Chapter Three
‘As 1916 began, the German strategic situation was stable if not favourable. Through the course of 1915, the German armies had advanced deep into Russia and had seemingly crushed the Russian offensive capability. Serbia had been dealt an even heavier blow, as a combined German-Austro-Hungarian-Bulgarian force occupied the country and ejected the remnants of the Serb army from the continent. The destruction of Serbia opened rail communications with Turkey, thus helping to shore up this beleaguered ally. In Italy and on the Western Front, the Central Powers had warded off powerful Entente offensives and looked likely to be able to hold off any similar attacks for the foreseeable future.’ However, Falkenhayn was no closer to achieving the goals set in November 1914.
Both Falkenhayn and Conrad, the two General Staff Chiefs, agreed that the war needed to be ended by 1917 before both nations reached the end of their resources. How could this be achieved? An offensive that would exhaust the French followed by a ‘counter-offensive to mop up the French and British armies after they had been bled white by their own relief offensives.’ After this the Entente should fall apart allowing a negotiated settlement. Thus the die was cast for Verdun and the Somme.
Ludwig III, King of Bavaria from 1913 to 1918 when the kingdom became a republic.
On 21 February, the great offensive against the French positions at Verdun began, but at the same time a diversionary attack was made by an infantry corps against the Bois de Givenchy, by which they regained possession of the knoll at the northern end of the Vimy Ridge from the French Tenth Army. The next day the French informed the British of the seriousness of the attack and requested the relief of the two flank corps of the four holding the Tenth Army front. Later, the French Commander-in-Chief asked that, of strategic necessity, the Tenth Army should be relieved at once. As an offensive against the Tenth Army front was considered unlikely, Haig decided to take over the whole of the front.
Between 2 and 14 March the relief of the Tenth Army was completed, but not in the secrecy that had been intended. The British 46 Division went into the line on 9 March with advance parties going into the trenches wearing French helmets to disguise their arrival from enemy observation. However, the changeover was already known by 7 March. On that day a ‘French listening post reported that a German patrol had looked in and were heard to comment that the British had not yet arrived.’
General Otto von Below (marked with X), seen here on the eastern front when he commanded 8 Army, was the commander of 6 Army during the British attacks near Arras.
Whilst the British were moving in, OHL was anticipating its counter-attack response to the Entente relief counter-attacks; one favoured area was Arras but 6 Army rejected this unless they were given more than the eight divisions promised. Falkenhayn rejected the proposal of a large-scale breakthrough attempt because there were insufficient troops available without a serious weakening of the other fronts.
6 Army were not deterred and proposed, on 16 March, an offensive that would result in the capture of Arras. The reasoning behind the proposal was sound: the British had only just taken over the sector, did not know their positions well and had very few reserves; taking the city would have a great negative psychological impact on the Entente. To take Arras, 6 Army wanted to launch a two-pronged attack to the north and south, in two parts due to a shortage of artillery. The first attack would take the heights at Ecurie and, after the heavy artillery had been moved, the southern attack would be launched.
The Entente powers were in no position to launch a relief attack anywhere on the front and Verdun was using up the OHL reserve more quickly than anticipated; there would be no major second offensive, only a secondary one. Falkenhayn telegraphed 6 Army on 4 April and asked whether they would be prepared to launch their offensive with four additional divisions and an increased number of heavy artillery batteries. Their reply was immediate: four divisions would allow them to take Loos and it would need three weeks of preparation before the attack. On 10 April, Falkenhayn ordered them to continue preparations for the Arras attack.
The rapid rebuilding of the poorly constructed French trenches by their new inhabitants made any attack more difficult. As a result, 6 Army requested eight extra divisions and more heavy artillery for the two-stage attack. Again events at Verdun caused a change of plans and the attack was put on hold.
Franz Matzinger, twenty-three, a farmer’s son, who died on 23 January 1916, from a head wound caused by shell splinter, while serving in 15 Bavarian Infantry Regiment.
