CHAPTER FOUR
Retrace your steps back into Heumen. Turn right and join the N271 signposted towards Nijmegen, Molenhoek and Mook. Cross the modern high level bridge over the Maas/Waal Canal and at the junction follow the signs towards Molenhoek and Mook. Take the N271 south. After a mile and a half, a railway bridge comes into sight. Stop and park in a turning to the left, before going under the bridge. This is the furthest point of the German advance and from here, a path can be followed to the Railway Bridge across the Maas, which was blown on the first day of the battle. The high ground described in this chapter is to the left of the road through Mook and Plasmollen.
Throughout MARKET GARDEN, the narrow strip of land, between the wooded Groesbeek Heights and the River Maas, on which Mook and Molenhoek stand, was an important enemy approach route into the 82nd Airborne’s area. 21st Army Group’s post operational report describes the intelligence assessment of the area’s significance:
‘It was estimated that as the two villages of MOOK E 7251 and CUYK E 7149 lay at the end of three main reinforcement routes from Germany the enemy would reinforce this area and hold onto these points. This subsequently proved to be correct.’
Despite the disadvantages of being narrow and hemmed in by woods and villages, the capture of the Mook movement corridor offered the Germans the possibility of taking and destroying, the vital Heumen Bridge across the Maas/Waal Canal. Generalfeldmarschall Model, always a grand and optimistic planner, identified that a successful attack along this route to Nijmegen, could cut-off and isolate 82nd Airborne. In doing so, he sought to destroy not only 1st Airborne Division isolated at Arnhem but the American paratroopers on the Groesbeek Heights as well.
The Mook and Molenhoek area formed a small part of 505 PIR’s front of some five miles that they were to secure on Sunday 17 September. The Regiment’s after-action report dated 27 October 1944 describes its overall tasks:
‘Our mission was to seize and hold the ground stretching from the German border at Reichswald and the area around the town of Groesbeek to the Maas River and the Maas-Waal Canal and, also, to aid the 504th in securing the locks at the canal, the railroad bridge just south of it, and the road bridge north of the locks by attacking these points from the east of the Maas Waal Canal. An enemy attack was expected to come from the Reichswald where it was known that the Germans had concentrations of troops and armour. Our regiment was ordered to hold the ground at all costs because on this depended very much the success of the missions of the other two regiments.’
Huemen, Mook and Groesbeek
To prevent the enemy moving through the area, roadblocks and outposts were to be established by elements of 1/505 PIR, as the area was too large to be held in detail. The widely dispersed forward companies would have platoons in reserve and further back, a battalion reserve would be dispatched to reinforce the line if the Germans looked like breaking through. 505 PIR’s report continues:
‘The First Battalion had already at 13.30 hours, twenty minutes after the jump, about ninety percent of the men assembled. The Commanding Officer, Major Long, ordered the companies to move to their objectives at once. The big threat for the Regiment was the tanks and troops which, according to the report we had received in England should be concentrated in the forest Reichswald. As First Battalion had the area closest to the Reichswald, it was very much concerned as to the correctness of the report. Therefore, at once they questioned civilians about the enemy in the forest. And they were glad to be informed that the report about the 1000 tanks in the Reichswald was false – a statement that was later confirmed over and over again. The First Battalion had the most fighting on the first day in Holland. It was at Riethorst and Mook that the enemy resistance was heaviest.
The Platoon that defended the roadblock at Riethorst had to withdraw 500 yards and dig in there. The railroad bridge the First Battalion was to seize and defend was demolished when the troops took it.’
