CHAPTER 6
On D-Day, 6 June, no direct orders from Army Group G were received by Das Reich immediately. There was exaltation in the streets of Montauban, where most of the regiments had grouped and the officers soon became aware of the landings in the north. There was a feeling of relief that the final battle had started, but there was concern over the lack of transport for the drive, as well as inadequate equipment and incomplete training of the newcomers to the division. Civilian trucks and cars were requisitioned. One tank company was in Germany collecting Panzer Vs.
Panther tanks of the Das Reich at Montauban prior to the drive to Normandy.
The division waited through the day while reports were received of the rising of the Resistance in southern and central France. The Division was eventually ordered to move towards the Normandy battlefield, crushing all resistance en route. Their task included the securing of communications between the units stationed between the Atlantic and the Mediterranean.
The direct route to the battlefield covered 450 miles, and the division had to cross a vast region renowned for the strength of the maquis who were dedicated to block every troop movement. The Resistance had sprung into action on 6 June as a result of coded messages broadcast from London.
Their strategy was based on two plans – the Plan Vert (green plan) and the Bibendum Plan. The Plan Vert aimed at paralysing the railways. On the morning of 6 June the Paris – Toulouse line was cut in several places, as also were the connections between Limoges and Chatroux, Brive and Montauban. The Clairmont Ferrand – Brive line had been severed in May and the Limoges – Angoulème and Limoges – Poitiers lines were cut on 8 June.
Resistance members undergoing training in small arms at a hidden location.
It was hoped that this action would effectively delay the transport of tanks and other material destined for the Normandy front. However, the Germans became proficient at repairing with the minimum of delay. The Resistance made the mistake of spacing the cuts too far apart and the trains managed to gather some speed between them.
The Bibendum Plan aimed at paralysing road transport and was effective for six weeks after D-Day. The Allies hoped the FFI could bring about a delay of 48 hours in the arrival of enemy reinforcements. In fact, the average delay was five or six days and reached ten days for some SS units. The Germans, seeking a passage through the blockades were often obliged to split into small groups who arrived in Normandy in complete disarray. The 2nd Panzer Artillery Regiment took to the road on 7 June. The 1st and 3rd battalions of the Der Führer Regiment and the 1st Battalion of the Deutschland Regiment started on 8 June. The tanks of the 2nd Panzer Regiment left Caussade on the same day.
When the regiments of the Das Reich division took to the road, the maquis clashed with them continuously. In spite of the big difference in means and numbers, the FFI had the advantage of their knowledge of the territory. They managed to inflict considerable damage on the SS, slowing them down on the sinuous roads of the Dordogne where many ambushes were laid.
The SS executed all the maquisards they captured, sometimes after torturing them. The Resistance could not halt the movement of the Das Reich to the north, although the division beat all records for tardiness in arriving at the Normandy battlefield. On 7 June the advance guard of Das Reich clashed with the 1st company of the 1st Battalion of the FFI of Basse-Corrèze near the Souillac bridge. The previous day the FFI had inflicted heavy losses of men and material on a German detachment at the same spot. The SS columns marching on both flanks of the main convoy met with the same difficulties. The one in the east arrived at the bridge at 6.30 a.m. and encountered the 3rd company of the resistants of Basse-Corrèze led by Lieutenant Destre. The SS had to wait for the arrival of several tanks and were held up for four hours.
Captured Maquisards await execution.
A Resistance camp hidden away in the woods. Above: cleaning a variety of weapons; below: a suspected colaborater is being tried before a ‘court’.
In the west, a company of 80 vehicles, preceded by schützpanzerwagen (small armoured cars) was held up at the Groslejac bridge and lost one vehicle and six men. Near Rouffignac the maquis company ‘Bernard’ destroyed a truck, and two mobile machine-guns. They killed some SS and wounded others.
Surprised and furious at these attacks, the SS fired at every living thing. Their victims were people of all ages and many homes were destroyed. On 8 June a detachment of six armoured vehicles arrive at the hamlet of Donadieu in the commune of Gramat. The people fled as soon as they heard the sound of approaching tanks and took shelter in the woods. A man of sixty-five stayed on his farm and was shot. The SS burnt nearly all the farms in the locality together with barns and stables containing livestock.
The farm of Gabaudet, about 500 metres from Donadieu was an assembly point of local resistants. It is not known how the SS found out about it. They may have been told by a local informer, or it may have been sheer chance. The farm was quickly surrounded and ninety-one maquisards were captured. After questionings and beatings, eleven were shot, the rest were taken first to Tulle and later towards Limoges. Many of the captives were policemen or airmen. To their utter surprise and relief, nearly all of them were released before the convoy reached Limoges. The remainder were deported. This was an example of the increasingly indecisive attitude of the SS officers.
During the afternoon of 8 June an SS convoy captured five maquisards in a car. One of them, a youth of twenty, managed to get away but the others were killed. A short while later the convoy came upon a certain Doctor Aicenbaum, a Jewish partisan refugee who had been attending wounded maquisards. He was shot on the spot, as were some other Jews who had come south, feeling they were in safer territory.
Jacques Chapou.
The SS were held up for a long time just outside the town of Calviac. They took their revenge at the nearby hamlet of Rouffillac. At the Hôtel Marty six women and five little gir1s were sheltering terrified by the sound of fighting. The SS brought them out into the street. Mme Yvonne Marty protested and they were all pushed into a café and shot, after which they were drenched with petrol and set alight. Some were only wounded and screamed. Two little girls, badly burnt, were recovered and taken to the Sarlat hospital where one, Irene Poukchliakoff aged seven, miraculously survived.
Many other people were killed in their homes and all the houses were burnt.
At this time most of the maquisards were members of the FTPF (Francs Tireurs et Partisans Francais) and were mostly Communists. In the Spring of 1944 it was estimated that there were about five thousand of them in the Corrèze. There were many former army officers and NCOs in the region and an officer from London did his best to persuade them to join the FTPF so that they could be led by experienced men. But it was of no avail, probably because of the politics of the maquisards. So civil servants, simple workmen and even peasants improvised as officers in the FTPF of the Corrèze.
Some smaller cadres were formed. The army officers created the ORA (Organisation de Résistance de l’Armée), while professors and teachers had their own maquis.The winter of 1943-44 had been very cold and hard for the maquis. The Germans made many arrests, executions and deportations.
In the Lot the principal resistance movement carried the title ‘Libération’, with Jacques Chapou, also known as ‘Philippe’ as its leader. At the beginning of 1944 he took command of a number of maquis, grouped under the title Mouvements Unis de Resistance. In March he decided to mount a military operation.