After Flanders, the area was dry and bright. The relieving British troops found that the area from the Somme to Arras had seen practically no fighting since the line had settled down in 1914. ‘North of this in the Vimy sector, where the French had recently lost ground in the German attacks of the 8th and 21st February, the line was found to be in a bad condition: the trenches were poor, without wire and without dugouts.’
A timber dump at Feuchy, with construction materials for use in the trenches.
Easter 1916 at Angres, resting medics pose for the camera.
The change from French to British occupancy on the Arras Front was noted by one soldier: ‘Early in March 1916 the British took over the sector from Arras south to the Somme Valley. The Germans were alerted to the presence of these newcomers by the white puffs of their high-bursting shrapnel, the British and American stampings on the munitions, and the unwelcome increase in the numbers of the enemy machine guns. The leisurely tic-tac of the French machineguns, which ceased after every twenty-five rounds to allow a strip to be inserted, was replaced by the headlong and endless chatter of the new weapons, which sprayed the landscape with bullets and endangered our approach routes by night.’
This was the opposite of what had been the norm in the area. While the French had lived in trenches without wire, the German positions were protected by thick wire belts. There was little firing, with both sides living by a policy of ‘live and let live’. Such an atmosphere encouraged verbal exchanges, when the trenches were close enough, and even led to the troops exposing themselves at will without fear of drawing hostile fire.
Michael Deisenberger, a twenty-year old businessman from Unterammergau, who died a hero’s death on 1 February 1916 while serving with 20 Bavarian Infantry Regiment.
While the southern sector had been very quiet since 1914, the opposite was true of the northern part of the line, as evidenced in the sections on 1914 and 1915. Even though the German army had fought hard, the French had made some gains, but the strategically important Vimy Ridge defences had resisted all attempts at capture. Just before the British takeover of the sector, surprise German attacks were successful, and the French were pushed back on two occasions. On 8 February ‘a length of trench half-a-mile wide, south of Central Avenue’ was captured and on 21 February, ‘the first day of the attack on Verdun, a knoll at the northern end of the ridge, opposite Souchez, known later as “The Pimple”, the only place where the French had gained the crest of the ridge’ was also lost, removing the only high point on the ridge held by Entente troops.
Vimy Ridge ‘extends for nine miles from the valley of the river Scarpe, in front of Arras, to the valley of the Souchez stream, in which lie the villages of Souchez and Carency, captured by the French in May 1915.’ However, only the northern end is usually called Vimy Ridge. Beyond the Souchez valley, facing north, is the Lorette ridge and at the eastern end stands the chapel of Notre Dame de Lorette (this replaced the church destroyed during the fighting of 1914 and 1915, of which the only remnant when the British arrived was part of a brick wall).
Crown Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria, overall commander of the Armies on the Arras front.
Georg Hopper of 12 Bavarian Infantry Regiment who was killed on 17 July 1916.
A farm in Wancourt – life continued around the shell holes.
Barbed wire entanglements in Beaurains, a suburb of Arras.
‘The western slope of Vimy Ridge is gentle, but cut into, just behind the British front line of 1916, by a branch of the Souchez valley running southwards, known as Zouave valley, which therefore narrows and accentuates the end of the ridge.’ Zouave valley was named after the men who had fought there during the battles of 1915; many of them had not left and could be seen in the valley, ‘unburied and unpleasantly close to the trenches’; they were rotting but still dressed in their scarlet pantaloons.
‘The eastern slope drops sharply to the plain of Douai. Along almost the entire length of the ridge the Germans held the summit; only at its northern extremity did the line taken over by the British from the French lie near the top, and even there the crest was in No Man’s Land, with the trenches of the two adversaries on the slopes on either side.’
The troops enjoyed perfect observation over the British forward area and approaches, so that, for the Allied troops, positioning artillery was a particularly difficult problem. The maze of old and new trenches and gun positions deeply dug in the chalk gave the British troops some small security, simply because it was not possible to shell all the old positions; when they were shelled many were unoccupied; these latter were repaired and occasionally occupied in order to further confuse the German gunners.
