6

Egypt and the Middle East

1940

June — July — August

Mussolini Prepares to Invade Egypt — Our Competing Anxieties — The Italian Strength in North Africa — Concentration Towards the Egyptian Frontier — Beads on the String — Initiative of Our Covering Troops — Amphibious Possibilities — Need to Reinforce with Tanks and Other Weapons — My Complaints of Dispersion — The Kenya Front — Palestine — Need to Send Forth an Armoured Brigade and Later the Second Armoured Division — The Mediterranean Short Cut — The Tanks Have to Go Round the Cape — Plans for Cutting the Italian Coastal Road from the Sea — Ministerial Committee on the Middle East — General Wavell Comes Home for Conference — Hard and Tense Discussions with Him — Directive of August 16 — Assembly of the Army of the Nile — Its Tactical Employment — The Somaliland Episode — A Vexatious Rebuff — My Minutes Thereupon — Increase in Italian Forces in Albania — My Report on the General Situation to the Prime Ministers of Australia and New Zealand.

WITH THE DISAPPEARANCE of France as a combatant and with Britain set on her struggle for life at home, Mussolini might well feel that his dream of dominating the Mediterranean and rebuilding the former Roman Empire would come true. Relieved from any need to guard against the French in Tunis, he could still further reinforce the numerous army he had gathered for the invasion of Egypt. The eyes of the world were fixed upon the fate of the British Island, upon the gathering of the invading German armies, and upon the drama of the struggle for air mastery. These were, of course, our main preoccupations. In many countries we were presumed to be at the last gasp. Our confident and resolute bearing was admired by our friends, but its foundations were deemed unsure. Nevertheless, the War Cabinet were determined to defend Egypt against all comers with whatever resources could be spared from the decisive struggle at home. All the more was this difficult when the Admiralty declared themselves unable to pass even military convoys through the Mediterranean on account of the air dangers. All must go round the Cape. Thus we might easily rob the Battle of Britain without helping the Battle of Egypt. It is odd that, while at the time everyone concerned was quite calm and cheerful, writing about it afterwards makes one shiver.

* * * * *

When Italy declared war on June 10, 1940, the British Intelligence estimated – we now know correctly – that, apart from her garrisons in Abyssinia, Eritrea, and Somaliland, there were about 215,000 Italian troops in the North African coastal provinces. These were disposed as follows: in Tripolitania, six metropolitan and two militia divisions; in Cyrenaica, two metropolitan and two militia divisions, besides frontier forces equal to three divisions; a total of fifteen divisions. The British forces in Egypt consisted of the 7th Armoured Division, two-thirds of the 4th Indian Division, one-third of the New Zealand Division, and fourteen British battalions and two regiments of the Royal Artillery, ungrouped in higher formations; the whole amounting to perhaps fifty thousand men. From these both the defence of the western frontier and the internal security of Egypt had to be provided. We, therefore, had heavy odds against us in the field, and the Italians had also many more aircraft.

During July and August the Italians became active at many points. There was a threat from Kassala, on the White Nile, westward towards Khartoum. Alarm was spread in Kenya by the fear of an Italian expedition marching four hundred miles south from Abyssinia towards the Tana River and Nairobi. Considerable Italian forces advanced into British Somaliland. But all these anxieties were petty compared with the Italian invasion of Egypt, which was obviously being prepared on the greatest scale. For some time past Mussolini had been steadily moving his forces eastward towards Egypt. Even before the war a magnificent road had been made along the coast from the main base at Tripoli, through Tripolitania, Cyrenaica, and Libya, to the Egyptian frontier. Along this road there had been for many months a swelling stream of military traffic. Large magazines were slowly established and filled at Benghazi. Derna, Tobruk, Bardia, and Sollum. The length of this road was over a thousand miles, and all these swarming Italian garrisons and supply depots were strung along it like beads on a string.

At the head of the road and near the Egyptian frontier an Italian army of seventy or eighty thousand men, with a good deal of modern equipment, had been patiently gathered and organised. Before this army glittered the prize of Egypt. Behind it stretched the long road back to Tripoli; and after that the sea! If this force, built up in driblets week by week for years, could advance continually eastward, conquering all who sought to bar the path, its fortunes would be bright. If it could gain the fertile regions of the Delta, all worry about the long road back would vanish. On the other hand, if ill-fortune befell it only a few would ever get home. In the field army and in the series of great supply depots all along the coast there were by the autumn at least three hundred thousand Italians, who could, even if unmolested, retreat westward along the road only gradually or piecemeal. For this they required many months. And if the battle were lost on the Egyptian border, if the army’s front were broken, and if time were not given to them, all were doomed to capture or death. However, in July, 1940, it was not known who was going to win the battle.

