13

One month of grace

On the morning of June 4th, 1940, Generaloberst Milch flew his personal aircraft to Dunkirk, and surveyed the smouldering ruins left after the evacuation. He was surprised to see the enormous quantities of war material which choked the roads and the beaches. It was clear that the British Army had abandoned nearly all its tanks, guns and motor vehicles.

The rapid progress across France made by the German Army in the next ten days convinced Milch that an immediate effort should be made against Britain while the island’s defences were still disorganised and the R.A.F. was in the process of re-forming.

Accordingly he went to see Göring on June 18th at command headquarters at Sovet in Belgium, whence the organisation had moved from Polch in the Eifel. France had collapsed and Paris was occupied. Milch proposed that all available paratroops and air landing forces which remained operational after the battles of Belgium and Holland should be despatched immediately to southern England. There they were to take and hold key fighter airfields such as Manston and Hawkinge and be reinforced by normal troops taken over by air in second or third waves.

Stuka formations were to provide the artillery support and both Stukas and Me 109s were to be operated from the airfields as soon as they had been cleared. While Ju 52s maintained supplies of ammunition, fuel and food German ground troops were to be ferried across the Channel in any and every available ship. Milch envisaged that Luftflotten 2 and 3 would transfer the whole of their effort from the French front to the British coast.

The plan involved considerable risk, but it might have succeeded. At that time British ground defence was almost non-existent. At the worst, the troops would be lost, but such would have been the confusion and destruction in Britain that the air war might have been won in 1940. The start of widespread air attack in mid-June would have allowed no rest for Fighter Command and an extra month’s good weather for the Luftwaffe.

Göring’s reaction was one of blank amazement and he described Milch’s suggestions as ‘nonsense’. Putting such unpleasant thoughts out of his mind he prepared to enjoy the pleasures of Paris in the early summer. One of the most unusual opportunities in German military history had been thrown away.

To the British public the failure of hordes of German paratroops, fifth columnists and waves of black-crossed bombers to arrive came as a distinct surprise. For nearly 900 years the ‘sea-girt isle’ had been inviolate. Now a powerful enemy was on the doorstep and from the Army point of view the country was naked on the ground. There were not even enough rifles to equip regular troops let alone the newly formed Local Defence Volunteers. Only the Royal Air Force and the Royal Navy remained to challenge Hitler’s might.

The assault was awaited hourly but none came. For over a month, apart from a few night raids, the Luftwaffe stayed away. The sea-borne landing preparations were not completed until September, then to be shelved permanently.

In June 1940 it seemed to Germany and to many in authority in neutral countries that the sun was setting on Britain and her Empire and that the end was only a matter of time. Apart from poor intelligence services the German Government suffered from a complete lack of knowledge of the British way of life and character. This was to cost them dear. Neither Göring nor Hitler had been to the United Kingdom and they did not speak English. While Mein Kampf and other inter-war documents showed a marked respect on the Führer’s part for the British nation, his regard for its military potential deteriorated rapidly from the time of the Munich crisis. Chamberlain’s performance in 1939 and a great deal of pacifist oratory and scribbling led him to believe that the vitality and morale of the British had been undermined.

His view of the island race was further distorted by an extraordinary clique which vigorously campaigned for friendship with Germany before 1939. The British Union of Fascists were loud in voice but few in number. Nevertheless their activities, coupled with those of a small hybrid set of discountenanced and overtaxed aristocracy known as ‘the Link’, were constantly brought to Hitler’s attention by Ribbentrop, the German Foreign Minister. After the outbreak of war the Link was disbanded as an agency of enemy propaganda.

Having no personal knowledge, Hitler came to believe that Britain was still run by aristocracy on a feudal system and that the legally elected House of Commons was in constant danger of being overthrown. He and other members of the party, in particular Rudolf Hess, cultivated the friendship of a certain class of English people, whom they believed held the ultimate reins of Government and would have direct access to the Royal Family. The Nazi party tended to be overawed by titles.

After his visit to England in 1937 General Milch spent two hours with Hitler discussing British war potential and Anglo-German relations. Göring could not be bothered even to look through Milch’s reports when they were submitted and did not discuss the R.A.F. with him. Milch was quite certain that the Empire would provide a formidable enemy and that rearmament was well under way. He warned the Führer against underestimating the British and told him that Ribbentrop was the worst possible person to be associated with the British Government. He said: ‘If you don’t get rid of him now, you will have trouble with England’.