Military cemetery in the churchyard at Angres in the summer of 1916.
On the other hand, the eastern slope of Vimy Ridge was so steep that the Germans were able to ‘place trench mortars and supporting troops close to the front line entirely concealed from ground view and safe from all but very high angle fire. The plain beyond, though visible to British observers on the Lorette ridge, which afforded good distant observation, was covered with the numerous villages of the Lens coalfield, and therefore ideal for the concealment of guns.’
On paper, the front defences along Vimy Ridge consisted of three lines but, when taken over, were found to be of the crudest description, and entirely lacking in continuity. ‘The trenches were described by the incoming troops as merely shell holes joined up; hastily organized positions in mine craters; a line of detached posts, accommodated in grouse butts; straight trenches without traverses. In places actually only a few sandbags laid on the ground marked the line. The section opposite the Pimple was reported as the worst.’ Here, the newly arrived British troops found that the continuous trench that appeared on the map did not exist. The whole area was a quagmire, impossible to use as an attack point; it was difficult enough just to get to the trenches – only feasible at night and in the open - and even then only with great difficulty and in deep mud.
Conditions rapidly improved for the British as spring set in; the surface was soon bone dry except in Zouave Valley. Fortunately – for the German defenders – the British found few good communication trenches. Most were unfit for use, so the movement of materials for any future attacks against them was slowed down. Most of the communication trenches were undrained and insanitary. Around the area lay months-old dead bodies and the detritus of warfare. ‘The wire, where any existed, was thin and weak, or in bad condition; the positions for machine guns were very poor. The dug-outs, except those some distance from the front, were small, damp and bad…the ground (was) sufficiently organized for the launching of an offensive, but offered only precarious tenure as a defensive line.’ It was a state of affairs – new troops in a new area with poor defences – ready for a keen and watchful adversary to exploit.
While OHL was brewing its own plans, the British troops let them know that this was no longer a quiet area of the front by firing a few shells over their heads as a warning of what was to come. However, both sides realized that their defences were inadequate and hostilities ceased for a week while both sides dug, day and night, in full view of each other. When active hostilities were resumed, artillery fire, backed by excellent observation, prevented the British from completing their work. A fact noted by the Battalion History of 1st/4th Leicesters was that ‘for sheer discomfort Vimy took a lot of beating’, and after all the hard work restoring parapets and parados, and filling sandbags with sodden earth, the arrival of a minenwerfer could at once destroy ten yards or more of trench.
Captured British aircraft near Arras on 29 March 1916.
The cemetery of an elite unit, 1 Garde Reserve Regiment, at Fresnes.
‘Whilst the Germans had been smiling over the parapet, they had been pushing on below’ recorded the British Official History. The British had taken over an active mining area in which the German Army had the upper hand, with many deep tunnels in place under the British lines. This, coupled with the poor defensive positions and the superior observation positions held by the German army, should have resulted in the British army pulling back to better positions, especially as this was not to be an offensive area of action. However, this would have appeared as an insult to the French, so Haig ordered the troops to take action, by mining and frequent raids, that would suggest a forthcoming Spring offensive.
British casualties were heavy for the next three months but slowly the German mining troops lost the initiative; four mines on 3 May and a further five on 15 May secured new observation positions for the British, giving greater visibility over German positions. However, there was no retaliation or counter-attack by the German forces except heavy bombardment of the craters every night. This was a change from the norm; before, newly exploded craters had been hotly contested, with infantry rushing to capture the near lip of the crater, while the enemy who had not fired the mine, replied with artillery and both sides opened up with machineguns. At such times, ‘there was much bombing, but the rifle and the bayonet were rarely used.’
Further British casualties were caused by sniping. Again the upper hand was held by the Germans, whose snipers stayed in one area and identified the vulnerable positions, while the newly arrived British troops inevitably lacked knowledge of the terrain. These newly arrived troops were not well equipped for trench warfare and, to make up for the shortfall, resorted to handmade equipment, catapulting beer bottles filled with explosives, designed to explode two seconds after they had arrived in the opposing trench.
