CHAPTER EIGHT
At first light on 8 March Brigadier Hoge reviewed his situation and began to plan how to expand the bridgehead. Although men were pouring into the Remagen area, Hoge needed space to deploy them on the east bank of the river. The rugged terrain compounded the congested nature of the bridgehead and there would be few opportunities to deploy regiments as a whole. In fact Hoge would be forced to split up the battalions, deploying them as and how he saw fit. It would make communication and cooperation difficult as the battalion commanders found themselves operating under new makeshift commands.
One immediate priority was to continue clearing the hills overlooking Remagen to deny the Germans direct observation of the bridge. Although 27th Armored Infantry Battalion had already secured Orsberg, they only held the rim of the high ground overlooking the river. Brigadier Hoge was concerned that a German counterattack from Bruchhausen could drive the battalion off the heights, bringing the enemy within striking distance of the bridge. Consequently, Hoge planned to send the 2nd Battalion of the 47th Infantry Regiment up to Orsberg, with orders to attack Bruchhausen. The Regiment’s 1st Battalion would also head up the hill to Orsberg before swinging north to descend into Scheuren and Rheinbreitbach. It was hoped that the two battalions would be able to secure the northeast sector of the bridgehead.
Infantry of the 78th Division are carried through the streets of Remagen. National Archives 111-SC-421362
Once 47th Infantry Regiment had secured its objective, the 311th Infantry Regiment, which was expected to cross before midday, could advance north along the riverbank. The leading battalion would take Honnef and the high ground surrounding the town, while the second in line swung east to secure Himberg; the remaining battalion would fill the gap between the two.
Meanwhile, the terrain south of the bridge posed a serious problem to Brigadier Hoge’s plans. The only road south ran along the riverbank and for most of its length it was overlooked by steep wooded hills crowned by villages. The only way to advance east was via steep narrow roads that wound their way up ravines to the crests of hills. The tanks and infantry would have to work in close cooperation to avoid being ambushed. At first light Brigadier Hoge planned to send the third battalion of the 47th Infantry Regiment to seize Ohlenberg, one of the villages overlooking the river road. It would block the road from Kalenborn, the most likely route for a German counterattack. Meanwhile, the 1st Battalion of the 310th Infantry Regiment would push east from Kasbach to clear Ockenfels while the 60th Armored Infantry Battalion pushed south along the road past Linz and Dattenberg.
Brigadier Hoge’s first priority was to clear the hills overlooking the bridge.
Brigadier Hoge’s plan was to create a wide bridgehead, five miles north and three miles south of the bridge, as early as possible. Meanwhile, he would aim to push east at a steady rate through the Westerwald, keeping the Germans on the move to deny them the opportunity to dig in. It was an ambitious plan and it relied on the steady flow of reinforcements across the bridge. In a later interview Hoge lamented how the congestion on the west bank would let the opportunity for exploitation slip away;
It did not work as fast as we had expected; we had twelve battalions on paper, and had they arrived on schedule, we could have walked through the opposition, but the enemy had a little time to get set.
Traffic congestion on the west bank of the river severely limited the flow of troops across the bridge. National Archives 111-SC-203733
During the morning Major-General Leonard crossed the Ludendorff Bridge to review the plan. He left content that his subordinate was fully in control of the bridgehead; all that was needed now was reinforcements.
Holding Erpel
The third platoon of C Company 656th Tank Destroyer Battalion was directed north along the river road past Erpel, where it joined 52nd Infantry Battalion’s roadblock covering the approach from Unkel. Although there were no signs of activity along the road, Lieutenant Lowry’s men noticed a river barge sailing up the river from the direction of Honnef. With a mixture of curiosity and suspicion they watched as it drew closer. Of the incident it is recorded,
They were just sitting there, blocking the road, when around the bend in the river came a boat. They did not know if it was an Allied engineer’s boat or what. Through glasses Lt Lowry could see someone in a German uniform. He called to the first tank destroyerto open fire on it. There were trees in front so the first TD could not fire. Sergeant Batdorf’s destroyer with Corporal Miller as gunner could see the boat and fired a round at it. The shot hit but went high. APC ammunition was used and it exploded on the other side of the boat. The personnel on the boat whipped out a white flag. The boat was a long boat shaped like a tug. It had another boat or barge, which it was pulling with it. The gunner lowered his sight and shot. The shell hit the water line. The third shot hit home and the Germans raised everything they had that was white.
