8
Ekaitz Etxeberria Gallastegi
On March 1, 1476, Ferdinand the Catholic faced Afonso V of Portugal in the battle of Toro. Despite the fact that the battle had a disputed result, it was a strategic victory for the future Catholic Monarchs. This paper will analyze the development of the early stages of the War of Castilian Succession and the military events leading to the pitched battle, focusing on Ferdinand’s battle-seeking strategy. Toro’s example will serve to illuminate the role of battle-seeking strategies in civil war contexts, their political and propagandistic value, and their consequences.
Afonso V of Portugal invaded Castile in May 1475, starting the War of Castilian Succession, which lasted until 1479. The conflict was, in fact, a civil war, that was virtually settled with the last light of day on 1 March 1476, in the fields that spread out in front of the town of Toro.1 Although the battle of Toro resulted in a disputed victory, the day turned out to be a strategic triumph that tipped the scales of war in favor of the Catholic Monarchs. In the end, Toro was a battle that resolved the political issue of the war, making many of those who had supported the Portuguese pretender change sides and securing the throne for Isabella. The hope of such a decisive strategic victory is exactly why Ferdinand had very eagerly sought a full-scale battle in the weeks leading up to the combat.
One might well ask how a battle without a clear tactical winner managed to turn into a strategic success. That, however, makes it necessary to first answer other more far-reaching questions: what was the role of battle in internal wars? Did battle take on more importance and symbolism in civil war than in other types of conflict, stimulating commanders to actively seek a decisive clash?
Since the beginning of the twenty-first century, several of the most renowned medieval military historians have debated battle-seeking or battle-avoidance as a key element in the thought and practice of medieval military leaders, attempting to rethink what is known as the Gillingham paradigm. The theory put forward by John Gillingham (building on R. C. Smail’s work) asserts that medieval military leaders – following Vegetius – would rarely accept battle, and then only if they felt sure of gaining a victory or had no other option.2 Some critics have come out against this idea – referred to by Matthew Strickland as the “new orthodoxy”3 – stating that battle might have been a remedy sought far more often than hitherto believed as a tool for settling hostilities.4 Clifford Rogers proposed that some military leaders were active battle-seekers, and recalled that Vegetius also encouraged commanders to seek battle if they clearly had the upper hand. He also added that although it was commonly accepted that gains in battle were doubtful, the advantages obtained from a triumph on the battlefield could be substantial or even decisive, and that some commanders might consider that possibility a reason to seek, rather than to avoid, battle.5
John Gillingham seized his opportunity to reply in the second issue of the Journal of Medieval Military History, in which he published an article criticizing the quantitative vagueness of Rogers’ article and proposed a twofold approach to the matter: the study of the career of a medieval commander or that of a specific campaign.6 João Gouveia Monteiro, Francisco García Fitz, and Andrew Villalon, among others, took up the call.7 The contribution made by Villalon distanced itself from the dichotomy imposed by the debate – seeking or avoiding battle – by bringing in a third possibility, according to which medieval commanders could be “battle-willing.” Military leaders could therefore design strategic plans that did not focus on battle seeking but would accept battle if it was offered under at least minimally favorable circumstances.8
Both within and outside the framework of the debate, several people have pointed out that certain contexts could prove particularly favorable for giving battle a central place in strategic planning. In this regard, Anthony Goodman, John France, Clifford Rogers, Stephen Morillo, and even John Gillingham himself have noted that active battle-seeking took place in medieval civil wars.9
The aim of this article is to analyze, in the light of the above-mentioned debate, the battle-seeking strategy applied by Ferdinand the Catholic in the War of Castilian Succession, until he found battle at Toro.10 To undertake this task, chronicle sources from Castile – which were practically contemporary with the events – and from Portugal – written a little later on – will be used.11 There is also documentation of an epistolary nature that consists of the propaganda letters sent by the Catholic Monarchs to cities in the kingdom, in which reports were given on the progress of military operations. Lastly, there is an even more extraordinary and unusual source: the private correspondence between Ferdinand the Catholic and his father, John II of Aragon and Navarre. It is unique documentation that plainly shows Ferdinand’s decision-making process, without any retroactive “spin,” and makes it possible to contribute a few ideas regarding battle-seeking strategy, its political value, and its consequences in a civil war context.
Background
The death of the Castilian monarch, Henry IV, in 1474 led to a succession crisis, one that had been smoldering for the better part of a decade. In 1465 civil war broke out in the kingdom, when the noble league confronting the king chose Alfonso, Henry’s half-brother – and brother of the future Isabella the Catholic – as an alternative candidate to the throne.12 To legitimize Alfonso, his supporters questioned the legitimacy of Princess Juana, arguing that she was not Henry IV’s daughter, but rather but had been born as a result of the adulterous relationship between the queen and Beltrán de la Cueva, the king’s favorite.13
Henry IV was symbolically deposed by Alfonso’s supporters in Ávila in June 1465, starting a civil war that would last until July 1468, the date of the death of the young candidate for the throne.14 Isabella took up her brother’s struggle until the signing of the Treaty of the Bulls of Guisando, in September of that same year. According to the treaty, Henry recognized his half-sister Isabella as heir to the Castilian throne, although reserving the right to decide on her marriage.15 However, when Isabella married Ferdinand in 1469, the king disowned her and the following year he proclaimed his daughter Juana as heir.16 What followed was a growing instability in the kingdom, which would eventually erupt violently on the death of Henry IV in December 1474. This time, the crisis gave rise to a civil war.
