Military history



1. Matthew Parris, “What if the Turkeys Don’t Vote for Christmas?”, The Times, May 12, 2012.

2. The concept of strategy as being “concerned with ways to employ means to achieve ends” is comparatively recent but is now well established in military circles, although not in such a way as always to capture the dynamic interaction between these elements. Arthur F. Lykke, Jr., “Toward an Understanding of Military Strategy,” Military Strategy: Theory and Application (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1989), 3-8.

3. Ecclesiastes 9:11.

4. This can be tracked using Google’s Ngram facility: ngrams/.

5. Raymond Aron, “The Evolution of Modern Strategic Thought,” in Alastair Buchan, ed., Problems of Modern Strategy (London: Chatto & Windus, 1970), 25.

6. George Orwell, “Perfide Albion” (review, Liddell Hart’s British Way of Warfare), New Statesman and Nation, November 21, 1942, 342-343.

Chapter 1. Origins 1: Evolution

1. Frans B. M. de Waal, “A Century of Getting to Know the Chimpanzee,” Nature 437, September 1, 2005, 56-59.

2. De Waal, Chimpanzee Politics (Baltimore : Johns Hopkins Press, 1998). First edition was in 1982.

3. De Waal, “Putting the Altruism Back into Altruism: The Evolution of Empathy,” Annual Review Psychology 59 (2008): 279-300. See also Dario Maestripieri, Macachiavellian Intelligence: How Rhesus Macaques and Humans Have Conquered the World (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007).

4. Richard Byrne and Nadia Corp, “Neocortex Size Predicts Deception Rate in Primates,” Proceedings of the Royal Society of London 271, no. 1549 (August 2004): 1693-1699.

5. Richard Byrne and A. Whiten, eds., Machiavellian Intelligence: Social Expertise and the Evolution of Intellect in Monkeys, Apes and Humans (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988); Machiavellian Intelligence II: Extensions and Evaluations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). The idea is often traced back to Nicholas Humphrey, “The Social Function of Intellect,” in P

P. G. Bateson and R. A. Hinde, eds. Growing Points in Ethology, 303-317 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976).

6. Bert Hollbroder and Edward O. Wilson, Journey to the Ants: A Story of Scientific Exploration (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994), 59. Cited in Bradley Thayer, Darwin and International Relations: On the Evolutionary Origins of War and Ethnic Conflict (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2004), 163.

7. Jane Goodall, The Chimpanzees of Gombe: Patterns ofBehavior (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986).

8. Richard Wrangham, “Evolution of Coalitionary Killing,” Yearbook of Physical Anthropology 42, 1999, 12, 14, 2, 3.

9. Goodall, The Chimpanzees of Gombe, p. 176, fn 101.

10. Robert Bigelow, Dawn Warriors (New York: Little Brown, 1969).

11. Lawerence H. Keeley, War Before Civilization: The Myth of the Peaceful Savage (New York : Oxford University Press, 1996), 48.

12. Azar Gat, War in Human Civilization (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 115-117.

13. Keeping in mind that these societies were relatively simple and social moves within them, including deception, would be less demanding than those in more complex human societies. Kim Sterelny, “Social Intelligence, Human Intelligence and Niche Construction, ” Philosophical Transactions of The Royal Society 362, no. 1480 (2007): 719-730.

Chapter 2. Origins 2: The Bible

1. Steven Brams, Biblical Games: Game Theory and the Hebrew Bible (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2003).

2. Ibid., 12.

3. Genesis 2:22, 23. All biblical references use the King James Version.

4. Genesis 2:16, 17; 3:16, 17.

5. Diana Lipton, Longing for Egypt and Other Unexpected Biblical Tales, Hebrew Bible Monographs 15 (Sheffield: Sheffield Phoenix Press, 2008).

6. Exodus 9:13-17.

7. Exodus 7:3-5.

8. Exodus 10:1-2.

9. Chaim Herzog and Mordechai Gichon, Battles of the Bible, revised ed. (London: Greenhill Books, 1997), 45.

10. Joshua 9:1-26.

11. Judges 6-8.

12. 1 Samuel 17.

13. Susan Niditch, War in the Hebrew Bible: A Study in the Ethics of Violence (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 110-111.

Chapter 3. Origins 3: The Greeks

1. Homer, The Odyssey, translated by M. Hammond (London: Duckworth, 2000), Book 9.19-20, Book 13.297-9.

2. Virgil, TheAeneid(London: Penguin Classics, 2003).

3. Homer, The Iliad, translated by Stephen Mitchell (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2011), Chapter IX.310-311, Chapter IX.346-352, Chapter XVIII.243-314, Chapter XXII.226-240.

4. Jenny Strauss Clay, The Wrath of Athena: Gods and Men in the Odyssey (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 1983), 96.

5. As “ou” is interchangeable with “me,” this was linguistically equivalent to metis.

6. The Odyssey, Book 9.405-14.


8. W. B. Stanford, The Ulysses Theme: A Study in the Adaptability of the Traditional Hero (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1954), 24.

9. Jeffrey Barnouw, Odysseus, Hero of Practical Intelligence: Deliberation and Signs in Homer’s Odyssey (New York: University Press of America, 2004), 2-3, 33.

10. Marcel Detienne and Jean-Pierre Vernant, Cunning Intelligence in Greek Culture and Society, translated from French by Janet Lloyd (Sussex: The Harvester Press, 1978), 13-14, 44-45.

11. Barbara Tuchman, The March of Folly: From Troy to Vietnam (London: Michael Joseph, 1984), 46- 4 9.

12. The word strategos was a compound of stratos, for an encamped army spread out over ground, and agein (to lead).

13. Thucydides, The History of the Peloponnesian War, translated by Rex Warner (London: Penguin Classics, 1972), 5.26.

14. The extent to which contemporary realist theories claim Thucydides as one of their own is discussed critically in Jonathan Monten, “Thucydides and Modern Realism,” International Studies Quarterly (2006) 50, 3-25, and David Welch, “Why International Relations Theorists Should Stop Reading Thucydides,” Review of International Studies 29 (2003), 301-319.

15. Thucydides, 1.75-76.

16. Ibid., 5.89.

17. Ibid., 1.23.5-6.

18. Arthur M. Eckstein, “Thucydides, the Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War, and the Foundation of International Systems Theory,” The International History Review 25 (December 4, 2003), 757-774.

19. Thucydides, 1.139-45: 80-6.

20. Donald Kagan, Thucydides: The Reinvention of History (New York: Viking, 2009), 56-57.

21. Thucydides, 1.71.

22. Ibid., 1.39.

23. Ibid., 1.40.

24. Richard Ned Lebow, “Play It Again Pericles: Agents, Structures and the Peloponnesian War,” European Journal of International Relations 2 (1996), 242.

25. Thucydides, 1.33.

26. Donald Kagan, Pericles of Athens and the Birth of Democracy (New York: Free Press, 1991).

27. Sam Leith, You Talkin’ To Me? Rhetoricfrom Aristotle to Obama (London: Profile Books, 2011), 18.

28. Michael Gagarin and Paul Woodruff, “The Sophists,” in Patricia Curd and Daniel W. Graham, eds., The Oxford Handbook of Presocratic Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 365-382; W. K. C. Guthrie, The Sophists (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1971); G. B. Kerferd, The Sophistic Movement (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1981) ; Thomas J. Johnson, “The Idea of Power Politics: The Sophistic Foundations of Realism,” Security Studies 5:2, 1995, 194-247.

29. Adam Milman Parry, Logos and Ergon in Thucydides (Salem : New Hampshire: The Ayer Company, 1981), 121-122, 182-183.

30. Thucydides, 3.43.

31. Gerald Mara, “Thucydides and Political Thought,” The Cambridge Companion to Ancient Greek Political Thought, edited by Stephen Salkever (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 116-118. Thucydides, 3.35-50.

32. Thucydides, 3.82.

33. Michael Gagarin, “Did the Sophists Aim to Persuade?” Rhetorica 19 (2001), 289.

34. Andrea Wilson Nightingale, Genres in Dialogue: Plato and the Construct of Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 14. See also Hakan Tell, Plato’s Counterfeit Sophists (Harvard University: Center for Hellenic Studies, 2011); Nathan Crick, “The Sophistical Attitude and the Invention of Rhetoric,” QuarterlyJournal ofSpeech 96:1 (2010), 25-45; Robert Wallace, “Plato’s Sophists, Intellectual History after 450, and Sokrates,” in The Cambridge Companion to the Age of Pericles, edited by Loren J. Samons II (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 215-237.

35. Karl Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies: The Spell of Plato, vol. 1 (London, 1945).

36. Book 3 of The Republic, I4lb-c. Malcolm Schofield, “The Noble Lie,” in The Cambridge Companion to Plato’s Republic, edited by G. R. Ferrari (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 138-164.

Chapter 4. Sun Tzu and Machiavelli

1. Cited in Everett L. Wheeler, Stratagem and the Vocabulary of Military Trickery. Mnemoseyne supplement 108 (New York: Brill, 1988), 24.

2. Ibid., 14-15.

3. Strategemata/home.html.

4. Lisa Raphals, Knowing Words: Wisdom and Cunning in the Classical Tradition of China and Greece (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992), 20.

5. The first translation of Sun Tzu into English by Lionel Giles in 1910 remains a standard work. The translation by Samuel Griffiths in 1963 helped to popularize the book, as it drew the link with contemporary Asian approaches to warfare (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963). During the 1970s, new materials made possible a more complete version. Giles’s text can be found at For a more up-to-date translation and discussion of Sun Tzu, see

6. Jan Willem Honig, Introduction to Sun Tzu, The Art of War, translation and commentary by Frank Giles (New York: Barnes & Noble, 2012), xxi.

7. François Jullien, Detour and Access: Strategies of Meaning in China and Greece, translated by Sophie Hawkes (New York: Zone Books, 2004), 35, 49-50.

8. Victor Davis Hanson, The Western Way of War: Infantry Battle in Classical Greece (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1989).

9. Pulling these criticisms together, Jeremy Black quotes John Lynn with approval: “Claims that a Western Way of Warfare extended with integrity for 2500 years speak more of fantasy than fact. No overarching theory can encompass the totality of Western combat and culture.” J. A. Lynn, Battle (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2003), 25, cited in Jeremy Black, “Determinisms and Other Issues,” The Journal of Military History 68, no. 1 (October 2004): 217-232.

10. Beatrice Heuser, The Evolution ofStrategy (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 89-90.

11. Michael D. Reeve, ed., Epitoma rei militaris, Oxford Medieval Texts (Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2004). An earlier translation is found in Roots of Strategy: The Five Greatest Military Classics of All Time (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1985).

12. Clifford J. Rogers, “The Vegetian ‘Science of Warfare’ in the Middle Ages,” Journal of Medieval Military History 1 (2003): 1-19; Stephen Morillo, “Battle Seeking: The Contexts and Limits of Vegetian Strategy,” Journal of Medieval Military History 1 (2003): 21-41; John Gillingham, “Up with Orthodoxy: In Defense of Vegetian Warfare,” Journal of Medieval Military History 2 (2004): 149-158.

13. Heuser, Evolution ofSrategy, 90.

14. Anne Curry, “The Hundred Years War, 1337-1453,” in John Andreas Olsen and Colin Gray, eds., The Practice of Strategy: From Alexander the Great to the Present (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 100.

15. Jan Willem Honig, “Reappraising Late Medieval Strategy: The Example of the 1415 Agincourt Campaign,” War in History 19, no. 2 (2012): 123-151.

16. James Q. Whitman, The Verdict of Battle: The Law of Victory and the Making of Modern War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012).

17. William Shakespeare, Henry VI, Part 3, 3.2.

18. Victoria Kahn, Machiavellian Rhetoric: From the Counterreformation to Milton (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), 40.

19. Niccolo Machiavelli, Art of War, edited by Christopher Lynch (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003), 97-98. See also Lynch’s interpretative essay in this volume and Felix Gilbert, “Machiavelli: The Renaissance of the Art of War,” in Peter Paret, ed., Makers of Modern Strategy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986).

20. Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince, translated and with an introduction by George Bull (London: Penguin Books, 1961), 96.

21. Ibid., 99-101.

22. Ibid., 66.

Chapter 5. Satan’s Strategy

1. Dennis Danielson, “Milton’s Arminianism and Paradise Lost,” in J. Martin Evans, ed., John Milton: Twentieth-Century Perspectives (London : Routledge, 2002), 127.

2. John Milton, Paradise Lost, edited by Gordon Tesket (New York : W. W. Norton & Company, 2005), III, 98-99.

3. Job 1:7.

4. John Carey, “Milton’s Satan,” in Dennis Danielson, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Milton (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 160-174.

5. Revelation 12:7-9.

6. William Blake, The Marriage of Heaven and Hell (1790-1793).

7. Milton, Paradise Lost, I, 645-647.

8. Gary D. Hamilton, “ Milton ’s Defensive God: A Reappraisal, ” Studies in Philosophy 69, no. 1 (January 1972): 87-100.

9. Victoria Ann Kahn, Machiavellian Rhetoric: From Counter Reformation to Milton (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), 209.

10. Milton, ParadiseLost, V, 787-788, 794-802.

11. Amy Boesky, “Milton’s Heaven and the Model of the English Utopia,” Studies in English Literature, 1500-1900 36, no. 1 (Winter 1996): 91-110.

12. Milton, ParadiseLost, VI, 701-703, 741, 787, 813.

13. Ibid., I, 124, 258-259, 263, 159-160.

14. Antony Jay, ManagementandMachiavelli (London: Penguin Books, 1967), 27.

15. Milton, ParadiseLost, II, 60-62, 129-130, 190-91, 208-211, 239-244, 269-273, 296-298, 284-286, 379-380, 345-348, 354-358.

16. Ibid., IX, 465-475, 375-378, 1149-1152.

17. Ibid., XII, 537-551, 569-570.

18. Barbara Kiefer Lewalski, “Paradise Lost and Milton’s Politics,” in Evans, ed., John Milton, 150.

19. Barbara Riebling, “Milton on Machiavelli: Representations of the State in Paradise Lost,” Renaissance Quarterly 49, no. 3 (Autumn, 1996): 573-597.

20. Carey, “Milton’s Satan,” 165.

21. Hobbes, Leviathan, I. xiii.

22. Charles Edelman, Shakespeare’s Military Language: A Dictionary (London: Athlone Press, 2000), 343.

23. A Dictionary of the English Language: A Digital Edition of the 1755 Classic by Samuel Johnson, edited by Brandi Besalke,

Chapter 6. The New Science of Strategy

1. Martin van Creveld, Command in War (Harvard, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), 18.

2. R. R. Palmer, “Frederick the Great, Guibert, Bulow: From Dynastic to National War,” in Peter Paret, Gordon A. Craig, and Felix Gilbert, eds., Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age (Princeton, NJ : Princeton University Press, 1986), 91.

3. Edward Luttwak, Strategy (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1987), 239-240.

4. Beatrice Heuser, The Strategy Makers: Thoughts on War and Society from Machiavelli to Clausewitz (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2009), 1-2; Beatrice Heuser, The Evolution of Strategy (Cambridge, UK : Cambridge University Press, 2010), 4-5.

5. Azar Gat, The Origins of Military Thought: From the Enlightenment to Clausewitz (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), Chapter 2. See R. R. Palmer, “Frederick the Great, Guibert, Bulow: From Dynastic to National War,” in Paret et al., Makers of Modern Strategy.

6. Palmer, “Frederick the Great,” 107.

7. Heuser, The Strategy Makers, 3; Hew Strachan, “The Lost Meaning of Strategy,” Survival 47, no. 3 (August 2005): 35; J-P. Charnay in André Corvisier, ed., A Dictionary of Military History and the Art of War, English edition edited by John Childs (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), 769.

8. All the definitions come from the Oxford English Dictionary.

9. From “The History of the Late War in Germany” (1766) cited by Michael Howard, Studies in War & Peace (London: Temple Smith, 1970), 21.

10. Peter Paret, Clausewitz and the State: The Man, His Theories and His Times (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983), 91.

11. Whitman, The Verdict of Battle, 155. “The Instruction of Fredrick the Great for His Generals, 1747,” is found in Roots of Strategy: The Five Greatest Military Classics of All Time (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1985).

12. Napoleon’s Military Maxims, edited and annotated by William E. Cairnes (New York: Dover Publications, 2004).

13. Major-General Petr Chuikevich, quoted in Dominic Lieven, Russia Against Napoleon: The Battle for Europe 1807-1814 (London: Allen Lane, 2009), 131.

14. Lieven, Russia Against Napoleon, 198.

15. Alexander Mikaberidze, The Battle of Borodino: Napoleon Against Kutuzov (London: Pen & Sword, 2007), 161, 162.

Chapter 7. Clausewitz

1. Carl von Clausewitz, The Campaign of1812in Russia (London: Greenhill Books, 1992), 184.

2. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), Book IV, Chapter 12, p. 267.

3. Gat, The Origins of Military Thought (see chap. 6, n. 5).

4. John Shy, “Jomini,” in Paret et al., Makers of Modern Strategy, 143-185 (see chap. 6, n. 2).

5. Antoine Henri de Jomini, The Art of War (London: Greenhill Books, 1992).

6. “Jomini and the Classical Tradition in Military Thought,” in Howard, Studies in War & Peace (see chap. 6, n. 9), 31.

7. Jomini, TheArt of War, 69.

8. Shy, “Jomini,” 152, 157, 160, 146.

9. Gat, The Origins ofMilitary Thought, 114, 122.

10. For a useful discussion on the relationship between the two, see Christopher Bassford, “Jomini and Clausewitz: Their Interaction,” February 1993, http://

11. Clausewitz, On War, 136.

12. Hew Strachan, “Strategy and Contingency,” International Affairs 87, no. 6 (2011): 1289.

13. Martin Kitchen, “The Political History of Clausewitz,’’Journal ofStrategic Studies 11, vol. 1 (March 1988): 27-30.

14. B. H. Liddell Hart, Strategy: The Indirect Approach (London: Faber and Faber, 1968); Martin Van Creveld, The Transformation of War (New York: The Free Press, 1991); John Keegan, A History of Warfare (London: Hutchinson, 1993).

15. Jan Willem Honig, “Clausewitz’s On War: Problems of Text and Translation,” in Hew Strachan and Andrews Herberg-Rothe, eds., Clausewitz in the Twenty-First Century (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 57-73. For biography, see Paret, Clausewitz and the State (see chap. 6, n. 10); Michael Howard, Clausewitz (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983); Hew Strachan, Clausewitz’s On War: A Biography (New York: Grove/Atlantic Press, 2008). On historical context, see Azar Gat, A History of Military Thought (see chap. 6, n. 5). On influence, see Beatrice Heuser, Reading Clausewitz (London : Pimlico, 2002).

16. Christopher Bassford, “The Primacy of Policy and the ‘Trinity’ in Clausewitz’s Mature Thought,” in Hew Strachan and Andreas Herberg- Rothe, eds., Clausewitz in the Twenty-First Century (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 74-90; Christopher Bassford, “The Strange Persistence of Trinitarian Warfare,” in Ralph Rotte and Christoph Schwarz, eds., War and Strategy (New York: Nova Science, 2011), 45-54.

17. Clausewitz, On War, Book 1, Chapter 1, 89.

18. Antulio Echevarria, Clausewitz and Contemporary War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 96.

19. On War, Book 1, Chapter 7, 119-120.

20. Ibid., Book 3, Chapter 7, 177.

21. Terence Holmes uses this stress on planning to challenge the view that Clausewitz was preoccupied only with the chaotic and unpredictable. The point is that the potential chaos and unpredictability set the challenge for the general. This is why Clausewitz argued for cautious strategies. Holmes notes the reasons why plans may go awry, of which the most important would be a failure to anticipate the enemy’s moves correctly, and that when the original plans do not work new ones will be needed. It is setting up a straw man to counter a claim that Clausewitz opposed all planning, because clearly the logistical and command issues posed by the great armies of the time demanded planning. Better to view the strategic challenge as drawing up plans that took account of the problems of friction and unpredictable enemies but would not necessarily solve them. Terence Holmes, “Planning versus Chaos in Clausewitz’s On War,’’ TheJournal ofStrategicStudies 30, no. 1 (2007): 129-151.

22. On War, Book 2, Chapter 1, 128, Book 3, Chapter 1, 177.

23. Ibid., Book 1, Chapter 6, 117-118.

24. Paret, “Clausewitz,” in Makers of Modern Strategy, 203.

25. On War, Book 1, Chapter 7, 120.

26. Ibid., Book 5, Chapter 3, 282; Book 3, Chapter 8, 195; Chapter 10, 202203; Book 7, Chapter 22, 566, 572.

27. Ibid., Book 6, Chapter 1, 357; Chapter 2, 360; Chapter 5, 370.

28. Clausewitz, On War, 596, 485. Antulio J. Echevarria II, “Clausewitz’s Center of Gravity: It’s Not What We Thought,” Naval War College Review LVI, no. 1 (Winter 2003): 108-123.

29. Clausewitz, On War, Book 8, Chapter 6, 603. See Hugh Smith, “The Womb of War.”

30. Clausewitz, On War, Book 8, Chapter 8, 617-637.

31. Strachan, Clausewitz’s On War, 163.

32. “Clausewitz, unfinished note, presumably written in 1830,” in On War, 31. Note this date is now put at 1827. See also Clifford J. Rogers, “Clausewitz, Genius, and the Rules,” TheJournal of Military History 66 (October 2002): 1167-1176.

33. Clausewitz, On War, Book 1, Chapter 1, 87.

34. Ibid., Book 1, Chapter 1, 81.

35. Strachan, Clausewitz’s On War, 179.

36. Brian Bond, The Pursuit of Victory: From Napoleon to Saddam Hussein (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 47.

Chapter 8. The False Science

1. Michael Howard, War and the Liberal Conscience (London : Maurice Temple Smith, 1978), 37-42.

2. Cited in Ibid., 48-49.

3. Clausewitz, On War, Book 1, Chapter 2, 90. See Thomas Waldman, War, Clausewitz and the Trinity (London: Ashgate, 2012), Chapter 6.

4. Leo Tolstoy, War and Peace, translated by Louise and Aylmer Maude (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), 829.

5. Isaiah Berlin, The Hedgehog and the Fox (Chicago: Ivan Dee, 1978). The title, which is now the best remembered aspect of the book, comes from a quote from the Greek poet Archilocus: “The fox knows many things, but the hedgehog knows one big thing.”

6. W. Gallie, Philosophers of Peace and War: Kant, Clausewitz, Marx, Engels and Tolstoy (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1978), 114.

7. Tolstoy, Warand Peace, 1285.

8. Ibid., 688.

9. Lieven, RussiaAgainstNapoleon, 527.

10. Berlin, The Hedgehog and the Fox, 20.

11. Gary Saul Morson, “War and Peace,” in Donna Tussing Orwin, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Tolstoy (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 65-79.

12. Michael D. Krause, “Moltke and the Origins of the Operational Level of War,” in Michael D. Krause and R. Cody Phillip, eds., Historical Perspectives of the Operational Art (Center of Military History, United States Army, Washington, DC, 2005), 118, 130.

13. Gunther E. Rothenberg, “Moltke, Schlieffen, and the Doctrine of Strategic Envelopment,” in Paret, ed., Makers ofModern Strategy, 298 (see chap. 6, n. 2).

14. See Helmuth von Moltke, “Doctrines of War,” in Lawrence Freedman, ed., War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 220-221.

15. Echevarria, Clausewitz and Contemporary War, p.142 (see chap. 7, n. 18).

16. Hajo Holborn, “The Prusso-German School: Moltke and the Rise of the General Staff,” in Paret, ed., Makers of Modern Strategy, 288.

17. Rothenberg, “Moltke, Schlieffen, and the Doctrine of Strategic Envelopment,” 305.

18. John Stone, Military Strategy: The Politics and Technique of War (London: Continuum, 2011), 43-47.

19. Krause, “Moltke and the Origins of the Operational Level of War,” 142.

20. Walter Goerlitz, The German General Staff (New York: Praeger, 1953), 92. Cited by Justin Kelly and Mike Brennan, Alien: How Operational Art Devoured Strategy (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, 2009), 24.

Chapter 9. Annihilation or Exhaustion

1. Gordon Craig, “Delbrück: The Military Historian,” in Paret, ed., Makers of Modern Strategy, 326-353 (see chap. 6, n. 2).

2. Azar Gat, The Development of Military Thought: The Nineteenth Century (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), 106-107.

3. Quote from Mahan in Russell F. Weigley, “American Strategy from Its Beginnings through the First World War,” in Paret, ed., Makers of Modern Strategy, 415.

4. Donald Stoker, The Grand Design: Strategy and the U.S. Civil War (New York : Oxford University Press, 2010), 78-79.

5. David Herbert Donald, Lincoln (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995), 389, 499; Stoker, The GrandDesign, 229-230.

6. Stoker, The GrandDesign, 405.

7. Weigley, “American Strategy,” 432-433.

8. Stoker, The GrandDesign, 232.

9. AzarGat, TheDevelopmentofMilitary Thought, 144-145.

10. Ardant du Picq, “Battle Studies,” in Curtis Brown, ed., Roots of Strategy, Book 2 (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1987), 153; Robert A. Nye, The Origins of Crowd Psychology: Gustave Le Bon and the Crisis of Mass Democracy in the Third Republic (London: Sage, 1974).

11. Craig, “Delbrück: The Military Historian,” 312.

12. The debate has largely been conducted in the pages of the journal War in History. Terence Zuber has been conducting a lonely but vigorous campaign, against the deep skepticism of other historians, to assert that there was no Schlieffen Plan. Terence Zuber, “The Schlieffen Plan Reconsidered,” War in History VI (1999): 262-305. The argument is developed fully in his Inventing the Schlieffen Plan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).