At the time Hitler agreed but nothing was done. Ribbentrop and others continued to foster dissident elements in London, and to believe in them.

In the summer of 1939 a new political party was formed known as the British People’s Party. The chairman and a founder member was no less than the Marquess of Tavistock later 12th Duke of Bedford. His associate was Mr. Benjamin Greene, who had for two years been a member of the British Union of Fascists. In a by-election at Hythe the party put up a candidate, Mr. Harry St. John Philby. He lost his deposit but the proceedings did not go unnoticed in Berlin.

After September 3rd, 1936, Tavistock joined the new organisation calling itself ‘The British Council for Christian Settlement in Europe’. This had Mr. John Beckett as its secretary and included among its members Captain Gordon Canning, a former member of the Link. A first-class row blew up in Parliament over the new organisation, and many people connected with it were to spend most of the war in Brixton Prison under Section 18 of the Defence Regulations.

While the activities of the various Fascist and pro-Fascist organisations scarcely rippled the surface of the average Englishman’s life in the years before 1940, to the German Government they formed part of a definite pattern. This was thrown into sharp relief at the end of 1939 by a one-man peace offensive launched by the Marquess himself. Through an acquaintance who lived in Belfast, he was put in touch with the German Legation in Dublin.

The Legation, on orders from Berlin, propounded a wonderful case which led him to believe that the German Government was prepared to allow Poland and Czechoslovakia full independence provided they remained neutral. Germany would disarm if other major powers would do the same, and she would join a ‘reformed’ League of Nations. The Germans also expressed themselves ready to hold a plebiscite in Austria and to co-operate to find a national home for the Jews provided former German colonies were returned. The Marquess of Tavistock passed on this information to Lord Halifax, who described his action as ‘irregular’ but eventually gave him permission to visit Dublin to discover if the terms were authentic.

This the Marquess did in February 1940. The Germans were by now extremely evasive because final preparations were already in hand for the assault on Norway, France and the Low Countries. They ultimately repudiated the so-called ‘peace plan’.

The whole affair was released to the Press by an m.p., which caused a further political storm. It is clear that the Marquess was acting misguidedly but true to his opinions. The outcome for Berlin, however, was to stimulate the hallucination of British decadence.

After Dunkirk, when practically all channels of reliable information about Britain dried up, the myth of a widespread movement to oust Churchill and the Government coupled with rumours of general unrest and panic obsessed Hitler and his associates. More fuel was added to this fire by the ever-watchful British secret service, which deliberately allowed certain elements to continue sending messages of the right type through neutral embassies and via Dublin.

On June 19th and 23rd the German Foreign Office noted that according to Swedish sources certain authoritative circles in London were prepared to come to terms. The naval staff war diary on July 21st Recorded that there seemed to be a strong group in England who wished to know armistice terms. Winston Churchill’s pugnacity damped German hopes but they still looked for a change of heart. This was clearly shown in Hitler’s speech to the Reichstag on July 19th in which he launched once again ‘an appeal for reason’. He followed it up with a shower of speech reprints from Luftwaffe aircraft at the beginning of August which served only to give as much amusement to English householders as doubtless had the R.A.F. ‘bombphlet’ raids to the German hausfrau in 1939.

The four German radio stations set up in Europe to simulate an underground radio network in Britain also took up the internal strife theme with great gusto and appealed to non-existent workers’ cells and revolutionary organisations. Even Lieutenant-Colonel von Lossberg, an army officer attached to the O.K.W., has recorded that a revolution in Britain was seriously anticipated by Hitler.

Despite everything, the myth still held sway in September when, on the 19th, Ribbentrop informed the Italians in Rome that ‘English territorial defence does not exist. One German division will be sufficient to bring about complete collapse.’

It is remarkable that the mutterings and machinations of a few misguided British people and some pro-Fascists, when combined with German misconceptions, should have materially contributed to the invaluable breathing-space which Britain gained in June and July 1940. For one month Dowding was allowed freedom to rest and reorganise his tired squadrons, bring forward more pilots, build up aircraft reserves and extend his control and reporting network. For the country as a whole the respite was even longer. From the beginning of June until mid-August the work of building up vital ground defences, re-equipping Army divisions and increasing war production went on almost unhindered.

