16
The cloudy weather from August 19th to 23rd gave some brief respite to both combatants and time to adjust tactics. In Germany senior commanders of the Luftwaffe, and in particular the Jafus and fighter Gruppen commanders, were called to Karinhall on August 19th for discussions on escort problems.
To the Luftwaffe it appeared that Fighter Command had not been fully brought to battle and that, despite the very heavy losses to the R.A.F. shown in the German intelligence reports, a hard core still existed. At all costs this must be engaged and destroyed both in the air and on the ground. The very wide range of targets laid down had meant complete lack of concentration on any particular site, although this was certainly not apparent to Göring. In addition the haphazard use of bombers to raid singly or in threes over the length and breadth of England each night had diluted the bomb capacity in favour of overload fuel.
German bomber losses had been heavy, 127 medium bombers and forty Stukas having been lost between August 10th and 23rd. A major disappointment to the Reichsmarschall was the abject failure of the Ju 87 Stuka. Against modem fighters it was no longer the spearhead of the Blitzkrieg, but a slow, cumbersome and vulnerable machine which had little chance in daylight. To prevent further serious losses in the Stuka formations and to conserve them for the pending invasion, Fliegerkorps VIII (with 220 out of the 280 Ju 87s engaged) was withdrawn from the battle on the 19th, and on August 29th transferred from Cherbourg to Luftflotte 2 in the Pas de Calais. The Stuka had retired from the battle against Britain apart from some isolated sorties by the few remaining units in Luftflotte 3.
As a result of the talks on the 19th, Göring issued a new directive on the following day:
To continue the fight against the enemy air force until further notice, with the aim of weakening the British fighter forces. The enemy is to be forced to use his fighters by means of ceaseless attacks. In addition the aircraft industry and the ground organisation of the air force are to be attacked by means of individual aircraft by night and day, if weather conditions do not permit the use of complete formations.
The Luftwaffe High Command had for some time considered that the main concentration of R.A.F. fighters was in the area around London. Heavy attacks were therefore contemplated as early as August 2nd when an ObdL order was issued to this effect. The timing and implementation were left to the Luftflotten, and in turn to the individual Fliegerkorps commanders. The order of August 2nd seemed to give the right balance between Göring’s dictum of August 20th and the invasion plans for an attack on a narrow front due south of London. Moreover, the detailed planning for attacks on R.A.F. installations round London had now been completed and they could be carried out forthwith.
Fliegerkorps 2, under General Bruno Lürzer, took the initiative and decided to open the attacks as soon as the weather cleared. A new variant was also added to confuse the radar stations, formations of varying size patrolling all day up and down the Straits, and occasionally delivering a feint attack.
To provide overwhelming escorts of Me 109s, it was decided to transfer most of the single-seater fighter strength of Luftflotte 3 to the Luftflotte 2 area. In the following week the units of Jufue 3 were flown across to the Pas de Calais.
In the meantime Fighter Command took stock; in the second phase (August 8th to 18th) no less than ninety-four pilots were killed or missing, and sixty were wounded in varying degrees. Since August 8th the slight improvement in strength at that date had been whittled away and the operational training units were effectively prevented from raising the length of courses from two weeks to four weeks. Squadrons were dog-tired from long hours of fighting each day, and from the constant wear on nerves occasioned by air raids.
Of aircraft there was so far still no shortage despite the loss in the second phase of 54 Spitfires and 121 Hurricanes, 40 Spitfires and 25 Hurricanes damaged beyond unit repair, and a further 30 aircraft destroyed on the ground. Production was beyond schedule, and the repair depots were helping to ensure that any replacements required at the end of each day’s fighting were delivered by noon on the following day.
In the field the ground crews performed miracles. Quick servicing had been developed to a fine art— refuelling, rearming, engine checking, including oil and glycol coolant, replacing oxygen cylinders, and testing the R/T set would go on simultaneously. On many occasions all the aircraft of a squadron formation were replenished with fuel and ammunition, and got ready for another battle, in eight to ten minutes after landing. Slit trenches had been dug alongside dispersals so that work could continue until the airfield was under direct attack.
Regular repair and maintenance were carried on day and night with all maintenance personnel pooled on each station. The indefatigable station engineer officers detailed parties from the pool to squadrons in accordance with the work required to get them serviceable again.
Liberally sprayed by the fire section, this Spitfire of 92 Squadron came to grief at Biggin Hill during the September battles
Low and fast; a Staffel of Me 110s from ZG26 ‘Horst Wessel’ heads inland from the British coast for a raid during late August 1940
Most of the maintenance work on the signals equipment of the fighters had to be carried out at night by the light of torches. Trouble was caused by damp, and extreme care was necessary to keep R/T sets dry in rain or dew. Occasionally sets had to be taken to a hot air blower to dry them out.
Wherever possible maintenance was done in the open as hangars were primary targets for German bombs, and many had already been destroyed. Dispersal of aircraft not only to satellite aerodromes, but over wide areas at each of them, combined with lack of transport, increased the labour requirement for a given job. The blackout, damage to power and water mains, and to the station organisation, added to the difficulties.
Initially bomb craters and building repairs were undertaken by the station works and buildings detachments. As the damage grew, these units could no longer cope, and works repair depots were called in. Manned by between 50 and 200 workmen, these depots had lorries, bulldozers, excavators and mobile power generation and water plant.
Appointed Kommodore of JG26 in August 1940, Adolf Galland was one of the best known fighter pilots of the Luftwaffe, He is shown here taxiing in at Audembert after a sortie, and about to leave the cockpit. The Mickey Mouse emblem was much publicised
In many cases the depots performed sterling work, but often during an air raid a gang would retire to the shelters and refuse to budge. They claimed that they were not going to do the job if it was dangerous. There was little thought for the young fighter pilots above being killed or maimed to ensure the labourers’ continued freedom of choice in the matter.
Invariably a lot of the crater filling and rubble clearing was carried out by the airmen of the station itself.
To Park at 11 Group, the lull provided by four days of bad weather was a boon, as he was already extremely worried by his rising pilot losses and the damage being caused to his delicate network of communications. The savage attacks on fighter airfields required new tactics if the German intention of bringing as much of Fighter Command’s strength as possible into battle and destroying it was not to be realised.
Park’s directive of the 19th was therefore of the utmost importance and underlined Dowding’s policy of keeping the fighter force in being by any means at his disposal.
On August 24th the weather cleared, and both sides began to try new tactics, the Germans achieving their greatest successes of the Battle of Britain.
August 24th
Day Crucial phase begins. Airfield attacks in south-east. Heavy raid on Portsmouth. Manston evacuated.
Night Heavier attacks, widely spaced targets. Minelaying.
Weather Fine and clear in south. Drizzle in north.
German bomber crews photographed on a sortie over southern England in early September. Above: flying a Heinkel 111 and studying the map; below: gunners on a Dornier 17 searching the sky for the ever-present Hurricanes and Spitfires
Slogans of every type appeared on both sides of the Channel during the Battle of Britain. Some were polite, others were not! Here a Luftwaffe freelance artist is finishing a man size caricature on the side of a van. The caption reads ‘When we have shut Churchill’s big mouth …’
Caught by a British fighter, this Dornier 17Z of KG2 was riddled with bullets from nose to tail, but managed to get back to base
The early part of the Saturday morning was cloudless and fine and the controllers in 11 Group watched anxiously for the inevitable signs of a built-up over France. At 9 a.m. a big raid began to boil up around Cap Gris Nez and some 100 fighters and bombers of Fliegerkorps II advanced on Dover, stepped-up from 12,000 to 24,000 feet. Two formations broke away from the mass in mid-Channel and attacked Dover itself from the north. Eleven fighter squadrons were despatched and the raid broke up at about eleven o’clock.
An hour and a half later a series of feints developed, from which one raid was detached to attack Manston, as No. 264 Squadron’s defensive patrol for the airfield landed. The nine Defiants took off before the first bombs were dropped, and were then joined by a Hurricane squadron. The force was driven off with a loss of five bombers and two fighters but not before extensive damage had been done.
At 3.30 another big raid stacked up over Le Havre, and flew to Manston and Ramsgate. The Manston attack was to be the last straw for the station. The living quarters were now badly damaged, hardly any buildings remained intact, all telephone and teleprinter lines were cut and the field was littered with unexploded bombs.
Express delivery! A remarkable series of photographs of a 2½ ton bomb, from loading to delivery over England. The bomb, on the external racks of a special Heinkel 111, was inscribed ‘Extra Havana for Churchill’. The thoroughness of German official photographic teams at this period can be gauged from the fact that these pictures are only a selection from a long sequence of the raid right from the bombing-up stage
High level reconnaissance during the Battle of Britain was mainly carried out by specially equipped Dornier 17Ps and He 111s. Here the third Staffel of Aufkl.Gr.123 is shown in the hangar at its base in the Paris area
Before the afternoon raid, at 2.15, all communication between Manston and 11 Group ceased. The controller at II Group contacted No. 1 Observer Group at Maidstone to see if the Corps could find out what was going on. A mile from Manston was Post A.1, and Observer Foad volunteered to cycle to the airfield and obtain information. Coastal airfields had been reduced to dire straits.