Under French occupancy the atmosphere in the area had mainly been one of ‘live and let live’ and initially this was continued by the British in some sectors; 18 London Regiment provided the troops opposite them with a copy of ‘The Times’ on one occasion. However, the transfer of the Saxon division and completion of tunnelling towards the British lines created a tension that was broken on 26 April with the exploding of a mine near the Pimple. Unfortunately for the attacking force, the British had anticipated such an action and their front line was only lightly occupied; even so they managed to secure and consolidate the near lip of the crater holding and stopping the attacking forces. Expecting a further mine, the British blew a defensive camouflet mine that prematurely detonated the mine and created a huge crater. Heavy casualties were inflicted on 6 London Regiment when a third mine was blown between the two previous mines, but again the British managed to restore their line and hold their positions.
In retaliation the British fired four mines on 3 May and under covering artillery fire rushed troops forward, successfully occupying the British side of the three craters formed – the fourth mine explosion did not break the surface – while Pioneers and Sappers constructed defensive positions on the British near lip. At dawn the British troops retired to the newly prepared positions.
Every effort had been taken to make sure that the British were unaware of the carefully planned offensive against them. The tactics were simple: the systematic obliteration of the British front line using trench mortars, destroying the British defences on the ridge. This was to be followed, for a few days before the attack, by the artillery registering on communication trenches and batteries in the attack sector. All this made the British infantry officers suspicious, but air reconnaissance provided no clues, and British Intelligence pointed to the German shortage of men and artillery for such an attack. As a consequence, the transfer of five divisions from the British First, Second and Third Armies to strengthen the Fourth Army prior to the Somme offensive went ahead with all the necessary movement of Army, Corps and Divisional headquarters that this involved.
Camouflaged anti-aircraft guns near Roeux, east of Arras.
Fortunately for the attacking troops, the area for the forthcoming offensive was against British troops affected by the new boundary changes to the army and corps in the sector. The Berthonval sector was in a state of flux: signal traffic disturbance, no arrangements to ensure unit cohesion, no means of gathering intelligence and processing it. Not only had the sector been transferred to another army but to a different corps and a new division was taking its positions for the first time with only two battalions holding the front line. All of this was happening in a sector that was easily and clearly overlooked, with every British move easily registered.
The attacking troops had further advantages over the British defenders: the British front was held as an outpost line, with detached posts that could be approached only under cover of darkness, and thus had to be held by small numbers of troops for unrelieved twenty-four hour periods, starting at 2100 hours. Serious resistance would only be encountered much further down the slope; the ground was wet and any progress the British made in their defensive programme would be destroyed every night by artillery fire. As a result the attacking forces would face virtually no wire on the British front line, a support line that was only superficial, and troops in the detached posts who would have no shelter. All the odds were stacked in favour of the attackers.
Unusually, on both sides the commanding officers were experienced staff officers without combat experience; this was to be their first blooding. General von Freytag-Loringhoven was Generalquartiermeister (Deputy Chief of the General Staff) of the Supreme Command, under Falkenhayn, and, prior to that posting, had been senior liaison officer at the Austro-Hungarian Great Headquarters. He was anxious to have some experience at the front and in April was given a six weeks’ leave of absence to replace General von Zieten, commanding officer of 17 Reserve Division, who was sick. Shortly after, he was given command of IX Reserve Corps (General von Boehn was on leave due to poor health). Facing him was Lieutenant General Sir Henry Wilson who been sub-chief of the General Staff in France and also senior liaison at French Great Headquarters.