German POWs carry wounded GIs to safety. National Archives/Friedensmuseum
Keeping watch for saboteurs along the river. National Archives 111-SC-360968
An endless column of men and vehicles crossed the bridge around the clock. National Archives 111-SC-203736
Ten soldiers were eventually rescued from the two boats and after cross-examination Lieutenant Lowry discovered that they had sailed up river from Cologne, over ten miles, hoping to be taken prisoner.
47th Infantry Regiment advances into Bruchhausen
The 2/47th Infantry Regiment had reached Remagen at 04:00 and managed to cross the river before first light. Brigadier Hoge immediately sent it up the heights to Orsberg to join the 27th Armored Infantry Battalion’s outposts on the ridge. Brigadier Hoge had tanks available, but they were unable to climb the steep gradient to reach the village. The 2/47th would have to advance unsupported. Cautiously moving northeast across the open fields, the lead company came under small arms fire as it approached the village of Bruchhausen. Pushing on, the battalion managed to enter the streets, driving a small German rearguard before them. By late afternoon it had managed to clear the village but as the GIs began to dig in along the eastern outskirts three Panzer IVs and a number of halftracks emerged from the woods to the east.
Mainstay of the German armoured divisions, the Panzerkampfwagen Mk IV.
As the German infantry began to dismount the 2/47th opened fire with every available weapon while calling in close artillery support. It appeared that the Germans were not expecting to find Bruchhausen occupied and before long they withdrew into the woods to regroup. It had been a close call. If the 2/47th had arrived any later the German armour would have been able to attack Orsberg, less than half a mile from the bridge.
As the 2/47th fought for Bruchhausen, the 1st Battalion had moved up to Orsberg, turning north towards Scheuren. As the GIs descended into the valley they came under fire, but once again there were only a few Germans outposting the village. A counterattack by fifty enemy infantry during the evening was easily repulsed and by nightfall the two battalions of the 47th Infantry Regiment had managed to establish a continuous
47th Infantry Regiment’s defence of Bruchhausen.
Reconaissance troops make their way through Remagen. The sign warns of the severe consequences of listening to rumours. National Archives 111-SC-202343
defensive line. It meant that, for the time being, the Orsberg heights were safe. However, the next phase of Grigadier Hege’s plan, the advance along the river bank, had been frustrated by the late arrival of the 311th Infantry Regiment.
310th Infantry Regiemnt secures Linz
The 1st Battalion of the Infantry Regiment had crossed the river before first light and occupied Kasbach. The plan was for Company C and four tanks of the 14th Tank Battalion to advance along th river road towards Linz, working in cooperation with the 1st Battalion of the 310th Infantry Regiment. They set off at 09:00, with the infantry covering the road and searching for mines. It appeared that the Germans had fled and the only contact with the enemy was with four German soldier trying to escape in an American jeep. The orderly and his three startled passengers, a major and two lieutenant, were teken prisoner and sent to the rear. As the column moved slowly forward alongside the river, a second jeep was seen coming up the road from the direction of Linz. This time the occupants were wearing US Army uniforms. It was Captain Gibble, 27th
Armoured Infantry Battalion’s chaplain and he had welcome news:
As they approached the town they were informed that it had surrendered and had been declared an open town because there was a large hospital full of enemy wounded there. This information came from Captain William T Gibble, a Chaplain to whom the town had surrendered. Chaplain Gibble told Captain Soumas that LINZ was free of snipers and all enemy except wounded and medical personnel.