When the cable maintenance inspector at Manston was informed that all lines had gone he took two jointers and went to the particular crater despite the continuing explosion of delayed action bombs. Working like beavers, and with only an occasional glance at a large bomb adjacent to them, the three men got the essential circuits (out of 248 severed) restored in two hours and completed permanent restoration the following day.
As soon as word got through of the state of the station Fighter Command decided to evacuate it, except as an emergency airfield. Administrative personnel were tranferred permanently to Westgate while the remainder of No. 600 Squadron’s Blenheims were moved to Hornchurch.
Part of the raiding force split before reaching Manston, and one section attacked the small aerodrome at Ramsgate. The town itself was heavily hit and whole rows of seaside villas were wiped out with a number of casualties.
Concurrently with the south coast attacks, another raid flew to targets north of the Estuary, especially Hornchurch and North Weald, where high-altitude techniques were used. The No. 264 Squadron Defiants, withdrawn from Manston to Hornchurch earlier in the day, found themselves once more in the fray at 3.45, and just airborne as bombs began to rain down.
At North Weald nearly fifty Dorniers and He 111s escorted by Me nos dropped 150 to 200 bombs. The airmen’s and officers’ married quarters suffered severely, and the power house was badly damaged. Nine people were killed and ten wounded.
No. 12 Group were called upon to assist over North Weald and Hornchurch, but the Duxford wing was flown in too late to have any major effect.
With the raiders approaching London, the city registered its 11th, 12th and 13th air raid warnings, but the population did not seem unduly perturbed. In Regent’s Park, where A Midsummer Night’s Dream was being performed, few of the audience moved. They seemed to find very appropriate Titania’s wish ‘To each word a warbling note’.
While the sector stations were under fire a formation of 100 Luftflotte 3 fighters and bombers from North of the Somme headed for Portsmouth and Southampton. They managed to get well towards the coast before their targets were deduced from radar, which was cluttered with other tracks.
A formation of Heinkel 111s from KG 53 from Lille moves out across the Channel for one of the September raids
At Portsmouth only one fighter squadron was near enough to intercept, and that was still climbing when fifty bombers were heavily fired on by the anti-aircraft guns. The aircraft jettisoned their loads broadcast over the city, causing much damage and killing 100 civilians.
During the day Fighter Command flew 936 sorties— only slightly less than the Luftwaffe’s 1,030—and lost twenty-two fighters to the German total of thirty-eight fighters and bombers.
Luftflotte 3 from this time on began to fade from the daylight picture as the full weight of the assault switched to Luftflotte 2 and the Pas de Calais. After dark on the 24th the attacks were stepped up, and some 170 German aircraft ranged over England from the borderland to Kent. Largely due to bad navigation bombers directed to Rochester and the Thameshaven oil-tanks dropped their loads on the City of London. For the first time since the Gothas of 1918, Central London was damaged in an air raid. Fires burned at London Wall, and boroughs like Islington, Tottenham, Finsbury, Millwall, Stepney, East Ham, Leyton, Coulsdon and Bethnal Green all received their share. It was a foretaste of things to come.
Airfields had been the main focus of the attack in the south, but lack of Knickebein trained crews and general interference with direction-finding aids caused confusion. In the west only Driffield was hit, and this by a single machine. Fighter Command flew forty-five night sorties, but the only interception made was by a Hurricane pilot of No. 615 Squadron who successfully destroyed a Heinkel 111.
August 25th
Day Slight activity in morning. Main raids by Luftflotte 3 in afternoon in south-west.
Night Continued widespread attacks, main concentration the midlands.
Weather Early morning fair. Remainder of day cloudy.
For most of the morning and afternoon of Wednesday the Luftwaffe rested, although the Channel was filled with small formations which kept the radar plotters busy waiting to see which would turn north and become a genuine raid.
At 5 p.m. 50+ appeared near St. Malo and proceeded to Cherbourg where escort and escorted swelled the ranks to 100. Off the Channel Islands another raid of 30+ built up, and behind it further formations of 20, 60 and 20 joined up to form a mass of 100+ aircraft which headed for Weymouth.
Two squadrons, judiciously placed by 10 Group, intercepted, but were unable to get through the fighter screen which numbered nearly 200. A third squadron fared no better and the bombers attacked Warmwell aerodrome, dropping twenty bombs. Two hangars were damaged and the station sick quarters burnt out. Nine-unexploded bombs were left to be dealt with, and communications were disorganised until noon on the following day. Bombs also fell on Fareham, Pembroke and the Scilly Isles, at the last mentioned a direct hit being scored on the R.A.F. wireless station.
(A)
(B)
(C)
(D)
The various stages in the preparations for a Luftwaffe raid. First (A) target maps and photographs are studied, (B) the meteorological staff assess the weather situation, (C) a detailed pictorial lecture on the harbour is given and (D) final briefing to the crews
King George VI and Queen Elizabeth walking in the grounds of Bentley Priory with Air Chief Marshal Dowding, the architect of Fighter Command’s victory. The date was September 6th, 1940, and a series of German air attacks was in progress
Within an hour a further mass raid of 100 headed from Cap Gris Nez for Dover and the Estuary, but was attacked by several of the eleven fighter squadrons sent up. This final action brought Fighter Command’s losses for the day to sixteen with nine pilots dead, four missing and four wounded.
The Luftwaffe left behind twenty aircraft and their crews, but after nightfall they had it all their own way, carrying out widespread attacks without suffering any loss. Some mines were laid on the east, south and west coasts, while most of the sixty-five raids plotted in attacked industrial centres in the midlands, where bombs fell on forty places, including Birmingham, Coventry and towns in, southern England, South Wales and Scotland. Montrose, a fighter airfield between Dundee and Aberdeen, was the recipient of an unexpected attack.
While German bombers droned over England, eighty-one twin-engined R.A.F. bombers were heading the other way—for Berlin. Industrial and communications targets were the orders for the night. Cloud prevented accurate identification and bombs were dropped on several sections of the city, some damage being done to residential property. The R.A.F. raid was a reprisal for the German bombing of London the previous night. This incursion into Germany territory was the first of several and within a fortnight there were to be far-reaching results with changed Luftwaffe daylight tactics, and a reprieve for Fighter Command.
August 26th
Day Airfields in Kent and Essex attacked. Bombs on Dover and Folkestone. Raids in the Solent.
Night Widespread raiding, targets industrial centres and airfields.
Weather Mainly cloudy, but dry. Brighter in south, but Channel cloudy.
This was another day of widespread activity in the course of which the Luftwaffe delivered three main attacks: (a) on Kenley and Biggin Hill, (b) on Horn-church, North Weald, Debden and east London, and (c) on Portsmouth and the aerodromes at Warmwell in No. 10 Group.
Following several reconnaissance flights, Luftflotte 2 put in an appearance just after 11 a.m. when 150 aircraft were crossing the coast at Deal. Bombs dropped on Folkestone and more balloons were set on fire at Dover, but the main effort was directed at Biggin Hill and Kenley. Six squadrons and three flights from No. 11 Group intercepted well forward, and the raids were broken up.
In the early afternoon a second Luftwaffe concentration was observed by radar to be forming up over Lille. Further units joined it from St. Omer and Calais, until raids of 60+, 20+ and 30+ were being plotted in towards Dover and Harwich.
The main objectives for the bombers from KG2 and KG3 off Harwich were North Weald and Hornchurch, with diversions in the east London area. Their efforts were disorganised by 11 Group which put up ten squadrons and one flight. One section of the raid fared better, however, and despite the attentions of two R.A.F. fighter squadrons it successfully reached the sector station at Debden. Over 100 bombs damaged the landing area, the sergeants’ mess, the N.A.A.F.I, a motor transport depot and the equipment section. Both electricity and water mains were hit and five personnel killed.
A Gotha 145 trainer which landed intact on Lewes race-course, Sussex, on August 28th, 1940. The young pilot was delivering German forces mail from the Channel Islands to Strasbourg, but lost his way and was painfully surprised to be greeted by the Home Guard on landing. The second photograph shows the same aircraft being used by the R.A.F.
A squadron from Duxford had been sent up to patrol Debden, but due to late vectoring saw nothing of the enemy. Hurricanes of No. 310 (Czechoslovak) Squadron attempted to catch the raid as it left the Debden area, but most of them were unable to get proper courses to steer as they lacked the right radio-frequencies.