Isabella of Trastámara, supported by her husband Ferdinand – they were later known as the Catholic Monarchs – claimed her right to the throne. Those defending Juana’s cause did not stand idly by; they sought support from Afonso V, king of Portugal, who was Juana’s uncle and fiancé. Both sides started gathering their allies, with Afonso trying to persuade Louis XI, king of France, to join him. By mid-1475 the scale was quite balanced. The northern regions of the kingdom were mostly under the control of the Catholic Monarchs, with exceptions such as Burgos, Peñafiel, Arévalo, Urueña, and the Lower Duero region. In the south the situation was more complicated, as loyalties were more divided, especially in Extremadura, Andalusia, and the region now known as Castile La Mancha. In general, it could be said that, although the nobles who embraced Juana’s cause were not particularly numerous – they were definitely fewer than Afonso expected– they were powerful. Among the most prominent were the duke of Arévalo, the marquis of Villena, the marquis of Cádiz, the count of Feria, the count of Urueña, and the countess of Medellín, along with the Master of the Order of Calatrava, the archbishop of Toledo, and the bishop of Burgos.17
The Campaign
With the chessboard set up, the players began to move their pieces. The Portuguese invasion began early in May 1475, starting out from Arronches and penetrating the Portuguese-Extremaduran border in the direction of Albuquerque.18 The invading force was composed of perhaps 5,000–5,600 cavalry lances and 14,000–15,000 infantrymen, according to chronicle figures.19 At the same time, another Portuguese force under the command of the duke of Guimarães entered via Coria with 1,500 lances.20 Once in Castile, Afonso tried to unite his forces with those of Juana’s main supporters in the kingdom. However, not all of his allies were able to meet up with him, since the strategy planned by the Catholic Monarchs included preventing this from happening. 21 They thus tried to isolate their opponent by sending letters to cities such as Murcia and Seville, ordering them to make war in their regions against the nobles who showed allegiance to the Portuguese pretender.22 This move deprived Ferdinand’s army of Andalusian and Murcian recruits, who were employed to fix Juana’s supporters the marquis of Cadiz in Jerez and Alonso de Aguilar in Cordoba. The southern troops were also employed by the Catholic Monarchs to attack the lands of the marquis of Villena, as well as the Master of the Order of Calatrava and the counts of Urueña and Plasencia in Murcia and the modern region of Castile La Mancha, thereby stopping them from joining their forces with Afonso’s army.23 At the same time, border captains were appointed with wide-ranging autonomy for making incursions into Portuguese territory, thereby restricting Afonso V’s operational capacity.24
That move by the Catholic Monarchs created several secondary fronts and delimited the main theater of operations between Toro and Burgos, particularly in the lower Duero area lying between the towns of Toro and Zamora, where the main forces of both monarchs would operate. With the Portuguese enemy deprived of considerable support, Ferdinand the Catholic intended to settle the war by means of a pitched battle, telling his father, King John II of Aragon and Navarre, of his plans in a private letter dated 28 May 1475.25 Two weeks after the start of the invasion, he informed his father about the situation and his plans. He estimated the size of Afonso’s forces as between 8,000 and 10,000 infantry and a little over 3,000 cavalry. Ferdinand was in Salamanca at the time, collecting his troops and mustering them in Valladolid. He was trying to gather together the largest possible number of men, and his estimation of his own troops was that in the space of eight days – that is, by June 5 – he could have over 2,000 lances and between 12,000 and 15,000 infantry assembled. After explaining this situation, he went on to try to anticipate what the Portuguese monarch’s next move might be, saying that he was close to Plasencia, a place where supplies were few, so he would have to move on to Arévalo, which was when Ferdinand would seize the opportunity to give battle:26
… The King of Portugal entered these kingdoms through Alburquerque on the 10th of the present month [May] with up to 3,000 cavalrymen, and the duke of Guimarães and the count of Marialva entered through Coria with 600 or 700 horsemen. It is reported that they have between 8,000 and 10,000 footmen. Among the mounted troops, there are 1,000 that are good, 1,000 commoners and the rest are people of little value that do not make 100 men-at-arms in total. They also bring 200 carts loaded with supplies. They have not arrived to Plasencia yet, or at least no report of this has reached me. It is said that there he is to marry [Juana], taking the title of King of Castile, and the stage is being prepared for the event. I have been informed that the King [of Portugal] has a pain on his side and suffers from haemorrhoids, and for this reason he is brought in a litter. It is said that this malady is caused by his anger, because things are not going as he had planned. The knights assigned to him are fewer than 200. Francisco de Solís, master elect of Alcántara, Diego de Cáceres, valet of your highness, Alonso Portocarrero and the towns of Ciudad Rodrigo, Cáceres and Badajoz have mustered over 1,000 horsemen and have caused his cavalry over 200 casualties. I wrote to them to come here after the King of Portugal. I am currently mustering as many people as possible, and I think that in the course of 8 days I will have managed to muster 2,000 lances in Valladolid, of which 700 or 800 will be men-at-arms. This is above the armed garrison in this city [Salamanca], Madrigal, Olmedo and Tordesillas, which will be mustered in two days. I think that within this time I shall have ready 12,000 or 15,000 foot, and if the King of Portugal moves to Arévalo, as the rumours have it, I intend to give him battle. I think that he will go there, because in the area of Plasencia he has few supplies. I have come to this city, where I have been received with much joy, and if before they were enthusiastically on my side, now it is even more. I intend to go to Zamora and Toro to raise troops and I intend to negotiate with Juan de Ulloa. In this way, there will be nobody in this land that is not on my service, except for the governor of Castronuño…27
Map 1 Troop movements during May–July 1475.
