An old soldier recently wrote that ‘In writing about a military campaign it is certainly an advantage to have taken part.’1 With the greatest respect to the writer of those words, this author does not entirely agree. Six decades on from the Normandy campaign, the historian is better served with available source material than has ever been the case before. True, the reliable material is sometimes hard to find amidst a morass of ill-informed writing (and scantily researched film). But a very great quantity of source material is now available to those willing to conduct a diligent search. In the case of Operation GOODWOOD, at midday on 18 July no single participant had a very clear picture of the overall battle. Many first-hand accounts of the battle are imprecise with regard to the timing or even the location of key events, and many that purport to precision are discovered to be wrong. Unit histories can be found on both sides which even give incorrect dates for this major battle. Unit loyalties influence the records: a history of Regiment ‘A’ may state that a position was taken and then handed over to Regiment ‘B’; while Regiment ‘B’ stoutly maintains that the position was taken by them after ‘A’ failed in the attempt.
Among the available sources, oral history has an important place. But it has to be viewed in perspective. Most soldiers of the Second World War had a fairly limited view of the campaigns in which they fought: as a general rule, the closer to the action, the narrower the perspective. Not at all exceptional was the infantry company commander who ‘considered that 7, 8, and 9 Platoons should damned well know enough to enable them to do what they were told to do, and that regaling them with overmuch Big Picture was probably a waste of time.’2 Difficulties arise when soldiers ‘flesh out’ their stories, filling the gaps in their personal experience with information from other sources. These might be popular myths of the time, originating from battlefield fable or official propaganda. Inaccurate anecdotes find their way into general histories and poorly-researched television documentaries, to be absorbed and re-told by old soldiers, creating a ‘feedback loop’ of misinformation. Many a war story, widely repeated and acquiring in the repetition the status of ‘historical fact’, is found to stem from a single unsupported anecdote.
This is not to decry the great value of personal reminiscences, which often are found to contain nuggets of information lost in ‘broad-brush’ accounts of campaigns. And much Second World War history is ‘broad-brush’: recounting events on a global and theatre level; describing battles at the level of armies, corps, and divisions. On this scale, the detail of combat can easily be lost. The advance of an armoured division is considerably harder to visualize than, say, the image of a squadron of nineteen tanks, or a platoon of thirty infantrymen. This work will attempt to focus on the detail, the author believing that the story of smaller units’ actions may often convey a better understanding of the battle as a whole. When the general histories occasionally descend to this level of detail (to add ‘flavour’) many neglect to get the detail right, whether by omission, ignorance, or by casual acceptance of anecdote. Of the very many studies of Operation GOODWOOD consulted by this author, publications ranging from 1947 to 2004, not one has been free of such errors. Quite often the best-known and most oft-quoted anecdotes have turned out to be the least defensible.
To complete the opening quotation: ‘In writing about a military campaign it is certainly an advantage to have taken part. At least you know what the weather was like.’ What an indictment! But there exists today a body of Second World War historians prepared to question past assumptions and return to primary sources in search of answers. So, at sixty years remove, we progress closer to the truth. This author did not take part in the battle. He has nevertheless endeavoured to present a story as accurate as possible in its detail. Including ‘what the weather was like.’
This is the story of a battle. Rather than burden the story with too much technical material, a quantity of background information is presented in separate appendices, organized by topic, which the reader may consult as required. In these, specific subjects such as the mechanics of tank combat, the lie of the land, or examples of unit organization are covered without interrupting the narrative flow. Similarly, in cases where this work challenges the ‘accepted wisdom’, supporting evidence is presented in chapter-end notes rather than in the main text.
It would be foolhardy to hope that no errors have crept into this book. This will not be the last word on GOODWOOD. But, where this work appears to contradict earlier accounts, the author respectfully asks readers to consider that no single earlier study has enjoyed access to all the information contained herein.
Ian Daglish
Alderley Edge
2005
References
1
‘Assault Division’, Norman Scarfe, ISBN 1-86227-256-5. A very lucid story of 3rd Division including a useful account of actions on the eastern flank of GOODWOOD, sadly beyond the scope of this work. Quote from the Preface to the 2004 edition.
2
‘Lion Rampant’, Robert Woollcombe, 1955, p 42. This account of the 6th King’s Own Scottish Borderers is one of the best stories of the life of a British infantry regiment, so lightly fictionalized that the real personalities behind the fictional names are easily recognised.