The blowing of the Molenhoek Railway Bridge across the River Maas was a potentially serious set back, as its capture intact had been an important element of the MARKET GARDEN plan as an alternative route. The Battalion had jumped onto DZ N, two miles to the north-east but the consequent delay in assembling and reaching the bridge gave the German defenders ample time to arm the demolition charges. A coup de main attack from drop zones immediately adjacent to the bridge could have made a difference. However, in common with the Grave and Nijmegen Bridges, the Germans had prepositioned camouflage explosives at important points in the steel structure of the bridge. All that was needed was to check the electronic firing circuits and insert the various detonators; work that would have taken the German engineers a matter of ten to fifteen minutes to complete. As the American paratroopers approached, the German demolition commander authorised the destruction of the bridge but only as the leading Americans overwhelmed the defences on the northern end. The bridge exploded in the faces of the paratroopers and the centre span of the bridge dropped into the river, making it totally unusable. If the Germans had successfully blown both the Grave Road Bridge and the Molenhoek Rail Bridge, this would have been a disaster for the Allies. In this event a Royal Engineer’s bridging column of approximately five hundred vehicles, would have to have been brought up from Bourg Leapold, through forty miles of traffic jams and enemy action on Hell’s Highway. The delay would have been considerable before XXX Corps could resume its advance towards Arnhem and the fate of 1st Airborne Division would have been sealed. As already mentioned, at almost every point, the margin of error in the MARKET GARDEN plan was extremely slim.
The River Mook Railway bridge, blown on 17 September 1944 and rebuilt on the original piers.
By late afternoon, a platoon tasked to establish one of the roadblocks was in position on the Molenhoek Road. Their first contacts were with enemy staff-cars, bearing officers racing to the area to either rejoin their commands or simply find out what was happening. One of these was Oberstleutnant Harnisch, commander of the Wherkreise IV’s pioneers, along with a staff officer and driver. Reaching the outskirts of Riethorst at Plasmolen, Harnisch’s Opel staff car was ambushed by Lieutenant Weinberg’s platoon of US paratroopers of Company B 1/505 PIR. Harnisch died of head wounds while the driver and passenger were taken prisoner. At 20.00 hours on Sunday 17 September, three of 1/505 PIR’s platoons were digging-in along the woods on the southern slope of the Groesbeek Heights. Their positions dominated the road to Heumen and Nijmegen. From east to west, they occupied positions as follows, Company B Platoon, Company C Platoon (in the centre) and then Company A Platoon on the outskirts of Mook. Elements of 2/505 were to the east in the area of Hill 81.8 and the Maas / Waal Canal locks.
Colonel Ekman and his HQ, 1/505 PIR shortly after ambushing German staff cars near the drop zone.
The night was, however, not spent quietly. Private Doyle Lawson of Company C recalls:
‘Nightfall came and then we heard hobnail boots coming up the road from the south. There must have been a platoon. We scampered to both sides of the road and someone shoved a machine gun at me and we set-up on the east side of the road. Someone else ran to the other side with a submachine-gun.
Ordinarily, we would open fire at close range for surprise and effect, but whoever it was with the submachine-gun yelled “Halt” and everyone opened fire at once. The Germans were scattering in all directions, so I fired low on the ground, right and left. We know that some escaped but most were dead or wounded. When we finally quit fire, no one moved until morning.
When morning came on the 18th, we moved the wounded to the town hall. There were by now too many to handle, so by some agreement, we let the Germans evacuate, with the understanding that all were treated well. The prisoners were sent back to Headquarters.’
Monday 18 September 1944
The author of 505 PIR’s report wrote:
‘Our first day in Holland had been quiet, but the second day was just the opposite. The real fighting in the campaign started then.... All our battalions were in action and fighting the enemy. To have any reserve was impossible with a front line over seven miles long to hold. The enemy attacked from all directions, and at some points, we had to withdraw and shorten our lines.
At 07.30 hours, the First Battalion reported that tanks and infantry were moving towards their lines.... There was activity in all directions. The glider support was to land at 13.00 hours, but as the departure was postponed, it was decided not to clear the LZ of enemy until 12.40 hours. The First Battalion was given the order to clear the LZ, but almost immediately reported that they were being attacked by large numbers of the enemy at Riethorst and that the Germans were moving towards them from the south of Mook.’
