CHAPTER FIVE
During the planning stage of MARKET GARDEN, senior airborne commanders identified the importance of the Groesbeek Heights – a plateau some three hundred feet above the surrounding area that dominated the approaches to Nijmegen. The wooded slopes of the Heights, overlooked XXX Corps’ proposed routes from the south-west, as well as German counter-attack routes from the east. General Browning argued, with the support of General Gavin, that, without firmly holding the high ground, seizing the Nijmegen bridges would be pointless, as XXX Corps would be unable to run a gauntlet of fire between Grave and Nijmegen. However, striking the correct balance between securing the Groesbeek Heights and quickly seizing the vital Nijmegen Bridges against the rapidly recovering German forces proved to be an elusive balance.
From Molenhoek continue on under the railway bridge towards Mook, which had been secured by 505 PIR on Sunday 17 September. In the centre of town, take the left turn signposted to Groesbeek. Follow the road uphill into the woods. You will pass on the left the Mook Commonwealth War Graves Commission Cemetery (see Appendix 2 for details). After two miles, turn right at the crossroads by the ‘tZwaantje Restaurant. Take the rough Bisseltsebaan road through the woods. It is slightly uneven in places but accessible. Watch out for cyclists and pedestrians. After another mile, the visitor arrives at the south-west corner of DZ N. To the north lies the village of Groesbeek and to the north-east is the smaller village of Bredeweg. Beyond this latter village is the German frontier and the dark bulk of the Reichswald.
CWGC Cemetery on the road between Mook and Groesbeek.
A ‘Stick’ from 3/505 Bn, jump from a Dakota troop carrier.
Drop Zone N (November) – Sunday 17 September 1944
Brigadier General Gavin, standing in the door of his C-47, ready to jump attempted to follow the fly-in on his map:
‘I did not recognize the terrain when suddenly ahead the Grave bridge came into sight. Some ack-ack was coming up from it. We went on and in seconds, I could see the Groesbeek high ground just ahead of us. Along the woods, as we approached, could be seen a newly dug trench system that extended for quite some distance. Small arms fire was coming up from it. As the ground rose, it seemed to be very close to us, and everything that I had memorized was coming into sight. The triangular patch of woods near where I was to jump appeared under us as the jump light went on. Although we seemed quite close to the ground, we went out without a seconds delay, and we seemed to hit the ground almost at once. Heavily laden with ammunition, weapons, grenades, I had a hard landing while the parachute was still oscillating. At once we were under small-arms fire coming from nearby woods.’
US 82nd Airborne drop into Groesbeek, 17 September.
General Gavin had in fact badly injured his back and went on to fight the entire battle in considerable pain and discomfort! Having landed, such opposition as there was fired a few shots and wisely retired as the paratroopers bore down on them. All, however, did not go totally to plan. At one stage, two streams of C-47 aircraft were, converging above the DZ at the same time and were, consequently, in danger of dropping their paratroopers on one another. 2/505 PIR, as already mentioned, was quickly diverted to a secondary DZ north-west of Groesbeek near Kamp. Here despite understandable disorientation, the battalion quickly assembled and marched south through Groesbeek to its intended positions around Hill 81.8.
Following the paratroopers, in a glider that landed on the now secured LZ, was Cyril Wray, of the BBC, one of the two corespondents accredited to 82nd Airborne. He describes his initial impression of the American Paratroopers:
‘The 82nd was a good division, extremely professional, but approached the battle like bloodthirsty boy scouts, armed to the teeth. Grenades hanging all over them. Our gliders landed in the centre of a circle held by paratroops who had dropped previously. The American soldiers stormed out of the gliders, armed to the teeth, and met two cows and a Dutch farmer. Then they started to dig in, in a peaceful landscape of hills and woods.’
Looking across 2/505 PIR’s DZ between Groesbeek and Kamp. The Reichswald is on skyline three miles away.
Job done – an abandoned glider on LZ N is inspected by Dutch civilians.
While the DZ and LZ may have been relatively quiet when the gliders arrived, Wray’s American colleague, Bill Boni, quickly learnt that the surrounding woods were far from clear of enemy.