Brigadier Hoge was delighted to hear the news, it meant that he could expand his bridgehead a considerable distance without a fight. If the Germans had decided to defend Linz and the neighbouring hill, the Kaiserberg, they would have been in a suitable position to block the river road. Instead, Soumas’ tanks followed the infantry through the town unopposed and formed a roadblock facing Dattenberg. Meanwhile, 1st Battalion’s Company A followed close behind, heading north up the hill to occupy Ockenfels. So far it appeared as though the plan to expand the southern half of the bridgehead was progressing well.
While Captain Soumas’ men congratulated themselves on their good luck, the peace was suddenly shattered when they came under fire. As the tank crews scrambled for cover and began to look for the threat, they discovered that they were in a dangerous situation.
The tanks had been in position about an hour when they drew bazooka and small arms fire, evidently from inside the town. This came as a surprise, in view of what Chaplain Gibble had said, but Soumas decided to prepare his force for an enemy counterattack. In assembling what infantry he had, he discovered that there were no more than fifteen men available.
Fearing that his tanks could be overrun, Captain Soumas contacted CCB’s headquarters for assistance: ‘...down in town Linz, no doughs around, bazooka men are around my tanks, have to withdraw to edge of town.’
Brigadier Hoge responded by recalling the infantry company from Ockenfels and once they had retraced their steps down the hill, Lieutenant Durham’s men joined Captain Soumas. After securing the roadblock, a platoon of infantry and two tanks headed through the town in search of the snipers. Once on the outskirts of the town they took up positions covering the Kalenborn road. It appeared that there were no Germans in the area, but as Captain Soumas climbed out of his tank to brief the men, a sniper opened fire from a nearby church tower. Luckily no one was hurt and two squads went in search of the sniper, returning before nightfall with five prisoners. Linz had been secured and as more reinforcements crossed the river, Brigadier Hoge could look forward to securing Dattenberg and the last hill overlooking the bridge.
A military policeman waits to guide reinforcements along the Erpel road. National Archives 111-SC-334096
311th Infantry Regiment’s attack on Unkel
The congestion on the west bank had delayed 311th Infantry Regiment by several hours and leaving Neukirchen, Colonel Chester Willingham was frustrated by the amount of traffic on the roads. The infantry were desperately needed to reinforce the bridgehead, yet they spent most of the day waiting in the backs of trucks. The hold up was frustrating Brigadier Hoge’s plan for a rapid advance towards Honnef, and as the hours passed, he was aware that the Germans could be assembling in Unkel, preparing to counterattack.
The 1st Battalion, led by Lieutenant-Colonel Lyle Kennedy, eventually reached Remagen during the afternoon and while it waited to cross the river it appeared that every German artillery piece in the area was targeting the bridge. Lorries queued up for their turn to run the gauntlet of shrapnel. The military police waited for pauses in the shelling before ordering them to cross.
While the 1st Battalion assembled in Erpel the 3rd Battalion, led by Lieutenant-Colonel Andy Lipscomb, crossed the river. It was late afternoon by the time Colonel Willingham’s men were ready to move out. The 1st Battalion advanced alongside the railway line towards Heister while 3rd Battalion made its way tentatively along the riverbank. Hoge’s fears were realised as the infantry came under heavy small arms fire as they approached the outskirts of the village.
311 Infantry Regiment fought throughout the night to clear Unkel.
Nine Shermans from 14th Tank Battalion’s Company C provided covering fire as the two battalions edged closer to Unkel but they had little effect on the German positions. A message to 14th Tank Battalion’s commanding officer sums up the situation, ‘Doughs say they need more big boys – If I can’t have any, what do I do with what I have?’
Armoured troops on the move. National Archives 111-SC-336901
In the face of determined resistance 1st Battalion managed to secure Heister before nightfall and, after bypassing the centre of Unkel, it closed in on Scheuren. There was no sign of any white flags and Lieutenant-Colonel Kennedy expected to have to fight for the village. He did not have to wait long. 20mm AA guns opened fire as soon as the infantry advanced towards the outskirts, drawing fire from the Sherman tanks. So far there had been no answer to the plea for extra armour and 1st Battalion had to push with the few tanks it had. After several hours the Germans eventually withdrew and as darkness fell Lieutenant-Colonel Kennedy’s men were able to begin a house-to-house search.