At 4 p.m. 150 aircraft of Luftflotte 3 approached Portsmouth at high altitude while two small diversions were laid on in an attempt to distract the fighters. No. 11 Group despatched five squadrons and No. 10 Group three. Independently three of the squadrons intercepted the formation short of the target, destroying three Heinkel 111s from KG55 and causing many of the bombers to jettison their loads in the sea. By five o’clock the raid had been repulsed. This was Luftflotte 3’s last major effort in daylight for some weeks, as its units concentrated on night bombing. To Nos. 10 and 11 Groups it had been one of their most bitter fights with twenty-eight aircraft lost in one engagement, out of thirty-one for the day. Four pilots were killed near Portsmouth, and twelve were wounded. Altogether Fighter Command flew 787 sorties, over 300 more than on the 25th. The losses in pilots were rising alarmingly and replacements were few. German losses for the 26th were 41 aircraft.
Almost intact, a Heinkel 111 of KG1 lies in a Surrey field at mid-day on August 30th. The aircraft was one of a large formation that caused heavy damage to Biggin Hill, but was intercepted by 79 and 610 Squadrons. The crew of five were captured but one died from injuries
On this day another link in the Observer chain was forged through the formation of No. 20 Observer Group H.Q. at Truro with a small nucleus of posts. Gradually the gaps in the warning line were being closed, although the areas in Wales and the north were still without coverage. Communications were uppermost in Fighter Command’s mind, as exercises were being held to try out the ‘Beetle’ emergency signals system which would come into operation on invasion day.
By the 26th Fighter Command was getting a clearer picture of German lines of approach and overall target priorities in this third phase of the battle. Some authorities had suggested that the Luftwaffe was looking for gaps in the defences from the north and west by which to approach London. A full-scale study had been carried out by the operational research staff at Bentley Priory which proved conclusively that the Germans were proceeding to their targets with almost mathematical precision and that the priorities were still airfields and industrial centres.
The operations-room raid tracings and the Observer Corps tracks showed the main entry routed for then current industrial attacks on Birmingham and Coventry at night were either Abbeville-Pevensey-Birmingham, or Cherbourg-Bournemouth-Birmingham, as if drawn with a ruler and pencil.
To prove the point, the raids that night were mainly directed against Bournemouth and Coventry with about fifty bombers aiming at Plymouth. Widespread sorties by other aircraft included an attack against the 15 Group airfield at St. Eval in Cornwall, where the ‘Q’ site or decoy aerodrome for the station was bombed for several hours. The false flarepath was set on fire, and most of the sixty-two craters made were on open heathland. Some six airfields were on the Luftwaffe’s night list to back up the day offensive, but little damage was done due to poor navigation and low clouds.
For some days Park at 11 Group had been worried about the low rate of interceptions compared with sorties flown and the fact that single squadrons had been engaging large formations. This was due to cloud and consequent errors in time and position of Observer Corps plots. To overcome the defect he sent a signal to his controllers requiring that formation leaders should report ‘the approximate strength of enemy bombers and fighters, their height, and approximate position immediately on sighting the enemy. A special R/T message would be “Tally Ho! Thirty bombers, forty fighters, Angels 20, proceeding north Guildford.” These reports should enable us to engage the enemy on more equal terms and are to take effect from dawn August 27th.’
August 27th
Day Reconnaissance chiefly in Portsmouth-Southampton area.
Night Widespread activity industries and airfields from Lincolnshire to Portsmouth.
Weather Central and east England light rain. Some cloud in Channel and haze over Dover Straits.
The wreck of a Hurricane of No, 151 Squadron, North Weald. It was crash-landed at Eastchurch by its pilot, Sergeant Davies, after being damaged in a dogfight on August 28th, 1940. The second picture shows the same aircraft completely rebuilt by No. 1 Civilian Repair Unit at Cowley, Oxfordshire
The Tuesday morning dawned dull and hazy, but no Luftflotte 2 major raids developed. The main effort was devoted to small attacks and photographic reconnaissance at very high altitude to assess the damage done to date.
No. 11 Group had little opportunity to practise its new ‘Tally Ho!’ procedures but interrupted the now of aerial pictures back to northern France by destroying three of the long-range aircraft involved, two being Dornier 17s.
Park took the opportunity of the quiet spell to address another instruction to his controllers (No. 7) and this brought into the open the disagreements between himself and Air Vice-Marshal Leigh-Mallory at 12 Group over tactics. Park wanted to be assured of 12 Group squadrons over his north-eastern airfields when raids were being plotted into them, and his own forces were fully engaged elsewhere.
Within 12 Group the pilots were fretting at their lack of activity compared with their southern neighbours. Through Squadron-Leader Bader, the gallant legless CO. of 242 Squadron, a new system of interceptions at wing strength was shortly to be evolved. Leigh-Mallory had long fostered the idea, based on a maximum strength build-up against large raids instead of squadrons intercepting singly or in pairs. At Air Ministry Air Vice-Marshal Sholto Douglas, the D.C.A.S., lent a sympathetic ear.
One of the main types of night bomber used by the R.A.F. in raids over Germany and the Channel ports in 1940, the Armstrong Whitworth Whitley. This Whitley 5 of 58 Squadron was taking off at dusk from Linton-on-Ouse, Yorkshire
To Park the assembling of large formations of fighters was both time-wasting and unwieldy. In any case with the enemy on his doorstep he could not afford the expensive luxury of testing the scheme with consequent damage to sector stations. His fighters might be massed at one point against raids which could at any time split up and seek separate targets. The warning from radar was far too short to allow for anything but forward interception techniques with reserves on the back patrol lines to meet divided raids, or those not shown early on the group’s operations table.
The wing theories were not really born until three days later, but Park’s ire had already been aroused by the fact that on two occasions (one of which was the Debden raid of the preceding day) assistance had been requested from 12 Group for patrols over 11 Group airfields. The squadrons requested had not materialised and he suspected that they had gone elsewhere to find a fight.
Accordingly in his instruction of the 27th he did not mince his words. He opened with a note of thanks to 10 Group for their consistent help in covering the Portsmouth area and then went on to deal with the subject of 12 Group co-operation. Up to date, he stated, 12 Group had not shown the same desire to co-operate by despatching their squadrons to the places requested. The result of this attitude had been that on two occasions recently when 12 Group had offered assistance and were requested to patrol over aerodromes their squadrons did not in fact patrol over aerodromes. On both these occasions 11 Group aerodromes had been heavily bombed.
He had decided that rather than argue direct each time over these patrols, he would shift the onus to the shoulders of Command itself, and accordingly he ordered that Controllers were from then onwards immediately to put the requests for 12 Group assistance to the Controller, Fighter Command.
The controversy of wings versus squadron forward attack and 12 Group versus 11 Group was to become a major bone of contention for the rest of the daylight battle and ultimately it was, unjustifiably, to cost Park his command of 11 Group. It was not until 1942 that he had a further chance to prove the correctness of his techniques when he was posted as A.O.C. Malta. There he changed from wing to forward interception and produced remarkable results in two weeks.
While on the evening of the 27th the control-room staff were digesting and discussing Park’s forthright instruction, raids began to come in from Cherbourg, and a widespread attack by Luftflotte 3 was made. Bombs were dropped on Gravesend, Calshot, Southampton, the Isle of Wight, Tonbridge, Tiptree and Leighton Buzzard. Some fell within a few miles of Bentley Priory.
August 28th
Day Airfield attacks, Kent, Essex and Suffolk in three phases.
Night First major attack on Liverpool. 150 bombers. Harassing attacks midlands, north-east coast and London.
Weather Fine and fair. Cold. Cloud in Dover Straits.
The men who kept them flying; the groundcrews who laboured day and night rearming, refuelling, maintaining and repairing. This group is from No. 222 Squadron
Once more the Luftwaffe divided its main efforts into three phases. The first began at 8.30 a.m. with a heavy build-up over Cap Gris Nez which became a mass of 100+ , the larger proportion being fighters escorting two groups of Dorniers.
One section of the raid, consisting of twenty Dorniers, headed for Eastchurch, while the other with twenty-seven bombers flew to Rochford. Four 11 Group squadrons made desperate attempts to get through the escort screen of the Eastchurch raiders but without success and with the loss of eight aircraft and six pilots, two of which were from the ill-fated No. 264 Squadron with its two-seat Defiants.
The Coastal Command light-bomber station of Eastchurch therefore suffered yet another attack at eight minutes past nine, with two Fairey Battles destroyed on the ground and numerous craters on the airfield. Despite this the station remained serviceable for restricted day flying and there were no casualties.
At 12.30 the second raid developed, with the main objective as Rochford aerodrome near Southend. No. 264 Squadron were again forced to take off, with danger imminent, but fortunately before the bombs began to fall. Several squadrons out of thirteen on patrol intercepted, but the defensive screen was too strong, and most of the bombers reached their target. Despite thirty craters little serious damage was done to Rochford, which continued serviceable. While this was going on, Winston Churchill visited the battered station at Manston to view the damage.
