Chapter 10
In the meantime, the Canadians had recovered from their setback during Operation “Spring” on 25 and 26 July 1944 in the area of operations north of Falaise. They then made efforts on their part to also bring about the decisive breakthrough.
At the same time, German plans that were completely divorced from reality were in motion to pull out the mechanized forces of Panzergruppe West that were southeast of Caen to use them for a counterattack—Operation “Lüttich”— against the Americans in the area around Avranches.
Orders to this effect were issued to the 9. SS-Panzer-Division “Hohenstaufen” on 1 August 1944. The same orders were issued to the 1. SS-Panzer-Division “Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler” on 3 August 1944. However, the intended relief-in-place by the 89. Infanterie-Division did not start until the night of 4–5 August 1944.
In the end, the 1. SS-Panzer-Division “Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler” arrived too late for the start of Operation “Lüttich” on 6 August 1944. In addition, it was no longer available for the heavy defensive fighting that was developing in its former area of operations.
The 12. SS-Panzer-Division “Hitlerjugend” and schwere SS-Panzer-Abteilung 101 were left to face the new British offensive. These armored forces had been relieved by the 272. Infanterie-Division during 5 August 1944 and had already assembled east of the N 158 in the Laison Valley as an operational reserve. The orders to depart for the Condé-sur-Noireau area were supposed to be issued during the evening of 7 August 1944; it would never get to that, however.
The British and the Canadians had completed their preparations for Operation “Totalize” by this point. Supported by flanking attacks from the Orne bridgehead at Grimbosq, the main effort was to take place on both sides of the N 158. The British 51st Infantry Division was to be employed east of the road and supported by the 33rd Armoured Brigade. The Canadian 2nd Infantry Division was to be employed to the east of the road, where it would be supported by the Canadian 2nd Armoured Brigade.
In contrast to the previously conducted offensives, the start of the attack by the main forces on both sides of the Caen–Falaise road was to start in the evening.
View towards the attack objective of Tigergruppe Wittmann, the unobtrusive hills just south and southwest of St. Aignan-du-Cramesnil. The large building on the viewer’s left is part of a commercial district south of the village.
This photograph demonstrates the British vantage point. On this open terrain stretching more than four kilometers, the Tiger commanders thought that the superior range of their main guns would be to their advantage. The wood line seen to the left in the photograph made it impossible to identify the four Shermans positioned on the flanks there.
This sketch map shows the location of the vantage points shown in the accompanying photographs. E1 is the direction of attack of Tigergruppe Wittmann; E2 is the corresponding British viewpoint. E3 is the vantage point of the Tigers looking east as they would have passed the Sherman positions at E4 in their attack north.
In order to maintain at least a small element of surprise, there was to be no artillery preparation prior to the start of the attack. The start of the attack was to be signaled by the RAF’s Bomber Command. In all, some 1,020 aircraft dropped a total of 3,462 tons of bombs, primarily on the built-up areas and the terrain along the flanks of the attack. A half hour later, at 2330 hours, the tanks columns crossed the line of departure. The artillery—360 tubes for the rolling barrage and an additional 360 tubes for counterbattery fire on German positions—opened fire at 2345 hours.
In order to direct the movements of the attack groups at night, the British were imaginative. It was attempted to create artificial moonlight with the assistance of searchlights. Forty-millimeter Bofors automatic cannon fired tracers in each of the respective attack axes; with regard to Hill 122, which formed the boundary between the two attack divisions, it was marked by the artillery with green illumination rounds. Despite all this, nearly all of the attack columns quickly got off track, because the darkness was intensified by the smoke of the artillery impacts.
The British attack was facilitated in its first phase by close support provided by combat engineers and mine-clearing tanks—“Flails”—of the 79th Armoured Division, which had been specially trained for such missions. In the sector of the 89. Infanterie-Division, hundreds of infantrymen left their positions in panic.
After the 1. SS-Panzer-Division “Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler” had been withdrawn, the Germans could only put up the decimated armored forces of the 12. SS-Panzer-Division “Hitlerjugend” (and schwere SS-Panzer-Abteilung 101) to face this massive attack. Within the latter division, the tank strength was forty-eight (including nine Panthers). There were also nineteen operational Tigers out of an end strength of twenty-five. Once again, the 8.8-centimeter Flak of the III. Flak-Korps would play a large role.
