven hour night march. To avoid moving in daylight, they planned to set out at 2200 hours, which would allow sufficient time before dawn and the return of the dive bombers. Unfortunately, exhaustion and guides who were unfamiliar with the route by night meant that the Argylls did not arrive in the 14 Brigade perimeter until P.M. 25 May, whereupon the Highlanders took over the small sector held by the Leicesters, which released that battalion into a true, uncommitted, reserve for 14 Brigade.
The End of the Battle
With both sides reinforced, there was little change in the balance of combat power. The Germans decided to concentrate on the south-east flank. On 26 May, Hauptmann Schrimer of II/FJR 2 recalled that:
I sat down with Major Schultz, commander of I Battalion, to decide what had to be done. We had to carry on. We advanced east with the two battalions in line, one man behind the other, leaving the old front line only thinly occupied.
We marched off, headed south, right up to the edge of the mountains, and then bore left, heading east. We passed Knossos to reach the Lion Mountain [Apex Hill] with heavy losses.
Hauptmann Schrimer continued his account of his advance on Apex Hill: ‘We wanted to take the mountain. The English (sic) still held it, though somewhat feebly now. We took this mountain on I think 28th or 29th.’
On the 27th, Brigadier Chappel received word via Cairo that Crete was to be abandoned. For 14 Brigade this was not entirely surprising, despite their lack of detailed information and not unwelcome as they were running low on stores of all kind. Orders for the withdrawal were given to the battalions the following morning, coinciding with further drops of Fallschirmjäger and renewed bombing of the town and defended area. That night, a force of cruisers; HMS Orion, Dido and Ajax (the latter turned back damaged) and six destroyers braved the Luftwaffe and arrived at Iraklio to evacuate the waiting Commonwealth Troops. The last troops slipped away from the perimeter at 0100 hours, undetected by the enemy. They had to hurry, however, as the loading timetable was brought forward by an hour, to 0300 hours, due to the ships’ need to be well south of Crete by dawn. The Greeks, who were now operating as a guerrilla force, were neither informed of the evacuation or allowed precious spaces on board the overcrowded ships.
Oberst Brauer gives orders to a runner at Iraklio.
The Germans reported that they took five hundred prisoners and released two hundred of their own men. Of the Greeks, 1,000 capitulated, while approximately 1,000 took to the hills or ‘prudently became civilians overnight’.