‘I believe we landed in the Groesbeek area [he did]. The landing I can recall as having been made in what had been a turnip field. Much of it was ploughed soil, and that was the part where our glider landed with relatively little incident. The Lieutenant in charge of a Recon Platoon offered to take us along, since he was going out to look for stray Germans.
It was on a sand road through the woods, north of there and running from the Mook-Nijmegen highway towards Berg en Dal, that we found this little hotel. There we re-encountered the Recon lieutenant, with quite a cluster of POWs. On the day we landed there was actually, very little gunfire we were aware of. Later, we busied ourselves digging foxholes when it became clear that there would be some shelling...’
Brigadier General Gavin, with a commander’s sense of urgency, led the way off the DZ:
‘My immediate problem was to take my headquarters group to the site we had selected for our divisional command post. It was in the woods about a mile away, but the simplest and surest way to get to it was to follow a dirt road to the outskirts of Groesbeek and then turn back on the paved road that would bring us right to the command post ... The only “infantry” I had with me were engineers, so I told one of the officers to send out a point and start down the dirt road to Groesbeek without delay. They were extremely timid because of the firing that had taken place, and it was obvious that we would not get to the command post at that rate for a long time, if ever.
Operations of 505 PIR Sunday 17 September 1944 Groesbeek Heights
Lt. A.D. Bestebreurtje, 82nd Airborne’s Dutch liaison officer.
Captain Arie Bestebreurtje [a US Army officer of Dutch origin] was with me, and I told him that he and I would take point – that was that he was to walk on the left side of the road and that I would follow about five yards behind him on the right side of the road. The engineers would follow us and that we would move as fast as we could go. If the Germans shot at us, we would give them the first shot and take care of the situation.
With his past battle experience, he was just the man for that role, and we started down the road at a very fast clip. It was a sunken road through a heavy pine forest. The banks on both sides of the roads were seven or eight feet high, just a foot or two above our heads. We had gone only about five or ten minutes when a machine-gun fired from just over my head on the right; apparently they were shooting at Bestebreurtje. A small notch-like drainage ditch had been cut into the shoulder of the road, and they apparently had fired down it. The moment the weapon fired, I scrambled up the bank, pushing my rifle ahead of me to engage the Germans. As I stuck my head over the top, I saw a German darting between the trees and running away. I raised my rifle to shoot at him, but I probably would have ricocheted shots off the trees and wounded some of my people if they were in the vicinity. In the meantime, a German machine gun was in position about ten yards ahead of me, pointing at the road. The gunner had been hit in the forehead and was obviously dead, sprawled over the gun. There were no other Germans in sight.’
It is unusual to find a divisional commander advancing with his forward troops, let alone acting as one of a point or scout pair. General Gavin’s experience as a combat soldier was coming to the fore.
Also unusual was the 82nd’s use of the Dutch telephone system that the British in Arnhem had either not considered or had been too concerned about security to use. Perhaps, the cosmopolitan nature of US society, fed by waves of immigration from Europe, meant that the American paratroopers were less suspicious of foreigners than their British Allies. General Gavin continues:
‘In a short time we came to the outskirts [of Groesbeek] and Bestebreurtje went into a house and got on the telephone. Through a code he was able to communicate to Nijmegen and Arnhem with the Dutch Underground. They told him that the Arnhem landings had taken place and that all seemed to be going well. Without further delay we swung back to the left on the paved road and in another half hour reached the Division Command Post site. I at once went to work with the staff, getting in touch with the parachute regiments and other troops. All seemed to be going well. Later we learned from the Groesbeek police that there had been several thousand Germans in the wooded area outside the town. It had been used as a training area, and it was also the site of an ammunition storage dump. When Nijmegen had been bombed earlier in the day, many of the Germans had fled towards Germany, fearing a ground attack. It was well that they did; otherwise, we would have had to fight even to get to the command post.’
‘Champion’ the nickname for the 82nd Airborne Division command post, and the divisional staff at work.