Thanks to the use of liaison officers, who were positioned with the divisions in the front lines, the commander of the 12. SS-Panzer-Division “Hitlerjugend,” SS-Oberführer Meyer, received early warning of the start of the attack by the British. He immediately employed Kampfgruppe Waldmüller with approximately twenty tanks (including eight to ten Tigers). It was to establish a blocking position on the N 158 at Cintheaux.
Meyer went up front, personally stopped forces of the 89. Infanterie-Division that were flooding back and ordered them to dig in and prepare to defend.
By the evening of 7 August 1944, the British had advanced over the D 183 (Bretteville-sur-Laize–St. Sylvain road) and had taken the group of buildings on the N 158 at Haut Mesnil.
Ten Tigers of schwere SS-Panzer-Abteilung 101 were employed on the right (west) wing of the British offensive against the forces that were moving out of the Orne bridgehead there. For a short period of time, Grimbosq and Brieux were taken; however, when it was attempted to relieve the Tigers in Grimbosq with tanks from SS-Panzer-Regiment 12, the enemy exploited the situation and penetrated back into the village. An attack on the bridgehead the following morning bogged down in heavy artillery fire. The Tiger of SS-Obersturmführer Wendorff was hit, but it could be recovered. Wendorff shifted to the last operational vehicle.
The second phase of Operation “Totalize” started the next day at morning twilight. The objective of the attackers was to eliminate the German forces that had occupied the second set of defensive lines and break through to the operational objective of Falaise. These goals were to be supported again by massive aerial attacks, this time by the U.S. 8th Army Air Force. Of the 678 aircraft employed, only 492 found their objective areas. In all, 1,488 tons of bombs were dropped. Two bomber squadrons—each composed of twelve aircraft—bombed friendly forces.
Hardest hit was the Polish armored division in the area of Cormelles as well as the Canadian 3rd Infantry Division. More than 300 soldiers were killed or wounded and many vehicles were destroyed. It had been intended to use both formations in the second phase of Operation “Totalize” and help bring about the final success.
The 12. SS-Panzer-Division “Hitlerjugend” also suffered heavy casualties as a result of the bomb runs. On 11 August 1944, it was intended to finally take this division out of the line and replace it with the 85. Infanterie-Division. The 89. Infanterie-Division, which had only recently arrived at the front, had already sunk to 50 percent of its authorized strength.
A German counterattack was launched on 8 August 1944 into the advance towards Vielle Langannerie by the Canadians and the Poles along the N 158. Its objective was to retake the high ground south of St. Aignan.
Kampfgruppe Waldmüller—the II./SS-Panzer-Regiment 12 with thirty-nine tanks, the 1./SS-Panzer-Jäger-Abteilung 12 with ten Jagdpanzer IV’s and ten Tigers of schwere SS-Panzer-Abteilung 101—was assembled at Bretteville-le-Rabet. During the road march there, one of the Tigers collided with the tank ahead of it, that of SS-Hauptsturmführer Heurich, with the result that both tanks were unavailable for the attack.
SS-Hauptsturmführer Wittmann (in a headquarters tank, Tiger 007) and six other Tigers took the lead in moving on Cintheaux. The six other tank commanders were SS-Untersturmführer Dollinger, SS-Untersturmführer Ihrion, SS-Hauptscharführer Höflinger, SS-Hauptscharführer Kisters, SS-Oberscharführer von Westernhagen (the brother of the battalion commander) and SS-Hauptsturmführer Heurich. The Tigers headed north along the N 158 towards La Jalousie. There were dense columns of enemy tanks north of the road to Bretteville-sur-Laize as well as south of Garcelles and on the wood line to the southeast of the latter town.
For the German leaders, it was more than a bit surprising that the enemy was standing idly by and not moving out for the attack.
The commander of the 12. SS-Panzer-Division “Hitlerjugend” decided to take the village of Cintheaux as soon as possible and attack into the masses of enemy armor. The woods southeast of Garcelles was ordered as an intermediate objective. Several Canadian Shermans were knocked out there.
The view the Tiger commanders would have had as they passed the woods to the east and along the viewer’s right. The Shermans were approximately 400 meters farther to the rear in the stand of trees to the left. As a result, they were identified too late.
This view from the firing positions of the Shermans past the righthand edge of the patch of woods shows how the Tigers would have passed right in front of the main guns of the Canadian tanks, exposing their vulnerable flanks.