Eventually, Company C, 1/505 PIR could be spared and cleared LZ N only thirty minutes before the gliders touched down at 14.00 hours. Private Allen Langdon recalls:
Private Allen Langdon, Company C, 504 PIR, pictured wounded during June in Normandy.
‘The next day we were rushed to the DZ, as the gliders were supposed to come in but the Germans had taken over a part of the landing zone. It was there, just as the gliders were landing, that our CO Capt Anthony Stefanich, was killed in trying to save one of the gliders and its pilot when he landed a little outside of our zone.’
His dying words were: ‘We’ve come a long way together. Tell the boys to do a good job.’
Meanwhile, ad hoc Kampfgruppen under Generalfeldmarschall Model’s overall command, were formed from troops available in situ, along with those from support and training units from the administrative area Wherkreise VI. They were quickly grouped under Headquarters 406th Infantry Division and were thrown into battle as they arrived in the Reichswald/Groesbeek area. The results were predictable; for instance, Kampfgruppe Gobel’s attack on Reithorst, lacking strength, cohesion and fire support, was stopped at close quarters by paratroopers of 1/504 PIR in ambush positions in the villages and along the wood lined roads. In response German armour attempted to manoeuvre in the low lying areas, but found that they suffered the same disadvantages as the tanks of XXX Corps, who were similarly unable to manoeuvre off roads. Consequently, the panzers were easy pray to determined parachute infantrymen, armed with bazookas. These American weapons fired rocket-propelled missiles, with shaped charge warheads that could penetrate the side and armour of all but the heaviest tanks.
Captain A Stefanich.
Tuesday 19 September was:
‘...a quieter day on the front. Only small units of enemy tried now and then to penetrate our lines but were driven back each time.... The enemy started to shell our area with artillery: and for the first time, the Luftwaffe started to show that Germany still had an airforce. Both First and Third Battalions were straffed. We had the satisfaction of seeing the British tanks move into our area during the day.
On one of Colonel Ekman’s many visits to the frontlines, he had picked up the information that 500 Germans were moving towards Mook and Riethorst from the south [-west]. The Colonel sent this information over the radio to the Regimental CP at once, and the First Battalion prepared to resist the attack.
The 82nd’s artillery that had arrived in the previous day’s glider lift broke up the German attack. However, evidence was mounting that something was afoot and ‘it was with bad feeling that we waited for the new day’.
The Molenhoek Counter-Attack – Wednesday 20 September 1944 (see map page 62)
At this stage in the battle, the Germans clearly understood the importance, to both the 82nd Airborne and XXX Corps, of the bridge over the Heumen lock and they were determined to destroy it. The 505th’s report describes the attack:
‘About 10.00 hours it started for the First Battalion. About one regiment of Germans attacked at Riethorst and Mook. They were supported by tanks. Our men fought against the tanks with their small arms and bazookas and they fought bravely. The attacking forces were so numerically superior that they couldn’t be stopped by the two squads and two 57 mm AT guns south of Mook. Our men killed many and took prisoners in large numbers, but the Nazis continued to advance. At Riethorst two platoons, one from Company B and one from Company C, were fighting against one battalion which was supported by three Mk V [Panther] tanks.’
The Kampfgruppe ‘Hermann’ advancing on Mook during the early morning of 20 September.
German Fallschirmjäger push the Company box and stores in wheelbarrows whilst a Feldwebel monitors the progress of the column by bicycle.
The enemy, Fallschirmjäger of Kampfgruppe Hermann from II Fallschirmjäger Corps, had made their way by train and latterly on foot from the Cologne area. Generalfeldmarschall Model had insisted that they were to be immediately committed to reinforce the hard-pressed 406th Division in offensive operations. The ad hoc 406th had been fighting increasingly desperate actions against the cream of the Allied armies since shortly after the airborne landings. Kampfgruppe Hermann, based on remnants of 5th Fallschirmjäger Division, along with anti-aircraft guns and a battery from 6 Fallschirmjäger Artillery Regiment, were welcome reinforcements. However, the interrogation of a driver from a German Fallschirmjäger unit, captured by the Americans around 10.00 hours, provided information for the following intelligence report:
‘PW left KOLON, as did two prcht regts, on Monday morning [18 September]. Regts were to come part of the way by train, then march the rest of the way. PW with a lieutenant was leading a convoy of 30 – 35 vehicles (empty) which PW thought might be used to pick up parachutists at disembarkation from train. This was merely a surmisal.