Having jumped at the head of his Division and led the way off the DZ General Gavin was not present to witness the first parachute drop of a complete battalion of artillery. 376 Parachute Field Artillery (376/PFA), including not only its 544 veteran gunners and their twelve 75mm guns but first line scales of seven hundred rounds of ammunition as well. One witness remembers seeing Lieutenant Colonel Wilber Griffith nursing a broken ankle in a wheel barrow: ‘I shall never forget the Colonel being trundled from place to place and barking orders for everybody to get assembled at speed.’ Within an hour the regiment was ready for action and prepared to support the rapidly deploying paratroopers. Following behind the field artillery were forty-six of the fifty Waco gliders carrying elements of the 82nd’s divisional headquarters, anti-tank battalion and leading sections of other supporting troops including engineers. It is believed that one of the gliders lost from this group crashed south of Vught near the Headquarters of General Kurt Student’s newly created Fallschirmjäger Army. Whoever this glider belonged to, it was carrying a divisional set of MARKET GARDEN plans and these were on the German commander’s desk, having being translated, by 18.00 hours. This breach of security enabled Generaloberst Student to confirm his suspicions as to the Allies’ intent and provided information that allowed the Luftwaffe to assemble sufficient aircraft to regain local air superiority as subsequent waves flew in.
Generaloberst Kurt Student. Fallschirmjäger commander read the Allied orders for MARKET GARDEN.
Lieutenant General F. A. M. ‘Boy’ Browning. A rare picture of the General in battledress.
Towards the end of the stream of aircraft heading to DZ N were the 38 tugs and the Horsa and Waco gliders of Lieutenant General Browning’s Airborne Corps Headquarters. As they crossed the coast they could see the leading waves of C-47 Dakotas returning, on a parallel course, to their base in the UK having dropped their paratroopers. General Browning’s glider, piloted by Colonel Chatterton, the senior officer of the Glider Pilot Regiment, narrowly avoided coming to grief on an electricity pylon on the run in to the LZ, loosing a wheel in the process. Their landing was, however, in a relatively soft field of cabbages. The Corps War Diary records at 13.58 hours:
‘First Glider of Corps HQ containing Corps Comd landed. Other gliders followed immediately and landed in a good conc. No opposition met on LZ. One mishap on landing – 2 glider pilots injured. 12 enemy surrendered without a fight when the gliders landed.’
Landing near Grafwegen, to the south of the paratroopers, members of Corps Headquarters walked or as some authorities say, ‘ran joyfully’ to the edge of the Reichswald crossing the border into Germany in the process. Here, while answering a call of nature, General Browning is reputed to have said ‘Ha! I am the first British soldier to piss on Germany’. This incident was thought to have been apocryphal but at least one Brigadier was a witness and an entry in the Guards Armoured Division’s war diary, referring to a patrol that crossed the border some days later said, ‘they were the first British unit to enter Germany in this war, apart from Headquarters of the Airborne Corps’. This diary entry would seem to support the story. Back on the LZ, Colonel Chatterton and his Horsas were being mortared. Those soldiers left to unload the headquarters Jeeps from the gliders promptly took cover. Colonel Chatterton recalls, shortly afterwards that:
‘I shall never forget Browning standing above me, looking like some sort of explorer, and asking, “George, whatever in the world are you doing down there?” “I’m bloody well hiding sir.” “Well, you can bloody stop hiding. It’s time we were going.”
The Grafwegen area where 505 PIR and Browning’s headquarters landed. To the right of the photograph is the Reichswald and the German border.
British Horsa gliders of Airborne Corps HQ, which some argue, would have been better employed taking troops to Arnhem on 17 September.
Before leaving the LZ, General Browning unwrapped a small package and produced a maroon pennant bearing the sky blue pegasus emblem of British airborne forces. Pennant flying and having relieved themselves in enemy territory, the one hundred and five strong headquarters moved off towards the woods to the north. The next few log entries read:
‘1500 Set up first Corps HQ in wood 745533 near CP 82 US AB Div. List of comds and staff handed in. On check, it was found that 27 Horsas and 3 WACO loads out of a total of 32 Horsas and 6 Waco had arrived at RV. One Horsa seen in the Sea. Lt Gee R SIG reported killed by mine leaving DZ.
1800 W/Comdr Brown RAF killed on LZ by strafing ME 109.’
The airborne assault in the Groesbeek area was going well, with Corps HQ mounting an impromptu invasion of Germany. As far as the 82nd Airborne were concerned, they were, as predicted, meeting minimal resistance from low quality and rear echelon troops.
