6 ♦ What Stalin Heard

THE GREAT WHITE MARBLE-AND-GILT HALL OF ST. GEORGE in the Kremlin Palace was thronged with Soviet military men. It was December 31, 1940, and several hundred top army commanders had been meeting in Moscow for the past fortnight, discussing urgent matters. The big question in the minds of all, as General M. I. Kalinin, commander of the West Siberian Military District, recalled, was: Will Germany attack and when can we expect it?

“It was obvious that the Fascists were in a hurry,” he recalled. “They were doing everything they could to test our strength.”

Up to New Year’s Eve nothing had been said officially about Germany, but tonight the officers had been told that Stalin would speak. Most of them anticipated he would use the occasion to warn that war with Germany was possible within a few months. This was the gossip as the officers strolled about the parquet floor, looking up at the white marble tablets on which were engraved the golden lists of holders of the St. George’s cross, the highest czarist military decoration, Russian equivalent of the Victoria Cross. Although the czarist regime had long since fallen, the names of the great Russian military heroes had remained on the walls without change.

Suddenly came a stir. Stalin appeared. He walked to the upper end of the hall from the interior reception rooms of the palace and stood there mechanically clapping his hands in the customary Russian way during the prolonged applause. Finally, it died down and the officers waited expectantly. Stalin smiled cryptically. “S novym godom!” he said. “S novym schastyem!— Happy New Year! The best to you all!”

He spoke a few more words of formal welcome, then turned the reception over to Marshal Kliment Voroshilov and walked out. Voroshilov offered a slightly warmer New Year’s greeting, and that was all. The reception was over.

The officers straggled out of the Kremlin into the snowy night puzzled. They returned to the Central House of the Red Army for a rousing celebration, punctuated by more vodka toasts than some of them could remember.

“Evidently, this isn’t the time to talk about the matter,” Kalinin and his comrades concluded. They asked no more questions. They had long since learned that Stalin was an enigma and that questions were not only futile but often dangerous.

The military meeting went on until January 7. Lesser commanders then returned to their posts, and a war game was run off between January 8 and 11 for top-ranking officers. This was followed by a conference at the Kremlin on January 13 in which Stalin and the Politburo participated. To this restricted audience Stalin did mention the gathering signs of war but offered no indication of when he thought it might break out. He talked in general terms. He spoke of the possibility of two-front war—with Germany on the west and Japan on the east—for which Russia must be prepared. He thought that the future war would be one of maneuver, and he proposed to increase the mobility of infantry units and decrease their size. Such a war, he warned, would be a mass war and it was essential to maintain an over-all superiority in men and material of two to one or three to one over a possible enemy. The employment of fast-moving motorized units, equipped with automatic weapons, demanded exceptional organization of supply sources and great reserves of material. Some of his listeners were astonished to hear him expound at length on the wisdom of the czarist government in laying in reserves of hardtack against possible war. He praised hardtack highly, called it a very good product, very nourishing, especially when taken with tea.

Other listeners were deeply disturbed at Stalin’s pronouncement (faithfully approved by the meeting) that a superiority of at least two to one was required for a successful offensive not only in the area of the principal breakthrough but on the whole operational front. The application of such a doctrine would require numbers, equipment and rear support far beyond anything heretofore contemplated. The Soviet commanders agreed that overwhelming superiority was needed in the breakthrough area, but they did not see why such great numerical concentrations were required on the nonactive parts of the front as well.

They were even more disturbed that the plans and estimates for bringing the Red Army up to strength to meet the German threat were not intended to be completed before early 1942. War might not wait that long.

The corridors of the Kremlin and of the Defense Commissariat on Frunze Street sputtered with rumors, but the actions flowing from the meeting carried no feeling of crisis or urgency. There was another big shake-up of commands. Marshal Meretskov was replaced as Chief of Staff by General Zhukov, principally because Meretskov made a poor impression at the Kremlin when he gave his report on the war games on January 13.1

General M. P. Kirponos was shifted from Leningrad to Kiev, and General Markian M. Popov was brought back from the Far East to take Kirponos’ post in Leningrad.