General Freytag-Lorighoven discovered that he had not taken over a quiet front. In his reminiscences he recorded that ‘the casualties, which we suffered by mine explosions and continual night attacks, aroused in me lively anxiety…things could not go on as they were…If by attack we could throw back the British over the position we had held until the end of September 1915 [before the French attacks], and so rob them of all their mine shafts, and hold the position won, we should have tranquillity.’ A plan was then conceived and approved by the Army Commander, and, thanks to his influence at headquarters, ‘far more than the necessary heavy artillery and ammunition were allotted’ in order to attain a successful operation.
If he had asked his men, they would have agreed that something needed to be done to stop the British mines. The history of 163 Regiment explained their effect: ‘These continual mine explosions in the end got on the nerves of the men. The posts in the front trenches and the garrisons of the dug-outs were always in danger of being buried alive. Even in the quietest night there was the dreadful feeling that in the next moment one might die a horrible and cruel death’. The men felt defenceless and powerless against them. This view was shared by 86 Regiment which agreed that something must be done: ‘Our companies had suffered heavy losses through the British mine explosions. It was accepted that other large parts of our trench system were undermined and might fly into the air at any moment’. The answer was an attack to gain possession of the mine shafts and bring an end to underground warfare for as long as possible.
For the attack on a divisional front of four miles, the infantry were to be supported by eighty batteries, of which forty were new. Situated between Liévin to the west of Lens ‘and Vimy village, most of the guns were skilfully concealed amid houses and buildings. Very careful preparations were made. The British position was photographed from the air’, and, in order to prevent British Intelligence getting wind of the operation, ‘additional aeroplane squadrons and anti-aircraft guns, partly mounted in lorries, prevented British fliers from coming over and seeing any signs of the mounting of an attack.’ As a result of these measures and strict telephone secrecy, there was an uninterrupted flow of heavy lorries carrying ammunition to the front areas.
The day and night of 20 May were comparatively quiet in the British trenches, apart from a considerable amount of trench mortar fire that caused anxiety at the divisional level but, the next morning, between 0500 and 1100 hours, the Berthonval sector and the sectors on either side were heavily shelled. After a lull of four hours, an intense bombardment began. It landed on the British front line, the observation posts, the communication trenches, the Zouave valley, and even beyond the battery positions to the British headquarters (four miles back) and the billeting areas, seven or eight miles from the front line.
‘The whole front area was soon enveloped in a cloud of smoke and dust, so that the British artillery never really knew when the assault was delivered; and confusion was rendered worse by bursts of lachrymatory shell. All accounts agree that never had such a bombardment been seen, and spectators could only wonder that there was any rifle fire’ from the British when the assault took place. In the four hour barrage 70,000 shells were fired that caused severe damage to both the infantry and the artillery. In retaliation, the heavy artillery of three British corps returned fire but with little effect.
At 2145 hours the barrage moved a further 150 yards into the British lines, a mine was fired under the British trenches at the head of Royal Avenue, and one minute later, the assault started. The smoke clouded the British defenders’ vision and not until the attackers were half-way across no-man’s-land could they be made out in the dust and smoke. By then it was too late; resistance along the British front was negligible, ‘for the rifles and the bombs of the few dazed defenders still unwounded were unserviceable or buried’, whilst their artillery was unable to assist them due to a shortage of ammunition and cut telephone lines. As the attacking troops came rushing through ‘the front and support lines without pause in overwhelming numbers’; the British were unable to resist the onslaught. They were saved by the artillery of their enemy who ran into their own barrage due to the speed of their advance. Although there was little initial resistance, when the barrage moved on, sheltering troops emerged, and hand-to-hand combat took place.
The situation was desperate enough for the remaining British troops to man the reserve line, so desperate that the British had to bring up reserves in the form of three companies of Royal Engineers to fill the line. Unfortunately for the rest of the attackers, they did not advance as quickly or as far, capturing only small sections of the support line and the front line of the outposts. Although British resistance was stiff, it did not stop the important loss of all their mineshafts, except one at the head of Royal Avenue. Having achieved their target, the troops dug in and waited for the British counterattacks. These started almost immediately – some were successful, but others floundered against troops well dug in behind wire.
Whenever possible, military cemeteries were maintained neatly, using military and civilian labour.