505 PIR’s Initial Deployment
As described in the previous chapter, 505 PIR dispatched platoons to hold the Kiekberg Woods and the Hill and to block the road through the Mook movement corridor. Also on the low ground, platoons from 505 PIR deployed by early evening to assist 504 PIR in the capture of the Huemen and Malden Bridges (see Chapter 3). However, Colonel William Ekman, with a significant portion of his force heading for these objectives, could not hope to defend his area of responsibility in any detail. From the edge of the Kiekberg Woods to Groesbeek he had an arc of three miles of open country to cover with just one battalion. He had no choice but to deploy his men in a light screen of outposts close to the Reichswald and the German frontier backed up by platoons blocking roads and holding other key features. They would identify and attack and hold the enemy until regimental reserves from Bisselt or Groesbeek could counter-attack and blunt the enemy penetration. Supporting 505 PIR were the gunners of 376/PFA, who at 18.00 hours fired their first rounds in support of the platoons that were attempting to establish blocking positions close to the edge of the Reichswald. Despite the artillery fire, the paratroopers had to establish their positions out of effective small arms range of the Reichswald. The vast forest provided plenty of cover to German marksmen, who in good cover, proved to be difficult to suppress with returned fire. The divisional post-operational report summed up 505 PIR’s first day in Holland.
Civilians cheer US paratroopers as they arrive in the town of Groesbeek.
‘Dropped after the pathfinders at 13.00, seized Groesbeek, occupied its defensive area from Kamp south-east to Mook, cleared its area of enemy and contacted 504 Parachute Infantry at the Maas – Waal Canal bridge at Huemen. All initial missions were accomplished by 20.00 hrs.’
In the woods west of Groesbeek, General Gavin had established his headquarters and during the night of 17 / 18 September he:
‘... heard the plaintive wail of a locomotive whistle. I first heard it some distance away, and very quickly, it came near the command post. I had been stretched out on the ground under some pine trees to get some sleep, and I was awakened.... Having pulled myself to my feet [because of his injured back], I went to the operations centre. I asked a member of the staff to call the 505th in Groesbeek.
They told us that the train came right through the town and went on towards Nijmegen. They had not anticipated it and had not attempted to stop it. [It got through to Germany]. When another train tried to run through the divisional area an hour or so later, the locomotive was hit by a bazooka round, which stopped it. Germans came boiling off the train in all directions, and we were rounding them up most of the next day.’
The South Mill at Groesbeek was used as an observation post by the 82nd
Return to the Mook – Groesbeek road. Turn right and follow the road into Groesbeek. On the way into town, by the roundabout stands Groesbeek’s South Windmill, which served as a reference point during the initial stages of the battle and subsequently an Observation Post for 505 PIR. From here, they had a good view of most of the approaches to the area. Near to the windmill is a monument that commemorates the evacuation of Groesbeek’s civilian population during the period October 1944 to spring 1945, while the town was just behind the front line.
From the Groesbeek South Mill follow the signs to the Bevrijdingsmuseum or Liberation Museum through the town centre. The Museum is located on Wylerbann on the southern side of the town. See www.crosswinds.net/marketgarden/museumz.html for details of the Museum’s opening times etc. The museum stands on the edge of the alternative DZ that was used by 2/505 PIR. Well worth a visit.
The Beverijdings Museum at Groesbeek. The dome contains a memorial room, including a list of casualties by division.
Turn right out of the museum car park. Continue along Wylerbaan towards Wyler and onto DZ T. Look out for a metal memorial on your left just before the junction of Derdebaan and Wylerbaan. This is the dual purpose DZ T and Operation CLIPPER memorial.
Drop Zone T (TANGO) – Sunday 17 September 1944
Prior to leaving RAF Fulbeck, Lieutenant Colonel Mendez, commanding one of Colonel Lindquest’s battalions of 508 PIR, fixed the airman responsible for the forty-two C-47 aircraft that were to drop his battalion on DZ T, in the eye. His message to was simple but direct,
‘Put us down together in Holland, or put us down in Hell, but put us down together’.
Mendez was no doubt recalling the widely dispersed drop in Normandy and he had no wish to repeat that desperately confused battle he fought on the night of 5/6 June 1944. In daylight, three months later, he had no significant problems with his battalion’s drop. Only one aircraft overshot and dropped a stick of paratroopers 2,000 yards beyond the DZ, across the German border.