Hitler, believing that Britain would sue for an armistice, decided to finish France immediately after Dunkirk. Accordingly, his main forces were switched to the area between the Somme and the Aisne. The decisive battle opened oil June 9th, and by the 14th Paris had fallen. On the 17th the Pétain Government asked for terms and the historic railway carriage at Compiègne was used for the signing of the armistice as it had been by the Allied victors in 1918. From June 22nd to 29th Hitler went sightseeing in France and the O.K.W. free-wheeled for the period. This was an extraordinary procedure if a swift end to the war was to be brought about by military means.

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The Luftwaffe during June/July reorganised in France at leisurely pace, occupying and extending French airfields and bringing in munitions and supplies. The wrecks of French Air Force machines were pushed into heaps to make way for German aircraft. This Potez 63 lies wrecked from German fire, while in the background an Me 109 unit has moved in, its personnel being housed in tents

Following a somewhat nebulous directive from the Führer on May 26th which granted ‘unlimited freedom of action’ to the Luftwaffe to attack England when suitable strength had been built up, preliminary planning for an air assault began.

Five days after the conclusion of the Franco-German Armistice, on June 30th, 1940, Göring issued a general order regarding the air war against the island fortress. In it he stated:

The Luftwaffe war command in the fight against England makes it necessary to co-ordinate as closely as possible, with respect to time and targets, the attacks of Luftflotten 2, 3 and 5. Distribution of duties to the Luftflotten will, therefore, in general be tied to firm targets and firm dates of attack so that not only can the most effective results on important targets be achieved but the well-developed defence forces of the enemy can be split and be faced with the maximum forms of attack.

After the original disposition of the forces has been carried out in its new operational areas, that is after making sure of adequate anti-aircraft and fighter defence, adequate provisioning and an absolutely trouble-free train of command, then a planned offensive against selected targets can be put in motion to fit in with the overall requirements of the commanders-in-chief of the Luftwaffe.

To save us time as well as ensuring that the forces concerned are ready:

(A) The war against England is to be restricted to destructive attacks against industry and air force targets which have weak defensive forces. These attacks under suitable weather conditions, which should allow for surprise, can be carried out individually or in groups by day. The most thorough study of the target and its surrounding area from the map and the parts of the target concerned, that is the vital points of the target, is a pre-requisite for success. It is also stressed that every effort should be made to avoid unnecessary loss of life amongst the civil population.

(B) By means of reconnaissance and the engagement of units of smaller size it should be possible to draw out smaller enemy formations and by this means to ascertain the strength and grouping of the enemy defences. The engagement of the Luftwaffe after the initial attacks have been carried out and after all forces are completely battleworthy has for its objectives:

(a)by attacking the enemy air force, its ground organisations, and its own industry to provide the necessary conditions for a satisfactory overall war against enemy imports, provisions and defence economy, and at the same time provide the necessary protection for those territories occupied by ourselves;

(b)by attacking importing harbours and their installations, importing transports and warships to destroy the English system of replenishment. Both tasks must be carried out separately, but must be carried out in co-ordination one with another.

As long as the enemy air force is not defeated the prime requirement for the air war is to attack the enemy air force on every possible opportunity by day or by night, in the air or on the ground, without consideration of other tasks.

This, therefore, was to be the German plan of campaign: build up the airfields and facilities in France, Belgium and Holland; sound out the defences by using fighters with small bomber formations and then throw the full weight of the Luftwaffe into the destruction of the R.A.F. and its resources including the aircraft industry. Harbours and similar installations were to be attacked simultaneously to cut off vital imports from abroad.

It was a far too ambitious programme for an air force designed for continental warfare with armies on the move and now faced with a resolute and well-equipped foe. The pattern was to be exactly as in Poland, Belgium, Holland and France—the destruction of the enemy air force at the outset in the air and on the ground.

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On the French coast at Wissant, in late July, the German forces installed a Frey a radar station shown here on the cliffs. Instead of being used for fighter direction, however, this Freya was restricted to detecting and reporting, shipping along the British coast

It is noteworthy that the orders contain none of the sense of urgency which characterised similar documents in earlier campaigns. The Chief of the Army General Staff, Haider, noted on June 22nd: ‘The near future will show whether Britain will do the reasonable thing in the light of our victories.’

Göring believed that Britain would sue for peace or be forced to capitulate by air attack. He took little interest in various invasion study papers which were placed before Hitler by the Army chiefs on June 26th.

He had, however, misjudged the Führer’s intentions as became evident on July 2nd when Hitler issued his first brief directive for the invasion of England and called for intensive staff planning and research at High Command level. From this date Göring found that while his prime object, the destruction of the R.A.F., was still at the top of the list, his planning and target selection had to be co-ordinated with the invasion requirements of the Army and Navy.