For some responses, see Terence Holmes, “The Reluctant March on Paris: A Reply to Terence Zuber’s ‘The Schlieffen Plan Reconsidered,’” War in History VIII (2001): 208-232. A. Mombauer, “Of War Plan and War Guilt: The Debate Surrounding the Schlieffen Plan,” Journal of Strategic Studies XXVIII (2005): 857-858; R. T. Foley, “The Real Schlieffen Plan,” War in History XIII (2006): 91-115; Gerhard P Groß, “There Was a Schlieffen Plan: New Sources on the History of German Military Planning,” War in History XV (2008): 389-431.

13. Cited by Foley, “The Real Schlieffen Plan,” 109.

14. Hew Strachan, “Strategy and Contingency,” International Affairs 87, no. 6 (2011): 1290.

15. He did not start seriously publishing until he was 50, after which he published almost twenty books and numerous essays. The most important works are The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783 (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1890) and The Influence of Sea Power Upon the French Revolution and Empire, 1793-1812 (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1892).

16. Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon the French Revolution and Empire, 400-402.

17. Jon Tetsuro Sumida, Inventing Grand Strategy and Teaching Command: The Classic Works of Alfred Thayer Mahan Reconsidered (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1999).

18. Robert Seager, Alfred Thayer Mahan: The Man and His Letters (Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1977). See also Dirk Böker, Militarism in a Global Age: Naval Ambitions in Germany and the United States Before World War I (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2012), 103-104.

19. Alfred Mahan, Naval Strategy Compared and Contrasted with the Principles and Practice of Military Operations on Land: Lectures Delivered at U.S. Naval War College, Newport, R.I., Between the Years 1887 and 1911 (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1911), 6-8.

20. Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon the French Revolution, v-vi.

21. Seager, Alfred Thayer Mahan, 546. This was referring to Naval Strategy Compared and Contrasted.

22. Böker, Militarism in a Global Age, 104-107.

23. Cited in Liam Cleaver, “The Pen Behind the Fleet: The Influence of Sir Julian Stafford Corbett on British Naval Development, 1898-1918,” Comparative Strategy 14 (January 1995), 52-53.

24. Barry M. Gough, “Maritime Strategy: The Legacies of Mahan and Corbett as Philosophers of Sea Power,” The RUSIJournal 133, no. 4 (December 1988): 55-62.

25. Donald M. Schurman, Julian S. Corbett, 1854—1922 (London: Royal Historical Society, 1981), 54. See also Eric Grove, “Introduction,” in Julian Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy (Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1988). This book was first published in 1911. The annotated 1988 publication also contains “The Green Pamphlet” of 1909. See also Azar Gat, The Development of Military Thought: The Nineteenth Century.

26. On the relationship between Corbett and Clausewitz, see Chapter 18 of Michael Handel, Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought (London: Frank Cass, 2001).

27. Corbett, Some Principles, 62-63.

28. Ibid., 16, 91, 25, 152, 160.

29. H. J. Mackinder, “The Geographical Pivot of History,” The Geographical Journal 23 (1904): 421-444.

30. H. J. Mackinder, “Manpower as a Measure of National and Imperial Strength,” National and English Review 45 (1905): 136-143, cited in Lucian Ashworth, “Realism and the Spirit of 1919: Halford Mackinder, Geopolitics and the Reality of the League of Nations,” EuropeanJournal of International Relations 17, no. 2 (June 2011): 279-301. Also on Mackinder, see B. W. Blouet, Halford Mackinder: A Biography (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1987).

31. H. J. Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality: A Study in the Politics of Reconstruction (Suffolk: Penguin Books, 1919), 86; Geoffrey Sloan, “Sir Halford J. Mackinder: The Heartland Theory Then and Now,” Journal of Strategic Studies 22, 2-3 (1999): 15-38.

32. Ibid., 194.

33. Mackinder, “The Geographical Pivot,” 437.

34. Ola Tunander, “Swedish-German Geopolitics for a New Century—Rudolf Kjellen’s ‘The State as a Living Organism,’ ” Review of International Studies 27, 3 (2001): 451-463.

35. The consequential discrediting of an approach that encouraged consideration of the strategic implications of the physical environment has been regretted by, among others, Colin Gray, The Geopolitics of Super Power (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1988). See also Colin Gray, “In Defence of the Heartland: Sir Halford Mackinder and His Critics a Hundred Years On,” Comparative Strategy 23, no. 1 (2004): 9-25.

Chapter 10. Brain and Brawn

1. Isabel Hull argues that this behavior was the result of a reckless and insensitive military culture that had developed during the course of colonial wars. Isabel V. Hull, Absolute Destruction: Military Culture and the Practices of War in Imperial Germany (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005).

2. Craig, “Delbrück: The Military Historian,” 348 (see chap. 9, n. 1).

3. See Mark Clodfelter, Beneficial Bombing: The Progressive Foundations ofAmerican Air Power 1917—1945 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2010).

4. Curiously, given his later role as an enthusiastic proponent of mass bombing, his first thoughts were to deplore even thinking about attacks on defenseless cities and to argue for an international convention to ban such a thing. See Thomas Hippler, “Democracy and War in the Strategic Thought of Guilio Douhet,” in Hew Strachan and Sibylle Scheipers, eds., The Changing Character of War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 170.

5. Giulio Douhet, The Command of theAir, translated by Dino Ferrari (Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, 1983). Reprint of 1942 original. This was published by the War Department in Italy. Though judged a troublemaker during the war, he was now celebrated as something of a seer and became briefly commissioner of aviation under the Fascists. Mitchell’s major statement is found in William Mitchell, Winged Defense: The Development and Possibilities of Modern Air Power—Economic and Military (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1925). Caproni’s views were captured by a journalist Nino Salvaneschi who wrote a pamphlet in 1917 entitled Let Us Kill the War, Let Us Aim at the Heart of the Enemy, which advocated attacking manufacturing capacity. David MacIsaac, “Voices from the Central Blue: The Airpower Theorists,” in Peter Paret, ed., Makers of Modern Strategy, 624-647 (see chap. 6, n. 2).

6. Azar Gat, Fascist and Liberal Visions of War: Fuller, Liddell Hart, Douhet, and Other Modernists (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998).

7. Sir Charles Webster and Noble Frankland, The StrategicAir Offensive Against Germany, 4 vols. (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1961), Vol. 4, pp. 2, 74.

8. Sir Hugh Dowding, “Employment of the Fighter Command in Home Defence,” Naval War College Review 45 (Spring 1992): 36. Reprint of 1937 lecture to the RAF Staff College.

9. David S. Fadok, “John Boyd and John Warden: Airpower’s Quest for Strategic Paralysis,” in Col. Phillip S. Meilinger, ed., Paths of Heaven (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 1997), 382.

10. Douhet, Command of the Air.

11. Phillip S. Meilinger, “Giulio Douhet and the Origins of Airpower Theory,” in Phillip S. Meilinger, ed., Paths of Heaven, 27; Bernard Brodie, “The Heritage of Douhet,” Air University Quarterly Review 6 (Summer 1963): 120-126.

12. Wells’s scenario involved a preemptive German attack on the United States using dirigibles before the Americans had a chance to take full advantage of the Wright Brothers’ new invention.

13. Brian Holden Reid, J. F. C. Fuller: Military Thinker (London: Macmillan, 1987), 55, 51, 73.

14. Ibid.; Anthony Trythell, ‘Boney’ Fuller: The Intellectual General (London: Cassell, 1977); Gat, Fascist and Liberal Visions of War.

15. Gat, Fascist and Liberal Visions of War, 40-41.

16. J. F. C. Fuller, The Foundations of the Science of War (London: Hutchinson, 1925), 47.

17. Ibid., 35.

18. Ibid., 141.

Chapter 11. The Indirect Approach

1. On the influence of the Somme on Liddell Hart, see Hew Strachan, “ ‘The Real War’: Liddell Hart, Crutwell, and Falls,” in Brian Bond, ed., The First World War and British Military History (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991).

2. John Mearsheimer, Liddell Hart and the Weight of History (London: Brassey’s, 1988). Gat, without denying Liddell Hart’s vanity and self-aggrandizement, has challenged Mearsheimer’s critique. Azar Gat, “Liddell Hart’s Theory of Armoured Warfare: Revising the Revisionists,” Journal ofStrategicStudies 19 (1996): 1-30.

3. Gat, FascistandLiberal Visions of War, 146-160 (see chap. 7, n. 5).

4. Basil Liddell Hart, The Ghost of Napoleon (London: Faber and Faber, 1933), 125-126.

5. Christopher Bassford, Clausewitz in English: The Reception of Clausewitz in Britain and America, 1815-1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), Chapter 15.

6. Griffiths, Sun Tzu, vii (see chap. 4, n. 5).

7. Alex Danchev, Alchemist of War: The Life of Basil Liddell Hart (London : Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1998).

8. Reid, J. F. C. Fuller, 159 (see chap. 10, n. 13).

9. Basil Liddell Hart, Strategy: The IndirectApproach (London: Faber and Faber, 1954), 335, 339, 341, 344.

10. Brian Bond, Liddell Hart: A Study ofhis Military Thought. (London: Cassell, 1977), 56.

11. Basil Liddell Hart, Paris, or the Future of War (London: Kegan Paul, 1925), 12. Liddell Hart, like Fuller, was impressed by the impact of German bombing attacks on Britain in World War I: “Witnesses of the earlier air attacks before our defence was organized, will not be disposed to underestimate the panic and disturbance that would result from a concentrated blow dealt by a superior air fleet. Who that saw it will ever forget the nightly sight of the population of a great industrial and shipping town, such as Hull, streaming out into the fields on the first sound of the alarm signals? Women, children, babies in arms, spending night after night huddled in sodden fields, shivering under a bitter winter sky.” Basil Liddell Hart, Paris, or the Future of War (New York: Dutton, 1925), 39.

12. Richard K. Betts, “Is Strategy an Illusion?” International Security 25, 2 (Autumn 2000): 11.

13. Ian Kershaw, Fateful Choices: Ten Decisions That Changed the World: 1940-1941 (New York: Penguin Press, 2007), 47.

14. Churchill’s memoir of the war, written in its aftermath, denied that there was any consideration of whether or not to fight on. Resistance was “taken for granted and as a matter of course.” It would have been a waste of time to worry about “such unreal, academic issues” as a negotiated settlement. Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War, Their Finest Hour, vol. 2 (London: Penguin, 1949), 157. Reynolds explains the cover-up by a desire to protect Halifax, who was still a colleague in the higher ranks of the Conservative Party when the book was written in 1948, yet who later acquired the mantle of a would-be appeaser held back by Churchill’s bellicosity. The record, however, shows that Churchill was aware that negotiations with Germany might at some point be necessary. He knew that the next stage might turn out very badly, and that a settlement that compromised British independence might have to be accepted, but his task was to make invasion as hard as possible for the Germans, and his vivid language and steely demeanor (“We shall fight on the beaches... We shall never surrender”) were in that respect vital parts of his weaponry.

The story he told in 1940 was of inevitable victory and he had no desire to correct it when he got the chance to rewrite it in 1948. David Reynolds, In Command of History: Churchill Fighting and Writing the Second World War (New York: Random House, 2005), 172-173.

15. Eliot Cohen, “Churchill and Coalition Strategy,” in Paul Kennedy, ed., Grand Strategies in War and Peace (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1991), 66.

16. Max Hastings, Finest Years: Churchill as Warlord 1940-45 (London: Harper- Collins, 2010), Chapter 1.

17. The estimated 35,000 purged represented half the officer corps, 90 percent of all generals, and 80 percent of all colonels.

18. Winston Churchill, TheSecondWorldWar, TheGrandAlliance,vol. 3 (London: Penguin, 1949), 607-608.

Chapter 12. Nuclear Games

1. Walter Lippmann, The Cold War (Boston: Little Brown, 1947).

2. Ronald Steel, Walter Lippmann and the American Century (London: Bodley Head, 1980), 445. In a subsequent correspondence, another journalist, Herbert Swope, claimed paternity in a speech he wrote for Bernard Baruch, a high-profile financier. He also claimed to have been thinking back to the late 1930s when he had been asked whether America would get involved in a “shooting war” in Europe. He was struck by the oddity of the phrase: “It was like saying a death murder—rather tautological, verbose, and redundant.”

He thought the opposite of a “hot war” was a “cold war” and he began to use the phrase. William Safire, Safire’s New Political Dictionary (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 134-135.

3. Lippmann’s analysis came in response to an article in Foreign Affairs written from Moscow by the American diplomat George Kennan, under the pseudonym “X,” warning of Soviet ambitions and urging the new doctrine of containment. X, “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” Foreign Affairs 7 (1947): 566-582.

4. George Orwell, “You and the Atomic Bomb,” Tribune, October 19, 1945. Reprinted in Sonia Orwell and Ian Angus, eds., The Collected Essays; Journalism and Letters of George Orwell, vol. 4 (New York : Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1968), 8-10.

5. Barry Scott Zellen, State of Doom: Bernard Brodie, the Bomb and the Birth of the Bipolar World (New York: Continuum, 2012), 27.

6. Bernard Brodie, ed., TheAbsolute Weapon (New York: Harcourt, 1946), 52.

7. Bernard Brodie, “Strategy as a Science,” World Politics 1, no. 4 (July 1949): 476.

8. Patrick Blackett, Studies of War, Nuclear and Conventional (New York: Hill & Wang, 1962), 177.

9. Paul Kennedy, Engineers of Victory: The Problem Solvers Who Turned the Tide in the Second World War (London: Allen Lane, 2013).

10. Sharon Ghamari-Tabrizi, “Simulating the Unthinkable: Gaming Future War in the 1950s and 1960s,” Social Studies of Science 30, no. 2 (April 2000): 169, 170.

11. Philip Mirowski, Machine Dreams: Economics Becomes Cyborg Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 12-17.

12. Hedley Bull, The Control of the Arms Race (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1961), 48.

13. Hedley Bull, “Strategic Studies and Its Critics,” World Politics 20, no. 4 (July 1968): 593-605.

14. Charles Hitch and Roland N. McKean, The Economics ofDefense in the Nuclear Age (Cambridge, MA : Harvard University Press, 1960).

15. Deborah Shapley, Promise and Power: The Life and Times of Robert McNamara (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1993), 102-103.

16. Thomas D. White, “Strategy and the Defense Intellectuals,” The Saturday Evening Post, May 4, 1963, cited by Alain Enthoven and Wayne Smith, How Much Is Enough? (New York; London: Harper & Row, 1971), 78. For a critique of the role of systems analysis, see Stephen Rosen, “Systems Analysis and the Quest for Rational Defense,” The PublicInterest 76 (Summer 1984): 121-159.

17. Bernard Brodie, WarandPolitics (London: Cassell, 1974), 474-475.

18. Cited in William Poundstone, Prisoner’s Dilemma (New York: Doubleday, 1992), 6.

19. Oskar Morgenstern, “The Collaboration between Oskar Morgenstern and John von Neumann,” Journal of EconomicLiterature 14, no. 3 (September 1976): 805816. E. Roy Weintraub, Toward a History of Game Theory (London: Duke University Press, 1992); R. Duncan Luce and Howard Raiffa, Games and Decisions; Introduction and Critical Survey (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1957).

20. Poundstone, Prisoner’s Dilemma, 8.

21. Philip Mirowski, “Mid-Century Cyborg Agonistes: Economics Meets Operations Research,” Social Studies of Science 29 (1999): 694.

22. John McDonald, Strategy in Poker, Business & War (New York: W. W. Norton, 1950), 14, 69, 126.

23. Jessie Bernard, “The Theory of Games of Strategy as a Modern Sociology of Conflict,” American Journal of Sociology 59 (1954): 411-424.

Chapter 13. The Rationality of Irrationality

1. This is discussed in Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, 3rd ed. (London: Palgrave, 2005).

2. Colin Gray, Strategic Studies: A Critical Assessment (New York: The Greenwood Press, 1982).

3. R. J. Overy, “Air Power and the Origins of Deterrence Theory Before 1939,” Journal of Strategic Studies 15, no. 1 (March 1992): 73-101. See also George Quester, Deterrence Before Hiroshima (New York: Wiley, 1966).

4. Stanley Hoffmann, “The Acceptability of Military Force,” in Francois Duchene, ed., Force in Modern Societies: Its Place in International Politics (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1973), 6.

5. Glenn Snyder, Deterrence and Defense: Toward a Theory of National Security (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1961).

6. Herman Kahn, On Thermonuclear War (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1961), 126 ff. and 282 ff. It was originally going to be known as “Three Lectures on Thermonuclear War.”

7. Barry Bruce-Briggs, Supergenius: The Megaworlds of Herman Kahn (North American Policy Press, 2000), 97.

8. Ibid., 98. Noting the appalling style, Bruce-Briggs concludes that: “The artlessness imparts authenticity; were the author a hustler, he would have been slicker and ingratiating.”

9. Jonathan Stevenson, Thinking Beyond the Unthinkable (New York: Viking, 2008), 76.

10. http://www.nobelprize.Org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/2005/#.

11. Schelling’s major books were The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960); Arms and Influence (New York: Yale University Press, 1966); Choice and Consequence (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1984); and, with Morton Halperin, Strategy and Arms Control (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1961).

12. Robin Rider, “Operations Research and Game Theory,” in Roy Weintraub, ed., Toward a History of Game Theory (see chap. 12, n. 19).

13. Schelling, TheStrategyofConflict, 10.

14. Jean-Paul Carvalho, “An Interview with Thomas Schelling,” Oxonomics 2 (2007): 1-8.

15. Brodie, “Strategy as a Science,” 479 (see chap. 12, n. 7). One possible reason was the skepticism of Jacob Viner, professor of economics at Chicago and Brodie’s mentor. Viner’s 1946 essay on the implications of nuclear weapons was one of the foundation texts of the theory of deterrence and clearly influenced Brodie.

16. Bernard Brodie, “The American Scientific Strategists,” The Defense Technical Information Center (October 1964): 294.

17. Oskar Morgenstern, The Question of National Defense (New York : Random House, 1959).

18. Bruce-Briggs, Supergenius, 120-122; Irving Louis Horowitz, The War Game: Studies of the New Civilian Militarists (New York : Ballantine Books, 1963).

19. Cited in Bruce-Biggs, Supergenius, 120.

20. Schelling, in the Journal of Conflict Resolution, then edited by Kenneth Boulding, in 1957.

21. Carvalho, “An Interview with Thomas Schelling.”

22. Robert Ayson, Thomas Schelling and the Nuclear Age: Strategy as a Social Science (London: Frank Cass, 2004); Phil Williams, “Thomas Schelling,” in J. Baylis and J. Garnett, eds., Makers ofNuclearStrategy (London: Pinter, 1991), 120-135; A. Dixit, “Thomas Schelling’s Contributions to Game Theory,” Scandinavian Journal of Economics 108, no. 2 (2006): 213-229; Esther-Mirjam Sent, “Some Like It Cold: Thomas Schelling as a Cold Warrior,” Journal of Economic Methodology 14, no. 4 (2007): 455-471.

23. Schelling, TheStrategyofConflict, 15.

24. Schelling, ArmsandInfluence, 1.

25. Ibid., 2-3, 79-80, 82, 80.

26. Ibid., 194.

27. Schelling, Strategy of Conflict, 188 (emphasis in the original).

28. Schelling, ArmsandInfluence, 93.

29. Schelling, Strategy of Conflict, 193.

30. Dixit, “Thomas Schelling’s Contributions to Game Theory,” argues that many of Schelling’s formulations anticipate later developments in more formal game theory.

31. Schelling, Strategy ofConflict, 57, 77.

32. Schelling, ArmsandInfluence, 137.

33. Schelling, StrategyofConflict, 100-101.

34. Cited by Robert Ayson, Hedley Bull and the Accommodation of Power (London: Palgrave, 2012).

35. Wohlstetter was one of the most influential RAND analysts. See Robert Zarate and Henry Sokolski, eds., Nuclear Heuristics: Selected Writings of Albert and Roberta Wohlstetter (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2009).

36. Wohlstetter letter to Michael Howard, 1968, quoted in Stevenson, Thinking Beyond the Unthinkable, 71.

37. Bernard Brodie, TheReporter, November 18, 1954.

38. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 233. This essay on “Surprise Attack and Disarmament” first appeared in Klaus Knorr, ed., NATO and American Security (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1959).

39. Schelling, Strategy and Conflict, 236.

40. Donald Brennan, ed., Arms Control, Disarmament and National Security (New York: George Braziller, 1961); Hedley Bull, The Control of the Arms Race (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1961).

41. Schelling and Halperin, Strategy and Arms Control, 1-2.

42. Ibid., 5.

43. Schelling, Strategy of Conflict, 239-240.

44. Henry Kissinger, The Necessityfor Choice (New York: Harper & Row, 1961). This particular essay first appeared in Daedalus 89, no. 4 (1960). The first reference that I (and the OED) can find is an article by the English writer Wayland Young, an active proponent of disarmament, who referred to “the danger of what strategists call escalation, the danger that the size of the weapons used would mount up and up in retaliation until civilization is destroyed as surely as it would have been by an initial exchange of thermonuclear weapons.” In his glossary, we find the following: “Escalation- Escalator: The uncontrolled exchange of ever larger weapons in war, leading to the destruction of civilization.” Wayland Young, Strategyfor Survival: First Steps in Nuclear Disarmament (London: Penguin Books, 1959).

45. Schelling, Strategy of Conflict.

46. Schelling, ArmsandInfluence, 182.

47. Schelling, “Nuclear Strategy in the Berlin Crisis, ” Foreign Relations of the United States XIV, 170-172; Marc Trachtenberg, History and Strategy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991), 224.

48. I deal with this in my Kennedy’s Wars (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000).

49. Fred Kaplan, Wizards ofArmageddon (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991), 302.

50. Kaysen to Kennedy, September 22, 1961, Foreign Relations in the United States XIV-VI, supplement, Document 182.

51. Robert Kennedy, Thirteen Days: The Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962 (London: Macmillan, 1969), 69-71, 80, 89, 182.

52. Ernest May and Philip Zelikow, The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House During the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: W. W. Norton, 2002).

53. Albert and Roberta Wohlstetter, Controlling the Risks in Cuba, Adelphi Paper No. 17 (London ISS, February 1965).

54. Kahn, On Thermonuclear War, 226, 139.

55. Herman Kahn, On Escalation (London: Pall Mall Press, 1965).

56. Cited in Fred Ikle, “When the Fighting Has to Stop: The Arguments About Escalation,” World Politics 19, no. 4 (July 1967): 693.

57. McGeorge Bundy, “To Cap the Volcano,” Foreign Affairs 1 (October 1969): 1-20. See also McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival: Choices About the Bomb in the First Fifty Years (New York : Random House, 1988).

58. McGeorge Bundy, “The Bishops and the Bomb,” The New York Review, June 16, 1983. For a discussion of “existentialist” literature, see Lawrence Freedman, “I Exist; Therefore I Deter,” International Security 13, no. 1 (Summer 1988): 177-195.

Chapter 14. Guerrilla Warfare

1. Werner Hahlweg, “Clausewitz and Guerrilla Warfare,” Journal ofStrategic Studies 9, nos. 2 - 3 (1986): 127-133 ; Sebastian Kaempf, “Lost Through NonTranslation: Bringing Clausewitz’s Writings on ‘New Wars’ Back In,” Small Wars & Insurgencies 22, no. 4 (October 2011): 548-573.

2. Jomini, The Art of War, 34-35 (see chap. 7, n. 5).

3. Karl Marx, “Revolutionary Spain,” 1854, available at http://www.marxists. org/archive/marx/works/1854/revolutionary-spain/ch05.htm.

4. Vladimir Lenin, “Guerrilla Warfare,” originally published in proletary, No. 5, September 30, 1906, Lenin Collected Works (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1965), Vol. II, 213-223, available at archive/lenin/works/1906/gw/index.htm.

5. Leon Trotsky, “Guerrila-ism and the Regular Army,” The Military Writings of Leon Trotsky, Vol. 2, 1919, available at trotsky/1919/military/ch08.htm.

6. Leon Trotsky, “Do We Need Guerrillas?” The Military Writings of Leon Trotsky, Vol. 2, 1919, available at trotsky/1919/military/ch95.htm.

7. C. E. Callwell, Small Wars: Their Theory and Practice, reprint of the 1906 3rd edition (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1996).

8. T. E. Lawrence, “The Evolution of a Revolt,” in Malcolm Brown, ed., T. E. Lawrence in War & Peace: An Anthology of the Military Writings of Lawrence of Arabia (London: Greenhill Books, 2005), 260-273. It was first published in the Army Quarterly, October 1920. It forms the basis of Chapter 35 of The Seven Pillars of Wisdom (London: Castle Hill Press, 1997).

9. Basil Liddell Hart, Colonel Lawrence: The Man Behind the Legend (New York: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1934).

10. “T. E. Lawrence and Liddell Hart,” in Brian Holden Reid, Studies in British Military Thought: Debates with Fuller & Liddell Hart (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1998), 150-167.

11. Brantly Womack, “From Urban Radical to Rural Revolutionary: Mao from the 1920s to 1937,” in Timothy Cheek, ed., A Critical Introduction to Mao (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 61-86.

12. Jung Chang and Jon Halliday, Mao: The Unknown Story (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2005).

13. Andrew Bingham Kennedy, “Can the Weak Defeat the Strong? Mao’s Evolving Approach to Asymmetric Warfare in Yan’an,” China Quarterly 196 (December 2008): 884-899.

14. Most of the key texts—“Problems of Strategy in China’s Revolutionary War” (December 1936), “Problems of Strategy in Guerrilla War Against Japan” (May 1938), and “On Protracted War” (May 1938)—are found in Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung, Vol. II. “On Guerrilla War” is in Vol.VI. They can be found at index.htm.