Therefore, if their numbers were evenly matched and a private document expressly states that the king of Castile wanted to settle the war by means of a pitched battle, what happened to cause the clash to be delayed for another ten months? Afonso did, in fact, end up by moving from Plasencia to Arévalo, where he stopped for two months before proceeding to Toro to lay siege to the town’s castle, which, unlike the town itself, remained loyal to Isabella.28 It is difficult to assess why Afonso stopped in Arévalo. It is possible that the Portuguese king planned to lift the siege to which his supporters were being subjected in Burgos castle, and then to link up with the French invasion that was about to take place through Gipuzkoa in support of Juana. It is also possible that when he failed to find as many supporters as he had expected in Castile, he decided on a more cautious strategy, involving control of the fortifications and towns close to the Portuguese border. Either way, Ferdinand the Catholic kept to his original plan and set off from Valladolid at the head of more troops than he had initially expected to assemble: approximately 10,000 cavalry and 30,000 infantry, according to the chronicles.29 After gathering additional troops in Tordesillas, his plan was to assist Toro’s castle, which was under siege by Afonso from inside the town – which was loyal to Juana. Once again, on July 14 he informed his father that his aim was to put an end to the war as soon as possible, and not only did he hope to free the town and the castle, but was confident he would be able to defeat the king of Portugal:
… After having increased the number of troops, both on horseback and on foot, I have come here [close to Tordesillas], where I will stop until the marquis of Santillana and the duke of Albuquerque join me. Then I will go to Toro, where the king of Portugal is, to help those in the town who are loyal to me. I hope, with God’s help, not only to relieve the fortress, but to obtain a victory against the said king of Portugal, as not only do I have justice on my side, but I also have numerous and good people on horseback and on foot that no other outcome could be expected. By the grace of our Lord, my deeds in these kingdoms are going so prosperously, so that I hope to overcome them within a few days…30
The clash appeared to be imminent after all these moves and preparations. Ferdinand placed himself with his army in battle formation in front of the walls of Toro and commenced an exchange of letters challenging the Portuguese monarch to fight in battle, or at least face him in single combat. Afonso was heavily outnumbered and refused to comply with either request, instead remaining inside the town’s walls, and this led to the Castilian army withdrawing.31 It is true that rather than reflecting a real interest in forcing battle, the letters of challenge may have been simple rhetoric used for propaganda purposes.32 The two options are not, however, mutually exclusive: Ferdinand could, in fact, seek to bring about a confrontation; if unsuccessful, he would then have a political weapon. We know from the letters sent to his father that Ferdinand wanted battle, and when he did not find it he used the letters of challenge as political propaganda to undermine Afonso’s authority and honor.33 After all, the nobles who were with Ferdinand in that campaign advised him to publish the refusal of the Portuguese monarch to fight, so as to promote his position in the “opinion of the people.”34
After that first attempt to settle the war in a single day, both kings focused their attention on consolidating their positions. After withdrawing from Toro, Ferdinand went on to tighten the siege around Burgos castle, which had risen up in favor of Juana, although the city remained loyal.35 Despite everything, the Castilian ruler had not given up his wish to face his opponent in battle, as he told his father in a fresh letter dated 25 July 1475 in reply to a missive sent by the Aragonese monarch, unfortunately now lost. It seems that John II had advised Ferdinand either to seek a pitched engagement or to attack a position that Afonso must recover in order to force him to take the initiative, as his son’s reply would suggest:
… the advice Your Highness gives me on proceedings with the king of Portugal is received with special thanks; it has not been possible to follow it thus far, because I had so many people on horseback and on foot that I thought that I should not offer battle to the said king of Portugal as he showed signs of not daring to come out, as indeed he did not, to give due battle: now I understand that what Your Highness says will be very sound advice, and I shall work to put it thus into effect…36
After Afonso V had successfully completed the siege of Toro castle, everything appeared to have reached an impasse: a positional war in the traditional style. Although Ferdinand’s new plan was to complete the siege around Burgos castle, he found himself with the opportunity of regaining Zamora, which was in Portuguese hands. Leaving the siege of Burgos castle under way, the Castilian monarch marched to Zamora, entering the city thanks to a betrayal perpetrated by the garrison manning the access bridge towers. Faced with this situation, the Portuguese occupiers made haste to either leave the city or take refuge, particularly in the castle, which Ferdinand immediately placed under siege.37
Map 2 Troop movements prior to the battle of Toro (February 15 to 1 March 1476).
Afonso then made ready to go to its aid. A series of cross-challenges then followed: Afonso challenged Ferdinand to leave Zamora and fight him in the open, which Ferdinand refused to do, arguing that accepting battle would mean turning his back on the siege positions and leaving them unattended, with the danger that this entailed.38 In view of the poor image of himself he had given by refusing the confrontation, and being aware that “sometimes the expectations of the people need to be met,” Ferdinand drew up his army outside the walls of Toro, likewise challenging the Portuguese monarch, who also refused to fight, as he had insufficient troops.39 This situation changed when Prince John of Portugal arrived with reinforcements, which encouraged Afonso to go on the offensive.
It was now 1476 and Burgos castle had fallen into Castilian hands in January. In February, Afonso set up his camp opposite Zamora, on the other side of the river Duero, blocking the bridge and battering the city walls and towers with his artillery. The critical point of the war was drawing closer. From their position, the Portuguese were unable to establish an effective siege around Zamora. Winter was taking its toll of the Portuguese forces, who had to sleep outdoors and were running out of supplies, and so Afonso discharged most of his infantry. Meanwhile, the Castilians were stationed in the city and were not suffering from any great hardships. For his part, Ferdinand was not merely engaging in a static defense but, having noticed the absence of Portuguese infantry, positioned 600 lances in Fuentesaúco (40km away) and 400 in Alaejos (50km away). Ferdinand was cutting the Portuguese supply lines, leaving only the Toro-Zamora route free, in a possible attempt to make a daring pincer movement that would cut off Portuguese army off from reinforcements.40
Two weeks of being under siege, the shortage of supplies, and detection of the Castilian troops operating behind their backs, besides observing that Ferdinand was making openings in the city walls of Zamora in order to go out to fight, led the Portuguese to break camp and withdraw towards Toro at daybreak on March 1. This seemed to be the moment Ferdinand was waiting for: the troops were fairly evenly balanced, though Ferdinand’s force was somewhat smaller, and he took advantage of pursuing the retreating enemy. The Castilian troops consisted of some 2,500 to 3,000 horsemen and 5,000 infantrymen, while the Portuguese had 3,500 mounted troops and 5,000 on foot.41 The Castilian army caught up with the Portuguese troops almost at the gates of Toro.42
At this point both factions held councils of war. Afonso knew he could not withdraw, because the entrance to Toro was over a narrow bridge, a bottleneck on which the Castilians would have destroyed the Portuguese troops, and so he lined up his men in front of the city walls. As for Ferdinand, he claimed that most of his infantry had fallen behind in the pursuit, so he would have to give battle with cavalry forces; he had no artillery; and, above all, it was almost nightfall. Ferdinand listed those disadvantages in the letters sent to cities in Castile to inform them about his victory, and so the propagandistic tone of the source advises caution. Nonetheless, everything the Catholic monarch claimed seems perfectly plausible, since the 20km chase achieved in just a few hours would first have wearied the infantrymen and certainly made it necessary to leave the heavy train of artillery behind.43 Even so, it was a unique opportunity and strategic considerations demanded action, despite tactical disadvantages. According to the chroniclers Diego de Valera and Alonso de Palencia, this is what the Castilian knight Luis de Tovar said to Ferdinand: “it is to your benefit, my lord, to fight if you want to be king of Castile.”44
At last, both monarchs came face to face, giving rise to the battle of Toro. In the event, King Afonso succumbed to the Castilians –the Portuguese monarch himself was forced to flee – with the exception of his left flank which, under the command of Prince John of Portugal, broke up the Castilian right wing. Thus, although the Castilians were victorious, the triumph was not total. Regarding casualties, Portuguese chronicles do not provide any information. On the Castilian side, Valera mentions 800 “dead and captives,” while Bernáldez raises the figure to 1,200 dead – with no number of prisoners provided.45 None of the sources, however, detail how many fell on the Castilian side other than Palencia, who claims only five died on the evening of 1 March 1476.46 The Portuguese defeat was possibly not as devastating as it could have been, as the battle started with sundown and ended with nightfall, so darkness impeded any meaningful pursuit of the fleeing troops.47 The chronicle’s figures were probably exaggerated, in the classic tendency to minimize one’s own losses and maximize those of the enemy. Besides, after the clash, Ferdinand returned to Zamora with his troops, while the Portuguese heir, the future João II, remained holding a nearby hill.48 According to medieval tradition, the winner had to remain the owner of the field in order to make the victory “official”; a formal act that took on special relevance in indecisive or not entirely conclusive clashes.49
After the battle, the War of Castilian Succession dragged on until 1479, although it became increasingly less intense and the initiative remained entirely with Ferdinand. After the battle of Toro, Afonso V and Prince John, together with Juana and most of the army, returned to Portugal.50 The French attack, which occurred almost simultaneously with the battle, failed in a costly and unsuccessful siege in front of the walls of the border town of Hondarribia in Gipuzkoa.51 Ferdinand and Isabella spent the next two years recovering the towns taken by the Portuguese or by Castilian nobles loyal to Juana. A last invasion attempt by the Portuguese, this time far more limited, was defeated at the battle of La Albuera in 1479.52 Peace was finally signed in September that same year, with the Treaty of Alcáçovas, which recognized Isabella as queen of Castile.53 The war was over.