Our foremost defended position at that time was the railhead at Mersa Matruh. There was a good road westward to Sidi Barani, but thence to the frontier at Sollum there was no road capable of maintaining any considerable strength for long near the frontier. A small covering mechanised force had been formed of some of our finest Regular troops, consisting of the 7th Hussars (light tanks), the 11th Hussars (armoured cars), and two motor battalions of the 60th Rifles and Rifle Brigade, with two regiments of motorised Royal Horse Artillery. Orders had been given to attack the Italian frontier posts immediately on the outbreak of war. Accordingly, within twenty-four hours, the 11th Hussars crossed the frontier, took the Italians, who had not heard that war had been declared, by surprise, and captured prisoners. The next night, June 12, they had a similar success, and on June 14, with the 7th Hussars and one company of the 60th Rifles, captured the frontier forts at Capuzzo and Maddalena, taking two hundred and twenty prisoners. On the 16th they raided deeper, destroyed twelve tanks, intercepted a convoy on the Tobruk-Bardia road, and captured a general.

In this small but lively warfare our troops felt they had the advantage, and soon conceived themselves to be masters of the desert. Until they came up against large formed bodies or fortified posts, they could go where they liked, collecting trophies from sharp encounters. When armies approach each other, it makes all the difference which owns only the ground on which it stands or sleeps and which one owns all the rest. I saw this in the Boer War, where we owned nothing beyond the fires of our camps and bivouacs, whereas the Boers rode where they pleased all over the country.

Ever-growing enemy forces were now arriving from the west, and by the middle of July the enemy had re-established his frontier line with two divisions and elements of two more. Early in August our covering force was relieved by the support group of the 7th Armoured Division, comprising the 3d Cold-stream Guards, the first 60th Rifles, the 2d Rifle Brigade, the 11th Hussars, one squadron of the 6th Royal Tank Battalion, and two mechanised batteries, R.H.A., one of which was antitank. This small force, distributed over a front of sixty miles, continued to harass the enemy with increasing effect. The published Italian casualties for the first three months of war were nearly thirty-five hundred men, of whom seven hundred were prisoners. Our own losses barely exceeded a hundred and fifty. Thus the first phase in the war which Italy had declared upon the British Empire opened favourably for us.

* * * * *

It was proposed by the Middle East Command, under General Wavell, to await the shock of the Italian onslaught near the fortified position of Mersa Matruh. Until we could gather an army, this seemed the only course open. I therefore proposed the following tasks: First, to assemble the largest fighting force possible to face the Italian invaders. For this it was necessary to run risks in many other quarters. I was pained to see the dispersions which were tolerated by the military authorities. Khartoum and the Blue Nile certainly required strengthening against the Italian-Abyssinian border, but what was the sense of keeping twenty-five thousand men, including the Union Brigade of South Africa and two brigades of excellent West African troops, idle in Kenya? I had ridden over some of this country, north of the Tana River, in 1906. It is a very fine-looking country, but without much to eat. The idea of an Italian expedition of fifteen or twenty thousand men, with artillery and modern gear, traversing the four or five hundred miles before they could reach Nairobi seemed ridiculous. Behind the Kenya front would lie the broad-gauge Uganda Railway. We had the command of the sea, and could move troops to and fro by sea and rail with a facility incomparable to anything that could be achieved by enemy land movements. On account of our superior communications, it was our interest to fight an Italian expedition as near to Nairobi and the broad-gauge railway as possible. For this large numbers of troops were not required. They were more needed in the Egyptian Delta. I got something, but only after a prolonged hard fight against the woolly theme of being safe everywhere.

I did my utmost to draw upon Singapore and bring the Australian division which had arrived there, first to India for training and thence to the Western Desert. Palestine presented a different aspect. We had a mass of fine troops sprawled over Palestine: an Australian division, a New Zealand brigade, our own choice Yeomanry division, all in armoured cars or about to be; the Household Cavalry, still with horses, but longing for modern weapons; with lavish administrative services. I wished to arm the Jews at Tel-Aviv, who with proper weapons would have made a good fight against all comers. Here I encountered every kind of resistance. My second preoccupation was to ensure that freedom of movement through the Mediterranean was fought for against the weak Italians and the grave air danger, in order that Malta might be made impregnable. It seemed to me most important to pass military convoys, especially of tanks and guns, through the Mediterranean instead of all round the Cape. This seemed a prize worth many hazards. To send a division from Britain round the Cape to Egypt was to make sure it could not fight anywhere for three months; but these were precious months, and we had very few divisions. Finally, there was our island, now under pretty direct menace of invasion. How far could we denude our home and citadel for the sake of the Middle East?