15. Mao Tse-Tung, “On Protracted War.”

16. Beatrice Heuser, Reading Clausewitz (London: Pimlico, 2002), 138-139.

17. John Shy and Thomas W. Collier, “Revolutionary War,” in Paret, ed., Makers of Modern Strategy, p. 844 (see chap. 6, n. 2). On Maoist strategy, see also Edward L. Katzenback, Jr., and Gene Z. Hanrahan, “The Revolutionary Strategy of Mao Tse-Tung,” Political Science Quarterly 70, no. 3 (September 1955): 321-340. In “On Protracted War” he made the classic distinction between strategies of attrition and annihilation, which began with Delbrück, but Mao probably got it through Lenin (see below pp. 289).

18. Mao Tse-Tung, “Problems of Strategy in Guerrilla War Against Japan.”

19. Mao Tse-Tung, “On Protracted War.”

20. Mao Tse-Tung, “On Guerrilla War.”

21. “People’s War, People’s Army” (1961), in Russell Stetler, ed., The Military Art of People’s War: Selected Writings of General Vo Nguyen Giap (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1970), 104-106.

22. Graham Greene, The QuietAmerican (London: Penguin, 1969), 61. The contemporary importance of Greene’s critique of American naïveté in Vietnam and the debates this prompted comes over in Frederik Logevall, Embers of War: The Fall of an Empire and the Making of America’s Vietnam (New York: Random House, 2012). William J. Lederer and Eugene Burdick, The Ugly American (New York: Fawcett House, 1958), 233. Hillendale was not the “Ugly American” of the title. Cecil B. Currey, Edward Lansdale: The Unquiet American (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1988). Edward G. Lansdale, “Viet Nam: Do We Understand Revolution?” Foreign Affairs (October 1964), 75-86. For an appreciation of Lansdale, see Max Boot, Invisible Armies: An Epic History of Guerrilla Warfare from Ancient Times to the Present (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 2012), 409-414.

23. On counterinsurgency thinking and its development during the Kennedy administration, see Douglas Blaufarb, The Counterinsurgency Era: US Doctrine and Performance (New York: The Free Press, 1977); D. Michael Shafer, Deadly Paradigms: The Failure of US Counterinsurgency Policy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988); and Larry Cable, Conflict of Myths: The Development of American Counterinsurgency Doctrine and the Vietnam War (New York: New York University Press, 1986). Apart from some work undertaken on the stresses and strains in newly independent states in the third world, there was very little academic work on the requirements of a counterinsurgency strategy prior to President Kennedy’s embrace of the concept at the start of his administration. The early development of the doctrine within the administration is normally credited to Walt Rostow and Roger Hilsman. For the flavor of the doctrine, see W. W. Rostow, “Guerrilla Warfare in Underdeveloped Areas,” address to the graduating class at the U.S. Army Special Warfare School, Fort Bragg, June 1961. Reprinted in Marcus Raskin and Bernard Fall, The Viet-Nam Reader (New York: Vintage Books, 1965). See also Roger Hilsman, To Move a Nation: The Politics of Foreign Policy in the Administration of John F. Kennedy (New York : Dell, 1967).

24. Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency: Experiences in Malaya and Vietnam (London: Chatto & Windus, 1966).

25. Boot, InvisibleArmies, 386-387.

26. David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (Wesport, CT: Praeger, 1964).

27. Gregor Mathias, Galula in Algeria: Counterinsurgency Practice versus Theory (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger Security International, 2011).

28. M. L. R. Smith, “Guerrillas in the Mist: Reassessing Strategy and Low Intensity Warfare,” Review of International Studies 29, no. 1 (2003): 19-37; Alistair Horne, A Savage War of Peace: Algeria, 1954-1962 (London: Macmillan, 1977), 480-504.

29. Charles Maechling, Jr., “Insurgency and Counterinsurgency: The Role of Strategic Theory,” Parameters 14, no. 3 (Autumn 1984): 34. Shafer, Deadly Paradigms, 113.

30. Paul Kattenburg, The Vietnam Trauma in American Foreign Policy, 1945-75 (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1980), 111-112.

31. Blaufarb, The Counterinsurgency Era, 62-66.

32. Jeffery H. Michaels, “Managing Global Counterinsuregency: The Special Group (CI) 1962-1966,” Journal ofStrategicStudies 35, no. 1 (2012): 33-61.

33. See, for example, Alexander George et al., The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy, 1st edition (Boston: Little Brown, 1971). John Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of PostWar American Security Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), 243.

34. See in particular an address at University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, December 19, 1962, discussed at length in William Kaufmann, The McNamara Strategy (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), 138-147.

35. Schelling reported that the response was that “Schelling’s games demonstrate how unrealistic this Cuban crisis is.” Ghamari-Tabrizi, 213 (see chap. 12, n. 10).

36. William Bundy, cited in William Conrad Gibbons, The U.S. Governmentand the Vietnam War (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), Vol. II, p. 349.

37. The Pentagon Papers, Senator Gravel Edition: The Defense Department History of the U.S. Decision-Making on Vietnam, Vol. 3 (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), 212.

38. Gibbons, The U.S. GovernmentandtheVietnam War: 1961-1964, 254.

39. Ibid., 256-259. See Chapter 4 of Arms and Influence.

40. See Freedman, Kennedy’s Wars (see chap. 13, n. 48).

41. Fred Kaplan, The Wizards ofArmageddon (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), 332-336.

42. Arms and Influence, vii, 84, 85, 166, 171-172. Given this analysis, Pape “Coercive Air Power in the Vietnam War,” is unfair to Schelling in assuming that he would have advocated only attacks on civilian targets as part of Rolling Thunder.

43. Richard Betts, “Should Strategic Studies Survive?” World Politics 50, no. 1 (October 1997): 16.

44. Colin Gray, “What RAND Hath Wrought,” Foreign Policy 4 (Autumn 1971): 111-129; see also Stephen Peter Rosen, “Vietnam and the American Theory of Limited War,” International Security 7, no. 2 (Autumn 1982): 83-113.

45. Zellen, State ofDoom, 196-197 (see chap. 12, n. 5); Bernard Brodie, “Why Were We So (Strategically) Wrong?” Foreign Policy 4 (Autumn 1971): 151-162.

Chapter 15. Observation and Orientation

1. Beaufre’s two key works were published in French as Introduction à la Stratégie (1963) and Dissuasion et Stratégie (1964). Both were published with English translations by Major-General R. H. Barry in 1965 as Introduction to Strategy and Dissuasion and Strategy, respectively, by Faber & Faber in London. This quote comes from Introduction, p. 22. Beaufre is discussed in Beatrice Heuser, The Evolution of Strategy, 460-463. See Chapter 6, n. 4.

2. Bernard Brodie, “General André Beaufre on Strategy,” Survival 7 (August 1965): 208-210. For a more sympathetic review, at least of Beaufre’s thought if not his policy advocacy in France, see Edward A. Kolodziej, “French Strategy Emergent: General André Beaufre: A Critique,” World Politics 19, no. 3 (April 1967): 417-442. While he was unimpressed with Brodie’s complaint about “majestic concepts” that got in the way, he acknowledged that Beaufre ideas were often expressed too vaguely to be convincing.

3. There is no evidence of this, although he had been influenced by Clausewitz (there are regular references to “centers of gravity”) and Liddell Hart.

4. J. C. Wylie, Military Strategy: A General Theory of Power Control (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1989), first published in 1967. A biography is provided by John Hattendorf’s introduction.

5. Henry Eccles, Military Concepts and Philosophy (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1965). On Eccles see Scott A. Boorman, “Fundamentals of Strategy: The Legacy of Henry Eccles,” Naval War College Review 62, no. 2 (Spring 2009): 91-115.

6. Wylie, Military Strategy, 22.

7. On the importance of the distinction, see Lukas Milevski, “Revisiting J. C. Wylie’s Dichotomy of Strategy: The Effects of Sequential and Cumulative Patterns of Operations,” Journal of Strategic Studies 35, no. 2 (April 2012): 223-242. Twenty years after the first publication, Wylie believed that cumulative strategies were more important. Military Strategy, 1989 edition, p. 101.

8. His collected works can be found at Boyd-Papers.html. The key books on Boyd are Frans P. B. Osinga, Science, Strategy and War: The Strategic Theory of John Boyd (London : Routledge, 2007); Grant Hammond, The Mind of War, John Boyd andAmerican Security (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 2001); and Robert Coram, Boyd, The Fighter Pilot Who Changed the Art of War (Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 2002).

9. John R. Boyd, “Destruction and Creation,” September 3, 1976, available at pdf.

10. John Boyd, OrganicDesignfor Commandand Control, May 1987, p.16, available at

11. The theory was popularized by Edward Lorenz, a diligent meteorologist who discovered the “butterfly effect” while searching for a way to produce more accurate weather predictions. Minuscule changes in his initial input to mathematical calculations for weather predictions could have extraordinary and unpredictable effects on the outcomes. The butterfly effect comes from a 1972 paper by Lorenz to the American Association for the Advancement of Science entitled, “Predictability: Does the Flap of a Butterfly’s Wings in Brazil Set Off a Tornado in Texas?” For a history of chaos theory, see James Gleick, Chaos: Making a New Science (London: Cardinal, 1987). On complexity theory, see Murray Gell-Man, The Quark and the Jaguar: Adventures in the Simple and the Complex (London: Little, Brown & Co., 1994); Mitchell Waldrop, Complexity: The Emerging Science at the Edge of Order and Chaos (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1993). On the relationship between scientific theories and military thought, see Antoine Bousquet,

The Scientific Way of Warfare: Order and Chaos on the Battlefields of Modernity (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009); Robert Pellegrini, The Links Between Science, Philosophy, and Military Theory: Understanding the Past, Implications for the Future (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, August 1997),

12. Alan Beyerchen, “Clausewitz, Nonlinearity, and the Unpredictability of War,” International Security (Winter 1992/93); Barry D. Watts, Clausewitzian Friction and Future War, McNair Paper 52 (Washington, DC: National Defense University, Institute for Strategic Studies, October 1996).

13. John Boyd, Patterns of Conflict: A Discourse on Winning and Losing, unpublished, August 1987, 44, 128, available at

14. Patterns of Conflict, 79.

15. U.S. Department of Defense, FieldManual 100-5: Operations (Washington, DC: HQ Department of Army, 1976).

16. William S. Lind, “Some Doctrinal Questions for the United States Army,” Military Review 58 (March 1977).

17. U.S. Department of Defense, Field Manual 100-5: Operations (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1982), vol. 2-1; Huba Wass de Czege and L. D. Holder, “The New FM 100-5,” Military Review (July 1982).

18. Wass de Czege and Holder, “The New FM 100-5.”

19. Ibid.

20. Cited in Larry Cable, “Reinventing the Round Wheel: Insurgency, CounterInsurgency, and Peacekeeping Post Cold War,” Small Wars and Insurgencies 4 (Autumn 1993): 228-262.

21. U.S. Marine Corps, FMFM-1: Warfighting (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, 1989), 37.

22. Edward Luttwak, Pentagon and the Art of War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1985).

23. Edward Luttwak, Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987), 5. For a flavor, see Harry Kreisler’s conversation with Edward Luttwak in Conversations with History series, March 1987, available at luttwak-conO.html.

24. Luttwak, Strategy, 50.

25. Gregory Johnson, “Luttwak Takes a Bath,” Reason Papers 20 (1995): 121-124.

26. Jomini, The Art of War,69 (see chap. 7, n. 5). On the development of the concept of operational art, see Bruce W. Menning, “Operational Art’s Origins,” Military Review 77, no. 5 (September-October 1997): 32-47.

27. Jacob W. Kipp, “The Origins of Soviet Operational Art, 1917-1936” and David M. Glantz, “Soviet Operational Art Since 1936, The Triumph of Maneuver War,” in Michael D. Krause and R. Cody Phillips, eds., Historical Perspectives of the Operational Art (Washington, DC: United States Army Center of Military History, 2005); Condoleeza Rice, “The Making of Soviet Strategy,” in Peter Paret, ed., Makers of Modern Strategy, 648-676; William E. Odom, “Soviet Military Doctrine,” Foreign Affairs (Winter 1988/89): 114-134.

28. See also Eliot Cohen, “Strategic Paralysis: Social Scientists Make Bad Generals,” TheAmerican Spectator, November 1980.

29. He had also been given a prominent place in an essay by Gordon Craig in the remarkable 1943 collection, Makers of Modern Strategy. It was retained for the 1986 edition. Gordon A. Craig, “Delbrück: The Military Historian,” in Paret, ed., Makers of Modern Strategy. Delbrück’s Geschichte der Kriegskunst im Rahmen der Politischen Geschichte, 4 vols., 1900-1920 (a further three volumes in the series were completed by other writers by 1936), did not begin to appear in English until 1975: Hans Delbrück, trans. Walter J. Renfroe, Jr., History of the Art of War Within the Framework of Political History, 4 vols. (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1975-1985).

30. J. Boone Bartholomees, Jr., “The Issue of Attrition,” Parameters (Spring 2010): 6-9.

31. U.S. Marine Corps, FMFM-1: Warfighting, 28-29. See Craig A. Tucker, False Prophets: The Myth of Maneuver Warfare and the Inadequacies of FMFM-1 Warfighting (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1995), 11-12.

32. Charles C. Krulak, “The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War,” Marines Magazine, January 1999.

33. Michael Howard, “The Forgotten Dimensions of Strategy,” Foreign Affairs (Summer 1979), reprinted in Michael Howard, The Causes of Wars (London : Temple Smith, 1983). Gregory D. Foster, “A Conceptual Foundation for a Theory of Strategy,” The Washington Quarterly (Winter 1990): 43-59. David Jablonsky, Why Is Strategy Difficult? (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1992).

34. Stuart Kinross, Clausewitz and America: Strategic Thought and Practicefrom Vietnam to Iraq (London: Routledge, 2008), 124.

35. U.S. Department of Defense, FieldManual (FM) 100-5: Operations (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, 1986), 179-180.

36. U.S. Marine Corps, FMFM-1: Warfighting, 85.

37. Joseph L. Strange, “Centers of Gravity & Critical Vulnerabilities: Building on the Clausewitizan Foundation so that We Can All Speak the Same Language,” Perspectives on Warfighting 4, no. 2 (1996): 3; J. Strange and R. Iron, “Understanding Centres of Gravity and Critical Vulnerabilities,” research paper, 2001, available at usmc/cog2.pdf.

38. John A. Warden III, The Air Campaign: Planning for Combat (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1988), 9; idem, “The Enemy as a System,” AirpowerJournal 9, no. 1 (Spring 1995): 40-55; Howard D. Belote, “Paralyze or Pulverize? Liddell Hart, Clausewitz, and Their Influence on Air Power Theory,” Strategic Review 27 (Winter 1999): 40-45.

39. Jan L. Rueschhoff and Jonathan P. Dunne, “Centers of Gravity from the ‘Inside Out,’” Joint Forces Quarterly 60 (2011): 120-125. See also Antulio J. Echevarria II, “ ‘Reining in’ the Center of Gravity Concept,” Air & Space Power Journal (Summer 2003): 87-96.

40. Carter Malkasian, A History of Modern Wars of Attrition (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002), 5-6.

41. Ibid., 17.

42. Hew Strachan, “The Lost Meaning of Strategy,” Survival 47, no. 3 (Autumn 2005): 47.

43. Rolf Hobson, “Blitzkrieg, the Revolution in Military Affairs and Defense Intellectuals,” TheJournal ofStrategicStudies 33, no. 4 (2010): 625-643.

44. John Mearsheimer, “Maneuver, Mobile Defense, and the NATO Central Front,” International Security 6, no. 3 (Winter 1981-1982): 104-122.

45. Luttwak, Strategy, 8.

46. Boyd, PatternsofConflict, 122.

Chapter 16. The Revolution in Military Affairs

1. See Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh, The Gulf Conflict (London : Faber, 1992).

2. Reflected in title of a book by editors of U.S. News & World Report, Triumph Without Victory: The Unreported History of the Persian Gulf War (New York: Times Books, 1992).

3. See Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., “The Military-Technical Revolution: A Preliminary Assessment,” Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2002, 1, 3. In the introduction to this edition, Krepinevich provides more detail on Marshall’s role. See also Stephen Peter Rosen, “The Impact of the Office of Net Assessment on the American Military in the Matter of the Revolution in Military Affairs,” The Journal of Strategic Studies 33, no. 4 (2010): 469-482. See also Fred Kaplan, The Insurgents: David Petraeus and the Plot to Change the American Way of War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2013), 47-51.

4. Andrew W. Marshall, “Some Thoughts on Military Revolutions—Second Version,” ONA memorandum for record, August 23, 1993, 3-4. Cited in Barry D. Watts, The Maturing Revolution in Military Affairs (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2011).

5. A. W. Marshall, “Some Thoughts on Military Revolutions,” ONA memorandum for record, July 27, 1993, 1.

6. Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., “Cavalry to Computer: The Pattern of Military Revolutions,” The National Interest 37 (Fall 1994): 30.

7. Admiral William Owens, “The Emerging System of Systems,” US Naval Institute Proceedings, May 1995, 35-39.

8. For an analysis of the various theories, see Colin Gray, Strategyfor Chaos: Revolutions in Military Affairs and the Evidence of History (London: Frank Cass, 2002). Lawrence Freedman, The Revolution in StrategicAffairs, Adelphi Paper 318 (London: OUP for IISS, 1998).

9. Barry D. Watts, Clausewitzian Friction and Future War, McNair Paper 52 (Washington DC: NDU, 1996).

10. A. C. Bacevich, “Preserving the Well-Bred Horse,” The National Interest 37 (Fall 1994): 48.

11. Harlan Ullman and James Wade, Jr., Shock &Awe: Achieving Rapid Dominance (Washington, DC : National Defense University, 1996).

12. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-13, Joint Doctrine for Information Operations (Washington, DC: GPO, October 9, 1998), GL-7.

13. Arthur K. Cebrowski and John J. Garstka, “Network-Centric Warfare: Its Origin and Future,” US Naval Institute Proceedings, January 1998.

14. Department of Defense, Report to Congress, Network Centric Warfare, July 27, 2001, iv.

15. Andrew Mack, “Why Big Countries Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict,” World Politics 26, no. 1 (1975): 175-200.

16. Steven Metz and Douglas V. Johnson, Asymmetry and U.S. Military Strategy: Definition, Background, and Strategic Concepts (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2001).

17. Harry Summers, On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1982). The review was by Robert Komer, Survival 27 (March/April 1985): 94-95. See also Frank Leith Jones, Blowtorch: Robert Komer, Vietnam and American Cold War Strategy (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2013).

18. The distinction was developed in Department of Defense, Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1993). See Jonathan Stevenson, Thinking Beyond the Unthinkable, 517 (see chap. 13, n. 9).

19. Douglas Lovelace, Jr., The Evolution of Military Affairs: Shaping the Future U.S. Armed Forces (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1997); Jennifer M. Taw and Alan Vick, “From Sideshow to Center Stage: The Role of the Army and Air Force in Military Operations Other Than War,” in Zalmay M. Khalilzad and David A. Ochmanek, eds., Strategy and Defense Planning for the 21st Century (Santa Monica, CA: RAND & U.S. Air Force, 1997), 208-209.

20. Remarks by the President at the Citadel, Charleston, South Carolina, December 11, 2001. See also Donald Rumsfeld, “Transforming the Military,” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2002, 20-32.

21. Stephen Biddle, “Speed Kills? Reassessing the Role of Speed, Precision, and Situation Awareness in the Fall of Saddam,” Journal of Strategic Studies, 30, no. 1 (February 2007): 3-46.

22. Nigel Aylwin-Foster, “Changing the Army for Counterinsurgency Operations,” Military Review, November/December 2005, 5.

23. For example, Kalev Sepp’s critique of the American focus on killing insurgents rather than engaging the population and training local forces to be like the Americans in “Best Practices in Counterinsurgency,” Military Review, May-June 2005, 8-12. See Kaplan, The Insurgents, 104-107. Kaplan provides a thorough account of the shift in American military thinking over this period.

24. John A. Nagl, Counterinsurgency Lessonsfrom Malaya andVietnam: Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002). The title picked up on T. E. Lawrence’s aphorism.

25. David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One (London: Hurst & Co., 2009).

26. David H. Petraeus, “Learning Counterinsurgency: Observations from Soldiering in Iraq,” Military Review, January/February 2006, 2-12.

27. On the “surge,” see Bob Woodward, The War Within: A Secret White House History (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2008); Bing West, The Strongest Tribe: War, Politics, and the Endgame in Iraq (New York: Random House, 2008); Linda Robinson, Tell Me How This Ends: General David Petraeus and the Search for a Way Out of Iraq (New York: Public Affairs, 2008).

28. On the links with Boyd, see Frans Osinga, “On Boyd, Bin Laden, and Fourth Generation Warfare as String Theory,” in John Andreas Olson, ed., On New Wars (Oslo: Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, 2007), 168-197, available at Documents/OF_4_2007.pdf.

29. William S. Lind, Keith Nightengale, John F. Schmitt, Joseph W. Sutton, and Gary I. Wilson, “The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation,” Marine Corps Gazette, October 1989, 22-26; William Lind, “Understanding Fourth Generation War,” Military Review, September/ October 2004, 12-16. This reports the findings of a study group which he convened at his house.

30. Keegan, A History of Warfare and van Creveld, The Transformation of War, for both see Chapter 7, n. 14; Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World (London: Allen Lane, 2005); Mary Kaldor, New & Old Wars, Organized Violence in a Global Era (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999).

31. “The Evolution of War: The Fourth Generation of Warfare,” Marine Corps Gazette, September 1994. See also Thomas X. Hammes, “War Evolves into the Fourth Generation,” Contemporary Security Policy 26, no. 2 (August 2005): 212-218. This issue contains a number of critiques of the idea of fourth-generation warfare, including one by the author. This was republished as Aaron Karp, Regina Karp, and Terry Terriff, eds., Global Insurgency and the Future of Armed Conflict: Debating Fourth-Generation Warfare (London: Routledge, 2007). For a full account of Hammes’s ideas see his The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century (St. Paul, MN: Zenith Press, 2004); Tim Benbow, “Talking ‘Bout Our Generation? Assessing the Concept of ‘Fourth Generation Warfare’” Comparative Strategy, March 2008, 148-163 and Antulio J. Echevarria, Fourth Generation Warfare and Other Myths (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 2005).

32. Cited in Jason Vest, “Fourth-Generation Warfare,” AtlanticMagazine, December 2001.

33. William Lind et al., “The Changing Face of War,” The Marine Corps Gazette, October 1989, 22-26, available at TheChangingFaceofWar-onscreen.pdf.

34. Ralph Peters, “The New Warrior Class,” Parameters 24, no. 2 (Summer 1994): 20.

35. Joint Publication 3-13, Information Operations, March 13, 2006.

36. Nik Gowing, ‘Skyful of Lies’ and Black Swans: The New Tyranny of Shifting Information Power in Crises (Oxford, UK: Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism, 2009).

37. John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, “Cyberwar is Coming!” Comparative Strategy 12, no. 2 (Spring 1993): 141-165.

38. Steve Metz, Armed Conflict in the 21st Century: The Information Revolution and Post-Modern Warfare (April 2000): “Future war may see attacks via computer viruses, worms, logic bombs, and trojan horses rather than bullets, bombs, and missiles.”

39. Thomas Rid, Cyberwar Will Not Take Place (London: Hurst & Co., 2013). David Betz argues for the complexity of effect in “Cyberpower in Strategic Affairs: Neither Unthinkable nor Blessed,” The Journal of Strategic Studies 35, no. 5 (October 2012): 689-711.

40. John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, eds., Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001). The full text is available at For a summary of their arguments, see David Ronfeldt and John Arquilla, “Networks, Netwars, and the Fight for the Future,” First Monday 6, no. 10 (October 2001), available at

41. Jerrold M. Post, Keven G. Ruby, and Eric D. Shaw, “From Car Bombs to Logic Bombs: The Growing Threat from Information Terrorism,” Terrorism and Political Violence 12, no. 2 (Summer 2000): 102-103.

42. Norman Emery, Jason Werchan, and Donald G. Mowles, “Fighting Terrorism and Insurgency: Shaping the Information Environment,” Military Review, January/Febuary 2005, 32-38.

43. Robert H. Scales, Jr., “Culture-Centric Warfare,” The Naval Institute Proceedings, October 2004.

44. Montgonery McFate, “The Military Utility of Understanding Adversary Culture,” Joint Forces Quarterly 38 (July 2005): 42-48.

45. Max Boot, InvisibleArmies, 386 (see chap. 14, n. 22).

46. A useful guide to the academic debates on this issue is Alan Bloomfield, “Strategic Culture: Time to Move On,” Contemporary Security Policy 33, no. 3 (December 2012): 437-461.

47. Patrick Porter, Military Orientalism: Eastern War Through Western Eyes (London: Hurst & Co., 2009), 193.

48. David Kilcullen, “Twenty-Eight Articles: Fundamentals of Company-Level Counterinsurgency,” Military Review, May-June 2006, 105-107. This began as an e-mail that was widely distributed around the army.

49. Emile Simpson, Warfrom the Ground Up: Twenty-First-Century Combat as Politics (London: Hurst & Co., 2012), 233.

50. G. J. David and T. R. McKeldin III, Ideas as Weapons: Influence and Perception in Modern Warfare (Washington, DC : Potomac Books, 2009), 3. See in particular Timothy J. Doorey, “Waging an Effective Strategic Communications Campaign in the War on Terror,” and Frank Hoffman, “Maneuvering Against the Mind.”

51. Jeff Michaels, The Discourse Trap and the US Military: From the War on Terror to the Surge (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013). See also Frank J. Barrett and Theodore R. Sarbin, “The Rhetoric of Terror: ‘War’ as Misplaced Metaphor,” in John Arquilla and Douglas A. Borer, eds., Information Strategy and Warfare: A Guide to Theory and Practice (New York: Routledge, 2007): 16-33.