The great mistake of January, 1941, in the opinion of Soviet marshals who survived the war, was that Stalin simply refused to believe that a German attack was near and therefore did not order the drafting of urgent plans.

Not that Stalin was lacking concrete evidence of German intentions. It had already begun to pile up impressively. The earliest hint of what the future held may have been a report of the Soviet intelligence agency, the NKGB, to the Kremlin in July, 1940, revealing that the Nazi General Staff had asked the German Transport Ministry to provide data on rail capabilities for movement of troops from west to east. It was at this time that Hitler and the General Staff first began seriously to examine the question of an attack on Russia, and by July 31, 1940, the German planning was in full swing.2

There is no indication that Stalin or any other high Soviet official paid heed to the early intelligence warnings. Indeed, it was not until after Molo-tov’s frosty conversations with Hitler in Berlin in November, 1940, at which Nazi-Soviet differences over spheres of influence and plans for dividing up the world became obvious, that talk began to be heard among some Soviet military men of a change in relations with Germany which might bring war. Marshal A. M. Vasilevsky, who accompanied Molotov to Berlin, returned convinced that Germany would attack the Soviet Union. His opinion was shared by many of his colleagues. Vasilevsky believed Molotov reported to Stalin the general conviction that Hitler sooner or later would attack and that Stalin did not believe him. Draft plans for the strategic deployment of the Soviet armed forces in case of German attack were twice laid before the Soviet Government by the High Command in the fall of 1940 but were not acted upon. As early as September, 1940, Soviet commanders along the Western Front were talking about Hitler’s “Drang nach Osten” and his habit of carrying around in his pocket a picture of Frederick Barbarossa. War games predicated on a German attack were discussed, but the generals were reprimanded by their political superiors for “Germanophobia.”

It was not healthy for military men to speak their minds openly about Germany so long as Stalin clung to his conviction that Hitler would respect the Soviet-German pact. Occasionally, after the Hitler-Molotov talks Stalin or Molotov remarked that Germany was no longer so punctual or careful about fulfilling her obligations under the pact. But no serious significance seemed to be attachéd to this.

Hitler gave approval to Operation Barbarossa, the military plan for attacking Russia, on December 18. At noon the next day he received the new Soviet Ambassador, V. G. Dekanozov, who had been cooling his heels in Berlin, waiting to present his credentials for nearly a month. Hitler received Dekanozov with great courtesy, apologizing that he had been “so busy with military affairs” that he had not had time to meet with him earlier. A week later, on Christmas Day, the Soviet military attaché in Berlin received an anonymous letter, saying the Germans were preparing for an attack on Russia in the spring of 1941. By December 29 Soviet intelligence agencies had in their hands the basic facts about Barbarossa, its scope and intended time of execution.

Toward the end of January the Japanese military attaché, Yamaguchi, returned to Moscow from Berlin. He gave a member of the Soviet naval diplomatic service his impressions of Germany. The Germans, he said, were extremely dissatisfied with Italy and were seeking another field of action.

“I do not exclude the possibility of conflict between Berlin and Moscow,” Yamaguchi said.

This information was reported to Marshal Voroshilov January 30, 1941.

Before the end of January the Defense Commissariat had become sufficiently concerned to begin drafting a general directive to the border commands and the fleets which would for the first time name Germany as the likely opponent in a future war.

At about this time the Chief Political Administration of the Army proposed to Zhdanov—who was in chargé of Party ideological work—that they shift the basis of army propaganda to a stronger line. They warned that a mood of overconfidence was being fostered by excessive emphasis on the theme of the “all-victorious strength” of Soviet forces and the constant implication that Russia was too powerful for anyone to attack her. The Political Administration wanted a line emphasizing vigilance, the need for preparedness and the danger of attack. But Stalin categorically forbade this approach for fear it would be regarded by the Germans as Soviet preparation for an attack.

In the first days of February the Naval Commissariat began to receive almost daily reports concerning the arrival of German military specialists in the Bulgarian ports of Varna and Burgas and of preparations for the installation of shore batteries and antiaircraft units. This information was reported to Stalin February 7. At the same time the Leningrad Command reported German movements in Finland and German conversations with the Swedes concerning transit of their troops.