The third attack consisted of large fighter formation sweeps over Kent and the Estuary at 25,000 feet. Seven R.A.F. squadrons attempted to intercept at various times but lost nine aircraft. On this occasion Park’s principle of avoiding combat with German fighters was not adhered to, and the day’s losses of twenty Hurricanes and Spitfires was heavy in comparison with German losses of thirty-one for the whole twenty-four hours, although these included twelve bombers. Curiously, the Fighter Command assessment of German casualties was the most accurate of the period at twenty-eight.
The official records show only thirty German aircraft lost on the 28th, but in fact there was one more. A Gotha 145 biplane trainer carrying mail from the German forces in the Channel Islands to Strasbourg was diverted and came down on Lewes racecourse in Sussex, to the surprise of the young German pilot. The contents of mailbags made interesting reading for British intelligence officers.
In Göring’s order for the 19th August Liverpool had been singled out for heavy raids (i.e., over 100 tons) and the preparations entrusted to Luftflotte 3. The Germans had long considered Liverpool a major target and, it ranked second only to London on their port priority list.
Thus on the 28th Liverpool received the first of four consecutive night raids and about 150 bombers reached the area Liverpool-Birkenhead, causing widespread damage. Simultaneously Luftflotte 2 and a few Luftflotte 3 aircraft attacked Birmingham, Coventry, Manchester, Sheffield, Derby and London, and dropped bombs on a wide selection of other places.
While many of these raids had little or no effect on the British war effort they did disrupt production because of the air raid warning system then in operation. There were three types of warning:
1 Yellow, issued by Fighter Command as a preliminary to all areas over which raiders might pass.
2 Purple, issued at night to areas in the course of raiders. On receipt of this all exposed lighting in docks, factories, sidings, etc., had to be extinguished.
Mill Street, Maidstone, Kent, after a raid on September 5th, 1940, Miraculously the naval officer driving the car escaped unhurt
3 Red, a public warning upon receipt of which the sirens were sounded.
The information for the various warning signals could only be obtained from Observer Corps plots and at this time the Corps came in for a lot of uninformed criticism by the public and the Press on warnings being in force when no air raid occurred. The responsibility rested with Fighter Command and the liaison officers at Observer Corps centres, and although great discretion was used the problem was not completely solved until after the Battle of Britain, and in the meantime night raids on the midlands or the north-west could mean the greater part of England being under Purple or Red warnings as the bomber stream flew northwards from the coast.
August 29th
Day Quiet morning. Airfield attacks in south and south-east in afternoon.
Night Liverpool again attacked; diversions in the midlands.
Weather Showers and bright intervals. Channel and Straits cloudy.
After the feverish activity of the previous night, the Thursday morning was dull but peaceful. Little activity was reported until after lunch, when at three o’clock radar picked up formations at Cap Gris Nez, Boulogne and the mouth of the Somme. Brightening weather had led Luftflotte 2 to put up massive fighter sweeps in the hope of attracting British fighters to the slaughter. Jafus 1 and 2 operated over Kent with 564 Me 109s and 159 Me nos respectively.
No. 11 Group sent up forward patrols, expecting a renewal of bomber raids. Thirteen squadrons were despatched and some were involved in combats, but in the main the pilots adhered to Park’s order of the 19th and retired when it was clear that no bombers were involved. This incident was particularly noted by the Luftwaffe operations and intelligence staffs who correctly deduced that the R.A.F. was avoiding wastage in fighter versus fighter battles. Thes tactics paid, as Fighter Command losses were only nine machines and German casualties were seventeen for the twenty-four-hour period, of which five were Me 109s from JG3.
After nightfall, Luftflotte 3 delivered its second attack on Liverpool and over 130 bombers reached the target, dropping both high explosives and incendiaries, navigation being assisted by a cloudless night. Diversionary raids on the midlands and outskirts of London were carried on by forty-four aircraft, usually singly.
A group of pilots from No. 310 ( Czech) Squadron at Duxford on September 1st, 1940. No. 310 was formed, with Hurricanes, on July loth
August 30th
Day Feint raids on shipping, then heavy attacks on southeastern airfields. Raid on Luton.
Night Main target Liverpool. Single raids over wide area.
Weather Fair. Channel and Straits clear.
The day began with a renewal of shipping raids, this time in the Thames Estuary, designed to act as feints for the main assault which was picked up by radar over Cap Gris Nez at 10.30. Three waves totalling 100 aircraft came at half-hour intervals at 14,000 feet.
A cloud-layer at about 7,000 feet meant that the Observer Corps had to rely on sound plotting and it was not until an hour after the build-up over France that the 11 Group controller realised that forces were heading for Kent and Surrey sector stations. Sixteen squadrons were despatched to intercept, of which two, to guard Kenley and Biggin Hill, became involved in a dog-fight over Surrey. One formation of German bombers which had split off from the main group attacked Biggin Hill at noon and was not seen by the 12 Group Squadron flying on airfield protection patrol. From high altitude delayed-action bombs were dropped which damaged the airfield surface and the village but once again did not render the former unserviceable.
A second mass attack began at 1.30 when raids of 6 + , 12 + and 20 + crossed the coast between Dover and Dungeness, and then split up, sections heading for Biggin Hill, Shoreham, Kenley and Tangmere. Eight squadrons of fighters were ordered up and the raids retreated just before four o’clock. During this attack the radar stations at Dover, Pevensey, Rye, Foreness, Fairlight, Whitstable and Beachy Head were out of action due to a mains supply failure.
No sooner was this over than a third attack developed from Dover in waves, the objectives being Kenley, Biggin Hill, North Weald, Slough, Oxford and a convoy code-named ‘Bacon’.
Detling airfield was hit by forty to fifty bombs which set fire to oil-tanks, cut the mains cable, cratered the roads and damaged one Blenheim. It was estimated that the station would not be serviceable until 8 a.m. on the 31st.
Far worse than this, one small raid of less than ten confused the defences by flying to the Thames Estuary and then turning south to Biggin Hill where at six o’clock, by low-level bombing with 1,000-pounders, the airfield was reduced to a shambles. Workshops, the transport yard, stores, barracks, the met. office, the armoury, W.A.A.F. quarters, and another hangar were wrecked; the power, gas and water mains were severed and all telephone lines north of the camp were cut in three places. Amid the rubble and fires casualties were very heavy, with thirty-nine dead and twenty-six injured—a number of them in a shelter trench which received a direct hit. Somehow the mess was cleared up and the station put back on an operational footing.
A member of the crew of a Do 17Z-3 of 6,/KG3 being escorted ashore. Four men were rescued by local boatmen and the Margate Lifeboat after the aircraft had been shot down in the sea in the course of a raid on Eastchurch and Rochford on August 28th
During the period another raid had come in over Sheppey, and, although intercepted, part of the force managed to reach Luton, where ten bombs were dropped and one hit the Vauxhall motor works, the total casualties including over fifty dead.
At dusk Fighter Command totted up its losses. Twenty-five fighters had been shot down compared with thirty-six German aircraft destroyed. The only bright spot was the saving of fifteen pilots. Altogether this Friday had been a maximum effort for both sides with the R.A.F. flying 1,054 sorties and the Luftwaffe 1,345.
On the night of the 30th/31st there was no respite for the island, with raiders coming in from 8.30 onwards. A continuous flow of bombers streamed up towards the midlands, South Wales and London, with Liverpool again the main target. Single raiders created diversions by attempting to bomb the airfields Biggin Hill, Debden, North Weald, Hornchurch, Detling, Eastchurch, Thorney Island, Broxbourne, Rochford and Calshot, while others ranged over towns from Derby to Norwich, and Cardiff to Peterborough.
On the 30th another link in the reporting chain had been forged with the opening of No. 35 Observer Group with its Headquarters at Oban in Scotland.
August 31st
Day Fighter Command’s heaviest losses. South-east and eastem airfields again main targets.
Night Heavy raid on Liverpool. Light attacks from north-east coast to Portsmouth.
Weather Mainly fair. Haze in Estuary and Straits.
The odds were weighted even more heavily against Fighter Command on this Saturday and its losses were the heaviest of the whole battle—thirty-nine fighters shot down with fourteen pilots killed. The Germans almost achieved parity, as they lost forty-one aircraft in- the whole twenty-four-hour period.
Raiding began at 8 a.m. with waves coming in over Kent and the Estuary, Me 109s amusing themselves shooting down all the Dover balloons both land and water based. Once again airfields such as North Weald, Duxford and Debden were the main targets. Debden received about one hundred high-explosive and incendiary bombs from a formation of Dorniers, the sick quarters and barrack block receiving direct hits and other buildings being damaged. The operations rooms continued, however, to operate right through the attack. The raid steering for Duxford was intercepted by 111 Squadron from Croydon and did not reach its target.
