NOTES ON TRANSLITERATION AND ARCHIVAL MATERIALS

In transliterating from Russian to English a modified version of the Standard Library of Congress system for the Russian vowels was used, especially in the initial positions:

E = Ye (Yezhov, not Ezhov),

Ia = Ya (Yagoda, not Iagoda),

Iu = Yu (Yurii, not Iurii).

In the final position of last names ‘ii’ becomes ‘y’ (Trotsky, not Trotskii), and ‘iia’ is usually given as ‘ia’ (Izvestia, not Izvestiia).

On first usage, the names of institutions are given in transliterated Russian (in italics) followed by the English translation.

The majority of documents translated and cited in this book come from the following Russian archives:

APRF	Arkhiv Prezidenta Rossiskoi Federatsii [Presidential Archive]
FSB Archive	Tsentral’nyi arkhiv FSB Rossii [FSB Central Archive; FSB = Federal’naya sluzhba bezopasnosti or Federal Security Service]
RGVA	Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi voennyi arkhiv [Russian State Military Archive]
TsAMO	Tsentral’nyi arkhiv Ministerstva Oborony Rossiskoi Federatsii [Defense Ministry Central Archive]
GARF	Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii [State Archive of the Russian Federation]

If a document was published in a Russian book that includes a compilation of documents and could be found in many libraries, a reference to the document in this book is given, and the archival reference can be found in the book. For the documents published or cited in the Russian periodicals and found by the author, the complete reference to the document is given. Russian archival documents are cited and numbered by collection (Fond), inventory (Opis’), file (Delo), and page (List’ or L., or in plural, Ll.)

Original documents were found in the RGVA (Moscow), GARF (Moscow), the archive of Vladimir Prison (Vladimir, Russia), the U.S. National Archives and Records Administration (NARA, Washington) and the Archives Branch of the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum (USHMM, Washington). Additionally, I used documents connected with the Raoul Wallenberg case available on the website of the Swedish Foreign Office and some documents available on the website of the British National Archives (Kew, Surrey).

The work in the RGVA in Moscow needs a comment. In 1990–91, when I had access to the files of the former foreign prisoners kept in the RGVA (Fond 451), it was called the Special Archive, and only researchers cleared by the KGB (Komitet gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti or State Security Committee) could study documents there. I did not have security clearance and worked there as a representative of the International Commission on the Fate and Whereabouts of Raoul Wallenberg. I had no access to the catalogues of the Special Archive and simply submitted to the head of the archive lists of names of foreigners who had been in Soviet captivity, in whom I was interested in connection with the Wallenberg case. After a while this man brought me archival personal files of most (but not all) of the listed people and I studied the files in his office. As a result, since I did not see catalogues, I do not have archival numbers for all files, and in the text I refer to the file of a particular person without a file number.

There was a similar situation with the Vladimir Prison Archive. In the autumn of 1990, members of the International Wallenberg Commission were allowed to study archival prisoner cards (each prisoner had a special card filled in when he or she was brought to the prison). From a file (kartoteka in Russian) of about 60–70,000 cards a few hundred cards of political prisoners kept in Vladimir Prison in the 1940–50s were selected and filmed. Later a computer database was created and a printout of the card records is kept in the Memorial Society Archive in Moscow, which I used in this book.

INTRODUCTION

O, this fatal word SMERSH! … Everyone froze from fear when he heard it.

-Nikolai Nikoulin, WWII veteran, 2007

We fought not for the Motherland and not for Stalin. We had no choice: the Germans were in front of us, and SMERSH was behind.

-Yelena Bonner, WWII veteran, widow of

Academician Andrei Sakharov, 2010

This book chronicles the activities of Soviet military counterintelligence just before and during World War II, with special emphasis on the origins, structure, and activities of SMERSH—an acronym for the Russian words ‘Death to Spies’—which was the Soviet military counterintelligence organization from April 1943 to May 1946. In the Soviet Union, before and after these years, military counterintelligence was part of secret services generally known under the acronyms NKVD (Narodnyi komissariat vnutrennikh del or the Internal Affairs Commissariat), and, after the war until the death of Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin in 1953, the MGB (Ministerstvo gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti or State Security Ministry). Formed right after the all-important Soviet victory in Stalingrad, SMERSH was part of the Defense Commissariat (NKO, Narodnyi komissariat oborony). Its head, Viktor Abakumov, reported directly to the Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin, at the time NKO Commissar.

In Russia, the first archival information about SMERSH was released in 2003.¹ While not mentioning SMERSH’s size directly, this data reveals that this organization was enormous for a counterintelligence service. SMERSH’s headquarters in Moscow consisted of 646 officers (at the same time, the HQ of the German military counterintelligence, Abwehr III, was comprised of 48 officers), while in the field there were at least 18–20,000 officers. In 1943, there were 12 fronts (army groups) and four military districts (army groups on the Soviet territory not involved in military actions) with their SMERSH directorates of 112–193 officers each; each front/military district consisted of between two and five armies with their SMERSH departments of 57 officers. Altogether, there were 680 divisions within all fronts with their departments of 57 SMERSH members; and five SMERSH officers were attached to each corps.² Taking into consideration that the work of each SMERSH officer in the field was based on reports from several secret informers, the number of servicemen involved in SMERSH activity was several times higher than the number of SMERSH officers.