The memorial to 508 PIR on Wylerbaan.
Shortly after 13.30 hours, 508 PIR started to land on DZ T. In common with experience at DZ N, flak rose to meet the transport aircraft and at least one Luftwaffe gun-crew continued to engage the enemy as the paratroopers landed. General Gavin records:
‘...a platoon of the 508th deployed and attacked an anti-aircraft battery that was continuing to fire at the air transports. It overran the guns and took the Germans prisoners.’
Defiant POWs from the 82nd Airborne Division, begin their journey to the ‘cage’. Despite the general success of the drop, some sticks of paratroopers landed across the border in Germany
General Gavin continued:
‘We were all pleased with the ability of the troops to jump in daylight on anti-aircraft positions and destroy them. After Sicily we were told time and again that parachute operations might succeed at night where anti-aircraft could not engage the air transports, but if they ever dared to fly over German anti-aircraft guns in any numbers, they would be totally blown from the skies.’
The airforce lobby had been proved to be very badly wrong in the 82nd’s case and, it is probable that similarly bold actions at the Nijmegen and Arnhem Bridges would have altered the course of MARKET GARDEN.
The drop on the Groesbeek Heights had been as successful as that of 504 PIR on the low ground north of Overasselt. The 505th and 508th dropped 4,511 men in a stream of aircraft that took a full eighteen minutes to cross DZs N and T. In addition, the British and American gliders that followed, brought in seventy tons of vehicles, equipment and stores. The divisional total for the first lift was 7,467 men but this was only a third of the number dropped or landed by the Allies on the first day of MARKET GARDEN. It is little wonder that as he stood on his study balcony Generaloberst Kurt Student observed wistfully:
‘... wherever I looked I could see aircraft troop transports and aircraft towing gliders ... I was only thinking of my own airborne operations in earlier days. If ever I had such resources at my disposal!’
508 PIR’s Initial Deployment – Sunday 17 September 1944
On the Groesbeek Heights, 508 PIRs’s mission was to organize the defence of the north-eastern approaches to the divisional area. The divisional report described their mission.
‘The Regiment occupied the area immediately east of the Maas Waal Canal and established roadblocks to prevent enemy movement south of a line running east and west through Hatertse.’
Colonel Lindquest’s objectives were as widely spread as 505 PIR’s but his principal defensive position was to be established on the high ground overlooking Beek. General Gavin explains that beyond the difficulties of widely dispersed troops, Colonel Lindquist had other problems, a planned coup de main on the Nijmegen Bridge having been cancelled:
‘Next, his mission was a bit ambiguous, since he had authorization to take a battalion from Groesbeek – Wyler front, where the glider landings were to take place the next day, if, in his opinion, the situation was quiet enough to permit it. That battalion was then to be committed to the seizure of the Nijmegen bridge. When we looked back on the situation years later, we realized that it should have been obvious that Tucker’s 504th was much better prepared to spare a battalion to go to the Nijmegen bridge that night. However, there was no way to determine this on the night of September 17, 1944.’
Despite these words, there are abiding suspicions that, following the cancellation of the coup de main, there had been a misunderstanding between General Gavin, Colonel Lindquest and Lieutenant Colonel Shields Warren. It is thought that this misunderstanding led to the Nijmegen Bridge not being attacked promptly from the DZ, immediately after P Hour. It is alleged that when General Gavin discovered about 18.00 hours that Warren, and 1/508 PIR had not moved on the bridges, he was far from pleased. He promptly ordered Colonel Lindquest
Paratroopers of 508 PIR passing through Groesbeek (Ottenhofstraat) on the evening of 17 September.
‘to delay not a second longer and get the bridge as quickly as possible with Warren’s battalion.’
Thus, 1/508 PIR was instructed to abandon its positions near the Sionshof Hotel, on the main road from Groesbeek to Nijmegen, and advance the three miles to the Waal Bridge. At 20.00 hours, only two companies set out to Nijmegen, as Company C appeared to be disorientated in the woods. The battle for Nijmegen and the bridges is covered in Chapter 7.
