CHAPTER SIX
Evacuation of Remagen
As Colonel Engeman’s troops prepared to advance down the slopes into Remagen, the German commanders, Major Scheller and Hauptmann Bratge were resigned to the fact that they would have to withdraw across the river. There was no time to contact the Bridge Security Company and the reinforcements promised by Fifteenth Army had failed to materialise. Hauptmann Freisenhahn’s men were fully employed preparing the bridge for demolition and the crews of the flak guns had already been directed elsewhere. Although men from the 277th Volksgrenadier Division had been making their way through the town all that morning, the two officers had been able to stop them. Major Scheller’s orders to establish a bridgehead on the west bank were impossible to carry out.
Major Scheller.
Around noon an artillery officer from 277th Volksgrenadier Division contacted Scheller. The division had four artillery regiments and the three motorised regiments had already crossed the Rhine upstream. However, the remaining horse drawn regiment had been cut off from the rest by the American advance and was now heading for Remagen. The officer was concerned that the bridge would be destroyed before it reached the town. Scheller reassured him the bridge would be kept open until the very last moment.
An hour later the rumours that the Americans were close were confirmed when they were sighted on the hill above Apollinaris Church. Time was running out and as the engineers hurried to complete their work, Major Scheller ordered Hauptmann Bratge to cross the bridge and re-establish his headquarters on the east bank of the river. The American troops on the hill seemed to have halted, it was only a matter of time before began their advance into Remagen town itself. In the meantime, Scheller decided to wait behind on the west bank for the missing artillery regiment.
Sergeant Malcolm Fleming admires the view over the Apollinaris Church and the Rhine. National Archives 111-SC-377909
Advance into Remagen
It was a few minutes before 13:00 when US troops first looked down on the Ludendorff Bridge. As Colonel Engeman and Major Deevers considered their next move lieutenants Timmermann and William McMasters reconnoitred possible routes into the town. Infantry could advance down the steep slopes past the Apollinaris Church on foot, however, vehicles were restricted to the road, which wound down the hillside into the town.
Engeman considered sending all the infantry into the town mounted in halftracks, and ‘take the road shooting’, however, the plan was rejected in case they ran into strong German rearguards. Instead he chose to send Lieutenant Timmermann’s company down the hill on foot, setting off at 14:00. Twenty minutes later Lieutenant John Grimball’s platoon of Pershing tanks would:
...barrel down the hill and go through and cover the bridge with tank fire, and if anyone attempted to repair or demolish the bridge to liquidate them.
Company C, under Lieutenant McMasters, would follow the tanks mounted in their halftracks. It was hoped that the foot soldiers and the armour would reach the outskirts of the town simultaneously.
Once Lieutenant Timmermann had given the signal to advance, Lieutenant Burrows led 2nd Platoon down the hill, while Sergeant Joe DeLisio and Sergeant Michael Chinchar echeloned their platoons behind his flanks. Although it appeared as though the Germans had fled, the GIs kept a lookout for snipers who might have stayed. Twenty minutes later the Pershing tanks began moving down the road and although they saw no signs of enemy activity they encountered a crater at the bottom of the hill. Sergeant Grimball voiced his concern that it could be a trap and was reluctant to continue. Colonel Engeman’s reply left no doubt what he should do, ‘never mind the crater, get going toward the bridge’.
Meanwhile, Feldwebel Rothe was still at the Waldberg Hotel, waiting for instructions from Hauptmann Bratge. Despite the fact that there had been no signs of American troops on the Victoriasberg Heights, as soon as he saw Company A moving down the slopes past the Apollinaris Church, he knew he had to contact his officer. Attempts to call his headquarters failed and there was no time to gather up his men from the outposts half a mile to the west. All Rothe could do was to run down the hill into the town and raise the alarm.
As Company A entered Remagen, the Pershings turned right to bypass the town centre. Brigadier Hoge arrived on the heights and made it clear to Engeman what he expected, ‘I want you to get to the bridge as soon as possible’.
Engeman’s was equally enthusiastic, ‘I am doing every damn thing possible to get to the bridge’.
Down in the town Timmermann’s men were cautiously making their way along Marktstrasse past the town hall. There were no immediate signs of armed resistance, but the narrow street was ideal for an ambush. Dodging from doorway to doorway, the GIs edged forward as the local population looked on anxiously. Lieutenant Timmermann later recalled how the townspeople watched silently as the young soldiers passed by:
Many people had white flags out already, and some stood in the street waving white flags. None of the civilians appeared happy or cheered; many of them wept. The three platoons of Company A leapfrogged each other as they proceeded through the town of REMAGEN, cleaning it out house by house.
Infantry make their way along Marktstrasse towards the bridge. National Archives 111-SC-201876-1
Although the advance was proceeding according to plan, Brigadier Hoge and Colonel Engeman were still concerned that the Germans might try and blow up the bridge at the last moment. As Sergeant Grimball drove past the town he was able to confirm that the majority of Germans had fled,
Bring all big boys and assault guns up. Proceeding to bridge – town looks deserted only 10 to 12 soldiers out posting bridge, receiving some fire now don’t know what it will amount to.
As the Pershings drew closer to the approach ramps the tank crews noticed a train making steam on the far bank. The opportunity was too good to miss,
Because of their relative positions, machine gun fire could not be brought to bear on the locomotive, so 90mm was used. The locomotive was about 800 yards south of the bridge, and had a long string of flat cars and some boxcars behind it. It had scarcely got under way when the first round from Sergeant Shaeffer’s tank ripped into it at a vital point, immobilising it. The next round knocked out an enemy truck which happened to be passing right in front of the locomotive on a parallel road.
