CHAPTER THREE
Follow the N324 across the Grave bridge towards Nijmegen. After a couple of hundred metres, on reaching the outskirts of Nederasselt, take the right turn, signposted towards Overasselt. You are now following a diversion from the planned route, used by the Grenadier Guards when the Germans blew a bridge on the direct road to Nijmegen. The area to the left between your road and the low wooded ridge, 1,700 metres to the north-east is DZ O. After a mile, on the left of the road, is the memorial to the US 504 Parachute Infantry Regiment.
Drop Zone OSCAR – Sunday 17 September 1944
504 Parachute Infantry Regiment, less Company E, 2/504, used the two distinct parts of DZ O. The two parts of the DZ were well marked by the divisional pathfinders and were easy for pilots to identify, in broad daylight, at the base of the loop created by the Maas and the Maas-Waal Canal. This was the only DZ General Gavin chose to have marked, as 504 PIR had two of the Division’s foremost objectives to capture. He preferred to preserve the surprise factor for the other two regiments. The Pathfinders dropped at 12.31 hours and set up their radio beacons and visual markers on the two parts of DZ O. Consequently, the drop was very accurate. The three battalions were able to concentrate and organise themselves quickly and many accounts of this stage of the battle exclaim that ‘it was just like an exercise’. There were, however, a few casualties from the inevitable landing accidents. 2/504 PIR’s mission to capture the Grave Bridge to the west has been covered. 1/504 PIR’s objectives lay to the east along the line of the Maas-Waal Canal, which was spanned by five bridges. In an aid to radio security, designed to defeat German eavesdroppers, the four closest bridges had been nicknumbered, from south to north, 7 – 10 respectively. Colonel Ruben Tucker hoped to secure intact all four of the bridges but the Neerbosch/Honinghuite Canal road and railway bridge (number 10) was a priority, as it was the only crossing known to be able to bear the weight of armour. 3/504 PIR’s mission was to secure the main Grave to Nijmegen road, which XXX Corps was planning to use in its drive north. This they achieved with little difficulty. In summary, three battalions were expected to secure over five miles of road and crossings on five miles of canal! A tall order for light troops lacking vehicles, even if they were operating in the enemy’s rear-area.
504 PIR, prepare to board C-47 Skytrains. This aircraft type was known to the British as the Dakota.
Dakota W7-Q, on its way to the Netherlands.
DZ O and the memorial to 504 Parachute Infantry Regiment.
Drive on through Overasselt towards Heumen, passing under the motorway bridge. Follow the road through the village of Heumen to the lock on the Mass Waal-Canal and park by the side of the canal. You are standing on the ‘island’ in the centre of the canal system, where the Germans held out. The memorial, on the building near the bridge, is to the Dutch soldiers who were killed defending the bridge from German attack on 10th May 1940. The wartime bridge was removed in 1990. However, the basic layout of the lock has changed little since its capture by the 82nd. Looking north along the canal, past the modern bridge is the Malden Bridge – Number 8.
The Heumen Bridge – Sunday 17 September 1944
Bridge Number 7 crossed a lock, capable of taking the largest river going barges. This lock bridge was the objective of Captain Thomas B. Heldeson’s Company B 1 /504 PIR. The German defenders, knowing that they were about to be attacked, by paratroopers who they had seen dropping to the east and west of them, were quickly driven back as the first Americans approached. They withdrew onto the small island between the lock and the broad sluice channel. On the western side of the bridge, engineers and paratroopers of Company B, crawling forward under the cover of their machine-guns cut every cable they could find in an attempt to prevent the Germans blowing the bridge. In the words of their battalion commander,
Operations of 504 PIR Sunday 17 September 1944 Grave, Overasselt & Heumen
The central portion of DZ O, which was used by all of 504 PIR less Company E.
Removed at the end of the eighties, the site of the Heumen Lock. The bridge is now a dead end.
Aerial shot of the Heumen Lock taken 10 September 1944.
‘They worked with the urgency of men who knew that if they didn’t succeed they were likely to go up with the bridge!’
Unable to cross the Sluice Bridge and close with the enemy, Company B’s attack ground to a halt on the bank. Bringing up every available machine-gun, the paratroopers poured fire onto the area of the locks, thus preventing the Germans from moving around and possibly, suicidally, attempting to blow the bridge. The German crew of a pre-1942 vintage Russian 75mm anti-tank gun were driven away from their fixed but poorly protected position by the hail of bullets.
The stalemate was eventually broken when paratroopers from 2/505 PIR belatedly arrived. They had been dropped on Kamp near DZ Tango, four miles away just to the north-east of Groesbeek rather than on the closer DZ November. The Battalion had been deliberately dropped there as there was congestion in the air over DZ N. Consequently they had an extra two miles to march to their objective. Coming down from the Groesbeek heights, they attacked the Germans in what, hither to, had been their rear. Now surrounded, German resistance crumbled after being subjected to heavy fire and by 18.00 hours the welcome news of the bridges capture was being received at Brigadier General Gavin’s newly established Headquarters.