The light was beginning to fade by the time 311th Infantry Regiment’s 2nd Battalion reached the east bank of the Rhine. As the GIs assembled in Erpel few would have been aware that they belonged to the first complete regiment to cross the river. Now that Brigadier Hoge had adequate forces in the northern part of the bridgehead, he was determined to attack the village of Unkel at the first opportunity. Under cover of darkness the 3rd Battalion advanced with a platoon of Tank Destroyers in support, but before long the leading company came under heavy machine gun fire. A German strongpoint covered the approaches to the village was blocking the way forward. Lieutenant-Colonel Lipscomb called up the tank destroyers in the hope of reviving the advance.
They [the infantry] left it up to Lt Lowery how to do it. Both APC and HE were used. The ready rack was fired at a range of about fifteen feet. The flash of the gun completely blinded the entire crew. The destroyer was returned to cover and another destroyer was backed into firing position and fired while the first destroyer loaded its ready rack. Lt Lowery told his crew to keep their eyes closed and to stay covered up while the others fired so that when they went forward, they could see. The third destroyer was used to spray the buildings with .05 calibre machine gun fire. They were getting direct machine gun fire on the turret of their destroyers. Ten of the enemy were trying to escape. Five were killed by intentional enemy fire. The German officer in charge ordered the men to stay at the guns and when they ran they were fired on.
Once the threat had been removed the infantry were able to move forward into the outskirts of Unkel. They advanced cautiously searching every house en route but despite the presence of armour, the Germans put up a stiff fight, pouring fire indiscriminately into the darkness. In the confusion, reports of heavy casualties along the main street began to worry Lieutenant-Colonel Lipscomb. It appeared that the Germans were holding a series of fortified houses which the infantry were unable to outflank. Once again Lipscomb called up the tank destroyers to deal with the threat. 2nd Platoon’s After-Action Report illustrates the vicious nature of the fighting in Unkel;
He [Sergeant Miller] reported to a Captain who gave him the situation and told him that the task force was to be moved down the street, but the street was covered by eight machine guns which had accounted for about fifty infantrymen. The TD men couldn’t see the men and didn’t know how it [the situation] ran. Sergeant Miller pulled up two destroyers and fired down the street. Houses were set on fire by these shots. They fired at the first four houses with APC. He was told not to fire HE because of the wounded men in the street. Enemy returned fire and never took cover. The tracer fire was coming up, so we figured they were in the cellars. Once again Sergeant Miller asked permission to fire HE but didn’t get it because of the wounded men in the street. All the while they were firing 76mm, they were also firing the .50 calibre machine guns, spraying all the houses but keeping it away from the wounded men. They fired more APC and .05 calibre but still got returning fire. They then used white phosphorous hand grenades to get more light. It was a pitch dark night. When the grenades went off, they could see most of the way down the street. They saw no wounded men in the street so took a chance and fired HE into the houses. At that time both 76mm guns jammed. Cause is unknown. Pulled back again and reported to the Infantry captain telling him that the streets were clear for 150 yards and that no casualties were received. Twenty-four rounds of 76mm ammunition and 2,000 rounds of .05 calibre were expended.
German prisoners are escorted through the outskirts of Remagen. National Archives 111-SC-202240
Tanks and tank destroyers continued to work closely with the infantry and after a night of fierce fighting, Colonel Willingham was able to report that Unkel was clear. Over two hundred prisoners had been taken in the battle anddozens more had been killed.
The attack on Ohlenberg
Having secured the river road as far south as Linz, Brigadier Hoge turned his attentions towards Ohlenberg on the heights overlooking the river. It was less than half a mile from the river and the Germans would be able to use the road from Kalenborn to launch a counterattack towards Kasbach, the shortest route to the bridge.