Battle-Seeking Strategy in a Civil War Context
I have shown that Ferdinand the Catholic started the campaign by seeking battle but, in the words of the well-known phrase attributed to Helmuth von Moltke the Elder, “no plan survives contact with the enemy.” After the failed attempt at Toro in the summer of 1475, Ferdinand turned his focus to recovering the strongholds that had been lost, while not losing sight of his initial plan. In other words, Ferdinand moved from “battle-seeking” to “battle-willing.”
It is harder to analyze the strategy of the Portuguese king, perhaps because less information is available. Even so, Afonso’s actions suggest that the principle governing his campaign strategy was caution. We do not know why his momentum diminished once the invasion had taken place. Perhaps it was because he did not receive as much support from the Castilian nobles as he had expected or because he hoped to be able to synchronize his attack with the French invasion. It is also possible that the strategy implemented by the Catholic Monarchs to isolate him through the creation of secondary fronts had borne fruit, preventing Afonso from being reinforced by his allies in Castile. Either way, it seems clear that Afonso ultimately accepted battle at Toro because he had no other option, and that fits in with the Vegetian paradigm. After all, the Roman author recommended accepting battle only if it was advantageous or if there was no other option.54
In this respect, the analysis of the main campaign in the War of Castilian Succession is a good example from which to evolve a few ideas. In a civil war context, the strategic value of battle increases exponentially, as it can change the axis on which the wheel of war turns, from a struggle for control of territory and strongholds to a conflict that would be clearly settled by the personal defeat of the opponent. This peculiar nature of the conflict is enhanced by time limitations and, associated with that, shifting or uncertain support between factions or supporters of the opponents, forcing a quick settlement of the war. Given the presumable fluctuation of alliances, the lack of political capital made it almost impossible to put together a Vegetian defensive strategy, based on defending strongholds and harassing the enemy. Similarly, even though “scorched earth” tactics were sometimes employed in civil wars, they were never a good option, as they could lead to fatal consequences in terms of losing popular support. The Crónica Incompleta de los Reyes Católicos refers to the fact that Afonso initially avoided doing any harm to Castilian land as he wanted to be seen as “its natural king.”55 Refraining from devastation in order to retain popular support was especially important in the main theatre of operations where both Ferdinand and Afonso were fighting –secondary fronts did see some raids.56 This was also a common feature in the Wars of the Roses, in which commanders tended to avoid harming the local population or living off the land, therefore encouraging the quick settlement of campaigns.57
Ever since the war began, Ferdinand had decided to offer battle to the Portuguese monarch, but it soon became clear also that defense-in-depth, based on Vegetian precepts, was not possible even if he had preferred it. The Portuguese capture of Zamora in 1475, while Ferdinand was making his way to Toro to challenge Afonso, called into question the possibility of trusting in the garrisons and defenses of cities and fortresses across the kingdom.58 A Vegetian defensive strategy was not practical; neither was it for the Portuguese in 1385, when they decided to give battle at Aljubarrota.59
Clifford Rogers points out that battle seekers were usually those who needed reaffirmation, such as Henry of Trastámara at Nájera, Peter I at Montiel, or John I at Aljubarrota. These monarchs needed to demonstrate strength in order to attract new followers or preserve those they already had. For Rogers this is particularly true on the occasions when the monarch in question either was the first of a new dynasty, had usurped the throne, or was claiming it, either for the first time or after having lost it.60 However, I believe that Rogers’ assertion should be nuanced. In the case of the War of Castilian Succession, the Catholic Monarchs were the ruling power, and whoever holds power must also maintain it. The very existence of an uprising or a rebellion represented a challenge to the established order which, unless quickly eradicated, might attract more sympathizers, grow and, ultimately, achieve victory. This would not, of course, apply to all Late Medieval rebellions, although it would appear to be a common feature on those occasions when the opposing side presented an alternative candidate for the throne.61 It was at those times of greatest danger when the monarch in question – the ruling power, in this case Ferdinand and Isabella – needed to seek battle, since the kingdom was watching. After the victory at Toro, the chronicler Andrés Bernáldez tells us that a great many crossed over to Isabella’s side, as more than a few were waiting to see who would win.62 In fact, Juana’s principal supporters switched to Isabella after the battle, including the duke of Arévalo and his wife Leonor Pimentel, who decided to change sides one month after Toro. They were followed between May and September by the marquis of Villena and the Master of the Order of Calatrava – the powerful Pacheco-Girón family. Lastly, also in September, the archbishop of Toledo made peace with the Catholic Monarchs.63