52. Hy S. Rothstein, “Strategy and Psychological Operations,” in Arquilla and Borer, 167.

53. Neville Bolt, The Violent Image: Insurgent Propaganda and the New Revolutionaries (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012).

54. Al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri wrote in July 2005: “We are in the midst of war, and more than half of that struggle takes place on an information battlefield; we are in an information war for the hearts and minds of all Muslims.” The text of the letter is available in English from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, at press_releases/20051011_release.htm.

55. Benedict Wilkinson, The Narrative Delusion: StrategicScripts and Violent Islamism in Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Yemen, unpublished doctoral thesis, King’s College London, 2013.

Chapter 17. The Myth of the Master Strategist

1. Colin S. Gray, Modern Strategy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 23-43.

2. Harry Yarger, Strategic Theoryfor the 21st Century: The Little Book on Big Strategy (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2006), 36, 66, 73-75.

3. Colin S. Gray, The Strategy Bridge: Theory for Practice (Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2010), 23.

4. Ibid., 49, 52. This was a reference to Albert Wohlstetter.

5. Yarger, Strategic Theoryfor the 21st Century, 75.

6. Robert Jervis, Systems Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life (Princeton, NJ : Princeton University Press, 1997).

7. Hugh Smith, “The Womb of War: Clausewitz and International Politics,” Review of International Studies 16 (1990): 39-58.

8. Eliot Cohen, Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, andLeadership in Wartime (New York: The Free Press, 2002).

Chapter 18. Marx and a Strategy for the Working Class

1. Mike Rapport, 1848: Year of Revolution (London: Little, Brown & Co. 2008), 17-18.

2. Sigmund Neumann and Mark von Hagen, “Engels and Marx on Revolution, War, and the Army in Society,” in Paret, ed., Makers of Modern Strategy, 262-280 (see chap. 6, n. 2); Bernard Semmell, Marxism and the Science of War (New York : Oxford University Press, 1981), 266.

3. This section comes from Part I, Feuerbach. “Opposition of the Materialist and Idealist Outlook,” The German Ideology, available at http://www.marxists. org/archive/marx/works/1845/german-ideology/ch01a.htm.

4. Azar Gat, “Clausewitz and the Marxists: Yet Another Look,” Journal of Contemporary History 27, no. 2 (April 1992): 363-382.

5. Rapport, 1848: Year of Revolution, 108.

6. Alan Gilbert, Marx’s Politics: Communists and Citizens (New York: Rutgers University Press, 1981), 134-135.

7. Engels, “Revolution in Paris,” February 27, 1848, available at http://www.

8. News from Paris, June 23, 1848, emphasis in original. Available at http://

9. Gilbert, Marx’s Politics, 140-142, 148-149.

10. Rapport, 1848: YearofRevolution, 212.

11. Engels, “Marx and the Neue Rheinische Zeitung,” March 13, 1884, available at

12. Rapport, 1848: YearofRevolution, 217.

13. Karl Marx, Class Struggles in France, 1848-1850, Partll, available at http://

14. Engels to Marx, December 3, 1851, available at archive/marx/works/1851/letters/51_12_03.htm#cite.

15. John Maguire, Marx’s Theory of Politics (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1978), 31.

16. Ibid., 197-198.

17. Manifesto of the Communist Party, February 1848, 75, available at http://www.

18. Engels, “The Campaign for the German Imperial Constitution,” 1850, available at imperial/intro.htm.

19. David McLellan, Karl Marx: His Life and Thought (New York: Harper & Row, 1973), 217.

20. Frederick Engels, “Conditions and Prospects of a War of the Holy Alliance Against France in 1852,” April 1851, available at archive/marx/works/1851/04/holy-alliance.htm.

21. Gerald Runkle, “Karl Marx and the American Civil War,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 6, no. 2 (January 1964): 117-141.

22. Engels to Joseph Weydemeyer, June 19, 1851, available at http://www.

23. Engels to Joseph Weydemeyer, April 12, 1853, available at http://www.

24. Sigmund Neumann and Mark von Hagen, “Engels and Marx on Revolution, War, and the Army in Society,” in Paret, ed., Makers of Modern Strategy, Semmell, Marxism and the Science of War, 266.

25. Engels had fought beside him in Baden. The story of Engels’s military adventures is found in Tristram Hunt, The Frock-Coated Communist: The Revolutionary Life of Friedrich Engels (London: Allan Lane, 2009), 174-181.

26. Gilbert, Marx’s Politics, 192.

27. Christine Lattek, Revolutionary Refugees: German Socialism in Britain, 18401860 (London: Routledge, 2006).

28. Marx to Engels, September 23, 1851, available at archive/marx/works/1851/letters/51_09_23.htm.

29. Engels to Marx, September 26, 1851, available at archive/marx/works/1851/letters/51_09_26.htm.

30. This was originally published as articles under Marx’s name in the New York Tribune and then brought together as a book under his own name, Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Germany. The quote is from p. 90. Available at

Chapter 19. Herzen and Bakunin

1. Isaiah Berlin’s influential assertion that Herzen had been neglected in the West first appeared in the New York Review of Books in 1968 and appeared as an introduction to Herzen’s diaries, My Past & Thoughts (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973). For a long time, the most substantial biography was E. H. Carr’s Romantic Exiles (Cambridge, UK: Penguin, 1949), from which Stoppard drew extensively. See also Edward Acton, Alexander Herzen and the Role of the Intellectual Revolutionary (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1979).

2. Tom Stoppard, “The Forgotten Revolutionary,” The Observer, June 2, 2002.

3. Tom Stoppard, The Coast of Utopia, Part II, Shipwreck (London: Faber & Faber, 2002), 18.

4. Anna Vanninskaya, “Tom Stoppard, the Coast of Utopia, and the Strange Death of the Liberal Intelligentsia,” Modern Intellectual History 4, no. 2 (2007): 353-365.

5. Tom Stoppard, The Coast of Utopia, Partlll, Salvage (London: Faber & Faber, 2002), 74-75.

6. Cited in Acton, Alexander Herzen and the Role of the Intellectual Revolutionary, 159.

7. Ibid., 171, 176; Herzen, My Past & Thoughts, 1309-1310.

8. Stoppard, Salvage, 7-8.

9. Engels, “The Program of the Blanquist Fugitives from the Paris Commune,” June 26, 1874, available at works/1874/06/26.htm.

10. Henry Eaton, “Marx and the Russians, ’’Journal of the History of Ideas 41, no. 1 (January/ March 1980): 89-112.

11. Cited in Mark Leier, Bakunin: A Biography (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2006), 119.

12. Herzen, My Past & Thoughts, 573.

13. Ibid., 571.

14. Aileen Kelly, Mikhail Bakunin: A Study in the Psychology and Politics of Utopianism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982). For a critique, see Robert M. Cutler, “Bakunin and the Psychobiographers: The Anarchist as Mythical and Historical Object,” KLIO (St. Petersburg), [Abstract of English original of article] in press [in Russian translation], available at http://www.

15. In his later confessions, cited by Peter Marshall, Demanding the Impossible: A History of Anarchism (London: Harper Perennial, 2008), 269.

16. Paul Thomas, Karl Marx and the Anarchists (London: Routledge, 1990), 261-262.

17. Marshall, DemandingtheImpossible, 244-245, 258-259.

18. Proudhon, quoted in K. Steven Vincent, Pierre-Joseph Proudhon and the Rise of French Republican Socialism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), 148.

19. Thomas, Marx and the Anarchists, 250.

20. Alvin W. Gouldner, “Marx’s Last Battle: Bakunin and the First International,” TheoryandSociety 11, no. 6 (November 1982): 861. Special issue in memory of Alvin W. Gouldner.

21. Cited in Hunt, The Frock-Coated Communist, 259 (see chap. 18, n. 25).

22. Leier, Bakunin: A Biography, 191; Paul McClaughlin, Bakunin: The Philosophical Basis of his Anarchism (New York: Algora Publishing, 2002).

23. Mikhail A. Bakunin, Statism andAnarchy (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 159.

24. Saul Newman, From Bakunin to Lacan: Anti-authoritarianism and the Dislocation of Power (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2001), 37.

25. Leier, Bakunin:ABiography, 194-195.

26. Ibid., 184, 210, 241-242.

27. Proudhon’s own War and Peace is extremely muddled, not least in its apparent glorification of war. A more literary inspiration for Tolstoy was Victor Hugo, whose Les Misérables demonstrated a way of writing about historical events.

28. Leier, Bakunin: A Biography, 196.

29. Carr, The Romantic Exiles.

30. Available at

31. Cited by Marshall, Demanding the Impossible, 346.

32. Carl Levy, “Errico Malatesta and Charismatic Leadership,” in Jan Willem Stutje, ed., Charismatic Leadership and Social Movements (New York: Berghan Books, 2012), 89-90. Levy suggests that Malatesta’s barnstorming around Italy from December 1919 to October 1920 meant that opportunities were missed to organize the workers.

33. Ibid., 94.

34. Joseph Conrad, Under Western Eyes (London: Everyman’s Library, 1991).

35. Joseph Conrad, The SecretAgent (London: Penguin, 2007).

36. Stanley G. Payne, The Spanish Civil War, the Soviet Union and Communism (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2004).

37. Levy, “Errico Malatesta,” 94.

Chapter 20. Revisionists and Vanguards

1. Engels, Introduction to Karl Marx’s the class struggles in France 1848 to 1850, March 6, 1895, available at archive/marx/works/1895/03/06.htm.

2. Engels to Kautsky, April 1, 1895, available at archive/marx/works/1895/letters/95_04_01.htm.

3. Engels, Reply to the Honorable Giovanni Bovio, Critica Sociale No. 4, February 16, 1892, available at works/1892/02/critica-sociale.htm.

4. Marx, Critique of the Gotha Programme, May 1875, available at https://www. McLellan, Karl Marx see Chapter 20, n. 19, 437.

5. Leszek Kolakowski, Main Currents of Marxism: The Founders, the Golden Age, the Breakdown (New York: Norton, 2005), 391.

6. Stephen Eric Bronner, “Karl Kautsky and the Twilight of Orthodoxy,” Political Theory 10, no. 4 (November 1982): 580-605.

7. Elzbieta Ettinger, Rosa Luxemburg: A Life (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1986), xii, 87.

8. Rosa Luxemburg, Reform or Revolution (London: Bookmarks Publications, 1989).

9. Rosa Luxembourg, The Mass Strike, the Political Party, and the Trade Unions, 1906, available at strike/index.htm.

10. Engels, “The Bakuninists at Work: An Account of the Spanish Revolt in the Summer of 1873,” September/October 1873, available at http://www.

11. Rosa Luxemburg, The Mass Strike.

12. Leon Trotsky, My Life: The Rise and Fall of a Dictator (London: T. Butterworth, 1930).

13. Karl Kautsky, “The Mass Strike,” 1910, cited in Stephen D’Arcy, “Strategy, Meta-strategy and Anti-capitalist Activism: Rethinking Leninism by Re-reading Lenin,” Socialist Studies: The Journal of the Society for Socialist Studies 5, no. 2 (2009): 64-89.

14. Lenin, “The Historical Meaning of the Inner-Party Struggle,” 1910, available at

15. Vladimir Lenin, What Is to Be Done?, 35, available at http://www.marxists. org/archive/lenin/works/1901/witbd/index.htm.

16. Nadezhda Krupskaya, MemoriesofLenin (London: Lawrence, 1930), 1: 102103, citing One Step Forward, Two Steps Back.

17. Beryl Williams, Lenin (Harlow, Essex: Pearson Education, 2000), 46.

18. Hew Strachan, The First World War, Volume One: To Arms (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 113.

19. Robert Service, Comrades: A World History of Communism (London: Macmillan, 2007), 1427, 1448.

Chapter 21. Bureaucrats, Democrats, and Elites

1. At the same time, Mauss also records Durkheim’s concern that his students’ interest in Marxism was leading them away from liberalism, his distrust of the “shallow philosophy of the radicals,” and his “reluctance to submit himself to party discipline.” Marcel Mauss’s preface to Emile Durkheim, Socialism (New York: Collier Books, 1958).

2. David Beetham, “Mosca, Pareto, and Weber: A Historical Comparison,” in Wolfgang Mommsen and Jurgen Osterhammel, eds., Max Weber and His Contemporaries (London: Allen & Unwin, 1987), 140-141.

3. See Joachim Radkau, Max Weber: A Biography (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2009).

4. Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, translated by Henderson and Parsons (New York: The Free Press, 1947), 337.

5. Peter Lassman, “The Rule of Man over Man: Politics, Power and Legitimacy,” in Stephen Turner, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Weber (Cambridge,

UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 84-88.

6. Sheldon Wolin, “Legitimation, Method, and the Politics of Theory,” Political Theory 9, no. 3 (August 1981): 405.

7. Radkau, Max Weber, 487.

8. Ibid., 488.

9. Nicholas Gane, Max Weber and Postmodern Theory: Rationalisation versus Re-enchantment (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 60.

10. Max Weber, “Science as a Vocation,” available at

11. Radkau, Max Weber, 463.

12. Wolfgang Mommsen, Max WeberandGerman Politics, 1890-1920, translated by Michael Steinberg (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), 310.

13. Ibid., 296.

14. Max Weber, “Politics as Vocation,” available at wp-content/uploads/2011/12/Weber-Politics-as-a-Vocation.pdf.

15. Reinhard Bendix and Guenther Roth, Scholarship and Partisanship: Essays on Max Weber (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), 28-29.

16. Isaiah Berlin, “Tolstoy and Enlightenment,” in Harold Bloom, ed., Leo Tolstoy (New York: Chelsea Books, 2003), 30-31.

17. Philosophers of Peace and War, see Chapter 8, n. 6, 129.

18. Rosamund Bartlett, Tolstoy: A Russian Life (London: Profile Books, 2010), 309.

19. Leo Tolstoy, The Kingdom of God and Peace Essays (The World’s Classics), 347-348. Cited by Gallie, Philosophers of Peace, 122.

20. The essay appears as the introduction to Lyof N. Tolstoi, What to Do? Thoughts Evoked by the Census of Moscow, translated by Isabel F. Hapgood (New York: Thomas Y Cromwell, 1887).

21. Ibid., 1.

22. Ibid., 4-5, 10.

23. Ibid., 77-78.

24. Mikhail A. Bakunin, Bakunin on Anarchy (New York: Knopf, 1972).

25. Jane Addams, Twenty Years at Hull House (New York: Macmillan, 1910).

26. Ibid., 56.

27. Jan C. Behrends, “Visions of Civility: Lev Tolstoy and Jane Addams on the Urban Condition in Fin de Siècle Moscow and Chicago,” European Review of History: Revue Européenne d’Histoire 18, no. 3 (June 2011): 335-357.

28. Martin, The Chicago School of Sociology: Institutionalization, Diversity and the Rise of Sociological Research (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), 13-14.

29. Lincoln Steffens, The Shame of the Cities (New York: Peter Smith, 1948, first published 1904), 234.

30. Lawrence A. Schaff, Max Weber in America (Princeton, NJ : Princeton University Press, 2011), 41-43.

31. Ibid., 45. Schaff suggests that the descriptions of violence may have been overdrawn.

32. Ibid., 43-44.

33. James Weber Linn, Jane Addams: A Biography (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2000), 196.

34. Addams, Twenty Years at Hull House, 171-172. Her approach is set out in Jane Addams, “A Function of the Social Settlement” in Louis Menand, ed., Pragmatism: A Reader (New York: Vintage Books, 1997), 273-286.

35. Ibid., 98-99.

36. Lear was also Tolstoy’s favorite Shakespeare play. The king’s character at the end of the play was “English literature’s nearest equivalent to the holy fool (yurodivy)—that peculiarly Russian form of sainthood to which Tolstoy aspired, and which is not encountered in any other religious culture.” Bartlett, Tolstoy, 332.

37. Jane Addams, “A Modern Lear.” This 1896 speech was not published until 1912. Available at lear_10003b.htm.

38. Jean Bethke Elshtain, Jane Addams and the Dream ofAmerican Democracy (New York: Basic Books, 2002), 202, 218-219.

39. The quality of the Hull House research has led to suggestions that were it not for the misogynist male sociologists at the University of Chicago, Addams and her colleagues would be properly appreciated as important figures in the history of American sociology. Mary Jo Deegan, Jane Addams and the Men of the Chicago School (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1988).

40. Don Martindale, “American Sociology Before World War II,” Annual Review of Sociology 2 (1976): 121; Anthony J. Cortese, “The Rise,

Hegemony, and Decline of the Chicago School of Sociology, 1892—1945,” The Social Science Journal, July 1995, 235; Fred H. Matthews, Questfor an American Sociology: Robert E. Park and the Chicago School (Montreal: McGill Queens University Press, 1977), 10; Martin Bulmer, The Chicago School of Sociology.

41. Small, cited by Lawrence J. Engel, “Saul D. Alinsky and the Chicago School,” TheJournal ofSpeculative Philosophy 16, no. 1 (2002): 50-66. In addition to a mass of case studies in its neighborhood, the university had the added advantage of John D. Rockefeller’s generous endowment, a free intellectual atmosphere, and a lack of the social elitism and discrimination associated with the Ivy League universities.

42. Albion Small, “Scholarship and Social Agitation,” AmericanJournal of Sociology 1 (1895-1896): 581-582, 605.

43. Robert Westbrook, “The Making of a Democratic Philosopher: The Intellectual Development of John Dewey,” in Molly Cochran, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Dewey (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 13-33.

44. Among the most important titles are Democracy and Education (New York: Macmillan, 1916); Human Nature and Conduct (New York: Henry Holt, 1922); Experience and Nature (New York: Norton, 1929); The Quest for Certainty (New York: Minton, 1929); Logic: The Theory of Inquiry (New York: Henry Holt, 1938).

45. Small, “Scholarship and Social Agitation,” 362, 237.

46. Andrew Feffer, The Chicago Pragmatists and American Progressivism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993), 168.

47. Ibid., 237.

48. William James, “Pragmatism,” in Louis Menand, ed., Pragmatism, 98.

49. Louis Menand, The Metaphysical Club (London: HarperCollins, 2001), 353-354.

50. Ibid., 350.

51. Dewey came “perilously close to reconciling desire with deed.” John Patrick Duggan, The Promise of Pragmatism: Modernism and the Crisis of Knowledge and Authority (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 48.

52. Dewey, Human Nature and Conflict, 230.

53. Menand, TheMetaphysical Club, 374.

54. Robert K. Merton, “The Unanticipated Consequences of Purposive Social Action,” American Sociological Review 1, no. 6 (December 1936): 894-904.

Chapter 22. Formulas, Myths, and Propaganda

1. H. Stuart Hughes, Consciousness andSociety: The Reorientation of European Social Thought (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1958).

2. Robert Michels, Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy (New York: The Free Press, 1962), 46. First published in 1900.

3. Wolfgang Mommsen, “Robert Michels and Max Weber: Moral Conviction versus the Politics of Responsibility,” in Wolfgang and Jurgen Osterhammel, 126.

4. Michels, Political Parties, 338.

5. Gaetano Mosca, The Ruling Class (New York: McGraw Hill, 1939), 50. First published in 1900.

6. Ibid., 451.

7. David Beetham, “Mosca, Pareto, and Weber: A Historical Comparison,” in Wolfgang Mommsen and Jurgen Osterhammel, eds., Max Weber and His Contemporaries (London: Allen & Unwin, 1987), 139-158.

8. Vilfredo Pareto, The Mind and Society, edited by Arthur Livingston, 4 volumes (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1935).

9. Geraint Parry, Political Elites (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1969).

10. Gustave Le Bon, The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1896), 13, available at public/BonCrow.html.

11. Hughes, Consciousness and Society, 161.

12. Irving Louis Horowitz, Radicalism and the Revolt Against Reason: The Social Theories of George Sorel (Abingdon: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 2009). He notes, however, Sorel’s “poverty of formal organization... indiscriminate shifting of the basis of an argument from fact to hypothesis to free speculation... tendentious style” (p. 9).

13. Jeremy Jennings, ed., Sorel: Reflections on Violence (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999), viii. First published 1906 in Le Mouvement Sociale.

14. Antonio Gramsci, The Modern Prince & Other Writings (New York: International Publishers, 1957), 143.

15. Thomas R. Bates, “Gramsci and the Theory of Hegemony,” Journal of the History of Ideas 36, no. 2 (April-June 1975): 352.

16. Joseph Femia, “Hegemony and Consciousness in the Thought of Antonio Gramsci,” Political Studies 23, no. 1 (1975): 37.

17. Ibid., 33.

18. Gramsci, The Modern Prince, 137.

19. Walter L. Adamson, Hegemony and Revolution: A Study of Antonio Gramsci’s Political and Cultural Thought (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), 223, 209.

20. Ibid., 223.

21. T. K. Jackson Lears, “The Concept of Cultural Hegemony: Problems and Possibilities,” TheAmerican Historical Review 90, no. 1 (June 1985): 578.

22. Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf, vol. I, ch. X. First published in 1925.

23. James Burnham, The Managerial Revolution (London: Putnam, 1941). See also Kevin J. Smant, How Great the Triumph:James Burnham, Anti-Communism, and the Conservative Movement (New York: University Press of America, 1991).

24. Bruno Rizzi, The Bureaucratization of the World, translated by Adam Westoby (New York: The Free Press, 1985).

25. Ibid., 223-225, 269.

26. See, for example, C. Wright Mills, “A Marx for the Managers,” in Irving Horowitz, ed., Power, Politics and People: The Collected Essays of C. Wright Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), 53-71. George Orwell voiced many misgivings, noting Burnham’s earlier presumption of German victory in the war, yet he nonetheless used Burnham’s geopolitical analysis, predicting a world divided into three strategic centers for world control, each similar to the other yet engaged in a constant struggle, as the basis for his dystopian novel, 1984. As always, Orwell’s analysis makes for fascinating reading. See his “James Burnham and the Managerial Revolution,” New English Weekly, May 1946, available at work/essays/burnham.html.

27. This was not fully published in English until 1972, although it was reflected in other writings of Park.

28. Stuart Ewen, PR! A Social History of Spin (New York: Basic Books, 1996), 69.

29. Ibid., 68.

30. Robert Park, the Mass and the Public, and Other Essays (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1972), 80. First published in 1904.

31. Cited by Ewen, PR!, 48.

32. Ronald Steel, Walter Lippmann and the American Century (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1999).

33. W. I. Thomas and Dorothy Swaine Thomas, The Child in America: Behavior Problems and Programs (New York: Knopf, 1928). Robert Merton, who turned Thomas’s aphorism into a theorem, described it as “probably the single most consequential sentence ever put in print by an American sociologist.” “Social Knowledge and Public Policy,” in Sociological Ambivalence (New York: Free Press, 1976), 174. See also Robert Merton, “The Thomas Theorem and the Matthew Effect,” Social Forces 74, no. 2 (December 1995): 379-424.

34. Walter Lippmann, Public Opinion (New York: Harcourt Brace & Co, 1922), 59, available at html.

35. Michael Schudson, “The ‘Lippmann-Dewey Debate’ and the Invention of Walter Lippmann as an Anti-Democrat 1986-1996,” International Journal of Communication 2 (2008): 140.

36. Harold D. Lasswell, “The Theory of Political Propaganda,” The American Political Science Review 21, no. 3 (August 1927): 627-631.

37. Sigmund Freud, Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego (London: The Hogarth Press, 1949). First published 1922, available at stream/grouppsychologya00freu/grouppsychologya00freu_djvu.txt.

38. Wilfred Trotter, Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War (New York: Macmillan, 1916); Harvey C. Greisman, “Herd Instinct and the Foundations of Biosociology,” Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences 15 (1979): 357-369.

39. Edward Bernays, Crystallizing Public Opinion (New York: Liveright, 1923), 35.

40. Edward Bernays, Propaganda (New York : H. Liveright, 1936), 71.

41. The title of a 1947 article, Edward L. Bernays, “The Engineering of Consent,” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 250 (1947): 113.

42. There remains debate about whether or not this really made a difference to women’s smoking habits. See Larry Tye, The Father of Spin: Edward L. Bernays and the Birth of Public Relations (New York: Holt, 1998), 27-35.

43. “Are We Victims of Propaganda? A Debate. Everett Dean Martin and Edward L. Bernays,” Forum Magazine, March 1929.

Chapter 23. The Power of Nonviolence

1. Laura E. Nym Mayhall, The Militant Suffrage Movement: Citizenship and Resistance in Britain, 1860-1930 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 45, 79, 107, 115.

2. Donna M. Kowal, “One Cause, Two Paths: Militant vs. Adjustive Strategies in the British and American Women’s Suffrage Movements,” Communication Quarterly 48, no. 3 (2000): 240-255.

3. Henry David Thoreau, Civil Disobedience, originally published as Resistance to Civil Government (1849). Available at

4. Writing in 1942 “To American Friends,” he wrote how, “You have given me a teacher in Thoreau, who furnished me through his essay on the ‘Duty of Civil Disobedience’ scientific confirmation of what I was doing in South Africa.” For evidence on Thoreau’s influence, see George Hendrick, “The Influence of Thoreau’s ‘Civil Disobedience’ on Gandhi’s Satyagraha,” The New England Quarterly 29, no. 4 (December 1956): 462-471.

5. Leo Tolstoy, A Letter to a Hindu, introduction by M. K. Gandhi (1909), available at

6. These paragraphs draw on Judith M. Brown, “Gandhi and Civil Resistance in India, 1917—47: Key Issues,” in Adam Roberts and Timothy Garton Ash, eds., Civil Resistance & Power Politics: The Experience of Non-Violent Action from Gandhi to the Present (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 43-57.

7. Sean Scalmer, Gandhi in the West: The Mahatma and the Rise of Radical Protest (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 54, 57.

8. “To the American Negro: A Message from Mahatma Gandhi,” The Crisis, July 1929, 225.