Brigadier Hoge ordered the 3rd Battalion of the 47th Infantry Regiment to secure the village as soon as it had crossed the Rhine and at 19:30 the battalion began to climb the heights heading for the village. As the infantry advanced cautiously up the wooded slopes towards their objective they came under heavy fire; German infantry, supported by armour were waiting for them. The after-action report sums up the bitter fighting for Ohlenberg,
This attack brought out some of the most stubborn resistance encountered in the REMAGEN bridgehead. The advance was made under heavy small arms fire, self-propelled gun and tank fire, and the town itself consisted of a series of strong points. Enemy infantry had to be cleaned out house by house. Direct tank and self-propelled gun fire from the North and East sections made this task a difficult one.
The battle raged on throughout the night but eventually the Germans withdrew northeast along the Kalenborn road to regroup. Brigadier Hoge was pleased to hear that the threat had been removed, but there was little respite for the men of the 47th Infantry Regiment. As they dug in on the northern outskirts of Ohlenberg, artillery targeted their shallow foxholes as the Germans prepared to counterattack.
The Plan for 9 March
At 02:00 on 9 March, Major-General Louis Craig, of the 9th Infantry Division, took over command of operations on the east bank of the Rhine from Brigadier Hoge. The base of the Remagen bridgehead was now three miles wide, stretching from Unkel in the north to Linz in the south, however, in places it was still less than a mile deep and a determined counterattack could force the Americans back to the river. The main areas of concern were the roads leading through the wooded hills to Bruchhausen and Ohlenberg. Aerial reconnaissance revealed that German armour was indeed heading towards the bridgehead and at high speed:
Second TAC Air Force reports tonight that about 22:30 large columns of vehicles coming from northeast and south apparently heading in our direction. Columns using lights. Targets coming from northeast estimated about 25 minutes out. British working over them. So are our night fighters’ ceiling too low to do much good. All units must be on alert for vehicles or any other signs of activity.
General Millikin wanted the bridgehead to be expanded to a width of five miles along the river. This would allow his engineers to build new bridges out of the range of mortars and machine guns. He also wanted Craig to push east to a depth of two miles, clearing the Germans from the high ground immediately overlooking the river. He could then carry out the second stage of his plan, advancing east to cut the road running through Kretzhaus, four miles northeast of Remagen. In doing so he would deny the Germans freedom of movement to deploy their armour.
The crew of an anti-aircraft gun keep watch over the bridge. National Archives 111-SC-361071
311th Infantry Regiment’s advance to Honnef
After fighting through the night for Unkel, the 311th Infantry Regiment was given little time to rest. General Craig was anxious to expand the bridgehead north, clearing Honnef before the Germans could occupy the town in force. The 1st Battalion was given the task of entering the town from the south and it advanced along the riverbank with three companies abreast. At first the battalion made good progress, however as soon as it reached the outskirts of the Honnef it became clear that the Germans intended to fight for the town,
... enemy resistance in this city was stiffer than was expected and as the Battalion entered the town the enemy withdrew in a house to house retreat. It was noted that as the enemy withdrew he did not fight from every house as he had done on the west bank of the Rhine. Instead only the most strategically located houses were defended.
With the aid of tanks and tank destroyers, 1st Battalion cleared street after street and by nightfall it had managed to reach the centre of Honnef.
Panzerkampfwagen Mk V, better known as the Panther.
Meanwhile, the 3rd Battalion had managed to clear out the last elements of resistance in Unkel. Five Shermans of the 14th Tank Battalion gave close support to the infantry, successfully engaging a Panther tank while the GIs kept Germans armed with panzerfausts at bay. However, as the Battalion completed its first objective one panzerfaust found its target, disabling Sergeant Herder’s tank and wounding three crewmembers. It was a sharp reminder that tanks were extremely vulnerable in built up areas.
311th Regiment’s advance on Honnef.
German infantryman with a panzerfaust, a simple yet successful anti-tank weapon
After clearing Scheuren, the battalion encountered stiff resistance as they entered Rheinbreitbach to the north. The After-Action report succinctly notes that ‘the Germans elected to fight for every room of every house’. A Panther tank was quickly knocked out, hit by a HE round followed by four armour-piercing rounds in quick succession. As the house clearing operation continued, Colonel Willingham ordered the 2nd Battalion forward to help but by the time it had deployed southeast of the village the Germans had withdrawn.
