Chapter 6
Whatever the debate and controversy regarding its ultimate goal, the first key objective of the GOODWOOD plan was the Bourguébus ridge. To this end, the greatest obstacle appeared to be the initial advance down a narrow corridor, overlooked by factories to the west and wooded hills to the east, closely flanked by hamlets and villages of solid Norman stone. Previous Normandy battles had stalled due to unexpected hold-ups in the opening stages of the assault. This time it was fondly hoped that if the forward defences could be obliterated, the German front line be cleanly penetrated, and the speed of the advance be maintained over the first few miles, then the operation might take on a momentum of its own, rolling on forward.
Between the dual-track Caen to Paris railway and the ridge, the map promised open country: gently undulating farmland with only the odd orchard-girt hamlet intervening until the ridge itself was reached. Surely this was ‘good tank country’ par excellence, in which the armoured divisions could employ their mobility and manoeuvrability as never before in the campaign to date. Shortly after 09.30 hours, the first tanks of two regiments, moving more or less abreast, reached that railway line. And from that point the nature of the battle changed.
3rd RTR AT GRENTHEVILLE
A and B Squadrons of 3rd Royal Tanks had a little time to draw breath after running the gauntlet of German resistance at le Mesnil Frémentel. Advancing south-west, a slight downslope put them into dead ground as viewed from le Mesnil Frémentel. Ahead a hedgerow-lined rectangular field blocked the line of sight to the south, while due west appeared the raised embankment of the Chemin de Fer Minier. As the lead tanks rounded the north-west corner of this field they saw ahead the main Caen to Paris railway line, at this point an insignificant obstacle only slightly above the level of the surrounding fields. And just beyond the dual tracks lay the next objective: Grentheville. Ahead, to the tanks’ left flank, a mass of orchards reached out from the village as far as the railway; straight ahead and set back from the railway was a 150 metre long wall, ominously loopholed. And beyond the wall, nestling amongst orchards, stood a chateau, farmyards, and houses of the hamlet itself. Only this outer wall of the chateau was so far visible amid the as-yet largely untouched tree cover. The advancing tank commanders’ attention was caught by movements along the wall and in the treeline. Suddenly, as the range closed, the ground immediately ahead erupted in columns of fire.
Grentheville: woods and orchards west of the village led almost to the railway embankment.
From the wall and even closer from emplacements hidden in the crops ahead, salvoes of rockets howled skywards. These were the notorious Nebelwerfer. Large-calibre rockets launched from light six-barrelled mounts, they constituted an important part of the German artillery in Normandy. Relatively inaccurate and short ranged, and hugely demanding in their consumption of scarce ammunition, nevertheless their massed salvoes could be devastating against unprepared troops. Many a platoon of British infantry having advanced to seize an enemy hedgerow or orchard was mercilessly cut down in its moment of victory by a coordinated hail of pre-plotted mortar and rocket fire. And the unearthly wail of the Nebelwerfer rockets ripping the sky led the troops to loathe them as ‘Moaning Minnies’ or ‘Sobbing Sisters’. For tanks, and especially against tanks charging headlong, they were no match. The screaming warheads rocketed steeply upwards, over the tanks, bound for somewhere in the rear, tails of smoke clearly revealing the positions of their launchers. Some of the advancing Shermans now fell victim to true antitank guns camouflaged in the distance. But most pressed on, raking the nearest Nebelwerfer emplacements with bow and turret machine guns; and as the range rapidly closed, they physically overran the positions, crushing the flimsy launcher carriages beneath tank tracks.
21 cm, six-barrelled ‘Nebelwerfer’ and its ammunition.
Still, tanks as yet unaccompanied by infantry were not about to venture into orchards and buildings. Once again, the first wave of the armoured tide flowed around the obstacle, turning westward while attempting to return fire on the move. Bill Close was on the right flank of this movement.
As I reached a little cornfield a few hundred yards from Grentheville we were engaged by antitank guns on the forward edge of the village. And some of the tanks in my troops on the left, about four of them, went up in flames. I could also see several of the tanks further left, in the left hand squadron, were also brewing. There was quite a lot of AP shot coming from the bushes and trees in Grentheville and also where the farm buildings are. Obviously antitank guns in very well concealed positions.1
The initial deployment of Becker’s 3.Batterie: armoured command vehicle to the fore; two troops of 7.5 cm Pak; one troop of four howitzers.