9. Vijay Prashad, “Black Gandhi,” Social Scientist 37, no. 1/2 (January/February 2009): 4-7, 45.

10. Leonard A. Gordon, “Mahatma Gandhi’s Dialogues with Americans,” Economic and Political Weekly 37, no. 4 (January-February 2002): 337-352.

11. Joseph Kip Kosek, “Richard Gregg, Mohandas Gandhi, and the Strategy of Nonviolence,” The Journal of American History 91, no. 4 (March 2005): 1318-1348. Gregg published a number of books on nonviolence. The most influential was The Power of Non-Violence (London: James Clarke & Co., 1960). First published in 1934.

12. Reinhold Neibuhr, Moral Man and Immoral Society (New York: Scribner, 1934).

13. Described in James Farmer, Lay Bare the Arms: An Autobiography of the Civil Rights Movement (New York: Arbor House, 1985), 106-107.

14. On Muste’s conversion from Marxism to Christian Pacifism, see Chapter 9 of Ira Chernus, American Nonviolence: The History of an Idea (New York: Orbis, 2004). Both Gregg and Niebuhr were members of FOR, although the latter’s intellectual journey led him to leave.

15. August Meierand and Elliott Rudwick, CORE: A Study in the Civil Rights Movement, 1942-1968 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973), 102-103.

16. Ibid., 111.

17. Krishnalal Shridharani, War Without Violence: A Study of Gandhi’s Method and Its Accomplishments (New York: Harcourt Brace & Co., 1939). See James Farmer, Lay Bare the Heart: An Autobiography of the Civil Rights Movement (New York: Arbor Books, 1985), 93-95, 112-113.

18. Paula F. Pfeffer, A. Philip Randolph. Pioneer of the Civil Rights Movement (Baton Rouge : Louisiana State University Press, 1990).

19. Jervis Anderson, Bayard Rustin: Troubles I’ve Seen (NewYork: HarperCollins, 1997), 17.

20. Adam Fairclough, “The Preachers and the People: The Origins and Early Years of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, 1955-1959,” The Journal of Southern History 52, no. 3 (August 1986), 403-440.

21. In his history of the movement, Garrow notes the comparison to Gandhi being made by a sympathetic white lady in a letter to a newspaper. David Garrow, Bearing the Cross: Martin Luther KingJr. and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, 1955-1968 (New York: W. Morrow, 1986), 28.

22. Ibid., 43. Bo Wirmark, “Nonviolent Methods and the American Civil Rights Movement 1955-1965,” Journal of Peace Research 11, no. 2 (1974): 115-132; Akinyele Umoja, “1964: The Beginning of the End of Nonviolence in the Mississippi Freedom Movement,” Radical History Review 85 (Winter 2003): 201-226.

23. Scalmer, Gandhi in the West, 180.

24. The books referred to by King were: M. K. Gandhi, An Autobiography; or, The Story of My Experiments with Truth, translated by Mahadev Desai (Ahmedabad: Navajivan Publishing House, 1927); Louis Fischer, The Life of Mahatma Gandhi (London: Jonathan Cape, 1951); Henry David Thoreau, “Civil Disobedience,” 1849; Walter Rauschenbusch, Christianity and the Social Crisis (New York: Macmillan Press, 1908); Richard B. Gregg, The Power ofNon- Violence; Ira Chernus, American Nonviolence: The History of an Idea (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2004), 169-171. See James P. Hanigan, Martin Luther King, Jr. and the Foundations of Nonviolence (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1984), 1-18.

25. Taylor Branch, Parting the Waters. America in the King Years, 1954-63 (New York: Touchstone, 1988), 55.

26. Martin Luther King, “Our Struggle,” Liberation, April 1956, available at OurStruggle.pdf.

27. Branch, Parting the Waters, 195.

28. Garrow, Bearing the Cross: Martin Luther KingJr. and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, 1955-1968, 111. One example: Gregg had written of the nonviolent resister: “Toward his opponent he is not aggressive physically, but his mind and emotions are active, wrestling constantly with the problem of persuading the latter that he is mistaken.” King wrote: “For while the nonviolent resister is passive in the sense that he is not physically aggressive toward his opponent, his mind and emotions are always active, constantly seeking to persuade his opponent that he is wrong.” Martin Luther King, Jr., “Pilgrimage to Nonviolence,” in Stride Toward Freedom: The Montgomery Story (New York: Harper & Bros., 1958), 102; Gregg, The Power of Non-Violence, 93.

29. Daniel Levine, Bayard Rustin and the Civil Rights Movement (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2000), 95.

30. Cited by Anderson, Bayard Rustin, 192.

31. Aldon Morris, “Black Southern Student Sit-in Movement: An Analysis of Internal Organization,” American Sociological Review 46, no. 6 (December 1981): 744-767.

32. For a balanced assessment of the relationship between Baker and King, see Barbara Ransby, Ella Baker and the Black Freedom Movement: A Radical Democratic Vision (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003), 189-192.

33. Alan Fairclough, “The Preachers and the People,” 424.

34. Morris, “Black Southern Student Sit-In Movement,” 755.

35. Doug McAdam, “Tactical Innovation and the Pace of Insurgency,” American Sociological Review 48, no. 6 (December 1983): 748.

36. Bayard Rustin, Strategiesfor Freedom: The Changing Patterns of Black Protest (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976), 24.

37. Aldon D. Morris, “Birmingham Confrontation Reconsidered: An Analysis of the Dynamics and Tactics of Mobilization,” American Sociological Review 58, no. 5 (October 1993): 621-636.

38. Letterfrom BirminghamJail, April 16, 1963, available at annotated_letter_from_birmingham/

39. Rustin, Strategiesfor Freedom, 45.

40. Quoted in Branch, Parting the Waters, 775.

41. Martin Luther King, Jr., Why We Can’t Wait (New York: New American Library, 1963), 104-105; Douglas McAdam, Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency 1930-1970 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983); David J. Garrow, Protest at Selma: Martin Luther King,Jr. and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1978); Branch, Parting the Waters; Thomas Brooks, Walls Come Tumbling Down: A History of the Civil Rights Movement (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice- Hall, 1974).

Chapter 24. Existential Strategy

1. Tom Hayden, Reunion: A Memoir (New York : Collier, 1989), 87. For a history of SDS, see Kirkpatrick Sale, The Rise and Development of the Students for a Democratic Society (New York: Vintage Books, 1973).

2. Todd Gitlin, The Sixties: Years of Hope, Days of Rage (New York: Bantam Books, 1993), 286.

3. William H. Whyte, The Organization Man (Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2002). First published 1956.

4. David Riesman, The Lonely Crowd (New York: Anchor Books, 1950).

5. Erich Fromm, The Fear of Freedom (London: Routledge, 1942).

6. Theodore Roszak, The Making of a Counter-Culture (London: Faber & Faber, 1970), 10-11.

7. See Jean-Paul Sartre, Being andNothingness: An Essay in Phenomenological Ontology (New York: Citadel Press, 2001), first published in 1943; Existentialism and Humanism (London : Methuen, 2007), first published in 1946.

8. Albert Camus, The Plague (New York: Vintage Books, 1961). First published in 1949.

9. The ambiguity toward Mills is evident in Irving Horowitz, C. Wright Mills: An American Utopian (New York: The Free Press, 1983). This is explored in John H. Summers, “The Epigone’s Embrace: Irving Louis Horowitz on C. Wright Mills,” Minnesota Review 68 (Spring 2007): 107-124.

10. C. Wright Mills, Sociology and Pragmatism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969), 423. Published posthumously.

11. In Listen Yankee (New York : Ballantine, 1960), he defended the Cuban Revolution in the imagined words of a Cuban revolutionary.

12. Robert Dahl, Who Governs: Democracy and Power in an American City (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1962).

13. David Baldwin, “Power Analysis and World Politics: New Trends versus Old Tendencies,” World Politics 31, no. 2 (January 1979): 161-194. He is drawing here on Klaus Knorr, The Power of Nations: The Political Economy of International Relations (New York: Basic Books, 1975).

14. Robert Dahl, “The Concept of Power,” Behavioral Science 2 (1957): 201-215.

15. Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, “Two Faces of Power,” The American Political Science Review 56, no. 4 (December 1962): 947-952. Also see Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, “Decisions and Non-Decisions: An Analytical Framework,” The American Political Science Review 57, no. 3 (September 1963): 632-642.

16. C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1956).

17. Theodore Roszak, The Making of Counter-Culture, 25.

18. C. Wright Mills, The Sociological Imagination (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959).

19. Tom Hayden and Dick Flacks, “The Port Huron Statement at 40,” The Nation, July 18, 2002. The statement was produced as a mimeographed pamphlet in 20,000 copies and sold for 35 cents. Note the use of the word rebels.

20. Hayden, Reunion: A Memoir, 80. On the impact of Mills, seeJohn Summers, “The Epigone’s Embrace: Part II, C. Wright Mills and the New Left,” Left History 13.2 (Fall/Winter 2008).

21. The Port Huron Manifesto can be found at http://coursesa.matrix.msu. edu/~hst306/documents/huron.html.

22. Hayden, Reunion: A Memoir, 75.

23. Port Huron Manifesto.

24. Richard Flacks, “Some Problems, Issues, Proposals,” July 1965, reprinted in Paul Jacobs and Saul Landau, The New Radicals (New York: Vintage Books, 1966), 167-169.

25. Tom Hayden and Carl Wittman, “Summer Report, Newark Community Union, 1964,” in Massimio Teodori, The New Left: A Documentary History (London: Jonathan Cape, 1970), 133.

26. Tom Hayden, “The Politics of the Movement,” Dissent, Jan/Feb 1966, 208

27. Tom Hayden, “Up from Irrelevance,” Studies on the Left, Spring 1965.

28. Francesca Polletta, “Freedom Is an Endless Meeting”: Democracy in American Social Movements (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002).

29. Lawrence J. Engel, “Saul D. Alinsky and the Chicago School,” TheJournal of Speculative Philosophy 16, no. 1 (2002).

30. Robert Park, “The City: Suggestions for the Investigation of Human Behavior in the City Environment,” The American Journal of Sociology 20, no. 5 (March 1915): 577-612.

31. Engel, “Saul D. Alinsky and the Chicago School,” 54-57. One of Burgess’s courses taken by Alinsky was on the “pathological conditions and processes in modern society,” which included “alcoholism, prostitution, poverty, vagrancy, juvenile and adult delinquency.” This would be done through “inspection trips, survey assignments, and attendance at clinics.”

32. He got to know Capone’s number two, Frank Nitti, and through him the mob’s operations, from “gin mills and whorehouses and bookie joints to the legitimate businesses they were beginning to take over.” Given that they had much of the local political class and police force in their pockets, he argued that there was not much he could do with the information he gathered. As he later noted, “the only real opposition to the mob came from other gangsters, like Bugs Moran or Roger Touhy.” He claimed to have learned “a hell of a lot about the uses and abuses of power from the mob, lessons that stood me in good stead later on, when I was organizing.” “Empowering People, Not Elites,” interview with Saul Alinsky, Playboy Magazine, March 1972.

33. Engel, “Saul D. Alinsky and the Chicago School,” 60.

34. “Empowering People, Not Elites,” interview with Saul Alinsky.

35. Saul D. Alinsky, “Community Analysis and Organization,” TheAmerican Journal of Sociology 46, no. 6 (May 1941): 797-808.

36. Sanford D. Horwitt, “Let Them Call Me Rebel”: Saul Alinsky, His Life and Legacy (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1989), 39.

37. Saul D. Alinsky, John Lewis: An UnauthorizedBiography (New York: Vintage Books, 1970), 104, 219.

38. Saul D. Alinsky, Reveillefor Radicals (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1946), 22.

39. Horwitt, “Let Them Call Me Rebel,” 174.

40. Charles Silberman, Crisis in Black and White (New York: Random House, 1964), 335.

41. “This did not work out,” he recorded in a notebook. See Horwitt, “Let Them Call Me Rebel,” 530.

42. Nicholas von Hoffman, Radical: A Portrait of Saul Alinsky (New York: Nation Books, 2010), 75, 36.

43. The two rival organizations had reunited in 1955.

44. El Malcriado, no. 14, July 9, 1965, cited by Marshall Ganz, Why David Sometimes Wins: Leadership, Organization and Strategy in the California Farm Worker Movement (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 93.

45. Randy Shaw, Beyond the Fields: Cesar Chavez, the UFW, and the Strugglefor Justice in the 21st Century (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2009), 87-91.

46. Von Hoffman, Radical, 163.

47. Ganz, WhyDavidSometimes Wins.

48. Miriam Pawel, The Union ofTheir Dreams: Power, Hope, and Struggle in Cesar Chavez’s Farm Worker Movement (New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2009).

49. Von Hoffman, Radical, 51-52.

50. Horwitt, “Let Them Call Me Rebel,” 524-526.

51. “Empowering People, Not Elites,” interview with Saul Alinsky.

52. Von Hoffman, Radical, 69.

53. David J. Garrow, Bearing the Cross: Martin Luther KingJr. and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (New York: Quill, 1999), 455.

Chapter 25. Black Power and White Anger

1. Malcolm X made no strategic statement. The key themes come over in his autobiography, written with Arthur Haley, The Autobiography of Malcolm X (New York: Ballantine Books, 1992).

2. David Macey, Frantz Fanon: A Biography (New York: Picador Press, 2000).

3. Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (London: Macgibbon and Kee, 1965), 28; Jean-Paul Sartre, Anti-Semite andJew (New York: Schocken Books, 1995), 152, first published 1948. See Sebastian Kaempf, “Violence and Victory: Guerrilla Warfare, ‘Authentic Self-Affirmation’ and the Overthrow of the Colonial State,” Third World Quarterly 30, no. 1 (2009): 129-146.

4. Preface to Fanon, Wretched of the Earth, 18.

5. Hannah Arendt, “Reflections on Violence,” The New York Review of Books, February 27, 1969. An extended version appeared in Crises of the Republic (New York: Harcourt, 1972).

6. Paul Jacobs and Saul Landau, The New Radicals: A Report with Documents (New York: Random House, 1966), 25.

7. Taylor Branch, At Canaan’s Edge: America in the King Years 1965-68 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006), 486.

8. SNCC, “The Basis of Black Power,” New York Times, August 5, 1966.

9. Stokely Carmichael and Charles V. Hamilton, Black Power: The Politics of Liberation in America (New York: Vintage Books, 1967), 12-13, 58, 66-67.

10. Garrow, Bearing the Cross, 488 (see chap. 23, n. 21).

11. Martin Luther King, Jr., Chaos or Community (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1968), 56.

12. Bobby Seale, Seize the Time: The Story of the Black Panther Party and Huey P. Newton (New York: Random House, 1970), 79-81.

13. Stokely Carmichael, “A Declaration of War, February 1968,” in Teodori, ed., The New Left, 258.

14. John D’Emilio, Lost Prophet: The Life and Times of Bayard Rustin (New York: The Free Press, 2003), 450-451.

15. Bayard Rustin, “From Protest to Politics,” Commentary (February 1965).

16. Staughton Lynd, “Coalition Politics or Nonviolent Revolution?” Liberation, June/July 1965, 197-198.

17. Carmichael and Hamilton, Black Power, 72.

18. Ibid., 92-93.

19. Paul Potter, in a speech on April 17, 1965, available at http://www.sdsrebels. com/potter.htm.

20. Jeffrey Drury, “Paul Potter, ‘The Incredible War,’ ” Voices of Democracy 4 (2009): 23-40. Also Sean McCann and Michael Szalay, “Introduction: Paul Potter and the Cultural Turn,” The Yale Journal of Criticism 18, no. 2 (Fall 2005): 209-220.

21. Gitlin, The Sixties, 265-267 (see chap. 24, n. 2).

22. Mark Rudd, Underground, My Life with SDS and the Weathermen (New York: Harper Collins, 2009), 65-66.

23. Herbert Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man (London: Sphere Books, 1964); “Repressive Tolerance” in Robert Paul Wolff, Barrington Moore, Jr., and Herbert Marcuse, eds., A Critique of Pure Tolerance (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969), 95-137; An Essay on Liberation (London: Penguin, 1969).

24. Che Guevara, “Message to the Tricontinental,” first published: Havana, April 16, 1967, available at htm.

25. Boot, InvisibleArmies, 438 (see chap. 14, n. 22). On Snow, see 341.

26. Matt D. Childs, “An Historical Critique of the Emergence and Evolution of Ernesto Che Guevara’s Foco Theory,” Journal of Latin American Studies 27, no. 3 (October 1995): 593-624.

27. Che Guevara, Guerrilla Warfare (London: Penguin, 1967). See also Che Guevara, The Bolivian Diaries (London: Penguin, 1968).

28. Childs, “An Historical Critique,” 617.

29. Paul Dosal, Commandante Che: Guerrilla Soldier, Commander, and Strategist, 1956—1967 (University Park: Pennsylvania University Press, 2003), 313.

30. Regis Debray, Revolution in the Revolution (London : Pelican, 1967).

31. Ibid., 51. Jon Lee Anderson, Che Guevara: A Revolutionary Life (New York: Bantam Books, 1997), suggests a more positive view of the book by Che but not of Debray. Debray eventually decided that Castro and Che were not so admirable.

32. It was originally circulated in the Tricontinental Bimonthly (January-February 1970). It is available at carlos/1969/06/minimanual-urban-guerrilla/index.htm. On Marighella and his influence, see John W. Williams, “Carlos Marighella: The Father of Urban Guerrilla Warfare,” Terrorism 12, no. 1 (1989): 1-20.

33. The episode is covered in Branch, At Canaan’s Edge, 662-664. Henry Raymont, “Violence as a Weapon of Dissent Is Debated at Forum in ‘Village,’ ” New York Times, December 17, 1967. The proceedings are found in Alexander Klein, ed., Dissent, Power, and Confrontation (New York: McGraw Hill, 1971).

34. Arendt, Reflections on Violence.

35. Eldridge Cleaver, Soul on Fire (New York: Dell, 1968), 108. Cited by Childs, “An Historical Critique,” 198.

36. Hayden, despite his denunciations of liberal corporatism, had maintained a conversation with Kennedy, and was pictured weeping by his coffin.

37. Tom Hayden, “Two, Three, Many Columbias,” Ramparts, June 15, 1968, 346.

38. Rudd, Underground, 132.

39. Ibid., 144.

40. Daniel Bell, “Columbia and the New Left,” National Affairs 13 (1968): 100.

41. Letter of December 3, 1966. Bill Morgan, ed., The Letters ofAllen Ginsberg (Philadelphia: Da Capo Press, 2008), 324.

42. Interview with Ginsberg, August 11, 1996, available at http://www.english.

43. Amy Hungerford, “Postmodern Supernaturalism: Ginsberg and the Search for a Supernatural Language,” The Yale Journal of Criticism 18, no. 2 (2005): 269-298.

44. On the origins of the Yippies, see David Farber, Chicago ’68 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988). The name had the advantage of fitting in with hippie (which came from being “hip”) and sounding like a happy cry. To give it some jokey credibility, it was turned into an acronym through reference to a youth international party.

45. Gitlin, TheSixties, 289.

46. Farber, Chicago ’68, 20-21.

47. Harry Oldmeadow, “To a Buddhist Beat: Allen Ginsberg on Politics, Poetics and Spirituality,” Beyond the Divide 2, no. 1 (Winter 1999): 6.

48. Ibid., 27. By the mid-1970s, he was looking back with a rather conventional observation: “All of our activity in the late sixties may have prolonged the Vietnam war.” Because the Left refused to vote for Humphrey, they got Nixon. He had actually voted for Humphrey. Peter Barry Chowka, “Interview with Allen Ginsberg,” New AgeJournal, April 1976, available at ginsberg/interviews.htm.

49. After it was all over, Hayden, along with seven of the more notorious leaders of the New Left, including Bobby Seale of the Black Panthers, were arrested for inciting the mayhem. Their trial rapidly turned into farce.

50. Scalmer, Gandhi in the West, 218 (see chap. 23, n. 7).

51. Michael Kazin, American Dreamers: How the Left Changed a Nation (New York: Vintage Books, 2011), 213.

52. Betty Friedan, TheFeministMystique (New York: Dell, 1963).

53. Casey Hayden and Mary King, “Feminism and the Civil Rights Movement,” 1965, available at resources/documents/ch34_02.htm. On Casey Hayden, see Davis W. Houck and David E. Dixon, eds., Women and the Civil Rights Movement, 1954-1965 (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 2009), 135-137.

54. Jo Freeman, “The Origins of the Women’s Liberation Movement,” American Journal of Sociology 78, no. 4 (1973): 792-811; Ruth Rosen, The World Split Open: How the Modern Women’s Movement Changed America (New York: Penguin, 2000).

55. Carol Hanish, “The Personal Is Political,” in Shulamith Firestone and Anne Koedt, eds., Notesfrom the Second Year: Women’s Liberation, 1970, available at com/pages/viewpage. action ?pageId=2259.

56. Ruth Rosen, The World Split Open.

57. Robert O. Self, All in the Family: The Realignment of American Democracy since the 1960s (New York: Hill and Wang, 2012), Chapter 3.

58. Gene Sharp, The Politics ofNonviolentAction, 3 vols. (Manchester, NH: Extending Horizons Books, Porter Sargent Publishers, 1973).

59. A list of 198 tactics appears in vol. 2 of Sharp, The Politics of Nonviolent Action. The list can be found at html.

60. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, “Shy U.S. Intellectual Created Playbook Used in a Revolution,” New York Times, February 16, 2011.

61. Todd Gitlin, Letters to a Young Activist (New York: Basic Books, 2003), 84, 53.

Chapter 26. Frames, Paradigms, Discourses, and Narratives

1. Karl Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies (London: Routledge, 1947).

2. Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge (Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, 1966).

3. Erving Goffman, Frame Analysis (New York: Harper & Row, 1974), 10-11, 2-3. William James, Principles of Psychology, vol. 2 (New York: Cosimo, 2007). The relevant chapter first appeared in the journal Mind. James observed the importance of selective attention, intimate involvement, and non-contradiction by what is otherwise known, and how there can be a variety of sub-worlds, each “real after its own fashion” before, according to Goffman, copping out.

4. Peter Simonson, “The Serendipity of Merton’s Communications Research,” International Journal of Public Opinion Research 17, no. 1 (January 2005): 277-297. One side effect of this collaboration was that Merton brought

C. Wright Mills (the “outstanding sociologist of his age”) to join the research, but Mills struggled with the statistical analyses of his project and was eventually fired by Lazarsfeld, which helps explain his appearance in The Sociological Imagination under the heading of “Abstracted Empiricism,” that produce details that “no matter how numerous, do not convince us having anything worth having convictions about.” The viciousness of the attacks led to Mills being virtually excommunicated by mainstream sociologists. John H. Summers, “Perpetual Revelations: C. Wright Mills and Paul Lazarsfeld,” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 608, no. 25 (November 2006): 25-40.

5. Paul F. Lazarsfeld and Robert K. Merton, “Mass Communication, Popular Taste, and Organized Social Action,” in L. Bryson, ed., The Communication of Ideas (New York: Harper, 1948), 95-188.

6. M. E. McCombs and D. L. Shaw, “The Agenda-setting Function of Mass Media,” PublicOpinion Quarterly 36 (1972): 176-187; Dietram A. Scheufele and David Tewksbury, “Framing, Agenda Setting, and Priming: The Evolution of the Media Effects Models,” Journal of Communication 57 (2007): 9-20.

7. McCabe, “Agenda-setting Research: A Bibliographic Essay,” Political Communication Review 1 (1976): 3 ; E. M. Rogers and J. W. Dearing, “Agendasetting Research: Where Has It Been? Where Is It Going?” in J. A. Anderson, ed., Communication Yearbook 11 (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1988), 555-594.

8. Todd Gitlin, The Whole World Is Watching: Mass Media in the Making and Unmaking of the New Left (Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 2003), xvi.

9. Ibid., 6.

10. J. K. Galbraith, TheAffluentSociety (London: Pelican, 1962), 16-27.

11. Sal Restivo, “The Myth of the Kuhnian Revolution,” in Randall Collins, ed., Sociological Theory (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1983), 293-305.

12. Aristides Baltas, Kostas Gavroglu, and Vassiliki Kindi, “A Discussion with Thomas S. Kuhn,” in James Conant and John Haugeland, eds., The Road Since Structure (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000), 308.

13. Thomas Kuhn, TheStructure ofScientificRevolutions, 2nd edn. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970), 5, 16—17. For an accessible intellectual biography see Alexander Bird, “Thomas S. Kuhn (18 July 1922-17 June 1996),” Social Studies of Science 27, no. 3 (1997): 483-502. See also Alexander Bird, Thomas Kuhn (Chesham, UK: Acumen and Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000).

14. Kuhn, Scientific Revolutions, 77.

15. E. Garfield, “A Different Sort of Great Books List: The 50 Twentieth-century Works Most Cited in the Arts & Humanities Citation Index, 1976-1983,” Current Contents 16 (April 20, 1987): 3-7.

16. Sheldon Wolin, “Paradigms and Political Theory,” in Preston King and B. C. Parekh, eds., Politics and Experience (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1968), 134-135.

17. The Wedge Project, The Center for the Renewal of Science and Culture,

18. Intelligent Design and Evolution Awareness Center, http://www. To add to the mix, some of Kuhn’s critics were also critical of evolutionary theory, notably Steven Fuller, the author of both Thomas Kuhn: A Philosophical Historyfor Our Times (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000) and Dissent Over Descent: Intelligent Design’s Challenge to Darwinism (London: Icon Books, 2008). See also Jerry Fodor with Massimo Piattelli-Palmarini, What Darwin Got Wrong (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2010).