* * * * *

In July, 1940, I began, as the telegrams and Minutes show, to concern myself increasingly about the Middle East. Always this long coastal road bulked in my mind. Again and again I recurred to the idea of cutting it by the landing of strong but light forces from the sea. We had not, of course, at that time proper tank-landing craft. Yet it should have been possible to improvise the necessary tackle for such an operation. If used in conjunction with a heavy battle it might have effected a valuable diversion of enemy troops from the front.

Prime Minister to General Ismay.

10.VII.40.

Bring the following before the C.O.S. Committee:

Have any plans been made in the event of large forces approaching the Egyptian border from Libya to cut the coastal motor road upon which they would be largely dependent for supplies of all kinds? It is not sufficient merely to bombard by air or from the sea. But if a couple of brigades of good troops could take some town or other suitable point on the communications, they might, with sea-power behind them, cause a prolonged interruption, require heavy forces to be moved against them, and then withdraw to strike again at some other point. Of course, such an operation would not be effective until considerable forces of the enemy had already passed the point of interception. It may be, however, that the desert itself affords free movement to the enemy’s supplies. I wonder whether this is so, and if so why the Italians were at pains to construct this lengthy road.

I still do not see why it should not have been possible to make a good plan. It is, however, a fact that none of our commanders, either in the Middle East or in Tunis, were ever persuaded to make the attempt. But General Patton in 1943 made several most successful turning movements of this character during the conquest of Sicily, and gained definite advantages thereby. It was not until Anzio in 1944 that I succeeded in having this experiment tried. This, of course, was on a far larger scale, nor did it, in spite of the success of the landing, achieve the decisive results for which we all hoped. But that is another story.

* * * * *

I was anxious that the case of the Middle East should be strongly presented by a group of Ministers, all experienced in war and deeply concerned in that theatre.

Prime Minister to Sir Edward Bridges.

10.VII.40.

I think it would be well to set up a small standing Ministerial Committee, consisting of the Secretaries of State for War [Mr. Eden], India [Mr. Amery], and the Colonies [Lord Lloyd], to consult together upon the conduct of the war in the Middle East (in which they are all three concerned), and to advise me, as Minister of Defence, upon the recommendations I should make to the Cabinet. Will you kindly put this into the proper form? The Secretary of State for War has agreed to take the chair.

Mr. Eden reported to his Committee the shortage of troops, equipment, and resources in the Middle East, and that the C.I.G.S. was equally perturbed. The Committee urged the full equipment of the armoured division already in Egypt but far below strength, and also recommended the provision of a second armoured division at the earliest moment when it could be spared from home. The Chiefs of Staff endorsed these conclusions, the C.I.G.S. observing that the moment must be chosen in relation to declining risks at home and increasing risks abroad. On July 31, Mr. Eden considered that we might be able to spare some tanks in a few weeks’ time, and that if they were to reach the Middle East by the end of September we might have to send them and the other equipment through the Mediterranean. In spite of the rising tension about invasion at home, I was in full agreement with all this trend of thought, and brought the extremely harassing choice before the Cabinet several times.

The other aspects of the Middle East pressed upon me.

Prime Minister to General Ismay.

23.VII.40.

Where is the South African Union Brigade of ten thousand men? Why is it playing no part in the Middle East? We have agreed today to send further reinforcements of Hurricanes and other modern aircraft to the South African Air Force. What is happening to the concert of the campaign in the Middle East? What has been done by the Committee of Ministers I recently set up? Now that large naval operations are contemplated in the Mediterranean, it is all the more essential that the attack on the Italian position in Abyssinia should be pressed and concerted by all means. Make sure I have a report about the position, which I can consider on Thursday morning.

I felt an acute need of talking over the serious events impending in the Libyan Desert with General Wavell himself. I had hot met this distinguished officer, on whom so much was resting, and I asked the Secretary of State for War to invite him over for a week for consultation when an opportunity could be found. He arrived on August 8. He toiled with the Staffs and had several long conversations with me and Mr. Eden. The command in the Middle East at that time comprised an extraordinary amalgam of military, political, diplomatic, and administrative problems of extreme complexity. It took more than a year of ups and downs for me and my colleagues to learn the need of dividing the responsibilities of the Middle East between a Commander-in-Chief, a Minister of State, and an Intendant-General to cope with the supply problem. While not in full agreement with General Wavell’s use of the resources at his disposal, I thought it best to leave him in command. I admired his fine qualities, and was impressed with the confidence so many people had in him.