It is just possible that some self-propelled guns of Becker’s 3. Batterie were still at this moment within the orchards of Grentheville. However, it is more likely that the antitank fire aimed at Bill Close was coming from guns emplaced outside the village. Before the British advance, the mobile battery had been deployed with one section of three 7.5cm guns due north of the village, along the railway, facing north; a second to the east, facing le Mesnil Frémentel; and the section of four 10.5cm howitzers south east of the buildings. The battery observation post was positioned north of the railway, and would have given early warning of tanks streaming around le Mesnil Frémentel. By 10.00 hours, it seems certain that the northern section would have displaced southwards, through the orchards north of the village, under cover of the battery’s other guns. Given the policy of the lightly armoured Abteilung to fall back well before coming under effective fire, this was probably a fairly hasty manoeuvre performed as soon as the first British tanks appeared, barely one thousand metres distant, offering little immediate opportunity to inflict damage on the attacking force. Hardly surprising, therefore, that when Becker’s guns did deliver fire from south east of Grentheville, the forward elements of 3rd RTR should seek some relief from the enemy by moving to the opposite, north-western, side of the village and orchards. Still on the right flank, Bill Close’s A Squadron was now suffering badly, and,
within a matter of moments there were five or six tanks brewing up. I told my two right hand troops to tuck themselves down along the line of the embankment and get some HE fire on the forward edges of the village as quickly as possible. I had an OP with me right from the start. He was in a sawn-off Honey [see Appendix VI] and I had given him instructions to stick close to me. I tucked myself in behind a small ridge, called him over, and told him, “For Christ’s sake get a stonc [a standard concentration of artillery] down as quickly as possible.”2
Road and rail underpasses below the Chemin de Fer Minier.
With 3rd RTR temporarily held up north and west of Grentheville, a few words are needed about the immediate lie of the land. Without revisiting the details of the Chemin de Fer Minier railway embankment (see Appendix I), it should be pointed out that the only shelter to be found by the tanks in front of Grentheville was the slight down-slope to the north of Grentheville and the low embankment along which ran this stretch of the dual-track Caen – Paris railway (turning further east into a shallow cutting). Together with the remaining crops, this did not amount to much protection, but was better than nothing. Hence, Major Close’s injunction to his troops to ‘tuck in’ close to the angle formed between the eastern side of the steep embankment and the northern side of the main Caen-Paris railway.
By 10.00 hours, the bulk of the 3rd RTR regimental group was passing le Mesnil Frémentel on its way towards Grentheville. Increasing numbers of vehicles were stopping short of the firing and accumulating in the area north of the railway, behind the stalled tanks. Urged on by 29th Brigade, Colonel Silvertop was insistent that the momentum of the advance be regained. Major Close was keen to comply, but recognised the essential need for some preparatory fire to cover any advance.
All the time, I was being told in no uncertain manner by my CO to get over to the west side of the embankment. And I said wait out until can get a stonc down on the village. My two right hand troops had in the meantime engaged several antitank guns and assault guns in this area. They claimed to have knocked out two or three antitank guns and at least one assault gun.3
With the Sherman tanks’ suppressive fire against the north end of the village and H Battery of 13th Royal Horse Artillery pounding the enemy, the position north of the railway eased slightly. Close sensed that the time had come to move out.