SMERSH spied on its own servicemen, investigated and arrested even senior officers on Stalin’s orders and tirelessly vetted Soviet POWs. From June 1941 to May 1945, forty-seven Red Army generals arrested by military counterintelligence during the war were executed, or died in labor camps or in special investigation prisons while awaiting trial.³ Later, after Stalin’s death in March 1953, these generals were politically rehabilitated—in other words, it was officially admitted that they were innocent; the number of real collaborators with the Nazis among the high Soviet military, like General Andrei Vlasov, was very small. Overall, from 1941 to 1945, military tribunals sentenced 472,000 servicemen whose cases were investigated by military counterintelligence and of them, 217,000 were shot. About 5.4 million Soviet POWs and civilians sent by the Nazis to Germany as slave laborers went through SMERSH’s hands, and 600,000 of them ended up as convicts in the GULAG.⁴ In Eastern Europe, SMERSH cleansed newly-acquired land of any potential threat to Sovietization. Former Russian émigrés in these countries were specially targeted by SMERSH.

SMERSH successfully fought against and outwitted many operations of the German secret services, the Abwehr and SD (the foreign branch of the German State Security). These results were not only because of the overwhelming number of SMESRH officers compared to the German intelligence services, but were also due to the sophistication of SMERSH’s organization. During its three years of existence, SMERSH operatives captured or killed 9,500 German agents and saboteurs and successfully carried out more than 180 deception operations. In August–September 1945, during a short military campaign against Japan, thirty-five SMERSH operational groups dropped from planes to arrest approximately 800 intelligence and military Japanese leaders and at least 400 former White Russian and Russian fascist collaborators with the Japanese. Later, during vetting of the Japanese POWs, SMERSH operatives arrested up to 50,000 alleged Japanese agents. According to General Aleksandr Bezverkhny, head of the current Russian military counterintelligence, ten million POWs, Soviet and foreign, were vetted by SMERSH.⁵

SMERSH was created on Stalin’s secret orders. This is not surprising, since SMERSH existed during a time when Stalin was juggling many competing security agencies, constantly changing their structure, responsibilities, and leaders. In addition, Stalin took steps to ensure that SMERSH personnel would be difficult to identify, even by the Red Army personnel they worked among. For instance, SMERSH officers wore standard Red Army uniforms and had standard Red Army ranks, since they were formally part of the Defense Commissariat, but they did not report to the military hierarchy—only to higher-level SMERSH officers. SMERSH officers could be identified only by their special IDs.

Due to the complete secrecy that surrounded SMERSH during and just after the war, its activities are almost unknown in the West. If the name ‘SMERSH’ is familiar to English readers, it is probably because of its use in the spy novels of Ian Fleming. A Royal Navy intelligence man during World War II, Fleming must have run across the name during his work and decided to use SMERSH as the name of his fictional Soviet spy agency, perhaps because the acronym sounds vaguely absurd in English. In the second chapter of his debut novel, Casino Royale, SMERSH is introduced in a fictional ‘Dossier to M,’ which is a curious combination of fact and fiction.⁶ Fleming states correctly that ‘SMERSH is a conjunction of two Russian words: “Smyert Shpionam”, meaning roughly: “Death to Spies”’, but he incorrectly identifies the head of SMERSH as Lavrentii Beria (in fact, NKVD Commissar) and locates its headquarters in Leningrad, while SMERSH headquarters, like all important Soviet agencies, was actually in Moscow. In his second novel, From Russia with Love, Fleming places SMERSH’s HQ in Moscow on the Sretenka Street, not far from its real location on Lubyanka (Dzerzhinsky) Square, but writes that SMERSH was ‘the murder apparat of the MGB’, which is not accurate.⁷

Even among Western historians and the many avid readers of World War II history, SMERSH is almost unknown. For instance, the impressive 982-page The Library of Congress World War Companion, published in 2007, does not mention SMERSH at all.⁸Similarly, the British historian Chris Bellamy mentions SMERSH only twice in his encyclopedic 813-page study, Absolute War, even though this book about the Great Patriotic War analyses, among other topics, the role of the troops of the Soviet security services.⁹ Obviously, these omissions have occurred because of the secrecy and lack of archival information until the 2000s. Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky devote only three paragraphs to SMERSH in their comprehensive book on the history of Soviet security services, KGB: The Inside Story, which was published in 1990; this is not nearly enough coverage of such an important organization and its role during World War II.¹⁰ In The Lesser Terror, Michael Parrish gives an accurate short account of what was known in the early 1990s about SMERSH’s activities and its leader, Abakumov, but the few other English-language books that do mention SMERSH mostly give inaccurate information.¹¹

The most important works in English about SMERSH are two little-known memoirs by defectors: SMERSH by Nicola Sinevirsky (a pseudonym of Mikhail Mondich, a young man from Carpathian Ruthenia who worked for SMERSH as a translator), and Nights Are Longest There: A Memoir of the Soviet Security Services by A. I. Romanov (a pseudonym for the only known SMERSH defector, Captain Boris Baklanov).¹² I have found the information in both of these memoirs to be quite accurate. The detailed descriptions of SMERSH interrogations, during which Sinevirsky acted as translator, are particularly revealing.