The discussions, both oral and written, were severe. As usual I put my case in black and white.

Prime Minister to General Ismay, for General Wavell.

10.VIII.40.

I am very much obliged to you for explaining to me so fully the situation in Egypt and Somaliland. We have yet to discuss the position in Kenya and Abyssinia. I mentioned the very large forces which you have in Kenya, namely, the Union Brigade of six thousand white South Africans, probably as fine material as exists for warfare in spacious countries; the East African settlers, who should certainly amount to two thousand men, thoroughly used to the country; the two West African Brigades, brought at much inconvenience from the West Coast, numbering six thousand; at least two brigades of King’s African Rifles (K.A.R.); the whole at least twenty thousand men – there may be more. Why should these all stand idle in Kenya waiting for an Italian invasion to make its way across the very difficult distances from Abyssinia to the south, or preparing themselves for a similar difficult inroad into Abyssinia, which must again entail long delays, while all the time the fate of the Middle East, and much else, may be decided at Alexandria or on the Canal?

Without, of course, knowing the exact conditions locally, I should suppose that a reasonable disposition would be to hold Kenya with the settlers and the K.A.R., and delay any Italian advance southward, it being so much easier to bring troops round by sea than for the Italians to make their way overland. Thus we can always reinforce them unexpectedly and swiftly. This would allow the Union Brigade and the two West African Brigades to come round at once into the Delta, giving you a most valuable reinforcement in the decisive theatre at the decisive moment. What is the use of having the command of the sea if it is not to pass troops to and fro with great rapidity from one theatre to another? I am sure I could persuade General Smuts to allow this movement of the Union Brigade. Perhaps you will let me have your views on this by tomorrow night, as time is so short.

Prime Minister to General Ismay, for General Wavell.

12.VIII.40.

1. I am not at all satisfied about the Union Brigade and the West African Brigade in Kenya. These forces as now disposed would play no part in the critical attacks now being developed against Egypt, Khartoum, and Somaliland. It is always considered a capital blemish on military operations that large bodies of troops should be standing idle while decisions are reached elsewhere. Without further information, I cannot accept the statement that the South African Brigade is so far untrained that it cannot go into action. The Natal Carbineers were much further advanced in training before the war than our British Territorials, and they have presumably been embodied since the declaration. I cannot see why the Union Brigade as a whole should be considered in any way inferior to British Territorial units. Anyhow, they are certainly good enough to fight Italians. I have asked for full particulars of their embodiment and training in each case.

2. I do not consider that proper use is being made of the large forces in Palestine. The essence of the situation depends on arming the Jewish colonists sufficiently to enable them to undertake their own defence, so that if necessary for a short time the whole of Palestine can be left to very small British forces. A proposal should be made to liberate immediately a large portion of the garrison, including the Yeomanry Cavalry Division. I do not understand why the Australians and New Zealanders who have been training in Palestine for at least six months should be able to provide only one brigade for service in Egypt. How many of them are there, and what are the facts of their training? These men were brought at great expense from Australia, having been selected as the first volunteers for service in Europe. Many of them had previous military training, and have done nearly a year’s training since the war broke out. How disgraceful it would be if owing to our mishandling of this important force only one brigade took part in the decisive operations for the defence of Egypt!

3. The two West African brigades could certainly be brought to Khartoum via Port Soudan. It is a very good policy to mix native units from various sources, so that one lot can be used to keep the other in discipline. These two brigades ought to be moved immediately to the Soudan, so that the Indian Division can be used in Egypt or Somaliland as soon as it arrives. I do not know why these brigades were taken away from West Africa, if the only use to be made of them was to garrison Kenya.

4. Let me have a return of the white settlers of military age in Kenya. Are we to believe they have not formed any local units for the defence of their own province? If not, the sooner they are made to realise their position the better. No troops ought to be in Kenya at the present time other than the settlers and the K.A.R. Considering the risks and trouble we are taking to reinforce Egypt from home, it cannot be accepted that forces on the spot should not be used to the highest capacity at the critical moment.

5. Let me have a full account of the two British divisions in the Delta. It is misleading to think in divisions in this area, nor can any plea that they are not properly equipped in every detail be allowed to prejudice the employment of these fine Regular troops.

