This book is the compendium edition featuring complete reprints of five of the titles from the series entitled ‘Hitler’s War Machine.’ The aim of the series is to provide the reader with a varied range of materials drawn from original writings covering the strategic, operational and tactical aspects of the weapons and battles of Hitler’s war. The concept behind the series is to provide the well-read and knowledgeable reader with an interesting compilation of related primary sources combined with the best of what is in the public domain to build a picture of a particular aspect of that titanic struggle.
I am pleased to report that the series has been well received and it is a pleasure to be able to bring original primary sources to the attention of an interested readership. I particularly enjoy discovering new primary sources, and I am pleased to be able to present them unadorned and unvarnished to a sophisticated audience. The primary sources such as Die Wehrmacht and Signal, speak for themselves and the readership I strive to serve is the increasingly well informed community of reader/historians which needs no editorial lead and can draw its own conclusions. I am well aware that our community is constantly striving to discover new nuggets of information, and I trust that with this volume I have managed to stimulate fresh enthusiasm and that at least some of these facts and articles will be new to you and will provoke readers to research further down these lines of investigation, and perhaps cause established views to be challenged once more. I am aware at all times in compiling these materials that our relentless pursuit of more and better historical information is at the core our common passion. I trust that this selection will contribute to that search and will help all of us to better comprehend and understand the bewildering events of the last century.
A Panzer I in action during the Spanish Civil War
In order to produce an interesting compilation giving a flavour of events at the tactical and operational level I have returned once more to the wartime US Intelligence series of pamphlets, which contain an intriguing series of contemporary articles on weapons and tactics. I find this series of pamphlets particularly fascinating as they are written in, what was then, the present tense and, as such, provide us with a sense of what was happening at the face of battle as events unfolded.
The first vehicle to be produced in any numbers for the Panzerwaffe was, of course, the tiny Panzer I, which at the time was known as the MG Panzerwagen. Delivery of 318 of these had been made by August 1935, along with 15 of the Zugfuhrerwagen, which was later to become the Panzer III. One aspect of tank design which the Germans got absolutely right from the very outset was to identify the importance of radio communications. Although initially only the command tanks were fitted with radios that could both transmit and receive, the other vehicles were at last equipped with receiving radio sets, and this was a major advance upon the thinking of many of the countries which would come to oppose Germany. Throughout 1934 exercises continued with the experimental tank units and a number of other valuable lessons quickly became apparent, particularly the need for close co-operation between the air forces and the tanks on the ground. At this point the first serious tank tactics which were to bring so much success during the Second World War began to appear. It was soon obvious that the tanks needed to be employed on a relatively narrow front. A divisional front was estimated at about three kilometres, a great change from the wide fronts of the Great War. It was still obvious to the German High Command that the decisions which were being made, were based on theory, rather than practice. Germany - and indeed every other nation of the time - had no practical experience to draw upon, therefore a number of educated guesses were made.
In January 1936 General Beck reported to the High Command, his findings being based on a study of a French organisation. He was also very critical of the slow rise in production capacity which was hampering the development of the tank force. Interestingly, the debate about which tasks tanks were suitable for, and whether specialist machines had to be developed for each task, was already beginning to take shape. Beck’s report clearly stated that the three main tasks of the Panzers were supporting infantry, operating in units with other mobile weapons and, finally, combating other tanks. Beck himself was unable to come to a decision about whether a single tank should be developed with the capability to take on each of these purposes or whether a specialist vehicle should he designed for each purpose.
Ultimately the decision was that the light tanks would be used in a scouting role and that an infantry support tank would be developed which was later to come to fruition in the form of the Panzer IV; this decision cast the Panzer III in the role of main battle tank. Amazingly the decision was taken that the 3.7cm gun which initially equipped the Panzer III would be sufficient for the battle conditions. The various types of German tank design were to cater for most eventualities on the battlefield. Initially the Panzer I was considered to be fit for training purposes only, however manufacturing proceeded very slowly and eventually both the Panzer I and II were earmarked for the reconnaissance role. The Panzer III was essentially designed for break-through and anti-tank operations and the Panzer IV was designed to provide close support for the infantry battling their way forward against dug-In positions. Almost from the outset the limitations of the design for the Panzer I were obvious. The armament in the form of two machine guns, was inadequate for most purposes on the battlefield. In addition the very thin armour gave protection only against rifle bullets: almost any battlefield weapon could penetrate the armour. More significant was the fact that the crew was comprised of only two men.