If you talk to Russian war veterans about the World War (which they call the Great Patriotic War), most of them still recall the fear of the osobisty, as military counter intelligence officers were generally known, and of smershevtsy (plural for officers of SMERSH; the singular is smershevets). The word osobist (singular) comes from the name Osobyi otdel (Special Department or OO) of counterintelligence departments in the Red Army until April 1943. For instance, Vladimir Nikolaev, a Russian writer and veteran of World War II, recalled:

The so-called SMERSH (‘Death to Spies’) was the most horrible organization within the army and the fleet… Day and night, its countless fattened impudent officers watched every serviceman, from privates up to generals and marshals. Everyone was afraid of SMERSH… Its officers frequently invented criminal cases to demonstrate their necessity and usefulness, but mainly to avoid being sent to the front line. They lived very well and escaped the bullets and bombs.¹³

Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, who described his arrest by SMERSH operatives at the front in February 1945 in his famous book, The Gulag Archipelago, tells us that ‘the counterintelligence men used to love that tastelessly concocted word “SMERSH”… They felt that it intimidated people.’¹⁴

Until recently, many Russians knew of the activities of smershevtsy mainly through a popular novel, In August 1944, by Vladimir Bogomolov, published in 1974.¹⁵ Bogomolov, a former military intelligence officer, based the novel on his own experience during the war. The KGB (Komitet gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti or State Security Committee) and Defense Ministry were amazed that Bogomolov had managed to recreate the events so accurately without using documents. They tried to prevent the publication of two chapters of the novel, but Bogomolov, who was not a member of the Communist Party or the Writers Union, refused to compromise with the authorities, and the novel was finally published without censorship.¹⁶ The novel describes SMERSH’s actions against Ukrainian nationalists and became an icon of the Great Patriotic War among many Soviet war veterans.

The roles of osobisty and smershevtsy were always controversial in Russia because most of the war veterans who had fought at the front line could not forget—or forgive—the brutality of military counterintelligence. The writer Vasil’ Bykov may have given the most powerful descriptions of osobisty in his novels The Trap (1964) and The Dead Do Not Feel Pain (1966). Before The Trap was published, a Soviet censor forced Bykov to change the ending of his story in which a lieutenant who had just escaped from the Germans was shot by an osobist. In the new ending, the lieutenant was sent into an attack after the osobist had threatened to shoot him. The Dead Do Not Feel Pain was banned in the Soviet Union from 1966 till 1982 because of Bykov’s portrayals of cruel commanders, a ruthless osobist, and a brutal chairman of the military tribunal. As functionaries of the Party’s Central Committee indignantly wrote, Bykov depicted the osobist called Sakhno ‘as a villain and a murderer. Sakhno takes justice in his hands and kills soldiers and officers, and shoots the wounded to death.’¹⁷

Obviously, the Party bureaucrats would have been more comfortable with the glorious ‘truth of generals’ celebrated in the memoirs of high commanders. Later Bykov responded to Marshal Ivan Konev, one such memoirist, who criticized Bykov’s novel on the grounds that the Soviet leader Joseph Stalin had awarded him the highest Order of Lenin for the Kirovograd Operation in January 1944, which Bykov described. Bykov explained: ‘In his [Konev’s] and Stalin’s opinion, this was a successful operation. Possibly, seen from the Kremlin’s perspective, it was. But there was also a different point of view: that of a soldier who was lying on a snowy field covered with blood and trampled down with tank tracks, where our regiment was almost completely destroyed.’¹⁸

Bykov described his own experience with the OO in A Long Road Home, an autobiographical work published after his death in 2003. He recalled how in 1941, when he was a 17-year-old soldier, an osobist ordered him to be executed as a traitor because he had become separated from his military unit while trying to buy some food (soldiers were not provided with any rations). An aged Red Army private, not an NKVD executioner, fired a shot over Bykov’s head, and he was able to run away. The other unfortunate servicemen detained by the same osobist were shot to death.

But it was not until 2003 that a special exhibition at the Central Military Museum in Moscow revealed for the first time the organizational structure and activities of SMERSH.¹⁹ A part of the sixtieth-anniversary celebration of SMERSH’s birth, the exhibition presented a flattering portrait of SMERSH and highlighted its success in fighting German spies. However, the exhibition made little mention of SMERSH’s more sinister activities, such as the vetting camps (fil’tratsionnye lagerya) where hundreds of thousands of innocent repatriated Russian POWs, unfairly suspected of treason and espionage, were subjected to brutal interrogations by SMERSH investigators.²⁰ Many of the same exhibits, along with some additions, were presented at the exhibition 90 Years of Military Counterintelligence, which opened in December 2008 at the same museum.²¹

The present Russian security service, the FSB (Federal’naya sluzhba bezopasnosti or Federal Security Service, the main successor of the Soviet KGB that includes the current military counterintelligence), produced both exhibitions in conjunction with the Central Military Museum. The FSB even published a glossy ‘coffee-table’ companion book to the 2003 exhibition that is highly complimentary of Abakumov, although he, as an enforcer of Stalin’s will at the highest level, personally arrested and often participated in brutal interrogations of many innocent people.²²Viktor Stepakov, an FSBaffiliated author, went so far as to raise the question of rehabilitation, i.e., official recognition that Abakumov was not guilty of any crime, in his recent biography of Abakumov. Stepakov cites the opinion of Ivan Krauze, a secret service veteran: ‘Viktor Semyonovich Abakumov was a good man… If during an interrogation he beat somebody up, these were enemies of the people since he did not touch innocent [arrestees]… A monument must be erected to him as an innocent victim killed by the libertarian [Nikita] Khrushchev.’²³

The controversy continues on the Russian TV. In November 2004, a Russian TV documentary, People’s Commissar of SMERSH: The Fall portrayed Abakumov as a devoted, talented serviceman, inspired by Communist ideals, who was executed on the order of traitors. On May 6, 2009, the Russian government-controlled TV channel Rossiya showed a new ‘documentary’ movie (actually a work of fiction) called To Kill Comrade Stalin, in which Abakumov and SMERSH operatives are shown saving Stalin’s life by arresting a Nazi assassin sent by the German secret services. Contrary to this, on December 30, 2010 the Russian historian Nikolai Svanidze broadcasted his TV documentary Historical Chronicle of 1950. Viktor Abakumov in which he presented Abakumov quite adequately. Soon after this broadcast Svanidze’s TV program was closed.