Less than an hour later over 100 machines advanced from Calais and concentrated on Eastchurch where the airfield remained serviceable despite cratering and damage to buildings. Detling received a heavy quota of machine-gun bullets but no bombs.
The third attack, which began soon after noon, was to be the most serious of the day. Over 100 aircraft crossed the coast at Dungeness and flew up two clearly defined corridors.
One section attacked Croydon and Biggin Hill. At the former airfield twelve bombers came in at 2,000 feet demolishing a hangar, damaging other buildings and causing casualties. At Biggin Hill the bombing came from high altitude and to the long-suffering occupants of the airfield it seemed that they must be the A1 priority target for the whole Luftwaffe. Further extensive damage was done to hangars and buildings, the married quarters and officers’ mess were bombed and the operations block received a direct hit, extinguishing the lights and filling the rooms with acrid fumes, dust and smoke from the fires which broke out. The temporary telephone lines and power cables put in after the raid on the 30th were destroyed.
At 6.35 Kenley aerodrome advised the Observer centre at Bromley that all lines to Biggin Hill were dead and that the frequency and call-signs of Biggin’s 72 and 79 Squadrons were urgently required. Lines from Bromley to Biggin Hill were also found to be out of action, and finally a despatch-rider had to be sent to get the information.
The raiders approaching up the second air corridor over Dungeness headed for Hornchurch, and there they caught 54 Squadron in the act of taking off. Two sections got airborne but the last was blown into the air by explosions. One machine was hurled into a field, another was thrown across the airfield to land on its belly, while the third, piloted by Flight Lieutenant Deere, was blown upside down. Miraculously all three pilots emerged shaken but uninjured and were back on operations the following morning. The thirty Dorniers involved dropped about 100 bombs which left a string of craters and cut the main power cable. Four Do 17s were shot down.
German ‘Ace’ Franz von Werra, adjutant of II/JG3 ‘Udet’, was forced down in this Me 109E in a field near Marden, Kent, on September 5th. He was transferred to a prison camp in Canada where he eventually escaped to Germany. He warned German intelligence that Britain had broken the Luftwaffe unit and R/T codes and, as a result, the system was changed. The fin of von Werra’s aircraft shows 13 victories. He was killed in October 1944
During the course of these sorties, other German aircraft made a sharp attack on coastal radar stations, damaging Pevensey, Dunkirk, Rye, Foreness, Whitstable and Beachy Head C.H.s. The advantage was not, however, pressed home and the stations were left to recuperate.
The fourth and last attack of the day was delivered at 5.30 p.m. by several groups of Ju 88s and bomb-carrying Me 110S which cratered runways and perimeter tracks, particularly at Hornchurch, where two more Spitfires were destroyed on the ground. Both Hornchurch and Biggin Hill were serviceable again the following morning.
On the night of August 31st/September 1st raids began coming in at 8.45 p.m. with single aircraft and groups of up to three. Bombs from twenty-five aircraft were scattered north and south, keeping many awake and in the shelters, but achieving little material effect. Liverpool and the Cammell Laird yards at Birkenhead received their fourth night raid in succession and absorbed the main force. Other targets hit by error or intention included Rotherhithe, Portsmouth, Manchester, Durham, Stockport, Bristol, Gloucester, Hereford, Worcester and the York to Leeds arterial road.
One delayed-action bomb fell on the airfield at Duxford. It was dealt with in the usual way, by being hitched with 100 yards of rope to an Armadillo vehicle and then towed to a safe part of the airfield and left to explode ‘at its leisure’.
On the 31st Fighter Command issued orders that the Defiants were to be used primarily for night fighting. They could continue to be used by day where suitable, i.e. where only hostile bombers were involved. The Defiant Squadrons 141 and 264 henceforth operated in Nos. 13 and 12 Groups respectively.
The amazing trio of American-pilots who fought with No. 609 Squadron. From left to right: Gene Tobin, Vernon Keough and Andrew Mamedoff. All were killed later flying from Britain with the American Eagle Squadron
September 1st
Day Four main attacks on Fighter Command airfields. Heavy damage.
Night Liverpool again. Diversions in midlands and South Wales.
Weather Fair with cloud patches in morning. Fine afternoon.
As September opened, a Fighter Command diarist noted that ‘the month of August saw the beginning of a war of attrition’. Dowding’s forces were now suffering from accumulated fatigue and the mounting losses in pilots. The Luftwaffe was continuing its time-table concentration on sector airfields, many of which looked on the surface to be complete wrecks: it had become a question of just how long the organisation and the squadrons could continue to operate under continuous bombardment.
During the day, which was warm and sunny, four major attacks developed and these were aimed at Fighter Command airfields. Some 450 aircraft of Luftflotte 2 took part. The first signs of activity came at 10.15 a.m. when radar plotted raids of 20 +, 30+, and 12+ forming up over the French coast. Once assembled this force became eleven formations, totalling 120 machines, which flew over Dover and split up to attack Biggin Hill, Eastchurch, Detling and Tilbury Docks. Fourteen and a half Fighter Squadrons were sent up to meet them.
For Biggin Hill it was the sixth raid in three days. No. 610 Squadron had been ordered to Acklington for a rest, but the ground crews were waiting to embus on the north side, and they smartly took cover in the woods, despite the exhortations of an over-zealous officer brandishing a revolver. One pilot of 610, who had been waiting for a final check on his machine, watched from a shelter as his Spitfire blew up.
The small formation of Dorniers in this action bombed from 12,000 feet and pitted the runways with craters, rendering the airfield unserviceable until the afternoon. No. 79 Squadron’s Hurricanes, returning from the fray, were forced to land at Croydon.
At I p.m. the usual signs of aircraft taking-off behind Calais were recorded by the gun-laying radar at Dover, and shortly afterwards the C.H. radar reported a concentration of approximately 150+ aircraft over Cap Gris Nez. These followed the same course as the morning raid and headed for the same targets.
The third and fourth attacks in the late afternoon were launched simultaneously, one mixed formation of fifty aircraft bombing Hawkinge and Lympne and another fifty raiding Detling and firing on the Dover balloon barrage. Small formations split off and one of these, consisting of Dorniers, headed for Biggin Hill where it was now realised that 6 p.m. was the regular allotted time for the last daylight Luftwaffe visitation.
The runways were again hit, but, far more serious, the sector operations room was reduced to a shambles, all lines except one out of 13 being severed, and the Defence Teleprinter Network wrecked by a 500 lb. bomb which bounced off a steel safe. Two W.A.A.F. telephone operators, Sergeant Helen Turner and Corporal Elspeth Henderson, worked on until the last moment and then flung themselves flat in time to avoid flying steel, glass and blast. Both received the Military Medal for bravery.
When the crew crawled out of the remains of sector operations they found that four Spitfires had been destroyed, and the armoury was on fire.
First priority was to get the operations room reestablished in some form, and here the Post Office engineers came to the rescue. On the night of the 30th the main London-Biggin Hill-Westerham telephone cable had been cut by bombs north of the airfield. The station Post Office maintenance officer, although blown out of a slit trench himself, had made his way through the raid and had got a message to Tunbridge Wells maintenance control. An inspector and six men volunteered to repair the cable, and despite warnings from the Sevenoaks police that an air raid was still in progress they reached the crater after darkness had fallen.
Shot down by Spitfires, this Heinkel 111 of 9./KG27 lies wrecked beside a road in the Mendip Hills near Cheddar on August 25th
Nothing could be done until dawn due to the presence of both gas and water in the crater. On September 1st the party started work. Despite the morning attack, the effects of coal-gas fumes and lack of food and drink they got the cable restored in seven hours.
Before they had finished, however, the operations room had been smashed, and every G.P.O. engineer was needed to get an emergency set-up working in a village shop. Within an hour some measure of control was once more at the disposal of Biggin Hill Sector, and working through the night, the engineers had by the following day rigged two new switch-boards and restored the telephone services. Meanwhile, the main cable was again severed, but the tireless engineers repaired it and reconnected several Observer posts which had lost their communications.
In daylight on the 1st. Fighter Command sent up 147 patrols involving 700 machines, and suffered fifteen aircraft casualties from which nine pilots were saved. The Luftwaffe reported the loss of fourteen aircraft including night operations which for the first time gave them an advantage on the score card.
Darkness had brought a lull until midnight, but between 9 p.m. and 4 in the morning about 100 aircraft singly attacked industrial targets and laid mines. Bombs fell at Birkenhead, Sealand, Stafford, Sheffield, Burton-on-Trent, Hull, Grimsby, Ashford and Gillingham. The most serious damage was done between Swansea and Neath where six 10,000-ton oil-tanks were set on fire.