6. Surely the statement that the enemy’s armoured forces and vehicles can move just as easily along the desert as along the coastal road requires further examination. This might apply to caterpillar vehicles, but these would suffer severely if forced to make long journeys over the rocky and soft deserts. Anyhow, wheeled transport would be hampered in the desert unless provided with desert-expanded india-rubber tyres of a special type. Are the Italian vehicles so fitted, and to what extent?

7. What arrangements have been made to “depotabilise” ¹ for long periods any wells or water supplies we do not require for ourselves? Has a store of delayed-action fuzes been provided for mines in roadways which are to be abandoned? Make sure that a supply of the longest delayed-action fuzes, i.e., up to at least a fortnight (but I hope they run longer now), are sent to Egypt by the first ship to go through. Examine whether it is not possible to destroy the asphalt of the tarmac road as it is abandoned by chemical action of heavy petroleum oil, or some other treatment.

8. Let me have a statement in full and exact detail of all units in the Middle East, including Polish and French volunteers and arrivals.

I should be glad to discuss all these points tonight.

* * * * *

As a result of the Staff discussions on August 10, Dill, with Eden’s ardent approval, wrote me that the War Office were arranging to send immediately to Egypt one cruiser tank battalion of fifty-two tanks, one light tank regiment (fifty-two tanks), and one infantry tank battalion of fifty tanks, together with forty-eight anti-tank guns, twenty Bofors light anti-aircraft, forty-eight twenty-five-pounder field guns, five hundred Bren guns, and two hundred and fifty anti-tank rifles, with the necessary ammunition. These would start as soon as they could be loaded. The only question open was whether they should go round the Cape or take a chance through the Mediterranean. I pressed the Admiralty hard, as will be seen in a later chapter, for direct convoy through the Mediterranean. Much discussion proceeded on this latter point. Meanwhile, the Cabinet approved the embarkation and despatch of the armoured force, leaving the final decision about which way they should go till the convoy approached Gibraltar. This option remained open to us till August 26, by which time we should know a good deal more about the imminence of any Italian attack. No time was lost. The decision to give this blood-transfusion while we braced ourselves to meet a mortal danger, was at once awful and right. No one faltered.

* * * * *

The following directive, which we had thrashed out together, was finally drafted by me, and the Cabinet approved it without amendment in accord with the Chiefs of Staff:

Prime Minister to Secretary of State for War and C.I.G.S.

16.VIII.40.

(General directive for Commander-in-Chief, Middle East.)

1. A major invasion of Egypt from Libya must be expected at any time now. It is necessary, therefore, to assemble and deploy the largest possible army upon and towards the western frontier. All political and administrative considerations must be set in proper subordination to this.

2. The evacuation of Somaliland is enforced upon us by the enemy, but is none the less strategically convenient. All forces in or assigned to Somaliland should be sent to Aden, to the Soudan via Port Soudan, or to Egypt, as may be thought best.

3. The defence of Kenya must rank after the defence of the Soudan. There should be time after the crisis in Egypt and the Soudan is passed to reinforce Kenya by sea and rail before any large Italian expedition can reach the Tana River. We can always reinforce Kenya faster than Italy can pass troops thither from Abyssinia or Italian Somaliland.

4. Accordingly either the two West African Brigades or two brigades of the K.A.R. should be moved forthwith to Khartoum. General Smuts is being asked to allow the Union Brigade, or a large part of it, to move to the Canal Zone and the Delta for internal security purposes. Arrangements should be made to continue their training. The Admiralty are being asked to report on shipping possibilities in the Indian Ocean and Red Sea.

5. In view of the increased air attack which may be expected in the Red Sea following upon the Italian conquest of British Somaliland, the air reinforcement of Aden becomes important.

6. The two brigades, one of Regulars and the other Australian, which are held ready in Palestine should now move into the Delta in order to clear the Palestine communications for the movement of further reserves, as soon as they can be equipped for field service or organised for internal security duties.

7. However, immediately three or four regiments of British cavalry, without their horses, should take over the necessary duties in the Canal Zone, liberating the three Regular battalions there for general reserve of the Field Army of the Delta.

8. The rest of the Australians in Palestine, numbering six battalions, will thus [also] be available at five days’ notice to move into the Delta for internal security or other emergency employment. The Polish Brigade and the French Volunteer Unit should move to the Delta from Palestine as may be convenient and join the general reserve.

9. The movement of the Indian division now embarking or in transit should be accelerated to the utmost. Unless some of the troops evacuated from Somaliland and not needed for Aden are found sufficient to reinforce the Soudan, in addition to reinforcements from Kenya, this whole division, as is most desirable, should proceed to Suez to join the Army of the Delta [later called the Army of the Nile]. In addition to the above, at least three batteries of British artillery, although horse-drawn, must be embarked immediately from India for Suez. Admiralty to arrange transport.