Shortly beyond Gaumesnil, the 3rd Platoon of A Squadron of the 1st Northhamptonshire Yeomanry opened fire from the right flank on the moving Tigers. The sole Sherman Firefly set three Tigers ablaze; the other Shermans knocked out two additional Tigers. There were few survivors. SS-Hauptsturmführer Wittmann and his crew were killed. A Tiger from the 2nd Company that was falling back about 1,500 meters north of this location was abandoned.
In the meantime, three other Tigers let forces of the Polish Armored Division approach east of St.-Aignan and were able to knock out seven vehicles. In all, the Poles took heavy losses—the 2nd Royal Tank Regiment lost twenty-six tanks and the 24th Ulan Regiment lost fourteen tanks—and did not have enough confidence to continue the attack.
Without doubt, 8 August 1944 represented a black day for schwere SS-Panzer-Abteilung 101, even without the loss of Wittmann. When looking at where this fighting took place, it can be seen how treacherous the terrain is. Moving out over an open stretch of terrain on both sides of the N 158, the Tigers could be certain that they would be able to use the superior range of their weapons to full advantage. It was because of this that the crews advanced somewhat carelessly and did not notice in time that a curtain of woods started just to the right of Haut Mesnil, behind which—set farther back—there was a line of high ground. The Shermans had just moved into position on this high ground that was covered in vegetation.
Although they could only see the attacking Tigers much later due to the wood line, they were themselves not to be seen. From this hidden position, the Firefly, with it 17-pounder (7.62-centimeter) main gun, which was also dangerous to the Tiger, could take its time aiming and engage one Tiger after the other. The formation of Tigers had made the mistake of not having the outermost tank on the right move with its turret in the three o’clock position. In addition, the Tigers were being constantly shelled with artillery. When the first Tiger was burning, it took a moment before the enemy could be identified. The other crews desperately attempted to traverse their turrets in the observed direction. This took too long.
In the documentation concerning the 27th Canadian Armoured Regiment in his book, A Fine Night for Tanks, author Ken Tout presents a detailed account of what happened:
The events of 8 August 1944 have been clouded in some mystery and debate, but appear to have been fairly simple. Early an that day [SS-Hauptsturmführer] Franz Heurich had taken a group of Tigers down the main road without orders. Hearing this, Wittmann was concerned because it was Heurich’s first day in action. Wittmann quickly called for his Volkswagen and, with his good friend, Capt Dr Rabe, drove to Cintheaux where the Tigers were well hidden for fear of air attack by Typhoons and other ground support aircraft. German sources suggest, with some surprise, that RAF ground support was not called on, possibly because of the raid by USAAF heavy bombers which had been planned.
Wittmann met and conferred with [SS-Sturmbannführer] Waldmüller, who was finishing his briefing for the counter-attack, and “Panzer” Meyer. Meyer had already studied the serried ranks of Allied tanks visible in the distance (the follow-up forces of Totalize). The instinctive reaction of the three experienced tank commanders was to hit before being hit, and the Garcelles wood and chateau were indicated as an appropriate target from which a German group could then dominate a wide panorama of open slopes packed tight with Allied armour in almost as perilous a situation as the vehicles at Villers Bocage. The decision may have been a desperate throw of the dice in the knowledge of the scarcity of their own resources. As Keegan has commented, “[the tank] companies were now so weak that half-repaired tanks had to be driven out of the battalion workshops only a mile behind the lines. Ominously too, some of the Tigers had to drop out of the action for want of fuel, which was not coming up the line of supply.”
Wittmann himself had to take a Tiger (No. 007) other than his usual mount. Although Meyer had left liaison officers in Saint-Aignan and other villages it is debatable whether the three commanders at Cintheaux were fully aware of what awaited Wittmann’s troop, or whether the bait of the massed hundreds of static tanks was too much temptation, blurring their logic. What, in fact, awaited was 27 CAR [Canadian Armoured regiment], on Wittmann’s left, 144 RAC [Royal Armour Corps Regiment] ahead, and 1st Northamptonshire Yeomanry on the right, all fairly well hidden. These three regiments counted at that moment with about thirty-four Firefly tanks in total, all likely to be within range of Wittmann’s route.