The next day, 22 May, was comparatively quiet and British planes located most of the batteries that had caused devastation the day before. Attempts to penetrate the British lines were stopped by British fighting patrols, so no information about the new British positions could be gained. No attempts were made by the British to recapture the lost ground, the only activity being their shelling of the lost territory while they prepared a counter-attack. In return British positions in Zouave Valley were heavily shelled after a British deserter revealed that a counter-attack would take place that evening.
At 2025 hours the British assault was launched after just over an hour’s intensive bombardment. Its object was to recover the old support line and, if possible, the old front line to form a new support line half-way between it and the Talus des Zouaves. However, the British assembly area for the attack was heavily bombarded at 1130 hours with in an increase in the shelling at 1400 and 1800 hours. Just before 2000 hours, three separate barrages landed on the area containing the attacking troops. The desired effect was achieved. The British 99 Brigade attack was stillborn, except for one company who did not the receive the order to abort the attack. Having advanced through the machine gun fire that swept no-man’s land, the company reached the front line. When attempts were made to bring it back, it was realised that it had been wiped out.
A quiet moment in the trenches at Lorettohöhe during the summer of 1916.
British battalions on the right and left flank of the attack also moved forward. The defenders fell back against the bombing onslaught but quickly counter-attacked and retook the positions, only to lose and regain them again in quick succession.
No further attacks were made by the British and the front quietened down. Two British reconnaissance flights the next day found that there was little activity behind the lines and from this surmised ‘that the attack had been a local one with a limited objective’. However, the very large number of batteries brought up for the attack, the amount of ammunition used, together with the pushing forward of saps and the amount of mining, inclined the British Third Army Commander, General Allenby, to believe that this could be the prelude to a full scale attack on Arras via Roclincourt.
With so many troops committed in Russia and at Verdun, there was no real possibility of this success being built upon, and the British were left alone. What the operation at Vimy had demonstrated again to the British was ‘that given sufficient artillery and observation, it was possible’ to drive them ‘out of any small portion of the line’. At 2450, the British casualty rate was nearly double that of the attacking force – 1350. The battle was described by one British General as ‘the best executed trench raid carried out on the Western Front’, and experienced British soldiers ‘declared that the fire upon this occasion was among the most concentrated and deadly of the whole war.’
Even though the intentions of the Entente on the Somme were clearly known, 6 Army was holding a shorter line than 2 Army there, with seventeen and a half divisions and large amounts of heavy artillery. Falkenhayn intended to launch his counter-offensive at Arras after the British had exhausted themselves on the Somme. He assumed that the line at Arras would be held by second-rate and inexperienced divisions that would provide less resistance, allowing any local breakthrough to be turned into a strategic success. To ensure success, OHL kept some of its best divisions deployed near or with 6 Army. With 2 Army reinforced to take the Entente offensive and continued pressure on the French at Verdun, ‘forces for the counter-stroke had been mustered’ and their deployment begun.
However, the reserve divisions carefully kept back for the counter-offensive were needed elsewhere. The success of the Russian offensive took four of these divisions to the Eastern Front and by 9 July seven additional divisions had been sent from the reserve and 6 Army to bolster 2 Army on the Somme. ‘As the summer wore on and the attacks on the Somme increased in their intensity…losses were so high that…Falkenhayn instituted a major reorganization of the Westheer’; as a result 6 Army lost most of its best units to 2 Army. By the end of August the reserves available to OHL consisted of just the Guards Ersatz Division. The Arras counter-offensive would never happen. On 29 August, Falkenhayn was replaced by Hindenburg and Ludendorff.
Troops in the trenches saw the Canadians taking over as their opponents on the Vimy Front during the autumn of 1916. Immediately, and to their chagrin, what had been a comparatively peaceful area became very active with trench raids and increased artillery fire. Such was the intensity of the fire at times that, in early December, the Canadians found an appeal on the barbed wire: ‘Cut out your damned artillery. We, too, are from the Somme’.
