PART THREE
14
With France out of the war, Britain in July 1940 no longer had thoughts for anything but her immediate defence against an almost certain assault. Anything that could help to hinder the success of an attack had to be turned into a weapon. Barbed wire and minefields were planted around the south coast, trenches were dug behind them, civilians drew Home Guard uniforms, armed themselves with pikes and pitchforks and set about erecting obstructions on every field a glider could use. On the aircraft industry’s airfields old cars salvaged from the unlikeliest rubbish-heaps lined the runways ready to be rolled into the paths of invading aircraft.
At Fighter Command attention had been focused on building up the squadrons. Before Dunkirk the pilot strength of most averaged about seventeen; by the second week in June they had about twenty.
Simultaneously the tasks fighter pilots were called upon to do were amplified; they were not merely to repulse raids levelled at the coasts of Britain, they were to fly special patrols over occupied areas of Belgium and France, and even to reconnoitre the continental coasts by day.
By June 30th Göring had detailed the preparatory work the Luftwaffe would have to undertake to fulfil the Nazis’ objectives against England.
Two Fliegerkorps were assigned to establish air superiority over the Channel and close it to British shipping: General Lörzer’s II Fliegerkorps based on the Pas de Calais and General Richthofen’s VIII Fliegerkorps near Le Havre.
Clearing the Straits of Dover seemed such a simple task that Lörzer did not consider it necessary to commit his whole force. A small battle group under Johannes Fink, Kommodore of the Do 17-equipped Kampfgeschwader 2 based at Arras, was accordingly given the job.
In addition to the Dornier bombers, Fink had at his disposal two Stuka Gruppen and two Me 109 Jagdgeschwader based on the Pas de Calais. The fighter component was distinguished by the fact that JG26 was led by Major Adolf Galland and JG53 by Major Werner Molders.
The battle group numbered in all about seventy-five bombers, sixty or more Stukas and about 200 fighters. To achieve air superiority over the English Channel Fink was given the impressive title of Kanalkampführer, or Channel Battle Leader.
Fink established his command post in an old bus near a statue of Louis Blériot erected to commemorate the pioneer’s conquest of the Channel in 1909. It stood on top of the cliffs at Cap Blanc Nez and from its windows Fink could follow the progress of his units. In good visibility he could watch the British through powerful binoculars.
Among the first officers to be sent to the Calais area that June was General Major Kurt von Döring. He also set up headquarters on the cliffs near Wissant with a W/T station. One of von Döring’s other assignments was to supervise the installation of a maritime radar observation system—Freya—but it was not until the end of July that it came into operation on the cliffs of Wissant to detect Channel shipping.
Richthofen did not dispose of any twin-engined bombers but his Stukas, supported by fighters, were presumed to be capable of establishing air superiority and clearing shipping from the area between Portsmouth and Portland.
On July 2nd the German Air Force Supreme Command issued instructions for the campaign against Britain. By the following day the effect was apparent. Small groups of bombers, covered from above by roving fighter patrols, were out hunting for ships.
On July 3rd a Dornier suddenly dived out of cloud and attacked No 13 EFTS at Maidenhead. One man was killed and half a dozen injured, while six Tiger Moths were destroyed and twenty-five damaged.
On the 4th twenty Ju 88s bombed Portland and two enemy aircraft penetrated as far as Bristol—one of these being shot down by 92 squadron from Pembrey.
One pilot of 601 squadron shot down a Dornier 17 on July 7th and reported that when about 100 yards from the bomber some 20 metal boxes, about 9 inches cube and attached to wires, were thrown out behind. The fighter was hit by the boxes, but remained serviceable.
The Luftwaffe’s first few incursions over the Channel made it clear that the British radar network was not able to pick up the German aircraft soon enough for the defending fighters to intercept. From July 4th a flight from each R.A.F. sector station was dispatched to operate from its forward landing grounds.
On July 8th Flying Officer Desmond McMullen leading a section of three No. 54 Squadron Spitfires ran into trouble tackling a formation of Me 110s which crossed the coast at Dungeness. The Spitfires were about to intercept when they were attacked from above by Me 109s.
Two of the Spitfires were shot down and the third was damaged. There were no casualties, but one pilot, Flying Officer Coleman, was wounded and put out of action for several weeks.
The Spitfire pilots were caught napping because they were still employing formations and tactics taught before the war and because the lessons learnt at Dunkirk had not been fully digested.
Before the war R.A.F. squadrons flew compact formations based on tight elements of three planes and the tactics employed were standardised in what were known as ‘Fighting Area Attacks’. There were five different forms of attack and a flight commander ordered them in combat as he saw fit.
In terms of flying discipline and spectacle they were excellent. They were worthless tactically and when related to effective shooting. There was never enough time to get the sights on the target since the business of keeping station was the prime requirement.
Following the command ‘F.A.A. Attack No. 1— Go’, for example, the fighters would swing into line astern behind the leader, follow him in an orderly line up to the bomber, fire a quick shot ‘when their turn came in the queue and then swing gracefully away after the leader again, presenting their bellies to the enemy gunner. They were all based on the belief that modern aircraft, especially fighters, were too fast for the dogfight tactics of World War I.
Fighting Area attacks were disastrous and it was not long before the British were imitating the Germans.
In the early evening of July 11th Heinkel III’s of KG55 raided Portsmouth. They were intercepted by R.A.F. fighters and this bomber crashed on the beach between Selsey and Pagham, Sussex. Two of the crew were killed and three injured. As the aircraft burns local inhabitants look on—including two firemen with magnificent Victorian-style helmets
By flying their loose formations the Germans found these advantages: they could maintain their positions more easily, they could keep a better look-out and by flying at separated heights they could cover each other and scan a greater area of sky.
The perfect fighter formation was devised by the Germans. It was based on an element of two planes which they called the rotte. About 200 yards separated a pair of fighters and the main responsibility of the wingman, or number two, was to cover the leader from quarter or stern attack. The leader looked after navigation and covered his wingman.
The schwarme consisted of two pairs, and it was this formation the R.A.F. adopted. The British called it a finger-four because each plane flew in a position corresponding to the finger-tips seen in plan view.
In this formation the leader is represented by the longest finger, the number two by the index. Numbers three and four take up the positions of the third and little finger-tips. Number two always flies on the sun side of the leader scanning down-sun. And he positions himself slightly below so that the other pilots can see him well below the glare. That leaves two pairs of eyes stepped-up down-sun of the leader scanning the danger area.
While these lessons were still being learned Fighter Command found itself on July 10th fighting the opening phase of the Battle of Britain.
July 10th
Day Convoy raids off North Foreland and Dover.
Night The east coast, home counties and western Scotland attacked.
Weather Showery in south-east England and Channel. Continuous rain elsewhere.
The first plots to appear on the operations room table indicated that the Luftwaffe were following routine procedure. Skirting the west of England, weather reconnasissance aircraft steered for the Atlantic. Radar tracked them for part of their course but they gave the R.A.F. few opportunities to intercept.
After sunrise a Spitfire from the Coltishall Sector, Suffolk, was directed to a suspect plot. Despite the morning haze it engaged a reconnaissance machine.
Apart from a few other skirmishes the morning was uneventful but activity showed signs of increasing.
A new procedure adopted by No. 11 Group nominated a whole squadron instead of a flight for dawn deployment to forward airfields. The squadron would return home in the evening.
Shortly before 1.30 p.m. radar blips showed a substantial build-up behind Calais. As a west-bound convoy streamed past Dover guarded by six Hurricanes from Biggin Hill about twenty Do 17s escorted by thirty Me 110s and twenty Me 109s arrived.
Within half an hour the Hurricanes were joined by elements of four squadrons from neighbouring sectors, including Hurricanes of No. 56, based at North Weald, but operating from Manston.
Near Newhaven a train was attacked, the driver being killed and the guard injured.
The fight cost the Luftwaffe four fighters. Three Hurricanes were lost, one of them, belonging to No. 111 Squadron, losing a wing after hitting a bomber. Only one small ship was sunk.