The Castilian victory at Toro was not as overwhelming as it might have been, but, magnified by an effective propaganda campaign, it resulted in a strategic triumph.64 No sooner had Ferdinand returned from battle than he sent letters to the main cities in the kingdom informing them of his newly won victory.65 Prince John of Portugal followed suit, except that he only notified the Portuguese cities of his success.66 However, the battlefield was in Castile and it was the hearts and minds of the Castilians that had to be won over.67
Other underlying aspects such as honor and prestige were linked to war propaganda. Both values had a deep, structuring significance in medieval societies, that could interfere directly in the relationship of allegiance and loyalty between governors and the governed or in the balance of power during the course of a military campaign.68 They were aspects that affected the image and popularity of political and military leaders.69 Ferdinand found a political use for the letters of challenge that he had exchanged with Afonso V of Portugal, and Castilian chronicles described the refusal of the Portuguese monarch to fight as shameful.70 Similarly, the chronicler Fernando del Pulgar claimed that because the challenge launched by Afonso in front of Zamora was not accepted, Ferdinand’s knights and the town dwellers felt “belittled.”71 On the other hand, the Portuguese chronicles allude to the fact that Ferdinand’s refusal to fight in a subsequent challenge made the Castilian consort realize that the affront to his honor could be extremely detrimental to his purposes, and so he decided to match the action of the Portuguese monarch with another challenge, moving his army up to the walls of Toro for the purpose.72
In a war whose ultimate aim was to win the throne, purely military actions had to be complemented with propaganda. The chronicles relating to the previous Castilian civil war, in which King Henry IV confronted his brother – Prince Alfonso – between 1465 and 1468, also stated this to be true. Thus, the war councils held by Alfonso’s side at the start of the conflict are described as discussions in which some nobles insisted on the need for a pitched battle, since “the favor of the people is changeable” and “the most important thing in war is opinion.”73 Therefore, in a context such as the War of Castilian Succession, it not only what was being done that was important, but also the way in which actions were perceived and the image that was projected. That is the only way to be able to understand how a contested triumph such as that resulting from the battle of Toro could turn into a strategic victory.
In short, the example of Toro shows how civil wars, particularly those that saw the uprising of an alternative candidate for the throne, were contexts in which battle rose up on its own, as a strategic goal. In those cases, the ruling power would be expected to take the initiative and seek a rapid resolution to the war. Raids and chevauchées were ruled out because of their implications in terms of popular support. Similarly, sieges did not make as much sense as they would have done in a war of conquest, since political support was changeable and a stronghold or town that had been loyal could change its mind. Consequently, the situation cried out for a crushing victory and, if that were not possible, propaganda would have to produce one. In that respect, Ferdinand the Catholic knew he needed a battle, he was willing to fight it, he sought it, and finally he found it. And that battle, albeit with dubious results, ended up by handing him final victory.
1 This paper was written within the framework of the Ministry of Science & Innovation-funded research project De la Lucha de Bandos a la hidalguía universal: transformaciones sociales, políticas e ideológicas en el País Vasco (siglos XIV y XV), (ref. HAR2017-83980-P) and of the Basque Government’s Consolidated Research Group Sociedad, poder y cultura (siglos XIV–XVIII), (ref. IT-896-16). An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 600th Anniversary of the Battle of Agincourt Conference 2015. I am grateful to Francisco García Fitz, João Gouveia Monteiro, Fernando Arias, Clifford Rogers, John France, and John Gillingham for reading and making helpful comments on previous drafts of this paper. I also thank the feedback received from the anonymous reviewer. The remaining imperfections are mine alone. Unless otherwise stated, all translations in the article are my own. »
2 Raymond C. Smail, Crusading Warfare, 1097–1193 (Cambridge, 1996); John Gillingham, “Richard I and the Science of War in the Middle Ages,” in Anglo-Norman Warfare: Studies in Late Anglo-Saxon and Anglo-Norman Military Organization and Warfare, ed. Matthew Strickland (Woodbridge, 1992), pp. 194–207; John Gillingham, “William the Bastard at War,” in ibid., pp. 143–60. »
3 Matthew Strickland, War and Chivalry. The Conduct and Perception of War in England and Normandy, 1066–1217 (Cambridge, 2003), p. 43. »
4 The inaugural issue of the Journal of Medieval Military History, which came out in 2002, focused on what has come to be known as “Vegetian strategy,” with two articles that set out to examine the so-called “Gillingham paradigm.” Clifford J. Rogers, “The Vegetian Science of Warfare in the Middle Ages,” Journal of Medieval Military History 1 (2002), 1–19; Stephen Morillo, “Battle Seeking: The Contexts and Limits of Vegetian Strategy,” Journal of Medieval Military History 1 (2002), 21–41. »
5 Rogers, “The Vegetian ‘Science of Warfare’,” pp. 1–19. »
6 John Gillingham, “Up with Orthodoxy!: In Defense of Vegetian Warfare,” Journal of Medieval Military History 2 (2004), 149–58. »