General Craig commended the 311th for its actions on 9 March, for it had secured the northern part of the bridgehead. As the Regiment dug in for the night and counted their losses, over seventy killed and wounded, 381 prisoners were making their way into captivity.
The heights east of Bruchhausen
While 311th Infantry Regiment pushed north towards Honnef, Colonel George W Smythe planned to advance towards the wooded hills overlooking Bruchhausen with two battalions of the 47th Infantry Regiment (the third battalion was in the southern half of the bridgehead). At 05:00 2nd Battalion moved out under cover of darkness towards Eischeider Kopf, the highest peak in the area. However, before Company G had moved far across the open fields, they were spotted. Enemy tanks and self-propelled guns opened fire from hidden positions, pinning the company down. It was obvious to Smythe that the Germans held strong positions in the woods and to avoid further casualties, he recalled his men to their start line. Meanwhile, the 1st Battalion managed to advance a short distance east of Bruchhausen before infantry opened fire from the woods ahead. Many fell back leaving Company B isolated astride the Kalenborn road. It was eventually forced to retire as the Germans closed in on its front and flanks.
By midday the two battalions were back in their foxholes, north and east of Bruchhausen. The Germans were able to take advantage of woods and high ground, leaving Colonel Smythe with few opportunities for exploitation.
Securing the St Severinsberg valley
52nd Armoured Infantry Battalion had spent the night billeted in Erpel but at 11:00am Lieutenant-Colonel Prince returned from Divisional headquarters with orders to move out at once. Intelligence suggested that the Germans might counterattack down the St Severinsberg valley to try and reach the bridge. The battalion was to counter the threat as soon as possible. The Battalion Journal outlines Prince’s plans:
CO gives orders to Company COs to move to Kasbach and be prepared to counterattack. Check all weapons and ammo, notify men when ready to move.
Order of March: A, C, B, HQ, CP will be in Kasbach. Coy C
Troops continue to pour onto the east bank of the Rhine. National Archives 111-SC-203734
will go in on left of the road, north of the town, Coy A on right of road and Coy B at the road junction.
GIs check their weapons before into action. National Archives 111-SC-360973
The Battalion moved out at 13:00 hours and before long it had established a series of defensive posts north of Kasbach ready to meet an attack. Patrols from the 89th Reconnaissance Squadron had already scouted past St Severinsberg that the road ended abruptly. While the GIs dug in, patrols from Company C searched the woods for signs of German troops. They returned empty handed. It appeared that the infantry had withdrawn onto the high ground. Although the Germans refrained from attacking, Lieutenant-Colonel Prince’s positions were targeted by random artillery bombardments throughout the afternoon.
While officers looked for a suitable building for their headquarters they stumbled on a huge cache of German supplies stored in a warehouse in Kasbach. It was a further sign that the enemy had fled into the hills to reorganise and await reinforcements. 52nd Armoured Infantry Battalion’s news meant that another sector of the bridgehead had been sealed off.
The Battle for Ohlenberg
While two of 47th Infantry Regiment’s battalions were struggling to make progress at Bruchhausen, the 3rd Battalion had had a degree of success to the south. Throughout the night the battalion had engaged armour and infantry in Ohlenberg and by first light had managed to secure most of the village. Despite the long night of fighting, and the fact that snipers were still operating in the village, the battalion’s work was far from complete.
The 3rd Battalion attacked at 05:45 hours to seize the road in vicinity of 685217 [northeast of Ohlenberg] and immediately encountered fierce resistance. Company K succeeded in reaching the objective and at 16:45, Company L was moved up to reinforce them. Fire from enemy tanks, self propelled guns and small arms was extremely heavy on this position throughout the period and the Battalion suffered high casualties in maintaining it. The day’s advances were made against a determined enemy amply supported by artillery, tanks and self-propelled guns and positions gained were subjected to numerous small counterattacks.