While the rest of the year was relatively calm on the Arras Front, the battles at Verdun, in Russia and on the Somme impacted badly on manpower resources and on the ability to hold a continuous stretch of trench from the North Sea to Switzerland. General von Kohl wrote that ‘the casualties suffered by Germany hit it harder than did those of the Allies’ and each year it was more difficult to replace the losses. The commander of 27 Infantry Division ably summed up the position of the German Army at the end of 1916:‘The formations which were deployed during the Battle of the Somme were very worn down physically and their nerves were badly affected. The huge gaps torn in the ranks could only be filled out by returning wounded, nineteen-year-olds who were too young, or by combing out from civilian occupations, men who, to a large extent, due to their physical condition or mental attitude, could not be regarded as fully effective troops’.
A withdrawal to the Siegfried Stellung would both reduce the length of the front line and remove a large salient; such a reduction would also increase the number of troops available as reserves. It was an obvious choice but OHL did not sanction the withdrawal.
The winter of 1916-1917 was wet and made work on the defences a neverending task. In theory a regiment had a battalion in the line, a second battalion in reserve while the third was behind the line, out of artillery range at rest – a euphemism shared by their British counterparts for work, work and more work, often back in the front line; reserves had tasks to perform even in the severe wet: ‘cement would not set, trenches flooded repeatedly, and the drainage table of the plain rose to the point where two-foot holes soon filled with muddy water.’ To add to the problem, the Canadians facing Vimy ridge, ‘had an irritating habit of shelling rear areas as well as forward trenches; all available man-power was needed to keep open the lines of communication.’ General von Bachmeister felt that, with the severe bombardment of rear areas and the ‘systematic destruction of artillery positions, dug-outs, rearward communications and the front line’, the British had a plan. ‘One result, quite aside from the damage caused, was that the soldiers on the ridge and in the rear were overworked and inadequately rested.’
Many of the troops in the Arras sector came from Bavaria and were used to a high meat content in their diet. As well as all their other problems the rations were bad and even the food for the forward trenches – already of poor quality - was also noticeably meagre as regards meat. ‘Out of the line, in reserve, it was even worse: there were meatless days, which made the mining villages that served as billets seem colder and damper than they already were.’ The troops were hungry as well as tired.
Out of the line, although their rations were inadequate, the Bavarian troops still managed to stay happy by singing. And in many cases their life was better than the life of a civilian back at home, but this was small comfort which gave no pleasure knowing that their families, especially the children, were faring worse than they were.
But of course, as in every army, the officers were better off than their men: they had freedom of movement and could travel further, back to towns like Valenciennes where they could enjoy, temporarily, a life of café society and security.
To add to their problems, the war news generally contained little to be cheerful about, and the news from home was gloomy. Goods were in short supply and in some areas food staples were rationed. Wives missed their husbands and complained about the shortages: ‘How long is the war going to last before you are all destroyed?…things are very bad for us. There is neither beer, gin, petroleum, soap, benzine, sugar, coffee nor meat.’
6 Army Christmas card produced by 6 Army field Printing section as a field postcard to send home.
The life was dangerous, and nearly always wet. Their uniforms smelt of sour sweat, and the trenches in which they lived, though deeper and better built than the ones occupied by ‘die Engländer’, were foul with years of occupation. Nevertheless, although it took time and determination to maintain an appearance of smart professionalism, it was done. By stand-to each morning, boots were clean, greatcoats brushed, faces shaved and refuse buried. Their officers demanded it.’ And according to the reports of men captured by the Canadians, officers were another problem in the lives of the men holding the ridge.
But life was not all bad on the ridge. On Christmas Day, two men of Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light infantry arranged a truce with their opponents. The two sides met in no man’s land and exchanged cigars and cigarettes and attempted to communicate. The peace was short-lived; at 2200 hours the Canadian troops in the neighbouring battalion raided their opponents’ trenches and stole all their Christmas presents, thus smartly ending the truce.