At this point it is necessary to stress that Germany had every intention of invading if Britain did not sue for peace.

Since the war historians on the Continent have made strenuous efforts to belittle the whole German invasion scheme and suggest that there was no real intention of carrying it out.

If, as has been postulated, the Sealion invasion plan was purely an exercise to frighten and put pressure on Britain, then it must surely have been the most expensive exercise ever.

Whole armies were re-trained and special equipment of all kinds was purchased, while coastal and barge traffic in northern Europe was disorganised for months with very adverse effects on the German economy.

The overall strategic plan was simple. Once Fighter Command had been defeated, the Luftwaffe could overcome the superior strength of the Royal Navy in the Channel. The slow trains of barges etc. would then have faced only the British Army and coastal defences. Once through these, with one or two airfields occupied, then the Luftwaffe could operate from British soil and range far and wide over the country.

Without Fighter Command, R.A.F. bombers would have been assailed over the bridgehead by the full weight of the German fighter forces with inevitable results.

Any half-heartedness evident in German records, particularly those of the naval staff, stemmed only from realisation that invasion could not be launched until Fighter and Bomber commands had been smashed. General Galland, in a post-war article in Forces Aériennes Francaises, correctly summarised the situation:

Time was required to complete invasion preparations, especially by the navy. The Luftwaffe was to make good use of this breathing-space by carrying out independent offensive operations aimed at securing air superiority. Though there was no deviation from the original purpose of invading Britain, the nature of operations began gradually to shift the emphasis to the strategic mission of the Luftwaffe.

In an enlightening lecture on the air war against Britain 1940–33 given at Gatow, Berlin, on February 2nd, 1944, Hauptmann Otto Bechtle stated: ‘After the western campaign had been successfully concluded, the aim of the German High Command was a speedy decision in the war against Britain. This it hoped to achieve by an invasion of Britain which was to be preceded by German mastery of the air over the British Isles … The invasion was scheduled to take place four weeks after the start of planned air attacks against the mainland of Britain.’

The whole position is very well summed up in a German official study of British air defences in 1940–41.

It states:

After the victorious conclusion of June 25th, 1940, of the campaign against France, it was the intention of the German General Staff to force a swift defeat on the British by a landing on the mainland of Britain.

Despite the fact that, because of Britain’s insular position, the operations that followed met with greater difficulties than on the Continent, the strategic setting of targets was the same as in the previous campaigns. In their attack, the aim of the Luftwaffe was above all to crush the Royal Air Force.

As long as Britain, protected by her Navy, was able to supplement and even to reinforce her power from overseas, the geo-political principle of the protective power of an insular position remained valid; as a sea power, Britain could only be defeated at sea.

But to do this, the German naval forces were inadequate …

Thus the only possibility open was to get the British bases into German hands. In these circumstances the German High Command had to decide to attack the British mainland; for this purpose, they had first to achieve air supriority.

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A Dornier 17Z bomber of Stab/KG3 being prepared for operations over France in May 1940

In its conclusions the study notes:

It was unavoidable that the operations of the Army and the Luftwaffe could not be combined. The weaknesses resulting from the operations on the Continent were known to the German High Command. They had to be overcome if Britain was to be defeated. If the wresting of air superiority from the enemy was the first condition for the success of the landing, then the commencement of Army operations could not and dared not coincide with those of the Luftwaffe.

Bearing in mind the effects of Luftwaffe successes in all the campaigns to date and the decisive outcome of the attacks on cities like Warsaw and Rotterdam, Hitler and Göring both felt that air power alone might suffice against Britain. Hitler put the invasion plans in train to provide the finale while Göring was so blinded by success that he was certain a few days of Luftwaffe attacks would see Britain on her knees.

Hitler’s determination in July to carry out the invasion is evinced by the opening gambit to his ‘Directive No. 16, Preparations for a Landing Operation Against England’, issued on July 16th, 1940:

As England, despite her hopeless military situation, still shows no sign of willingness to come to terms, I have decided to prepare, and if necessary to carry out, a landing operation against her.

The aim of this operation is to eliminate the English motherland as a base from which war against Germany can be continued and, if necessary, to occupy the country completely

While the willingness to mount an invasion was amply in evidence it entirely depended on the substitution of air supremacy for sea supremacy. General Jodl said in Munich in November 1945: ‘The landing in England, prepared down to the smallest detail, could not be attempted before the British air arm was completely beaten.’