Although 3/47th Infantry Regiment had, to some degree, secured the Ohlenberg ridge, twenty-four hours of continuous fighting had taken its toll. Heavy casualties and fatigue had left the Battalion in an extremely vulnerable position, astride the most likely avenue for a German attack. As the troops spent the night digging in they could hear the ominous sounds of enemy armour gathering to the east.
Holding Linz to the south
While troops tried to secure a footing on the high ground, south east of the bridge, the 1/310th Infantry Regiment held on to its positions around Linz. For the present time it appeared as though the Germans were concentrating their efforts against other sectors of the bridgehead. The first signs of enemy activity came during the early hours of the following morning when Captain Soumas was alerted by the sounds of a tracked vehicle approaching from the direction of Ronigerhof. As the infantry took up positions around the roadblock, Soumas instructed them to hold their fire until the last minute fearing that they might give his position away to the German halftrack coming up the road. Minutes passed as the halftrack crawled forward looking for signs of the roadblock:
It did not stop until it was almost on top of the outposts of the roadblock. One of its crew was taken prisoner. The prisoner said that a counterattack was planned, and that the halftrack had been sent down the road to draw fire. The enemy knew that there were two American tanks in the vicinity, and was hoping that the approaching halftrack would induce them to fire and give away their position.
Work on the Erpel bridge progressed in spite of heavy shelling. National Archives 111-SC-203735
Keeping watch for German aircraft. National Archives 111-SC-361072
Captain Soumas’ refusal to open fire had saved his men from a night attack.
Later that night Soumas was pleased to greet Lieutenant Magura’s platoon of tanks from B Company. With extra tanks to hand he decided move the second roadblock towards Dattenberg but as the tanks headed south along the river road, disaster struck in the darkness:
In moving out, they drew small arms fire, and one of them [a tank] ran over a mine, believed to be one of our own. The supposition was that the mine had been laid by another unit without their knowledge. Although the mine did no appreciable damage, the plan to move the block that night was abandoned.
Work starts on the treadway bridge
Lieutenant-Colonel David E Peregrin, 291st Combat Engineer Battalion’s commanding officer, had initially estimated that it would take twenty-four hours to construct the crossing to Erpel. Although the engineers had been ready to start work on 8 March, the 988th Engineer Treadway Bridging Company did not reach Remagen until the following morning, having been held up in traffic for thirty-six hours. The unit diary gives a brief insight into what the engineers faced:
Preparations for construction of a bridge across the Rhine River and initiation of construction under intense artillery fire, bombing and strafing attacks commenced at 09:30 on 9 March. The bridge received one direct hit and suffered damage through near misses.
Despite the shelling, which damaged cranes, trucks and air compressors, the engineers continued to work and the bridge began to grow at a rate of fifteen metres an hour. However, during the afternoon work came to an abrupt halt when a direct hit on the bridge destroyed fifteen floats and damaged many others. Although the repair work took six hours to complete by midnight the engineers had built over 400 feet of the treadway.
Bombing the Bridge
Following disastrous attempts to bomb the bridge with Stukas on 8 March (eight out of ten had been shot down), the Luftwaffe changed its tactics the following day. Six fighter planes, including Me109s, Me210s, FW190s and jet propelled Me262s flew low over the valley, in the hope of achieving a lucky strike. 413 Automatic Anti-Aircraft Battery was directly in the flight path of the planes and the gun crews noted that the
tactics used by the planes differed from what was observed yesterday. The planes took more evasive action and in general, manoeuvred more prior to the bombing runs and flew at lower altitudes.
The fast moving planes were difficult targets, however, four planes were shot down and a fifth was damaged. D Battery’s ‘highlight’ of the day came at 14:40 when a Me210 made its bombing run over Kripp. ‘Gun Control’, a new innovation, allowed a weapon to track a plane remotely by radar firing automatically at the optimum moment. One gun fired at the plane with a single round of M43A3 time fuse; as the shell hit home the Me210 burst into flame, crashing to the ground nearby. Once again the Luftwaffe had failed to destroy the Ludendorff Bridge.
The Messerschmitt Me 210 fighter bomber. The type was used to attack the bridge and one was brought down by a single artillery shell.