17
The timetable for the German invasion of England was not going to schedule due to the resistance of the R.A.F. during August, and to the High Command it appeared that they were no nearer defeating Fighter Command and achieving the air superiority for the landing. In addition the period August 24th to September 6th had shown 107 German bombers and two Stukas lost.
Intelligence under Schmid had been totally unable to assess the actual state of R.A.F. fighter forces from week to week or that the raids on sector airfields had caused great dislocation and damage with a high rate of pilot casualties. For two months the Luftwaffe had tried every device to bring the main British fighter force into battle when numerical superiority of Me 109s and Me nos would destroy it.
From the beginning there had been many in the Luftwaffe Command who were of the opinion that only direct and heavy daylight blows against London would achieve the desired results, with the possibility that the raids might cause morale to crack as occurred at Warsaw and Rotterdam. Hitler had consistently forbidden attacks on London as he felt certain Britain would sue for peace without such extreme measures.
The chain which led to a reversal of his policy was actually set off by the Germans themselves. On the night of August 25th a number of bombs had accidentally fallen on central London, due to bad navigation. The R.A.F. had immediately taken up the challenge and flown several night raids over Berlin. Little damage was actually caused, but the effect on both Hitler and Göring was decisive. As the glorious victors of Europe it was embarrassing to say the least to have enemy bombers droning over the Reich night after night practically unscathed.
As early as August 31st the Command Staff of the Luftwaffe issued preliminary orders for Luftflotten 2 and 3 to prepare for a daylight reprisal raid on London. On September 2nd Luftflotten 2 and 3 drew up instructions for the general plan of the attack which covered day and night raids on London and other large centres of population.
Thus, when the Luftwaffe commanders met in The Hague on September 3rd to discuss the progress of the air war against England, an attack on the heart of the British Empire seemed the only logical step. As related in Chapter 5 there were heated arguments between Kesselring and Sperrle over current R.A.F. fighter strength with the former winning the day on a theory that Fighter Command was almost finished. The attacks on sector stations from the south coast up to and around London had cleared the way, so it was thought, for the final assault. British reserves that had apparently been pulled back north out of range of the Me 109 would certainly be thrown into the defence of the city and would incur heavy losses. To Kesselring it seemed the only sensible idea, and one that he had been suggesting ever since the Battle started, i.e. massive attack at full strength against one key objective.
With the Luftwaffe committed to the plan, and the preparations well in hand, it only remained for the F?to give his sanction. After the first raids on Berlin, Hitler had clearly given Göring permission to put in hand arrangements for such an operation, otherwise the orders of August 31st could not have come from the O.K.L. The Luftwaffe had set the date as September 7th, and five days before that Hitler personally gave orders for ‘the start of the reprisal raids against London’.
In England neither Dowding nor Park were aware of any impending change in tactics. All they knew was that the unremitting attacks on airfields and the sector organisation during August had gravely impaired strength and efficiency.
The position was grim in the extreme as from August 24th to September 6th 295 fighters had been totally destroyed and 171 badly damaged, against a total output of 269 new and repaired Spitfires and Hurricanes. Worst of all, during the fortnight 103 pilots were killed or missing and 128 were wounded, which represented a total wastage of 120 pilots per week out of a fighting strength of just under 1,000.
Experienced pilots were like gold-dust, and each one lost had to be replaced by an untried man who for some time would be vulnerable, until he acquired battle know-how. Fresh squadrons, moved in to replace tired units, very often lost more aircraft and pilots than the formations they replaced. For instance, 616 Squadron lost twelve aircraft and five pilots between August 25th and September 2nd and had to be retired to Coltishall in No. 12 Group.
No. 603 Squadron, newly arrived in 11 Group on August 28th, had by September 6th lost sixteen aircraft and twelve pilots, while 253 Squadron at Kenley lost thirteen Hurricanes and nine pilots in the seven days they were in battle, from August 30th.
In contrast the experienced squadrons, while utterly weary and often flying over fifty hours per day, continued to show far better results. No. 54 Squadron, when sent north from Hornchurch on September 3rd, had lost only nine aircraft and one pilot since August 24th. No. 501 Squadron in the Biggin Hill sector during the complete phase (August 24th–September 6th) had suffered the loss of nine aircraft and four pilots.
A Heinkel 111 shot down at Burmarsh, Kent, on September 11th. The Spitfire that shot it down can be seen circling overhead.
Two of the German crew are being led away while the Heinkel burns out in the background
During the whole of August no more than 260 fighter pilots were turned out by the O.T.U.s and casualties in the same month were just over 300. A full squadron establishment was twenty-six pilots whereas the average in August was sixteen. The command was literally wasting away under Dowding’s eyes and there was nothing he could do about it if southern England was to continue as a defended area.
The ground organisation had also suffered severely and in a report to Headquarters Fighter Command, dated September 12th, Park stated that contrary to general belief and official reports, the enemy’s bombing attacks by day had done extensive damage to five forward aerodromes and also to six out of seven sector stations. The damage to forward aerodromes was so severe that Manston and Lympne were for several days quite unfit for fighters. Biggin Hill was so severely damaged that only one squadron could operate from the airfield and the remaining two squadrons had to be placed under the control of adjacent sectors for over a week. Park added that had the enemy continued his heavy attacks to the adjacent sectors, knocked out their operations rooms or telephone communications, the fighter defences of London would have been in a powerless state during the last critical phase, and unopposed heavy attacks would have been directed against the capital.
By the second week in September the Luftwaffe air assault on Britain covered a 24-hour cycle. As the last of the daylight raids faded out, the bombers were preparing to deliver their deadly loads by night. Here Do 17s of KG3 are seen on take-off, and heading out towards the Channel. For night operations the white outline of the wing crosses had been blacked over but the white bar denoting first Gruppe on the starboard wing had been retained. In early September KG3 had been transferred from Luftflotte 3 to Luftflotte 2 in the Pas de Calais
September 7th
Day Bombing switched to London. Heavy attack on the capital. Pressure on fighter airfields eased.
A street in west London on September 8th after the raiders had passed. A double-decker bus has been blown up into the first-floor windows of a terrace house
Night London raids continue dusk until dawn. Main objectives east London and docks.
Weather Fair in the south. Some haze.
Göring decided personally to command the assault against London, and accordingly his immaculate personal train with its cooks, telephones and stocks of wine rolled north-west to the Pas de Calais. At Cap Gris Nez the entourage of field marshals, generals and colonels took their stand while the Reichsmarschall gazed skyward through his binoculars waiting for the passing of his aerial armada.
Every available fighter was being used, and bombers in far greater force than hitherto. The targets lay in East London, on the banks of the Thames, among the docks and warehouses.
To the staff on duty in the filter and operations rooms at Bentley Priory the day began purely as a repetition of so many others. At 11.15 four raids developed with Hawkinge airfield as their main target. The fighter dispositions had been laid down with continued attacks on sector stations in view, and to this end Park in his order of September 5th had stressed the need to put fighter squadrons into battle in pairs, the Spitfires to deal with the fighter screen and the Hurricanes with the bombers. 11 Group was ready to deal with sector and factory raids, with the assistance of 10 Group on its western flank and 12 Group to the north.
Park was not, however, satisfied that fighters were being positioned correctly. In the early stages of the Battle there had been a tendency for radar plots to be shown with too low a height and many squadrons found themselves still climbing, with the enemy above. This had led both pilots and controllers to add a few thousand feet on to the height given in the hope of arriving above or on a level with the raid.
By early September the radar plotting and Fighter Command’s filtering had improved still further with continuous practice, and the heights fed into sector operations were usually accurate. The habit of ‘adding a bit’ nevertheless still went on with the result that squadrons found themselves going straight into the high-altitude escort screen while the bombers got through.
On the 7th a terse instruction was issued by Park to his controllers. After pointing out that on one occasion the previous day only seven out of eighteen squadrons despatched engaged the enemy and on another only seven out of seventeen got into the right position, he commented that it was obvious that some controllers were ordering squadrons intended to engage enemy bombers to patrol too high. When Group ordered a squadron to 16,000 feet, sector controller added on one or two thousand, and the squadron added on another two thousand in the vain hope that they would not have any enemy fighters above them. The net: result had been that daily some of the enemy bomber formations slipped in under 15,000 feet, frequently without any fighter escort, and bombed their objectives, doing serious damage, as at Brooklands. In fact the majority of enemy bomber formations had been intercepted only after they had dropped their bombs and were on the way out.
A Heinkel 111 of KG53 taxies out through a wheatfield in northern France. The dorsal gunner was obviously expecting the worst as he was wearing a steel helmet!
11 Group were also concerned about the prospects of invasion as the barge concentrations across the Channel daily grew larger. In the morning the Air Ministry informed Fighter Command ‘Invasion regarded Imminent’. This was followed by standard notifications of states of readiness:
Invasion Alert No. 3—an attack is probable within three days.
Invasion Alert No. 2—an attack is probable within two days.
Invasion Alert No. 1—an attack is imminent.
Fighter Command had plenty on its mind when at 4 p.m. the radar stations picked up several formations of twenty + over Calais. It was presumed they would adopt the usual tactics of crossing the coast and splitting up straightaway. Gradually it was realised at Bentley Priory that this was no ordinary raid. Over 300 bombers with 600 Me 109s and Me 110s in attendance, stepped up in solid layers, crossed the coast in two waves. The first flew direct to the Estuary and the second, an hour later, passed over central London, then steered back over the Estuary and the East End.
It was too late to alter the carefully prepared dispositions of the fighter squadrons, and as a result many bombers were not attacked until after they had delivered their loads. The sector stations were being well covered, but the road to London was clear. The 11 Group controller got everything he could vector on to the advancing phalanx, but it was in penny numbers compared with the solid masses of the Luftwaffe.
In addition the German fighter screen had adopted new techniques. Both bombers and fighters operated at great height with the former usually at between 16,000 and 20,000 feet.
Escorts were divided into two parts, some operating in close contact with the bombers, and others a few hundred yards away and a little above. Close cover was above, behind—at a lower level—and on both sides of the bombers. If the formation was attacked from starboard the starboard section engaged the attackers, the top section moving to starboard and the port section to the top position. If the attack came from the port side the system was reversed. British fighters coming in to the rear were engaged by the rear section and the two outside sections similarly moved to the rear. If the threat came from above, the top section went into action while the side sections gained height in order to be able to follow the R.A.F. fighters down as they broke away. If attacked themselves, all sections flew in defensive circles. These tactics were skilfully evolved and carried out, and they were extremely difficult to counter.
Approaching London, a formation of Heinkel 111s during one of the September raids, with an ever-ready official cameraman in the nose of this aircraft
Despite interception by four fighter squadrons and heavy anti-aircraft fire, the bombers of both waves made determined efforts to keep formation. High on the top of the Senate House, London University, the central London Observer post K.1 had a bird’s-eye view of the attack and passed plots as fast as the operations room could take them.
Bombs rained down upon the London docks, the oil-tanks at Cliffe and Thameshaven, Beckton gasworks, and on Poplar, Woolwich, Millwall, Limehouse, Tower Bridge, Tottenham, West Ham, Barking and Croydon. Silvertown became a raging inferno and the fires raged on acting as a beacon for the night bombers, while in the little streets of the East End the inevitable pattern of death and destruction was beginning to unfold.