German prisoners in Overasselt, 17 September, 1944.
US paratroopers moving through Overasselt.
With the capture of the Heumen Bridge, the 82nd had secured a route for XXX Corps to Nijmegen. However, it was off the direct route and it was not certain that the bridge would carry the weight of armour. The bridges further north along the canal, particularly the large Bridge 10, were urgently required. Bridges 8 and 9 were attacked during the evening of the first day. However, without coup de main operations, the German demolition guards were fully alert and had stood their ground despite paratroopers landing to both the east and west. Jumping at the eastern area of DZ O werCompany E C, 1/504 PIR. However, some sticks of paratroopers landed on the low, wooded, glacial moraine ridge that had been formed at the end of the last Ice Age and overlooked the DZ. Company C’s objective was Bridge 8 between Malden and Droge. Staff Sergeant Ross S Carter was in one of the sticks that overshot the DZ and found himself dropping towards one of the area’s small lakes:
US jump casualties and 2/HCR troops at Overasselt.
‘I began a desperate manhandling of the chute risers with my aim set on the left bank. Right up to the edge, I thought that I would inevitably fall into that water and drown. But luck had been with me.
A forest of evergreens, the tallest not over fifteen feet, had cushioned my fall and now provided protection. I got the direction of the bridge by observing the planes’ line of flight. Then I pushed through the conifers until I came to a trail. A careful scrutiny of my position convinced me that thCompany E would follow the trail towards the bridge. Since I was closest to it, I constituted myself as an advance outpost to guard against ambush and impatiently waited for my buddies. The boys dribbled down the trail in twos and threes until thCompany E was together. Nearly everyone had had a good jump. Within fifteen minutes after falling into Holland we were on the way to the bridge.
Soon we emerged from the comfortable cover of the evergreens and hurried over the mostly open country towards our objective. We were within five hundred yards of it when a tremendous explosion lifted the bridge high into the air and scattered it over a wide area. A few of us got bruised by the flying debris.... After destroying the bridge, the Germans set up a stout defence in its ruins. We were machine-gunned from several directions. So we lay in the ditch and waited for darkness.
When darkness came thCompany E moved into a wood near the blown-up bridge. We put out sentries, sent out patrols and dug in for the night. Relative quietness settled down over the immediate countryside. Later a patrol from the 505th, which had one hell of a battle judging by the gunfire, contacted us from the other side of the bridge.
There was a similar story at Bridge 9. The Germans blew it as the leading platoons of Company A 1/504 PIR approached. Again, coordination for a simultaneous attack on both ends of the bridge, with 3/508 PIR proved to be impossible, as they had been dropped some distance away on the Groesbeek Heights. However, the 82nd Airborne’s after-action report records that at 19.40 hours, 1/504 ‘... seized W (western) side of Bridge 9. Bridge blown’. The same document reports that, having reached their objective after dark, 3/508 PIR sent ‘patrols to the site of Bridge 9’ on 18 September via the village of Hatert. Presumably, they had been informed by the reliable and well-rehearsed divisional radio net that Bridge 9 was blown and that there was no need to attack it. It is worthy of note the American Paratroopers were able to communicate in the broken and wooded ground. Their British airborne counterparts at Arnhem, however, were only able to establish very local radio nets with their sets, in similar circumstances.
Neerbosch/Honinghuite Bridge (Number 10) – Dawn: Monday 18 September
The area of the Neerbosch / Honinghuite road and rail bridges is now heavily built over and the modern road bridge now carries a dual carriageway (A326) into the centre of Nijmegen. The open fields of 1944 have now been covered with houses and industrial buildings as the City of Nijmegen has expanded outwards. A visit to this bridge should be regarded as an option, as the visitor will lose little understanding of the battle if it is missed out. The Neerbosch/ Honinghuite Bridge (5 miles to the north of Heumen) can, however, be reached by heading towards Nijmegen on the A73 autoroute from the Huemen Junction and then onto the A326, also towards Nijmegen. By taking the Dukenburg turning off the first roundabout, going under the Railway Bridge and keeping left, the canal bank and bridge can be found.
The Neerbosch Bridge was the second objective of Company C, 1/504 PIR, attacking from the west and of Company E, 2/508 PIR approaching from the east. On the most direct route for XXX Corps to Nijmegen, Brigadier General Gavin has described the Neerbosch Bridge:
‘A railroad bridge crossed the canal beside the highway bridge. Seizure intact was of the uttermost importance to us as it was the one bridge between Grave and Nijmegen that I was sure could support the weight of armoured vehicles. The Germans seemed to be aware of this also, for, as we soon learned, they had organized a highly effective defence of entrenchments, pillboxes, and barbed wire. These were in turn, protected by minefields.’
The Neerbosch/Honinghuite Bridges.