Forced down on July 11th, near Goodwood, Sussex, this Me 110 of 4th Staffel Aufkl. Gr. 14 was repaired and became part of R.A.F.’s circus of German equipment captured. The original German code 5F + CM can just be discerned on the fuselage
Meanwhile seventy German bombers attacked Swansea and Falmouth killing thirty people and damaging shipping, a power station and railways. The Royal Ordnance Factory at Pembrey was hit and seventeen bombs fell on Martlesham.
The most significant event of a day in which Fighter Command flew 609 sorties was the promptness with which Me 110s went into a defensive circle when they were attacked by Hurricanes. It was a clear indication that this long-range fighter needed as much protection as a bomber.
An anti-aircraft battery on the south coast claimed a record by shooting down a 109 in thirty seconds with only eight shells. The battery log-book reads: ‘1312 hrs.—enemy aircraft seen at 8,000 feet. 1314 hrs.—opened fire on E/A; range 7,000 yards. 1314½ hrs.— cease fire. Enemy had disappeared. 1325 hrs.—enemy reported in the sea.’
Thirteen German aircraft failed to return. Six British fighters were destroyed.
July 11th
Day Convoys attacked off Suffolk. Portland harbour raided.
Night Activity over south-west England, East Anglia, York-shore coast and Portsmouth.
Weather Channel overcast. Cloud base 5,000 feet. Visibility fair. Thunderstorms and bright intervals in the midlands and north.
At 7.30 a.m. two Luftflotte 3 formations operating from Cherbourg peninsula were detected by radar heading for a convoy steaming eastwards across Lyme Bay. Six Spitfires and six Hurricanes from Warmwell in the Middle Wallop Sector were scrambled, the Spitfires to patrol the convoy, the Hurricanes to meet the German formation.
The Hurricanes intercepted ten Stukas and about twenty Me 109s shortly before eight o’clock. One Hurricane was shot down almost immediately.
Spitfires arrived as the Stukas were preparing to dive on the convoy. Three Spitfires positioned themselves to attack the dive-bombers while the other three stood by to cover from the rear. Two were shot down when the 109s broke through the rearguard. No ship was sunk.
No. 564 Squadron at Mansion flew continuous convoy patrols throughout the day. ‘B’ Flight, led by Air Commodore A. C. Deere, then a flight lieutenant, ran into trouble on the fourth scramble. It had just crossed the coast at Deal when Deere spotted a silver-coloured seaplane with Red Cross markings flying at wave-top height. Behind it were a dozen Me 109s in loose formation.
There was a fierce fight during which Deere collided head-on with a 109. His engine dead and the propeller blades bent horizontal, he glided back to a crash-landing five miles from Mansion, badly bruised, but otherwise unhurt. Two Spitfires were shot down for two Me 109s. The seaplane force-landed.
If the Me 109 pilot came down in the Channel he was probably picked up. The German air-sea rescue organisation was then better than the British.
The Germans used about thirty Heinkel 59 seaplanes to rescue their pilots from the water. Luftwaffe air crews were provided with inflatable rubber dinghies and a chemical that stained the sea around them a bright and conspicuous green.
Pilots of 151 Squadron, North Weald, in July. Fourth from the left is Squadron Leader E. M. Donaldson. On the previous day he had been shot down off Boulogne but was later picked up by a R.A.F. high-speed launch. Fifth from the left is Wing Commander F. V. Beamish, North Weald Station Commander, who flew many sorties during the Battle
The British system was not fully organised until after the formation of the Directorate of Air-Sea Rescue in the middle of February 1941. Before that R.A.F. crews had to rely on luck, the Navy, the coast-guards or a passing convoy, although Park, by the end of July, had succeeded in borrowing some Lysander aircraft to work with the launches and other craft.
Once located, R.A.F. naval high-speed launches or lifeboats of the Royal National Lifeboat Institution did the rescuing. These vessels were under the operational control of the local naval authorities. They formed a chain round the coast with an important centre at Dover, where a rescue service had been working since May.
Around midday on the 11th fifteen Luftflotte 3 Stukas joined thirty to forty 110s over the Cherbourg peninsula and set course for Portland. Thirty minutes later they surprised six Hurricane pilots of No. 601 Squadron, scrambled from Tangmere to intercept what they thought would be a single aircraft. The controllers of Nos. 10 and 11 Groups sent off more fighters. None intercepted until the Stukas were bombing.
Being up-sun from the Germans, the 601 Squadron Hurricanes exploited the situation by diving on the Stukas and shooting down two before the Me 110s could intervene. A running battle developed.
Luftflotte 3’s next raid did not come as such a surprise. Radar warned of a big attack and No. 601 were again sent forward to intercept. As predicted, the Hurricanes found twelve He 111s escorted by twelve Me 110s over the Isle of Wight heading for Portsmouth.
The Hurricanes split into two sections, the first to tackle the bombers and the other to climb and take on the fighters. In confused fighting the Luftwaffe lost eleven aircraft during the day and the R.A.F. four in the course of 432 sorties. At night 30 bombers raided Portsmouth, killing nine and injuring fifty.
July 12th
Day Attacks on convoy off Norfolk-Suffolk coast, shipping off the Isle of Wight and Aberdeen.
Night South Wales and Bristol areas.
Weather Mainly cloudy with early-morning fog in the Channel. Thunderstorms in many districts.
Formation of early-morning fog in the Channel hampered the Germans, and until 8.50 a.m. activity was slight. Several plots were then picked up heading for the convoys ‘Agent’, off North Foreland, and ‘Booty’, twelve miles north-east of Orfordness.
The heavier attack was aimed at ‘Booty’, and sections from Nos. 242,17,85 and 264 squadrons were scrambled by No. 12 Group to cover the convoy. No. 151 Squadron from No. 11 Group intercepted.
During the fighting over Dunkirk at the end of May and the offensive patrols in June/July the R.A.F. committed its Spitfire force for the first time. This Spitfire of 64 Squadron crashed in a beet field in France, providing a source of particular interest for locally based Luftwaffe personnel
An overshoot during the Battle. A Hurricane of 56 Squadron ends up in a hedge on the Epping road after attempting a landing at North Weald in July
Early in July Fighter Command intelligence reports noted that Ju 87 dive bombers had appeared off Portland carrying long-range fuel tanks under the wings to extend their radius of action. The two long-range Stukas shown here were from III/St.G.2 ‘Immelmann’. Use of long range tanks, however, made no difference to the fate of the Ju 87 in the Battle as, due to heavy losses, the type was withdrawn in August
Later that morning No. 603 Squadron shot down a He 111 belonging to 2./KG26 off Aberdeen, and during the afternoon several more German aircraft were destroyed—among them one off the Isle of Wight. Poor visibility made interceptions difficult and by nightfall these had become impossible. German losses by midnight totalled eight. In the course of 670 sorties the R.A.F. lost six.
The death of two pilots in the seaplane engagement on the 11th had brought No. 54 Squadron’s casualties up to six killed and two injured in ten days. The squadron was now down to twelve pilots and eight aircraft, thirteen Spitfires having been lost or damaged in that time.
Before Dunkirk, squadron strengths averaged seventeen pilots. The lull throughout June had enabled most units to train pilots and give newly appointed section leaders an opportunity to obtain experience. Even at this early stage some squadrons were beginning to run short of pilots.
The need for additional fighter pilots was fully realised by Flying Training Command. As early as June the A.O.C.-in-C, Air Marshal L. A. Pattinson, said the command’s ‘…. main contribution to the defence of this country is the maximum training output up to the required standards, and that some risks in local defence must be faced in order to meet the main responsibility’.
To the Luftwaffe, who had started serious planning for an all-out assault on Britain only on July 11th, British defences were still an unknown quantity, and it was to probe these defences and train new crews, particularly in navigation, that the Germans increased their activities at night. They were to encounter difficulties.
R.A.F. intelligence had found out before the war that the Germans were using normal broadcasting stations as navigational beacons. All the B.B.C.’s transmitters in Britain were in or near target areas, so a system of synchronising their transmissions was worked out to confuse or deny the Luftwaffe navigators the bearings they needed.