7 João Gouveia Monteiro, “Estratégia e risco em Aljubarrota: a decisão de dar batalha à luz do ‘paradigma Gillingham,’” in VI Jornadas luso-espanholas de Estudos Medievais: A guerra e a sociedade na Idade Média (Coimbra, 2009), pp. 75–107; Francisco García Fitz, “Las Navas de Tolosa y el paradigma bélico medieval,” in La península ibérica en tiempos de las Navas de Tolosa, eds. Carlos Estepa and María Antonia Carmona (Madrid, 2014), pp. 17–52; Andrew Villalon, “Battle-Seeking, Battle-Avoiding, or Perhaps Just Battle-Willing? Applying the ‘Gillingham Paradigm’ to Enrique II of Castile,” Journal of Medieval History 8 (2010), 131–54; Donald Kagay, “Battle-Seeking Commanders in the Later Middle Ages. Phases of Generalship in the War of the Two Pedros,” in The Hundred Years War (III), eds. Andrew Villalon and Donald Kagay (Leiden, 2013), pp. 63–84. »
8 Villalon, “Battle-Seeking, Battle-Avoiding,” pp. 150–52. »
9 John France, Western Warfare in the Age of Crusades, 1000–1300 (New York, 1999), pp. 150–51; Rogers, “The Vegetian ‘Science of Warfare’,” p. 18; Morillo, “Battle Seeking,” p. 30, 34, and 39; John Gillingham, The Wars of the Roses. Peace & Conflict in 15th Century England (London, 1981), pp. 15–50; Gillingham, “Richard I,” p. 207. The appendix to Anthony Goodman’s book shows that the campaigns in the Wars of the Roses tended to be brief and end in pitched battles: Anthony Goodman, The Wars of the Roses: Military Activity and English Society, 1452–1497 (London–New York, 1981), pp. 227–28. »
10 The battle of Toro has been the subject of several studies; it is in fact the most-studied fifteenth-century Castilian pitched battle. However, a strategic analysis of the campaign that led to Toro has yet to be undertaken. See Sousa Viterbo, A batalha de Touro. Alguns dados e documentos para a sua monographia histórica (Lisbon, 1900); Cesáreo Fernández, “La batalla de Toro (1476). Datos y documentos para su monografía histórica,” Boletín de la Real Academia de la Historia 38 (1901), 249–67; Antonio Macia, “La batalla de Toro y la unidad nacional,” Revista de historia militar 46 (1979), 47–56; Juan Barrios, “La voluntad de vencer en la batalla de Toro,” Revista de historia militar 46 (1979), 57–67; Rafael Casas, “Visión táctica actual de la batalla de Toro,” Revista de historia militar 46 (1979), 69–87; Vicente Álvarez, “Una divina retribución: la batalla de Toro en la mentalidad castellana,” in María Helena da Cruz, Saúl Antonio Gomes, and Antonio Manuel Ribeiro eds., VI Jornadas luso-espanholas de Estudos Medievais: A guerra e a sociedade na Idade Média, 2 vols. (Coimbra, 2009), 1:35–55; Filipa Roldão, “Na rua e no arquivo: a construção da memória portuguesa da Batalha de Toro no século XV,” in da Cruz et al., VI Jornadas, 2:319–27; Marcelo Augusto da Encarnaçao, A batalha de Toro (Porto, 2014); Nuno Severiano Teixeira, Francisco Contente Domingues, and João Gouveia Monteiro, História militar de Portugal (Lisbon, 2017), pp. 196–206. »
11 For available narrative sources see Encarnaçao, A batalha de Toro, pp. 37–61. »
12 Luis Suárez Fernández, “Los Trastámaras de Aragón en el siglo XV,” in Historia de España. Los Trastámaras de Castilla y Aragón en el siglo XV, ed. Ramón Menéndez (Madrid, 1970), pp. 253–86. »
13 In the years prior to the death of the monarch a propaganda campaign had been conducted with the aim of slandering the heir to the throne, even calling her “La Beltraneja,” in reference to her alleged father. Suárez, “Los Trastámaras,” p. 269; Óscar Villarroel, Juana la Beltraneja. La construcción de una ilegitimidad (Madrid, 2014); Ana Isabel Carrasco Manchado, Isabel I de Castilla. La sombra de la ilegitimidad (Madrid, 2014). »
14 Luis Suárez, Enrique IV de Castilla (Barcelona, 2002), pp. 309–94; Suárez, “Los Trastámaras,” pp. 253–86. »
15 Suárez, Enrique IV, pp. 395–414; Suárez, “Los Trastámaras,” pp. 287–88; José Manuel Triano, La llamada del rey y el auxilio del reino (Seville, 2018), p. 228. See Mª Isabel del Val, Isabel la Católica, princesa (1468–1474) (Valladolid, 1974), pp. 29–116, at pp. 73–91 »
16 Val, Isabel la Católica, pp. 117–314; Carrasco, Isabel I de Castilla, pp. 16–19. »
17 Luis Suárez Fernández, Los Reyes Católicos. La conquista del Trono (Madrid, 1989), pp. 98–101. »
18 A comprehensive account of the events of the war can be consulted in Encarnaçao, A batalha de Toro; Suárez, Los Reyes Católicos; and Jaime Vivens Vives, Historia crítica de la vida y reinado de Fernando II de Aragón (Zaragoza, 2006), pp. 391–523 (for the events leading to Toro see pp. 391–469). »
19 Diego de Valera, Crónica de los Reyes Católicos, ed. Juan de Mata Carriazo (Madrid, 1927), p. 9; Alonso de Palencia, Crónica de Enrique IV, ed. Antonio Paz y Meliá, 3 vols. (Madrid, 1973), 2:184; Rui de Pina, Chronica do senhor Rey D. Affonso V in Crónicas, ed. Manuel Lopes de Almeida (Porto, 1977), p. 832; Damião de Góis, Crónica do príncipe D. João, ed. Graça Almeida (Lisbon, 1977), p. 117; García de Resende, Crónica de dom João II e miscelánea (Lisbon, 1973), p. 7. Andres Bernáldez is the only chronicler who makes a lower estimate of the Portuguese mounted troops, counting only 3,500. Andrés Bernáldez, Memorias del reinado de los Reyes Católicos, eds. Manuel Gómez-Moreno and Juan de Mata Carriazo (Madrid, 1962), p. 48. See Encarnaçao, A batalha de Toro, pp. 131–34. In a letter to his father, Ferdinand the Catholic estimated the invading force as 3,000 cavalrymen and 8,000–10,000 infantrymen. Antonio Paz y Meliá, El cronista Alonso de Palencia (Madrid, 1914), p. 184. »
20 Crónica incompleta de los Reyes Católicos (1469–1476), ed. Julio Puyol (Madrid, 1934), p. 182. Again, Ferdinand the Catholic considered that the number was lower: 600 or 700 lances. Paz y Meliá, El cronista, p. 184. »