In October 1935 General Liese, head of the Heere’s Waffenamt issued a report which gave the limitations of the tanks. He noted that the MG Panzerwagen (Panzer I), although fitted out only with two 7.9mm machine guns, could be adapted to attack armoured cars and other light tanks if it was issued with special S.M.P. steel core ammunition. In the case of the MG Panzer II, it was noted that the muzzle velocity of the 2cm gun could penetrate up to 10mm of armoured plate at a range of up to 700 metres. It was therefore decided that the Panzer II could engage armoured cars with success, and was also fully functional for combat against tanks with approximately the same armour as itself. Liese noted that the tanks most likely to be encountered in large numbers in a war against the French were the light Renault Ml7 and Ml8 tanks, of which there were about three thousand operational in the French forces at the time. It was also thought that the Panzer II would be the equal of the Renault NC37 and NC31 tanks. Against the heavier French tanks, including the Char B, it was noted that the Panzer II was practically worthless. Despite these reservations large-scale delivery of the Panzer II was already in train and was expected to commence from 1st April 1937.
A Panzer II in flames following a hit near Tobruk 1941.
The Panzer I actually entered active service in 1937 with the Legion Condor and proved to be an efficient machine within its highly proscribed limits. There are those who state that the Panzer II was also deployed in Spain although I can find no evidence to support this claim. Perhaps there is someone out there who can resolve the debate, for the time being I continue to err on the side of caution.
Delivery of fifteen Zugfuhrerwagen, which was later to become the Panzer III was completed by August 1935. One aspect of tank design which the Germans got absolutely right from the very outset was to identify the importance of radio communications. Although initially only the command tanks were fitted with radios that could both transmit and receive, the other vehicles were at last equipped with receiving radio sets, and this was a major advance upon the thinking of many of the countries which would come to oppose Germany. Throughout 1934 exercises continued with the experimental tank units and a number of other valuable lessons quickly became apparent, particularly the need for close co-operation between the air forces and the tanks on the ground. At this point the first serious tank tactics which were to bring so much success during the Second World War began to appear. It was soon obvious that the tanks needed to be employed on a relatively narrow front. A divisional front was estimated at about three kilometres, a great change from the wide fronts of the Great War. It was still obvious to the German High Command that the decisions which were being made, were based on theory, rather than practice. Germany - and indeed every other nation of the time - had no practical experience to draw upon, therefore a number of educated guesses were made.
In January 1936 General Beck reported to the High Command, his findings being based on a study of a French organisation. He was also very critical of the slow rise in production capacity which was hampering the development of the tank force. Interestingly, the debate about which tasks tanks were suitable for, and whether specialist machines had to be developed for each task, was already beginning to take shape. Beck’s report clearly stated that the three main tasks of the Panzers were supporting infantry, operating in units with other mobile weapons and, finally, combating other tanks. Beck himself was unable to come to a decision about whether a single tank should be developed with the capability to take on each of these purposes or whether a specialist vehicle should he designed for each purpose.
Brand new Panzer III Ausf.F roll off the production line and out of the factory.
Ultimately the decision was that the light tanks would be used in a scouting role and that an infantry support tank would be developed which was ultimately to come to fruition in the form of the Panzer IV. This decision cast the Panzer III in the role of main battle tank. Amazingly the decision was taken that the 3.7cm gun which initially equipped the Panzer III would be sufficient for the battle conditions. The various types of German tank design were to cater for most eventualities on the battlefield. The Panzer I and II were earmarked for the reconnaissance role. The Panzer III was essentially designed for break-through and anti-tank operations and the Panzer IV was designed to provide close support for the infantry battling their way forward against dug-In positions. Almost from the outset the limitations of the design for the Panzer I were obvious. The armament in the form of two machine guns, was inadequate for most purposes on the battlefield. In addition the very thin armor gave protection only against rifle bullets: almost any battlefield weapon could penetrate the armor. More significant was the fact that the crew was comprised of only two men.
In October 1935 General Liese, head of the Heeres Waffenamt issued a report which gave the limitations of the tanks. He noted that the MG Panzerwagen (Panzer I), although fitted out only with two 7.9mm machine guns, could be adapted to attack armored cars and other light tanks if it was issued with special S.M.P. steel core ammunition. In the case of the MG Panzer II, it was noted that the muzzle velocity of the 2cm gun could penetrate up to 10mm of armored plate at a range of up to 700 metres. It was therefore decided that the Panzer II could engage armored cars with success, and was also fully functional for combat against tanks with approximately the same armor as itself. Liese noted that the tanks most likely to be encountered in large numbers in a war against the French were the light Renault Ml7 and Ml8 tanks, of which there were about three thousand operational in the French forces at the time. It was also thought that the Panzer II would be the equal of the Renault NC37 and NC31 tanks. Against the heavier French tanks, including the Char B, it was noted that the Panzer II was practically worthless. Despite these reservations large-scale delivery of the Panzer II was already in train and was expected to commence from 1st April 1937. As regards the new Panzer III, which was designed to be the main battle tank, it was obvious that, even in 1935, Liese was already beginning to have reservations about the effectiveness of the 37mm gun. Originally the 37mm L/45 had been planned for this vehicle, but it was urged that the experimental tanks be upgraded to include the L/65 version, which gave a much higher muzzle velocity and some real prospect of penetrating the 40mm thick armored plate of the new French medium tanks. With this in mind it was obvious at this stage that a 50mm gun would be a better proposition for the Panzer III; however the addition of the larger gun would demand a significant increase in the diameter of the turret which would in turn mean radical redevelopment of the chassis. Given the pressures of time and the need to equip the formations quickly Liese came to the conclusion that the 37mm L/65 was the favoured route, although it is interesting that the limitations of its design had already been noted.