As soon as the operations room at Fighter Command saw that a hostile aircraft had got to within reach of good bearing from a transmitter, the B.B.C. were warned and that station was closed down. Broadcasting services were not interrupted, however. Transmissions were continued by the other stations in the particular group concerned.
In the event of all but one station in a group being closed down, the remaining station was also closed and broadcasting was continued on alternative frequencies used by other groups or stations. Thus, unless hostile aircraft were inside relatively restricted areas broadcasting could continue. Under war conditions the scheme was entirely successful and the Germans were unable to use the B.B.C.’s broadcasting stations as beacons.
July 13th
Day Shipping attacks off Dover and Portland.
Night Minelaying in Thames Estuary.
Weather Early-morning fog in southern England clearing by mid-morning.
British sea power, one of Germany’s major problems in launching Operation Sealion without air superiority. Here the Royal Sovereign class 15-inch gun battleship H.M.S. Revenge is seen, on August 5th, 1940, escorting a special fast convoy from America carrying arms and supplies to Britain. The photograph was taken from a Sunderland flying boat of No. 210 Squadron. As the threat of invasion grew during the summer, Revenge was transferred south to Plymouth
Before the battle Park and Brand expressed the view that once the Germans began their offensive it would be as much as they could do to provide enough planes to guard the convoys. The first three days confirmed their fears.
Dowding resisted the temptation to strengthen the south-east sectors at the expense of the others, foreseeing that to do so would invite a flank attack he would be ill prepared to meet. Such changes as he did make were designed chiefly to strengthen the West Country and No. 11 Group’s right flank rather than its more obviously threatened centre. Thus he moved No. 152 Squadron with Spitfires from Acklington, Northumberland, to Middle Wallop, Hampshire, on July 12th, and a flight of No. 247 Squadron’s Gladiators from Sumburgh in the Shetland Islands to Roborough, Devon, on July 18th.
Roborough, a small grass airfield on the outskirts of Plymouth, was too small for Spitfires and Hurricanes, but it was no problem to the biplane Gladiators whose main task was the local defence of Plymouth.
Park and Brand therefore had to make do with what they had—Park with seven Spitfire, thirteen Hurricane and three Blenheim squadrons, Brand with two Spitfire and two Hurricane squadrons and a flight of Gladiators directed from No. 10 Group’s new headquarters at Rudloe Manor, Box, Wiltshire, inaugurated on this day.
German generals had by now reached Berchtesgaden to confer with Hitler who was still baffled by the British. Wrote General Haider in his diary: ‘The Führer is obsessed with the question why England does not want to take the road to peace.’
Hitler, he said, was reluctant to smash Britain because it would lead to the disintegration of the Empire which would benefit America, Japan and other countries at a cost to them only of German blood.
That evening Hitler wrote to Mussolini, declining the Duce’s offer to send Italian troops and aircraft for the invasion of Britain.
Pressure on the two groups was much reduced on the 13th owing to a deterioration in the weather. German bombers were, however, out after shipping, and two convoys were attacked off Harwich. There were two air engagements off Dover in which the Germans claimed two Spitfires and six Hurricanes and admitted the loss of five. In fact one British fighter was destroyed while the Germans lost seven aircraft including a FW 200 of I/KG40. At this time pilots reported being fired on by ‘old and dirty’ Hurricanes which bore no roundels or lettering and had two blade wooden airscrews. No official records exist but it is possible that the Luftwaffe used one or two Belgian Hurricanes repaired after the fighting in May.
July 14th
Day Shipping attacks off Dover and Swanage.
Night Bristol area, Isle of Wight, Kent and Suffolk raided.
Weather Fair all day.
Waiting for the call to scramble, a group of pilots from 610 ‘County of Chester’ Squadron at Biggin Hill in late July
German forces attacked the airfield at Ramsgate and a convoy off Dover. To the west, a destroyer off Swanage was ineffectually bombed, and during the afternoon an attack was directed against the convoy ‘Bread’. The Germans inflicted some damage on the convoy, which was guarded by a No. 11 Group patrol. Fighter Command tried to counter every incursion and flew 593 sorties in the attempt. Four Hurricanes were lost in a fight off Deal. German losses totalled two.
Two days had now elapsed since the Heinkel seaplane had been forced down and beached near Deal. The Government decided that they could not recognise the right of He 59s to bear the Red Cross, since it was prpbable that the planes were being used to report movements of British convoys. On the 14th British pilots were instructed to shoot them down.
July 15th
Day Shipping attacked off Norfolk coast and the Channel. Yeovil bombed.
Night Minelaying.
Weather Low cloud.
Each day German reconnaissance planes would fly at least two patrols, but thé use to which the information was put leads to the conclusion that the Germans had too much faith in their intelligence efficiency. Had they fully reconnoitred the airfields, aircraft factories and other vital targets in Britain in July and August they would have been able to concentrate more of their attacks on important objectives instead of wasting time on training stations like Detling.
The British, on the other hand, owed their small but efficient Photographic Reconnaissance Unit to the brilliant work of a few individuals like the adventurous and unorthodox Mr. F. S. Cotton. Based at Heston, Middlesex, the P.R.U. was equipped with special high-altitude Spitfires as well as other aircraft, including Lockheed Hudsons. These planes ranged over the whole of the German-held coastal areas from Spain to Norway. Between July and October the Photographic Reconnaissance Unit flew over 600 sorties for a loss of only seven Spitfires.
Luftwaffe activity on this Monday morning was devoted entirely to reconnaissance. Alerted to some intense shipping movements in the Channel, however, II Fliegerkorps decided to brave the low cloud and heavy rain. They sent fifteen Do 17s of KG2 into action.
The Dorniers reached the convoy ‘Pilot’ at 2.13 p.m., but their attacks were thwarted by Hurricanes of Nos. 56 and 151 Squadrons. The Hurricanes did not score.
While the Dorniers were busy in the Channel a small force of Luftflotte 3 bombers flew to the Westland Aircraft Works at Yeovil, Somerset, and other targets in the west of England and Wales. A hangar and the runway at Yeovil were slightly damaged. Bombs also fell on the railway at Avonmouth and on the airfield at St. Athan.
The R.A.F. flew 449 sorties and lost a Hurricane from No. 213 Squadron.
Pilot Officer Holland of No. 92 Squadron attacked a Ju 88 and used all his ammunition trying to shoot it down. All he would claim on returning to Pembrey was a ‘probable’. II/LG1 lost a Ju 88 in that area.
A Heinkel 59 seaplane high and dry on the beach at Deal after being forced down by 54 Squadron on July 11th. The seaplane had a strong escort of Me 109s and a running fight ensued with losses to both sides. The British Government refused to grant immunity to these seaplanes when operating in the battle area.
Right A German pilot being rescued by an He 59 from a Seenotflug Kdo. based on Cherbourg. He 59s operating along the north-east Channel coast bore red cross markings and civil registrations, while those farther west were camouflaged and bore Luftwaffe unit codes and call signs
The Germans lost three machines altogether, including a He 111 of 2./KG26 off the Scottish coast.
July 16th
Day Very little activity.
Night Minelaying off the north-east coast.
Weather Fog in northern France, the Straits and south-east England.
In his ‘Directive No. 16’ Hitler said of the invasion: ‘The landing operation must be a surprise crossing on a broad front. …’
As with all his plans, the Führer chose to ignore the obvious—that a clandestine crossing of the Channel was impossible. Or did his statement reflect Göring’s conviction that the R.A.F. would be destroyed before the invasion fleet set sail?
Charred and battered wreckage is all that remains of a Dornier 17 after being shot down near Portisham, Dorset, early in July 1940
Later on the 16th the weather cleared sufficiently to release a few aircraft. Again they went for shipping, and again the R.A.F. attempted to beat them off. It was not until 4 p.m. that the first successful interception took place—twenty-five miles east of Fraser-burgh, Scotland, where an He 111 of III/KG26 was shot down. Two hours later No. 601 Squadron from Tangmere destroyed a Ju 88. It went into the Solent where the.one surviving member of the crew took to a dinghy.
Fighter Command flew 313 sorties and lost two aircraft. German losses totalled five.
July 17th
Day Search for shipping off Scottish and east coasts.