Germans belonging to the Corps Feldt, take cover in a burnt out farm building.
Two prcht regt were merely training regts with no [unit identification] number and no combat experience. They had been in FRANCE at the time of the invasion but had been withdrawn to Germany. They have between ten and twenty practice jumps. Strength of each regt is about 2,000 men.
German soldiers running from cover to cover while under fire in the Mook area.
From what the lieutenant said, PW believed his regt was to be located about 3 km SE of REITHORST.’
The German prisoner (PW) also explained that they had crossed the Maas on temporary bridges built by the German engineers south of Midelaar. It is a measure of the Allied loss of air supremacy over the airborne divisions, that targets as easy to engage and destroy as a light military bridge, had been left standing. With adequate fighter-bomber support, Allied ground troops would have not been faced with a series of desperate fights.
H Hour for the German force assembling south and east of Riethorst, with a strength of over a thousand men, was planned to be at 06.30 hours. However, the attack eventually started at 10.00 hours. Kampfgruppe Hermann made steady progress in a north-westerly direction through Riethorst, cutting-off Company C’s platoon on The Hill. Private Doyle Lawson was with them:
‘A tank had moved up from the east. We were about to be surrounded, so an officer sent word to send someone across the road to stop them. Shelton, Coffin and myself were the ones chosen. I took up position between two houses but the Germans withdrew and laid in a mortar barrage, the likes of which I had not seen before. A shell landed behind me and shrapnel ripped into the calf of my leg, coming up through my map pocket, ripped my coat and helmet and tore the rifle stock into two pieces.
The attack seemed to go on for hours, with the tank pinning everyone down. Our bazooka shells were bouncing off its hull with no effect, so we decided to pool all our explosive into one grenade. Some brave soul crawled close enough to throw it down onto the tank, knocking it out.’
By late morning, the fighting had reached the outskirts of Mook, near the Heumen Bridge. It was the imminent fall of this latter village that brought Major General Gavin hurrying across his divisional area from Nijmegen, the true focus of Allied operations, to face a dangerous threat.
At about 13.30 hours, General Gavin was watching preparations for an Allied attack on the Nijmegen Bridge:
‘I had been there about a half-hour when I received a frantic call from Divisional Headquarters. The Chief of Staff told me that both Mook and Beek had been overrun and that the Germans were making their way into our positions there. If I wanted to save both areas from German take over with disastrous consequences, I had to get back and make some decisions about the use of reserves.... I knew there was a real likelihood of losing Mook and the only bridge over the Mass-Waal Canal at Molenhoek and also losing the Beek and the high ground at Berg-en-Dal. ’
A British carrier knocked out at Plasmolen. German soldiers walk in the direction of Mook along tramrails.
German Fallschirmjäger inside an armoured vehicle at Mook using a captured American machine-gun.
A German 20mm Flak self-propelled anti-aircraft gun firing at ground targets near Mook.
The Fallschirmjäger were not to know that they had diverted the first key Allied player ’s attention from the point of main effort – the crossing of the Waal – to a battle that, in strategic terms, was a mere side-show.
With the benefit of superior numbers, Kampfgruppe Hermann had pushed 1/505 PIR back out of their forward positions along the 82nd’s long south-eastern perimeter. By 14.10 hours, after a deadly game of cat and mouse amongst the town’s narrow streets and houses, Mook was almost in German hands.
‘At Mook the First Battalion men fought like devils, but the enemy advanced step by step. Mook was being lost. It was the German tanks that broke through our lines.... At the centre of Mook the two platoons of Company B, now reinforced by the Regimental Reserve, two platoons of Company A, stopped the enemy and a furious hand to hand fighting took place.’