Many war veterans felt that the osobisty would survive because they were in the barrage detachments placed behind the fighting troops, and would end up creating myths about the war. For instance, a former private described the feeling of the servicemen on the front line: ‘We [soldiers], dressed in cold greatcoats, will perish at the front line, while osobisty in sheepskin coats behind our backs and armed with heavy machine guns, will survive. And later they will tell stories about how they defeated Hitler.’²⁴ This is exactly what happened.

Recently a number of memoirs written by security veterans who served in SMERSH and military counterintelligence just after the war have become publicly available. Unfortunately, these memoirs provide little information about military counterintelligence history. However, they are a source of details about everyday counterintelligence work, and they also allow the reader to better understand the psychology of these brutal people. Even 65 years after the war the security-service veterans remain mostly staunch Stalinists, extremely anti-Western and anti-American, and they still believe that they made no mistakes in their glorious work of finding traitors within the Red Army.

Here is an example from former SMERSH officer Leonid Ivanov, who wrote in 2009: ‘I consider rightful the decision made by J. Stalin [in 1944] to exile the Crimean Tatars [executed by the NKVD, NKGB (State Security  Commissariat) and SMERSH] for their numerous crimes from such an [important] strategic region… as the Crimean Peninsula… The eviction of the Tatars from the Crimea was an act of historic justice. There is no sense in saying that the whole Tatar people in the Crimea were not guilty. And were the Russian people guilty when they were killed and burned alive during the Tatar-Mongolian invasion [in the 13th–15th centuries]?’²⁵

Fortunately, material that goes beyond FSB-controlled information has recently become available, enabling me to write this book. In the past ten years, independent Russian archivists and historians from the Alexander Yakovlev International Democracy Foundation and Memorial Society (both in Moscow) have published numerous compilations of original documents released from important archives, including the Presidential Archive of the Russian Federation (APRF), the FSB Central Archive, the State Archive of the Russian Federation (GARF), the Russian State Military Archive (RGVA), and a few others, all located in Moscow. Perhaps most important, the Memorial Society, which is devoted to the commemoration of Stalin’s victims, has published a series of books in Russian on the history and structure of the security services and the biographies of many of their key personnel. When I cite documents from these books, I give the number of the document in the book, while all archival details are available in the book. Additionally, many important archival documents were published in the Russian press.²⁶

Unfortunately, all these materials were published only in Russian, and so the English-reading audience interested in Soviet and World War II history, as well as many historians who work only with documents translated into English, are not aware of them.

In addition to these materials, my sources for this volume include a number of personal files of foreign prisoners that I studied at the RGVA in 1990–91; some documents that I discovered in the GARF; several incomplete SMERSH/MGB (State Security Ministry) investigation files in the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum (Washington, DC) that the Museum’s archive received from the FSB Central Archive in Moscow; numerous memoirs; NKVD history sources published primarily in Russian; and copies of prisoner cards from the Vladimir Prison Archive. Also I used documents from the archive of the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs—the collection of documents on Raoul Wallenberg posted on the website of this Ministry. In the Nuremberg chapter, I cite several documents that I found in the U.S. National Archive (NARA) in Washington, DC.

I even used documents published as photos in the FSB’s coffee-table book SMERSH, reading the documents with the help of a magnifying glass. Finally, I found a great deal of useful information on several Russian websites that provide access to an enormous number of books in Russian on such topics as military history, World War II, the memoirs of GULAG survivors, and hundreds of interviews with World War II veterans collected from 2007 on.²⁷ Almost all the materials and documents that I used in this book are available only in Russian and are new to the English-speaking audience.

If my description of SMERSH’s activities in this book seems a bit fragmentary, it is because I was only able to reconstruct so much. The SMERSH orders and reports I found are scattered throughout hundreds of sources, and it took years to find and collect them. I have translated extensive excerpts from the most important sources and included them throughout the book. I recreated the organization and work of military tribunals, the Military Collegium of the Soviet Supreme Court, and military prosecutors mostly on the basis of the recently published memoirs. Only during my work on this book were the first statistics on the activity of military tribunals during the war published.²⁸

Regrettably, many details are still unknown. For instance, the organizational structure of the NKVD Troops Guarding the Red Army Rear, created in May 1943 partly to support SMERSH’s activities, is still a mystery. And only the general structure of the NKGB—that is, the number and names of directorates and departments—is known. This information is important for a complete understanding of SMERSH, because NKGB officers, primarily from the 1st (intelligence) and 2nd (domestic counterintelligence) directorates, replaced SMERSH field officers in newly occupied territory, continuing arrests and interrogations while SMERSH units moved ahead with the advancing Red Army. This NKGB activity was described only in the memoirs of Anatolii Granovsky, an NKVD/NKGB officer who defected to the West in 1946.²⁹