Meanwhile, 2/508 PIR moved off the high ground eastwards towards Jonkerbos with little opposition. This battalion launched the attacks on Bridges 9 and 10 on the Maas Waal Canal from the east on the morning of 18 September. However, 3/508 PIR had a closer but more difficult objective to secure in the wooded hills that surrounded the village of Berg en Dal.
In common with the remainder of 82nd Airborne Division, 508 PIR’s drop on the Groesbeek Heights had been better than could have been hoped for and opposition was light. Everything was going to plan and maybe the delay in despatching a battalion to secure the Nijmegen Bridge would not matter. However, before midnight, the two companies of 1/508 were fighting a desperate battle with the SS in Nijmegen. Meanwhile on the Groesbeek Heights, the remainder of the Regiment would shortly be fighting for their lives as the Germans closed-in on their isolated positions in the wooded hills north of Groesbeek.
First German Counter Attacks – Monday 18 September 1944
US Army Parachute wings.
From the DZ T memorial, continue down the road towards Wyler and stop where the open ground to the east can be clearly seen, with the dark bulk of the Reichswald beyond. Across this open ground the Germans mounted various counter-attacks over the coming days.
Dawn saw the 508 PIR holding a long front that included LZs T and part of N that were due to be used by the Division’s second lift later that morning. Shortly after first light, one of Colonel Lindquest’s first visitors was his divisional commander:
‘At daylight on September 18, when I went to the 508th Command Post, the report was grim. My heart sank. They had failed to get to the [Nijmegen] bridge. The situation of the 1st Battalion was confusing. No one knew what had happened to it. ... and they had left the area almost wide open to the Germans.
I had to get troops back to clear the glider landing zone without delay. I therefore instructed Colonel Lindquest to disengage the 3rd Battalion and move it back to clear the landing zone of Germans. It was a big order, for already Germans were in the woods between Berg-en-Dal and Wyler, and attacking. The 3rd Battalion had been moving and fighting most of the night, and now they had to march six or seven miles back to Wyler, attack and destroy the Germans in the woods, and travel on to clear the landing zone beyond.’
The Germans, who were beginning to cross the frontier in the Wyler area and take up positions in the woods towards Nijmegen, were from 406th Infantry Division. On Sunday 17 September, this ‘Division’ had been a static headquarters administering a collection training units. The Division’s Adjutant, Major Rasch, has described the unexpected mobilization:
The view to the west across Wylerbaan towards Kranenburg inside Germany.
‘Only an expert in such matters can appreciate what it means to change from a barracks-based staff organization, with no equipment or vehicles, and turn it into a mobile field headquarters, all in the space of six hours. ...Our sector, we were told, was to be along the Maas from Venlo to Nijmegen, which we were to occupy with troops that did not yet exist’
On arrival in Holland, 406th Infantry Division was directed to the northern end of their sector, where the 82nd US Airborne Division had already seized a sizeable chunk of their intended area of responsibility. At this point, the German genius in producing ad hoc formations came into play. NCO schools, reinforcement and training battalions, as well as battalions made up of soldiers with stomach and ear problems came under command of the 406th Division, along with reluctant Luftwaffe units. By dawn on Monday 18 September, a force of approximately four battalions of mixed troops had assembled ready for an attack at 06.30 hours on the American airborne bridgehead. German General Feld, the corps commander responsible for tasking 406th Division, was executing Generalfeldmarschall Model’s instructions. He has written that:
‘It was almost an impossible task for 406th Division to attack picked troops with its motley crowd. But it was necessary to risk the attack in order to forestall an enemy advance to the east, and to deceive him in regard to our strength’.
All together, a force of 2,300 Germans, along with five armoured cars and three half-tracks, mounting quad 20mm flak guns were, by 10.30 hours, advancing towards the most thinly held sector of the American’s perimeter between Groesbeek and Beek. As already covered in the previous chapter, at the same time, on the German left flank, Kampfgruppe Gobel attacked Reithorst. Just twenty-four medium mortars supported the whole force but, in common with most German units, the attackers had a high proportion of machine-guns to cover the advancing riflemen. To the German Corps Commander’s enduring surprise ‘... at the beginning, the attack made slow progress everywhere’. However, it soon became apparent that the ‘pressed German amateurs’ were no match for the tough, battle hardened American paratroopers. One of the battalion commanders, Hauptman Gruenenklee, reported over the radio to General Scherbening that his replacement troops were under fire from the flanks and could not move forward. Major Rasch, well forward to the east of Groesbeek with his general, saw the attack begin to falter. As an experienced infantryman he was the natural choice to be sent forward to get the attack going again.