Night Targets attacked in south-west. Minelaying.
Weather Dull with occasional rain.
Early reconnaissance patrols were impeded by the weather but it cleared sufficiently later for operations against shipping to begin.
The scale of these operations was small. Fighter Command flew 253 sorties, during which one fighter was lost and Ju 88 and an He 111 were shot down.
By nightfall Fliegerdivision IX minelayers were flying to the Thames Estuary, Cardiff and Swansea.
In Germany the Army High Command allocated the forces for Sealöwe and ordered thirteen picked divisions to embarkation points on the Channel coast for the first wave of the invasion. The Army Command completed detailed plans for a broad front landing on the south coast of England. General von Brauchitsch told Admiral Raeder the whole operation would be relatively easy and over in a month.
July 18th
Day Shipping off south and east coasts attacked.
Night Very little activity.
Weather Occasional rain in southern districts. Straits of Dover cloudy. Cool.
Sporadic raids against the Channel ports and shipping kept Fighter Command busy. Only one major dog-fight developed—off Deal, where fifteen Spitfires engaged twenty-eight Me 109s. Three British fighters were destroyed in the course of the day, but two Ju 88s, one Do 17 and a Me 109 were lost to the Germans. Between 11 a.m. and 1 p.m. the coastguard station at. St. Margaret’s Bay was bombed and the Goodwin lightship sunk.
Pilots of No. 32 Squadron take a breather between patrols at Hawkinge on July 31st, 1940. In the background one of the squadron’s Hurricanes
In the north No. 232 Hurricane Squadron stationed at Wick detached a flight to Sumburgh in the Shetlands to replace No. 247 Squadron Gladiators sent to Plymouth.
This was not in the general sense a busy day but for one pilot a lot was involved. In a letter from Middle Wallop, Flight Lieutenant Howell wrote:
Bags of excitement here—almost too much. The other day [July 18], Red Section was sent up to 18,00 over Portland. It was a mucky day, and we had to go up through two layers of cloud. Control gave us a bearing to fly on and said that we ought to meet a jerry, possibly two which were in the vicinity. He had hardly finished speaking when out of the cloud loomed a Ju 88. Whoopee! I told Nos. 2 and 3 to look out for enemy fighters while I made an almost head on attack at it. I don’t think he liked that one little bit because he turned over and went split arse for the sea, releasing four large bombs, and doing over 350 m.p.h. I got in another attack, and got his port motor. I was going to do a third when I saw the other chaps screaming down at him. So I let them have a go being a generous chap! Just then I smelt a nasty smell! An ’orrid smell! I looked at the dials and things, and saw that the coolant temperature was right off the clock—about 180°c, and the oil temperature at 95° and going up. The bugger had shot me in the radiator! White fumes began pouring back into the cockpit, so I thought that that was not really good enough. The poor old motor began to seize up, groaning pitifully. I called up Bandy and said ‘Hello Bandy Control, Red 1 calling—I am going to bale out 4 miles off Poole!’ The silly C at the other end of course couldn’t hear me and asked me to repeat. Bah. Still, I still had 5,000 feet so I told him again and wished him a very good afternoon, and stepped smartly from the aircraft.
I read something somewhere about pulling a ripcord so had a grope—found same—pulled same, and sat up with a jerk but with no damage to the important parts.
Everything was lovely—quiet as a church, a lovely day— a spot of sun—3 ships 2 miles away who would be bound to see me! Found myself still holding the handle, so flung it away— chucked my helmet away but kept the goggles! Undid my shoes, blew up my Mae West, and leaned back and admired the scenery. The water quite suddenly came very close—a swish, and then I began my final swim of the season. I set out with a lusty crawl for Bournemouth, thinking I might shoot a hell of a line staggering up the beach with beauteous barmaids dashing down the beach with bottles of brandy—instead the current was taking me out to sea, and I was unceremoniously hauled on board a 12 ft. motorboat. Still the Navy pushed out a boat and the half tumbler of whisky went down with a rush!
July 19th
Day Dover raided. Defiant squadron largely destroyed.
Night Some activity between Isle of Wight and Plymouth, Thames Estuary and Harwich.
Weather Showery with bright intervals in most cases. Channel winds light—fair.
No. 141 Squadron, newly arrived from Edinburgh with their Defiant two-seater turret-fighters took off from Hawkinge on their first patrol at 12.32. They were assigned to a height of 5,000 feet on a line south of Folkestone.
Dover under fire on July 29th, 1940. Ju 87s can be seen banking away after dropping their bombs on the convoy in the harbour. The sky is peppered with bursting anti-aircraft shells
The nine Defiants had not long been airborne when they were attacked by twenty Me 109s diving out of the sun. Within minutes five Defiants had gone into the Channel. A sixth crashed at Dover. The remaining three would have shared the same fate but for the timely intervention of No. 111 Squadron with Hurricanes.
The Germans claimed twelve Defiants shot down. They lost one Me 109 in the engagement. The remains of No. 141 were removed to Prestwick, in Ayrshire, where they could still do good work against unescorted bombers. The other Defiant squadron, No. 264, moved temporarily to Kirton-in-Lindsey and then to Ringway for the defence of Manchester.
Inexplicably, No. 264 was later sent to the Horn-church sector and for a few days was in the thick of the day fighting.
Radar warned of a big gathering of aircraft over Calais at 4 p.m. on the 19th. Dover was their objective, and Nos. 64, 32 and 74 squadrons were scrambled to intercept. Outnumbered nearly two to one, the thirty-five British fighters did not score.
Fighter Command was more heavily committed than ever before; 701 sorties were flown. Total losses for the day were eight machines. The Germans lost two— a reconnaissance Do 17 and a He 111 bomber—the ratio of victories contributing to German confidence as Hitler made his ‘last appeal to reason’ speech at the Reichstag.
During the battle Göring confers with, left the Commander of Luftflotte 3, Generalfeldmarschall Hugo Sperrle and centre, the Commander of Luftflotte 2, Generalfeldmarschall Kesselring
July 20th
Day Convoys and shipping at Dover attacked.
Night Widespread minelaying from the Needles, Isle of Wight, to Land’s End; Bristol Channel and eastern coastal waters.
Weather Occasional thunderstorms. Straits of Dover cloudy clearing to bright intervals.
There was now so much activity around Dover that it was beginning to get the nickname ‘Hellfire Corner’.
In the afternoon a convoy appeared off Dover guarded by two sections of No. 32 Squadron Hurricanes taking turns at escort duty. At 5.40 p.m. it was attacked by Stukas escorted by Me 109s. Two Hurricanes were lost and two damaged.
An hour later forty-eight Messerschmitts clashed with about forty Hurricanes and Spitfires. There was again a lively engagement.
In operations round Britain the R.A.F. lost three and the Germans nine. The Luftwaffe losses included five Me 109s, a Ju 88, a Do 17 and a four-engined FW200, the latter north of Ireland.
The following was the strength of the Luftwaffe on July 20th:
LUFTFLOTTEN 2 AND 3
LUFTFLOTTE 5
KG 40 of Luftflotten 2 and 3 is not included but of its eleven planes only two were serviceable for mine-laying. KGr. 100 with twelve serviceable aircraft out of forty-two is also not included. Though subordinated to Luftflotte 2 it had moved out of the area.
July 21st
Day Raids on Convoys in Channel and Straits of Dover.
Night Targets chiefly at Merseyside.
Weather Fine and fair early, clouding over during the morning. Fair in the evening.
The morning of the 21st followed the usual pattern until after 9 a.m. when three British squadrons intercepted twenty German planes over the convoy ‘Peewit’. An Me 109 was shot down.
Later a Hawker Hector biplane was shot down by a Me 109 which, in turn, was destroyed by No. 238 Squadron.
The shattered cockpit of a Dornier 17Z from KG77 which careered across a hop field at Marden, Kent, after a raid on July 3rd, 1940. Altogether the R.A.F. shot down seven Dornier 17s from KG77 on this day
Fighter Command sorties numbered 571, and their losses six. German losses totalled seven.
Control rooms were largely dependent on the W.A.A.F. In the heat of battle they were brave and their services were invaluable.