While talking about World War II, it is necessary to keep in mind the enormous number of Soviet servicemen killed in that war, especially during the chaotic period that followed the German invasion in June 1941. Officially, Stalin declared that seven million Soviet citizens perished during the war, but according to some memoirs, in his inner circle he used to say that ‘30 million of our people have been killed, and of them, 20 million were [ethnic] Russians.’³⁰ In 2010, the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces claimed that 8,668,000 servicemen were killed during the war, while the total losses were 26.6 million people.³¹ The Russian historian Boris Sokolov writes that between 26.3 and 26.9 million servicemen were killed.³²

Although this number might be an overestimate, it is obvious that the number given by the General Staff was underestimated—possibly, with the intention of making the Soviet and German losses appear equal. In fact, the Germans and their allies lost between 3 and 3.6 million servicemen at the Eastern (Russian) Front, and between 1 and 1.5 million at the Western Front, in addition to approximately 2 million civilians. In 2008, the Military-Memorial Center of the Russian Armed Forces listed the names of 16.5 million servicemen killed and about 2.4 million men missing in action.³³ Comparing these figures to the 416,000 Americans killed during World War II highlights the enormity of this tragedy.

It is likely that the real extent of Soviet losses will never be known. Even 65 years after the war ended, approximately 80 per cent of archival documents about the war were still classified in Russia and, therefore, it was hard to make an independent estimation of losses.³⁴ Also, unlike American soldiers, Russian soldiers did not have ‘dog tags’. Before the war, in March 1941, special lockers were introduced in which privates were supposed to put a note with their personal data.³⁵ These lockers were abandoned in November 1942 because of their inefficiency. In October 1941, privates and low-level commanders began to receive special IDs similar to a passport without a photo (the high-level commanders had had such IDs from the beginning of the war) but issuing of these IDs at the fronts was not completed until July 1942. Therefore, during the first year of the war, most servicemen had no identification papers.

And even when sophisticated forensic methods of identification did become available, the Soviet—now, the Russian—state has shown little interest in identifying all the dead. As late as 2005, it was reported that at least a half a million unidentified soldiers killed during 1941–42 were thought to still be lying either unburied or buried in unmarked graves in Russian forests.³⁶

The publication of this book is especially timely now, because the present Russian government seems intent on whitewashing Stalin’s atrocities and the history of the Soviet security services. Since Vladimir Putin (a former KGB lieutenant colonel and then FSB head before becoming Russian president) came to power in 2000, siloviki (‘men of power’) with mostly KGB backgrounds have taken over key positions in government and business. They call themselves ‘Chekists’—followers of the first Bolshevik security service, the CheKa (Chrezvychainaya komissiya or Extraordinary Commission), created in 1918 under Felix Dzerzhinsky’s command, to unleash the first wave of Soviet repression and persecution, the Red Terror. This group is also known today as the Corporation or Brotherhood. In February 2009, Andrei Illarionov, a former Putin adviser and now the leading Russian-opposition economist, testified before the American House Committee on Foreign Affairs: ‘The members of the Corporation do share strong allegiance to their respective organizations, strict codes of conduct and of honor, basic principles of behavior, including among others the principle of mutual support to each other in any circumstances and the principle of omerta.’³⁷ These people see themselves as the descendants of the NKVD/SMERSH/MGB and are proud of those agencies. The Economist dubbed the current Russian regime the ‘spookocracy’.³⁸

To burnish their image, the current secret services have begun to connect themselves with Russia’s imperial past.³⁹ This process has coincided with an enormous increase in the number of new books glorifying Stalin and his epoch. For instance, during 2010 and early 2011, about 60 books praising Stalin and his administration, compared to 21 serious history books about Stalin’s time, were published in Russia.⁴⁰ In the spring of 2007, Russian TV (NTV channel) showed a forty-episode series, Stalin Alive, in which Stalin is depicted as a repentant intellectual. Even the sinister Beria, NKVD Commissar from 1938 until 1946, whose name was synonymous with terror in the Soviet Union, is portrayed as ‘the best manager of the 20th century’. There is nothing about his cruel atrocities in his official biography given on the FSB website.⁴¹

Putin has ordered textbooks rewritten. One of them called Stalin ‘one of the most successful USSR leaders’ and used the euphemism ‘Stalin’s psychological peculiarities’ to describe Stalin’s mass repressions.⁴² The intensive pro-Stalin propaganda has already resulted in the brainwashing of the Russian younger generation. In a poll conducted in October 2009, more than half of respondents over 55, and more than a quarter of 18-to 24-year-olds, said that they felt positively about Stalin.⁴³

The current Chekist attempts to whitewash Stalin and his methods must be strongly rebuffed. I hope the present book will help ensure that the atrocities of Stalin’s regime will not be forgotten.

For me, the topic of World War II has a personal dimension as well. While researching material for the chapter about the International Nuremberg Trial, I found out that the name of my great-uncle, Dr. Meer D. Birstein, was on a list of victims killed by the Nazis in 1941–42, which was presented by the Soviet Prosecutor Lev Smirnov on February 26, 1946 (Exhibit USSR 279).⁴⁴ My great-uncle was a surgeon at a hospital in the town of Vyazma, and he chose to stay with his patients despite the rapid German advance and his own awareness of the German attitude toward Jews.