I could see that the embankment was going to be rather a difficult problem, and I did not like the idea of going over the top, broadside on, within a few hundred yards of antitank guns... I wanted to get my two right-hand troops to the western side of the embankment, before I followed with the regimental group behind me. So, I gave orders for them to move. Not a tank moved. Nothing happened at all. So, I stood up in my tank, took off my beret, waved it three times round my head, and said over the air, “Conform to me.” As I approached the embankment my feelings were extremely mixed. I was not quite sure what to expect, and I was very apprehensive if there were any enemy mines. In the event they weren’t. And I shot through the hole, rather like a rat up a drainpipe. I emerged on the other side to see this beautiful country looking perfectly peaceful. There was no sign of any movement whatsoever. And I was an extremely relieved squadron commander, I can tell you.’4
The hesitation of Major Close’s troops to follow a direct order clearly made an impression on a commander with so many years of experience of fighting in tanks. The event provoked much analysis, not least from General Roberts. ‘Bill Close, in order to get his squadron under the bridge going through the embankment… had to take of his hat wave it in the air, and say “Follow me!” Now, I don’t believe that would have happened in either of the other three regiments in the division.’5 The problem was not simply lack of discipline, and certainly not lack of experience. Many of these tank men had fought together throughout the North Africa campaign. Roberts recognised better than anyone that his division included,
one regiment that had battle experience: the 3rd Tanks had a great deal... they had a very good commanding officer and some good squadron leaders.’ However, ‘The fact is that, with a great deal of fighting, all those concerned become a little more wary and a little more canny. It’s more difficult to get people to go “round the corner” after that sort of experience than it is right at the outset of a campaign.6
In point of fact, the chances of a Sherman tank surmounting the railway embankment at this point, even without enemy fire, would have been slim. And Major Close’s ‘drainpipe’ was actually the widest of all the underpasses the whole length of the railway embankment: the point at which the two-track Paris railway passed under the Chemin de Fer Minier. His Sherman tank emerged on the west side of the embankment into a wholly different landscape. The distinctive intersection of two railways had proved irresistible to bombers seeking targets in the murk below, as testified by large bomb craters in its immediate vicinity. But beyond the bridge were rippling fields of golden corn, the crop awaiting harvest and mostly concealing the effects of the American hundred pound fragmentation bombs scattered over this entire sector. Left behind was the smoke and dust of an armoured engagement, its distant sounds now drowned out by the roar of the tanks’ engines, the crackle of headphones, and the barrier of the embankment. The summer sun was now well up in the morning sky, beaming down through gaps in the smoke drifting downwind towards the ridge to the south.
3rd Royal Tanks’ advance past Grentheville.
Now the foremost element of 3rd RTR, Major Close’s leading troop, accompanied as ever by the 13th Royal Horse FOO in his turretless ‘Honey’, pressed on to reconnoitre the territory ahead. The small band pressed some way in the direction of Cormelles, stopping to survey the factories there and seeing no enemy movement at all.7
THE FATE OF THE FIFES
As their leading squadrons approached the second railway line, the Fifes’ progress seemed to be living up to the expectations of the optimistic briefing of the morning:
‘Head for Falaise, don’t stop for anything. When you come across enemy antitank guns, drive at them, destroy them, run over their traces!’
(This last comment gave some of the more sceptical individuals pause for thought.) A Squadron on the right reached the Paris railway first, and its lead tanks paused on the embankment. The way ahead appeared clear.
A Squadron briefly held position while B approached the embankment and the second wave of the regimental group closed up: regimental headquarters, the Recce Troop, and the carrier-borne infantry of 8th Rifle Brigade’s F Company. Though C Squadron, some way behind, was allocated the role of regimental reserve, this was by no means intended in a passive sense. Its Major Chris Nicholls was a desert veteran, the most experienced squadron commander in a regiment which had first seen action three weeks previously. Colonel Scott’s intention was to burst across the railway, pushing B Squadron left and A Squadron right. These would elbow aside any remaining defenders in order that C might, in textbook form, ‘pass through’ and make its run, possibly without interruption, on a single squadron front all the way to the Bourguébus ridge.
B Squadron established itself on the line of the railway, to the left of A Squadron. B Squadron had not experienced quite so smooth a run as A. Earlier, the squadron second-in-command, Captain Traherne, had been killed as he stood exposed in his turret. And passing Cagny the first tank loss was experienced when Sergeant Hogg’s Sherman was hit within sight of the commanding officer. Lieutenant Colonel Scott recalled,
I saw him and his crew bale out. I had no real idea where the fire was coming from. We were concentrating like mad and pushing on. You couldn’t stop and investigate…
The Fifes’ squadrons’ advance past Cagny.
The news was passed up the line. 11th Armoured Division headquarters noted laconically, ‘RIGHT just NE GRENTHEVILLE. LEFT CAGNY troublesome’.