The PzKpfw III (Panzerkampfwagen III Sd.Kfz.141)was therefore designed to be the Wehrmacht’s main combat machine and was developed by Daimler-Benz in the mid 1930s under the pseudonym Zugfuhrerwagen, which means platoon commanders’ truck. The first prototype of the PzKpfw III was produced by Daimler-Benz in Berlin 1936.
Following numerous modifications, the Ausf. A (1-Serie) appeared in May 1937 and by the end of 1937, 15 were produced. Only 8 of the Ausf. As were fully armed and the unarmed machines were used for further testing and modification.
The Panzer III Ausf B was unusual as it incorporated eight small road wheels arranged in pairs. The design was unsuccessful and only 15 were built.
Daimler-Benz produced 15 Ausf. Bs (2-Serie) in 1937, 15 Ausf. Cs (3a-Serie) by the beginning of 1938; it continued by introducing the next variant the Ausf. D (3b-Serie), 55 of which were produced in 1939. Of the entire Ausf. Ds production run, only 30 were armed.
All early models of the Panzer III, including the Ausf A/B/C/D were pre-prototypes of the whole series and were unsuitable for large scale production. Every new prototype was a marginal improvement on the last. Each model featured a different type of suspension, a variation on the Maybach DSO, such as the HL 108 TR engine. Only a relatively few vehicles saw combat in the early stages of the war; the Ausf. D saw service during fighting in Denmark and Norway in May 1940 and in Finland in 1941/42. In February 1940, the remaining Panzer Ills Ausf D were handed over to NSKK for training purposes.
The first Panzer III model to go into anything like full-scale production was the Ausf E of which 96 were produced. With a thicker 30mm frontal armor, a Maybach HL 120TR engine and new suspension and gearbox raising its weight up to 19.5 tonnes, the Ausf. E was the best machine so far.
By 1940, and during the ‘E’ model production, it was decided to fit all models with a 50mm gun as standard. The L/42 gun was fitted on Ausf. E, F, G and H. In an ill considered deal which would come back to haunt them, the Germans actually sold Two PzKpfw III tanks to the Soviet Union in the Summer of 1940 under the Ribbentrop-Molotov treaty. They were tested by the Soviets alongside the early T-34/76 tanks. The German PzKpfw III proved to be faster than Soviet T-34/76 and BT-7, reaching a maximum speed of 69km/h. However it was obvious that the Soviet T-34 was far superior in armor protection and armament even if lacking in esthetics and overall mechanical reliability, when compared to German PzKpfw III tanks. The PzKpfw III was also found to be far less noisy than Soviet T-34. It was discovered that the T-34 could easily be heard from a distance of 450m, while PzKpfw III could only be heard when it approached to within 150-200m.
From 1941, Hitler insisted that the more powerful L/60 (50mm) gun was fitted on Ausf J-1. In 1942, 104 Ausf J’s were converted to Panzerbefehlswagen III (Command Tanks) and in April 1943, 100 Ausf. M’s were converted by Wegmann into the Flammpanzer (Flamethrower Tanks); designed to fight in urban areas such as Stalingrad. Although the models produced never actually reached Stalingrad, they did see service on the Eastern Front. Additionally, many Ausf. Ms were converted into the Sturmgeschütz III or the Ausf. N.
The Panzer III provided the main battle tank for the Panzer Divisions in the early years of the war, yet its production was slow and stopped altogether in August 1943, in 1943/44, the Panzer III prototypes were fitted with dozers and were used to clean up the streets of war-torn cities.
The Panzer IV from the business end. The practice of adding the names of sweet-hearts to the vehicle was widespread in this unit.
The Panzer IV was originally designed as an infantry support tank with a unique tactical role. The Panzer IV was not designed to take part in tank vs tank combat. Although the Panzer IV initially had relatively thin armour, it carried a powerful 75mm gun and could match any other tank at that time. The prototype of the Panzer IV was given the code name Bataillonfuhrerwagen. The Panzer IV was ordered by Hitler from Krupp, MAN and Rheinmetall Borsig to weigh in at 18 tonnes with a top speed of 35 km/hr. The Krupp design - the VK 200 1 (K) - was eventually selected to enter into full-scale production in 1935. Along with the Panther, it was to become the main combat tank of the Third Reich.