About February 15 a German typographical worker appeared at the Soviet Consulate in Berlin. He brought with him a German-Russian phrase book which was being run off in his printing shop in a very large edition. Included were such phrases as: “Where is the chairman of the Collective Farm?”; “Are you a Communist?”; “What is the name of the secretary of the Party committee?”; “Hands up or I’ll shoot”; “Surrender.”

The implications were obvious.

The embassy in Berlin noted that more and more little items were appearing in the German press about “military preparations” on the Soviet side of the German border. Such ominous news releases had preceded the German attacks on Poland and Czechoslovakia.

There was no sign that any of this intelligence disturbed Stalin’s Olympian composure.

On Red Army Day, February 23, the Defense Commissariat issued the directive ordered by Meretskov naming Germany as the probable enemy and instructing the frontier regions to make appropriate preparations. However, by this time Meretskov had been replaced as Chief of Staff by Zhukov, and little was done by the new chief to follow the order up. It was decided to organize twenty new mechanized corps and many new air units, but little progress was made because the needed tanks, planes and other material were not available.

The daily bulletins of the General Staff and of the Naval Staff now began to carry items about German preparations for war against Russia. At the end of February and in early March German reconnaissance flights over the Baltic became an almost daily occurrence. The State Security organs obtained information that the German attack on the British Isles had been indefinitely postponed—until the end of the war against Russia.

The German flights were so frequent over Libau, Tallinn, the island of Ösel and the Moonzund Archipelago that the Baltic Fleet was given permission by Admiral Kuznetsov to open interdictory fire without warning. Kuznetsov’s directive was approved March 3. On March 17 and 18 German planes appeared over Libau and were fired on. Nazi planes also appeared over the approaches to Odessa. After one such incident Admiral Kuznetsov was summoned to the Kremlin. He found Police Chief Beria alone with Stalin. Kuznetsov was asked why he had issued the order to fire on the German planes. When he attempted an explanation, Stalin cut him off with a stiff reprimand and instructions to revoke his order. He did so on April 1, and the German reconnaissance flights resumed in force. Kuznetsov’s actions had violated orders issued by Beria forbidding border generals or any military units to fire on German planes.3

The intelligence data piled up. The State Security forces obtained a report in March concerning a meeting of Marshal Antonescu, the Rumanian dictator, with Bering, a German official, at which the question of war against Russia was discussed. On March 22 the NKGB received what it regarded as reliable information that “Hitler has given secret instructions to suspend the fulfillment of orders for the Soviet Union.” On March 25 the NKGB compiled a special report of its data on the concentration of German forces in the East. This disclosed that 120 German divisions had now been moved to the vicinity of the Soviet Union.

The NKGB had one truly remarkable source. This was the master spy, Richard Sorge, a German Communist and intelligence agent, who had for some years been in Tokyo, ostensibly as a correspondent for German newspapers but actually a Soviet spy of unmatched capability and insight. Sorge had made himself a close confidant of the German Ambassador in Tokyo, Hermann Ott. Thus he was privy to the most intimate German military and diplomatic information.

Utilizing a secret wireless station—and an elaborate courier system—Sorge sent back to Moscow a stream of incredibly accurate information about both Japan and Germany. In 1939 he transmitted 60 reports totaling 23,139 words, and in 1940 his volume was about 30,000.

His first message to Moscow reporting German preparations for an eastern offensive was dispatched November 18, 1940. Month by month his reports accumulated more data: that in Leipzig a new German reserve army of forty divisions was being formed (on December 28, 1940); that eighty German divisions had been concentrated on Soviet frontiers; that twenty divisions which had participated in the assault on France had been shifted to Poland. On March 5 Sorge was able to transmit to Moscow a sensational item. He sent off a microfilm of a telegram from Ribbentrop to Ambassador Ott which gave the date of the German attack as mid-June.

Did this mass of data obtained by Soviet intelligence agencies, particularly those agencies controlled by Police Chief Beria, actually reach Stalin, Zhdanov and other members of the Politburo? Some Soviet military figures, in the virulence of their hatred for Beria, have hinted that he suppressed or distorted these materials.