Also, like everyone born in Moscow during that war, in my childhood I heard stories about the disastrous year 1941, when the Soviet leadership was not prepared for the German advance and about the panic in Moscow on 16 October 1941, when German tanks showed up in Moscow’s suburbs. My mother, a doctor who was promoted in 1941 to the rank of Captain of Medical Service, served in a military field hospital from June 1941 until the end of 1943, and witnessed many horrifying events. For thousands of civilian volunteers called opolchentsy sent out to defend Moscow, there was only one rifle for every three soldiers.⁴⁵ In Leningrad there was only one rifle per thirty volunteers, and there were no munitions. Soviet pilots dropped scrap metal during the night instead of bombs, hoping at least to disturb the Germans’ sleep. Since practically all modern planes had been destroyed by the Germans, pilots used old two-man planes made of plywood. The number of Soviet defenders killed during that period, among them many of my parents’ friends, is simply unknown. Even more horrifying were stories about the everyday life of servicemen at the front later—arrests of officers by osobisty for no discernible reason, punishment battalion (shtrafbat) attacks through minefields, and so forth.

The poverty of most of my classmates in the early 1950s was profound. Many were raised by mothers because their fathers had been killed during the war or were imprisoned in the GULAG. And I cannot forget the thousands of human stumps—young men who had lost their legs and sometimes also one or both hands—who were seen after the war in the streets everywhere throughout the country. They had wooden discs instead of legs and they moved by propelling themselves with their hands (if they had them). Many of these ‘stumps’ had the highest military awards attached to their chests, and most of them begged for money. Their pension was 150 rubles a month, at a time when a loaf of bread cost 100 rubles at the market.

In July 1951, these people disappeared from the streets of Moscow. Following a secret decree, the militia (Soviet police) collected them and placed them in specially organized invalid reservations under squalid conditions, and the government reduced their pensions.⁴⁶ From time to time you would see an escapee from one of the reservations, singing patriotic war songs on a suburban train and begging for money.

All these memories will remain with me for the rest of my life.

One more issue is haunting me: the enormous scale of atrocities committed by Soviet soldiers in Eastern Europe and China in 1944–45. This topic was taboo during all the Soviet years, and many of Russia’s official historians and nationalists are still furiously denying the facts.⁴⁷ But I personally knew two Red Army officers who tried to stop rapes and reported to their superiors about the atrocities they had witnessed. Both were punished for ‘slandering the Red Army’ and spent years in the GULAG. However, the scale of the atrocities, especially in Hungary and Germany, became clear only from recent publications in Russian.⁴⁸ It is scary that even now, 65 years after the war, according to the interviews on the website http://www.iremember.ru, many war veterans recall the atrocities without remorse and consider the mass rapes of women and killings of children and old people to be justified by the atrocities the German troops committed in the Soviet territory in 1941–42.

I would like to end with a citation from the very thoughtful memoirs by Nikolai Nikoulin, a war veteran who became a prominent, internationally known art historian at the Leningrad Hermitage. In November 1941 Nikoulin volunteered for the army, just after he graduated from high school in Leningrad. He wrote his memoirs in the 1970s, not even hoping that they would ever appear in print; they were published in 2008. As he states in the introduction, the memoirs were written ‘from the point of view of a soldier who is crawling through the mud of the front lines’. Nikoulin was very strong in accusing the Soviet regime of an inhuman attitude toward its own people:

The war especially strongly exposed the meanness of the Bolshevik government…

An order comes from above: ‘You must seize a certain height.’ The regiment storms it week after week, each day losing a large number of men. The replacements for casualties keep coming without interruption; there is no shortage of men. Among them there are men swollen with dystrophy from Leningrad [in the Nazi blockade], for whom doctors had just prescribed intensive feeding and staying in bed for three weeks; there are also 14-year-old kids…who should not have been drafted at all…

The only command is ‘Forward!!!’ Finally, a soldier or a lieutenant—a platoon commander—or even, infrequently, a captain—a company commander—says, while witnessing this outrageous nonsense: ‘Stop wasting the men! There is a concrete-enforced pillbox on the top! And we have only the 76-mm cannon! It cannot destroy it!!!’

Immediately a politruk [political officer], a SMERSH officer, and a military tribunal start to work. One of the informers, plenty of whom are present in every unit, testifies: ‘Yes, in the presence of privates he [the officer] questioned our victory!’ After this a special printed form, where there is a space for a name, is filled in. Now everything is ready. The decision is: ‘Shoot him in front of formation!’ or ‘Send him to a punishment company!’—which is practically the same thing.

This is how the most honest and responsible people perished…

It was a stupid, senseless killing of our own servicemen. I think this [artificial] selection among the Russian people is a time bomb that will explode in a few generations, in the 21st or 22nd century, when the numerous scoundrels selected and raised by the Bolsheviks will give rise to new generations of those who are like them.⁴⁹

Nikoulin died in 2009. Unfortunately, he lived to see his prediction coming true in the twenty-first century.

For me, writing this book was like talking to the people of my parents’ generation, such as Nikolai Nikoulin, Vasil’ Bykov, and many, many others. Our ‘conversations’ were very painful, and like my harrowing postwar memories, they will stay with me forever.

Notes

1. SMERSH. Istoricheskie ocherki i dokumenty, edited by V. S. Khristoforov, et al. (Moscow: Glavnoe arkhivnoe upravlenie, 2003; second edition 2005; and the third, 2010) (in Russian).