September 2nd
Day Once again four main phases of airfield attacks.
Night Scattered raids: Liverpool, midlands and South Wales.
Weather Continuing fine and warm. Early-morning mist and fog patches.
Once again the early morning was warm and hazy, although there were occasional patches of low cloud.
The Luftwaffe stepped up the tempo, determined to eradicate the southern airfields as a source of R.A.F. defence. The day’s operations were divided into four main phases intended to stretch No. 11 Group to the maximum. Over 750 aircraft were despatched and the German Air Force mounted 972 daylighr sorties— 332 more than the previous day.
Instead of the early-morning reconnaissance aircraft which usually preceded attacks later in the morning formations of 30+, 40+, etc., to the tune of 100 aircraft were building up over Calais at 7.15 a.m. These resolved into 40 bombers escorted by about 60 fighters stepped-up from 12,000 to 20,000 feet east of Dover. The formations split and separate raids attacked Eastchurch, North Weald, Rochford and Biggin Hill. 11 Group despatched eleven squadrons, but of these only five made contact.
The problems of dealing with low raids were again brought out during these sorties and special orders were issued from Sectors to the Observer Corps giving priority to low-flying aircraft. The Bromley Observer Centre diary recorded: ‘Biggin Hill was caught by a low flight while everybody’s attention including our Corps was absorbed by heavy work in dealing with high flights.’
The second attack began to form up over France at noon and at about 12.35 some 250 fighters and bombers converged on Dover and then split up. All the raids were accurately tracked by the Observer Corps over the Isle of Sheppey and the Thames Estuary, but one of them severely damaged Debden aerodrome.
By 3.15 yet another build-up was shown on the radar screens over Calais. Two hundred and fifty German machines transitted Dover and then spread fanwise over Kent. One raid penetrated to Biggin Hill, Kenley and Brooklands. At Detling a hangar was hit and damage was caused at both Eastchurch and Hornchurch. At the latter, successful interceptions broke up the raid to such an extent that only six out of a hundred bombs dropped fell within the airfield boundary. Bombs fell at random on other places including Herne Bay, where one crater measured 200 feet across.
Finally at five o’clock in the afternoon a large raid and several small diversions appeared over Dungeness, their targets again being airfields.
Damage to airfields had been considerable with Detling and Eastchurch the worst hit. At Detling thirty aircraft wrecked ‘C’ Flight hangar and rendered the aerodrome unserviceable for several hours. Eastchurch received two attacks, the first by eighteen aircraft which exploded a dump of three hundred and fifty 250 lb. bombs, wrecked the N.A.A.F.I. and admin, buildings, smashed water mains and sewers, destroyed five aeroplanes and put most of the communications out of action, including the Defence Teleprinter Network. In the second raid another hangar was hit, and it was decided on the following day to remove G.H.Q. and the accounts section. The camp was transferred to Wymswold Warden and the sick quarters to Eastchurch village. Total casualties for the day at the station were four killed and twelve wounded.
To meet this phased effort against its stations, 11 Group had put up 751 sorties and had lost thirty-one aircraft to the Luftwaffe’s thirty-five, eight R.A.F. pilots had been killed and seven wounded. Once again Erprobungs Gruppe 210 had suffered, with eight Me nos destroyed. On one bomber shot down were found supplies of hand grenades intended to be thrown out at persuing fighters. A coastal raid in the north left two steamers off Aberdeenshire damaged, one of which was burned out.
Night brought a few hours respite until at 1.30 a.m. raiders began to arrive in ones and twos over East Anglia, of which approximately half were engaged in minelaying. Many of the bombers out of the seventy-five despatched were from Luftflotte 3, and their landfall was Swanage in Dorsetshire. Targets were again scattered, including Leighton Buzzard, Digby, Castle Bromwich, Sealand, Birmingham, Liverpool, Monmouth and Cardiff.
September 3rd
Day Heavy attacks on airfields. Losses equal.
Night Main attack Liverpool. Harassing raids on South Wales and the south-east.
Weather Fine and warm. Some cloud and drizzle in north. Haze in Channel and Straits.
At eight o’clock in the morning Luftflotte 2 began the familiar pattern of building up formations over Calais, and one by one the blips appeared on the cathode-ray tubes at the C.H. and gun-laying radar stations at Dover.
The targets were Hornchurch, North Weald and Debden, but through a series of disjointed dog-fights only one intact formation reached its target, North Weald. Here about thirty Dorniers escorted by Me nos did severe damage. Fire broke out in Nos. 151 and 25 Squadrons hangars, the motor transport yard was badly hit and several other buildings including the main stores were damaged. The new sector operations block received a direct hit but survived, although all communications with the Observer Corps were severed except for one line to Watford Centre. The airfield Tannoy system was destroyed and the vital high-frequency relay system for communication between aircraft and base was cut between the receiver and transmitter. Despite all this and a liberal sowing of delayed-action bombs, the aerodrome remained serviceable for day operations.
One of the pilots from 603 Squadron shot down in this operation was Pilot Officer Richard Hillary, later to write the best seller ‘The Last Enemy’. His cockpit in flames Hillary had difficulty in getting the Spitfire’s hood open. When at last he succeeded he fell, badly burned, into the sea. After over an hour of pain and misery he, like so many other pilots, was picked up by an R.N.L.I. lifeboat, the J. B. Proudfoot, on temporary duty at Margate.
Sgt. C. Babbage of 602 Spitfire Squadron, Westhamp-nett, Sussex, who baled out into the sea after a Luftflotte 3 attack on Portsmouth on August 26th. He was picked up by a fishing boat and brought ashore at Bognor Regis. Note the pier in the background with a large piece removed to stop its use by a seaborne invading force
In the afternoon a second attack developed in the same area which was beaten off, and in which action the Czech pilots of No. 310 Squadron, Duxford, played a significant part.
Due to continuing bomber losses, the Luftwaffe had been experimenting with new tactics on this day. Previously the plan had been to advance in stepped formations, but this was temporarily replaced by (a) fighters and bombers flying at the same level and (b) mixed groups of fighters and bombers. Neither of these was found to be satisfactory, and a few days later there was a general resumption of stepped formations. Freiejagd, or freelance patrols of Me 109s and Me nos, continued to fly in and then orbit in attempts to draw R.A.F. fighters away from the main attack.
The losses of the 3rd were nevertheless an ominous portent for the R.A.F. Sixteen fighters were shot down with eight pilots saved, while the German casualties for the whole twenty-four-hour period were also sixteen—the Luftwaffe had achieved parity for the second time.
The main raid of the night was against Liverpool, about ninety bombers flying in a steady stream from Cherbourg. Bombing was, however, not concentrated and damage was also done at Warrington, Chester and Sealand.
September 4th
Day Succession of airfield raids in two main phases. Serious damage at Vickers Works, Brooklands.
Night Further raid on Liverpool. Harassing attacks.
Weather Fine and warm. Occasional rain and strong winds in north. Haze in Estuary, Channel and Straits.
On September 1st the Luftwaffe Operations Staff IA had issued an order to the Luftflotten covering the destruction (if possible) of thirty British factories making aircraft, aero engines, propellers and ancillary equipment. This was an attempt to halt a seemingly endless flow of fighter equipment to the R.A.F., despite Intelligence IC statements that the aircraft were either destroyed or non-existent. The order covered both fighter and bomber production, and the necessary target briefings had been completed by September 3rd.
Accordingly on the 4th the raids by Luftflotte 2 were divided, with both sector airfields and factories as their targets.
The first big attack of the day concentrated on airfields, coming in via the Estuary and over Dover. At Eastchurch bombs from eighteen aircraft demolished the ration store and produced six craters in the runway, but there were no casualties. Lympne was shot up, as were the Dover Balloons.
At lunchtime successive waves of bombers with fighter escort totalling about 300 crossed the coast at Dover, Folkestone, Hastings and Beachy Head. Fourteen squadrons rose to do battle, and nine of them intercepted. In the ensuing confusion at 1.30 p.m. fourteen Me nos of 5/LG.1 slipped through at low level and followed the Southern Railway line over Guildford, Surrey, to the Vickers Armstrong factory at Brooklands, where two-thirds of the R.A.F.’s Wellington bombers were produced.
At mid-day on August 31st, 1940 Squadron Leader T. P. Gleave of No. 253 Squadron took off from Biggin Hill leading a formation of seven Hurricanes to intercept a raid approaching the airfield.
At 12,000 feet was a large formation of Ju 88s. Despite inferiority in numbers the handful of fighters went into the attack. Squadron Leader Gleave hit two bombers of the port line and was laying his sights on a third when a cannon shell hit his starboard fuel tank. The aircraft, P3115, burst into flames and the starboard wing came off. Severely burned, Squadron Leader Gleave managed to bale out and landed at Mace Farm just east of Biggin Hill.