The growing emphasis on invasion began to show itself in the Luftwaffe’s plans early in July. On the 11th the O.K.L. Operations Staff issued its first directive concerning ‘Intensive Air War Against England’. This gave orders for preliminary attacks on shipping, particularly in the Channel, and for raids on a limited number of specified places. Detailed planning on large-scale raids and crew briefing on targets was also initiated but no fixed date was given for the commencement of the main assault.

That night Göring gave a party at Karinhall, where Milch and the senior commanders were entertained to an after-dinner speech outlining the preparation for and fulfilment of the operations against England. As he had stated on June 30th, three Luftflotten (2, 3 and 5) were to take part.

From July 11th to July 21st the Luftflotten staffs worked out their plans for a concentrated attack but these had to be modified after the first week when Hitler’s ‘Directive No. 16’ was issued. In this the Luftwaffe, in addition to its role as destroyer of the R.A.F. with its bases and production plants, was required to prevent air intervention in the invasion. It was also to attack British naval forces at their home bases even up to the north of Scotland, overcome coastal defences, break the resistance of ground troops, annihilate advancing reserves and destroy lines of transport.

While the probing in strength of British defences and attacks on Channel shipping began on July 10th in accordance with Göring’s orders, planning for the major air attack did not begin until July 21st. This was the day following the creation of eight army and four Luftwaffe field marshals and the announcement of the one and only rank of Reichsmarschall for Göring himself.

On July 21st Milch, Kesselring, Sperrle and Stumpff, together with their Fliegerkorps commanders, assembled at Karinhall to hear Göring’s further requirements for the ‘Air War Against England’. He outlined once more the basic principles. There were, however, two amendments to his original orders of July 11th, and both were directly connected with the invasion plans. Wherever possible the British Fleet was to be attacked and harbours like Portsmouth were to be rendered unusable as bases from which Royal Navy units might interfere with the invasion fleet.

Certain quay and harbour installations on the south coast originally scheduled for attack were to be deleted from the plan because they would be required by the landing troops. Fliegerdivision IX, which specialised in mine-laying and anti-shipping attack, was ordered not to drop mines on the south coast which might later affect the barges and steamers in Operation Seelöwe (Sealion).

The operations staffs of Luftflotten 2, 3 and 5 were then told to proceed with the first plans for a concentrated assault. The spheres of operation were divided as follows: Luftflotte 2 was to attack targets in the area east of a line from Selsey Bill to Oxford, Birmingham-Manchester and Carlisle, while Luftflotte 3 dealt with all targets west of that line. Luftflotte 5 was to cover a small area bounded roughly by the Humber estuary, the Scottish border and the Lancashire border east of Lancaster.

The planning was not easy. There were too many conflicting requirements and a complete lack of any well-prepared long-term policy for the conduct of aerial warfare against Britain. Studie Blau was valuable but as it resembled an encyclopaedia of Britain it gave no idea of how a strategic attack by three Luftflotten should be developed.

The only real study of Britain that had been made was by Luftflotte 2 in 1938 and 1939. Before the annexation of Austria, the threatening attitude of Britain and France led to a directive from the O.K.L. on February 18th, 1938. This was a ‘Preliminary Orientation’ regarding air war across the Channel. The emphasis was on raids on London and air bases in eastern England because only airfields in west Germany could then be used.

After the Austrian union, the political temperature cooled slightly until the Sudetenland crisis in the summer. On August 23rd the Luftwaffe Chief of Air Staff warned Luftflotte 2 to be prepared to operate three or four bomber Geschwader against England if the Sudetenland situation, known to the Germans as ‘Fall Grün’ or Green Case, should spark off a war.

General Felmy, then commander-in-chief of Luftflotte 2, submitted a personal paper on the subject on September 22nd, 1938. Felmy concluded that while his command was in no state to achieve decisive results the best targets would be the air armaments industry, the fleet, harbours and merchant ships. These were, in fact, the targets chosen for 1940.

With the Sudetenland crisis passed, the growth of British air rearmament led to the plan by Hitler for a five-fold increase in Luftwaffe strength. This, however, never materialised. Included in this ‘Concentrated Aircraft type Programme’ were no less than thirteen Geschwader for anti-shipping work. Dearly would the German Air Force have wished to see such a well-trained force available in 1940.