This is possible. It is also true that Dekanozov, the Soviet Ambassador in Berlin, was a close associate of Beria’s and thus in a position to color, slant or suppress information on Beria’s instructions. Another Beria henchman, Bogdan Kobulov (one of the six police officials executed with Beria December 23, 1953), was Counselor of Embassy in Berlin and in chargé of intelligence operations. There is evidence that Dekanozov did, in fact, minimize reports indicating German preparations for attack. Andrei Y. Vishinsky, a Beria lieutenant, had been installed in the Foreign Commissariat as Molotov’s chief aide. Vishinsky’s influence may have been weighted against finding cause for alarm. However, these men could not have kept the military intelligence reports from reaching Stalin.

Marshal F. I. Golikov was chief of intelligence for the General Staff from mid-July, 1940, until the beginning of the war. He insists that all reports bearing on German plans were forwarded to Stalin and that they clearly indicated that an attack was being prepared.

Some of Golikov’s critics contend that while he forwarded the reports he labeled them of “dubious authenticity” or suggested that they came from agents provocateurs. However, it is probable that it was precisely the “dubious” reports which would particularly appeal to Stalin’s suspicious mind.

The evidence indicates that Stalin, Zhdanov and the others received the intelligence but consistently misinterpreted it, regarding it as provocative or indicative of a situation less immediately pressing and thus fitting Stalin’s concept of an attack by Germany not earlier than autumn 1941 or spring 1942.

“It was clear that the General Staff did not anticipate that war would begin in 1941,” Marshal Voronov, wartime head of Soviet artillery, concluded. “This viewpoint emanated from Stalin, who beyond reason believed in the nonaggression pact with Germany, who had full confidence in it and refused to see the obvious danger which threatened.”

It took a strong will to ignore all evidence. For months there had been a stream of worrisome reports from the Soviet military attaché, in France, Major General I. A. Susloparov. The Germans had systematically restricted Soviet Embassy activities, and in February, 1941, the embassy was shifted from Paris to Vichy, leaving only a consulate in Paris.

In April Susloparov sent word to Moscow that the Germans planned to attack Russia in the last days of May. A bit later he advised that the attack had been delayed a month because of the difficult spring weather. By the end of April Susloparov had obtained information about the impending attack from his Yugoslav, American, Chinese, Turkish and Bulgarian colleagues. All these data were forwarded to Moscow by the middle of May.

In April a Czech agent named Skvor reported that the Germans were moving troops to the border and that the Czech Skoda plant had been given instructions to halt deliveries to the Soviet Union. Stalin red-inked the report: “This informant is an English provocator. Find out who is making this provocation and punish him.”

An account quickly reached Moscow of an incident in Berlin at a reception at the Bulgarian Embassy. The chief of the German Western press department, a man named Karl Bemer, got drunk and shouted out: “Inside of two months our dear Rosenberg will be boss of all Russia and Stalin will be dead. We will demolish the Russians quicker than we did the French.” I. F. Filippov, the Berlin Tass correspondent, heard of the incident almost immediately and also that Bemer had been arrested as a result of his loose talking.

The reports came not only from Soviet sources. As early as January Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles warned the Soviet Ambassador in Washington, Konstantin Umansky, that the United States had information indicating the Germans were preparing war against Russia in the spring.

On April 3 Winston Churchill, through Sir Stafford Cripps, the British Ambassador in Moscow, sought to warn Stalin that British intelligence data indicated the Germans were regrouping to attack Russia. Sir Stafford had difficulty in relaying the message, in part because of touchy Soviet-British relations. He had instructions to hand the message to either Molotov or Stalin. In the end he gave it to Vishinsky, who may or may not have passed it higher.4

Toward the end of April Jefferson Patterson, then the First Secretary of the American Embassy in Berlin, invited Valentin Berezhkov, First Secretary of the Soviet Embassy, to cocktails at his pleasant Charlottenburg house. Among the guests was a German Air Force Major who was introduced as having just come home on leave from North Africa. Toward the end of the evening the Major sought out Berezhkov.