2. The number of divisions from Table 51 in G. F. Krivosheev et al., Velikaya Otechestvennaya bez grifa sekretnosti. Kniga poter’ (Moscow: Veche, 2009), 206–7 (in Russian).

3. I. I. Kuznetsov, Sud’by general’skie:Vysshie komandnye kadry Krasnoi Armii v 1940–1953 gg. (Irkutsk: Izdatel’stvo Irkutskogo universiteta, 2000), 180 (in Russian).

4. V. N. Stepakov, Narkom SMERSHa (St. Petersburg: Neva, 2003), 93 (in Russian).

5. SMERSH. Istoricheskie ocherki, 6.

6. Ian Fleming, Casino Royale (first published in Great Britain by Jonathan Cape Ltd., 1953), 10.

7. Ian Fleming, From Russia with Love (first published in Great Britain by Jonathan Cape Ltd., 1957), 10, 28.

8. The Library of Congress World War II Companion, edited by David M. Kennedy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2007).

9. Chris Bellamy, Absolute War: Soviet Russia in the Second World War (New York: Vantage Books, 2007), 29–30 and 644.

10. Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, KGB: The Inside Story of Its Foreign Operatrions from Lenin to Gorbachev (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1990), 342–3.

11. Michael Parrish, The Lesser Terror: Soviet State Security, 1939–1953 (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1996), 111–45.

12. Nicola Sinevirsky, SMERSH (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1950); A. I. Romanov, Nights Are Longest There: A Memoir of the Soviet Security Services, translated by Gerald Brooke (Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company, 1972). After the war, Mikhail Mondich (Sinevirsky) (1923–1969) lived in the United States, while Boris Baklanov escaped to the American sector in Vienna and went to live in London.

13. Vladimir Nikolaev, Stalin, Gitler i my (Moscow: Prava cheloveka, 2002), 155 (in Russian).

14. Aleksandr I. Solzhenitsyn, The GULAG Archipelago, 1918–1956: An Experiment in Literary Investigation, translated from the Russian by Thomas P. Whitney, Vols. I and II (New York: Harper and Row, 1973), 23.

15. Vladimir Bogomolov, V avguste sorok chetvertogo (Moscow: Molodaya gvardiya, 1974) (in Russian).

16. Vladimir Bogomolov, ‘Ya reshil svesti do minimuma kontakty s gosudarstvom,’ Novaya gazeta, No. 33, May 17, 2004 (in Russian), http://www.novayagazeta.ru/data/2004/33/25.html, retrieved September 4, 2011.

17. Letter of the Party Central Committee, dated April 15, 1966, in A. Novikov and V. Telitsyn, ‘Mertvym—ne bol’no, bol’no—zhivym,’ Voprosy literatury, No. 6 (2004) (in Russian), http://magazines.russ.ru/voplit/2004/6/nov15.html, retrieved September 9, 2011.

18. V. V. Bykov, ‘Dolgaya doroga domoi,’ Druzhba narodov, No. 8 (2003) (in Russian), http://magazines.russ.ru/druzhba/2003/8/bykov.html, retrieved September 4, 2011.

19. ‘Russia Unveils Stalin Spy Service,’ BBC News, April 19, 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2960709.stm, retrieved September 4, 2011.

20. Vadim Telitsin, ‘SMERSH’: Operatsii i ispolniteli (Smolensk: Rusich, 2000) (in Russian).

21. Nikolai Poroskov, ‘Voennaya kontrrazvedka vchera i segodnya,’ Voennopromyshlennyi kur’er, No. 48 (264), December 10-16, 2008 (in Russian), http://www.vpk-news.ru/article.asp?_sign=archive.2008.264.articles.chronicle_03, retrieved September 4, 2011

22. SMERSH. Istoricheskie ocherki.

23. V. N. Stepakov, Narkom SMERSHa (St. Petersburg: Neva, 2003), 145 (in Russian).

24. Cited in Dmitry Oreshnikov, ‘Finskaya voina kak opyt sotsiologii. Chast’ tret’ya,’ Yezhednevnyi zhurnal, June 10, 2010 (in Russian), http://www. ej.ru/?a=note&id=10171, retrieved September 4, 2011.

25. Leonid Ivanov, Pravda o ‘SMERSH’ (Moscow: Yauza-Eksmo, 2009), 112 (in Russian).

26. M. B. Smirnov, Sistema ispravitel’no-trudovykh lagerei v SSSR. 1923–1960. Spravochnik (Moscow: Zven’ya, 1998); N. V. Petrov and K. V. Skorkin, Kto rukovodil NKVD. 1934–1941. Spravochnik (Moscow: Zven’ya 1999); A. I. Kokurin and N. V. Petrov, Lubyanka. Organy VCheKa–OGPU–NKVD–NKGB–MGB–MVD–KGB. 1917–1991. Spravochnik (Moscow: Demokratiya, 2003); N. V. Petrov, Kto rukovodil organami gosbezopasnosti, 1941–1954. Spravochnik (Moscow: Zven’ya, 2010). All in Russian.

27. Especially the sites http://www.sakharov-center.ru/asfcd/auth/, http://militera.lib.ru, and http://www.iremember.ru, all retrieved September 4, 2011.