19. A survey of high school teachers of biology showed about one in eight U.S. high school biology teachers did present creationism or intelligent design in a positive light in the classroom, and about the same number raised it at some point for discussion, story/0,2933,357181,00.html. While it might be surprising that so many biology teachers are out of tune with the dominant scientific paradigm of the time, the important point is that they are still far more in tune with this paradigm than with the general public support for creationism and/or intelligent design. A 2008 Gallup poll suggests 44 percent of Americans believe that “God created man in present form” and another 36 percent believe that God guided man’s development. Only 14 percent did not think that God played any part in the process. Gallup, Evolution, Creationism, Intelligent Design, creationism-intelligent-design.aspx polling for id (2008).

20. A useful guide to these various positions, and the controversies surrounding evolution, is found on the TalkOrigins Archive (

21. Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977, edited by C. Gordon (Brighton: Harvester Press, 1980), 197.

22. Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archeology of the Human Science (London : Tavistock Publications, 1970).

23. Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (London: Penguin, 1991).

24. Michel Foucault, “The Subject and Power,” Critical Inquiry 8, no. 4 (Summer 1982): 777-795.

25. Julian Reid, “Life Struggles: War, Discipline, and Biopolitics in the Thought of Michel Foucault,” Social Text 86, 24:1, Spring 2006.

26. Michel Foucault, Society Must Be Defended, translated by David Macey (London: Allen Lane, 2003), 49-53, 179.

27. Michel Foucault, Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews (Oxford: Blackwell, 1977), 27.

28. Foucault, Power/Knowledge, 145.

29. In J. G. Merquior’s critique, Foucault (London: Fontana Press, 1985), he is described as being in a French tradition of philosophical glamour, combining brilliant literary gifts with a “theorizing wantonly free of academic discipline.”

30. Robert Scholes and Robert Kellogg, The Nature of Narrative (London: Oxford University Press, 1968).

31. Roland Barthes and Lionel Duisit, “An Introduction to the Structural Analysis of Narrative,” New Literary History 6, no. 2 (Winter 1975): 237272. Originally published in Communications 8, 1966, as “Introduction à l’analyse structurale des récits.” This journal set in motion the structuralist study of narrative in 1966 with a special issue on the topic.

32. Editor’s Note, Critical Inquiry, Autumn 1980. The volume was published as W. T. J. Mitchell, On Narrative (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981).

33. Francesca Polletta, Pang Ching, Bobby Chen, Beth Gharrity Gardner, and Alice Motes, “The Sociology of Storytelling,” Annual Review of Sociology 37 (2011): 109-130.

34. Mark Turner, The Literary Mind (New York; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 14-20.

35. William Colvin, “The Emergence of Intelligence,” Scientific American 9, no. 4 (November 1998): 44-51.

36. Molly Patterson and Kristen Renwick Monroe, “Narrative in Political Science,” Annual Review of Political Science 1 (June 1998): 320.

37. Jane O’Reilly, “The Housewife’s Moment of Truth,” Ms., Spring 1972, 54. Cited by Francesca Polletta, It Was Like a Fever: Storytelling in Protest and Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006), 48-50.

38. John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, eds., Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime and Militancy (Santa Monica, CA : RAND, 2001).

39. See, for example Jay Rosen, “Press Think Basics: The Master Narrative in Journalism,” September 8, 2003, available at pubzone/weblogs/pressthink/2003/09/08/basics_master.html.

Chapter 27. Race, Religion, and Elections

1. William Safire, “On Language: Narrative,” New York Times, December 5, 2004. By the same token, Al Gore had been criticized during the 2000 presidential debates for telling “tall tales.” The problem, as Francesca Polletta noted, was Gore lacked a gift for “persuasive storytelling,” and that intellectual policy wonks were less able to make appeals to emotions. Francesca Polletta, It Was Like a Fever: Storytelling in Protest and Politics (see chap. 26, n. 37).

2. Frank Lutz, Words that Work: It’s Not What You Say, It’s What People Hear (New York: Hyperion, 1997), 149-157.


4. George Lakoff, Don’t Think of an Elephant!: Know Your Values and Frame the Debate (White River Junction, VT: Chelsea Green Publishing Company, 2004).

5. George Lakoff, Whose Freedom? The Battle Over America’s Most Important Idea (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 2006).

6. Drew Westen, The Political Brain (New York: Public Affairs, 2007), 99-100, 138, 147, 346.

7. Steven Pinker, “Block That Metaphor!,” The New Republic, October 9, 2006.

8. Lutz, Words that Work, 3. As with many other effective political communicators, he went back to Orwell’s famous 1946 essay on “Politics and the English Language,” which stressed the importance of plain English; brevity; avoiding pretentious, meaningless, and foreign words; and jargon. See

9. Donald R. Kinder, “Communication and Politics in the Age of Information,” in David O. Sears, Leonie Huddy, and Robert Jervis, eds., Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 372, 374-375.

10. Norman Mailer, Miami and the Siege of Chicago: An Informal History of the Republican and Democratic Conventions of 1968 (New York: World Publishing Company, 1968), 51.

11. Jill Lepore, “The Lie Factory: How Politics Became a Business,” The New Yorker, September 24, 2012.

12. Joseph Napolitan, The Election Game and How to Win It (New York: Doubleday, 1972); Larry Sabato, The Rise of Political Consultants: New Ways of Winning Elections (New York : Basic Books, 1981).

13. Dennis Johnson, No Placefor Amateurs: How Political Consultants Are Reshaping American Democracy (New York: Routledge, 2011), xiii.

14. James Thurber, “Introduction to the Study of Campaign Consultants,” in James Thurber, ed., Campaign Warriors: The Role of Political Consultants in Elections (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2000), 2.

15. Dan Nimmo, The Political Persuaders: The Techniques of Modern Election Campaigns (New York : Prentice Hall, 1970), 41.

16. James Perry, The New Politics: The Expanding Technology of Political Manipulation (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1968).

17. The origins of the ad and its impact are discussed in Robert Mann, Daisy Petals and Mushroom Clouds: LBJ, Barry Goldwater, and the Ad That Changed American Politics (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2011).

18. Joe McGinniss, Selling of the President (London: Penguin, 1970), 76; Kerwin Swint, Dark Genius: The Influential Career of Legendary Political Operative and Fox News Founder Roger Ailes (New York: Union Square Press, 2008).

19. Richard Whalen, Catch the Falling Flag (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1972), 135.

20. James Boyd, “Nixon’s Southern Strategy: It’s All in the Charts,” New York Times, May 17, 1970.

21. Phillips eventually came to object to the conservative politics he had helped to promote and wrote of an “Erring Republican Majority.” He moved to the left, for example, Kevin Phillips, American Theocracy: The Peril and Politics of Radical Religion, Oil, and Borrowed Money in the 21st Century (New York: Viking, 2006).

22. Nelson Polsby, “An Emerging Republican Majority?” National Affairs, Fall 1969.

23. Richard M. Scammon and Ben J. Wattenberg, The Real Majority (New York: Coward McCann, 1970).

24. Lou Cannon, President Reagan: The Role of a Lifetime (New York: PublicAffairs, 2000), 21; Ewen, PR! A Social History of Spin (see chap. 2, n. 28), 396.

25. Perry, The New Politics, 16, 21-31. He employed Spencer and Roberts, who had worked for Nelson Rockefeller against Barry Goldwater in 1966, and said afterwards that he would always in the future use “professional managers.”

26. William Rusher, Making of the New Majority Party (Lanham, MD: Sheed and Ward, 1975). Rusher was making a case for a new conservative party, but his argument worked for an insurgency within the Republican Party.

27. Kiron K. Skinner, Serhiy Kudelia, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, and Condoleezza Rice, The Strategy of Campaigning: Lessonsfrom Ronald Reagan and Boris Yeltsin (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2007), 132-133.

28. David Domke and Kevin Coe, The God Strategy: How Religion Became a Political Weapon in America (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 16-17, 101.

29. John Brady, Bad Boy: The Life and Politics of Lee Atwater (New York: Addison- Wesley, 1996), 34-35, 70.

30. Richard Fly, “The Guerrilla Fighter in Bush’s War Room,” Business Week, June 6, 1988.

31. By the time of Atwater’s death, only the first volume, The Years of Lyndon Johnson: The Path to Power (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1982), had been published. Caro is now up to volume 4. In his admiration for Caro, Atwater was by no means unique among political strategists.

32. John Pitney, Jr., The Art of Political Warfare (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2000), 12-15.

33. Mary Matalin, James Carville, and Peter Knobler, All’s Fair: Love, War and Running for President (New York: Random House, 1995), 54.

34. Brady, Bad Boy, 56.

35. Matalin, Carville, and Knobler, All’sFair, 48.

36. Brady, BadBoy, 117-118.

37. Ibid., 136.

38. Sidney Blumenthal, Pledging Allegiance: The Last Campaign of the Cold War (New York: Harper Collins, 1990), 307-308.

39. Eric Benson, “Dukakis’s Regret,” New York Times, June 17, 2012.

40. Domke and Coe, The God Strategy, 29.

41. Sidney Blumenthal, The Permanent Campaign: Inside the World of Elite Political Operatives (New York : Beacon Press, 1980).

42. Matalin, Carville, and Knobler, All’sFair, 186, 263, 242, 208, 225.

43. The document was from Quintus Tullius Cicero to his brother Marcus, running for Consul in 64 BCE. “Campaign Tips from Cicero: The Art of Politics from the Tiber to the Potomac,” commentary by James Carville, Foreign Affairs, May/June 2012.

44. James Carville and Paul Begala, Buck Up, Suck Up... And Come Back When You Foul Up (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002), 50.

45. Ibid., 108, 65.

46. For a defense of negative campaigning, see Frank Rich, “Nuke ’Em,” New York Times, June 17, 2012.

47. Kim Leslie Fridkin and Patrick J. Kenney, “Do Negative Messages Work?: The Impact of Negativity on Citizens’ Evaluations of Candidates,” American Politics Research 32 (2004): 570.

48. A complicating factor in 1992 was the independent candidacy of Ross Perot. Although his campaign was somewhat chaotic, he managed to gain almost 20 percent of the popular vote. Although he seems to have taken equally from both Bush and Clinton, on balance he hurt Bush more.

49. Domke and Coe, The GodStrategy, 117.

50. Leading to headline: “Pat Robertson Says Feminists Want to Kill Kids, Be Witches,” Ibid., 133.

51. James McLeod, “The Sociodrama of Presidential Politics: Rhetoric, Ritual, and Power in the Era of Teledemocracy,” American Anthropologist, New Series 10, no. 2 (June 1999): 359-373. Quayle was not helped by an incident in June 1992 when he erroneously corrected an elementary school student’s spelling of “potato” to “potatoe.”

52. David Paul Kuhn, “Obama Models Campaign on Reagan Revolt,” Politico, July 24, 2007.

53. David Plouffe, The Audacity to Win: The Inside Story and Lessons of Barack Obama’s Historic Victory (New York: Viking, 2009), 236-238, 378-379. For a full account of the campaign, see John Heilemann and Mark Halperin, Game Change (New York: Harper Collins, 2010).

54. John B. Judis and Ruy Teixeira, The Emerging DemocraticMajority (New York: Lisa Drew, 2002).

55. Peter Slevin, “For Clinton and Obama, a Common Ideological Touchstone,” Washington Post, March 25, 2007.

56. She was quoting The Economist: “Plato on the Barricades,” The Economist, May 13-19, 1967, 14. The thesis, entitled “THERE IS ONLY THE FIGHT... An Analysis of the Alinsky Model,” was circulated by largely right-wing bloggers during 2008. See HillaryClintonThesis.pdf.

Chapter 28. The Rise of the Management Class

1. Paul Uselding, “Management Thought and Education in America: A Centenary Appraisal,” in Jeremy Atack, ed., Business and Economic History, Second Series 10 (Urbana: University of Illinois, 1981), 16.

2. Matthew Stewart, The Management Myth: Why the Experts Keep Getting It Wrong (New York: W. W. Norton, 2009), 41. See also Jill Lepore, “Not So Fast: Scientific Management Started as a Way to Work. How Did It Become a Way of Life?” The New Yorker, October 12, 2009.

3. Frederick W Taylor, Principles of Scientific Management ( 2008), 14. First published 1911.

4. Charles D. Wrege and Amadeo G. Perroni, “Taylor’s Pig-Tale: A Historical Analysis of Frederick W. Taylor’s Pig-Iron Experiments,” Academy of Management Journal 17, no. 1 (1974): 26.

5. Jill R. Hough and Margaret A. White, “Using Stories to Create Change: The Object Lesson of Frederick Taylor’s ‘Pig-Tale,’’’ Journal of Management 27 (2001): 585-601.

6. Robert Kanigel, The One Best Way: Frederick Winslow Taylor and the Enigma of Efficiency (New York: Viking Penguin, 1999); Daniel Nelson, “Scientific Management, Systematic Management, and Labor, 1880-1915,” The Business History Review 48, no. 4 (Winter 1974): 479-500. See chapter on Taylor in A. Tillett, T. Kempner, and G. Wills, eds., Management Thinkers (London: Penguin, 1970).

7. Judith A. Merkle, Management and Ideology: The Legacy of the International Scientific Movement (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), 44-45.

8. Peter Drucker, The Concept of the Corporation, 3rd edn. (New York: Transaction Books, 1993), 242.

9. Oscar Kraines, “ Brandeis’ Philosophy of Scientific Management,” The Western Political Quarterly 13, no. 1 (March 1960): 201.

10. Kanigel, The One Best Way, 505.

11. V. I. Lenin, “The Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Government,” Pravda, April 28, 1918. Available at mar/x03.htm.

12. Merkle, Management and Ideology, 132. See also Daniel A. Wren and Arthur G. Bedeian, “The Taylorization of Lenin: Rhetoric or Reality?” International Journal of Social Economics 31, no. 3 (2004): 287-299.

13. Mary Parker Follett, The New State (New York: Longmans, 1918), cited by Ellen S. O’Connor, “Integrating Follett: History, Philosophy and Management,” Journal of Management History 6, no. 4 (2000): 181.

14. Peter Miller and Ted O’Leary, “Hierarchies and American Ideals, 19001940,” Academy ofManagementReview 14, no. 2 (April 1989): 250-265.

15. Pauline Graham, ed., Mary Parker Follett: Prophet of Management (Washington, DC: Beard Books, 2003).

16. Mary Parker Follett, The New State: Group Organization—The Solution of Popular Government (New York: Longmans Green, 1918), 3.

17. Irving L. Janis, Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascos (Andover, UK: Cengage Learning, 1982)

18. This is drawn from Ellen S. O’Connor, “The Politics of Management Thought: A Case Study of the Harvard Business School and the Human Relations School,” Academy of Management Review 24, no. 1 (1999): 125-128.

19. O’Connor, “The Politics of Management Thought,” 124-125.

20. Elton Mayo, The Human Problems ofan Industrial Civilization (New York: MacMillan, 1933) and Roethlisberger and Dickson, Management and the Worker (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1939); Richard Gillespie, Manufacturing Knowledge: A History of the Hawthorne Eexperiments (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1991); R. H. Franke and J. D. Kaul, “The Hawthorne Experiments: First Statistical Interpretation,” American Sociological Review 43 (1978): 623-643; Stephen R. G. Jones, “Was There a Hawthorne Effect?” The American Journal of Sociology 98, no. 3 (November 1992): 451-468.

21. On Mayo’s life, see Richard C. S. Trahair, Elton Mayo: The Humanist Temper (New York: Transaction Publishers, 1984). Of particular interest is the damning foreword by Abraham Zaleznik, who joined the human relations team at Harvard as Mayo was leaving.

22. Barbara Heyl, “The Harvard ‘Pareto Circle,’ ’’Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences 4 (1968): 316-334; Robert T. Keller, “The Harvard ‘Pareto Circle’ and the Historical Development of Organization Theory,” Journal of Management 10 (1984): 193.

23. Chester Irving Barnard, The Functions of the Executive (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1938), 294-295.

24. Peter Miller and Ted O’Leary, “Hierarchies and American Ideals, 19001940,” Academy ofManagementReview 14, no. 2 (April 1989): 250-265; William G. Scott, “Barnard on the Nature of Elitist Responsibility,” Public Administration Review 42, no. 3 (May-June 1982): 197-201.

25. Scott, “Barnard on the Nature of Elitist Responsibility,” 279.

26. Barnard, The Functions of the Executive, 71.

27. James Hoopes, “Managing a Riot: Chester Barnard and Social Unrest,” Management Decision 40 (2002): 10.

Chapter 29. The Business of Business

1. I have drawn particularly on Ron Chernow, Titan: The Life ofJohn D. Rockefeller, Sr. (New York: Little, Brown & Co., 1998) and Daniel Yergin, The Prize: The Epic Questfor Oil, Money & Power (New York: The Free Press, 1992).

2. Chernow, Titan, 148-150.

3. Allan Nevins, John D. Rockefeller: The HeroicAge ofAmerican Enterprise, 2 vols. (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1940).

4. Ibid., 433.

5. Richard Hofstadter, The Age of Reform (New York: Vintage, 1955), 216-217.

6. The book made up of her articles is still in print: Ida Tarbell, The History of the Standard Oil Company (New York : Buccaneer Books, 1987); Steven Weinberg, Taking on the Trust: The Epic Battle of Ida Tarbell and John D. Rockefeller (New York : W. W. Norton, 2008).

7. Yergin, The Prize, 93.

8. Ibid., 26.

9. Chernow, Titan, 230.

10. Steve Watts, The People’s Tycoon: Henry Ford and the American Century (New York: Vintage Books, 2006), 16; Henry Ford, My Life and Work (New York: Classic Books, 2009; first published 1922).

11. Cited in Watts, The People’s Tycoon, 190.

12. Richard Tedlow, “The Struggle for Dominance in the Automobile Market: The Early Years of Ford and General Motors,” Business and Economic History Second Series, 17 (1988): 49-62.

13. Watts, The People’s Tycoon, 456, 480.

14. David Farber, Alfred P. Sloan and the Triumph of General Motors (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002), 41.

15. Alfred Sloan, My Years with General Motors (New York : Crown Publishing, 1990), 47, 52, 53-54.

16. Farber, AlfredP. Sloan, 50.

17. Sloan, My Years with General Motors, 71.

18. Ibid., 76. See also John MacDonald, The Game of Business (New York: Doubleday: 1975), Chapter 3.

19. Sloan, My Years with General Motors, 186-187.

20. Ibid., 195-196.

21. Sidney Fine, “The General Motors Sit-Down Strike: A Re-examination,” The American Historical Review 70, no. 3, April 1965, 691-713.

22. Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (New York : Harcourt, Brace and World, 1967), 46, 313.

Chapter 30. Management Strategy

1. Solow had the distinction of inspiring two novels, The Unpossessed, by his ex-wife Tess Slesinger, and James T. Farrell’s posthumously published Sam Holman, which has a theme of intellectual brilliance transformed into mediocrity through the political journey of the 1930s. McDonald appears as Holman’s (Solow’s) closest friend, a source of skepticism and conscience.

2. Amitabh Pal, interview with John Kenneth Galbraith, The Progressive, October 2000, available at mag_amitpalgalbraith.

3. Alfred Chandler, The Visible Hand (Harvard, MA: Belknap Press, 1977), 1

4. Galbraith, The New Industrial State, 2nd edn. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007), 59, 42.

5. Drucker, The Concept of the Corporation, see Chapter 28, n. 8.

6. Ibid., Introduction.

7. Peter Drucker, The Practice of Management (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1954), 3, 245-247.

8. Ibid., 11.

9. Ibid., 177. See his observations in his autobiography, Peter Drucker, Adventures of a Bystander (New York: Transaction Publishers, 1994).

10. This account appeared in an appendix to the book’s 1983 edition, and was repeated in an introduction he wrote to a 1990 edition of Sloan’s My Years with General Motors. It also appears in his autobiography.

11. Christopher D. McKenna, “Writing the Ghost-Writer Back In: Alfred Sloan, Alfred Chandler, John McDonald and the Intellectual Origins of Corporate Strategy,” Management & Organizational History 1, no. 2 (May 2006): 107-126.

12. Jon McDonald and Dan Seligman, A Ghost’s Memoir: The Making of Alfred P. Sloan’s My Years with General Motors (Boston: MIT Press, 2003), 16.

13. The lawyers were worried about references to Sloan’s early plan to take on Ford. A phrase in the original plan, stating that the company was not after a monopoly, might concede the point that a monopoly was an option.

14. Edith Penrose, The Theory of the Growth of the Firm (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959). In 1995, she described Chandler’s “analytical structure congruent with my own” (Foreword to the third edition). John Kay, Foundations of Corporate Success: How Business Strategies AddValue (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993) stresses Penrose’s foundational role, 335.

15. Alfed Chandler, “Introduction,” in 1990 edition of Strategy and Structure (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1990), v. In 1956, when he had first published on the topic, Chandler had described as long-range policy what he now called strategy.

16. Chandler, “Introduction,” StrategyandStructure, 13.

17. Chandler saw other examples of the same theme, for example with DuPont. Alfred D. Chandler and Stephen Salsbury, Pierre S. du Pont and the Making of the Modern Corporation (New York: Harper & Row, 1971).

18. Chandler, Strategy and Structure, 309. Robert F. Freeland, “The Myth of the M-Form? Governance, Consent, and Organizational Change,” The American Journal of Sociology 102 (1996): 483-526; Robert F. Freeland, “When Organizational Messiness Works,” Harvard Business Review 80 (May 2002): 24-25.

19. Freeland, “The Myth of the M-Form,” 516.

20. Neil Fligstein, “The Spread of the Multidivisional Form Among Large Firms, 1919-1979,” American Sociological Review 50 (1985): 380.

21. McKenna, “Writing the Ghost-Writer Back In.” Other large firms studied by Chandler, such as IBM and AT&T, would also have discouraged too much exploration of the impact of antitrust legislation on corporate structure.

22. Edward D. Berkowitz and Kim McQuaid, Creating the Welfare State: The Political Economy of Twentieth Century Reform (Lawrence, KS: Praeger, 1992), 233-234. Cited by Richard R. John, “Elaborations, Revisions, Dissents: Alfred D. Chandler, Jr.’s, ‘The Visible Hand’ after Twenty Years,” The Business History Review 71, no. 2 (Summer 1997): 190. Sanford M. Jacoby, Employing Bureaucracy: Managers, Unions, and the Transformation of Work in American Industry, 1900-1945 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985), 8. John, “Elaborations, Revisions, Dissents,” 190.

23. Louis Galambos, “What Makes Us Think We Can Put Business Back into American History?” Business and Economic History 21 (1992): 1-11.

24. John Micklethwait and Adrian Wooldridge, The Witch Doctors: Making Sense of the Management Gurus (New York: Random House, 1968), 106.

25. See foreword to the 1986 edition of Managingfor Results.

26. Stewart, The Management Myth, see Chapter 28, n. 2, 153.

27. Walter Kiechel III, The Lords of Strategy: The Secret Intellectual History of the New Corporate World (Boston: The Harvard Business Press, 2010), xi-xii, 4.

28. Kenneth Andrews, The Concept of Corporate Strategy (Homewood, IL: R. D. Irwin, 1971), 29.

29. Henry Mitzberg, Bruce Ahlstrand, and Joseph Lampel, Strategy Safari: The Complete Guide Through the Wilds of Strategic Management (New York: The Free Press, 1998). See also the companion volume of readings, Strategy Bites Back: It Is Far More, and Less, Than You Ever Imagined (New York: Prentice Hall, 2005).

30. “The Guru: Igor Ansoff,” The Economist, July 18, 2008; Igor Ansoff, Corporate Strategy: An Analytic Approach to Business Policy for Growth and Expansion (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965).

31. Igor Ansoff, CorporateStrategy (London: McGraw-Hill, 1965), 120.

32. Stewart, TheManagementMyth, 157-158.

33. Kiechel, The Lords of Strategy, 26-27.

34. John A. Byrne, The Whiz Kids: Ten Founding Fathers ofAmerican Business— And the Legacy They Left Us (New York : Doubleday, 1993).

35. Samuel Huntington, The Common Defense: Strategic Programs in National Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961).

36. Mintzberg et al., Strategy Safari, 65.

37. Friedrich Hayek, “The Use of Knowledge in Society,” American Economic Review 35, no. 4 (1945): 519-530.

38. Aaron Wildavsky, “Does Planning Work?” The National Interest, Summer 1971, No. 24, 101. See also his “If Planning Is Everything Maybe It’s Nothing,” Policy Sciences 4 (1973): 127-153.

39. Cited in Mitzberg et al., Strategy Safari, 65.

40. Jack Welch, with John Byrne, Jack: Straight from the Gut (New York: Grand Central Publishing, 2003), 448. The letter was by Kevin Peppard. It appeared in Fortune Magazine, November 30, 1981, p. 17. See also Chapter 3 of Thomas O’Boyle, At Any Cost: Jack Welch, General Electric, and the Pursuit of Profit (New York: Vintage, 1999).

41. Henry Mintzberg, The Rise and Fall of Strategic Planning (London: Prentice-Hall, 1994).

42. Igor Ansoff, “Critique of Henry Mintzberg’s ‘The Design School: Reconsidering the Basic Premises of Strategic Management,’ ”Strategic Management Journal 12, no. 6 (September 1991): 449-461.

Chapter 31. Business as War

1. Albert Madansky, “Is War a Business Paradigm? A Literature Review,” The Journal of Private Equity 8 (Summer 2005): 7-12.

2. Wess Roberts, Leadership Secrets ofAttila the Hun (New York: Grand Central Publishing, 1989).

3. Dennis Laurie, From Battlefield to Boardroom: Winning Management Strategies in Today’s Global Business (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 235.

4. Douglas Ramsey, Corporate Warriors (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1987).

5. Aric Rindfleisch, “Marketing as Warfare: Reassessing a Dominant Metaphor—Questioning Military Metaphors’ Centrality in Marketing Parlance,” Business Horizons, September-October, 1996. For a skeptical look, although with a concluding endorsement of Sun Tzu, see John Kay, “Managers from Mars,” Financial Times, August 4, 1999.