“There’s something Patterson wants me to tell you,” he said. “The fact is I’m not here on leave. My squadron was recalled from North Africa, and yesterday we got orders to transfer to the east, to the region of Lódź. There may be nothing special in that, but I know many other units have also been transferred to your frontiers recently. I don’t know what it may mean, but I personally would not like to have something happen between my country and yours. Naturally, I am telling you this completely confidentially.”

Berezhkov was taken aback. Never before had one of Hitler’s officers passed on this kind of top-secret information. The embassy had been repeatedly warned by Moscow to avoid provocations, so, fearful of a trap, Berezhkov did not attempt to draw out the officer. He did, however, relay the data to Moscow.

Berezhkov’s report went forward with a stream of similar information from the Berlin Embassy. Beginning in March the embassy heard a series of possible dates for the invasion—April 6, April 20, May 18 and June 22. All of them were Sundays. The embassy became convinced a multiplicity of dates was being deliberately circulated as a smoke screen.

It did not escape embassy notice that the German press, after several years, was again serializing excerpts from Mein Kampf. The passages republished were devoted to Hitler’s “Lebensraum” theories, the need for expansion to the east. Was the German public being prepared for events to come? This conclusion fitted other data coming into the hands of Soviet diplomats.

March and early April, 1941, were a tense period in relations between Germany and Russia. This was the moment in which Yugoslavia with tacit (or more than tacit) encouragement from Moscow defied the Germans and in which the Germans moved rapidly and decisively to end the war in Greece and occupy the whole of the Balkans. When Moscow signed a treaty with Yugoslavia April 6—the day Hitler attacked Belgrade—the German reaction was so savage that Stalin became alarmed.5 He ostentatiously closed down the diplomatic missions of countries occupied by the Germans (Belgium, Greece, Yugoslavia, Norway, Denmark) and even gave diplomatic recognition to the fleeting pro-Nazi government of Rashid Ali in Iraq. He seized on the departure of Japan’s Foreign Minister Matsuoka (who had just concluded a friendship pact with Molotov) for a demonstrative gesture toward the Germans. At the Kazan railroad station ceremonies for Matsu-oka’s departure April 13 he threw his arms around Count von der Schulen-burg’s shoulders and declared: “We must remain friends and you must do everything to that end.” He then sought out the German military attaché, Colonel Hans Krebs, and blurted: “We will remain friends with you—in any event!” It was on this same ebullient occasion that Stalin embraced Matsuoka and proclaimed: “We, too, are Asiatics!”

The diplomatic significance of Stalin’s conduct was not lost on Schulen-burg, who promptly telegraphed a report to Berlin. Stalin’s conduct may have been influenced by a report submitted to him and to Molotov by the NKGB on April 10 summarizing a conversation between Hitler and Prince Paul of Yugoslavia. Hitler was described as telling Prince Paul he would open military action against Russia at the end of June.

It may have been Stalin’s fear of growing German hostility that led him to speed deliveries of Soviet supplies to the Germans. These deliveries rose to new highs in April—208,000 tons of grain, 90,000 tons of oil, 8,300 tons of cotton, 6,340 tons of copper, tin, nickel and other metals, and 4,000 tons of rubber. For the first time the Russians began to transport rubber and other materials ordered by the Germans via the Trans-Siberian line by special express train. Much of this matériel, including the rubber, was purchased abroad and was destined, of course, to be used by the Nazi forces in their attack on Russia.

The stream of messages, microfilms and dispatches coming to the NKGB from Sorge by this time was reaching imposing dimensions. During the absence of Ambassador Ott (who had accompanied Foreign Minister Matsuoka to Berlin and Moscow) Colonel Kretschmer, the German military attaché in Tokyo, received word of Germany’s intention of attacking Russia. Sorge dispatched a message dated April 11 which said: “Representative of General Staff in Tokyo reports that immediately after the end of war in Europe war will begin against the Soviet Union.”

Throughout April the daily bulletins of the Soviet General Staff and the Naval Staff reported German troop movements to the Soviet frontier. The May i information bulletin of the General Staff to the frontier military districts summarized the situation in these words:

“In the course of all March and April along the Western Front from the central regions of Germany the German Command has carried out an accelerated transfer of troops to the borders of the Soviet Union.”