21 Crónica anónima de Enrique IV de Castilla 1454–1474, ed. María Pilar Sánchez-Parra (Madrid, 1991), pp. 491–92; Fernando del Pulgar, Crónica de los Reyes Católicos, ed. Juan de Mata Carriazo, 2 vols. (Granada, 2008), 1:103, 120–21; Pina, Chronica, pp. 830–34; Resende, Crónica, p. 7; Góis, Crónica, pp. 109 and 117–18; Puyol, pp. 180–83; Palencia, Crónica, 2:184, 187. »
22 Andrea Moratalla, Documentos de los Reyes Católicos (1475–1491) (Murcia, 2003), pp. 78–81 and. 81–82; Juan Torres, “La conquista del marquesado de Villena en el reinado de los Reyes Católicos,” Hispania 13 (1953), 37–151. »
23 The Catholic Monarchs also appointed several captains to wage war “by fire and blood” against the supporters of Afonso V in Extremadura. See Carlos J. Rodríguez Casillas, “Más allá del Duero: La guerra de Sucesión en Extremadura (1475–1477),” Medievalismo 27 (2017), 285–301. The Castilian chronicler Fernando del Pulgar pointed out that the count of Cabra and the Master of the Order of Santiago – supporters of the Catholic Monarchs – were fighting so intensely in the territorial domain of the Order of Calatrava that “neither the master of Calatrava nor his people could go to the aid of the king of Portugal because he [the master] needed to safeguard his lands.” Pulgar, Crónica, 1:146–49. »
24 Humberto Baquero, “A contenda entre D. Afonso y os Reis Católicos. Incursões castelhanas no solo portugues de 1475 a 1478,” Anais da Academia Portuguesa da História II 25 (1979), 297–324; Rodríguez, “Más allá del Duero,” pp. 285–301 »
25 Madrid, Biblioteca Nacional de España, MS lat. 20211/85; Paz y Meliá, El cronista, pp. 183–86. Some of the letters sent by Ferdinand the Catholic to his father, John II of Aragon and Navarre, were published by Antonio Paz y Meliá in the cited book. Francisco Bautista has recently located several of the aforementioned letters among the so-called “Zurita papers.” Francisco Bautista, “Sobre la ‘Alacena’ y otros papeles de Jerónimo Zurita,” Revista de historia Jerónimo Zurita 97 (2020), 149–87. »
26 “Si el dicho rey de Portogal passare á Arevalo, como se dize, le entiendo dar batalla, y creo todavía pasará, porque en aquella parte de Plasencia ha muy pocos mantenimientos.” »
27 Madrid, Biblioteca Nacional de España, MS lat. 20211/85; Paz, El cronista Alonso de Palencia, pp. 184–85. »
28 The Castilian chronicles state that the Portuguese suffered constant weariness and harassment at the hands of the garrisons surrounding Arévalo, so they “were dying of hunger.” Puyol, Crónica, p. 191. »
29 The Castilian chroniclers provide figures in this regard. Fernando del Pulgar quantifies the army at the excessive number of 20,000 mounted troops and 50,000 on foot. Diego de Valera, with a more conservative estimate, stated that there were 11,000 cavalry and 30,000 infantry. Similarly, Alonso de Palencia quantified the army as having 2,500 lances, 8,500 jinetes, and 30,000 infantrymen. Pulgar, Crónica, 1:132; Valera, Crónica, p. 26; Palencia, Crónica, 2:208. »
30 Paz, El cronista Alonso de Palencia, pp. 194–95. »
31 Pulgar, Crónica, 1:127–132 and 134–36; Pina, Chronica, p. 834; Gòis, Crónica, p. 121; Valera, Crónica, pp. 22–35; Puyol, Crónica, pp. 194–95, 219–24, and 233–34; Palencia, Crónica, 2:208–15. The contents of the letters can be consulted in Ángel Sesma, “Carteles de batalla cruzados entre Alfonso V de Portugal y Fernando V de Castilla: (1475),” Revista portuguesa de história 16 (1976), 277–95. One reason for the quick withdrawal could have been the lack of funds experienced by the Catholic Monarchs, a scarcity that lasted practically the whole conflict. Triano, La llamada del rey, p. 239; Rodrigo da Costa Domínguez and José Manuel Triano, “The Price of the Throne. Public Finances in Portugal and Castile and the War of the Castilian Succession (1475–1479),” Journal of Medieval History, forthcoming. »
32 Carrasco, Isabel I de Castilla, p. 167. »
33 Moratalla, Documentos, pp. 92–94; Carande and Carriazo, El tumbo, 1:48–50; Carrasco, Isabel I de Castilla, pp. 167–75. The Portuguese chronicler Damião de Góis acknowledged that Ferdinand the Catholic mobilized his troops with the wish to offer battle to Afonso V. Gòis, Crónica, p. 121. »
34 Valera, Crónica, p. 30. »
35 Pulgar, Crónica, 1:150–51, 153–56, 164–66, 173 and 177–78; Gòis, Crónica, pp. 130–31; Valera, Crónica, pp. 38–39 and 53; Puyol, Crónica, pp. 256–59; Palencia, Crónica, 2:224, 229–30, 245, 255, and 259. »
36 “El consexo de Vuestra alteza me da sobre los procesos del Rey de Portugal recibo en señalada merced; fasta aquí no se ha podido aquel seguir, porque yo tenia tanta gente de á caballo y de á pie, que parecio no se devia de presentar la batalla al dicho Rey de Portugal, del qual se facia indicio que non osaria salir, como non oso, á dar la debida batalla: ahora entiendo que sera muy sano consejo el que vuestra alteza dice, y trabaxaré porque así se ponga en execucion.” Paz, El cronista Alonso de Palencia, pp. 195–96. »
37 See Ekaitz Etxeberria, “La ciudad medieval como campo de batalla: el combate urbano en la guerra de Sucesión Castellana (1475–1479),” Clio&Crimen: Revista del Centro de Historia del Crimen de Durango 12 (2015), 280–84; Ekaitz Etxeberria, “Urban Warfare in 15th-century Castile,” e-Stratégica 3 (2019), 134–36. »
38 Pulgar, Crónica, 1:187–90. »
39 Pulgar, Crónica, 1:194; Valera, Crónica, pp. 61–63; Palencia, Crónica, 2:265; Góis, Crónica, pp. 153–54. »
40 Pulgar, Crónica, 1:168–73, 187–90, 193–98, 201–05 and 221; Valera, Crónica, pp. 48–50, 55 and 63–67; Palencia, Crónica, 2:248–49, 257–58 and 264–67; Pina, Chronica, pp. 839–43; Gòis, Crónica, pp. 152–54 and 157–60; Francisco Cascales, Discursos históricos de Murcia y su reyno (Murcia, 1775), p. 280. »