Reaching the railway line, Scott was impatient to keep up the momentum. He needed C Squadron to shake clear of the traffic jams to the north and join the main body of the regiment as quickly as possible. Leaving a single troop behind as left flank protection, B Squadron negotiated the railway crossing while Scott tried to contact Nicholls. After repeated radio calls enquiring where the reserve squadron had got to, a careful study of the view to the north revealed the awful truth.
The killing fields north west of Cagny (details shown opposite).
Some distance behind, the tanks of C Squadron had indeed been held up by the traffic jam as increasing numbers of vehicles of different units struggled forward. Further back still was the final element of the Fifes’ regimental group, the battery of self propelled artillery. Leaving their 13th RHA charges to look after themselves, C Squadron rushed south over the open ground, following the tracks of the leading waves of the regiment. Hearing B Squadron’s report of enemy fire from somewhere in the vicinity of the orchards to the left, around the small town of Cagny, C Squadron tank commanders’ eyes and turrets were turned that way. The Squadron commander himself was not overly perturbed. A and B Squadron had passed the place almost unscathed, and according to his briefing Cagny had been well and truly ‘Hamburged’ by the RAF. The blow fell unexpectedly. Nicholls’ tank blew up. Moments later the tank of Captain Miller, Nicholls’ second in command, likewise crashed to a halt and began belching black smoke. One after another, the Sherman tanks of C Squadron were knocked out, some burning, some miraculously giving their crews a chance to escape into the corn. In minutes, the squadron was put out of action. A dozen of its nineteen tanks were knocked out.
C Squadron tank belches smoke. (Stains are damage to original photograph.)
Corporal Ron Cox, an operator/loader in 3 Troop, managed to catch the destruction of the second tank in limited arc of his periscope.
It brewed as soon as it was hit, and the turret crew baled out, the gunner and radio operator both with their clothes smouldering. [These two would of course be last to leave the conflagration inside the turret, struggling after Captain Miller to clamber up through the single turret hatch.] Then Lieutenant Sammy Millar, our troop leader whose tank was halted just in front of us, was the next to be hit… The whole crew remained perfectly calm and almost totally silent apart from the occasional “bloody Hell!” as another tank went up.’
The periscope view: Jack Thorpe of C Squadron.
Jack Thorpe, lap (or bow) gunner in the tank commanded by the sergeant of 4 Troop, left a graphic account of the scene, as witnessed through the periscope above his Browning .30 calibre machine gun.
Along the column of tanks, I see palls of smoke and tanks brewing up with flames belching forth from their turrets. I see men climbing out, on fire like torches, rolling on the ground to try and douse the flames, but we are in ripe corn and the straw takes fire. Soon, what with the burning tanks and the burning men and the burning cornfield, plus smoke shells and smoke mortar shells from our tank, visibility is being shut out. Now every tank I can see in front of me is brewing, burning fiercely, flames shooting high and dense clouds of smoke rising up. The tank twenty yards away from us is hit, flames shoot out of its turret, I see a member of its crew climbing out through the flames, he is almost out, putting one foot onto the rim to jump down, he seems to hesitate and he falls back inside. Oh Christ!
Thorpe’s tank was able to stop in time to engage reverse gear and clear the scene. The sergeant in command, the only crew member with a rearwards field of vision, directed the driver as well as the gunner.
Cliff orders Bert to fire off more smoke shells and tells Robbie to reverse, and we go backwards, zig-zagging, right stick, left stick, right stick, gunner keep on target and keep firing, left stick, right stick, left stick”.8
So guided, the tank reversed, weaving its zig-zag path, all the way to the Troarn railway line, where they encountered the 23rd Hussars. With no word from the rest of their own regiment, they tagged along with the Hussars for the rest of the day.
The majority of C Squadron’s tanks were knocked out. Those immobilized tanks that failed to burn were hard to distinguish from those few still manned, and continued to be hit over and over as the German gunners ran out of live targets.9 Just as Colonel Scott tried to find out why C Squadron was not communicating, so too was Thorpe’s tank commander, Sergeant ‘Cliff’ Jones.