Such concentrations were particularly visible in the Memel area across the Soviet-German frontier from the advanced Baltic base of Libau.

The movements were so obvious along the central Bug River frontier near Lvov that the chief of frontier guards asked Moscow for permission to evacuate the families of his troops. Permission was categorically refused, and the commander was rebuked for his “panic.”

German overflights of Soviet territory continued to increase, and the German chargé in Moscow, Tippelskirch, was summoned to the Foreign Commissariat April 22 and presented with a stiff protest. The Russians claimed there had been eighty overflights from March 28 to April 18, including one in which a German plane had been forced down near Rovno April 15 and found to be carrying a camera, exposed film and a topographical map of the U.S.S.R. The Germans were warned of “serious incidents” if the flights continued, and they were reminded that Soviet instructions to border forces not to fire on German planes might be withdrawn.

Rumors of Soviet-German war were so persistent in Moscow (being fed by every traveler and diplomat arriving in Russia who had passed through Germany) that German diplomatic and military personnel begged Berlin for some excuse, however lame, with which to combat them. The efficient network of Soviet secret police informers reported all the rumors to the NKGB.

Now there came from Richard Sorge what could only be described as final confirmation of German plans. In a telegram sent by secret wireless from Tokyo May 2 Sorge reported:

Hitler has resolved to begin war and destroy the U.S.S.R. in order to utilize the European part of the Union as a raw materials and grain base. The critical term for the possible beginning of war:

A. The completion of the defeat of Yugoslavia.

B. Completion of the spring sowing.

C. Completion of conversations between Germany and Turkey.

The decision regarding the start of the war will be taken by Hitler in May. . . .

Stalin received from his intelligence forces on May 5 a report which said: “Military preparations are going forward openly in Poland. German officers and soldiers speak openly of the coming war between Germany and the Soviet Union as a matter already decided. The war is expected to start after the completion of spring planting.”

Sorge’s messages tumbled one after the other. In a day or’ two he was reporting: “A group of German representatives returning from Berlin report that war against the U.S.S.R. will begin at the end of May.” On May 15 he gave the date specifically as June 20–22. On May 19 he reported: “Against the Soviet Union will be concentrated 9 armies, 150 divisions.”

By this time Admiral Kuznetsov had ordered his Northern Fleet to carry out reconnaissance as far west as Cape Nordkyn in Norway, to strengthen its naval patrols and reinforce its fighter and AA (antiaircraft) crews. He sent similar orders to other fleet units.

He issued the order a day after the Soviet naval attaché in Berlin, Admiral M. A. Vorontsov, advised Moscow that he had obtained a statement by an officer attachéd to Hitler’s headquarters to the effect that Germany was preparing to attack Russia through Finland and the Baltic states. Moscow and Leningrad were to be attacked by air and paratroops landed. Madame Kol-lontai, the Soviet Minister in Stockholm, reported in mid-May that German troop concentrations on the Russian frontier were the largest in history.

A deputy military attaché in Berlin named Khlopov reported on May 22 that the attack of the Germans was scheduled for June 15 but might begin in early June. The military attaché, General Tupikov, was sending almost daily reports of German preparations.

The top personnel of the Soviet Embassy in Berlin met in early May and analyzed all the information available concerning German preparations for war. They drafted a report which concluded that the Germans were almost ready and on a scale that, considering the concentration of troops and matériel, left no doubt that an attack on Russia was to be expected at any moment. This report was sent to Moscow but not until late in the month. Possibly it was deliberately delayed by Dekanozov.

There was no diminution of the information from Sorge. He obtained from the German military attaché in Tokyo a German map of Soviet military dispositions, indicating the German plans for assault, and advised that the general German objective was to occupy the Ukraine and impress one to two million Russian prisoners of war into their labor force. He sent information that 170 to 190 divisions were being concentrated, that the assault would begin without an ultimatum or declaration of war and that the Germans expected total collapse of the Red Army and the Soviet regime within two months.