In ‘Planstudie 1939’, which was issued in February 1939 and outlined Luftwaffe policy for the year, Part 3 dealt with operations against the west. Luftflotte 2 was again responsible for action against Britain. This came under the heading of ‘Fall Blau’ (Blue Case). The theories were put into training practice in a five-day exercise in May 1939 when simulated raids were made over the North Sea. Some units came within a few miles of the east coast of England, causing considerable excitement at east coast radar stations. In the exercise report produced on May 13th, 1939, it was concluded that Luftflotte 2 was in no position to force a speedy decision on England because of its equipment, training and strength; in particular ‘there were not enough aircraft to cope with the large number of targets and the wide area of the theatre of operations’.

General Geisler, the General z.b.V. (special duties general) seconded to Luftflotte 2 in the spring of 19393 examined all the major objectives and problems concerned with war against Britain including the results of the May exercises. His ideas as to objectives (report dated August 7th, 1939) undoubtedly formed the basis for the staff plans in 1940. These were as follows:

1Gain air superiority.

2Cripple the British war economy.

3Cut off shipping.

4Inflict serious damage on the British fleet.

5Successfully attack British military transports to the Continent and threaten or carry out an invasion.

While the Luftwaffe took due note of the aims in Geisler ‘s report they ignored his conclusions. These, based on estimates of strength, training and efficiency, were that only partial success could be achieved against Britain in 1940. The Luftwaffe would not become a threat until the second year and then only if ‘available forces were strictly concentrated, operations were conducted flexibly and for a considerable length of time with gradually increased forces’.

From the outset the Luftflotten produced their own plans of campaign for their areas and submitted them separately. No overall programme was submitted by all three and agreed. Here the merit of the R.A.F. system of division into commands according to function became apparent.

The main Luftflotten (2 and 3) completed their basic studies by July 25th. Their views were received by the air force command staff four days later, an indication of the leisurely pace of the whole operation. There were marked divergences of opinion between Kesselring and Sperrle on methods to be adopted and on target selection. These were promptly criticised by the High Command.

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Adolf Hitler in June 1940 with a group of the airborne troops who captured the Belgian forts at Eben-Emael in a surprise attack on May 10th

While Sperrle was confident about operations against the R.A.F. he wanted maximum effort against ports and supplies, Kesselring at first believed that likely Luftwaffe losses in material and prestige would have far-reaching effects. He preferred to retain the cloak of invincibility covering the German Air Force and instead of mounting a frontal assault, to concentrate on the periphery of the British Isles and to isolate the Mediterranean theatre by smashing Gibraltar. Forced into a corner by the High Command, Kesselring advocated maximum strength over a few given targets instead of dissipating the Luftflotten over a wide area.

After the initial reports the Luftflotten were ordered to revise sections of their studies. On August 1st they were re-submitted to Göring, who made amendments but accepted the documents in principle on the same day.

Luftflotte 2 was not particularly happy about the alterations in its plan of attack. It had originally proposed that London should be the main target to draw the British fighter forces into battle over one vital point as it was thought. Hitler at that time forbade any attacks on London and therefore the main assault was redirected at airfields and military targets in southern England. This would have been Luftflotte 2’s second phase in the Battle if their plans had been accepted.

Fliegerkorps II, particularly its Chief of Staff General Paul Deichmann, recognised that the limited range of the Me 109 restricted its escort role to airfield attacks as far north as outer London. He supposed that British fighters would be withdrawn to more northern bases without air superiority having been gained. In fact the argument for attacking London was fallacious as it could only assist in concentrating the forces of Nos. 11 and 12 Groups against large and unwieldy Luftwaffe formations. Throughout the planning and the battle the morale of Londoners and the hopelessness of trying to destroy such an enormous city with the bombs and bombers then available was completely underestimated.

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Hitler and his newly promoted commanders after the Battle of France had ended. From left to right:

Feldmarschall Milch (Inspector General), Feldmarschall Sperrle (C.-in-C. Luftflotte 3), Adolf Hitler, Reichsmarschall Göring and Feldmarschall Kesselring (C.-in-C. Luftflotte 2)

Having resolved that the battle would be fought in accordance with Göring’s original directives, the Führer, on August 1st, 1940, issued his top secret Directive No. 17 for the carrying out of air and naval warfare against England. Ten copies of this document were issued. In it Hitler stated:

To produce the necessary conditions for the reduction of England I consider that the air and sea war against the English motherland must be carried out more firmly than previously. Therefore I order the following: (1) The German Air Forces must with all means in their power and as quickly as possible destroy the English air force. The attacks must in the first instance be directed against flying formations, their ground organisations, and their supply organisations, in the second against the aircraft production industry and the industries engaged in production of anti-aircraft equipment. (2) After achieving air superiority in terms of time and of area the air war should be continued against harbours, especially those which are engaged in the provision of food supplies and also against the installation for food supplies in the heart of the country.