10. Most of the above movements should be completed between September 15 and October 1, and on this basis the Army of the Delta should comprise:

(1) The British Armoured Force in Egypt.

(2) The four British battalions at Mersa Matruh, the two at Alexandria, and the two in Cairo – total, eight.

(3) The three battalions from the Canal Zone.

(4) The reserve British Brigade from Palestine – total, fourteen British Regular infantry battalions.

(5) The New Zealand Brigade.

(6) The Australian Brigade from Palestine.

(7) The Polish Brigade.

(8) Part of the Union Brigade from East Africa.

(9) The Fourth Indian Division now in rear of Mersa Matruh.

(10) The new Indian division in transit.

(11) The eleven thousand men in drafts arriving almost at once at Suez.

(12) All the artillery (one hundred and fifty guns) now in the Middle East or en route from India.

(13) The Egyptian Army so far as it can be used for field operations.

11. The above should constitute by October 1, at the latest thirty-nine battalions, together with the armoured forces; a total of 56,000 men and 212 guns. This is exclusive of internal security troops.

(Part II)

12. It is hoped that the armoured brigade from England of three regiments of tanks will be passed through the Mediterranean by the Admiralty. If this is impossible, their arrival round the Cape may be counted upon during the first fortnight in October. The arrival of this force in September must be deemed so important as to justify a considerable degree of risk in its transportation.

(Part III) Tactical employment of the above force:

13. The Mersa Matruh position must be fortified completely and with the utmost speed. The sector held by the three Egyptian battalions must be taken over by three British battalions, making the force homogeneous. This must be done even if the Egyptian Government wish to withdraw the artillery now in the hands of these three battalions. The possibility of reinforcing by sea the Mersa Matruh position and cutting enemy communications, once they have passed by on their march to the Delta, must be studied with the Naval Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean Fleet. Alternatively a descent upon the communications at Sollum or farther west may be preferred.

14. All water supplies between Mersa Matruh and the Alexandria defences must be rendered “depotable.” ² A special note on this is attached. No attempt should be made to leave small parties to defend the wells near the coast in this region. The 4th Indian Division should withdraw upon Alexandria when necessary or be taken off by sea. The road from Sollum to Mersa Matruh, and still more the tarmac road from Mersa Matruh to Alexandria, must be rendered impassable, as it is abandoned, by delayed-action mines or by chemical treatment of the asphalt surface.

15. A main line of defence to be held by the whole Army of the Delta, with its reserves suitably disposed, must be prepared (as should long ago have been done) from Alexandria along the edge of the cultivated zone and irrigation canals of the Delta. For this purpose the strongest concrete and sandbag works and pillboxes should be built or completed from the sea to the cultivated zone and the main irrigation canal. The pipeline forward of this line should be extended as fast as possible. The Delta zone is the most effective obstacle to tanks of all kinds, and can be lightly held by sandbag works to give protection to Egypt and form a very strong extended flank for the Alexandria front. A broad strip, four or five miles wide, should be inundated from the flood waters of the Nile, controlled at Assouan. Amid or behind this belt a series of strong posts armed with artillery should be constructed.

16. In this posture, then, the Army of the Delta will await the Italian invasion. It must be expected that the enemy will advance in great force, limited only, but severely, by the supply of water and petrol. He will certainly have strong armoured forces in his right hand to contain and drive back our weaker forces unless these can be reinforced in time by the armoured regiment from Great Britain. He will mask, if he cannot storm, Mersa Matruh. But if the main line of the Delta is diligently fortified and resolutely held, he will be forced to deploy an army whose supply of water, petrol, food, and ammunition will be difficult. Once the army is deployed and seriously engaged, the action against his communications, from Mersa Matruh, by bombardment from the sea, by descent at Sollum, or even much farther west, would be a deadly blow to him.

17. The campaign for the defence of the Delta, therefore, resolves itself into: strong defence with the left arm from Alexandria inland, and a reaching-out with the right hand, using sea-power upon his communications. At the same time it is hoped that the [our] reinforcements [acting] from Malta will hamper the sending of further reinforcements – Italian or German – from Europe into Africa.

18. All this might be put effectively in train by October 1, provided we are allowed the time. If not, we must do what we can. All trained or Regular units, whether fully equipped or not, must be used in defence of the Delta. All armed white men and also Indian or foreign units must be used for internal security. The Egyptian Army must be made to play its part in support of the Delta front, thus leaving only riotous crowds to be dealt with in Egypt proper.