About June I Admiral Vorontsov, the naval attaché in Berlin, advised Admiral Kuznetsov in Moscow that the Germans would attack about June 20–22. Kuznetsov checked to be certain Stalin received a copy of the telegram. He did.

On June I Sorge sent another message from Tokyo explaining the German offensive tactics which were to be employed: strong reliance on cutting off, surrounding and destroying isolated Russian units.

Stalin could not have had more specific, more detailed, more comprehensive information. Probably no nation ever had been so well informed of an impending enemy attack. The encyclopedic mass of Soviet intelligence makes even the imposing data which the United States possessed concerning Japan’s intention to attack Pearl Harbor look quite skimpy.

But the Soviet experience reveals that neither the quantity nor the quality of intelligence reporting and analysis determines whether a national leadership acts in timely and resolute fashion. It is the ability of the leadership to comprehend what is reported, to assimilate the findings of the spies and the warnings of the diplomats. Unless there is a clear channel from lower to top levels, unless the leadership insists upon honest and objective reporting and is prepared to act upon such reports, regardless of preconceptions, prejudices, past commitments and personal politics, the best intelligence in the world goes to waste—or, even worse, is turned into an instrument of self-deceit. This was clearly the case with Stalin. Nothing in the Bolshevik experience so plainly exposed the fatal defects of the Soviet power monopoly when the man who held that power was ruled by his own internal obsessions.


1 Meretskov was scheduled to deliver an evaluation of the military exercises at the Defense Commissariat January 14. Stalin suddenly telephoned and ordered the discus sions held at the Kremlin a day earlier. Meretskov’s data were incomplete, his notes skimpy and his presentation unavoidably halting. Whether the change of plans was a political trick on the part of Stalin or an intrigue by someone in the Kremlin is not clear. Zhukov was named immediately (January 14) to replace Meretskov, although public announcement was deferred to February 12. (A. I. Yeremenko, V Nachale Voiny, Moscow, 1964, p. 45; Kuznetsov, Oktyabr, No. 11, November, 1965, p. 149; M. I. Kazakov, Nad Kartoi Bylikh Srazhenii, Moscow, 1965, pp. 61-66.) Marshal Bagramyan is mistaken in claiming that the Zhukov appointment was announced in the papers of January 15. His memory seems to have played him a trick. (Bagramyan, Voyenno-Istoricheskii Zhurnal, No. 1, January, 1967, p. 55.)

2 The earliest published reference to Nazi planning for the war in the East is Haider’s diary entry for July 22, 1940.

3 Not long thereafter a German reconnaissance pilot made a forced landing just outside Libau Harbor. His plane was towed in, he was given a dinner, his plane was refueled and he was sent off with a hearty greeting—on special orders from Moscow. (Orlov, op. cit., p. 36.)

4 Churchill drafted a brief, cryptic warning which he wished, conveyed personally to Stalin by Cripps. This was dispatched with covering instructions to Moscow by Eden, a few days after April 3. Cripps did not respond to the instruction until April 12, when he advised London that he had just sent Vishinsky a long personal letter along similar lines. He objected that if he forwarded the message from Churchill it would only confuse matters. After some back-and-forth between Churchill, Eden and Cripps, the message was finally delivered to Vishinsky for Stalin on April 19. On April 23 Vishinsky confirmed that it had been given to Stalin, but nothing further was ever heard of the matter. Whether or not the information got to Stalin, it seems to have gotten to Hitler. A top-secret communication from the German Foreign Office to the German Embassy in Moscow on April 22 reported the contents of Cripps’s communication and said it had been delivered April 11. The Germans must have had a spy in the Soviet Foreign Office or, possibly, in the Soviet Embassy in Berlin, which may have been informed of Cripps’s letter. (Churchill, The Grand Alliance, Boston, 1950, pp. 356-361; Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918–45, Series D, Vol. XII, p. 604.)

5 The treaty was signed in Moscow at i: 30 A.M., April 6. The Germans attacked Yugoslavia at 7 A.M., April 6. Possibly in the knowledge that German attack was imminent, the treaty was backdated to April 5. (Henry C. Cassidy, Moscow Dateline, Cambridge, Mass., 1943, p. 10.)

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