Rows of jerry-built terraced houses of the early Victorian era suddenly became heaps of tiles and rubble. Processions of bombed-out families—with a perambulator, a few bundles and the children clinging on for dear life—threaded their way through the glass and debris. Wardens, firemen and a host of others dug in the ruins searching for the injured. London’s testing time had begun, and like the pilots, ground staff and W.A.A.F.s of the R.A.F., the city was not found wanting. In curious irony it was a quarter of a century before, on September 8th, 1915, that Zeppelins had made their first big raid on London.
Many of the raiders did not fare so well as their companions who had a clear run over the City. The 12 Group wing at Duxford had been practising their formation techniques, and had Leigh-Mallory’s blessing to operate en masse. No. 242 Squadron which led the wing had a bitter fight with a large formation ot Dorniers and Messerschmitts and shot down several, although the remaining two squadrons—19 and 310—could not gain height in time to join in.
The most successful of the units operating on the 7th was No. 303, the Polish squadron from Northolt. When the Poles came into the battle they found forty Dorniers at 20,000 feet with a formation of Me 110s above and behind, and further back still, at over 25,000 feet, were the Me 109s. The engagement was a first-class piece of the kind of co-operation Park wanted. A squadron of Spitfires took on the 109s, while a Hurricane squadron attacked the rear of the bombers forcing them to turn back. At this juncture the Poles waded in, turning their whole unit broadside on to the enemy.
They dived 4,000 feet out of the sun, each pilot selecting a victim. The squadron commander, Squadron Leader R. G. Kellett, reported afterwards: ‘We gave them all we’d got, opening fire at 450 yards and only breaking away when we could see the enemy completely filling the gunsight. That means we finished the attack at point-blank range. We went in practically in one straight line, all of us blazing away.’ Nearly a quarter of the bombers were destroyed or badly damaged.
One of No. 10 Group’s squadrons on the factory protection patrol was also involved in the general mêlée as the Luftwaffe retired just after 6 p.m. Flight Lieutenant J. H. G. McArthur, ‘Blue Leader’ No. 609 Squadron, reported:
Whilst on patrol at 10,000 feet between Brooklands and Windsor, we saw about 200 enemy aircraft over London surrounded by A.A. fire. We climbed towards them and I led the squadron into a quarter attack on a large number of twin-engined and twin-tailed bombers which I think must have been Do 17s. I went for the nearest bomber and opened fire at about 400 yards, meanwhile experiencing very heavy return cross-fire from the bomber formation. After about twelve seconds smoke started to come from the port motor and it left the formation. I broke away as there were many 110s and 109s behind. The bomber with one motor still pouring out thick smoke continued to lose height, so I waited until it got down to about 3,000 feet and then dived vertically on to it and fired off the rest of my ammunition (about 3 to 4 sees.). It kept going on down seemingly still under some sort of control, until it hit the water about ten miles out from the centre of the Thames Estuary.
The two Air Forces meet and vapour trails criss-cross the sky. Older trails fluff out and break up as more aircraft with thin clear contrails take up the battle. These pictures were taken from the R.A.F. station at Manston, Kent
No. 7 O.T.U. at Hawarden gained their second victory of the Battle, having chalked up an He 111 on August 14th. Sergeant L. S. Pilkington, while instructing a pupil in formation flying, heard on the R/T that a ‘bandit’ was approaching Hoylake. Having sent the pupil home he intercepted a Ju 88 at 20,000 feet and was able to get in a good burst with his two 20 mm. cannon, which were a rarity at the time. The Ju 88 subsequently crashed in Wales.
While the day had been a frustrating one for Fighter Command with London heavily bombed and nineteen pilots lost out of twenty-eight fighters shot down, they could show forty-one German aircraft destroyed during the whole day—a not inconsiderable total which led the German radio to report that the attack had entailed ‘heavy sacrifices’.
During the afternoon German radio stations had kept up a gleeful commentary on the raids. In the evening Göring, highly delighted, telephoned his wife to report ‘London is in flames’. He then broadcast that this was ‘a historic hour’ and that the Luftwaffe had ‘for the first time delivered its stroke right into the enemy’s heart’.
Many returning fighter and bomber pilots reported little or no opposition, and for one day at least the Luftwaffe operations and intelligence staff believed that their aim of destroying Fighter Command was nearly achieved.
On the night of the 7th/8th the blitz on London continued with unabated fury, a continuous stream of bombers, totalling 247 in all, stoking the fires in the East End from eight in the evening to nearly five o’clock the next morning. Some 330 tons of high explosives were dropped, and 440 incendiary canisters, the latter contributing to the nine conflagrations (huge spreading areas of flame) which lit up the night sky with a dull glow. Typical of the East End slums which suffered in these early September raids was Tulip Street with its long rows of dingy terraced houses. It had been hit in the August night raids and again on September 7th. Within a few nights it had been reduced to twin rows of shattered roofless walls, and when the debris had finally been cleared away Tulip Street had disappeared for ever.
To add to the confusion the code-word ‘Cromwell’ was issued at 8 p.m. Many took it that invasion was in progress. Church bells were rung, road blocks put up and Home Guards roamed the countryside with loaded rifles.
Part of Banquet, the Flying Training Command reinforcement programme for invasion, was put into operation. For instance, the Senior Course at No. 3 School of General Reconnaissance at Squire’s Gate was on invasion stand-by. Blackpool in 1940 was still a bouncing town in the pre-war mood and Wakes weeks were still celebrated. Stand-by in the Senior Course invariably meant that they spent their week-ends in gay Blackpool.
When the alert came through on the night of Saturday, September 7th, the Senior Course was immediately sent for. No one, however, could be found in his billet. Persistent efforts by the police and the station staff eventually routed all these officers out of bars, night clubs and beds other than their own. Rather the worse for wear, they were hurried into the navigator’s seats of Ansons and flown to Thorney Island.
When they reached this southern base they noticed in a somewhat hazy way that the aircraft were being bombed up. Upon enquiry they were informed that they were being readied to attack the German invasion fleet; one man is rumoured to have fainted.
When dawn came there had been no landing but 306 civilians in London were dead and 1,337 seriously injured. Clouds of smoke billowed up over the dock area and the fires burned on, filling the air with acrid fumes and soot. Londoners crawled out of their shelters and picked their way towards their places of work through the hoses and rubble, round the fire engines and the rescue workers still toiling in the wreckage. Some found added difficulty in commuting as three main-line terminal stations were out of action, including London Bridge and Victoria.
The Spitfire factory at Woolston, Southampton, after the raid on September 26th. The factory was wrecked, but by dispersal to thirty-five sites and expansion at the Castle Bromwich factory the flow of aircraft to the R.A.F. was maintained. The Luftwaffe would have done better to concentrate on this vital production centre early in the battle
Near Waterloo station three lines hung crazily over a large crater, the supporting arches beneath having disappeared. The station was not reopened for passenger traffic until September 19th.
One train from Ramsgate in Kent had bombs go off all round it with an oil bomb eventually falling on the tender. The fire was put out with the engine hose and the guard and fireman, black as soot, delivered the train safely at Charing Cross.
Many eyes looked skywards awaiting the resumption of the day battle, but except for harassing raids and odd attacks which penetrated to the centre, London had had its first and last mass daylight raid; henceforth the Luftwaffe achieved its main results under cover of night.
September 8th
Day Only slight activity. Some small attacks on airfields.
Night Heavy concentration on London, mainly east.
Weather Fair early morning and evening. Rest of day cloudy.
Göring on this day decided that the attacks on London would bear considerable fruit, and accordingly he issued orders for the area covered by bombing to be widened both by day and night. For target purposes the city had been divided into two sections, target area ‘A’ being east London and the docks and target ‘B’ west London. Particular emphasis was laid on power stations and railway termini. From the 8th onwards both ‘A’ and ‘B’ were bombed. In the morning German radio stations solemnly announced the fact that the Reichsmarschall had assumed command of operations for the first time since the outbreak of war.
Extraordinary contrasts were produced in 1940, even in advertisements in the technical press. On the left is a Vickers-Armstrong’s advertisement for the Spitfire which appeared in The Aeroplane for September 13th, 1940, while on the right is a Junkers advertisement of the period reproduced in Der Adler
For the R.A.F. the concentration on London was to ease the pressure on hard-hit sector stations, but it could do nothing to increase the flow of new fighter pilots to replace the heavy losses of August and the first week in September. Normally a fighter squadron remained in the line from a month to six weeks, but the intensity of the fighting and resultant losses had required some units to be replaced after a week or ten days. Reluctantly Dowding put into operation a new ‘stabilisation’ system of classification for fighter squadrons with top priority for groups in the daylight battle zone.
Squadrons were grouped into three categories, viz.:
Category A. Squadrons in No. 11 Group and on its immediate flanks, which bore the brunt of the fighting.
Category B. A small number of squadrons maintained at operational strength to be available as immediate reliefs should this be unavoidable.
Category C. Remaining squadrons, stripped of the majority of their operational pilots for the benefits of the A squadrons and with energies mainly devoted to training new pilots from the O.T.U.s or those transferred from other commands.
The A squadrons were stabilised and were not to be relieved unless circumstances were exceptional, their strength being maintained largely by intakes from the C squadrons. The C squadrons were considered unfit to meet German fighters, but were quite capable of dealing with unescorted bombers.
While the new system tided over a crucial period in the command it was not good for overall morale, as nobody particularly liked belonging to a unit which bore the designation Category C.
By this time the fighter resources were so stretched that Dowding could no longer maintain standing patrols for all the convoys, nor could he divert fighters even to defend such important sites as aircraft storage units.
Believing the danger of invasion to be growing, it was decided to install three retractable machine-gun pill-boxes at each operational airfield to give additional local defence against parachutists and airborne invaders. These elaborate items were raised above ground level to a height of three feet using compressed air.
While Fighter Command examined the records of the London attack the day before, the Luftwaffe somewhat reduced the scale of its efforts on the 8th, partly through fatigue and partly due to bad weather.
Between 11 a.m. and 12.30 Luftflotte 2 put in several raids over Kent with airfields once more the chief objectives. Some fifteen formations of varying size dropped bombs on Sevenoaks, West Mailing, Detling, Hornchurch, Dover and Gravesend. Eleven fighter squadrons were sent up and many of the enemy were turned back, doing little damage. Compared with its 817 sorties of the 7th, Fighter Command flew 305 on the 8th and lost only two aircraft, the pilot of one returning safely. In contrast Luftwaffe losses for the twenty-four-hour period were fifteen.
Desolation; a London street after Luftffotte 3 had visited it on the night of September 8th. Firemen attempt to damp down the flames
At night Luftflotte 3 returned to the assault on London, sending 207 bombers via Rennes, Caen, Le Havre and Dieppe in steady succession from 7.30 p.m. until dawn. In these nine and a half hours high explosives and incendiaries again showered dockland, but many fell on the city proper, leaving twelve conflagrations for the indefatigable fire service to deal with. Three hospitals and two museums were hit, and more than fifty people died when a large bomb wrecked a block of flats in the East End. By Monday morning 412 more Londoners were dead and 747 badly hurt. Whole rows of houses were gutted or knocked down, factories were wrecked, and every railway line southwards out of the city was unserviceable.
September 9th
Day Unsuccessful sorties against London, Thames Estuary and aircraft factories.
Night Main target London, including City and West End.
Weather Scattered showers. Thundery in the east. Channel fair.