One of the Ju 88s he fired at crashed at the village of Downe to the north.
The 19 Group Bromley Observer Corps log book at 1300 hours recorded: ‘Hurricane and hostile bomber crashed Q8J79. Hurricane pilot baled out in approximately Q9577’.
Squadron Leader Gleave became one of the first plastic surgery ‘guinea pigs’ and subsequently returned to R.A.F. service, rising to the rank of Group Captain. He presumed that his aircraft had completely broken up, but in fact the engine and other large sections lay deep in a thicket on a lonely hillside by the farm. They were ‘re-discovered’ after more than 20 years. In 1967 the engine was transported to Biggin Hill by the Flairavia Flying Club and is now a museum piece. Somewhere in the surrounding fields lie four Browning machine guns which will doubtless come to light one day. Aircraft wreckage, bullets, bombs and pieces of uniform and equipment from 1940 are still being found in the south of England.
The photographs show left, the Merlin engine of P3115 lying in a thicket at Mace Farm and right. Group Captain Gleave, in 1967, holding up a piece of the wreckage
The adjacent sector and Observer Corps operations tables were ‘saturated’ with raid plots and the formation ‘Bradshawing’ up the railway went unnoticed until the last moment. Due to an unusually quick piece of recognition by the sergeant in charge of the airfield guns, the two leading aircraft were shot down almost immediately and several others jettisoned their bombs outside the target area when intercepted by No. 253 Squadron’s Hurricanes over the village of Clandon. The bombs dropped, however, scored direct hits on the machine and erecting shops. Many workers were buried under rubble and girders while hundreds more were injured by blast and flying splinters. From the six bombs in the works area eighty-eight people were killed and 600 injured, while factory output almost ceased for four days.
Other small groups of raiders got through to Rochester, Eastchurch, Shoeburyness, Canterbury, Faversham and Reigate. At Rochester the target was again the Short Brothers factory engaged in initial production of the Sterling four-motor heavy bombers.
In these fierce engagements of the morning and afternoon. Fighter Command put up a total 678 sorties and lost seventeen fighters against German losses of twenty-five—the balance was beginning to improve slightly.
The night was extremely active with nearly 200 bombers over England, the majority going to Liverpool, Bristol and South Wales. A number of raiders approached the Thames Estuary but seemed disconcerted by the London barrage. Parachute flares were dropped over Hendon and Hatfield, while other bombs fell on Manchester, Halifax, Newcastle, Nottingham, Tilbury and Gravesend.
September 5th
Day Airfield attacks in two phases. Park orders special cover for fighter factories.
Night Continuous activity over most of England.
Weather Again fine and warm, cloud developing later. Channel and Straits fine.
As on previous days, the Luftwaffe effort was divided up into two major attacks, the sub-formations breaking away and heading for their targets after crossing the coast, in order to confuse the defences.
About 10 a.m. raids developed over Kent heading for Croydon, Biggin Hill and Eastchurch, while others concentrated on North Weald and Lympne. Fourteen R.A.F. squadrons joined the fight and most of the raiders were diverted before reaching their targets as occurred at Biggin Hill where 79 Squadron successfully intercepted.
Just after lunch radar began to track several formations over France, but many came in so high that they were missed by the Observers on the ground and were not plotted on the operations tables. The oil-tanks at Thameshaven were set on fire while Biggin Hill and Detling received further attention.
The bombers dispersed at two o’clock and swarms of Me 109s patrolled the Channel to see them home, as German losses through being shot down into the sea were becoming too frequent to be ignored.
In these engagements fighter Command lost twenty machines to the Germans’ twenty-three throughout the twenty-four hour period, although five British pilots were saved.
At night during the 5th/6th there was almost continuous activity, with bombs dropped on Liverpool, Manchester, London and over forty other towns and cities.
Following the attacks on Weybridge and Rochester, Park, on the 5th, issued instructions passed on from Dowding that maximum fighter cover should be given to the Hawker factories at Kingston, Langley and Brooklands, and to the Vickers-Supermarine works at Southampton. Dowding had correctly diagnosed that part of the enemy’s effort had been switched to factories and that more such raids would be forthcoming. The only direct protection he could afford was to ask for two No. 10 Group squadrons to patrol the lines Brooklands-Croydon and Brooklands-Windsor whenever a heavy attack developed south of the Thames.
In his order Park stressed the ‘vital’ importance to the R.A.F. of the Southampton factories and in particular the Supermarine works at Woolston. Ever helpful, 10 Group had agreed to reinforce the Tangmere sector by up to three or four squadrons whenever a mass raid approached the Southampton–Portsmouth area.
On the 5th, No. 504 Squadron was ordered to move south from Catterick. The procedure was a typical example of unit moves during the Battle. In the early morning a message was received for the squadron to transfer complete to Hendon. Bombay transport aircraft arrived to take part of the personnel, while the remainder entrained after lunch. The pilots flew down at midday and were in action over London on the 7th.
September 6th
Day Three main attacks, largely broken up.
Night Less activity. Harassing raids only.
Weather Fine, but cooler. Haze in Straits and Estuary.
Park’s orders on factory defence had been issued none too soon for on Friday the 6th Luftflotte 2 tried to attack the Hawker works at Brooklands where half the total output of Hurricanes was produced. The squadrons on patrol were able to prevent any serious damage being done.
In all there were three main attacks during the day, which cost Fighter Command twenty-three fighters, the pilots of twelve machines being saved. German losses were thirty-five, including sixteen Me 109s and eight He 111s from KG26.
Groups of bombers with fighter escort began to mass at 8.30 in the morning, and they fanned out over Kent trying to get at five of the sector stations around London. Their efforts were frustrated and they therefore made a second attempt at midday and a third in the early evening. No great damage was done due to successful interceptions, as was evidenced at Biggin Hill where most of the bombs overshot the target and fell on the Westerham road where the much repaired main trunk cable was once more severed. An unusual present for the R.A.F. came on this evening in the shape of an Me 109 which landed at Hawkinge when it ran out of fuel.
The night of the 6th/7th was less active than usual with single raiders wandering the counties and dropping bombs sufficient to keep the sirens howling and the shelters occupied. The Fighter Command controllers presumed that the enemy was resting after the long period of sustained activity. They did not know that the Luftwaffe was about to change its policy and that the agonising strain on 11 Group was to be eased at the expense of the citizens of London. The morrow was to provide many surprises.