Pray let the above be implemented and be ready to discuss it in detail with me at 4.30 P.M., August 16.

With this General Wavell returned to Cairo in the third week of August.

* * * * *

I now have to record a small but at the time vexatious military episode. The Italians, using vastly superior forces, drove us out of Somaliland. This story requires to be told.

Until December, 1939, our policy in a war with Italy was to evacuate Somaliland; but in that month General Ironside, C.I.G.S., declared for defence of the territory, and in the last resort to hold Berbera. Defences were to be prepared to defend the Tug Argen Gap through the hills. One British battalion (the Black Watch), two Indian, and two East African battalions, with the Somaliland Camel Corps and one African light battery, with small detachments of anti-tank and anti-aircraft units, were gathered by the beginning of August. General Wavell on July 21 telegraphed to the War Office that withdrawal without fighting would be disastrous for our influence, and that Somaliland might be a valuable base for further offensive action. Fighting began during his visit to London, and he told the Middle East Ministerial Committee that, although the strategic disadvantages of the loss of Somaliland would be slight, it would be a blow to our prestige.

The Italians entered British Somaliland on August 3 with three battalions of Italian infantry, fourteen of colonial infantry, two groups of pack artillery, and detachments of medium tanks, light tanks, and armoured cars. These large forces advanced upon us on August 10, and a new British commander, General Godwin Austen, arrived on the night of the 11th. In his instructions he had been told, “Your task is to prevent any Italian advance beyond the main position…. You will take the necessary steps for withdrawal if necessary.” Fighting took place on the 12th and 13th, and one of our four key-positions was captured from us after heavy artillery bombardment. On the night of the 15th, General Godwin Austen determined to withdraw. This, he said, “was the only course to save us from disastrous defeat and annihilation.” The Middle East Headquarters authorised evacuation, and this was successfully achieved under a strong rearguard of the Black Watch.

I was far from satisfied with the tactical conduct of this affair, which remains on record as our only defeat at Italian hands. At this particular moment, when formidable events impended in Egypt and when so much depended on our prestige, the rebuff caused injury far beyond its strategic scale. There was much jubilation in Italy, and Mussolini exulted in the prospects of his attack on the Nile Valley. General Wavell, however, defended the local commander, affirming that the fighting had been severe.

In view of the great business we had together, I did not press my view further either with the War Office or with General Wavell.

* * * * *

Our information at this time showed a rapid increase in the Italian forces in Albania and a consequent menace to Greece. As the German preparations for the invasion of Britain grew in scale and became more evident, it would have been particularly inconvenient to lessen our bombing attack on the German and Dutch river mouths and French ports, where barges were being collected. I had formed no decision in my own mind about moving bomber squadrons away from home. It is often wise, however, to have plans worked out in detail. Strange as it may seem, the Air Force, except in the air, is the least mobile of all the Services. A squadron can reach its destination in a few hours, but its establishment, depots, fuel, spare parts, and workshops take many weeks, and even months, to develop.

(Action this day.) Prime Minister to C.A.S. and General Ismay.

28.VIII.40.

Pray let me have proposals for moving at least four heavy bombing squadrons to Egypt in addition to anything now in progress. These squadrons will operate from advanced bases in Greece as far as may be convenient should Greece be forced into the war by Italy. They would refuel there before attacking Italy. Many of the finest targets, including the Italian Fleet, will be open to such attacks. It is better to operate from Greece, should she come in, than from Malta in its present undefended state. The report should be brief, and should simply show the method, the difficulties, and the objectives, together with a time-table. It is not necessary to argue the question of policy, which will be decided by the Defence Committee of the Cabinet. Making the best plan possible will not commit the Air Ministry or anyone else to the adoption of the plan, but every effort is to be made to solve its difficulties.

* * * * *

I cannot better end this chapter than by the report I gave of the situation in August to the Prime Ministers of Australia and New Zealand.

This followed up my message of June 16.

Prime Minister to the Prime Ministers of Australia and New Zealand.

11.VIII.40.

The combined Staffs are preparing a paper on the Pacific situation, but I venture to send you in advance a brief foreword. We are trying our best to avoid war with Japan, both by conceding on points where the Japanese military clique can perhaps force a rupture, and by standing up where the ground is less dangerous, as in arrests [by the Japanese] of individuals. I do not think myself that Japan will declare war unless Germany can make a successful invasion of Britain. Once Japan sees that Germany has either failed or dares not try, I look for easier times in the Pacific. In adopting against the grain a yielding policy towards Japanese threats, we have always in mind your interests and safety.