We take stock and find we have used up most of our gun ammunition. We have lost wireless contact with the rest of the Regiment. We cannot raise our Troop Leader, nor the Squadron Leader or the C.O. There is absolutely no reply from “Red Sun” or “Sun Ray” or any other station. There is no reply as there is no one to answer.10
At the railway line ahead, realising the enormity of the disaster, Colonel Scott’s immediate reaction was to prevent the remainder of his regimental group from being cut off by enemies in its rear. He gave orders to his accompanying motor infantry company to prepare to dismount and advance on Cagny, less than a thousand yards distant to the north east, with a view to clearing the place. Informing Brigadier Harvey’s Tac HQ of the plan, he was about to set the assault in motion when an emphatic counter order came back from Brigade.
The Fifes were not to concern themselves with Cagny but were to continue on their way south. Scott made his dispositions accordingly. The whole of B Squadron would now assume the lead; two troops of A Squadron under Captain J D (‘Pinkie’) Hutchison, third-in-command,11 would face east to cover the left flank, advancing between Four and the farm complex of le Poirier, until relieved by the expected arrival of the 23rd Hussars. The rest of A Squadron would support the right flank of the advance. And behind them would come the rest of the regimental group, now virtually complete save for I Battery of the Horse Artillery who would take the safer, roundabout route west of le Mesnil Frémentel.
THE HUSSARS’ DELAYS
Even before they entered the lanes through the minefields, it became clear to the 23rd Hussars that the morning was not going to plan.
For the first time one felt slight misgivings. Would that long tail of supporting arms ever manage to keep up with the leading tanks? One thought of the gaps through the minefield, and remembered that each regiment’s “tail” was supposed to move in line a hundred yards behind the tanks, with ourselves [i.e., the following regiment] three hundred yards behind that. From the very straggled appearance of the mass of vehicles in front, even before the minefield had been reached, it looked as if the maintenance of correct distances was not going to be more than a pious hope. If we, as reserve Regiment were going to be left behind, how much more so were the Guards and the Seventh Armoured?12
Like the two regiments that had gone before, the 23rd Hussars paused after emerging from the minefields to shake out into the prescribed formation: A and B Squadrons leading, left and right respectively, with C Squadron following on the flanks of the remainder of the regimental group. But the pause was only brief. Instead of three hundred yards, the tail of the preceding regiment was now a mile ahead. And in the open country, blasted by bombs and shells and littered with a confused medley of support vehicles all heading generally southwards, was the familiar figure of the brigadier. Roscoe Harvey stood in his turret, distinctive in the red beret which he refused to give up in action, furiously waving the newcomers on.
Dazed Germans were still being winkled out of foxholes and dugouts.
One corporal in C Squadron bogged his tank in a crater and while waiting to be pulled out amused himself collecting prisoners. He got up to twenty before the squadron ARV (Armoured Recovery Vehicle, see Appendix 6) arrived to tug his tank back into action. Before long it became clear that there had been little need to hurry down the two mile corridor. The traffic jam around the first railway crossings grew steadily worse as the last tanks of the Fife and Forfar regimental group left the area and their motor infantry company got their vehicles over. The first squadrons of the Hussars’ tanks arrived on the scene shortly after 09.35 hours: just as A Squadron of 3rd RTR was approaching Grentheville, B Squadron of the Fifes was crossing the Paris railway towards Four, and the Fifes’ C Squadron was beginning its death ride in front of Cagny.
The Hussars had even more difficulty crossing the railway than the two forward regiments, as wheeled vehicles still queuing for the few practical crossings blocked their way. Tanks sought out the paths of least resistance, and the leading troops of A Squadron strayed eastward in search of a clear passage. Suddenly from one of the forward troop commanders came an urgent report of Tiger tanks spotted moving in the vicinity of the large walled farm of le Prieuré. Like the preceding regimental commanders, Lieutenant-Colonel Perry Harding needed no reminding of the need to keep pressing on. But enemy tanks so close on his left flank simply could not be ignored. A Squadron was ordered to hold in place and put down suppressive fire while C Squadron came up around the left to flank the enemy force. Then, if possible, C Squadron alone would remain to ‘mask’ the enemy, protecting tanks and others alike at the nearby railway crossings. A and B Squadrons could thereby maintain the southwards momentum, with C rejoining as soon as relieved by the leading elements of Guards Armoured Division. Major Shebbeare’s C Squadron moved into place. Formed their protective line, they witnessed a sight that was to become depressingly familiar as the day wore on.