41 Bernáldez, Memorias, pp. 57–59; Palencia, Crónica, 2:273; Valera, Crónica, p. 73. »
42 For the events immediately leading to Toro and the role played by cardinal Pedro González de Mendoza, see L. J. Andrew Villalon, “‘Cardinal Sins’ and ‘Cardinal Virtues’ of ‘El Tercer Rey,’ Pedro González de Mendoza: The Many Faces of a Warrior Churchman in Late Medieval Europe,” Journal of Medieval Military History 13 (2015), 225–27. »
43 Moratalla, Documentos, pp. 113–35. Regarding the tactical role played by cavalry and infantry in fifteenth-century Castile, see Ekaitz Etxeberria, “Dead Horse, Man-at-Arms Lost: Cavalry and Battle Tactics in 15th Century Castile,” Journal of Medieval Iberian Studies 12 (2020), 106–23. »
44 Valera, Crónica, p. 69; Palencia, Crónica, 2:270. »
45 Valera, Crónica, p. 73; Bernáldez, Memorias, p. 59. »
46 Palencia, Crónica, 2:273. »
47 Pulgar, Crónica, 1:213–15. »
48 Pulgar, Crónica, 1:207–15 and 223; Pina, Chronica, pp. 843–48; Resende, Crónica de dom João II, pp. 11–15; Gòis, Crónica do príncipe D. João, pp. 161–67; Valera, Crónica, pp. 68–73; Bernáldez, Memorias, pp. 57–59; Palencia, Crónica, 2:269–73; Encarnaçao, A batalha de Toro, pp. 178–82; Severiano, Contente, and Monteiro, História militar, pp. 204–05. »
49 The custom, although ancient, was still in force in the Late Middle Ages as shown by various examples, including Sempach (1315), Aljubarrota (1385), Alfarrobeira (1449), or Grandson (1476). Philippe Contamine, War in the Middle Ages (Oxford, 1984), p. 261; João Gouveia Monteiro, A guerra em Portugal nos finais da Idade Média (Lisboa, 1998), pp. 309–10. »
50 Encarnaçao, A batalha de Toro, pp. 186–87. »
51 Pulgar, Crónica, 1:180–86 and 250–51; Valera, Crónica, pp. 56–60; Palencia, Crónica, 2:276. »
52 Pulgar, Crónica, 1:370–76; Pina, Chronica, p. 866; Gòis, Crónica, pp. 204–06; Bernáldez, Memorias, pp. 80–82; Alonso de Palencia, Cuarta Década, ed. José Toro (Madrid, 1974), pp.115–19; Don Alonso de Cárdenas, ed. Antonio Vargas-Zúñiga (Badajoz, 1976), pp. XXXIII–XXXV. »
53 Suárez, Los Reyes Católicos, p. 329. »
54 Vegetius, III, IX. »
55 The same chronicle states that Portuguese troops devastated some lands but did not loot them. Puyol, Crónica, p. 190. »
56 Carlos J. Rodríguez Casillas, “Legacy and Change: Medieval Warfare in Castile through the Chronicle of Grand Master Alonso de Monroy (Fifteenth Century),” Journal of Medieval Iberian Studies 11 (2019), 107–08. »
57 Gillingham, The Wars of the Roses, pp. 48–49. »
58 Pulgar, Crónica, 1:129–31; Valera, Crónica, pp. 28–30; Palencia, Crónica, 2:209. »
59 Monteiro, “Estratégia e risco,” pp. 165–66. »
60 Rogers, “The Vegetian ‘Science of Warfare,’” p. 18. »
61 The most noteworthy example is that of the Wars of the Roses. Goodman, The Wars of the Roses; Gillingham, The Wars of the Roses. »
62 “With so many victories obtained by King Ferdinand and his wife Queen Isabella, then there were many turns in the hearts of men and great effort in those of their partiality; very great sadness and fainting in his opponents of him. Those who offered themselves by word, in fact, came to serve them; and those who were waiting for ‘long live to the one who wins,’ did not go to join King Afonso’s army and serve him.” Bernáldez, Memorias, p. 64. »
63 Suárez, Los Reyes Católicos, pp. 157–69. »
64 See Vicens Vives, Historia crítica, p. 441. »
65 Copies are kept in several municipal archives, such as Murcia and in Seville. Moratalla, Documentos, pp. 113–15; El tumbo de los Reyes Católicos del Concejo de Sevilla, vol. 1, eds. Ramón Carande and Juan de Mata Carriazo (Seville, 1968), 1:132–34. The Catholic Monarchs made use of propaganda right from the outset of the war, constantly sending letters to the cities in the kingdom informing them of how the war operations were progressing. »
66 Carrasco, Isabel I de Castilla, pp. 195 and 349. »
67 On the existence of public opinion in fifteenth-century Castile, see Carrasco, Isabel I de Castilla; Ana Isabel Carrasco Manchado, “El rumor político. Apuntes sobre la opinión pública en la Castilla del siglo XV,” Cuadernos de historia de España 80 (2006), 65–90; Ana Isabel Carrasco Manchado, “Vana o divina vox populi. La recreación de la opinión pública en Fernando del Pulgar,” in Gobernar en tiempos de crisis. Las quiebras dinásticas en el ámbito hispano (1250–1808), eds. José Manuel Nieto and María Victoria López-Cordón (Madrid, 2008), pp. 287–305; María Isabel del Val Valdivieso, “La opinión pública en los núcleos urbanos de la Castilla de fines de la Edad Media: posibilidades de estudio,” in La comunidad medieval como esfera pública, eds. Hipólito Rafael Oliva, Vincent Challet, Jan Dumolyn and Mª Antonia Carmona (Sevilla, 2014), pp. 173–91; José Manuel Nieto Soria, “Álvaro de Luna tirano. Opinión pública y conflicto político en la Castilla del siglo XV,” Imago temporis. Medium Aevum 11 (2017), 488–507. »
68 Monteiro, “Estratégia e risco,” p. 154. »
69 Ana Isabel Carrasco states that the actions of the Catholic Monarchs were examined down to the last detail, “as the smallest deed that represents royal shame can be an asset that, on the other hand, increases the good name of the adversaries.” Carrasco, Isabel I de Castilla, p. 237. »
70 Moratalla, Documentos, pp. 92–94; Carande and Carriazo, El tumbo, 1:48–50; Palencia, Crónica, 2:211–15; Valera, Crónica, pp. 30–31; Carrasco, Isabel I de Castilla, pp. 167–75. »
71 Pulgar, Crónica, 1:193–94. »
72 Gòis, Crónica, pp. 153–54. »
73 Diego de Valera, Memorial de diversas hazañas, ed. Juan de Mata Carriazo (Madrid, 1941), pp. 105–07; Alonso de Palencia, Gesta Hispaniensia ex annalibus suorum dierum collecta, eds. Brian Tate and Jeremy Lawrence (Madrid, 1998), pp. 340–41. »