Should Japan nevertheless declare war on us, her first objective outside the Yellow Sea would probably be the Dutch East Indies. Evidently the United States would not like this. What they would do we cannot tell. They give no undertaking of support, but their main fleet in the Pacific must be a grave preoccupation to the Japanese Admiralty. In this first phase of an Anglo-Japanese war we should, of course, defend Singapore, which if attacked – which is unlikely – ought to stand a long siege. We should also be able to base on Ceylon a battle cruiser and a fast aircraft-carrier, which with all the Australian and New Zealand cruisers and destroyers, which would return to you, would act as a very powerful deterrent upon the hostile raiding cruisers.

We are about to reinforce with more first-class units the Eastern Mediterranean Fleet. This fleet could, of course, at any time be sent through the Canal into the Indian Ocean, or to relieve Singapore. We do not want to do this, even if Japan declares war, until it is found to be vital to your safety. Such a transference would entail the complete loss of the Middle East, and all prospect of beating Italy in the Mediterranean would be gone. We must expect heavy attacks on Egypt in the near future, and the Eastern Mediterranean Fleet is needed to help in repelling them. If these attacks succeed, the Eastern Fleet would have to leave the Mediterranean either through the Canal or by Gibraltar. In either case a large part of it would be available for your protection. We hope, however, to maintain ourselves in Egypt, and to keep the Eastern Fleet at Alexandria during the first phase of an Anglo-Japanese war, should that occur. No one can lay down beforehand what is going to happen. We must just weigh events from day to day, and use our available resources to the utmost.

A final question arises: whether Japan, having declared war, would attempt to invade Australia or New Zealand with a considerable army. We think this very unlikely, first, because Japan is absorbed in China, secondly, would be gathering rich prizes in the Dutch East Indies, and, thirdly, would fear very much to send an important part of her fleet far to the southward, leaving the American Fleet between it and home. If, however, contrary to prudence and self-interest, Japan set about invading Australia or New Zealand on a large scale, I have the explicit authority of the Cabinet to assure you that we should then cut our losses in the Mediterranean and sacrifice every interest, except only the defence and feeding of this island, on which all depends, and would proceed in good time to your aid with a fleet able to give battle to any Japanese force which could be placed in Australian waters, and able to parry any invading force, or certainly cut its communications with Japan.

We hope, however, that events will take a different turn. By gaining time with Japan the present dangerous situation may be got over. We are vastly stronger here at home than when I cabled to you in May. We have a large army now beginning to be well equipped. We have fortified our beaches. We have a strong reserve of mobile troops, including our Regular Army and Australian, New Zealand, and Canadian contingents, with several armoured divisions or brigades ready to strike in counter-attack at the head of any successful lodgment. We have ferried over from the United States their grand aid of nearly a thousand guns and six hundred thousand rifles with ammunition complete. Relieved of the burden of defending France, our Army is becoming daily more powerful and munitions are gathering. Besides this, we have the Home Guard of 1,500,000 men, many of them war veterans, and most with rifles or other arms.

The Royal Air Force continues to show that same individual superiority over the enemy on which I counted so much in my cable to you of June 16. Yesterday’s important action in the Channel showed that we could attack against odds of three to one, and inflict losses of three and a half to one. Astounding progress has been made by Lord Beaverbrook in output of the best machines. Our fighter and bomber strength is nearly double what it was when I cabled you, and we have a very large reserve of machines in hand. I do not think the German Air Force has the numbers or quality to overpower our air defences.

The Navy increases in strength each month, and we are now beginning to receive the immense programme started at the declaration of war. Between June and December, 1940, over five hundred vessels, large and small, but many most important, will join the Fleet. The German Navy is weaker than it has ever been. Scharnhorst and Gneisenau are both in dock damaged, Bismarck has not yet done her trials, Tirpitz is three months behind Bismarck. There are available now in this critical fortnight, after which the time for invasion is getting very late, only one pocket-battleship, a couple of eight-inch Hippers, two light cruisers, and perhaps a score of destroyers. To try to transport a large army, as would now be needed for success, across the seas virtually without escort in the face of our Navy and air force, only to meet our powerful military force on shore, still more to maintain such an army and nourish its lodgments with munitions and supplies, would be a very unreasonable act. On the other hand, if Hitler fails to invade and conquer Britain before the weather breaks, he has received his first and probably fatal check.

We therefore feel a sober and growing conviction of our power to defend ourselves successfully, and to persevere through the year or two that may be necessary to gain victory.