Sad little parties began to come back on foot. They were the surviving members of the leading crews… They all looked smoke grimed, as does anyone who has just jumped out of a burning tank, while, beside the more active members, staggered the black-skinned figures of badly burned men. Some of the parties carried stretchers, on which still figures lay. We gave these groups a passing glance and watched our flanks intently. The sharp crack of an eighty-eight sounded as a Tiger opened up upon us from the east. It was supported by more than one Panther and, in the battle which followed, Second Troop of “C” Squadron destroyed two enemy tanks and a Nebelwerfer. Captain Hagger destroyed a Tiger, though A Squadron lost two tanks before the opposition was silenced.’13
The enemies were not ‘Tigers’, though unseen Tiger tanks were indeed present in woods just a mile to the east. Approaching 10.00 hours, frantic efforts were being made to get these into battleworthy state. But the hour of their appearance in combat was yet to come. Nor were reports of Panther tanks any more accurate. There was at this time none on the GOODWOOD battlefield. Nevertheless, enemy fire here as well as further forward on the British left flank was now beginning to cause losses and delays. Captain Heywood of the Grenadier Guards, assigned to the Hussars as liaison officer, left and hastened north to bring down his regiment’s tanks to relieve the lingering C Squadron.
THE BRIGADIER
As soon as the tanks of the 23rd Hussars were past, Roscoe Harvey’s 29th Brigade Tac Headquarters motored on south, over the railway, past the belt of bocage hedge, and into the cover of the hedgerows north of le Mesnil Frémentel. Here, a field appeared to offer a good position from which to conduct the next phase of the brigade’s operations. The stout hedgerow running the length of the southern face of the field offered not only cover but also hidden vantage points overlooking the north wall of le Mesnil Frémentel; at its eastern end, a short stub of the hedge bent back to offer protection from the direction of Cagny.
Harvey’s immediate concern was to subdue the enemy still holding le Mesnil. With the Royal Tanks to the west and the Fifes to the east both having left this German outpost in their rear, and with supporting vehicles needing to follow through, the German-held priory presented a potential threat to the brigade’s operations. There are times in battle when it is hard for an attacking force to distinguish between an ‘isolated enemy pocket’ and a serious obstacle. Besides, Harvey had no way of knowing when or where a major German counter-attack might arise, and a British-held strongpoint would be a valuable bulwark against such a development.
Taking le Mesnil would require a mixed-arm force: heavy firepower, obviously, to suppress the defences; and infantry, the only arm capable of taking and holding ground. The brigade’s infantry amounted to a single battalion, whose three rifle companies were already allocated one each to the three armoured regiments. Two of these had already passed by and Harvey had no thoughts of distracting the Hussars from their southward march. However, he had other resources. At Harvey’s side were the commanders of his brigade support arms. The three 13th Royal Horse Sexton batteries under Lieutenant-Colonel Bob Daniels were no less committed to the support of his three armoured regiments than were the motor infantry companies. But also present was the young Lieutenant-Colonel Tony Hunter of 8th Rifle Brigade. Although the majority of his battalion was with the forward tank squadrons, nevertheless he still retained a small mobile reserve in the shape of his Headquarters Company plus the two machine gun platoons of his Support Company. At 09.55 hours, Hunter was ordered to ‘mop up and take over’ le Mesnil, with troops of the 22nd Dragoons’ flails and of Royal Engineers AVREs in support. At the time, the 8th RB Headquarters troops were still negotiating the first railway; it would take over half an hour for Hunter to assemble the attackers. It appears that the AVREs were not called upon to assist, possibly because they were too deeply involved in creating crossing points over the rail embankment. But the infantry were hurried forward, alongside the troops of Sherman Crabs, the very mine-clearing tanks whose presence had been so unwelcome to Pip Roberts and which had yet to find a use on the battlefield. The GOC himself arrived in the field as preparations for the assault were being made.