When the fighting began to get tough and the language of the pilots started to match it, senior officers tried moving the girls beyond earshot of the control room loud-speakers. It was not idle swearing, however, but the voices of men fighting for their lives. The girls refused to leave their jobs and said they did not mind the language as much as the men thought.
July 22nd
Day Shipping off the south coast attacked.
Night Minelaying the whole length of eastern seaboard.
Weather Straits fair; Channel cloudy. Light westerly winds in both. Bright intervals between showers in the east.
Although British fighters flew 611 sorties, hostile aircraft were elusive and in the course of the day only one was shot down. The score was even.
At Wick, Sea Gladiators of No. 804 Squadron Fleet Air Arm flew their first Battle of Britain sortie under the control of No. 13 Group.
July 23rd
Day East coast shipping raided.
Night Minelaying from Dover to the Tyne and Forth Estuary.
Weather Slight haze in Straits of Dover. Cloudy with occasional rain in other districts.
With prospects of a hard fight ahead, a new situation had arisen as a result of the abolition of the western approaches and the transfer of the country’s main trade artery to the North Channel. The result of this (Dowding said in a letter to the Chief of the Air Staff) was that convoys would be navigating around the entire coast of Great Britain.
During the winter months, when it would only be necessary to protect convoys on the east coast, the resources of Fighter Command would be strained to the limit in providing standing patrols, even at section strength for these convoys.
At that time, attacks were made by one or two bombers at the most and a section was an ample escort.
It was the policy for the Germans to attack convoys with strong formations of bombers escorted by fighters whenever possible. Defensive measures had to be on a much larger scale if they were not to have sections frequently overwhelmed by sudden attacks in greatly superior numbers.
Bearing in mind the fact that enemy bombers were active almost every night and that units were detailed in every sector for night flying, it appeared that three squadrons per sector were about the minimum requirement to safeguard the passage of convoys off the east coast of England, and that this number would be inadequate north of the Tay and west of the Isle of Wight.
Dowding had about twenty sectors, not counting Northolt, Sumburgh and Coltishall (the latter because he was already counting the sectors behind); and on this, basis he should have had about sixty squadrons to cover the coast from the Orkneys to the north shore of the Bristol Channel.
R.A.F. Hornchurch, June 1940. Flight Lt. ‘Al’ Deere, a New Zealander of 54 Squadron, receives a well-merited Distinguished Flying Cross from King George VI. Next to the King stands Air Chief Marshal Dowding, A.O.C.-in-C. Fighter Command. Al Deere survived an extraordinary number of incidents and crashes and finally retired from the R.A.F. as an Air Commodore
While the R.A.F. was fighting in the skies above, the call to civilians on the ground was for scrap aluminium to build more aircraft. Here is A.R.P. post C 2/3 at Canterbury in July, collecting pots and pans of all shapes and sizes
He had now to expand from St. David’s Head to Greenock besides meeting a possible demand for five squadrons in Ireland.
In addition to the above, he could not afford to distribute his squadrons evenly along the front but had to keep some extra strength in the neighbourhood of London to guard against the possibility of invasion in East Anglia or Kent.
It became obvious, then, that the creation of new squadrons should be pressed on with as rapidly as possible to guard against the possibility of invasion.
The Admiralty, said Dowding, had to co-operate with him if any but casual protection was to be afforded to the convoys. They had to start their journeys at definite times and channels had to be swept as close as possible to the coast-lines.
Since it was impossible for some time to be strong everywhere he would have to consider some form of additional mobility within groups so that a sector opposite whose front a convoy was travelling at any time might be temporarily strengthened for the occasion.
The Air Council in session at the Air Ministry, London, in July 1940. Round the top of the table, from left to right: Air Marshal Sir Christopher Courtney (Air Member for Supply and Organisation), Air Marshal E. L. Gossage (Air Member for Personnel), Captain H. H. Balfour (Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Air), Sir Archibald Sinclair (Secretary of State for Air), Air Chief Marshal Sir Cyril Nezvall (Chief of Air Staff), Sir Arthur Street (Permanent Under Secretary) and Air Chief Marshal Sir Wilfred Freeman (Air Member for Development and Production)
German activity during this day was reduced. Concentration being centred on shipping off the east coast. Fighter Command flew 470 sorties and destroyed three enemy machines at no cost to itself.
July 24th
Day Convoys and shipping in the Channel attacked.
Night Nil.
Weather Channel and Straits of Dover cloudy. Coastal and hill fog in western districts spreading east. Rain in most districts.
A sudden break in the weather brought a co-ordinated attack by two bomber formations heavily escorted by fighters—the first against a convoy steaming into the Thames Estuary, and the other against one off Dover.
It was 8.15 a.m. when No. 54 Squadron were scrambled from Rochford. They climbed to 20,000 feet and were just about to intercept the first raid when Deere, leading Red Section, was warned of the second
This formation [he said], the largest I had seen up to that time, consisted of about 18 Dorniers protected by a considerable number of escort fighters weaving and criss-crossing above and behind the bombers. I reported the unpleasant facts to control and requested immediate assistance.
Heavily outnumbered, the squadron split—half taking on one raid, the other half taking on the next. In the fierce fighting one pilot was killed.
There were several more engagements that day and at the end of it eight German and three British aircraft were destroyed. Fighter Command flew 561 sorties.
Among the targets attacked in Britain that day was Brooklands. A Ju 88 circled it for seven minutes, and then, after lowering its undercarriage, followed several friendly machines going in to land. The moment it was over the airfield buildings it dropped twelve bombs and flew off. Despite the ruse, there was surprisingly little damage.
While only five French pilots took part in the Battle of Britain the Free French Air Force was beginning to appear at St. Athan, Wales. There, a number of French pilots were given clearance to keep in practice with the aircraft in which they had escaped from France, subject to British markings being carried and the planes being painted yellow underneath. The aircraft were two Potez 63, three Dewoitine D 520s, three Caudron Simoun, a Caudron 440 and a Farman F222.
July 25th
Day Convoys and shipping in the Channel raided.
Night Minelaying in Firth of Forth and Thames Estuary. Reconnaissance over Bristol and Channel area.
Weather Fine day with haze in the Straits of Dover. Winds north-westerly and light.
The Luftwaffe concentrated again on shipping and in one attack sank five small vessels and damaged another five in the same convoy. The bombers numbered about sixty and they co-ordinated their efforts with nine E-boats which were engaged by the British destroyers Boreas and Brilliant.
The two destroyers were dive-bombed and one had to be towed into Dover.
Because the Germans were operating from bases close to their objectives, they were much better placed than the defending squadrons to concentrate their planes above any target, for the British fighters had to rely on continuous patrols in small numbers to find the enemy before calling for reinforcements. These patrols invariably attacked on their own without waiting for help which took some time to arrive.
Fighter Command squadrons flew 641 sorties on the 25th, and destroyed sixteen raiders and lost seven fighters. A curious claim in German records was for a French Breguet 690!
During the night of July 25th–26th mines were laid along the south and east coasts. One raid penetrated to the Forth Bridge and some bombs were dropped in raids on northern Scotland.
July 26th
Day Shipping off south coast attacked.
Night Minelaying in Thames Estuary and off Norfolk coast. Bristol area.
Weather Heavy cloud with rain and poor visibility.
Fliegerkorps VIII took the initiative with attacks on shipping near the Isle of Wight. Two of the convoy raiders were shot down near Portland in the course of 581 sorties by British fighter planes. Two British planes were destroyed. The motor lifeboats Rosa Woodd and Phyllis Lunn went out after survivors of three steamers sunk in the Channel.
The pattern of German flying during the night pointed to mine-laying in the Thames Estuary, Norfolk and the Bristol Channel.
July 27th
Day Raids on shipping and naval units in Dover harbour and Straits.
Night Attacks on south-west England.
Weather Fair Straits, cloudy in Channel. Slight rain in the midlands and the North Sea.
Richthofen’s Fliegerkorps started operations at 9.45 a.m. with an attack on a convoy off Swanage. Simultaneously two convoys off the estuary and Harwich were bombed. The destroyer H.M.S. Wren was sunk.