Attacks carried out against harbours on the south coast must bear in mind the future operations that we may wish to carry out and therefore be restricted to the minimum. (3) The war against enemy warships and merchant ships must, however, take second place from the air war point of view so far as it does not concern particularly attractive opportunity targets or so far as it is not an additional bonus to the attacks carried out under paragraph 2 above, or where it is used for training of crews for specialised future tasks. (4) The increased air war is to be carried out so that the air force can support naval operations on satisfactory opportunity targets with sufficient forces as and when necessary. Additionally it must remain battle-worthy for Operation Sealion. (5) Terror raids as revenge I reserve the right to order myself. (6) The strengthening of the air war can start from 5th August. The starting point is to be decided by the air force itself after completion of preparations and bearing in mind weather conditions. The navy will also at the same time carry out an increased scope of operations at sea from the same date.

Receipt of Directive No. 17 by the Luftwaffe High Command gave the green light for orders to the three Luftflotten to be issued on August 2nd. These took the form of a Directive for ‘Adlerangriff’ or ‘The Attack of the Eagles’ but no date for ‘Adler Tag’ or ‘Eagle Day’ was given. The O.K.W. intention was that battle should begin twelve hours after the Führer’s orders, that is twelve hours after the issue of Order No. 17.

Göring, however, appears to have misinterpreted Hitler’s intentions in that he thought about eight days should be allowed for final preparations. Adler Tag should have been on August 2nd or 3rd, but arguments were still going on between Kesselring and Sperrle on the strength and composition of raids on various targets, the heights to be flown and the question of escorts. Göring himself seems to have been a little confused over the problems of integrating a strategic air war with the needs for invasion support. It had been made plain to him on August 2nd that Hitler intended to carry through the Seelöwe invasion plans, if necessary four weeks after the beginning of the air war. The Luftwaffe was to provide the full support which was forthcoming in earlier campaigns. To clear the air, and probably his own mind, he called a small conference of senior officers including Milch on August 3rd at Karinhall.

The difficulties were finally sorted out by August 6th and on that day Milch, Sperrle, Stumpff and others were called again to Karinhall for the final analysis on Adlerangriff. No date could be agreed as weather conditions were then unfavourable. Later August 10th was selected as Adler Tag but this was postponed from day to day and from hour to hour until finally fixed for the morning of August 13th.

While the operational staff was endeavouring to produce some cohesive overall plans, the process of building up the Luftwaffe in the newly occupied countries was proceeding leisurely. After France fell large numbers of air and ground crew were granted leave in Germany and much time was spent in organising the great victory parade on the Champs Elysées set for July 18th.

Among the rank and file the rumour was that the war was nearly over and that Britain, would sue for peace any day. The knowledge that some soldiers were being demobilised heightened the effect.

Only very gradually were the forces built up along the coast facing England. In many cases elaborate preparations were made at new sites including the construction of railway sidings into airfields. In the months of May and June 1940 the Luftwaffe lost 1,469 aircraft on operations although a large percentage of these were due to flying accidents and other causes. Bomber strength was reduced from 1,002 operational planes on March 30th, 1940, to 841 on June 29th.

The losses were not as high as had been anticipated, but German production was still in low gear and the reserves were drawn on heavily to bring units back to strength. Of aircrew there was no shortage. The flying schools were turning out a steady stream and large numbers of P.O.W.s released during the May/June campaigns returned to their units.

The two air fleets in the west extended their boundaries from Germany across France to the mouth of the Seine. Luftflotte 2 established main H.Q. at Brussels with advanced H.Q. at Cap Gris Nez opposite Dover and Luftflotte 3 had its main H.Q. at Paris with advanced H.Q. at Deauville. The general layout of the Fliegerkorps remained as for the Battle of France except that Fliegerkorps IV was transferred to Luftflotte 3 to carry out its anti-shipping work in the Western approaches and its place in Luftflotte 2 was taken by Fliegerkorps II.