THE GENERAL OFFICER COMMANDING
Major-General ‘Pip’ Roberts had begun the day with his tank Tac Headquarters near the small wood west of Amfreville where 11th Armoured Division Main Headquarters was established. He was all too conscious that his division’s was to begin its second battle as it had begun its first: divided. His tank brigade and his infantry brigade had different objectives and were, initially at least, to be fighting separate battles. Still, there was no doubt in Roberts’ mind that his leadership would be in greatest need in support of the tanks. The task set for Jack Churcher’s 159 Infantry Brigade seemed relatively straightforward. Though annoyed that his own infantry had to be employed in the task of clearing Cuverville and Démouville, Roberts had given them ample support to get the job done. With the infantry brigade were the divisional towed Field Regiment (the Ayrshire Yeomanry) and the Northants Yeomanry’s Cromwells (whose value in a purely reconnaissance function Roberts had come to question – they were after all tanks!) in a direct support role.14
In view of the tremendous hammering these two villages would have received… I thought they could be dealt with fairly quickly. Consequently, I concentrated my attention on the armoured brigade’s advance.15
Tac HQ tanks (boxed) and Protection Troop (circled) north of le Mesnil
Roberts’ elevated vantage point commanded a good view of the bombing, but once the artillery barrage began the view was obscured by clouds of dust. He decided to move forward, his own tank leading (the ADC, Captain Charles Pidduck, normally navigated at the head of the column but this morning was temporarily incapacitated by mosquito stings). Roberts was mildly concerned to find no queue for the passages through the minefields:
‘I rather hoped that the Guards Armoured Division… might be jockeying us for a place, but no sign of them.16
The three Cromwell command tanks and their escort troop of Shermans stopped in the area of the Forming Up Place south of the minefields, on the slight elevation of the Butte de la Hogue. To the west could be made out the infantry advancing over open ground towards the ruins that had been Cuverville; ahead the tail elements of the 23rd Hussars were progressing south. From yet further ahead came word of the initial difficulties experienced crossing the Troarn railway line. The CRA, Brigadier B J ‘Frizz’ Fowler set about trying to organize a delay in the commencement of the second phase of the rolling barrage. His work was being interrupted by sudden shellbursts, so Roberts moved the HQ group five hundred yards east, only to receive a further ‘stonc’ which cut in two the map board on which the CRA was working (for convenience and field of vision, this board was affixed prominently to the turret top). There was no alternative but to abandon the higher ground and descend south.
The projected assault on Cagny by F Company, 8 RB.
The significance of this move was not realised at the time. After moving south to join the tail elements of 29th Armoured Brigade, Major-General Roberts became ever more deeply involved with the affairs of that brigade to the exclusion of the wider picture. In effectively delegating control of his infantry brigade to Churcher, the British Army’s most capable commander of an armoured division limited his influence over the battle to that of a brigadier. Roscoe Harvey was himself a brigadier imbued with sufficient energy and aggression to have conducted his brigade’s battle with minimal direction throughout this most difficult day. Instead of retaining a grasp of events at division and corps level, Roberts’ presence near the front lines throughout 18 July risked narrowing his perspective and arguably contributed little to proceedings. However, it will also be seen that other British commanders no less senior than Roberts also failed to exercise their proper scope of command.
Roberts and his followers followed the tracks of the preceding tanks and arrived at Roscoe Harvey’s 29th Brigade Tac HQ a little after 10.00 hours. The position looked grim. On his approach, Roberts had not failed to note the mass of knocked out and burning tanks in the direction of Cagny. His arrival coincided with a severe mortaring. Still, he quickly found that 3rd RTR was well on the way southwards, and so too the forward squadrons of the Fifes who had evidently escaped the ambush laid for their reserve: ‘I was really quite happy with the situation, except that in the rear a little trouble had developed.’ Preparations were under way for the proposed assault on le Mesnil, with the Dragoons’ flail tanks deployed in an arc around the west side of the walled farm, pouring in HE rounds from just four hundred yards range. Roberts did not interfere (no doubt he was pleased to see the flails being put to good use).
Overall, Roberts saw grounds for optimism. While sympathising with the plight of the Fifes’ commander, his sympathy would not extend to altering the battle plan.