Quad 20mm flak gun mounted on a halftrack.
‘These old boys lying there, veterans of the First World War, who had just been called up to relieve the younger soldiers manning POW camp battalions. Now they too had been put into the front line. Somebody in the line called out to me, “Major, we’ve already stormed the Craoneer Heights in 1914!” “Ja,” I was able to answer, “Can’t you see that its up to us old boys to run the whole show again; and we will do it exactly as we did then. First of all we have to get Tommy on the run, then we’ve cracked it”.’
His stirring words worked and the ‘old salts’ moved forward again.
As the Germans slowly advanced, General Gavin’s concerns grew. 1/508 PIR were, however, on their way back from Nijmegen to clear the glider landing zones that the Germans now held. These LZs were scheduled to be used shortly by 82nd Airborne’s second lift. All available troops were summoned to clear the vital ground and, as the planned landing time came and went, the Germans still held the ground. However, Major Rasch recalls how:
‘First of all a droning, a buzzing in the ears which developed, rattling and crackling, into a thunderous rumble. Enemy aircraft formations covered the entire sky. Their machine-guns swept the entire area with fire. Bombs exploded in between, it was as though all hell had broken loose. Then gliders came down at every conceivable place. The Americans had predicted our attack and its likely success, and were now throwing new airborne troops into the fight without respite ... gliders were landing as if on a normal field.’
The machine-gunning and bombing of the Germans on the LZs by Allied aircraft finally broke the will of the old, young and infirm enemy infantry. Amidst the landing gliders, they were pursued from the LZ by companies of 505 and 508 PIR pounded by the 75mm guns of 376/PFA. General Feld recalls, in 406th Division’s records, that the dramatic appearance of the gliders:
German 81mm mortar could fire fifteen 3.5 kg bombs out to a range of 2,400 metres inside a minute.
‘... caused panic amongst the attackers and that it was only with the greatest difficulty that General Scherbenning and I succeeded in halting our troops in the original jumping off positions.’
The Germans lost at least fifty men killed and one hundred and fifty prisoners. After the attack, the American paratroopers on the Groesbeek Heights were far from at their best and most of them had not slept in the previous thirty-six hours. In that time they had parachuted into Holland, dug a defensive position, marched sixteen miles, fought a sharp battle overnight and marched back to clear the enemy from the LZs. These were exceptional soldiers.
With the LZ secure, the second lift of four hundred and fifty Waco gliders brought in the balance of the divisional troops – most importantly the rest of the divisional artillery. General Gavin now had significant firepower available to him, albeit with limited ammunition. However, he was severely constrained, as he still only had his three parachute infantry regiments with him on the Groesbeek Heights. The division’s fourth regiment, 325 GIR, was scheduled to land the following day (19 September) but the 82nd would have to wait a further five days for them to arrive, as they were delayed by successive days of bad weather.
Wyler – The Border Village – Tuesday 19 – Wednesday 20 September 1944
Continue along Wylerbaan towards the village of Wyler. Park on the Dutch side of the border at the edge of the village.
It had not been fully appreciated that the small and otherwise totally unremarkable village of Wyler straddled the border of Holland and Germany. The 82nd could not initially understand the Germans’ violent reaction that any movement into or, indeed, towards Wyler, prompted. The first indication Wyler was a problem was when a company of 3/508 PIR moving to the north of the DZ towards Wyler came under heavy fire on the afternoon of 17 September. It had been intended to position a road block in the village but over the coming days, it proved to be impossible to hold the village without unacceptable losses to a division that was already thinly spread. The hillside sloping down to Wyler was the scene of many low-level actions where junior commanders and their small groups of men and supporting tanks endured the ‘bickering’ not dissimilar to that of the ‘glory holes’ of the Great War. Typical of the action around Wyler are the experiences of Corporal Boccafogli, of Company B 1/508 PIR, whose platoon dug in on the outskirts of the Dutch side of the village. On Tuesday 19 September he recalls that:
Waco glider with an airborne 75mm artillery piece aboard.