FIGHTER COMMAND ORDER OF BATTLE Groups and Squadrons September 7th, 1940 (0900 hours)
|
13 GROUP, HEADQUARTERS NEWCASTLE |
||
|
Wick |
||
|
3 |
Hurricane |
Castletown |
|
232 |
Hurricane |
Sumburgh (one flight) |
|
Dyce |
||
|
145 |
Hurricane |
A Flight Dyce |
|
Turnhouse |
||
|
605 |
Hurricane |
Drem |
|
65 |
Spitfire |
Turnhouse |
|
141 |
Defiant |
Turnhouse |
|
615 |
Hurricane |
Prestwick |
|
Usworth |
||
|
607 |
Hurricane |
Usworth |
|
610 |
Spitfire |
Acklington |
|
32 |
Hurricane |
Acklington |
|
Catterick |
||
|
54 |
Spitfire |
Catterick |
|
219 |
Blenheim |
Catterick |
|
12 GROUP, HEADQUARTERS WATNALL |
||
|
Kirton-in-Lindsey |
||
|
74 |
Spitfire |
Kirton-in-Lindsey |
|
264 |
Defiant |
Kirton-in-Lindsey |
|
Church Fenton |
||
|
85 |
Hurricane |
Church Fenton |
|
302 |
Hurricane |
Church Fenton (Polish) |
|
64 |
Spitfire |
Church Fenton |
|
Digby |
||
|
611 |
Spitfire |
Digby |
|
151 |
Hurricane |
Digby |
|
29 |
Blenheim |
Digby |
|
Coltishall |
||
|
616 |
Spitfire |
Coltishall |
|
242 |
Hurricane |
Coltishall |
|
266 |
Spitfire |
Coltishall (A Flight Wittering) |
|
Wittering |
||
|
23 |
Blenheim |
Wittering |
|
229 |
Hurricane |
Wittering (B Flight Bircham Newton) |
|
Duxford |
||
|
19 |
Spitfire |
Duxford |
|
310 |
Hurricane |
Duxford (Czech) |
|
11 GROUP, HEADQUARTERS UXBRIDGE |
||
|
Debden |
||
|
17 |
Hurricane |
Debden |
|
73 |
Hurricane |
Castle Camps |
|
25 |
Blenheim |
Martlesham |
|
257 |
Hurricane |
Martlesham (B Flight North Weald) |
|
North Weald |
||
|
249 |
Hurricane |
North Weald |
|
46 |
Hurricane |
Stapleford |
|
Hornchurch |
||
|
222 |
Spitfire |
Hornchurch |
|
603 |
Spitfire |
Hornchurch |
|
600 |
Blenheim |
Hornchurch |
|
41 |
Spitfire |
Rochford |
|
Biggin Hill |
||
|
79 |
Spitfire |
Biggin Hill |
|
501 |
Hurricane |
Gravesend |
|
Kenley |
||
|
111 |
Hurricane |
Croydon |
|
72 |
Spitfire |
Croydon |
|
66 |
Spitfire |
Kenley |
|
253 |
Hurricane |
Kenley |
|
Northolt |
||
|
1 |
Hurricane |
Heathrow |
|
1 |
Hurricane |
Northolt (R.C.A.F.) |
|
303 |
Hurricane |
Northolt (Polish) |
|
504 |
Hurricane |
Northolt |
|
Tangmere |
||
|
601 |
Hurricane |
Tangmere |
|
43 |
Hurricane |
Tangmere |
|
602 |
Spitfire |
Westhampnett |
|
10 GROUP, HEADQUARTERS, BOX, WILTSHIRE |
||
|
Pembrey |
||
|
92 |
Spitfire |
Pembrey |
|
Filton |
||
|
213 |
Hurricane |
Exeter |
|
87 |
Hurricane |
Exeter (B Flight Bibury) |
|
St. Eval |
||
|
238 |
Hurricane |
St.Eval |
|
247 |
Gladiator |
Roborough (one flight) |
|
Middle Wallop |
||
|
234 |
Spitfire |
Middle Wallop |
|
609 |
Spitfire |
Middle Wallop |
|
604 |
Blenheim |
Middle Wallop |
|
56 |
Hurricane |
Boscombe Down |
|
152 |
Spitfire |
Warmwell |
LUFTWAFFE ORDER OF BATTLE IN THE WEST September 1940
|
LUFTFLOTTE 5—NORWAY (at 14.9.40) |
||
|
X Fliegerkorps |
||
|
Aufkl.Gr.22 Stab, with |
||
|
l./(F)120 |
He 111 and Ju 88 |
|
|
2./(F)22 |
Do 17 |
|
|
3./(F)122 |
Do 17 and Ju 88 |
|
|
l./(F)121 |
Do 17 and Ju 88 |
|
|
Coastal reconnaissance |
||
|
Aufkl.Gr.Ob.d.l.Ku.FlGr.506 |
||
|
(one kette) |
He 115 |
|
|
1./506 |
He 115 |
|
|
2./506 |
He 115 |
|
|
3./506 |
He 115 |
|
|
Fighters |
||
|
II/JG77 |
Me 109 |
|
|
LUFTFLOTTE 2—HOLLAND, BELGIUM AND |
||
|
NORTHERN FRANCE |
||
|
(at 3.9.40) |
||
|
Long-range reconnaissance |
||
|
Aufkl.Gr.l22 Stab |
||
|
l./(F)22 |
Do 17 and Me 110 |
|
|
2./(F)122 |
Ju88 |
|
|
4./(F)122 |
Ju 88, He 111 and Me 110 |
|
|
I Fliegerkorps |
||
|
Long-range reconnaissance |
||
|
5./(F)122 |
Ju 88 and He 111 |
|
|
Long-range bombers |
||
|
KG76 Stab, I, II, III |
I, III, Do 17; |
|
|
II, Ju 88 |
||
|
KG77 Stab, I, II, III |
Ju 88 |
|
|
KG1 Stab, I, II, III |
I, II, He 111; |
|
|
III, Ju 88 |
||
|
KG30 Stab, I, II |
Ju 88 |
|
|
II Fliegerkorps |
||
|
Long-range reconnaissance |
||
|
l./(F)122 |
Ju 88 |
|
|
7./(F)LG2 |
Me 110 |
|
|
Long-range bombers |
||
|
KG2 Stab, I, II, III |
Do 17z |
|
|
KG53 Stab, I, II, III |
He111 |
|
|
KG3 Stab, I, II, III |
Do 17z |
|
|
IV/(St)LGl |
Ju 87 |
|
|
Fighter-bombers |
||
|
LG2 II (Schlacht) |
Me 109 |
|
|
Epr. Gr.210 |
Me 109/110 |
|
|
Dive-bombers |
||
|
St.Gl Stab, II |
Stab, Do 17 |
|
|
and Ju 87; II, Ju 87 |
||
|
St.G26 I, II |
Ju 87 |
|
|
VIII Fliegerkorps (In process of transfer from Luftflotte 3 to Luftflotte 2 as from 29.8.40. See Battle order for August) |
||
|
IX Fliegerdivision |
||
|
Long-range reconnaissance |
||
|
3./(F)122 |
Ju 88 and He 111 |
|
|
KG4 Stab, I, II, III |
I, II, He 111; |
|
|
III, Ju 88 |
||
|
Minelaying |
||
|
KGr.126 |
He 111 |
|
|
KG40 Stab |
Ju 88 |
|
|
Coastal reconnaissance |
||
|
K.Fl.Gr.106 |
He 115 and Do 18 |
|
|
Jagdfliegerführer 1 |
||
|
JG76 Stab, II |
Me 109 |
|
|
V.(Z)/LG1 |
Me 110 |
|
|
Jagdflegerführer 2 |
||
|
JG53 Stab, I, II, III |
Me 109 |
|
|
JG51 Stab |
Me 109 |
|
|
JG3 (in process of transfer from |
||
|
Luftflotte 3) |
Me 109 |
|
|
Luftgaukommando VI |
||
|
I./JG52 (one Schwarm) |
Me 109 |
|
|
III./JG3 (one Schwarm) |
Me 109 |
|
|
Luftgaukommando XI |
||
|
JGl Stab |
Me 109 |
|
|
JG52 II |
Me 109 |
|
|
JG51 II |
Me 109 |
|
|
Luftgaukommando Holland |
||
|
JG54 (one Schwarm) each from |
||
|
I, II, III |
Me 109 |
|
|
JG51 II (one Schwarm) |
Me 109 |
|
|
Luftgaukommando Belgium |
||
|
Close reconnaissance aircraft only |
||
|
LUFTFLOTTE 3 (at 23.9.40) |
||
|
Long-range reconnaissance |
||
|
Aufkl.Gr.l23 Stab |
||
|
1./(F)123 |
Ju 88 and Do 17 |
|
|
2./(F) 123 |
Ju 88 and Do 17 |
|
|
3./(F)123 |
Ju 88 and Do 17 |
|
|
Jagdfliegerführer 3 |
||
|
IV Fliegerkorps |
||
|
Long-range reconnaissance |
||
|
3./(F)121 |
Ju 88 and He 111 |
|
|
LGl Stab, I, II, III and reserve |
||
|
Staffel |
Ju 88 |
|
|
Dive-bombers |
||
|
St.G3 Stab, I, II |
Ju 87 |
|
|
St.G2 |
Ju 87 |
|
|
Long-range bombers |
||
|
K.Gr.806 |
Ju 88 |
|
|
KG27 Stab, I, II, III, and |
||
|
reserve Staffel |
He 111 |
|
|
Long-range bombers |
||
|
K.Gr.806 |
Ju 88 |
|
|
KG27 Stab, I, II, III, |
||
|
and reserve Staffel |
He 111 |
|
|
K.Gr, 100 |
He 111 |
|
|
K.Gr;606 |
Do 17 |
|
|
Long-range reconnaissance |
||
|
3./(F)31 (subordinate to 9th Army |
||
|
H.Q.) Me 110 and Do 17 |
||
|
Naval-co-operation |
||
|
I/KG40 |
FW 200 |
|
|
Fighters |
||
|
ZG76 Stab, II, III |
Me 110 |
|
|
JG53 Stab, I, II, III |
Me 109 |
|
|
V./LGl |
Me 110 |
|
|
V Fliegerkorps |
||
|
Long-range reconnaissance |
||
|
4./(F)121 |
Ju 88 and Do 17 |
|
|
4./(F)14 |
Me 110 and Do 17 |
|
|
Long-range bombers |
||
|
KG51 Stab, I, II, III |
Ju 88 |
|
|
and reserve Staffel |
||
|
KG54 Stab, I, II and |
Ju 88 |
|
|
reserve Staffel |
||
|
KG55 Stab, I, II, III |
He 111 |
|
|
and reserve Staffel |
||
|
Fighters |
||
|
ZG26 Stab, I, II, III |
Me 110 |
|
|
JG2 Stab, I, II, III |
Me 109 |
|
|
(operating both Luftflotten 2 and 3) |
||
|
JG27 Stab, I, II, III |
Me 109 |
|
|
(under VIII Fliegerkorps for admin.) |
||