Once more the morning brought respite, and attacks did not develop until the afternoon, when formations began massing in the area Calais-Boulogne. Raids of 30+, 50+, 15+ and 12+ were plotted by the radar stations, and appeared over the coast as groups of escorted and unescorted bombers. A high-flying screen of fighters attempted to draw off British interceptors just before the raids developed.
This time 11 Group were not caught napping. At five o’clock, when the raids began to come in, nine 11 Group squadrons were in position, while units from 10 Group and 12 Group guarded factories and north Thames airfields respectively.
It was the German intention to attack targets in London, the Thames Estuary and the factories at Brooklands, but the fighter interceptions were so successful that most of the formations were broken up long before they reached them. German aircraft sent out a number of distress signals and radio control stations on the French coast ordered formation leaders to break off the attacks ‘if the defences are too strong, or if fighter protection is too weak’. These messages were heard with great interest by British radio monitoring receivers in Kent.
Bombs were jettisoned over a wide area, including Canterbury, Kingston, Epsom, Surbiton, Norbiton and Purley, while in central London itself a few fell on Wandsworth, Lambeth and Chelsea.
A Focke Wulf 200C-I of KG40. This four-motor bomber, derived from a pre-war Lufthansa transport, was used for bombing, maritime reconnaissance and met. forecasting. Several of these aircraft were forced down during the Battle of Britain, including one which ran out of fuel over the Irish Sea
After the enemy had retired the R.A.F. could show twenty-eight German aircraft destroyed for the loss of nineteen British fighters from which six pilots were recovered. London had been saved from a further onslaught, and the German bomber air crew complained bitterly at their de-briefing of the sudden upsurge of the defences and the apparent shortcomings of their Messerschmitt escorts.
A report of the Luftwaffe Command Staff of September 9th stated:
The maintaining of the attack against London is intendec to take place by day through Luftflotte 2 with strong fighter and destroyer units; by night Luftflotte 3 will carry out attacks with the object of destroying harbour areas, the supply and power sources of the city. The city is divided into two target areas, the eastern part of London is target area A with its widely stretched out harbour installations, target area B is the west of London, which contains the power supplies and the provision installations of the city. Along with this major attack on London the destruction raids will be carried on as much as possible against many sectors of the armament industry and harbour areas in England in their previous scope.
On the night of the 9th/10th London was for the third time the main target. Luftflotte 3 had now standardised its techniques. Aircraft came over in small waves at intervals and flew along clearly defined corridors of approach using other routes for the homeward journey. First waves usually flew in over the south coast and out via Essex; the second wave arrived from the east and returned over the Beachy Head area, passing the third incoming wave over that area.
In response to Göring’s order of the 8th, that the London coverage be extended, 195 aircraft attacked all districts for eight and a half hours. Familiar landmarks began to suffer, and on this occasion it was the turn of the Royal Courts of Justice and Somerset House. Three hundred and seventy Londoners died and 1,400 were injured, and this was the third night running that total casualties were over 1,700.
September 10th
Day Slight activity. Single raiders over airfields in afternoon.
Night London main objective but also raids on Merseyside and South Wales.
Weather Generally cloudy. Some rain.
The day dawned cloudy, and on the whole it was peaceful over England. In Germany the Luftwaffe Command Staff issued orders that ‘if the weather situation does not allow the engagement of strong force of Luftflotten 2 and 3 against England, the Luftflotten must carry out individual attacks against targets of the aircraft production industry’.
Nothing developed until five o’clock in the afternoon when single aircraft of Luftflotte 3, taking advantage of cloud cover, delivered attacks in 10 Group and the western part of 11 Group. One raider machine-gunned Tangmere, and another dropped bombs on West Mailing. Poling radar station reported bombs in the vicinity and a few fell in the area of Portsmouth dockyard. In the airfield raids fighters accounted for two Dorniers.
Above is a photograph of the original Luftwaffe operations staff intelligence map for September 15th showing targets attacked and units operating. Altogether 328 bomber and 769 fighter sorties were flown. On the right-hand side is written a detailed breakdown of units involved, with losses and claims for British aircraft destroyed.
The figures given for British fighters shot down show 51 Spitfires, 26 Hurricanes and I Blenheim—a grand total of 78, where in fact only 26 R.A.F. fighters were written off during the day. It is interesting to note that JG53 and JG51 claimed between them to have destroyed 38 British fighters, twelve more than the complete Fighter Command total!
German unit losses on this chart amount to S3 whereas the definitive analysis of total write-offs on operation in the Quartermaster General’s return shows 60. The R.A.F. claimed no less than 185 German aircraft destroyed on the 15th. On both sides the claims were treble the actual losses. The analysis on the map reads as follows:
Unit |
Claims of British aircraft destroyed |
Unit losses |
JG2 |
(3 Spitfires) |
|
JG3 |
(9 Spitfires and 3 Hurricanes) |
4 Me 109 |
JG26 |
(3 Spitfires and 2 Hurricanes) |
|
JG51 |
(8 Spitfires and 7 Hurricanes) |
3 Me 109 |
JG53 |
(14 Spitfires and 9 Hurricanes) |
6 Me 109 |
ZG76 |
(7 Spitfires and 1 Blenheim) |
3 Me 110 |
III/KG2 |
(1 Spitfire) |
6 Do 17 |
II/KG53 |
(1 Spitfire) |
6 He 111 |
II/KG3 |
(4 Spitfires) |
6 Do 17 |
KG26 |
(1 Spitfire) |
1 He III |
JG52 |
(9 Hurricanes) |
3 Me 109 |
I and III/KG76 |
6 Do 17 |
|
II/KG2 |
2 Do 17 |
|
KG30 |
1Ju 88 |
|
JG27 |
2 Me 109 |
|
III/KG55 |
1 He 111 |
|
missing |
||
v.d. Wekusta 51 |
1 He111 |
|
missing |
The bomber aimer of this He 111 can be clearly seen getting ready for the run-up to the target. The aircraft is from KG55, V Fliegerkorps, Luftflotte 3
Following these incursions came six small raids from Luftflotte 2, which passed over Dungeness-Beachy Head and flew towards Biggin Hill. One aircraft reached the airfield, but was intercepted some minutes later south of Kenley and shot down. Two small raids appeared near Eastchurch but turned for home without accomplishing anything and these were followed by similar sorties towards south and south-west London.
The rumours of invasion began to assume greater significance at 4.30 p.m. when a Coastal Command aircraft reported twelve merchant vessels plus five destroyers and thirty E-boats off Dieppe.
At night the attack was more varied, and while London received the main weight of bombs from 148 aircraft, others visited South Wales and Merseyside. Many German aircraft avoided detection in the early hours by mixing with a stream of R.A.F. machines returning from Berlin via Orfordness.
September 11th
Day Some bombs on London. Three large raids in south-east. Raids on Portsmouth and Southampton. Seelöwe postponed until the 14th.
Night London attacked and Merseyside.
Weather Mainly fine. Some local showers. Channel and Estuary cloudy.
The spirited defence put up by Fighter Command on the 9th had important repercussions in Germany. Despite all the prognostications of the Luftwaffe C-in-C, Command Staff and Intelligence, the R.A.F. had shown itself undefeated and as resolute as ever. This single day’s action led Hitler to postpone the warning order for invasion which was scheduled for the nth. This warning would have led to the laying of a boundary minefield across the Channel for the landing fleet and a final positioning of vital units, in particular, flak.
The Führer decided to issue the warning for the 14th with a view to opening Seelöwe on September 24th—always providing that air superiority had been achieved. He set great store on the effects of the London bombing and hoped that an internal collapse in England would avoid the necessity for a hazardous landing operation. At this time the day and night attacks were regarded as a dual strategic and tactical concept, to destroy British will to fight at all and to bring the R.A.F. fighters into a final pitched battle.
In London itself, the postponement was naturally unknown. All the outward portents showed the preparations across the Channel at an advanced level. Winston Churchill broadcast:
The effort of the Germans to secure daylight mastery of the air over England is of course the crux of the whole war. So far it has failed conspicuously…For him [Hitler] to try and invade this country without having secured mastery in the air would be a very hazardous undertaking. Nevertheless, all his preparations for invasion on a great scale are steadily going forward. Several hundreds of self-propelled barges are moving down the coasts of Europe, from the German and Dutch harbours to the ports of northem France, from Dunkirk to Brest, and beyond Brest to the French harbours in the Bay of Biscay.
While the anti-invasion build-up on land and sea went on day and night. No. 11 Group was tackling the problems of new German tactics initiated on the 7th. After careful study of all available information, Park issued a further instruction (No. 16) to his controllers. He outlined that the enemy had changed from two to three separate attacks in one day, to mass raids of 300 to 400 aircraft in two to three waves following in quick succession, the whole engagement covering about forty-five to sixty minutes.
The procession; Göring leads a line of officers on an official visit to Luftwaffe units in Luftflotte 3. Second from the left in the picture is Generalfeldmarschall Sperrle
So as to meet the Luftwaffe in maximum strength he ordered paired squadrons to be used wherever possible. The ‘Readiness’ squadrons were to engage the first wave, Spitfires against fighter screen, Hurricanes against bombers and close escort. The squadrons ‘available fifteen minutes’ were to be brought to ‘Readiness’ in pairs and despatched to deal with the second wave, while the ‘Available thirty minutes’ squadrons were to be sent singly as reinforcements or to protect factories and sector airfields.
Should there be a third wave the last squadrons were to be paired, those from Debden and North Weald together, Hornchurch with Biggin Hill, and Kenley with Northolt.
The squadrons from Tangmere were to be employed within Kenley or the back Tangmere sector to cover factories and to intercept German formations approaching London from the south.
It was left to the group controller to name the base over which paired squadrons would rendezvous. Once sector had linked them up, group detailed the raid, etc., and sector carried the operation through.
There dispositions were timely as the Luftwaffe renewed the attack on London on the same day that they were ordered. In the morning activity was limited to patrolling, with a Henschel 126 tactical reconnaissance aircraft cruising off Dover, and one machine dropping a bomb near Poling radar station.
After the initial heavy raids on radar stations the Germans had concentrated on setting up jamming transmitters on the coast. The work of these became particularly noticeable in September. On this Wednesday morning at eleven o’clock Great Bromley C.H. station reported that it had suffered interference for nearly an hour. Under these conditions the airmen and W.A.A.F.s watching the blips on the cathode-ray tube had to insert coloured slides and strain their eyes to make out the true afterglow trace through the dancing white lights shown up from the jammers. Plotting, however, continued as before and full-scale ‘blotting out’ of stations was never achieved due to the distance involved and to the German lack of high-power valves.
After reconnaissance flights at lunchtime, Luftflotte 2 put up three big raids and Luftflotte 3 attacked Southampton. At 2.45 p.m. formations began building up over Calais and Ostend and aimed for London. At 3.45 another wave came in over Folkestone, and was shortly followed by a third. Bombs fell on the City, the docks, Islington and Paddington, and others on Biggin Hill, Kenley, Brooklands and Hornchurch.
Simultaneously two raids from Seine Bay and Cherbourg had linked up over Selsey Bill and despite harrying fighters dropped bombs on Southampton and, Portsmouth.
A complete Gruppe of KG3 forms up for the journey across the Channel to England, It was the assembly of these formations which gave British radar the warning necessary to put up fighters to intercept
An hour later waves of Me 109s appeared over Kent, some attacking the Dover balloons. Another force attacked a convoy and single aircraft headed for Colerne, Kenley, Detling and Eastchurch. The convoy ‘Peewit’ was dive-bombed, its escort ‘Atherstone’ being disabled.