‘I was sent on a patrol into Wyler with Lieutenant Gleim and Private Mendez. We moved cautiously, as we got an eerie feeling as everything was so quiet – not a person to be seen, not even a dog or a cat.
After reporting back to Capt Millsaps that the town was clear, I was ordered to set up a roadblock on the other side of Wyler. We moved to the eastern side of the village and took up positions where the land dropped off towards the swamps on a road that led into some woods where Jerries might hide. We had a 57mm [anti-tank gun] positioned up the hill behind us.
Darkness came on thick and heavy and we strained our eyes into the blackness. The hours passed and nothing happened. Then about dawn I thought I heard the faint sound of a motor coming from the woods. I fixed a grenade launcher on the end of my rifle and loaded a grenade along with the blank cartridge [to propel the grenade] and waited. I knew the grenade would not stop an armoured vehicle, but at least it would alert the 57mm anti-tank gun behind him for action. The engine noise got louder and a truck loaded with German soldiers came into sight and when the truck came within range, I fired the grenade. It fell short, but the 57mm opened up and made a direct hit. Some Jerries were killed but others fled from the truck and escaped.’
This enemy move into Wyler was a part of the general attack on the 82nd Airborne Division eastern and north-eastern by the three Kampfgrupen of General Feldt Corps. The next German attack was better planned. The outnumbered Company B, 508 PIR were under severe pressure and, by the afternoon of Wednesday 20 September they were forced back to the Dutch edge of the village, fighting from house to house. Corporal Boccafogli and his squad withdrew through a barn with the Germans following. They decided to make a stand along the line of a wall, facing the barn.
Looking downhill in a south easterly direction, towards the German border.
‘Then Private Herbert Ellerbusch did a brave thing. He crawled up behind the wall to an open gate with his bazooka and fired. The rocket set the barn on fire. Ellerbusch had to expose himself in the open to get in position to hit the barn, as a result, Ellerbusch was mortally wounded. Six or seven Jerries came out of the burning barn and surrendered. The other Germans in the barn ran back towards the rear of Wyler.’
Despite making progress, as with 406th Division’s attack on the 18th, Corps Feldt ran out of steam against the American paratroopers. However, on the night of 20/21 September, Corporal Boccafogli’s Company was permitted to withdraw back up the hill. Being in such close proximity to the enemy, they were receiving both enemy and friendly fire and casualties were mounting. Despite the cover of darkness, the Germans spotted the withdrawal and fired at a haystack and set it on fire with tracer rounds. With the burning haystack illuminating the scene, Company B suffered further casualties during the withdrawal.
The interrogation of prisoners captured between Horst and Wyler during 20 September revealed to the Americans the ad hoc nature of the force attacking them.
‘Four PWs were from 1st Co, 526 Inf Bn (Str 350 men). Bn made up in KOLON on Sunday and moved from there on Monday [18 September] by train to BEDBURGHAU from which they walked to their present positions West of KRANENBURG. Recd order to attk at 0800 this morning (20th). Two coys in line and one in res. His Bn line of attack was through HORST to GROESBEEK. They were told that to their north a whole flak division was also attacking His personal estimate of the flak division was one company. In PW’s Bn were 2 LMGs per coy and no mortars. Our MGs completely broke up their attack. This PW still has an open wound from the Russian front fighting and was taken from hospital on Sunday to make up this Bn..’
The German 7.92mm Model G43 semiautomatic rifle was a limited issue weapon. It was designed to respond to the growing Allied fire power and was found amongst the SS and other special units.
The Horst – Wyler area of the Groesbeek heights, was the scene of much fighting and at least a troop of tanks from the Notts (SR) Yeo were positioned in the area from 22 September, to support the American paratroopers.
Retrace your route back towards Groesbeek. To reach the Canadian War Cemetery and memorial wall, turn off Wylerbaan onto Derdebaan. Follow Derdebaan until a crossroads is reached. Turn right and the cemetery is on the right three hundred metres further on, in the direction of Berg en Dal.
The Groesbeek CWGC Canadian Cemetery and one of the memorial pavillions to the missing.