German total first-line strength deployed against Britain on August 10th, 1940, was 3,358 aircraft of which 2,550 were serviceable. The latter figure covered 80 close and 71 long-range reconnaissance aircraft, 998 bombers, 261 Stukas, 31 ground attack machines, 224 twin-engined fighters, 805 single-engined fighters, and 80 coastal reconnaissance aircraft. The total strength of the Luftwaffe in all countries on August 13th was 4,632 of which an average of 3,306 were serviceable.

In addition to these forces there were sundry night fighters and transport aircraft.

The only alteration made to the normal command structure for Adlerangriff was the grouping of fighters in Luftflotten 2 and 3 into tactical fighter commands called Jagdflieger führ er, or Jafu for short. Jafus 2 and 3 in Luftflotten 2 and 3 respectively exercised some independence in their operational planning but were without any radar or radio close control. This resulted in their autonomy being rendered useless as briefings on the ground often bore no relation to the tactical battles that developed.

General Martini’s service set up listening stations along the Dutch, Belgian, Danish and French coasts, while engineers of the Luftwaffe signals and the German Post Office began to rig transmitters to jam British radar, although ineffectively because the valves available gave insufficient power for the ranges involved.

A few Freya radars were erected along the coast but they did not fit in with any adequate operational network. They had a range of seventy-five miles and gave bearing and elevation but no altitude information. Particular use was to be made of the Freya transferred in late July from Dieppe to Wissant in the Pas de Calais. This instrument, however, was concentrated on shipping watch and had no function as a fighter director station.

FIGHTER COMMAND ORDER OF BATTLE Groups and Squadrons July 7th, 1940 (0900 hours)

13 GROUP

HEADQUARTERS NEWCASTLE

Wick

   

3

Hurricane

Wick

504

Hurricane

Castletown

Dyce

   

603

Spitfire

Dyce (A Flight)

603

Spitfire

Montrose (B Flight)

Turnhouse

141

Defiant

Turnhouse

245

Hurricane

Turnhouse (operational by day only)

602

Spitfire

Drem

Usworth

152

Spitfire

Acklington

72

Spitfire

Acklington

Catterick

41

Spitfire

Catterick

219

Blenheim

Catterick

Church Fenton

249

Hurricane

Church Fenton (operational by day only)

616

Spitfire

Leconfield

12 GROUP

HEADQUARTERS WATNALL

Kirton-in-Lindsey

 

253

Hurricane

Kirton-in-Lindsey

222

Spitfire

Kirton-in-Lindsey

Digby

 

29

Blenheim

Digby

611

Spitfire

Digby

46

Hurricane

Digby

266

Spitfire

Digby

Coltishall

 

66

Spitfire

Coltishall

242

Hurricane

Coltishall

Wittering

23

Blenheim

Wittering

229

Hurricane

Wittering

Duxford

19

Spitfire

Duxford

264

Defiant

Duxford

Debden

85

Hurricane

Debden (B Flight)

85

Hurricane

Martlesham (A Flight)

17

Hurricane

Debden

11 GROUP

HEADQUARTERS UXBRIDGE

North Weald

 

56

Hurricane

North Weald

25

Blenheim

Martlesham (1 Flight)

25

Blenheim

North Weald (1 Section)

151

Hurricane

North Weald

Hornchurch

 

65

Spitfire

Hornchurch

74

Spitfire

Hornchurch

54

Spitfire

Rochford

Biggin Hill

 

600

Blenheim

Biggin Hill

79

Hurricane

Hawkinge

610

Spitfire

Biggin Hill

32

Hurricane

Biggin Hill

604

Blenheim

Gravesend

Kenley

 

64

Spitfire

Kenley

615

Hurricane

Kenley

111

Hurricane

Croydon

Northolt

 

1

Hurricane

Northolt

257

Hurricane

Northolt (operational by day only)

Tangmere

 

43

Hurricane

Tangmere

145

Hurricane

Tangmere

601

Hurricane

Tangmere

F.I.U. Flight Blenheim, Tangmere

Filton*

87

Hurricane

Exeter

213

Hurricane

Exeter

92

Spitfire

Pembrey

234

Spitfire

St. Eval (1 Section at Hullavington)

Middle Wallop*

 

501

Hurricane

Middle Wallop

238

Hurricane

Middle Wallop (operational by day only)

609

Spitfire

Warmwell

* These sectors transferred to the operational control of No. 10 Group at Box, Wiltshire, at twelve noon on July 18th. Sector stations in italic

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