In all this widespread activity, Fighter Command flew 678 sorties. The scoreboard at the end of the day was in reality depressing, R.A.F. losses being 29 aircraft, 17 pilots killed and 6 wounded, compared with German casualties for the 24 hours of 25 aircraft. KG26 was the worst hit, with eight He 111s shot down. At the time it was estimated German losses were far higher, but the red in the British balance sheet on the final reckoning is accounted for by the fact that many squadrons became entangled with the escorting formations who attacked from above.
As the evening drew on jamming of British radar became more general, and four stations reported interference before darkness fell. Throughout the night harassing raids moved up and down the country, while London was receiving a heavy attack from 180 bombers. Merseyside was the secondary target, while single aircraft were over Scotland, the Bristol Channel, Lincolnshire and Norfolk with Fliegerdivision IX minelaying on the south and east coasts in preparation for invasion.
To Londoners there had been one comfort on this Wednesday night; the anti-aircraft defences had been doubled since the 7th and a tremendous barrage was kept going. The Inner Artillery Zone fired no less than 13,500 rounds and although they inflicted little damage on the bombers, they did cause many to drop their loads outside the central area, and others to fly higher than usual.
Once again the bomber stream bound for London mixed with returning aircraft, confusing the plots. On several occasions 11 Group reported that raiders coming in from the south were giving the correct R.A.F. recognition signals and then unloading their bombs.
September 12th
Day Only small raids in south. Reconnaissance.
Night Reduced effort. Main force London. Single aircraft over wide area.
Weather Unsettled, rain in most districts. Channel cloudy.
Thursday proved mainly quiet thanks to cloud and poor weather over the south and east coasts. The morning was marked by continuous German reconnaissance. At lunch three small raids appeared on the operations table, and dropped bombs on the radar station at Fairlight—although without doing any real damage. Fighters chased one raider as far as Cap Gris Nez and there shot it down.
Incursions by single raiders went on during the afternoon and early evening but the 247 R.A.F. sorties flown were hampered by the weather. No Fighter Command machine was lost, and the Luftwaffe for the whole period suffered only four casualties.
A sad task, pulling furniture and belongings from wrecked houses after night raids on north London on September 26th/27th
Neptune Street, Rotherhithe, close by the Commercial Docks in East London. Rescue workers clear the rubble after heavy bombing by Luftflotte 3 on the night of September 8th
Even the Luftwaffe’s night efforts were heavily reduced, with fifty-four bombers over London, and singles over the midlands, Merseyside, Essex, Suffolk, Cambridge, Kent and Surrey. One bomber was brought down by 966 Balloon Barrage Squadron at Newport, Monmouthshire.
Of the bombs on London, one, of the delayed-action variety, fell within a few yards of the north wall of St. Paul’s Cathedral. It took three days to remove it from a depth of twenty-seven feet. The bomb disposal officer, Lieutenant R. Davies, and his chief assistant, Sapper Wylie, became the first recipients of the George Cross.
An Me 110 on the point of being shot down over Hastings, Sussex, on the afternoon of September 15th. The camera gun which took the film was mounted on Spitfire R6691 of No. 609 Squadron, piloted by Fit. Lt. F. J. Howell
September 13th
Day Small raids mainly directed at London. Hitler in conference, discussing air offensive and invasion.
Night Renewed effort against London.
Weather Unsettled. Bright intervals and showers. Rain in Channel. Straits cloudy.
Hitler was far from dissatisfied with the results of the bombing so far, and the reports he received on the operations of the nth indicated that British opposition was weak and the German casualty rate low. At a luncheon in Berlin attended by a group of naval, army and air force officers (notable among them being Brau-chitsch, Göring, Jodl and Milch) Hitler delivered a speech on the current situation. He commented particularly on the need for air superiority and the audience gathered that he was dropping the idea of invasion in view of the success of air bombardment. Nevertheless he indulged in considerable detailed discussion with the army chiefs on their dispositions and strength.
At seven o’clock in the morning the Luftwaffe began its weather reconnaissance for the day’s work, aircraft covering the Biggin Hill, North Weald and Hornchurch sectors and another Kenley and Northolt. The weather reports radioed back to France were picked up by the British radio monitoring service although the actual targets could not be deciphered.
Three quarters of an hour later a Focke Wulf 200 of I/KG40, on maritime patrol, bombed the S.S. Longfort off Copeland Light near Belfast and fired on a motor vessel in the same area. This was followed from 9.30 to 11.30 a.m. by a stream of single aircraft from Dieppe, passing over Hastings and heading for south London, while simultaneously the Canewdon, Dover and Rye radars suffered jamming.
Near midday, radio monitoring reported that an enemy bomber over Kent was sending messages to the effect that ‘cloud is 7/10th at 1,500 metres, and that attack is possible between 1,500 and 2,500 metres’. No. 11 Group were alerted, and sure enough just over an hour and a half later several raids attempted to attack Biggin Hill and the mid-Kent area, while three more, including a few Ju 87s from Luftflotte 3, crossed the coast at Selsey heading for Tangmere. One Heinkel which arrived over Maidstone was promptly shot down by 501 Squadron from Biggin Hill.
At this time a curious report came in from the naval liaison officer to the effect that a long-nosed Blenheim 4, positively identified, had dropped two bombs in Dover harbour. Several Blenheims had been captured on the Continent but there has never been documentary evidence to confirm their use in the Battle of Britain.
In the morning raids single aircraft had penetrated to central London, where bombs hit Downing Street, Whitehall, Trafalgar Square and the Chelsea Hospital. Buckingham Palace had its third bombing, with the Royal Chapel wrecked, and four near-misses.
Due to the intermittent rain and low clouds and the high altitude of the raiders, fighter squadrons had difficulty in finding their prey and only four bombers were destroyed for the loss of one fighter.
During the day the expectation of invasion was sharpened by a report from a coastal post in No. 1 (Maidstone) Observer Group, which had sighted ten large enemy transports each towing two barges from Calais to Cap Gris Nez.
The Me 110s of the Luftwaffe lived a dangerous life in 1940 with heavy casualties causing eventual unit amalgamation. Above a Staffel of ZG26 ‘Horst Wessel’ flies in over southern England; below one of this unit in a field at Lenham, Kent, on September 20th
Subject of a head-on attack by British fighters, this Ju 88 of KG30 crashed on the beach at Pagham, Sussex, in September
Mam targets of the night raiders was again London, with 105 bombers over the capital. Harassing raids covered the Home Counties and East Anglia.
September 14th
Day Hitler postpones Seelöwe until September 17th. Succession of afternoon raids aimed at London, but mainly consisting of fighters.
Night Reduced activity. Main force over London.
Weather Showers and local thunder. Cloud in Straits, Channel and Estuary.
In Berlin Adolf Hitler gathered the Cs.-in-C. of his army, navy, and air force and addressed them on the progress of the war. He pointed out that naval preparations for the invasion were complete and that the ‘operations of the Luftwaffe are above all praise’. He felt that four to five days of good weather were required to achieve decisive results, conveniently forgetting that was exactly what Göring had stated before Adler Tag in August.
Hitler blamed the weather for the lack of complete air superiority so far but stressed once again that a ‘successful landing means victory, but complete air superiority is required to carry it out’.
Despite contrary opinion expressed by the navy (who had lost eighty barges through R.A.F. action the previous night), Hitler decided to postpone Sealion only until September 17th, and the build-up went on with top priority. It is clear that while Hitler hoped for decisive results from the Luftwaffe, he still put his confidence in a landing if all else failed.
The main German target for the 14th was again London and throughout the morning reconnaissance aircraft probed the weather and the defences, while between Poling and Great Bromley radar stations there was continual electronic interference. One raider was destroyed over Selsey Bill at lunchtime and bombs were dropped at Eastbourne.
Just after 3 p.m. three raids in quick succession crossed the coast at Deal and Dungeness, and headed for London up two corridors, one via Kent and the other up the Thames. No. 11 Group were involved in a series of combats, and requested two 12 Group squadrons to patrol Hornchurch and North Weald, while other 12 Group aircraft shot down a Ju 88 off Lowestoft. In all, 11 Group sent up twenty-two squadrons against these raids, and 12 Group five squadrons.
At 5.15 a feint came in over Bournemouth from Cherbourg, but turned back before being intercepted, and shortly afterwards a flurry of raids appeared on the Bentley Priory tables with 12+, 20+, 30+, 15+ and 10+ between 17,000 and 20,000 feet. From then until nine o’clock a succession of individual attacks were made covering the south-eastern area, and aimed towards London.
The final score of fourteen to each side was poor from the R.A.F.’s point of view, particularly as 860 sorties were flown. Six R.A.F. pilots were, however, saved. Most of the German aircraft sent over were fighters and these lured the squadrons into combat.
To the Luftwaffe the opposition appeared scrappy and un-co-ordinated, and they felt that during the last few days Fighter Command had begun to collapse. This news was, of course, conveyed to the Reichsmarschall, and via the situation reports to Hitler. Both felt that the hour of destiny was approaching.
That night Luftwaffe activity was at a much lower level, while they prepared for a major blow on the following morning. Fifty-five German bombers attacked London whilst others went to Cardiff, Gloucester, Maidstone, Ipswich and Farnham. One naval patrol vessel was attacked by aircraft from Luftflotte 5 on the Firth of Forth.
The unusually low level of attack was noted by Fighter Command, particularly as the weather was fine, and it could only betoken a great effort on the following day.
September 15th
Day Heavy attacks on London, broken up by Fighter Command. Highest German losses since August 18th. Serious rethinking by German High Command.
Night Main target London. Heavy damage.
Weather Fair but cloud patches. Fine evening.
Now celebrated annually as Battle of Britain Day, Sunday the 15th was remarkable for its ultimate change of German policy and not for its heavy losses, as the 185 German aircraft claimed would lead many to believe.
The weather was misty but promised to be fine and the chance had come for a heavy blow against London which would show once and for all the desperate state of Fighter Command, and perhaps have a decisive effect on British morale. It was to be a repeat of September 7th in German eyes, and a lead-in to invasion.
The usual reconnaissance aircraft patrolled the east and south coasts during the morning, one of which, an He 111, was shot down off Start Point.
At eleven o’clock radar showed mass formations building up over Calais and Boulogne. No. 11 Group put up eleven squadrons, 10 Group one, while No. 12 Group sent five squadrons as a wing to patrol Debden-Hornchurch. No real feints developed and complete attention was devoted to the advancing armadas. The stupidity of large formations sorting themselves out in full view of British radar was not yet realised by the Luftwaffe.
All the way up from the coast, the raids stepped up from 15,000–26,000 feet were constantly under attack, first by two Spitfire squadrons over mid-Kent, next by three more over the Medway towns, then by four Hurricane squadrons over the suburbs of London, and finally by the Duxford wing from 12 Group over London itself. The wing on Leigh-Mallory’s instructions was now five squadrons strong. In all, twenty-four fighter squadrons operated and twenty-two engaged the enemy.
Accurate bombing was out of the question, and as formations broke so they scattered their, loads on Beckenham, Westminster, Lambeth, Lewisham, Batter-sea, Camberwell, Crystal Palace, Clapham, Tooting, Wandsworth and Kensington. A heavy bomb damaged the Queen’s private apartments in Buckingham Palace, while a second fell on the lawn.