Due to the widely dispersed objectives of 1/504 PIR, the attack on the bridge was to be mounted by platoons who had earlier attacked Bridges 8 and 9. Given the ‘uttermost’ importance of seizing this bridge it seems strange that such a small force was allocated to this bridge as a secondary task. The first platoon to approach the bridge was from Company E, 2/508 PIR, commanded by Lieutenant Lloyd Polette, who was one of the bravest and most able junior commanders in the division. Having arrived at Bridge 9 after it had been blown, this company had not become heavily engaged and were consequently able to reach Neerbosch first. Lieutenant Polette made a cautious approach, to Bridge 10 hoping to achieve surprise:
‘He moved out at 03.30 hours on the morning of September 18. He was able to move quite close because of the early morning darkness, and later the early-morning sunlight shone into the eyes of the defenders, making it possible for Polette’s men to work their way closely up into the German position.’
It was a significant achievement even for such well-trained and experienced paratroopers to get as close to their objective as they managed, with the enemy expecting an attack. However, time and again, the low hours around dawn, when those who watch for the enemy, struggle against tiredness, have been exploited by generations of soldiers. The American paratroopers reached a position within one hundred and fifty yards of the bridge before the defenders opened fire, having been belatedly alerted by their sentries. Lieutenant Polette’s platoon was pinned down by the weight of German fire, including mortar rounds fired by a German support section positioned to the east of the canal.
Casualties amongst the attackers, with no fire support, mounted quickly. Fortunately the 82nd’s radios were working well and Lieutenant Polette was able to call on Lieutenant Tomlinson and his platoon. Their night attack on Bridge 9, at Hatert, two miles to the south, had ended with the Germans blowing the bridge as they approached. Tomlinson’s arrival with his platoon at Bridge 10, however, helped swing the fire fight in the Americans’ favour but they lacked the numbers and heavy fire support to press home an attack against the well defended bridge. General Gavin described the final phase of the action:
‘During the fire-fight they noticed Germans moving about the bridge, whenever they could move, and they attempted to stop them, assuming that they were placing explosives. About 10.30 German demolitions were fired, destroying the Railroad Bridge. Although Polette did not know it at the time, they also seriously damaged the Highway Bridge. About 11.00 AM Polette and Tomlison resumed the attack with 81mm mortar support and overran the German positions. The Germans fled across the bridge to the south-west.’
It seems strange that the Germans only blew the railway bridge. Perhaps this was authorised as a preliminary demolition and they were surprised by the speed and weight of the American attack, or perhaps the charges on the road bridge failed to fire properly. Either way, the paratroopers quickly put the bridge into a state of defence. However, when the Household Cavalry Regiment reached the bridge mid-morning on Tuesday 19 September, their accompanying Royal Engineer ‘recce’ Sergeant pronounced the bridge unfit for use by armour. A diversion via the smaller but undamaged Heumen Bridge was organised. A few days later, the Neerbosch Bridge crossing was in use after XXX Corps’s Royal Engineers had struggled forward through the traffic and over-bridged the damaged structure, thus allowing Club Route to be used as originally planned.
Guards Armoured Division’s Deployment – 19 September 1944
Having reached and crossed the Maas at Grave, the leading elements of the Guards Armoured Division were, initially, diverted via the Heumen Bridge, considerably to the south of their planned crossing of the Maas/Waal Canal. The Grenadier Group was tasked to join 2/505 PIR in taking the Nijmegen Bridges. However, tactical air reconnaissance, according to 21st Army Group’s report, had identified that the enemy were,
‘... digging-in in the REICHSWALD FOREST area 7852, and it was obvious that the enemy were building up there with a view to staging a counter-attack against our RIGHT in the area held by 505 PIR.. ... To meet this threat, COLDSTREAM GUARDS Group from the Guards Armoured Division was put under command of 82nd US Airborne Division.’
General Adair Commander of the Guards Division with General Dempsey.
Late morning 19 September the Guards Armoured Division’s vehicles queue in Overasselt before being called forward to cross the Heumen Bridge.
Following behind the Grenadiers and Coldstream Groups, were the Welsh Guards who took over defence of the Grave Bridge. While the Irish Guards Group, who had led for much of the way north up ‘Hell’s Highway’, were the divisional reserve.
In summary 504 PIR’s drop and operations on the afternoon of 17 September, to take the triangle of country between the River Maas and the Maas/Waal Canal were a success. Speed, surprise and concentration of effort were key elements but where the Germans were given time to regain their balance, they invariably managed to fire their demolitions. However, a route for XXX Corps, via the Heumen Bridge, had been promptly established, without the necessity of time consuming bridging operations by 43 Wessex Division and the RE bridging groups.
Having crossed the Heumen Bridge the Guards Armoured Division with Household Cavalry Regiment Daimler Armoured Cars wait to move forward to do battle in Nijmegen. Note the censor’s attempt to obliterate the Heumen town sign and divisional badges on vehicles.
CLUB ROUTE XXX Corps ‘Tac’ signs marked the route north.