In two attacks on Dover four high-explosive bombs dropped on the harbour and five fell on the barracks. In the second attack the destroyer Codrington was hit. A second destroyer was sunk off the east coast and another was damaged, with the result that the Admiralty applied the policy of withdrawing the target. Dover was abandoned as an advanced base for anti-invasion destroyers which relieved Fighter Command of the burden of protecting them. This meant, however, that the defence of the Straits now depended more than ever on the R.A.F. One of the Dover attacks was carried out by six Me 109Es carrying bombs on centre-section racks. This was the first report of 109s being used in this role.
German attacks on Dover were becoming so serious that the Air Ministry issued special instructions to Fighter Command to engage them approaching the port with superior forces whenever possible. To secure this concentration in the south-east meant increasing the number of squadrons to twenty-eight and making more use of Hawkinge and Manston.
Accidents were putting a strain on the repair organisation. To reduce them Dowding ordered the posting of two flying disciplinary flight lieutenants to each station to keep an eye on aircraft handling. At the same time he ordered that pilots were not only to take physical exercise, but to take at least eight hours off a day and twenty-four hours’ leave a week.
Early that afternoon Belfast was raided and at about 6 p.m. planes were reported near Wick and Plymouth. The weather deteriorated to such an extent in the southeast of England, however, that those fighters protecting the convoy ‘Agent’ had to be recalled. Nine Thames barrage balloons were struck by lightning.
During the night several raids were flown over the Bristol Channel and there was some minelaying between Portland and the Lizard, and along the east coast.
By midnight British fighters had flown 496 sorties and destroyed four raiders at a cost of one fighter.
July 28th
Day Shipping attacked off Dover and south coast ports.
Night Minelaying from Thames Estuary to Humber. Scattered raiders over England and Wales.
Weather Fine early. Fair for the rest of the day, clouding over in the evening.
Luftwaffe activity was mainly confined to the Channel and east coasts. At 12 a.m. a large raid set course for Dover, but it turned back when halfway across the Straits and dispersed. At 2 p.m. more than 100 machines approached and were engaged by No. 11 Group in the Straits. There were fifty fighters and fifty bombers in the formation. No bombs were dropped.
Four No. 11 Group squadrons were involved in harassing the Germans—Nos. 74, 41, 257 and 111. They lost four Hurricanes. Fighter Command flew 758 sorties and shot down fifteen. Five British planes were destroyed during the day.
German minelaying aircraft were so active during the night that it was impossible to distinguish all the tracks in the operations room. Other raiders were plotted at Nottingham, Edinburgh, Perth, the Tyne, Newcastle-under-Lyme, Hungerford, Manchester, the Mersey and Plymouth. Some bombs were dropped but with little effect.
July 29th
Day Convoy off Dover raided.
Night Activity on reduced scale over land.
Weather Fair all over Britain. Thames Estuary and Dover hazy.
After weeks of deliberation over an He 59 Red Cross seaplane forced down, on July 1st off Hartlepool, the Air Ministry issued this communiqué:
… enemy aircraft bearing civil markings and marked with the Red Cross have recently flown over British ships at sea and in the vicinity of the British coast, and that they are being employed for purposes which His Majesty’s Government cannot regard as being consistent with the privileges generally accorded to the Red Cross.
His Majesty’s Government desire to. accord to ambulance aircraft reasonable facilities for the transportation of the sick and wounded, in accordance with the Red Cross Convention, and aircraft engaged in the direct evacuation of the sick and wounded will be respected, provided that they comply with the relevant provisions of the Convention.
A line-up of Spitfires of No. 65 Squadron at Hornchurch in July 1940. The censor of the period has scratched out the serial number of the first aircraft in the line to avoid identification by German intelligence
His Majesty’s Government are unable, however, to grant immunity to such aircraft flying over areas in which operations are in progress on land or at sea, or approaching British or Allied territory, or territory in British occupation, or British or Allied ships.
Ambulance aircraft which do not comply with the above requirements will do so at their own risk and peril.
The first indication of a raid showed on radar at 10.20 a.m. It was intended to surprise Dover. No. 11 Group controllers were quick off the mark, however, the thirty Stukas and fifty Me 109s being intercepted at levels from 5,000 to 15,000 feet before they could line up for an accurate bombing run.
The fighting was fierce and it was made the more dangerous for the British pilots by the heavy antiaircraft fire of the Dover gunners who, however, hit two Stukas.
At 5 p.m. twenty raiders attacked near Harwich. Seventy-four fighters scrambled to intercept but only No. 151 Squadron engaged. The Germans lost six machines for a loss by the British of three. Sorties flown by the R.A.F. numbered 758.
July 30th
Day Raids on convoys off Orfordness, Clacton and Harwich.
Night South Wales and midlands.
Weather Unsettled, with drizzle and low cloud.
Flying was largely restricted by the weather, but by noon the Germans were hunting in the Channel and the North Sea. At 11 a.m. Ju 88s attacked a convoy without success. Drizzle hampered R.A.F. efforts, but Fighter Command flew 688 sorties and shot down five German machines without loss. One of the raiders, a He 111, was destroyed by No. 603 Squadron north-east of Montrose.
July 31st
Day Widespread attacks on shipping in south, south-east and south-west coastal waters. Dover balloon barrage.
Night South Wales and Thames raided.
Weather Fair all over the country with temperatures slightly above average. Channel and Straits hazy.
Thick haze made flying for both air forces difficult. German aircraft attacked convoys at 11 a.m. At 12.50 p.m. the Luftwaffe was active with reconnaissance planes off the Lizard and between 1 and 4 p.m. flew a number of isolated raids over the North Sea. At 5 p.m. fifteen Me 109s went for Dover, and although five squadrons were sent after them only No. 74 was able to engage.
Fighter Command flew only 365 sorties, shot down five enemy machines and lost three themselves.
A large proportion of the night raiders were minelayers, and they operated in the Tyne, Humber, Harwich, Thames Estuary and Dover areas. Some scattered raids were flown against random targets in the south-east and East Anglia.
Throughout July the Germans probed and sparred with little achievement. They sank eighteen small steamers and four destroyers, and shot down 145 British fighters for the loss of 270 planes.
For the R.A.F. the planes lost were more than replaced by one week’s output from the factories. Only the shortage of pilots, who now numbered 1,434, gave cause for concern.
Hurricanes of No. 56 Squadron take off from North Weald for a patrol in July. Another aircraft from 56 stands at dispersal
So far as the system was concerned, July gave Fighter Command ample opportunity of putting it to the test. Experience produced confidence, but the defences were not yet fully tried in the face of a heavy onslaught.
August 1st
Day East and south coast shipping attacked.
Night South Wales and midlands targets. Minelaying in Thames Estuary and north-east Scottish coast.
Weather Fair in most districts with Straits and Channel overcast. Low cloud dispersing during the day. Warmer.
Shortly before 1 p.m. Church Fenton sector controllers were alerted to two plots approaching the east coast convoys ‘Agent’ and ‘Arena’. Nos. 616 and 607 Squadrons were scrambled and they intercepted a Do 17 and a Ju 88, but without definite results. Cloud base was down to 1,000 feet and this enabled the raiders to escape.
In the south a No. 145 Squadron section operating from Westhampnett, Sussex, intercepted two raids off Hastings and reported shooting down a Hs 126 and damaging a Ju 88. They lost a Hurricane and its pilot. Simultaneously an attack was developing on Norwich, where a factory, a timber yard and a goods yard were hit. Fire gutted the timber yard.
Minelayers were active again during the night and twelve raids were flown on targets as far apart as Bristol, Southend and Montrose.
In addition to carrying high explosives and incendiaries, planes raiding the West Country scattered Hitler’s ‘Last Appeal to Reason’, a turgid document printed on green-and-yellow paper. The German air crews could scarcely have chosen a less receptive readership, for the majority fell among the grazing cattle of Hampshire and Somerset.
Fighter Command squadrons flew 659 sorties and destroyed five hostile aircraft for the loss of one Hurricane. A sixth, shot down in the vicinity of Mablethorpe by a No. 12 Group plane, was later identified as a Battle belonging to No. 1 Group).