The 609 Squadron diarist recorded that one portion of a Dornier they destroyed during the engagement ‘is reported to have reached the ground just outside a Pimlico public house to the great comfort and joy of the patrons’.
No. 504 Squadron had a busy morning. At 11 a.m. Generals Strong and Emmons of the U.S. Army Air Corps and Rear-Admiral Gormley of the U.S. Navy paid a visit to see ‘the life of a fighter squadron’. No sooner had introductions been completed than an attack developed with the squadron to patrol North Weald at 15,000 feet. Using a stop-watch, the Americans recorded that twelve Hurricanes got away in 4 min. 50 sec. from the word ‘Go’. No. 504 met a formation of Dorniers between Fulham and Gravesend and shot down several. One pilot. Sergeant R. T. Holmes, attacked and damaged a Dornier, and then found another, which he fired at four times. On the fourth occasion the bomber exploded, sending the Hurricane into an uncontrollable spin.
The Dornier crashed in the station yard at Victoria, with the crew landing by parachute on Kennington Oval cricket ground. Sergeant Holmes baled out and finally came to rest in a dustbin in Chelsea.
Before they could eat lunch the squadron was again engaged with German formations between London and Hornchurch.
After a two-hour break the second attack was seen by radar just after 1 p.m. and began to come in in three waves an hour later. Squadrons were ready to receive them and a running fight took place all the way to the capital. Twenty-three squadrons from 11 Group were airborne, five from No. 12 Group and three from No. 10. Two formations were broken up before reaching London, one turning back in the face of a head-on attack by a lone Hurricane flown by Group Captain Vincent, commander of the Northolt sector.
The remaining bombers were engaged over the city itself by five pairs of squadrons from No. 11 Group and the full five-squadron wing of No. 12 Group. Two squadrons each from 10 and 11 Groups harried the enemy as they retired. Scattering of formations and frequent jettisoning of bombs caused hits over a very wide area in contrast to the concentration achieved on September 7th. West Ham and Erith were the main recipients but other targets were Woolwich, Stepney, Hackney, Stratford, Penge and East Ham—at the last mentioned a telephone exchange and a gasholder being smashed.
While every effort was being made to deal with the attack on London, a force of Heinkel 111s of KG55 from the Villacoublay area set out to bomb Portland. Although seen by radar at three o’clock, the count was only given as six +. The raid detoured and approached Portland from an unusual angle which confused the A.A. gunners. The bombing was inaccurate and only slight damage was done in the dockyard. The one squadron left in the Middle Wallop sector succeeded in intercepting, but after the bombs had dropped.
The final daylight sortie came at about six o’clock when some twenty bomb-carrying Me nos from Epr. Gr.210 at Denain attempted to hit the Supermarine works at Woolston. They were heavily engaged by the Southampton guns as they dived in and this undoubtedly upset their aim as no bombs fell on the factory. Five R.A.F. squadrons were put up, but most of them were unable to find their quarry, and those that did only encountered the nos as they were streaking for the safety of the French coast using any available cloud cover.
During the morning Winston Churchill had been on one of his periodic visits to the 11 Group underground operations room at Uxbridge. From the balcony with Park at his side he watched the raids pouring in. The operations table became saturated with plots, and two by two the squadrons of 11 Group were committed, followed by the 12 Group wing, Finally the tote board showed all squadrons engaged and that nothing was left in reserve. No new raids developed, however, and slowly the bulbs began to glow again as fighters were re-fuelled and re-armed.
Bombing up for a raid against the invasion fleet assembled in the Channel ports. This Blenheim IV of No. no Squadron is seen here at Wattisham in September 1940. This Squadron carried out the first R.A.F. raid of the war, on September 4th, 1939
Churchill was greatly impressed with the gravity of such a situation and with the calm methodical way in which 11 Group’s nerve centre worked. He recorded the incident at length in Volume II of The Second World War, although there had been many similar occasions during the Battle which passed unnoticed.
Families throughout the country listened in to the evening news bulletin and heard ‘185 shot down’. The figures became the sole topic of conversation and the nation glowed with pride. It. was a tremendous and much-needed tonic for civilians and R.A.F. alike.
In the cold light of history the actual German losses of sixty machines make poor reading to the layman. In fact, for a force which had suffered a heavy loss rate tor over two months they were extremely serious, not to mention the numerous aircraft which limped back to France with dead gunners, burned engines and broken undercarriages.
The 12 Group wing under Bader was not so pleased. It felt that it should have earlier warning in order to get at the enemy with the advantages of height and time. Unfortunately most raids kept climbing after the initial radar plots and split up over the coast making interception more difficult. In addition the links between 11 Group and 12 Group were not properly streamlined and 11 Group sectors dealing with raids could not control 12 Group squadrons.
Hitler, Göring and the whole of the Luftwaffe Command had expected great things of the 15th. After the apparently successful efforts of the 12th it seemed that at long last the R.A.F. was ready for the coup de grace. Instead the losses were highter than on any day since August 18th. At de-briefing bomber pilots complained of the incessant R.A.F. attacks by squadrons that had long since ceased to exist—if the German radio and intelligence reports were to be believed.
Naturally, but unfairly, they vented their wrath upon the Jafus and the long-suffering fighter pilots. Instead of being allowed full rein, the fighters were ordered to stick even closer to the bomber formations which further nullified their essential space to manoeuvre and attack.
When the tally book was closed at nightfall on the 15th, Fighter Command had lost twenty-six aircraft and saved thirteen pilots; the balance was swinging sharply in favour of the weary defence.
Before the next day’s fighting losses in pilots and aircraft had to be made good. One Polish squadron had only four aircraft serviceable by the evening. The remainder had suffered all sorts of damage; control surfaces shot away, radiators smashed, cables cut and wings riddled with bullets. The mechanics worked until dawn patching and repairing so that on the 16th twelve aircraft were ready for operations.
After dark the Luftwaffe returned to the attack, knowing that it was safer than operating in daylight. Some 180 bombers formed long processions from Le Havre and Dieppe-Cherbourg, all heading for London, Once again the barrage opened up, and more scars were added to the city’s face. Shell-Mex House and the Embankment were hit, bombs fell on Woolwich Arsenal, and large fires were started in Camberwell, Battersea and Brixton. Other smaller raids dropped their loads on Bristol, Cardiff, Liverpool and Manchester.
September 16th
Day Göring confers on losses of the 15th. Policy changes. Park changes tactics. Only slight air activity.
Night Continuous attacks on London. Smaller raids Merseyside and midlands.
Weather General rain and cloud.
Göring Called a conference of his Luftflotten and Fliegerkorps commanders in France and decided to return to a policy of attack against Fighter Command itself. It appeared to the Reichmarschall that the R.A.F. had produced many fresh pilots and aircraft when in reality it was the same force using the new tactics devised by Park.
Bomber formations. Göring outlined, were to be reduced in size, and Gruppen would bomb targets in the London area with maximum fighter escort. ‘As many fighters as possible’ would be destroyed and he estimated that the R.A.F. fighter force should be finished off in four to five days. Göring was mesmerised by ‘four to five days’ as this was the time taken in the Polish and French campaigns. He had uttered the selfsame words before Adler Tag and nearly five weeks had passed.
His lecture included orders for mass formations only to be used in perfect weather conditions, and for raids to be stepped-up on aircraft production centres. Göring clung to his theory that the Luftwaffe would render Seelöwe unnecessary and went so far as to note that air force operations must not be disturbed by any plans for a landing. For the first time he admitted that air crews were tiring and that for the fighter arm the incessant attacks were ‘very exhausting’. Fighter Command pilots were not the only ones weary at this stage.
In England Park took advantage of the lull due to bad weather (rain and cloud-base 300 feet) to issue another instruction, No. 18, to his controllers. Despite the successes of the 15th and the improved loss ratio, he felt that still more interceptions could be made. He listed the faults as he saw them:
Individual squadrons failing to rendezvous.
Single squadrons being detailed to large raids.
Paired squadrons being rendezvoused too far forward, and too low.
High-flying massed formations of German fighters attracting most of the Group while the bombers got through.
Delays in vectoring of paired squadrons on to raids by Group controllers.
Errors in sector reports on pilot and aircraft effective strengths.
To improve the situation he ordered that in clear weather the Hornchurch and Biggin Hill squadrons should attack the high fighter screen in pairs. Rendezvous of pairs was to be made below cloud base in the event of overcast, and at height in clear weather or well in advance of any raids.
Whenever raid information was scanty, fighter squadrons were detailed to short patrol lines, if necessary with two squadrons very high and two squadrons between 15,000 and 20,000 feet.
To deal with high-flying German fighter diversions, Park required several pairs of Spitfire squadrons to be put up while ample Hurricane squadrons were assembled in pairs near sector airfields. The Northolt and Tangmere squadrons were to be despatched as three squadron wings to intercept the second and third waves of attack which experience had shown normally contained bombers.
From this it is quite clear that Park was not averse to using wing formations, where the warning time was sufficient and the type of mass raid required it.
During the 16th the weather precluded any heavy attacks and from the few small raids which penetrated to east London, nine German aircraft were shot down for the loss of one R.A.F. pilot. The dull weather was lightened for both sides by the solemn announcement in the German war communiqué that Göring himself had flown over London in a Ju 88. Apart from lacking the courage for such an enterprise, it was a physical impossibility, as the Reichsmarschall’s girth precluded him getting through the door of a Ju 88, and even in the four-motor Condor he had to have a special wide seat with thigh supports.
At night heavy attacks were renewed on London, commencing at 7.40 and going on until 4.30 a.m. Over 200 tons of bombs were dropped by 170 aircraft, while other towns hit by harassing raids included Liverpool and Bristol. Some bombs fell on Stanmore, but did no damage to Fighter Command headquarters. One enemy aircraft was claimed by the balloon barrage, but during the night balloons at ten major centres broke away.
September 17th
Day Slight activity. One large fighter sweep in afternoon. Seelöwe postponed until further notice.
Night Heavy attacks on London. Lighter raids on Merseyside and Glasgow.
Weather Squally showers, local thunder, bright intervals. Channel, Straits and Estuary drizzle.
A shapely outline, a Spitfire of 19 Squadron from Duxford photographed during September
The continued strength of both Fighter and Bomber Commands of the R.A.F. and an adverse weather report for the coming week led Hitler on this day to postpone Operation Seelöwe until further notice and he issued a directive to this effect. A high state of preparedness was, however, to be maintained. The naval staff war diary recorded that an order from the Führer to carry out Sealion was still to be expected at any time, and that if the air and weather situations permitted, the invasion might be got under way as late as October.
The weather was unsuitable for mass raids on London, and in accordance with Göring’s directive of the 16th, Luftflotte 2 sent waves of flghters across, with a few bombers as bait, in the hope of luring 11 Group into an unprofitable battle.
Seven to eight main raids totalling some 250 aircraft built up over France and crossed the coast at Lympne, Dover and Deal at 15,000 feet. Intercepting R.A.F. fighters found that the majority of the formations were Me 109s and the twenty-eight squadrons put up succeeded in turning them back over Maidstone. A few bombs were dropped, and British losses were only five aircraft (one pilot killed and two wounded) out of the 544 sorties flown. Luftwaffe casualties totalled eight aircraft for the whole twenty-four hours.