6. On BCG see pp. 519.

7. Bruce Henderson, Henderson on Corporate Strategy (New York: HarperCollins, 1979), 9-10, 27.

8. Philip Kotler and Ravi Singh, “Marketing Warfare in the 1980s,” Journal of Business Strategy (Winter 1981): 30-41.The start of this line of work has been attributed to Alfred R. Oxenfeldt and William L. Moore, “Customer or Competitor: Which Guideline for Marketing?” Management Review (August 1978): 43-38.

9. Al Ries and Jack Trout, Marketing Warfare (New York: Plume, 1986); Robert Duro and Bjorn Sandstrom, The Basic Principles of Marketing Warfare (Chichester, UK: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1987); Gerald A. Michaelson, Winning the Marketing War (Lanham, MD: Abt Books, 1987).

10. In addition to editions of The Art of War and other Chinese masters, see, for example, the titles collected by Madansky, including Foo Check Teck and Peter Hugh Grinyer, Organizing Strategy: Sun Tzu Business Warcraft (Butterworth: Heinemann Asia, 1994); Donald Krause, The Art of Warfor Executives (New York: Berkley Publishing Group, 1995); Gary Gagliardi, The Art of War Plus The Art of Sales (Shoreline, WA: Clearbridge Publishing, 1999); Gerald A Michaelson, Sun Tzu: The Art of Warfor Managers: 50 Strategic Rules (Avon, MA: Adams Media Corporation, 2001).

11. Episodes: “Big Girls Don’t Cry”; “He Is Risen.” See the-sopranos/episodes/index.html.

12. Richard Greene and Peter Vernezze, eds., The Sopranos and Philosophy: I Kill Therefore I Am (Chicago : Open Court, 2004). In one episode, one of Soprano’s lieutenants, Paulie ‘Walnuts’ Gualtieri, reports that “Sun-Tuh- Zoo” says: “A good leader is benevolent and unconcerned with fame.” He explains that “Sun-Tuh-Zoo” is the “Chinese Prince Machiavelli,” at which point his colleague Silvio Dante corrects him: “Tzu, Tzu! Sun Tzu, you fucking ass-kiss!” In the next episode, Paulie, trying to reestablish himself after a spell in prison, is listening to a tape of Sun Tzu while driving to his aunt’s neighborhood. At an appropriate moment, as the tape refers to catching an enemy by surprise, he comes across two brothers pruning trees in an area which they have just taken from one of Gualtieri’s friends. His tactics are similar to those used by the brothers: intimidation based on brute force. When they refuse to give the area back, Gualtieri hits one brother over the head with a shovel causing him to let go of the rope holding the other brother in the tree, who then plunges down. Not really Sun Tzu! (Series 5).

13. Marc R. McNeilly, Sun Tzu and the Art of Business (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000).

14. Khoo Kheng-Ho, Applying Sun Tzu’s Art of War in Managing Your Marriage (Malaysia: Pelanduk, 2002).

15. William Scott Wilson, The Lone Samurai: The Life of Miyamoto Musashi (New York: Kodansha International, 2004), 220; Miyamoto Musashi, The Book of Five Rings: A Classic Text on the Japanese Way of the Sword, translated by Thomas Cleary (Boston: Shambhala Publications, 2005).

16. Thomas A. Green, ed., Martial Arts of the World: An Encyclopedia (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2001).

17. George Stalk, Jr., “Time—The Next Source of Competitive Advantage,” Harvard Business Review 1 (August 1988): 41-51; George Stalk and Tom Hout, Competing Against Time: How Time-Based Competition Is Reshaping Global Markets (New York: The Free Press, 1990).

18. The two are also brought together in Chet Richards, Certain to Win: The Strategy of John Boyd as Applied to Business (Philadelphia: Xlibris, 2004).

19. A later book spoke about crushing more than outsmarting competitors, by such means as unleashing “massive and overwhelming force,” threatening their “profit sanctuaries,” and enticing them into retreat. This was not for the soft-hearted. “The common theme” in his ideas, he later observed, was that they were “about taking advantage to the point where competitors are left astounded by what’s happened.” George Stalk and Rob Lachenauer Hardball, Are You Playing to Play or Playing to Win? (Cambridge, MA : Harvard Business School Press, 2004); Jennifer Reingold, “The 10 Lives of George Stalk,” Fast, December 19, 2007, http://www.fastcompany. com/magazine/91/open_stalk.html.

Chapter 32. The Rise of Economics

1. Mirowski, Machine Dreams, 12-17 (see chap. 12, n. 11). The term Cyborg only came into use in the 1960s to refer to humans with artificial, technological enhancements.

2. Duncan Luce and Howard Raiffa, Games and Decisions: Introduction and Critical Survey (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1957), 10.

3. Ibid., 18.

4. Sylvia Nasar, A Beautiful Mind (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1988).

5. John F. Nash, Jr., Essays on Game Theory, with an introduction by K. Binmore (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 1996).

6. Roger B. Myerson, “Nash Equilibrium and the History of Economic Theory,” Journal of Economic Literature 37 (1999): 1067.

7. Mirowski, MachineDreams, 369.

8. Richard Zeckhauser, “Distinguished Fellow: Reflections on Thomas Schelling,” The Journal of Economic Perspectives 3, no. 2 (Spring 1989): 159.

9. Milton Friedman, Price Theory: A Provisional Text, revised edn. (Chicago: Aldine, 1966), 37. (cited by Mirowski)

10. Cited in Rakesh Khurana, From Higher Aims to Higher Hands: The Social Transformation of American Business Schools and the Unfulfilled Promise of Management as a Profession (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007), 239-240.

11. Ibid., 292, 307.

12. Cited by Ibid., 272.

13. Ibid., 253-254. 275, 268-269, 331.

14. Pankat Ghemawat, “Competition and Business Strategy in Historical Perspective,” The Business History Review 76, no. 1 (Spring 2002): 37-74, 44-45.

15. Interview with Seymour Tilles, October 24, 1996.

16. John A. Seeger, “Reversing the Images of BCG’s Growth/Share Matrix,” Strategic Management Journal 5 (1984): 93-97.

17. Herbert A. Simon. “From Substantive to Procedural Rationality,” in Spiro J. Latsis, ed., MethodandAppraisal in Economics (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1976), 140.

18. Michael Porter, Competitive Strategy Techniquesfor Analyzing Industries and Competitors (New York: The Free Press, 1980).

19. Porter, Competitive Strategy, 3.

20. Mitzberg et al., Strategy Safari, 113 (see chap. 30, n. 29).

21. Porter, CompetitiveStrategy, 53, 86.

22. Porter, Competitive Advantage.

23. Michael Porter, Nicholas Argyres, and Anita M. McGahan, “An Interview with Michael Porter,” The Academy of Management Executive (1993-2005) 16, no. 2 (May 2002): 43-52.

24. Vance H. Fried and Benjamin M. Oviatt, “Michael Porter’s Missing Chapter: The Risk of Antitrust Violations,” Academy of Management Executive 3, no. 1 (1989): 49-56.

25. AdamJ. Brandenburger and Barry J. Nalebuff, Co-Opetition (New York: Doubleday, 1996).

26. As demonstrated by Wikipedia:

27. Stewart, TheManagementMyth, 214-215.

Chapter 33. Red Queens and Blue Oceans

1. Kathleen Eisenhardt, “Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review,” Academy of Management Review 14, no. 1 (1989): 57-74.

2. Justin Fox, The Myth of the Rational Market: A History of Risk, Reward, and Delusion on Wall Street (New York: Harper, 2009), 159-162.

3. Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling, “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure,” Journal of Financial Economics 3 (1976): 302-360.

4. Michael C. Jensen, “Organization Theory and Methodology,” The Accounting Review 58, no. 2 (April 1983): 319-339.

5. Jensen, “Takeovers: Folklore and Science,” HarvardBusiness Review (November-December 1984), 109-121.

6. Cited by Fox, The Myth of the Rational Market, 274.

7. Paul M. Hirsch, Ray Friedman, and Mitchell P. Koza, “Collaboration or Paradigm Shift?: Caveat Emptor and the Risk of Romance with Economic Models for Strategy and Policy Research,” Organization Science 1, no. 1 (1990): 87-97.

8. Robert Hayes and William J. Abernathy, “Managing Our Way to Economic Decline,” HarvardBusinessReview (July 1980), 67-77.

9. Franklin Fisher, “Games Economists Play: A Noncooperative View,” RAND Journal of Economics 20, no. 1 (Spring 1989): 113.

10. Carl Shapiro, “The Theory of Business Strategy,” RANDJournal of Economics 20, no. 1 (Spring 1989): 125-137.

11. Richard P. Rumelt, Dan Schendel, and David J. Teece, “Strategic Management and Economics,” Strategic Management Journal 12 (Winter 1991): 5-29.

12. Garth Saloner, “Modeling, Game Theory, and Strategic Management,” Strategic Management Journal 12 (Winter 1991): 119-136. See also Colin F. Camerer, “Does Strategy Research Need Game Theory?” Strategic Management Journal 12 (Winter 1991): 137-152.

13. Richard L. Daft and Arie Y. Lewin, “Can Organization Studies Begin to Break Out of the Normal Science Straitjacket? An Editorial Essay,” Organization Science 1, no. 1 (1990): 1-9; Richard A. Bettis, “Strategic Management and the Straightjacket: An Editorial Essay,” Organization Science 2, no. 3 (August 1991): 315-319.

14. Sumantra Ghoshal, “Bad Management Theories Are Destroying Good Management Practices,” Academy of Management Learning and Education 4, no. 1 (2005): 85.

15. Timothy Clark and Graeme Salaman, “Telling Tales: Management Gurus’ Narratives and the Construction of Managerial Identity,” Journal of Management Studies 3, no. 2 (1998): 157. See also T. Clark and G. Salaman, “The Management Guru as Organizational Witchdoctor,” Organization 3, no. 1 (1996): 85-107.

16. James Champy, Reengineering Management: The Mandate for New Leadership (London: HarperBusiness, 1995), 7.

17. Michael Hammer and James Champy, Reengineering the Corporation: A Manifesto for Business Revolution (London: HarperBusiness, 1993), 49.

18. Peter Case, “Remember Re-Engineering? The Rhetorical Appeal of a Managerial Salvation Device,” Journal of Management Studies 35, no. 4 (July 1991): 419-441.

19. Michael Hammer, “Reengineering Work: Don’t Automate, Obliterate,” Harvard Business Review, July/August 1990, 104.

20. Thomas Davenport and James Short, “The New Industrial Engineering: Information Technology and Business Process Redesign,” Sloan Management Review, Summer 1990; Keith Grint, “Reengineering History: Social Resonances and Business Process Reengineering,” Organization 1, no. 1 (1994): 179-201; Keith Grint and P. Case, “The Violent Rhetoric of Re-Engineering: Management Consultancy on the Offensive,”JournalofManagementStudies 6, no. 5 (1998): 557-577.

21. Bradley G. Jackson, “Re-Engineering the Sense of Self: The Manager and the Management Guru,” Journal of Management Studies 33, no. 5 (September 1996): 571-590.

22. Hammer and Champy, Reengineering the Corporation: A Manifestofor Business Revolution. See also John Micklethwait and Adrian Wooldridge, The Witch Doctors: Making Sense of the Management Gurus.

23. Iain L. Mangham, “Managing as a Performing Art,” BritishJournal of Management 1 (1990): 105-115.

24. Michael Hammer and Steven Stanton, The Reengineering Revolution: The Handbook (London: HarperCollins, 1995), 30, 52.

25. Michael Hammer, Beyond Reengineering: How the Process-Centered Organization Is Changing Our Work and Our Lives (London: HarperCollins, 1996), 321.

26. Champy, Reengineering Management, 204.

27. Ibid., 122.

28. Willy Stern, “Did Dirty Tricks Create a Best-Seller?” Business Week, August 7, 1995; Micklethwait and Wooldridge, The Witch Doctors, 23-25; Kiechel, The Lords of Strategy, 24 (see chap. 30, n. 27). Timothy Clark and David Greatbatch, “Management Fashion as Image-Spectacle: The Production of Best-Selling Management Books,” Management Communication Quarterly 17, no. 3 (February 2004): 396-424.

29. Michael Porter, “What Is Strategy?” Harvard Business Review, November- December 1996, 60-78.

30. Leigh Van Valen, “A New Evolutionary Law,” Evolutionary Theory I (1973): 20.

31. Ghemawat, “Competition and Business Strategy in Historical Perspective,” 64.

32. Chan W. Kim and Renee Mauborgne, Blue Ocean Strategy: How to Create Uncontested Market Space (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 2005), 6-7.

33. Ibid., 209-221.

34. Chan W. Kim and Renee Mauborgne, “How Strategy Shapes Structure,” Harvard Business Review (September 2009), 73-80.

35. Eric D. Beinhocker, “Strategy at the Edge of Chaos,” McKinsey Quarterly (Winter 1997), 25-39.

Chapter 34. The Sociological Challenge

1. James A. C. Brown, The Social Psychology of Industry (London: Penguin Books, 1954).

2. Douglas McGregor. The Human Side of Enterprise (New York: McGrawHill, 1960). See also Gary Heil, Warren Bennis, and Deborah C. Stephens, Douglas McGregor Revisited: Managing the Human Side of the Enterprise (New York : Wiley, 2000).

3. Cited in David Jacobs, “Book Review Essay: Douglas McGregor? The Human Side of Enterprise in Peril,” Academy ofManagement Review 29, no. 2 (2004): 293-311.

4. These are discussed below, p. 592.

5. Karl Weick, The Social Psychology of Organizing (New York: McGraw Hill, 1979), 91.

6. Tom Peters, Bob Waterman, and Julian Phillips, “Structure Is Not Organization,” Business Horizons, June 1980. Peters’s account comes from Tom Peters, “A Brief History of the 7-S (‘McKinsey 7-S’) Model,” January 2011, available at

7. Richard T. Pascale and Anthony Athos, The Art of Japanese Management: Applications for American Executives (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1981).

8. Kenichi Ohmae, The Mind of the Strategist: The Art of Japanese Business (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1982).

9. It was originally going to be called The Secrets of Excellence, but McKinsey’s were worried that would sound like they were giving away the secrets of clients.

10. Tom Peters and Robert Waterman, In Search of Excellence: Lessonsfrom America’s Best Run Companies (New York: HarperCollins, 1982).

11. Tom Peters, “Tom Peters’s True Confessions,” Fast, November 30, 2001, On Tom Peters, see Stuart Crainer, The Tom Peters Phenomenon: Corporate Man to Corporate Skink (Oxford: Capstone, 1997).

12. Peters and Waterman, In Search of Excellence, 29.

13. D. Colville, Robert H. Waterman, and Karl E. Weick, “Organization and the Search for Excellence: Making Sense of the Times in Theory and Practice,” Organization 6, no. 1 (February 1999): 129-148.

14. Daniel Carroll, “A Disappointing Search for Excellence,” Harvard Business Review, November—December 1983, 78-88.

15. “Oops. Who’s Excellent Now?” Business Week, November 5, 1984. The book did note that of its “excellent companies most probably will not stay buoyant forever” (pp. 109-10), and a number did actually show considerable endurance.

16. Tom Peters, Liberation Management: Necessary Disorganizationfor the Nanosecond Nineties (New York: A. A. Knopf, 1992).

17. Tom Peters, Re-Imagine! Business Excellence in a Disruptive Age (New York: DK Publishing, 2003), 203.

18. “Guru: Tom Peters,” The Economist, March 5, 2009. Tom Peters with N. Austin, A Passionfor Excellence: The Leadership Difference (London: Collins, 1985); Thriving on Chaos: Handbookfor a Management Revolution (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1987).

19. Stewart, The Management Myth, 234.

20. “Peter Drucker, the Man Who Changed the World,” Business Review Weekly, September 15, 1997, 49.

21. C. K. Prahalad and G. Hamel, “Strategic Intent,” Harvard Business Review (May-June 1989), 63-76.

22. C. K. Prahalad and G. Hamel, “The Core Competence of the Corporation,” Harvard Business Review (May-June 1990), 79-91.

23. C. K. Prahalad and G. Hamel, “Strategy as a Field of Study: Why Search for a New Paradigm?” Strategic Management Journal 15, issue supplement S2 (Summer 1994): 5-16.

24. Gary Hamel, “Strategy as Revolution,” Harvard Business Review (July-August 1996), 69.

25. Cited in Ibid., 78.

26. Gary Hamel, Leading the Revolution: How to Thrive in Turbulent Times by Making Innovation a Way of Life (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 2000).

27. Mintzberg somewhat gleefully includes an embarrassing interview conducted by Hamel with Enron Chairman Kenneth Lay in Strategy Bites Back.

28. Hamel was not the only author to identify Enron as the model for the future. The Financial Times observed on December 4, 2001: “The books of various gurus have singled out the company as paragon of good management, for LEADING THE REVOLUTION (Gary Hamel, 2000), practising CREATIVE DESTRUCTION (Richard Foster and Sarah Kaplan, 2001), devising STRATEGY THROUGH SIMPLE RULES (Kathy Eisenhardt and Donald Sull, 2001), winning the WAR FOR TALENT (Ed Michaels, 1998) and Navigating the ROAD TO THE NEXT ECONOMY (James Critin, scheduled for publication in February 2002—and now, presumably being rewritten).”

29. Gary Hamel, The Future of Management (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 2007), 14.

30. Ibid., 62.

31. Gary Hamel, What Matters Now: How to Win in a World of Relentless Change, Ferocious Competition, and Unstoppable Innovation (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2012).

32. Scott Adams, TheDilbertPrinciple (New York: HarperCollins, 1996), 153, 296. The strips which describe strategy are available on http://www.dilbert. com/strips/.

Chapter 35. Deliberate or Emergent

1. Henry Mintzberg and James A. Waters, “Of Strategies, Deliberate and Emergent,” StrategicManagementJournal 6, no. 3 (July-Sept ember 1985): 257-272.

2. Ed Catmull, “How Pixar Fosters Collective Creativity,” Harvard Business Review, September 2008.

3. Henry Mintzberg, “Rebuilding Companies as Communities,” Harvard Business Review, July-August 2009, 140-143.

4. Peter Senge, The Fifth Discipline: The Art and Practice of the Learning Organization (New York: Doubleday, 1990).

5. Daniel Quinn Mills and Bruce Friesen, “The Learning Organization,” European Management Journal 10, no. 2 (June 1992): 146-156.

6. Charles Handy, “Managing the Dream,” in S. Chawla and J. Renesch, eds., Learning Organizations (Portland, OR: Productivity Press, 1995), 46, cited in Michaela Driver, “The Learning Organization: Foucauldian Gloom or Utopian Sunshine?” Human Relations 55 (2002): 33-53.

7. Robert C. H. Chia and Robin Holt, Strategy Without Design: The Silent Efficacy of Indirect Action (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 203.

8. Although Liddell Hart (as the prophet of the indirect approach) and Luttwak (as the celebrator of strategy as paradox) were called in aid, and both certainly argued against direct frontal approaches, neither suggested that somehow military success could be achieved by purposeless activity, seeing how the individuals in an army coped with the predicaments in which they found themselves (which without any direction would probably have been to surrender or desert). Indirect strategies in war required imaginative leadership and an ability to consider the world as it might appear to the enemy before embarking on maneuvers that could carry high risks.

9. Chia and Holt, Strategy WithoutDesign, xi.

10. Jeffrey Pfeffer, Managing with Power: Politics andInfluence in Organizations (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1992). His definition of power was “the potential ability to influence behavior, to change the course of events, to overcome resistance, and to get people to do things they would not otherwise do,” 30.

11. Jeffrey Pfeffer, Power: Why Some People Have It—and Others Don’t (New York : HarperCollins, 2010), 11. The best and certainly most amusing guide to organizational politics is F. M. Cornford, Microcosmographia Academica: Being a Guide for the Young Academic Politician (London: Bowes & Bowes, 1908).

12. Helen Armstrong, “The Learning Organization: Changed Means to an Unchanged End,” Organization 7, no. 2 (2000): 355-361.

13. John Coopey, “The Learning Organization, Power, Politics and Ideology,” Management Learning 26, no. 2 (1995): 193-214.

14. David Knights and Glenn Morgan, “Corporate Strategy, Organizations, and Subjectivity: A Critique,” Organization Studies 12, no. 2 (1991): 251.

15. Stewart Clegg, Chris Carter, and Martin Kornberger, “Get Up, I Feel Like Being a Strategy Machine,” European Management Review 1, no. 1 (2004): 21-28.

16. Stephen Cummings and David Wilson, eds., Images of Strategy (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003), 3. Their proposal: “A good strategy, whether explicit or implicit, is one that both orients a company and animates it,” 2.

17. Peter Franklin, “Thinking of Strategy in a Postmodern Way: Towards an Agreed Paradigm,” Parts 1 and 2, Strategic Change 7 (September-October 1998), 313-332 and (December 1998), 437-448.

18. Donald Hambrick and James Frederickson, “Are You Sure You Have a Strategy?” Academy of Management Executive 15, no. 4 (November 2001): 49.

19. John Kay, The Hare & The Tortoise: An Informal Guide to Business Strategy (London : The Erasmus Press, 2006), 31.

20. “Instant Coffee as Management Theory,” Economist 25 (January 1997): 57.

21. Eric Abrahamson, “Management Fashion,” Academy of Management Review 21, no. 1 (1996): 254-285.

22. Jane Whitney Gibson and Dana V. Tesone, “Management Fads: Emergence, Evolution, and Implications for Managers,” The Academy of Management Executive 15, no. 4 (2001): 122-133.

23. Dilbert had an example: After the executive was told that he could gauge his success by the number of repeat customers, he proudly reported that “virtually every customer gets another unit within three months of buying the first one!” When asked what happened if he did not “count warranty replacements,” he replied, “Ooh then we don’t look so good.”Adams, The Dilbert Principle, 158.

24. R. S. Kaplan and D. P. Norton, “The Balanced Scorecard: Measures that Drive Performance,” Harvard Business Review 70 (Jan-Feb 1992): 71-79, and “Putting the Balanced Scorecard to Work,” Harvard Business Review 71 (Sep- Oct 1993): 134-147. Stephen Bungay, The Art of Action: How Leaders Close the Gaps Between Plans, Actions and Results (London: Nicholas Brealey, 2011), 207-214.

25. Paula Phillips Carson, Patricia A. Lanier, Kerry David Carson, and Brandi N. Guidry, “Clearing a Path Through the Management Fashion Jungle: Some Preliminary Trailblazing,” The Academy of Management Journal 43, no. 6 (December 2000): 1143-1158.

26. Barry M. Staw and Lisa D. Epstein, “ What Bandwagons Bring: Effects of Popular Management Techniques on Corporate Performance, Reputation, and CEO Pay,” Administrative Science Quarterly 45, no. 3 (September 2000): 523-556.

27. Keith Grint, “Reengineering History,” 193 (see chap. 33, n. 20).

28. Guillermo Armando Ronda-Pupo and Luis Angel Guerras-Martin, “Dynamics of the Evolution of the Strategy Concept 1992-2008: A Co-Word Analysis,” StrategicManagementJournal 33 (2011): 162-188. Their consensus definition: “the dynamics of the firm’s relations with its environment for which the necessary actions are taken to achieve its goals and/or to increase performance by means of the rational use of resources.” This has yet to catch on.

29. Damon Golskorkhi, Linda Rouleau, David Seidl, and Erro Vaara, eds., “Introduction: What Is Strategy as Practice?” Cambridge Handbook of Strategy as Practice (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 13.

30. Paula Jarzabkowski, Julia Balogun, and David See, “Strategizing: The Challenge of a Practice Perspective,” Human Relations 60, no. 5 (2007): 5-27. To be fair, the word had been around since at least the 1970s.

31. Richard Whittington, “Completing the Practice Turn in Strategy Research,” Organization Studies 27, no. 5 (May 2006): 613-634. (Note the attractions of alliteration.)

32. Ian I. Mitroff and Ralph H. Kilmann, “Stories Managers Tell: A New Tool for Organizational Problem Solving,” Management Review 64, no. 7 (July 1975): 18-28; Gordon Shaw, Robert Brown, and Philip Bromiley, “Strategic Stories: How 3M Is Rewriting Business Planning,” Harvard Business Review (May-June 1998), 41-48.

33. Jay A. Conger, “The Necessary Art of Persuasion,” Harvard Business Review (May-June 1998), 85-95.

34. Lucy Kellaway, Sense and Nonsense in the Office (London: Financial Times: Prentice Hall, 2000), 19.

35. Karl E. Weick, Sensemaking in Organizations (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1995), 129.

36. Valérie-Inès de la Ville and Elèonore Mounand, “A Narrative Approach to Strategy as Practice: Strategy Making from Texts and Narratives,” in Golskorkhi, Rouleau, Seidl, and Vaara, eds., Cambridge Handbook of Strategy as Practice, 13.

37. David M. Boje, “Stories of the Storytelling Organization: A Postmodern Analysis of Disney as ‘Tamara-Land,’ ” Academy of Management Journal 38, no. 4 (August 1995): 997-1035.

38. Karl E. Weick, Making Sense of the Organization (Oxford : Blackwell, 2001), 344-345. It appears in a number of versions in his work, starting in 1982.

39. Mintzberg et al., Strategy Safari, 160 (see chap. 30, n. 29).

40. This led to accusations of plagiarism. Thomas Basbpll and Henrik Graham, “Substitutes for Strategy Research: Notes on the Source of Karl Weick’s Anecdote of the Young Lieutenant and the Map of the Pyrenees,” Ephemera: Theory & Politics in Organization 6, no. 2 (2006): 194-204.