August 2nd
Day Shipping attacked in Channel and east coast.
Night South Wales and the midlands.
Weather Mainly fine in the north but cloudy in the east. Channel cloudy. Drizzle in Dover Straits.
After early-morning reconnaissance and weather sorties by German aircraft an east coast convoy was attacked and a trawler sunk. R.A.F. fighters intercepted several hostile raids in the course of 477 sorties but claimed no victories although four of the planes they damaged failed to reach home. No R.A.F. fighters were lost.
The steamship Highlander shot down two He 111s and steamed into Leith harbour with one of the victims on the deck.
Minelayers were active again during the night and eighty were plotted from the Orkneys to Dungeness, together with raids on the R.A.F. Technical College at Halton, the airfields of Catterick, Farnborough and Romford and the Forth Bridge.
August 3rd
Day Mainly shipping reconnaissance in Channel.
Night South Wales, with some raids continuing to Liverpool, Crewe and Bradford areas.
Weather Mainly dull with bright patches. Cloud base 4,000 feet. Visibility two to five miles.
Hostile activity in the morning was largely confined to shipping reconnaissance. Five raids developed in the south-west, but activity was slight except for the occasional pack of about a dozen aircraft over the Channel against which 415 sorties were flown by Fighter Command at no cost to themselves. Four German planes were destroyed in the twenty-four hours.
Minelayers were active again during the night and bombers from Luftflotte 5 attacked the Orkneys and the Firth of Forth. In the south a dozen raids were flown on Harwich, and six each were reported from the Tyne and the Humber. At Gravesend a bomb put an Observer Corps post out of action and incendiaries in Essex set fire to some cornfields.
One enterprising raider dropped a large bundle of leaflets to which was attached an explosive charge; the whole assembly fell in the right place—a sewage farm near Tonbridge.
August 4th
Day Reconnaissance along the south coast and Bristol Channel.
Night Little activity.
Weather Fine to fair early. Cloudy with bright intervals at midday, clearing in the evening.
Sunday, August 4th, gave Fighter Command a respite. A few reconnaissance sorties were flown over the Channel and as far as the west of England, but otherwise the R.A.F. had little to contend with in the course of 261 sorties during which neither side scored.
August 5th
Day Shipping in Straits attacked.
Night Minelaying between the Wash and the Tay.
Weather Temperatures high. Fine with slight haze in the Channel.
In a sharp clash with Spitfires of No. 65 Squadron on patrol over the Straits of Dover a German aircraft was destroyed at 8 a.m.
The squadron was four miles from Calais when the leader caught sight of five Me 109s. Going straight in to the attack, he fired a burst at one Messerschmitt which went straight into the sea. The next 109 hit was last seen heading for the coast with smoke pouring from it, while the third left a trail of debris from the port wing as it headed for France.
At 2 p.m. No. 41 Squadron with Spitfires and No. 151 Squadron with Hurricanes engaged between thirty and forty Germans hunting for shipping in the Channel. Because of the haze the interception was only partially successful, but a Me 109 went down in the fighting.
A typical summer scene at a fighter airfield in 1940. Pilots of 92 Squadron relax on the grass at Bibury, a station in Nl. 10 Group. The pilot on the left is Flight Lt. C. B. F. Kingcombe. In the background is a Spitfire with the trolley accumulator plugged in
Fighter Command flew 402 sorties. Six German planes were destroyed for one British machine.
August 6th
Day Little activity.
Night Minelaying off east and south-east coasts.
Weather Generally cloudy with fairly strong winds. Cloud ceiling 3,000 to 5,000 feet.
Only seven hostile planes reached the English coast although there was some activity in the Channel against which Fighter Command flew 416 sorties. The score at the end of the day was even at one all, although the only German aircraft lost, an Arado 196 of 1./196, was accidentally wrecked.
August 7th
Day Convoy reconnaissances. Convoy off Cromer attacked.
Night Widespread raids from Thames Estuary to Aberdeen and from Poole, Dorset, to Land’s End and Liverpool.
Weather Mainly fair with cloud and thunderstorms in eastern districts. South-eastern districts cloudy. Winds variable.
In the light of subsequent events it is not surprising that German operations were so light, and why they were largely confined during the daylight hours of August 7th to convoy reconnaissance. Preparations were being made for Adlerangriff. Fighter Command squadrons flew 393 sorties, destroying four hostile planes at no cost to themselves.
Broadcasting to the German people on this day, General Sander hinted at the measures to be taken against Britain and indicated that the main weapon would be the bomber. The dawn of Adler Tag was near.
Improvised land defence against invasions.
While the R.A.F. fought its battle in the air, frantic efforts were being made on the ground, in England, to repel the expected invasion.
Ancient armoured vehicles of all types reappeared from sheds and museums. On the Wool–Dorchester Road the vast one and only ‘Independent’ heavy tank prototype patrolled back and forth; Rolls Royce, Peerless, Crossley and Lanchester armoured cars appeared at many places; at R.A.F. South Cerney, an original ‘Little Willie’ from World War I provided some measure of airfield defence.
Probably the most unusual ‘runner’ of the period was a World War I Mk. IV tank presented by the Tank Corps to the Royal Naval Gunnery School, H.M.S. ‘Excellent’, at Whale Island in 1919. Ever-enterprising, the staff refitted the tank, loaded it with naval 6-pounder ammunition and mounted a Lewis gun on the after hatch. They hoisted the White Ensign over it and. the monster went into service as part of ‘Excellent’s’ R.N. Battalion in the defence of Portsmouth. The vehicle can still be seen to this day in full working order.
The photographs show the following:- A typical scene by a British country road in 1940; an A.13 2-pounder gun cruiser tank of the 2nd Royal Tank Regiment with branches for camouflage.
Originally someone’s ‘pride and joy’! A 1934 Alvis ‘Speed 20’ after it had been doctored by the King’s Lynn Home Guard. The chicken-wire-lined ‘roof’ was designed to keep out enemy hand grenades.
Old heavy guns of many calibres were mounted for anti-invasion defence in 1940. Here is a 9.2 inch on a fully mobile railway mounting at Ashford, Kent. Originally these guns had been used by the Royal Garrison Artillery 1915–1918. The final mobile force of 9.2’s in the south east totalled 26 guns.
The remarkably ugly A.11 Matilda 1 heavy tank. Despite being slow, cumbersome and armed only with a machine gun, its armour was so thick that no anti-tank gun of the period could penetrate it. The Matilda Mk. 2 with a 2-pounder gun was also available in small numbers in 1940.
At first sight a street in Chicago during prohibition, but in fact a Home Guard-modified Railton Terr aplane motor car at Maidenhead, Berkshire. In the sunshine roof is a Home Guard with an American Ross rifle while similar weapons protrude from the side windows.
Between 1939 and 1940 some 40 armoured trains were produced for coast protection. They were improvised out of goods wagons and boiler plate. The standard pattern, as here, mounted light machine guns and a 6-pounder Hotchkiss gun taken from a World War I tank.