By night the German Air Force returned at full strength with 268 bombers over London arriving in a stream via Dungeness and Selsey Bill. Much residential damage was done. It was the turn of the big department stores with John Lewis’s in Oxford Street almost completely burnt out, and both Bourne and Hollings worth and D. H. Evans hit. By this time 30,000 Londoners had lost their homes.
By way of diversion, a few raiders undertook the long flights to Merseyside and to Glasgow. Fighter Command put up thirty-eight single-engined fighter sorties, but they groped in vain, except for a Defiant of 141 Squadron which shot down a Ju 88 near Barking at 11.30.
While the Germans concentrated on London with the A.A. barrage the only opposition. Bomber Command was out in force attacking the barges, transport and munitions being mustered for invasion. Throughout the Battle and afterwards, in its historical surveys, the Luftwaffe always spoke disparagingly of the R.A.F.’s offensive efforts from July to October 1940. The German naval staff, however, were under no illusions, as they were at the receiving end.
On this night Bomber and Coastal commands, also taking advantage of the full moon, despatched aircraft to Dunkirk, Calais, Boulogne, Cherbourg and den Helder. The following morning the German naval staff described losses as Very considerable’. At Dunkirk twenty-six barges were sunk or badly damaged and fifty-eight slightly damaged. A tremendous explosion heralded the detonation of 500 tons of stored ammunition, while a ration depot and dock-handling equipment were destroyed. At the other ports buildings were smashed and a steamer and a torpedo-boat sunk.
September 18th
Day Oil targets in Thames Estuary attacked.
Night London and Merseyside raided.
Weather Bright and squally.
At 9 a.m. the first blips appeared on Fighter Command radar screens. They showed a heavy build-up over-Calais. The raiders, mainly fighters, penetrated between North Foreland and Folkestone at 20,000 feet. They were split up over Maidstone and the Estuary and turned for home after running engagements with seventeen R.A.F. squadrons. One was shot down by anti-aircraft fire.
Two hours later radar betrayed four raids totalling 190 planes. They crossed the coast at Deal and attacked Chatham. At least sixty reached the centre of London. The rest roamed over Kent.
At 2 p.m. Luftflotte 2 began to assemble 150 aircraft over Calais. As they climbed to 20,000 feet the Germans sorted themselves into neat formations and set course for Gravesend.
Breaking cloud over Kent the Germans were met in force, and although some of them penetrated the defences, the majority of formations were broken up and repelled.
Flying up the Thames, later, two groups of between twenty and thirty bombers were heading for London when Spitfires and Hurricanes of the Duxford wing attacked them. The wing had taken off at 4.20 p.m. and was patrolling Hornchurch when A.A. fire betrayed the presence of the enemy groups.
Leaving No. 611 Squadron on patrol and No. 19 Squadron to look after the escorts, Bader led his three Hurricane squadrons into an almost vertical diving attack on the first formation. The Germans scattered, leaving only four vies of five aircraft. These were soon broken up and the bombers turned for home.
Sergeant Plzak, a Czech pilot with No. 19 Squadron, fired a couple of bursts at an He 111 and stopped both its engines. The crew baled out and the bomber crashed near Gillingham, Kent.
The Duxford Wing claimed thirty destroyed, six probables and two damaged in the engagement. They lost none. But when the score came to be verified against the German Quartermaster General’s records, it was found that only nineteen Luftwaffe machines had actually been shot down during the whole day.
Twelve British fighters went down in the fighting of the 18th, but only three of the pilots were killed, in the course of 1,165 sorties.
No. 7 O.T.U. scored a third victory that day. Squadron Leader McLean, Flying Officer Brotchie and Sergeant Armitage took off from Hawarden, Cheshire, and intercepted a raid flying towards Liverpool. They damaged one Do 17 and shot down another which dived into the sea off the Welsh coast.
Dowding’s efforts to remedy the chronic shortage of fighter pilots bore further fruit on the 18th when the Air Ministry agreed to another combing of the Fairey Battle squadrons for Fighter Command’s benefit. They also agreed to allot to the Command more than two-thirds of the entire output of the flying training schools in the four-week period ending the middle of October.
On September 7th 984 Hurricane and Spitfire pilots were flying with the squadrons—a deficiency of nearly twenty-two pilots per squadron, and of these 150 were only semi-trained.
On the other side of the Channel German preparations for the invasion were reaching their peak. On the 15th 102 barges were photographed by reconnaissance aircraft in Boulogne, On the 17th there were 150. Calais harbour contained 266. By the 18th ‘the Channel ports held 1,004 invasion craft and a further 600 waited up-river at Antwerp.
From September 7th Blenheims pressed home their attacks by day whenever the weather permitted and Wellingtons, Whitleys, Hampdens and Battles operated at night. Operating under Coastal Command, Fleet Air Arm Swordfishes and Albacores also took part.
During September 60 per cent of the bombing was directed at the invasion ports on which 1,400 tons of bombs were dropped. The remaining effort was concentrated against rail communications, shipyards and oil targets in Germany and occupied Europe.
Night bombing on Britain started on September 18th at 7.30 p.m. and the flow of raids lasted until 5.30 a.m. the following morning. London and Liverpool were the principal targets. Bombs were also scattered over Kent and Surrey and in Middlesex 120 cylindrical parachute mines fell in the vicinity of Stanmore.
September 19th
Day Reduced activity, attacks chiefly over Thames Estuary and east London.
Night London and Merseyside.
Weather Showery.
Piccadilly, Regent Street, Bond Street, North Audley Street, Park Lane and many less famous thoroughfares in the centre of London were blocked after the night’s raids. Big cranes surrounded Marble Arch and men of the Civil Defence Corps, Pioneers and Police worked to clear the rubble and rescue the victims trapped in the wreckage.
A lull was expected after the intensity of the previous day’s operations. Only seventy hostile planes, flying singly, crossed the coast via Dungeness. A few reached Liverpool and London where a lone roof-top raider machine-gunned Hackney.
Near Bury St. Edmunds, Suffolk, a Ju 88 fell to the guns of No. 302 Squadron. Engine failure compelled another to land intact at Oakington airfield near Cambridge. Losses for the day were eight German and no British.
Rain in the night interfered with German plans, but they managed to despatch 200 aircraft to mine coastal waters. A few went for the Home Counties and London. At Heston aerodrome a parachute mine wrecked or damaged thirteen planes, including five Photographic Reconnaissance Unit Spitfires, a Lockheed 12A and a visiting Wellington bomber. Liverpool sirens sounded for six raids plotted approaching from the Irish Sea.
In Germany, Hitler formally ordered the assembly of the invasion fleet to be stopped, and shipping in the Channel ports to be dispersed ‘so that the loss of shipping space caused by enemy air attacks may be reduced to a minimum’.
September 20th
Day One large fighter sweep towards London: otherwise reconnaissance only.
Dornier 17s of KG 3 flying in over Canning Town on September 7th, 1940. In the middle of the picture is the West Ham Stadium while below, partially hidden, is the Royal Victoria Dock
Night London.
Weather Fair with bright periods. Showery.
There were few early-morning raids but at 10.30 a.m. the Luftwaffe started massing at Calais. Then twenty planes crossed the coast at Dungeness at 13,000 feet, thirty overflew Dover, at 12,000 feet, and a dozen or more passed over Lympne. The R.A.F. lost seven planes near Kenley, Biggin Hill and the Estuary, and the Germans lost eight.
At night the waning moon was still bright enough to help the Germans but they chose to curtail their activities which were mainly directed against London.
Reporting on his trip to Britain, in New York, Brigadier Strong, Assistant Chief of the U.S. Military Mission sent to London to observe the results of the Luftwaffe’s attacks, did much to influence American opinion. The German Air Force, he said, had made no serious inroad on the strength of the R.A.F. and the damage inflicted on military targets was comparatively small. Strong concluded by stating that the British were conservative in claiming German aircraft casualties.
September 21st
Day Slight activity; some fighter sweeps in east Kent.
Night London and Merseyside attacked.
Weather Mainly fine.
London, cloaked in haze, enjoyed a relatively quiet day, as did the rest of the country except for isolated attacks and extensive reconnaissance in coastal areas.
Among the lone raiders was a Ju 88 which bombed the Hawker works at Brooklands in a tree-top-level attack. Fortunately the damage did not affect production.
When an unidentified aircraft was plotted at 4.30 p.m. 25,000 feet over Liverpool, Pilot Officer D. A. Adams of No. 611 Squadron was ordered to investigate. He found a German bomber and sent it crashing into a field near Dolgelly, North Wales.
The bulk of Fighter Command’s 563 sorties were flown in the evening when five raids crossed the coast at Dover, Lympne and Dungeness to assail Kenley, Biggin Hill, Hornchurch and central London. Twenty No. 11 Group squadrons, the Duxford Wing and one No. 10 Group squadron scrambled to intercept but only one of them engaged. The German casualties numbered nine while the R.A.F. suffered no loss.
Scattered cloud and moonlight made the night perfect for the raiding, but the Germans chose to exert no more than moderate pressure on London, Liverpool, Warrington, Nottingham, Bolton and Colchester.
September 22nd
Day Slight activity.
Night London bombed.
Weather Dull with fog in morning. Cloudy in afternoon, fair to fine late. Some rain.
Twelve single raiders flying high over London and the noise of No. 234 Squadron’s Browning guns shooting down a lone Ju 88 scarcely disturbed this Sunday’s congregations. Even the sound of Merlin engines was strangely absent, for the squadrons flew only 158 sorties—the smallest number since the Battle began. German losses were five machines while the R.A.F. lost none.
By midnight the situation had changed; London, in the words of Lord Alanbrooke, was like Dante’s Inferno.
Twelve night fighters—Blenheims and Defiants— tried to intercept, but though the Luftwaffe gave them a selection of 123 bombers to shoot at no victories were recorded.
Nazi bombers were still over the capital in the early hours. Others mixed with Bomber Command streams returning from Germany and sneaked through the defences to attack airfields in Lincolnshire, including Digby, where they set fire to a hangar.
September 23rd
Day Fighter sweeps towards London.
Night London and Merseyside.
Weather Fine.
At 9 a.m. a build-up of nearly 200 planes was detected over Calais. Chiefly Me 109s, they came over in four large and two small waves fanned out beyond Dover. Twenty-four squadrons were up to cut them off and ten intercepted. A further force of 109s came in at 7 p.m.
Between 5 and 6 p.m. Uxbridge despatched twelve squadrons in four wings to counter five waves of Messerschmitts intruding through South Foreland, Dover and Hythe. The sweep lasted forty-five minutes but the attackers were elusive.
Eleven British aircraft and three pilots were lost in the day’s engagements. Eight of the pilots were wounded. German losses were sixteen.
With London under heavy bombardment the Cabinet were determined to retaliate and they ordered the indiscriminate bombing of Berlin with parachute mines. Nothing could have been less in keeping with Air Staff thinking, which contrasted the effect of four bombs on Fulham power station with several thousand bombs which fell elsewhere.
The dispute ended in compromise. The Air Staff agreed to include Berlin in their forthcoming directives on the understanding that only targets of specific military value were to be bombed. The directive was issued on September 21st and on the night of 23rd 119 Whitleys, Wellingtons and Hampdens took off for the German capital.
In contrast 261 German planes turned London into another inferno and damage was widespread.
September 24th
Day Tilbury and Southampton raided.
Night London and Merseyside attacked.
Weather Early-morning fog in northem France. Channel cloudy, haze in the Straits and Thames Estuary.