Despite Grimball’s assurances that he was closing in on the bridge, Brigadier Hoge ordered Colonel Engeman to catch up with his tanks and take control of the situation. As Engeman drove down into the town he radioed Grimball, urging him to get as quickly to the bridge as possible, ‘I am at the bridge’ came the reply. ‘All right, cover the bridge with fire and don’t let the Krauts do any more work on it.’
While Timmermann and Grimball were making their way towards the bridge, Hauptmann Friesenhahn had been put the finishing touches to his work. After ordering all but two his men to retire across the bridge Friesenhahn waited to detonate the explosives dug into the approach ramp to create an anti-tank trench. Before long, the three men could hear the rumble of tanks through the streets. Time was running out and after ordering his two guards to withdraw, Friesenhahn pressed the plunger, the time was 15:12,
His [Timmermann’s] small force headed straight for the bridge, the tanks leading. Just as they arrived at the earth ramp leading onto the bridge the first charge exploded, leaving a large crater in the runway.
The explosion had torn a gouge in the approach ramp three metres deep and ten metres wide, stopping the tanks driving onto the bridge.
As Company A closed in, Hauptmann Friesenhahn began to run across the bridge as the sound of gunfire echoed around the valley. One shell exploded close to the girderwork concussing Friesenhahn and, as he lay unconscious, another German soldier staggered onto the bridge. FeldwebelRothe had managed to run down the hill from the Waldberg Hotel without being seen. Lieutenant Timmermann later recalled what happened when his men spotted Rothe:
One German Luftwaffe sergeant refused to stop when called upon, so he was shot through the groin. Otherwise, there was no firing until close to the bridge when enemy machine gunners sent a few rounds from the towers on the bridge. No casualties resulted.
Hauptmann Friesenhahn and Feldwebel Rothe eventually managed to reach the east bank of the river and, although dazed, Friesenhahn went in search of Major Scheller. Everything was in place to destroy the bridge, but it was Scheller who had to give the order to detonate the charges.
Build up at the bridge
In the meantime the rest of Task Force Engeman was making its way towards the bridge. Sergeant Grimball had stationed one Pershing on the approach road, covering the railway tracks; the other three were lined along the road firing at targets on the east bank. Company A’s first attempt to advance onto the approach ramps had been met by heavy fire from AA guns on the far bank. While the tanks dealt with the guns Company A regrouped for a second attempt.
Meanwhile, Company C was making its way through Remagen. Lieutenant McMasters had split his halftracks into three groups, each consisting of four of five halftracks and while one group made its way through the centre of the town, a second group made its way along the promenade. The third group followed Grimball’s Pershings along the bypass. Colonel Engeman had also ordered the rest of Company A’s tanks, nine Shermans, to head towards the bridge at top speed. When the Shermans arrived they lined up alongside the Pershings at fifty-yard intervals.
While Colonel Engeman was preparing to cross the bridge, a report over his radio introduced a degree of urgency into his task. The reports are confusing, but it would seem that at around 15:15 Brigadier Hoge received disturbing news. Men of 89th Reconnaissance Squadron had rounded up two civilians in Sinzig as they searched the town for German soldiers. The two men informed Lieutenant DeRange, 52nd Armored Infantry Battalion’s intelligence officer, that the Ludendorff Bridge was due to be destroyed at 16:00. The accuracy of the information was doubtful but it did put Brigadier Hoge in a dilemma. Although he had men at the bridge his tanks were unable to cross due to the preliminary explosion that had damaged the approaches.
Brigadier Hoge recalls his reaction to the news,
At 15:15 on 7 March – that’s the only specific time during this operation of which I am certain – we received a PW [prisoner of war] report that the bridge was to be blown at 16:00. I immediately told Col Engeman that he had 45 minutes before the bridge was likely to be blown, and advised him to put WP [White Phosphorous] and smoke around the area, and cautioned him to cover his advance with tanks and machine guns, bring up his engineers to pull firing wires and whatever fuses found, and make a dash across the bridge.
With little time to spare, Colonel Engeman gave the order to cross. However, as the men of Company A prepared themselves there was a huge explosion across the river.
American engineers study the damage caused by the German demolition explosion. National Archives 111-SC-323975
Forty-five minutes passed before Hauptmann Friesenhahn managed to locate Major Scheller and after a brief argument over responsibilities, he was finally given the written order he wanted. After giving a warning, Friesenhahn turned the ignition switch for the primary circuit. Nothing happened. Several more attempts proved that the circuitry had been damaged. Whether it was the result of enemy fire or sabotage will never be known. Brigadier Hoge later explained his own theory in his After-Action report:
After careful investigation of all reports on why the bridge was not blown this headquarters believes that a Polish railroad worker at Erpel, one Sivinski, cut the wires and tied them back so that the cut could not be detected by inspection.
Another explanation could be that during the delay looking for Major Scheller, shrapnel had severed the cabling. Whatever the reason, the only option left for the officers at the eastern end of the bridge was to detonate the emergency charges.
In response to Hauptmann Friesenhahn’s calls for volunteers, Feldwebel Anton Faust led a handful of men back onto the bridge to detonate the secondary charges.
After lighting the primer cords, they returned to the safety of the tunnel to escape the huge explosion that proceeded to rock the construction along its length. All eyes turned expecting to watch as the Ludendorff Bridge fell into the river. When the dust and smoke cleared German and American soldiers alike, were astonished to see that the structure was still standing. One American engineer report read,
The charges upstream detonated and severed several members [girders]. On the downstream charge the cap exploded and the primer block shattered and neighbouring blocks [were] disturbed but the charge did not explode.