In reality the four platoons, established in stout Dutch houses in Mook, were surrounded and bypassed by the advancing Germans. General Gavin continues his personal account of the battle:
‘Driving south out of Molenhoek, in about half a mile we came to a railroad overpass just north of the town of Mook. A two-lane macadamized highway passed under the railroad and into the town. Beyond the underpass to the right was a high dike between fifteen and twenty feet high, erected to hold back the high water of the Mass River. There the dike swung to the south and east, following the river.’
As I arrived, just short of the railroad overpass, a tremendous amount of small-arms fire passed overhead. About twenty-five yards from the railroad overpass a paratrooper was in a foxhole with a bazooka. He seemed a bit shaken, and he was all alone. Just ahead of him mines were laid across the highway under the railroad. Beyond them a British tank [1/Coldstream Guards] was in position. Just after I arrived the tank apparently decided to withdraw, since the German infantry were coming quite close and the tank was all alone. As it attempted to turn around, a track hit one of the American mines and it was blown from the tank, thus disabling the tank. The crew jumped out and took off to my rear.... By then, the town was overrun and the Germans were upon us. I had Captain Olson and Sergeant Wood climb up on the railroad bank and engage any German Infantry they could see coming through the town. I then sent the jeep driver back for the Coldstream Guards, with orders for them to double-time to where I was.’
The railway bridge over the Mook - Molenhoek road where the German advance was halted.
Fallschirmjäger lying in wait with an MG-42 – machine gun.
However, the first reinforcements to arrive were from the other battalions of Colonel Ekman’s 505th PIR. Shortly afterwards the tanks of Number 3 Squadron 1/Coldstream Guards rolled up. They joined the fighting against Kampfgruppe Hermann within 2,000 metres of the Heumen Bridge. However, as German combat power ebbed, after seven hours in action, that of the Allies was building up quickly. During the afternoon the Germans were forced back towards Mook and the Allies,
‘retook Mook by early evening; and the enemy around the four surrounded platoons of Company B were forced to withdraw.’
The arrival of the infantry of 5/Coldstream Guards enabled the Allies to drive the enemy back to Riethorst and under cover of darkness, the Germans withdrew towards the Reichswald.
The outnumbered Americans had acquitted themselves very well but the contrast between the tough experienced US Paratroopers and the young, old and injured German soldiers of Kampfgruppe Hermann could not have been greater. The threat to the Heumen Bridge and Club Route was important enough but the attack, in what was effectively the 82nd’s rear, had diverted vital attention and resources from the drive to Arnhem. This was to have a profound effect on the outcome of events beyond the Waal at Nijmegen and MARKET GARDEN as a whole.
Subsequent Days
Over the next ten days, the Mook movement corridor continued to be the scene of much fighting, with the focus being on the wooded slopes of the Kikerberg and Hill 77.2 above the village of Riethorst. Following the German attack of 20 September the 82nd were at pains to hold the road with British tanks. After the action on 20 September, the Coldstream Guards Group had returned from Mook to act as the 82nd Airborne’s divisional reserve. However, according to 1/Armoured Coldsream Guard’s War diary,
‘22 Sep. The Regt Group was taken out of command of 82 US Airborne Div and sent south to clear Div Centre Line....’
‘Hell’s Highway’ in 101st Airborne’s area had been cut and therefore, instead of armour driving forward to Arnhem, a significant proportion of the force was actually going backwards in order to secure the highly vulnerable MARKET GARDEN line of communication. Their place was taken by the tanks of the Nottinghamshire (Sherwood Rangers) Yeomanry (Notts(SR)Y). This Territorial Army (reserve) regiment was detached from 8 Armoured Brigade and maintained throughout this period at least a squadron of Shermans in the Mook area, in close support to 505 PIR. A brief example of their tasking can be found in their war diary entry for 28 September.
