Military history


 1Belgium—The Official Account of What Happened, 1939–1940, pp. 27–29.

 2NCA, IV, p. 1037 (N.D. 2329–PS).

 3Ibid., VI, p. 880 (N.D. C–62).

 4. Allen Dulles, op. cit., pp. 58–61. Dulles says Col. Sas personally confirmed this account to him after the war.

 5. There is a vast amount of material on the development of the German plans for the attack in the West. I have drawn on the following: the diaries of Halder and Jodl; Halder’s booklet, Hitler als Feldherr, Munich, 1949 (an English translation, Hitler as War Lord, was published in London in 1950); extracts from the OKW War Diary published in the NCA and TMWC volumes of the Nuremberg documents; the various directives of Hitler and OKW, published in the Nuremberg volumes and in DGFP, VIII and IX; Manstein, Verlorene Siege; Goerlitz, History of the German General Staff and Der Zweite Weltkrieg; Jacobsen, Dokumente zur Vorgeschichte des Westfeldzuges, 1939–40; Guderian, Panzer Leader; Blumentritt, Von Rundstedt; Liddell Hart, The German Generals Talk; considerable German material in the Nuremberg documents of the NOKW series which were produced at the secondary trials. For the British plans, see Churchill’s first two volumes of his memoirs; Ellis, The War in France and Flanders, which is the official British account; J. F. C. Fuller, The Second World War; Draper, The Six Weeks’ War. The best over-all account, based on all the German material available, is in Telford Taylor’s The March of Conquest.

 6. Churchill, Their Finest Hour, pp. 42–43.

 7DGFP, IX, pp. 343–44.

 8. Both Goering and Kesselring were questioned on the stand at Nuremberg in regard to the bombing of Rotterdam. See TMWC, IX, pp. 175–77,213–18,338–40.

 9TMWC, XXXVI, p. 656.

10. Churchill, Their Finest Hour, p. 40.

11. For more detailed accounts, see Walther Melzer, Albert Kanal und Eben-Emael; Rudolf Witzig, “Die Einnahme von Eben-Emael,” Wehrkunde, May 1954 (Lt. Witzig commanded the operation, but because of a mishap to his glider did not arrive until his men, under Sgt. Wenzel, had nearly accomplished their mission); Gen. van Overstraeten, Albert I-Leopold III; Belgium—The Official Account of What Happened. Telford Taylor, The March of Conquest, pp. 210–14, gives an excellent summary.

12. Churchill, Their Finest Hour, pp. 46–47.

13. Hitler to Mussolini, May 18, 1940, DGFP, IX, pp. 374–75.

14. From the King’s own account of the meeting and that of Premier Pierlot. Published in the official Belgian Rapport, Annexes, pp. 69–75, and quoted by Paul Reynaud, who was French Premier at the time, in his In the Thick of the Fight, pp. 420–26.

15. Lord Gort’s dispatches, Supplement to the London Gazette, London, 1941.

16. Weygand, Rappelé au service, pp. 125–26.

17. Churchill, Their Finest Hour, p. 76.

18. Liddell Hart, The German Generals Talk, pp. 114–15 (soft-cover edition).

19Ciano Diaries, pp. 265–66.

20. Telford Taylor, The March of Conquest, p. 297.

21. Text, Wilhelm II’s telegram and draft of Hitler’s reply, DGFP, IX, p. 598.

22. Texts of the exchange of letters between Hitler and Mussolini in May-June 1940 are in DGFP, IX.

23Ciano Diaries, p. 267.

24DGFP, IX, pp. 608–11.

25Ciano Diaries, p. 266.

26Ibid., p. 266.

27. Though copies of the minutes found in the German Archives are unsigned, Dr. Schmidt has testified that he himself drew them up. Since he acted as interpreter, he was in the best position of anyone to do this. They are printed in DGFP, IX, as follows: negotiations of June 21, pp. 643–52; record of the telephone conversations between Gen. Huntziger and Gen. Weygand (at Bordeaux) on the evening of June 21, as drawn up by Schmidt, who had been directed to listen in, pp. 652–54; record of the telephone conversation between Gen. Huntziger and Col. Bourget, Gen. Weygand’s adjutant (at Bordeaux), at 10 A.M. on June 22, pp. 664–71; text of the Franco–German Armistice Agreement, pp. 671–76; memorandum of questions raised by the French and answered by the Germans during me negotiations at Compiègne, pp. 676–79. Hitler gave instructions that this document, though not a part of the agreement, was “binding on the German side.”

The Germans had placed hidden microphones in the wagon-lit and recorded every word spoken. I myself listened to part of the proceedings as they were being recorded In the German communications van. So far as I know, they were never published and perhaps neither the recording nor the transcript was ever found. My own notes are very fragmentary, except for the closing dramatic session.

28. Churchill, Their Finest Hour, p. 177.

29DGFP, X, pp. 49–50.

30Ibid., IX, pp. 550–51.

31Ibid., IX, pp. 558–59, 585.

32Ibid., X, pp. 125–26.

33Ibid., pp. 39–40.

34Ibid., p. 298.

35Ibid., pp. 424, 435.

36. Churchill, Their Finest Hour, pp. 259–60.

37Ibid., pp. 261–62.

38DGFP, X, p. 82.

39. OKW directive, signed by Keitel, FCNA, 1940, pp. 61–62.

40Ciano Diaries, p. 274.

41FCNA, 1940, pp. 62–66.

42. Letter of Hitler to Mussolini, July 13, 1940, DGFP, X, pp. 209–11.

43. Text of Directive No. 16, NCA, III, pp. 399–403 (N.D. 442–PS). It is also published in DGFP, X, pp. 226–29.

44The Ciano Diaries, pp. 277–78 (for July 19, 22).

45. Churchill, Their Finest Hour, p. 261.

46DGFP, X, pp. 79–80.

47Ibid., p. 148.

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