41. Richard T. Pascale, “Perspectives on Strategy: The Real Story Behind Honda’s Success,” California Management Review 26 (1984): 47-72. The California Management Review 38, no. 4 (1996) had a roundtable to discuss the implications of this story which included Michael Goold (author of the original BCG report), “Learning, Planning, and Strategy: Extra Time”; Richard T. Pascale, “Reflections on Honda”; Richard P. Rumelt, “The Many Faces of Honda”; and Henry Mintzberg, “Introduction” and “Reply to Michael Goold.” Pascale was challenging a report by the Boston Consulting Group commissioned by the British Government to explain the precipitate decline of the British motorcycle industry from a commanding market position. BCG blamed “a concern for short term profitability” in Britain while reporting on how the Japanese had managed to develop a massive internal market for small motorcycles. This meant that costs were low, so when they decided to export there was no way that British firms geared to large motorcycles could compete. Honda achieved stunning economies of scale: producing about two hundred motorcycles per worker per year compared with fourteen motorcycles in British factories. Boston Consulting Group, Strategy Alternatives for the British Motorcycle Industry, 2 vols. (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1975).

42. Henry Mintzberg, “Crafting Strategy,” HarvardBusiness Review (July-August 1987), 70.

43. Andrew Mair, “Learning from Japan: Interpretations of Honda Motors by Strategic Management Theorists,” Nissan Occasional Paper Series No.

29, 1999, available at A shorter version appears in Andrew Mair, “Learning from Honda,” Journal of Management Studies 36, no. 1 (January 1999): 25-44.

44. Jeffrey Alexander, Japan’s Motorcycle Wars: An Industry History (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2008).

45. Mair, “Learning from Japan,” 29-30. The debate is reviewed in Christopher D. McKenna, “Mementos: Looking Backwards at the Honda Motorcycle Case, 2003-1973,” in Sally Clarke, Naomi R. Lamoreaux, and Steven Usselman, eds., The Challenge of Remaining Innovative: Lessonsfrom Twentieth Century American Business (Palo Alto : Stanford University Press, 2008).

46. Phil Rosenzweig, The Halo Effect (New York : The Free Press, 2007).

47. John Kay, The Hare & The Tortoise, 33, 70, 158, 160.

48. Stephen Bungay, The Art ofAction: How Leaders Close the Gap Between Plans, Actions and Results (London: Nicholas Brealey, 2011).

49. A. G. Laffley and Roger Martin, Playing to Win: How Strategy Really Works (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business Review Press, 272), 214-215.

50. Richard Rumelt, Good Strategy, BadStrategy: The Difference and Why It Matters (London: Profile Books, 2011), 77, 106, 111.

51. Ibid., 32. “Fluff” involved superficial restatements of the obvious, raised to a higher level by neologisms, or abstruse concepts which could give an appearance of profundity. It was reflected in a tendency to string abstract nouns together, each with a positive connotation. Rumelt blamed the academic world, where the manipulation of abstractions was often a way of making authors appear cleverer than they are, and could require constant translation with real examples to give meaning to the ideas.

52. Ibid., 58.

Chapter 36. The Limits of Rational Choice

1. Cited in Paul Hirsch, Stuart Michaels, and Ray Friedman, “ ‘Dirty Hands’ versus ‘Clean Models’: Is Sociology in Danger of Being Seduced by Economics,” Theory andSociety 16 (1987): 325.

2. Emily Hauptmann, “The Ford Foundation and the Rise of Behavioralism in Political Science,” Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences 48, no. 2 (2012): 154-173.

3. S. M. Amadae, Rationalising Capitalist Democracy: The Cold War Origins of Rational Choice Liberalism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003), 3.

4. Martin Hollis and Robert Sugden, “Rationality in Action,” Mind 102, no. 405 (January 1993): 2.

5. Richard Swedberg, “Sociology and Game Theory: Contemporary and Historical Perspectives,” Theory and Society 30 (2001): 320.

6. William Riker, “The Entry of Game Theory into Political Science,” in Roy Weintraub, ed., Toward a History of Game Theory, 208-210 (see chap. 12, n. 19).

7. S. M. Amadae and Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, “The Rochester School: The Origins of Positive Political Theory,” Annual Review of Political Science 2 (1999): 276.

8. Ibid., 282, 291.

9. See Ronald Terchek, “Positive Political Theory and Heresthetics: The Axioms and Assumptions of William Riker,” The Political Science Reviewer, 1984, 62. Also on Riker see Albert Weale, “Social Choice versus Populism? An Interpretation of Riker’s Political Theory,” British Journal of Political Science 14, no. 3 (July 1984): 369-385; Iain McLean, “William H. Riker and the Invention of Heresthetic(s),” British Journal of Political Science 32, no. 3 (July 2002): 535-558.

10. Jonathan Cohn, “The Revenge of the Nerds: Irrational Exuberance: When Did Political Science Forget About Politics,” New Republic, October 15, 1999.

11. William Riker and Peter Ordeshook, An Introduction to Positive Political Theory (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1973), 24.

12. Richard Langlois, “Strategy as Economics versus Economics as Strategy,” Managerial and Decision Economics 24, no. 4 (June-July 2003): 287.

13. Donald P. Green and Ian Shapiro, Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory: A Critique of Applications in Political Science (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1996), X. One counterattack appeared in Jeffery Friedman, ed., “Rational Choice Theory and Politics,” Critical Review 9, no. 1-2 (1995).

14. Stephen Walt, “Rigor or Rigor Mortis? Rational Choice and Security Studies,” International Security 23, no. 4 (Spring 1999): 8.

15. Dennis Chong quoted in Cohn, The Revenge of the Nerds.

16. William A. Gamson, “A Theory of Coalition Formation,” American Sociological Review 26, no. 3 (June 1961): 373-382.

17. William Riker, The Theory of Political Coalitions (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1963).

18. William Riker, “Coalitions. I. The Study of Coalitions,” in David L. Sills, ed., International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, vol. 2 (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1968), 527. Cited in Swedberg, Sociology and Game Theory, 328.

19. Riker, Theory of Political Coalitions, 22.

20. Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965); Iain McLean, “Review Article: The Divided Legacy of Mancur Olson,” British Journal of Political Science 30, no. 4 (October 2000), 651-668.

21. Mancur Olson and Richard Zeckhauser, “An Economic Theory of Alliances,” The Review of Economics and Statistics 48, no. 3 (August 1966): 266-279.

22. Avinash K. Dixit and Barry J. Nalebuff, The Art of Strategy: A Game Theorist’s Guide to Success in Business and Life (New York: W. W. Norton, 2008), x.

23. Anatol Rapoport, Strategy and Conscience (New York: Harper & Row, 1964). For Schelling’s response, see his review in The American Economic Review, LV (December 1964), 1082-1088.

24. Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 1984), 177. The episode is covered in Mirowski, Machine Dreams: see Chapter 12, n. 11, 484-487.

25. Dennis Chong, Collective Action and the Civil Rights Movement (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 231-237.

26. Robert Jervis, “Realism, Game Theory and Cooperation,” World Politics 40, no. 3 (April 1988): 319. See also Robert Jervis, “Rational Deterrence: Theory and Evidence,” World Politics 41, no. 2 (January 1989): 183-207.

27. Herbert Simon, “Human Nature in Politics, The Dialogue of Psychology with Political Science,” American Political Science Review 79, no. 2 (June 1985): 302.

28. Albert Weale, “Social Choice versus Populism?”, 379.

29. William H. Riker, “The Heresthetics of Constitution-Making: The Presidency in 1787, with Comments on Determinism and Rational Choice,” The American Political Science Review 78, no. 1 (March 1984): 1-16.

30. Simon, “Human Nature in Politics,” 302.

31. Amadae and Bueno de Mesquita, “The Rochester School.”

32. William Riker, The Art of Political Manipulation (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1986), ix.

33. William Riker, The Strategy of Rhetoric (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1996), 4.

Chapter 37. Beyond Rational Choice

1. Cited by Martin Hollis and Robert Sugden, “Rationality in Action,” Mind 102, no. 405 (January 1993): 3.

2. Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper & Row, 1957), 5.

3. Riker, The Theory of Political Coalitions, 20 (see chap. 36, n. 17).

4. Seepp. 153-154.

5. Brian Forst and Judith Lucianovic, “The Prisoner’s Dilemma: Theory and Reality,’’Journal ofCriminalJustice 5 (1977): 55-64.

6. For example, Nalebuff and Brandenburger granted that the “simple textbooks present a view of ‘rational man’ that doesn’t apply very well to the mixed-up, real world of business. But that’s a problem with the textbooks.” For Nalebuff and Brandenburger, a rational person “does the best he can” depending on his perception, which is affected by the amount of information available and how he evaluates the various outcomes. This argued for remembering to look at a game from multiple perspectives. “To us,” they concluded, “the issue of whether people are rational or irrational is largely beside the point.” There is something refreshing about a book purporting to represent game theory to a wider business audience ducking so brazenly the fundamental conceptual issue that had shaped its methodology and potentially limited its application. Nalebuff and Brandenburger, Co-Opetition, 56-58.

7. Introduction in Jon Elster, ed., Rational Choice (New York: New York University Press, 1986), 16. Green and Shapiro, Pathologies ofRational Choice Theory, 20 (see chap. 36, n. 13) cite Elster to demonstrate the burdens strict criteria place on researchers. Elster was an early advocate for rational choice theory who later became disenchanted.

8. On the inability of individuals to manage formal reasoning and understand statistical methods, see John Conlisk, “Why Bounded Rationality?” Journal of Economic Literature 34, no. 2 (June 1996): 670.

9. Faruk Gul and Wolfgang Pesendorfer, “The Case for Mindless Economics,” in A. Caplin and A. Shotter, eds., Foundations of Positive andNormative Economics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).

10. Khurana, From HigherAims to Higher Hands, see Chapter 32, n. 10, 284-285.

11. Herbert A. Simon, “A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 69, no. 1 (February 1955): 99-118. See also “Information Processing Models of Cognition,” Annual Review of Psychology 30, no. 3 (February 1979): 363-396. Herbert A. Simon and William G. Chase, “Skill in Chess,” American Scientist 61, no. 4 (July 1973): 394-403.

12. Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, “Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases,” Science 185, no. 4157 (September 1974): 1124. See also Daniel Kahneman, “A Perspective on Judgment and Choice: Mapping Bounded Rationality,” American Psychologist 56, no. 9 (September 2003): 697-720.

13. “IRRATIONALITY: Rethinking thinking,” TheEconomist, December 16, 1999, available at

14. Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, “The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice,” Science 211, no. 4481 (1981): 453-458; “Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions,” Journal of Business 59, no. 4, Part 2 (October 1986): S251-S278.

15. Richard H. Thaler, “Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 1, no. 1 (March 1980): 36-90; “Mental Accounting and Consumer Choice,” Marketing Science 4, no. 3 (Summer 1985): 199-214.

16. Joseph Henrich, Steven J. Heine, and Ara Norenzayan, “The Weirdest People in the World?” Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 2010, 1-75.

17. Chris D. Frith and Tania Singer, “The Role of Social Cognition in Decision Making,” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society 363, no. 1511 (December 2008): 3875-3886; Colin Camerer and Richard H. Thaler, “Ultimatums, Dictators and Manners,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 9, no. 2: 209-219; A. G. Sanfey, J. K. Rilling, J. A. Aronson, L. E. Nystrom, and J. D. Cohen, “The Neural Basis of Economic Decisionmaking in the Ultimatum Game,” Science 300, no. 5626 (2003): 1755-1758. For a survey, see Angela A. Stanton, Evolving Economics: Synthesis, April 26, 2006, Munich Personal RePEc Archive, Paper No. 767, posted November 7, 2007, available at http://mpra. 67/.

18. Robert Forsythe, Joel L. Horowitz, N. E. Savin, and Martin Sefton, “Fairness in Simple Bargaining Experiments,” Game Economics Behavior 6 (1994): 347-369.

19. Elizabeth Hoffman, Kevin McCabe, and Vernon L. Smith, “Social Distance and Other-Regarding Behavior in Dictator Games,” American Economic Review 86, no. 3 (June1996): 653-660.

20. Joseph Patrick Henrich et al., “ ‘Economic Man’ in Cross-Cultural Perspective: Behavioral Experiments in 15 Small-Scale Societies,” Behavioral Brain Science 28 (2005): 813.

21. Stanton, EvolvingEconomics, 10.

22. Martin A. Nowak and Karl Sigmund, “The Dynamics of Indirect Reciprocity,”JournalofTheoreticalBiology 194(1998): 561-574.

23. Altruistic punishment has been shown to have a vital role in maintaining cooperation in groups. See Herbert Gintis, “Strong Reciprocity and Human Sociality,” Journal of Theoretical Biology 206, no. 2 (September 2000): 169-179.

24. Mauricio R. Delgado, “Reward-Related Responses in the Human Striatum,” Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 1104 (May 2007): 70-88.

25. Fabrizio Ferraro, Jeffrey Pfeffer, and Robert I. Sutton, “Economics, Language and Assumptions: How Theories Can Become Self-Fulfilling,” The Academy of Management Review 30, no. 1 (January 2005): 14-16; Gerald Marwell and Ruth E. Ames, “Economists Free Ride, Does Anyone Else? Experiments on the Provision of Public Goods,” Journal of Public Economics 15 (1981): 295-310.

26. Dale T. Miller, “The Norm of Self-Interest,” American Psychologist 54, no. 12 (December 1999): 1055, cited in Ferraro et al., “Economics, Language and Assumptions,” 14.

27. “Economics Focus: To Have and to Hold,” The Economist, August 28, 2003, available at

28. Alan G. Sanfey, “Social Decision-Making: Insights from Game Theory and Neuroscience,” Science 318 (2007): 598.

29. See Guido Mollering, “Inviting or Avoiding Deception Through Trust: Conceptual Exploration of an Ambivalent Relationship,” MPIfG Working Paper 08/1, 2008, 6.

30. Rachel Croson, “Deception in Economics Experiments,” in Caroline Gerschlager, ed., Deception in Markets: An EconomicAnalysis (London: Macmillan, 2005), 113.

31. Erving Goffman, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (New York: Doubleday, 1959), 83-84. Students of deception have sought to revive an old word paltering, which is defined as acting insincerely or misleadingly, creating a false impression through “fudging, twisting, shading, bending, stretching, slanting, exaggerating, distorting, whitewashing, and selective reporting.” Frederick Schauer and Richard Zeckhauser, “Paltering,” in Brooke Harrington, ed., Deception: From Ancient Empires to Internet Dating (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009), 39.

32. Uta Frith and Christopher D. Frith, “Development and Neurophysiology of Mentalizing,” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society, London 358, no. 1431 (March 2003): 459-473. Responses to another’s pain were found in the same area of the brain where individuals respond to their own pain.

An individual’s own pain, however, would lead to an effort to do something about it, and this required the activation of other parts of the brain. It was perhaps a legacy of the evolutionary process that by looking at others, important clues could be discerned about what to feel. In the faces of others could be seen warnings of an impending danger. T. Singer, B. Seymour, J. O’Doherty, H. Kaube, R. J. Dolan, and C. D. Frith, “Empathy for Pain Involves the Affective but Not Sensory Components of Pain,” Science 303, no. 5661 (February 2004): 1157-1162; Vittorio Gallese, “The Manifold Nature of Interpersonal Relations: The Quest for a Common Mechanism,” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society, London 358, no. 1431 (March 2003): 517; Stephany D. Preston and Frank B. M. de-Waal, “Empathy: the Ultimate and Proximate Bases,” Behavioral and Brain Scences 25 (2002): 1.

33. R. P. Abelson, “Are Attitudes Necessary?” in B. T. King and E. McGinnies, eds., Attitudes, Conflict, and Social Change (New York: Academic Press, 1972), 19-32, cited in IraJ. Roseman and Stephen J. Read, “Psychologist at Play: Robert P. Abelson’s Life and Contributions to Psychological Science,” Perspectives on Psychological Science 2, no. 1 (2007): 86-97.

34. R. C. Schank and R. P. Abelson, Scripts, Plans, Goals and Understanding: An Inquiry into Human Knowledge Structures (Hillsdale, NJ : Erlbaum, 1977).

35. R. P. Abelson, “Script Processing in Attitude Formation and Decisionmaking,” inJ. S. Carroll and J. W. Payne, eds., Cognition andSocial Behavior (Hillsdale, NJ : Erlbaum, 1976).

36. M. Lyons, T. Caldwell, and S. Shultz, “Mind-Reading and Manipulation—Is Machiavellianism Related to Theory of Mind?” Journal of Evolutionary Psychology 8, no. 3 (September 2010): 261-274.

37. Mirowski, Machine Dreams, 424.

38. Alan Sanfey, “Social Decision-Making: Insights from Game Theory and Neuroscience,” Science 318, no. 5850 (October 2007): 598-602.

39. Stephen Walt, “Rigor or Rigor Mortis?” (see chap. 36, n. 14).

40. Jonah Lehrer, How We Decide (New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2009), 227.

41. George E. Marcus, “The Psychology of Emotion and Passion,” in David O. Sears, Leonie Huddy, and Robert Jervis, eds., Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 182-221.

42. The designations System 1 and System 2 come from Keith Stanovich and Richard West, “Individual Differences in Reasoning: Implications for the Rationality Debate,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (2000): 645-665.

Daniel Kahneman has popularized the terms in his Thinking Fast and Slow (London: Penguin Books, 2011). J. St. B. T. Evans, “In Two Minds: DualProcess Accounts of Reasoning,” Trends in Cognition Science 7, no. 10 (October 2003): 454-459; “Dual-Processing Accounts of Reasoning, Judgment and Social Cognition,” The Annual Review of Psychology 59 (January 2008): 255-278.

43. Andreas Glockner and Cilia Witteman, “Beyond Dual-Process Models: A Categorisation of Processes Underlying Intuitive Judgement and Decision Making,” Thinking & Reasoning 16, no. 1 (2009): 1-25.

44. Daniel Kahneman, Thinking Fast and Slow, 42.

45. Alan G. Sanfey et al., “Social Decision-Making,” 598-602.

46. Colin F. Camerer and Robin M. Hogarth, “The Effect of Financial Incentives,’’Journal ofRisk and Uncertainty 19, no. 1-3 (December 1999): 7-42.

47. Jennifer S. Lerner and Philip E. Tetlock, “Accounting for the Effects of Accountability,” PsychologicalBulletin 125, no. 2 (March 1999): 255-275.

48. Daniel Kahneman, Peter P. Wakker, and Rakesh Sarin, “Back to Bentham? Explorations of Experienced Utility,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 112, no. 2 (May 1997): 375-405; Daniel Kahneman, “A Psychological Perspective on Economics,” American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings 93, no. 2 (May 2003): 162-168.

49. J. K. Rilling, A. L. Glenn, M. R. Jairam, G. Pagnoni, D. R. Goldsmith, H. A. Elfenbein, and S. O. Lilienfeld, “Neural Correlates of Social Cooperation and Noncooperation as a Function of Psychopathy,” Biological Psychiatry 61 (2007): 1260-1271.

50. Philip Tetlcok, Expert PoliticalJudgement (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006), 23.

51. Alan N. Hampton, Peter Bossaerts, and John P. O’Doherty, “Neural Correlates of Mentalizing-Related Computations During Strategic Interactions in Humans,” The National Academy of Sciences of the USA 105, no. 18 (May 6, 2008): 6741-6746; Sanfey et al., Social Decision-Making, 598.

52. David Sally, “Dressing the Mind Properly for the Game,” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society London B 358, no. 1431 (March 2003): 583-592.

Chapter 38. Stories and Scripts

1. Charles Lindblom, “The Science of‘Muddling Through,’” Public Administration Review 19, no. 2 (Spring 1959): 79-88.

2. Gordon Wood, “History Lessons,” New York Review of Books, March 29, 1984, p. 8 (Review of Barbara Tuchman’s March of Folly).

3. Speech to the National Defense Executive Reserve Conference in Washington, DC, November 14, 1957, in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1957 (National Archives and Records Service, Government Printing Office), p. 818. He then observed “the very definition of ‘emergency’ is that it is unexpected, therefore it is not going to happen the way you are planning.”

4. Hew Strachan, “The Lost Meaning of Strategy,” Survival 47, no. 3 (2005): 34.

5. Timothy Crawford, “Preventing Enemy Coalitions: How Wedge Strategies Shape Power Politics,” International Security 35, no. 4 (Spring 2011): 189.

6. Jon T. Sumida, “The Clausewitz Problem,” Army History (Fall 2009), 17—21.

7. Isaiah Berlin, “On Political Judgment,” New York Review of Books (October 3, 1996).

8. Bruce Kuklick, Blind Oracles: Intellectuals and Warfrom Kennan to Kissinger (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006), 16.

9. Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition, 2nd revised edition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999), 200. First published 1958.

10. Steven Lukes, Power: A Radical View (London: Macmillan, 1974).

11. Charles Tilly, “The Trouble with Stories,” in Stories, Identities, andSocial Change (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002), 25-42.

12. Naomi Lamoreaux, “Reframing the Past: Thoughts About Business Leadership and Decision Making Under Certainty,” Enterprise and Society 2 (December 2001): 632-659.

13. Daniel M. G. Raff, “How to Do Things with Time,” Enterprise and Society 14, no. 3 (forthcoming, September 2013).

14. Daniel Kahneman, ThinkingFastandSlow, 199, 200-201 206, 259 (see chap. 38, n. 44).

15. Nassim Taleb, The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable (New York : Random House, 2007), 8.

16. Joseph Davis, ed., Stories of Change: Narrative andSocial Movements (New York: State University of New York Press, 2002).

17. Francesca Polletta, It Was Like a Fever, see Chapter 27, n. 1, 166.

18. Joseph Davis, ed., Stories of Change: Narrative and Social Movements (New York: State University of New York Press, 2002).

19. Dennis Gioia and Peter P Poole, “Scripts in Organizational Behavior,” Academy of Management Review 9, no. 3 (1984): 449-459; Ian Donald and David Canter, “Intentionality and Fatality During the King’s Cross Underground Fire,” European Journal of Social Psychology 22 (1992): 203-218.

20. R. P Abelson, “Psychological Status of the Script Concept,” American Psychologist 36 (1981): 715-729.

21. Avner Offer, “Going to War in 1914: A Matter of Honor?” Politics and Society 23, no. 2 (1995): 213-241. Richard Herrmann and Michael Fischerkeller also introduce the idea of “strategic scripts” in their “Beyond the Enemy Image and Spiral Model: Cognitive-Strategic Research After the Cold War,” International Organization 49, no. 3 (Summer 1995): 415-450. Their use is, however, different with scripts considered as “hypothetical structures that offer a means to organize the totality of foreign policy behavior.” Another approach is that offered by James C. Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1992). Scott describes how subordinate groups critique the “public transcript” promoted by the dominant group by surreptitiously developing a critique in the form of “hidden transcripts.” He thus takes familiar arguments about paradigms, formulas, myths, and false consciousness and challenges them by suggesting that subordinate groups are not so easily duped.

22. Jerome Bruner, “The Narrative Construction of Reality,” Critical Inquiry, 1991, 4-5, 34.

23. Christopher Fenton and Ann Langley, “Strategy as Practice and the Narrative Turn,” Organization Studies 32, no. 9 (2011): 1171-1196; G. Shaw, R.Brown, and P. Bromiley, “Strategic Stories: How 3M Is Rewriting Business Planning,” HarvardBusinessReview (May-June 1998), 41-50.

24. Valérie-Inès de la Ville and Elèonore Mounand, “A Narrative Approach to Strategy as Practice: Strategy-making from Texts and Narratives,” in Damon Golskorkhi, et al. eds., Cambridge Handbook of Strategy as Practice (see chap. 35, n. 29), 13.

25. David Barry and Michael Elmes, “Strategy Retold: Toward a Narrative View of Strategic Discourse,” The Academy ofManagement Review 22, no. 2 (April 1997): 437, 430, 432-433.

26. Robert McKee, Story, Substance, Structure, Style, and the Principles of Screenwriting (London : Methuen, 1997).

27. Aristotle, Poetics,

28. Laton McCartney, The Teapot Dome Scandal: How Big Oil Bought the Harding White House and Tried to Steal the Country (New York : Random House, 2008).

29. Although the first senator to come out for Roosevelt and the New Deal, by 1939 he was known as a vigorous isolationist and for accusations that Jews in Hollywood were using the influence of the movies to stir up prowar fervor. He denied Japan’s hostile intent in the weeks before Pearl Harbor. This background led him to have a later literary incarnation, as Charles Lindbergh’s vice president in Philip Roth’s The Plot Against America (New York : Random House, 2004).

30. Michael Kazin, American Dreamers (see chap. 25, n. 51), 187; Charles Lindblom and John A. Hall, “Frank Capra Meets John Doe: Anti-politics in American National Identity,” in Mette Hjort and Scott Mackenzie, eds., Cinema and Nation (New York: Routledge, 2000). See also Joseph McBride, Frank Capra (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 2011).

31. This self-regulating body for upholding proper moral standards in film was largely about sexual conduct, but Breen also imposed political censorship, for example preventing anti-Nazi films being made, at least until 1938.

32. Richard Maltby, Hollywood Cinema (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003), 278-279.

33. Eric Smoodin, “ ‘Compulsory’ Viewing for Every Citizen: Mr. Smith and the Rhetoric of Reception,” Cinema Journal 35, no. 2 (Winter 1996): 3-23.

34. Frances Fitzgerald, Way Out There in the Blue: Reagan, Star Wars and the End of the Cold War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000), 27-37.

35. The original script can be found at MrSmithGoesToWashington.txt.

36. Michael P. Rogin and Kathleen Moran, “Mr. Capra Goes to Washington,” Representations, no. 84 (Autumn 2003): 213-248.

37. Christopher Booker, The Seven Basic Plots: Why We Tell Stories (New York : Continuum, 2004).

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