‘C Sqn in the early morning were counter-attacked by enemy infantry and tanks. They knocked out four tanks.’
The tanks would deal with enemy attacks along the road or across the open ground. However, the American paratroopers would have to bear the brunt of the fighting, as the enemy concentrated his efforts in the woods to the north-east of the road. Here, platoons of 1/505 PIR saw some of their most intense fighting of the war. Amidst the trees, they fought a nerve-racking battle at very short range, often cut off and unsure where friend or foe were positioned. The fighting was characterised by German attempts to infiltrate through the woods, interspersed by artillery, mortar and nebelwerfer fire. One entry in 505 PIR’s operations log records an unlucky direct hit.
German map of Nijmegen area.
‘15.40 hrs. Three men dead in one hole along trail at 747506 [above Hotel Plasmolen], these men may be difficult to identify. They are Sirois, Jewell and Cpl Haag / Coy B.’
Another casualty of the artillery fire was the Old (wind) Mill. A two storey structure built of stone topped with wooden housing that dominated Plasmolen/Riethorst skyline. As an obvious observation point, the Germans were happy to use some of their scarce ammunition in reducing it to rubble. The American artillery forward observation officers held on as long as possible, losing two of their number before abandoning it.
During the fighting, a Dutch civilian sheltered in one of the farmhouses along with sundry domestic animals, including twenty-two rabbits and a mother hen with nine chicks.
‘Outside, the Hill was changed into a fortification. Everywhere you looked, you could see foxholes with machine guns and bazookas. As for the Americans, they were perfect gentlemen and gave us plenty of cigarettes and chocolate for the children. They were not best provided for and they were very hungry. We prepared sandwiches for them. They were very grateful and paid me 50 Guilders for the cost. Altogether there were ninety-four men on the Hill with me.’
The defensive positions on the Mook movement corridor were taken over by 325 Glider Infantry Regiment (GIR) shortly after their much delayed arrived in the divisional area on 23 September. The fighting continued with small scale German attacks and attempts to break through the woods and along the Nijmegen road.
Securing the Low Ground 1 – 3 October 1944
The Allies held the line of the Mook to Riethorst road, which, though overlooked, left a triangle of territory between the Maas and the road undefended. This offered the Germans a relatively clear route to the Maas Waal Canal and its bridges and, therefore, had to be eliminated. The Notts(SR)Y war diary for 1 October records the planning of the attack on the villages of Katerbosch and Middelar that controlled enemy access to the area.
The American M1 .30 calibre carbine, widely used by paratroopers.
‘CO attended conference at Div HQ to discuss details of an attack to be put in by the Americans in the south in order to straighten out the line south east of MOOK. B and C Sqns required to take part in this attack. CO visited 325 Combat Team under command of Col Billingslea who is to organize this attack. Sqn and tp ldrs also had a conference with this American colonel.’
The entry for 2 October reads:
‘C Sqn and 1 & 3 Bns of 325 Regt took part in an attack from a point 1/2 mile S of Mook. The objective is a line from Riethorst, Katerbosch, Heikaut, Middelaar approximately 1000 yds in all. The attack starts at 0530 without arty sp. Arty concs had been put down last night on known enemy positions but may be repeated on application. B Sqn remained in Mook area in a counter attack role on immediate notice. CO contacted Col Billingslea in his fwd HQ at 0530 hrs. The attack was a success except for a gap in the centre. Col Billingslea put in his third and reserve bn with C Sqn in sp in order to straighten out the line. They were however, unable to clear the enemy out of Heikaut and Middelaar. A night attack was put in to clear Middelaar of enemy. This was only partly successful. The Regt lost two tanks on mines and one badly damaged by HE Fire.’
The attack by 325 PIR and the Notts(SR)Y continued on 3 October. The entry in the Notts(SR)Y war diary written by the Adjutant records that,
‘The attack in the south still continues and the Americans tried to clear up posns with 2 Tp of B Sqn in sp.’