|
13 GROUP, |
||
|
HEADQUARTERS NEWCASTLE |
||
|
Wick |
||
|
3 |
Hurricane |
Wick |
|
504 |
Hurricane |
Castletown |
|
232 |
Hurricane |
Sumburgh (1 Flight only) |
|
Dyce |
||
|
603 |
Spitfire |
A Flight Dyce |
|
Turnhouse |
||
|
605 |
Hurricane |
Drem |
|
232 |
Hurricane |
Turnhouse |
|
253 |
Hurricane |
Turnhouse |
|
141 |
Defiant |
Prestwick |
|
Usworth |
||
|
79 |
Spitfire |
Acklington (operational by day only) |
|
607 |
Hurricane |
Usworth |
|
72 |
Spitfire |
Acklington |
|
Catterick |
||
|
219 |
Blenheim |
Catterick |
|
Aldergrove |
||
|
245 |
Hurricane |
Aldergrove |
|
12 GROUP, |
||
|
HEADQUARTERS WATNALL |
||
|
Church Fenton |
||
|
73 |
Hurricane |
Church Fenton |
|
249 |
Hurricane |
Church Fenton |
|
616 |
Spitfire |
Leconfield |
|
Kirton-in-Lindsey |
||
|
222 |
Spitfire |
Kirton-in-Lindsey |
|
264 |
Defiant |
Kirton-in-Lindsey (A Flight Ringway) |
|
Digby |
||
|
46 |
Hurricane |
Digby |
|
611 |
Spitfire |
Digby |
|
29 |
Blenheim |
Digby |
|
Coltishall |
||
|
242 |
Hurricane |
Coltishall |
|
66 |
Spitfire |
Coltishall |
|
Wittering |
||
|
229 |
Hurricane |
Wittering |
|
266 |
Hurricane |
Wittering |
|
23 |
Blenheim |
Colly Weston |
|
Duxford |
||
|
19 |
Spitfire |
Duxford |
|
11 GROUP, |
||
|
HEADQUARTERS UXBRIDGE |
||
|
Debden |
||
|
17 |
Hurricane |
Debden |
|
85 |
Hurricane |
Martlesham |
|
North Weald |
||
|
56 |
Hurricane |
Rochford |
|
151 |
Hurricane |
North Weald |
|
25 |
Blenheim |
Martlesham |
|
Hornchurch |
||
|
54 |
Spitfire |
Hornchurch |
|
65 |
Spitfire |
Hornchurch |
|
74 |
Spitfire |
Hornchurch |
|
41 |
Spitfire |
Hornchurch |
|
Biggin Hill |
||
|
32 |
Hurricane |
Biggin Hill |
|
610 |
Spitfire |
Biggin Hill |
|
501 |
Hurricane |
Gravesend |
|
600 |
Blenheim |
Mansion |
|
Kenley |
||
|
615 |
Hurricane |
Kenley |
|
64 |
Spitfire |
Kenley |
|
111 |
Hurricane |
Croydon |
|
Northolt |
||
|
1 |
Hurricane |
Northolt |
|
257 |
Hurricane |
Northolt |
|
Tangmere |
||
|
43 |
Hurricane |
Tangmere |
|
145 |
Hurricane |
Westhampnett |
|
601 |
Hurricane |
Tangmere |
|
10 GROUP, |
||
|
HEADQUARTERS BOX, WILTSHIRE |
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|
Pembrey |
||
|
92 |
Spitfire |
Pembrey |
|
Pilton |
||
|
87 |
Hurricane |
Exeter |
|
213 |
Hurricane |
Exeter |
|
St. Eval |
||
|
234 |
Spitfire |
St. Eval |
|
247 |
Gladiator |
Roborough (1 Flight) |
|
Middle Wallot |
||
|
238 |
Hurricane |
Middle Wallop |
|
609 |
Spitfire |
Middle Wallop |
|
604 |
Blenheim |
Middle Wallop |
|
152 |
Spitfire |
Warmwell |
LUFTWAFFE ORDER OF BATTLE IN THE WEST August 1940
|
LUFTFLOTTE 5—NORWAY |
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|
X Fliegerkorps |
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|
Long-range bombers |
||
|
KG26 Stab, I, III |
He lll |
|
|
KG30 Stab, I, III |
Ju 88 |
|
|
Fighters |
||
|
ZG76 I |
Me 110 |
|
|
JG77 Stab, I, II |
Me 109 |
|
|
Coastal reconnaissance and mine-laying |
||
|
Kü.Fl.Gr.506 |
He 115 |
|
|
Long-rang reconnaissance |
||
|
Aufkl.Gr.22 with Aufkl. Staffel Obdl. |
||
|
l./(F)120 |
He 111 and Ju 88 |
|
|
l./(F)121 |
||
|
LUFTFLOTTE 2—HOLLAND, BELGIUM |
||
|
I Fliegerkorps |
||
|
Long-range bombers |
||
|
KG1 Stab, I, II, III |
||
|
I, II, He 111; III, Ju 88 |
||
|
KG76 Stab, I, II, III |
||
|
Lehrstaffel I, Do. 17; |
||
|
Long-range reconnaissance |
||
|
5./(F)122 |
Ju 88 and He 111 |
|
|
4./(F)132 |
Ju 88, He 111, Me 110 |
|
|
II Fliegerkorps |
||
|
Long-range bombers |
||
|
KG2 Stab, I, II, III |
Do 17 |
|
|
KG3 Stab, I, II, III |
Do 17 |
|
|
KG53 Stab, I, II, III |
He 111 |
|
|
Dive-bombers |
||
|
II/(St.)G.1 |
Ju 87 |
|
|
IV/(St.)L.G.1 |
Ju 87 |
|
|
Fighter-bombers |
||
|
Epr.Gr.210 |
Me 109 and Me 110 |
|
|
IX Fliegerdivision† |
||
|
Long-range bombers |
||
|
KG4 Stab, I, II, III |
||
|
I, II, He 111, III, Ju 88 |
||
|
KGr.100 (up to 16.8.40)† |
He 111 |
|
|
Naval co-operation |
||
|
KG40 Stab, I |
Ju 88 |
|
|
Mine-laying |
||
|
KGr.126 |
He 111 |
|
|
Coastal reconnaissance |
||
|
K.Fl.Gr.106 |
He 115 and Do 18 |
|
|
Long-range reconnaissance |
||
|
3./(F)122 |
Ju 88 and He 111 |
|
|
Jagdfliegerführer 2 |
||
|
Fighters |
||
|
JG3 Stab, I, II, III |
Me 109 |
|
|
JG26 Stab, I, II, III |
Me 109 |
|
|
JG51 Stab, I, II, III |
Me 109 |
|
|
JG52 Stab, I, II, III |
Me 109 |
|
|
JG54 Stab, I |
Me 109 |
|
|
ZG26 |
Me 110 |
|
|
Jagdfliegerführer 1 |
||
|
In process of formation 22.8.40. |
||
|
LUFTFLOTTE 3—FRANCE |
||
|
VIII Fliegerkorps (Transferred to Luftflotte 2 29.8.40) |
||
|
Dive-bombers |
||
|
St.G.l Stab, I, II |
Stab, Do 17 and Ju 87; I, II, Ju 87 |
|
|
St.G.2 Stab, I, II |
Stab, Do 17 and Ju 87; I, II, Ju 87 |
|
|
St.G.77 Stab, I, II, III |
Stab, Do 17 and Ju 87; I, II, III, Ju 87 |
|
|
Reconnaissance |
||
|
II./L.G.2 (at Boblingen, Germany) |
Do 17 |
|
|
2./(F)11 |
Do 17 |
|
|
2./(F)123 |
Ju 88 |
|
|
Fighters |
||
|
V./(Z)L.G.1 |
Me 110 |
|
|
V Fliegerkorps |
||
|
Long-range bombers |
||
|
KG51 Stab, I, II, III |
Ju 88 |
|
|
KG54 Stab, I, II |
Ju 88 |
|
|
KG55 Stab, I, II, III |
He 111 |
|
|
IV Fliegerkorps |
||
|
Long-range bombers |
||
|
LG1 Stab, I, II, III |
Ju 88 |
|
|
KG27 Stab, I, II, III |
He 111 |
|
|
KGr.806 (under St.G.3) |
Ju 88 |
|
|
KGr.100 (from 16.8.40) |
He 111 |
|
|
St.G.3 Stab |
Do 17 and He 111 |
|
|
Naval co-operation |
||
|
KG40 I |
FW 200 |
|
|
Long-range reconnaissance |
||
|
3./(F) (from 8.7.40 to 12.8.40 under St.G.3) |
Me 110 and Do 17 |
|
|
Jagdfliegerführer 3 |
||
|
Fighters |
||
|
JG2 Stab, I, II, III |
Me 109 |
|
|
JG27 Stab, I, II, III |
Me 109 |
|
|
JG53 Stab, I, II, III |
Me 109 |
|
|
ZG2 Stab |
Me 110 |
|
Notes:
* Later IX Fliegerkorps
† KGr.loo Pathfinder and radio beam bombing unit Stab = Staff flight which was usually operational Night-fighter gruppen, short-range reconnaissance gruppen (Hs 126) and transports are not included in these lisrs