British service chiefs, unaware that Seelöwe had been postponed on September 17th, continued to await the invasion. Equinoctial gales which had swept the Channel earlier in the week had now died down and the sea was quieter. By 8.30 a.m. the only sign of enemy activity was in the air where some 200 aircraft, mainly bombers, crossed the coast on a ten-mile front in five formations ranging from three to fifty planes in size.
‘An Air Raid and it’s Results’—the German caption to photographs showing the raid on the Bristol Aeroplane Company, Filton, when production was severely curtailed.
‘Our photographs show the large aircraft factories at Filton. The picture on the left was taken a few days before the raid which destroyed the factory.
Easily recognised, close to the railway, are the huge workshops, whose camouflage was intended as protection against aerial observation.
The aerial photograph, however, proves that the paint on the roofs alone is not enough. The workshops are clearly recognisable.
The upper picture was taken during the first bombing attack. The main works can be recognised in the left-hand lower corner. Bombs are seen exploding in the
middle of the works. The somewhat smaller branch factory above the railway which crosses the picture is completely covered by salvoes of bombs.
The white patches in the right-hand lower corner of the upper picture are clouds which have drifted between the ground and the bombing planes. The upper picture enables one to recognise with all desirable clarity that hell has been let loose on the Filton works below. Blow after blow rains on the great shops. This factory will not produce many more aircraft.
The numbers indicate:- 1. The main works. 2. Adjoining works. 3. Seven aircraft parked in line. 4. Three aircraft on the ground. 5, Barrage balloons on the ground. 6. The main run-way crossing the middle of the aerodrome’
Flying between 10,000 and 25,000 feet the Germans tried to get through to London, but were repulsed. Three hours later another 200 assembled into five formations over Cap Gris Nez and headed north. Of the eighteen British squadrons sent up to intercept them only two engaged.
Soon after lunch between fifteen and twenty Me 109 fighter-bombers came up the Solent in two waves. Diving singly, they attacked the Supermarine works at Woolston near Southampton. They did little damage to the factory itself but hit a shelter and killed nearly 100 of the staff.
The Messerschmitts then turned over Portsmouth and for twenty minutes trailed their coats. Not a British fighter was to be seen but the A.A. guns blazed away and shot down one German aircraft, making eleven for the day. This brought German losses since September 19th to fifty-nine. In the same period twenty-two British fighters were destroyed of which four were lost on the 24th.
From early evening until 5.30 the following morning there was widespread bombing over the whole country.
September 25th
Day Bristol and Plymouth bombed.
Night London, North Wales and Lancashire attacked.
Weather Fair to fine in most districts. Cool. Channel cloudy with bright intervals; hazy.
Apart from the usual reconnaissance flights and the detection of intense activity over France at 8.20 a.m., the morning was quiet. At 11.20 a large raid crossed the coast.
Fighter-bombers made diversionary attacks on Portland while some sixty Heinkel 111s comprising the three Gruppen of KG55 slipped through the defences with Me nos of ZG26 and reached Bristol at 11.45. They attacked the Bristol Aeroplane Company’s works at Filton with ninety tons of high-explosive and twenty-four oil-bombs.
Production was curtailed for many weeks. The bombing killed or injured more than 250, blocked railways near the factory and cut communications between Filton airfield and No. 10 Group Headquarters. Eight out of fifty completed bombers were badly damaged.
Three No. 10 Group squadrons and a flight of Hurricanes were scrambled in time to meet the attackers. But they were vectored to Yeovil where the Westland aircraft works seemed the more likely target. When the actual objective became known the three squadrons swung into pursuit but only a few of the aircraft caught up with the Germans before they reached Filton. Five of the enemy aircraft were shot down, one of them by anti-aircraft fire.
Although Filton was acting as a temporary sector station, Nos. 87 and 213 Squadrons allocated to it were operating from Exeter and Bibury. To guard against further attack Dowding immediately ordered No. 504 (County of Nottingham) Squadron to move to Filton from Hendon.
No. 601 Squadron engaged twelve bombers and twelve Me 110s at Start Point near Plymouth at 4.30 p.m. At the same time No. 74 Squadron, operating from Duxford, joined Nos. 611 and 19 squadrons to intercept a raid coming in over London at 20,000 feet.
By dusk Fighter Command had flown 668 sorties. The score was four British to thirteen German planes destroyed.
On the night of the 25th the highest number of people sheltering in tube stations was recorded. A Home Security operations room weekly report on this day records:
The German attack upon London has had no fundamental ill effect either upon the capital or on the nation. Its first impact caused bewilderment and there was some ill-temper…
This loss of temper … has almost completely vanished and a general equanimity prevails … Nothing has affected the unconquerable optimism of the Cockney nor has anything restricted his ready if graveyard humour … Without over emphasis people take the obvious precautions to ensure sufficient sleep. Having done so they regard the event philosophically. During the day they continue their ordinary business … It is still necessary to canvas some classes of the people to leave London.
September 26th
Day Supermarine works at Southampton attacked and wrecked.
Night London and Merseyside.
Weather Mainly fair to cloudy in the south.
It was obvious to the Germans as they studied reconnaissance photographs of Southampton that Super-marine’s Woolston factory remained intact.
In the afternoon seventy-six planes—He 111s, Ju 88s and Me 109s—assembled over Brittany and set course for the Solent. By 5.45 they had delivered a ‘pattern bombing’ attack on the home of the Spitfire. It was all over in a few minutes with seventy tons of bombs dropped to such good purpose that for a short time production was completely stopped. In addition more than thirty people were killed and a nearby warehouse filled with grain was destroyed.
Engaged on the way in by anti-aircraft fire only, the attackers were intercepted after the bombing by four No. 10 and No. 11 Group squadrons. One of these was No. 303 (Polish) Squadron which had left Northolt in the middle of an inspection by the King. Three German aircraft were shot down. The R.A.F. lost six. The day’s engagements cost both air forces nine planes each, the R.A.F. flying 417 sorties.
Only three Spitfires on the Woolston production line were destroyed. Many others were damaged by the blast and debris but they were soon repaired and delivered to the squadrons.
In August 149 Spitfires had been produced, mostly at Woolston, as the shadow factory at Castle Bromwich was only just coming into production. In October 139 Spitfires were built. The Southampton facilities were dispersed to thirty-five sites and by the end of the year production was back to normal.
September 27th
Day Heavy attacks on London and one on Bristol.
Night London, Merseyside and the midlands.
Weather Fair in extreme south and south-west. Cloudy in the Channel with haze. Slight rain in southern England.
The first sign of German activity appeared on the operations table at No. 11 Group as the 8 a.m. watch took over.
The planes were bomb-carrying Me nos escorted by Me 109s. Harried by fighters from Dungeness to the outskirts of London they scattered their bombs indiscriminately.
Some Me 109s stuck tenaciously to the London area. They had orders to protect two succeeding formations of Do 17s and Ju 88s, but the bombers did not make the rendezvous. 11 Group was ready for them and they were intercepted over the coast by a powerful assembly of Spitfires and Hurricanes which broke up the tidy German formations and compelled them to jettison their bombs.
Badly mauled, the Messerschmitt pilots over London were obliged to split up and dive for the safety of a ground-level retreat.
Having failed to clear the skies by sending fighters ahead of the bombers in the first assault, the Germans reverted at 11.30 to a split raid, sending eighty aircraft to Bristol and 300 to London.
No. 10 Group squadrons fought the Bristol raiders across the West Country and only ten Me 110s and some 109s managed to get through. These were intercepted on the outskirts of Bristol by the Nottingham squadron, which compelled them to release their bombs un-profitably on the suburbs. The survivors were harried all the way back to the coast and out to sea.
The majority of the London raiders got no further than the middle of Kent where they were so severely mauled that they retreated in confusion. Some reached the outskirts of the city and twenty slipped through to the centre.
With fifty-five German aircraft missing (including twenty-one bombers) the Channel was alive with air-sea rescue planes and boats in the evening. Most of the twenty-eight British planes lost came down on land.
September 28th
Day London and the Solent area attacked.
Night The target London.
Weather Fair to fine generally. Channel, Straits of Dover and Thames Estuary cloudy. Winds moderate.
Delighted by the results of the 27th, Churchill was moved to send the Secretary of State this message: Tray congratulate the Fighter Command on the results of yesterday. The scale and intensity of the fighting and the heavy losses of the enemy … make 27th September rank with 15th September and 15th August, as the third great and victorious day of the Fighter Command during the course of the Battle of Britain.’
By that evening, however, sixteen fighters and nine pilots had been lost resisting two major raids on London and one on Portsmouth.
This, coupled with the fact that only three German planes were shot down, was an indication that the British pilots were exhausted by the intensity of the demands made on them.
The Luftwaffe’s losses for the day in fact totalled ten machines. Seven of them were destroyed accidentally.
Another important factor to be found in these results lay in the composition of the German formations. As a result of their losses—accentuated on the 27th— the Germans were forced to admit that their large bomber formations were not paying big enough dividends to justify the heavy losses they had incurred. New tactics were accordingly ordered, involving smaller bomber formations consisting of thirty of the faster Ju 88s, escorted by 200 to 300 fighters.
Evidence of this change in tactics did not become apparent until midday when several large formations of Me 109s appeared between Deal and Dungeness escorting some thirty bombers. The raiders were driven off before they reached central London, but not without difficulty for the British, who were placed at a disadvantage by the heights at which the German escorts were flying.
All No. II Group squadrons were involved, as well as five squadrons from No. 12 Group.
At 2.45 p.m. fifty Me 110s were intercepted en route for Portsmouth and driven back by squadrons of No. 10 Group assisted by five No. 11 Group units diverted to help.
From 5 p.m. until nightfall the Germans concentrated on reconnaissance. At 9 p.m. they began night operations which were centred on London.
September 29th
Day Reduced activity in south-east and East Anglia.
Night London and Merseyside attacked.
Weather Fine and fair early. Fair late. Cloudy for the rest of the day.
The Germans, after a morning harassing convoys, struck out with several high-flying formations. Nine of their aircraft failed to return home and that night Weybridge A.A. gunners added a bomber to the score. Five British fighters were destroyed.
September 30th
Day Fighter sweeps towards London but few bombs dropped.
Night London attacked.
Weather Generally fair but cloudy. Winds light.
An hour separated the first two major raids which began at 9 a.m. In the first there were thirty bombers and 100 fighters; in the second sixty planes.
Crossing the coast at Dungeness the two raids were met in force. Split and harried, neither reached London.
At 10.50 a.m. radar warned of another attack—this time approaching Dorset from Cherbourg. The planes were Me no fighter-bombers escorted by 109s. They were so severely handled by the R.A.F. that they turned back before reaching the coast.
Midday came and with it a fierce battle over Kent. Then at 3.10 p.m. a series of minor sorties was followed by a major raid of more than 100 planes. Thirty reached. London. Within fifty minutes 180 more bombers and fighters were plotted approaching Weybridge and Slough on a front of eight miles.
One hundred miles west, forty escorted Heinkel bombers crossed the coast heading for the Westland works at Yeovil. Cloud obscured the target and the Germans were obliged to bomb blind. Sherborne, some miles from Yeovil, took the full impact of the attack.
The Germans had to fight their way in against four British squadrons and they were beset by another four on the way out. Four Hurricanes fell to their gunners and an Me 110 shot down another.