The PzKpfw IV was perceived as the ‘workhorse’ of all the Panzer divisions and more were produced than any other variant in the 1933-1945 period. The Ausf. A was built as a pre-production vehicle and only 35 were produced. The modifications from this gave rise to the Ausf. B which emerged in 1938 with an increased frontal armour thickness and a six-speed gearbox, which enhanced its cross-country performance. That same year Krupp-Gruson produced the Ausf. C and 134 of this model were in production until 1939.
The Ausf. D/E saw an upgrading of its armour thickness and improved vision blocks for the driver. The Ausf. E was the first of the Panzer IV fitted with turret mounted stowage bins. The Ausf. F(1), produced between 1941-1942 was the last Panzer IV to be based on the short version chassis. 25 of the F Is were converted into Ausf F2s (it had the British nickname of “Mark IV Special” because, with its high velocity 75mm main armament it was far superior to any other tank at the time). It was followed by the modified version of the Ausf. G in May 1942.
The Ausf. H, introduced in April 1943, was exclusively armed with a newer version of the 75mm KwK 40 L/48 gun and was fitted with steel/wire armour skirts. Over 3,770 of the P/zKpfw IV Ausf H were made and saw action.
As late as 1945 the last model, the Ausf J, was an effective weapon in the hands of an experienced crew. A selected number of the Ausf H and J were also converted into command tanks or observation tanks towards the end of the war period.
The Panzer IV was the only German tank to stay in production throughout the war. It was the real workhorse of the German army and was deployed on every front. Due to its efficient armament, robust armour and outstanding reliability, it was preferred by crews over the Panther, Tiger and King Tiger. The Panzer IV was the most widely exported tank in German service, with around 300 sold to partners such as Finland, Romania, Spain and Bulgaria. After the war, the French and Spanish sold dozens of Panzer IVs to Syria, where they saw combat in the 1967 Six-Day War.
Panzer IV tanks of the SS-Division ‘Hitlerjugend’ on parade February 1944.
The Panzer IV was intended to be replaced by the Panzer V The Panther however the numbers produced were never sufficient to replace the mark IV which saw service right to the end of the war.
The Tiger I was a radical departure from other tank designs and was destined to become the most famous heavy tank used in World War II. It was developed in great haste during 1942 by the Henschel & Sohn company as the answer to the unexpectedly formidable Soviet armour encountered during 1941 in the closing stages of Operation Barbarossa. During that titanic campaign an unpleasant surprise for the German armies appeared in the ominous form of the T-34 and the KV-1 to which the German tank designs of the time could provide no answer. The 50mm calibre high velocity gun of the German Mark III lacked projectile mass and penetrating power while the low velocity gun mounted on the German Mark IV was incapable of penetrating the well sloped armour of the T-34 at anything but the shortest range. The high velocity 88mm anti-aircraft gun, which had been forced into action in an anti-tank role in Russia and the western desert, was the only gun which had demonstrated its effectiveness against even the most heavily armoured ground targets such as The KV1.
Rushed into service in August 1942 the Tiger I design at least gave the Panzerwaffe its first tank capable of mounting the fearsome 88mm gun as its main armament. For the hard pressed men of the Panzewaffe however there was a very high price to pay for the Tiger in both literal and metaphorical terms. The highest price of all, or course, was paid by the slave labourers who were forced to build the Tiger.
The Panzer Mark V - The Panther.
The Roman numeral I was only officially added in 1944 when the later Tiger II entered production. The initial official German designation was Panzerkampfwagen VI Ausführung H (‘Panzer VI version H’), abbreviated to PzKpfw VI Ausf. H. Somewhat confusingly the tank was redesignated as PzKpfw VI Tiger Ausf. E in March 1943. It also enjoyed the ordnance inventory Sonderkraftzug designation SdKfz 181.
The Tiger I first saw action on 22nd September 1942 near Leningrad. It was not an instant success. Under pressure from Hitler, the tank was driven into action in unfavourable terrain, months earlier than planned. Many early models proved to be mechanically unreliable; in this first action most broke down. More worryingly two others were easily knocked out by dug-in Soviet anti-tank guns. Of even more concern was the fact that one disabled tank was almost captured intact by the Soviets. It was finally blown up in November 1942 to prevent it falling into Soviet hands. In any event the Soviets used the battlefield experience well and used the time to study the design and begin to prepare a response which, in due course, would emerge as the fearsome Josef Stalin heavy tank which was to prove equal to the Tiger in every respect.
I trust you enjoy discovering these new sources of information.
Bob Carruthers
Berchtesgaden 2013
A Tiger I deployed in Tunisia. Note the bemused locals to the right.