28. Vyacheslav Zvyagintsev, Voina na vesakh Femidy. Voina 1941–1945 gg. V materialakh sledstvenno-sudebnykh del (Moscow: Terra, 2006); Aleksandr Beznasyuk and Vyacheslav Zvyagintsev, Tribunal. Arbat, 37 (Dela i lyudi) (Moscow: Terra, 2006).

29. Anatoli Granovsky, I Was an NKVD Agent (New York: The Devin-Adair Company, 1962), 235–58.

30. Recollections by Aleksander Golovanov, in F. I. Chuev, Soldaty imperii. Besedy. Vospominaniya. Dokumenty (Moscow: Kovcheg, 1998), 229 (in Russian).

31. Krivosheev et al., Velikaya Otechestvennaya, 39–43.

32. Details in Boris Sokolov, Poteri Sovetskogo Soyuza i Germanii vo Vtoroi mirovoi voine: Metody podschetov i naibolee veroyatnye rezul’taty (Moscow: AIRO-XXI, 2011) (in Russian).

33. Vladimir Dobryshevsky, ‘Pomnit’ vsekh poimenno,’ Krasnaya zvezda, June 18, 2008 (in Russian), http://www.redstar.ru/2008/06/18_06/3_05.html, retrieved September 4, 2011.

34. Aleksandr Melenberg, ‘Podachka iz arkhiva,’ Novaya gazeta, No. 48, May 7, 2010 (in Russian), http://www.novayagazeta.ru/data/2010/048/09.html, retrieved September 4, 2011.

35. NKO orders No. 138, dated March 15, 1941 (Document No. 109 in Russkii arkhiv: Velikaya Otechestvennaya: Prikazy Narodnogo Komissara Oborony SSSR, 13 (2-1) (1994), 258–61), and No. 376, dated November 17, 1942 (Document No. 292 in ibid., 13 (2-2) (1997), 368), on personal lockers, and No. 330, dated October 7, 1941 (Document No. 86 in ibid., 111–2), on IDs.

36. Stepan Kashurko, ‘Lezhat’ smirno!,’ Novaya gazeta, No. 33, May 12, 2005 (in Russian), http://www.novayagazeta.ru/data/2005/33/00.html, retrieved September 4, 2011.

37. Testimony of Andrei Illarionov, Senior Fellow of the Cato Institute, Washington, DC, and the President of the Institute of Economic Analysis, Moscow, before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs at the hearing ‘From Competition to Collaboration: Strengthening the U.S.-Russia Relationship,’ February 25, 2009, http://www.internationalrelations.house.gov/111/ill022509.pdf, retrieved September 4, 2011.

38. ‘The Making of a Neo-KGB State,’ The Economist, August 25–31, 2007, 25–28. A detailed analysis of the Russian political and business elite is given in Olga Kryshtanovskaya, Anatomiya rossiiskoi elity (Moscow: Zakharov, 2004) (in Russian).

39. Vladimir Ivanov and Igor Plugatarev, ‘FSB menyaet orientiry,’ Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie, October 29, 2004 (in Russian), http://nvo.ng.ru/spforces/2004-10-29/7_fsb.html, retrieved September 4, 2011.

40. List of published books in Russia on http://www.biblio-globus.com, retrieved September 4, 2011.

41. http://www.fsb.ru/fsb/history/author/single.htm%21id%3D10318168%2540fsbPublication.html, retrieved September 4, 2011.

42. Istoriya Rossii. 1900–1945 gg. Kniga dly uchitelya, edited by Aleksandr Danilov and Aleksandr Filippov (Moscow: Prosveshchenie, 2009).

43. Owen Matthews, ‘Young Russians’ About-Face From the West.’ Newsweek, November 5, 2009, http://www.newsweek.com/id/221210, retrieved September 4, 2011.

44. The Soviets participated only in the Military International Tribunal and the Trial of the Major War Criminals (November 1945–October 1946). Most Russians are not aware of the twelve American Subsequent Nuremberg Proceedings that followed from 1946 to 1949.

45. Only recently were several truthful memoirs about these events published, including Nikolai I. Obryn’ba, The Memoirs of a Soviet Resistance Fighter on the Eastern Front, translated by Vladimir Kupnik (Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, 2007), and Vladimir Shimkevich, Sud’ba moskovskogo opolchentsa. Front, okruzhenie, plen. 1941–1945 (Moscow: Tsentrpoligraf, 2008) (in Russian).

46. Aleksandr Melenberg, ‘Pobeda. Vremya posle bedy. Chast’ III. L’goty veteranam Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny v instruktsiyakh i postanovleniyakh vlasti,’ Novaya gazeta, tsvetnoi vypusk 17 (May 11, 2007) (in Russian). http://www.novayagazeta.ru/data/2007/color17/07.html, retrieved September 4, 2011.

47. The denial intensified after the publication in 2005 of the Russian translation of Antony Beevor’s The Fall of Berlin 1945 (New York: Viking, 2002), see S. Turchenko, ‘Nasilie nad faktami,’ Trud, July 21, 2005 (in Russian). Beevor’s Russian opponents ignored the fact that Beevor cited Soviet documents from the Russian military archive.

48. For instance, a discussion in Mark Solonin, Net blaga na voine (Moscow: Yauza-Press, 2010), 180–264 (in Russian).

49. N. N. Nikoulin, Vospominaniya o voine (St. Petersburg: Izdatel’stvo Gosudarstvennogo Ermitazha, 2008), 41–42 (in Russian).