Two of the British pilots baled out and the third. Wing Commander Constable-Maxwell, shot down by a single bullet puncturing the oil system of his aircraft, force-landed his Hurricane on a beach.
By dusk the last great daylight battle was over and the score was forty-seven German aircraft destroyed for a loss of twenty R.A.F. fighters and eight pilots killed or wounded.
Just as the Stuka had been withdrawn from the battle so now were the twin-engined bombers to be relegated to the night offensive—except for those rare occasions when they could use the clouds to cover their sorties over Britain.
And as if to mark the occasion the King appointed Dowding Knight Grand Commander of the Bath.
At night there were heavy raids on London, East Anglia, Liverpool and Bristol. The attack was mounted mainly by Luftflotte 2 whose 250 aircraft penetrated between Beachy Head and the Isle of Wight.
Attempting to reach London 175 of the raiders met with heavy anti-aircraft fire and stalking night fighters. A few broke through to bomb Acton and Westminster, but most of them were content to release their loads on the suburbs.
FIGHTER COMMAND ORDER OF BATTLE Groups and Squadrons September 30th, 1940 (0900 hours)
13 GROUP, HEADQUARTERS NEWCASTLE |
||
Wick |
||
232 |
Hurricane |
Castletown |
Dyce |
||
145 |
Hurricane |
A Flight Dyce |
Turnhouse |
||
65 |
Spitfire |
Turnhouse |
3 |
Hurricane |
Turnhouse |
141 |
Defiant |
Turnhouse |
111 |
Hurricane |
Drem |
263 |
Hurricane |
Drem (one flight only) |
615 |
Hurricane |
Prestwick |
Usworth |
||
43 |
Hurricane |
Usworth |
32 |
Hurricane |
Acklington |
610 |
Spitfire |
Acklington |
Catterick |
||
54 |
Spitfire |
Catterick |
219 |
Blenheim |
Catterick |
12 GROUP, HEADQUARTERS WATNALL |
||
Kirton-in-Lindsey |
||
616 |
Spitfire |
Kirton-in-Lindsey |
264 |
Defiant |
Kirton-in-Lindsey |
Church Fenton |
||
86 |
Hurricane |
Church Fenton |
302 |
Hurricane |
Leconfield (Polish) |
64 |
Spitfire |
Leconfield (A Flight; |
Digby |
||
151 |
Hurricane |
Digby |
29 |
Blenheim |
Digby |
611 |
Spitfire |
Digby (A Flight, |
Coltishall |
||
74 |
Spitfire |
Coltishall |
242 |
Hurricane |
Coltishall |
Wittering |
||
266 |
Spitfire |
Wittering |
1 |
Hurricane |
Wittering |
Duxford |
||
19 |
Spitfire |
Duxford |
310 |
Hurricane |
Duxford (Czech) |
11 GROUP, HEADQUARTERS UXBRIDGE |
||
Dehden |
||
17 |
Hurricane |
Debden |
73 |
Hurricane |
Castle Camps |
257 |
Hurricane |
Castle Camps |
North Weald |
||
249 |
Hurricane |
North Weald |
46 |
Hurricane |
Stapleford |
25 |
Blenheim |
North Weald (one flight |
Hornchurch |
||
41 |
Spitfire |
Hornchurch |
603 |
Spitfire |
Hornchurch |
222 |
Spitfire |
Rochford |
Biggin Hill |
||
72 |
Spitfire |
Biggin Hill |
92 |
Spitfire |
Biggin Hill |
66 |
Spitfire |
Gravesend |
Kenley |
||
253 |
Hurricane |
Kenley |
501 |
Hurricane |
Kenley |
605 |
Hurricane |
Croydon |
Northolt |
||
1 |
Hurricane |
Northolt (R.C.A.F.) |
303 |
Hurricane |
Northolt (Polish) |
229 |
Hurricane |
Heathrow |
264 |
Defiant |
Luton (A Flight) |
241 |
Defiant |
Gatwick (B Flight) |
Tangmere |
||
607 |
Hurricane |
Tangmere |
213 |
Hurricane |
Tangmere |
602 |
Spitfire |
Westhampnett |
23 |
Blenheim |
Ford (one flight |
10 GROUP, HEADQUARTERS BOX, |
||
WILTSHIRE |
||
Pembrey |
||
79 |
Hurricane |
Pembrey |
Filton |
||
504 |
Hurricane |
Filton |
601 |
Hurricane |
Exeter |
87 |
Hurricane |
Exeter |
St. Eval |
||
234 |
Spitfire |
St. Eval |
247 |
Gladiator |
Roborough (one flight) |
Middle Wallop |
||
238 |
Hurricane |
Middle Wallop |
609 |
Spitfire |
Middle Wallop |
604 |
Blenheim |
Middle Wallop |
152 |
Spitfire |
Warmwell |
56 |
Hurricane |
Boscombe Down |
LUFTWAFFE ORDER OF BATTLE IN THE WEST October 26th, 1940
LUFTFLOTTE 5—NORWAY |
||
X Fliegerkorps |
||
Bombers |
||
11./KG26 |
He 111 |
|
Long-range reconnaissance |
||
Aufkl.Gr.22 Stab |
||
l./(F)120 |
He 111 and Ju 88 |
|
2./(F)22 |
Do 17 |
|
3./(F)22 |
Do 17 |
|
L/(F)121 |
He 111 and Ju 88 |
|
Fighters |
||
11/JG77 |
Me 109 |
|
9./ZG76 |
Me 110 |
|
LUFTFLOTTE 2—HOLLAND, BELGIUM |
||
AND NORTHERN FRANCE |
||
Long-range reconnaissance |
||
Aufkl.Gr.l22 |
||
2./(F)122 |
Ju 88 and He 111 |
|
4./(F)122 |
Ju 88, He 111 and Me 110 |
|
L/(F)22 |
Do 17 and Me 110 |
|
7./(F)LG2 |
Me 110 |
|
II Fliegerkorps |
||
Long-range bombers |
||
KG2 Stab, I, II, III |
Do 17 |
|
KG3 Stab, I, II, III |
Do 17 |
|
KG53 Stab, I, II, III |
He 111 |
|
IV./LGl |
||
Long-range reconnaissance |
||
L/(F)122 |
Ju 88 |
|
VIII Fliegerkorps |
||
Dive-bombers |
||
St.G2 Stab, I, III |
Stab, Ju 87 |
|
and Do 17;I, III, Ju 87 |
||
St.G77 Stab, I, II, III |
Ju 87 |
|
Long-range recormaissance |
||
2./(F)ll |
Do 17 |
|
IX Fliegerkorps (name changed from |
||
IX Fliegerdivision 16.10.40) |
||
KG4 Stab, I, II, III |
I, II, He 111; |
|
III, Ju 88 |
||
KG40 Stab |
Ju 88 |
|
KG30 Stab, II, III |
Ju 88 |
|
Minelaying |
||
KGr.126 |
He 111 |
|
Coastal reconnaissance |
||
KGr.106 |
He 115 |
|
Jagdfliegerführer 2 |
||
Fighters |
||
JG3 Stab, I, II, III |
Me 109 |
|
JG26 Stab, I, II, III |
Me 109 |
|
JG27 Stab, II, III |
Me 109 |
|
JG51 Stab, I, II, III |
Me 109 |
|
JG52 Stab, I, II |
Me 109 |
|
I./LG2 |
Me 109 |
|
JG54 Stab, II |
Me 109 |
|
JG53 Stab, I, II, III |
Me 109 |
|
JG77 I |
Me 109 |
|
Ground attack |
||
II./LG2 |
Me 109 |
|
Epr.Gr.210 |
Me 110 |
|
Luftgaukommando XI |
||
Fighters |
||
JGl Stab |
Me 109 |
|
JG54I |
Me 109 |
|
ZG76 II |
Me 110 |
|
Luftgaukommando VI |
||
Fighters |
||
JG3 I (one Schwarm) |
Me 109 |
|
Luftkommando Holland |
||
Fighters |
||
JG54 III |
Me 109 |
|
C.A.I Verb, Stab (Corpo Aero Italiano) |
||
Bombers |
||
KG43 (43 Stormo) |
Fiat BR 20 |
|
KG13 (13 Stormo) |
Fiat BR 20 |
|
Fighters |
||
JG56 Stab |
||
18/JG56 (18 Gruppo) |
Fiat G.50 |
|
20/JG56 (20 Gruppo) |
Fiat CR.42 |
|
Reconnaissance |
||
Aufkl.St. 172 |
||
(172 Squadriglia) |
Cant Z.1007 bis |
|
LUFTFLOTTE 3—FRANCE |
||
Long-range reconnaissance |
||
Aufkl.Gr.l23 Stab |
||
l./(F)123 |
Ju 88 and Do 17 |
|
2./(F)123 |
Ju 88 and Do 17 |
|
3./(F)123 |
Ju 88 and Do 17 |
|
Long-range bombers |
||
KGl III (10 and 12 Staffeln Ju 88 |
||
on special duties) |
||
Jagdfliegerführer 3 |
||
I Fliegerkorps |
||
Long-range reconnaissance |
||
5./(F)122 |
Ju 88 and He 111 |
|
Long-range bombers |
||
KGl Stab, I, II, III and |
Stab, I, |
|
reserve Staffel II, 1 |
He 111; III, Ju 88 |
|
KG26 Stab, II, III and |
He111 |
|
reserve Staffel |
||
KG76 Stab, I, II, III |
Do 17 |
|
and reserve Staffel |
||
KG77 Stab, I, II, III and |
Ju 88 |
|
reserve Staffel |
||
IV Fliegerkorps |
||
Long-range reconnaissance |
||
3./(F)121 |
Ju 88 and He 111 |
|
3./(F)31 |
Me 110 and Do 17 |
|
Long-range bombers |
||
LGl Stab, I, II, III and |
Ju 88 |
|
reserve Staffel |
||
KG27 Stab, I, II, III |
He 111 |
|
IV and reserve |
||
Staffel |
||
KGr.100 |
He 111 |
|
Naval co-operation |
||
KG40 I |
FW 200 |
|
K.Fl.Gr.606 |
Do 17 |
|
Fighters |
||
JG27 I, II |
Me 109 |
|
Long-range reconnaissance |
||
Aufkl.Gr.31 Stab |
Me 110 and Do 17 |
|
(subordinate to H.Q. 9th Abteilung) |
||
V Fliegerkorps |
||
Long-range reconnaissance |
||
(subordinate to 9th Army) |
||
4./(F)121 |
Ju 88 and Do 17 |
|
4./(F)14 |
Me110 and Do 17 |
|
Long-range bombers |
||
KG51 Stab, I, II, III and |
Ju 88 |
|
reserve Staffel |
||
KG54 Stab, I, II |
Ju 88 |
|
KG55 Stab, I, II, III and |
He 111 |
|
reserve Staffel |
||
K.Gr.806 |
Ju 88 |
|
Dive-bombers |
||
St.G.3 Stab, I, II |
Stab, Do 17 |
|
and He 111; I, II, Ju 87 |
||
Fighters |
||
ZG26 Stab, I, II, III |
Me 110 |
|
and reserve Staffel |
||
JG2 Stab, I, II, III and |
Me 109 |
|
reserve Staffel |
||
5./JG53 (subordinate to |
Me 109 |
|
Luftflotte 2) |
||
Coastal reconnaissance |
||
K.Fl.St.2./106 |
Do 18 |