Perhaps you would like to consider what you would do as commanding officer [of a tank regiment] when, having not heard from your rear squadron for a short time, you don’t get them on the air, and you look back and you find that all of these were knocked out. Some of them were burning and some of them the crews have bailed out from; at any rate, they’re non-operational. Now, a little bit after this had occurred, I had come forward in my Tac Headquarters and I had gone to Brigadier Harvey who was in the outskirts of le Mesnil Frémentel. A lot of mortar fire was coming down, so I got onto the back of his tank to enquire exactly what situation was. And as I was there, I heard that it was the intention of the CO of the Fife and Forfar Yeomanry to get his motor company on their feet and to attack Cagny. Bearing in mind that I had particularly asked that we should not have to take Cagny, and bearing in mind that our objectives were further over on the right flank, I did not want to start getting involved on the left flank, as the Guards were coming forward and they were going to take over Cagny. So, I told Brigadier Harvey to cancel that order.
Later, Pip Roberts was characteristically honest about his mistake.
How unfortunate was it that I had that order cancelled. Because the motor company on its own could easily have cleared up the village in a very short time.17
Speculating about ‘what would have happened if…’ is a dangerous trap for historians. In the dust and smoke of the 18 July battle, mistakes were made on both sides. War is the province of uncertainty, and battles are not generally won by avoiding mistakes altogether, but rather by taking calculated risks in the hopes of making one or two fewer mistakes than the enemy. Sadly, Roberts’ self-confessed error of judgement was compounded by a later action. Convinced that Cagny was held in some considerable strength,
when the Guards Armoured Division began to arrive I rushed over to the leading troop and warned them of the situation, and a few minutes later got hold of the CO. I fear I badly misled them.18
11th Armoured (Tank) Tac HQ, followed by its protection troop of Shermans.
The extent to which Roberts’ warning may have influenced the Guards’ caution is impossible to judge. Their performance in this, their first battle revealed the division to be somewhat ponderous in contrast to their less risk-averse 11th Armoured colleagues. Certainly, getting into and past Cagny as far as Frénouville was going to take Guards Armoured all that remained of the day and all of the next.
References
1
Close, interview at Staff College, Camberley, 1979
2
Close, interview at Staff College, Camberley, 1979. An ‘OP’ is an observation post, in this case a tank. The ‘FOO’ was the Forward Observation Officer in command of the post, directing and authorizing fire missions. In a British artillery regiment, the senior officers generally operated as FOOs, forward of the guns. A ‘stonc’ was a standard artillery concentration.
3
Close, interview at Staff College, Camberley, 1979
4
Close, interview at Staff College, Camberley, 1979
5
Roberts, interview at Staff College, Camberley, 1979
6
Roberts, interview at Staff College, Camberley, 1979
7
In his writing and his contributions to the Staff College Battlefield Tours, Major Close refers to ‘the whole of the regimental group’ following his lead across the railway. When questioned on this point, he was emphatic that his own crossing point was via the Caen to Paris railway (a landmark so clear that it is inconceivable that it could have been mistaken). He admitted however that only his small band crossed at that point; he thought that the rest of the regiment used the main Caen to Cagny road underpass five hundred yards to the north. In fact, only a small number of tanks (possibly the remaining troop of Close’s squadron) crossed there. Out of Close’s sight, the main body of the regimental group later moved around Grentheville on the eastern side of the railway embankment.
8
This and previous passages from Thorpe diary.
9
This was standard German procedure: a Russian study of the Kursk offensive in mid-1943 concluded that, ‘German artillery, tanks, and self-propelled guns did not stop firing against tanks until they caught fire, even when the tank had stopped as a result of being hit.’ From ‘The Battle of Kursk’, Journal of Slavic Military Studies, March 1994, p 112
10
Thorpe diary
11
Not to be confused with Lieutenant G G O (‘Gee Gee’) Hutchison or Sergeant Hutcheson, both of the Fifes’ C Squadron!
12
Bishop, ‘23rd Hussars’, p 72
13
Bishop, ‘23rd Hussars’, p 74
14
The 11th Armoured Division history suggests that the 1943 decision to incorporate an ‘armoured reconnaissance regiment’ may have been ‘merely a subterfuge to incorporate a fourth tank unit’ albeit one equipped with Cromwell instead of Sherman (and Firefly) tanks. Eventually both the equipment and the employment of the fourth regiment were to become ‘practically identical, and ultimately quite identical, with that of the ordinary armoured regiment.’ (Palamountain, ‘Taurus Pursuant’, p 8)
15
Roberts, p 172
16
Roberts, p 172
17
Roberts, interview at Staff College, Camberley, 1979
18
Roberts, p 175