It was “A” Squadron 27 CAR with the Royal Regiment of Canada which observed the first movement of enemy counter-attack along the main road at about 08.00 hours. A number of German tanks, Panthers and Mark IVs, with infantry, ran into the Canadians, and the tank fire destroyed a number of the lighter carriers belonging to the anti-tank platoon and the machine-gunners of the Toronto Scottish. The Canadian Firefly tanks (as with the British, one 17-pdr Firefly with three 75 mm Shermans formed a troop) gave a good account of themselves. Two Panthers and two Mark IVs were knocked out and the enemy withdrew.
Subsequently, Radley-Walters moved his squadron further up towards Gaumesnil. This action no doubt caused the Germans to be wary of their left flank when sending a troop of Tigers down the road. A strong and tenacious Canadian presence on the west side of the road meant that the Tigers approached cautiously, seeking whatever cover they could find on the east side of the road. Their approach did indeed stimulate “A” Squadron of 27 CAR to open fire while “A” Squadron of 1st Northamptonshire Yeomanry was hidden to the east of the Tiger’s route. The Tiger commanders, concentrating on the western danger, therefore had their backs to the eastern danger. The complementary actions of the two “A” Squadrons were not prearranged in a master plan but were the logical outcome of the innovative idea of the Night March. This placed the two “A” Squadrons in primarily defensive positions which, to an extent, reduced the overwhelming advantages of power and armour enjoyed by Tigers and Panthers. The reverse of Goodwood was now happening in miniature. But for “Rad” Radley-Walters, as for Tom Boardman at the time, “to us it was just another German tank attack and it wasn’t until after the war that I heard about this German ace Wittmann.”
The remnants of Wittmann’s Tiger 007 lying next to road leading to the north. The dot in the middle of the horizon above the lefthand side of the turret is the Tiger that had advanced the farthest.
The same viewpoint today.
Even with Tiger 007, Tiger 314 was also hit and knocked out. This photograph was taken several months after the fighting.
Tiger 214 was knocked out at the Bois de Quesnay. This photograph shows Polish soldiers exploring the wreck. (IWM)
“Hullo, William 3 Charlie. Figures three nasties range twelve hundred alongside road. Look like Tigers. 3 Charlie, over.” The very slightly raised voice of “A” Squadron’s Sgt Gordon ushered in the time of fatal gambles among the orchards. Three Tigers! Only a few weeks earlier one lone Tiger had knocked out twenty tanks of another Yeomanry regiment. The Totalizator would surely set odds of 15 to 3 in this instance. The voice of Capt Tom Boardman, now well known from his Night March conversations, ordered Gordon to hold fire while a plan was quickly concocted.
Three of the 53-ton Tiger tanks, the most feared weapon in Normandy, were moving slowly parallel and near to the main road from Caen to Falaise. Their guns were traversed left to cover the far side of the road. Gordon’s troop, commanded by Lt James, was therefore lurking in the orchards on the right of the Tigers. The German tank commanders appeared to feel that they were sheltered on their left by the trees beside the main road and by the road itself which was slightly raised at that point. None of the three Tigers appeared to be watching out to the right. Arriving close to Lt James, Capt Boardman ordered the three 75 mm Shermans, plus his own, to “pepper” the turrets of the Tigers. The 75 mm shot would have little effect on the Tiger armour but would make the commanders close down and restrict themselves to periscope view. Gordon’s Firefly would then shoot at the rearmost Tiger.
In 3 Charlie Firefly, Joe Ekins, the shoe clicker from Bedfordshire, lined up his sights and, as the Tigers prowled to within about 800 yd, Boardman gave the order to fire. At 12.40 hours Ekin’s boot trod on the trigger button and the immense flash of the Firefly wrapped itself around the turret. Gordon and Ekins blinked deliberately and then opened their eyes to see the shot strike the enemy turret. Ekins fired again. The Tiger started to burn. Immediately the other two Tigers alerted began feverishly to traverse their 88 mm guns towards the Yeomanry. One Tiger fired and Gordon ordered his tank to reverse so that he could find other cover from which to resume firing. A third Tiger shot glanced on the turret hatch of the Firefly, doing no material damage but smashing the heavy steel plate against Gordon’s head. Gordon staggered out of the tank and was wounded by a random mortar bomb.
Lt James ran to Gordon’s tank, guided the driver into a new firing position under the apple trees and gave the fire order. 12.47 hours—one shot from Ekins and the Tiger’s turret exploded. The 75 mm Shermans appeared to have done some kind of damage to the third Tiger, possibly smashing the commander’s periscope, for the tank seemed to be circling as though looking for escape from the open field in which it found itself. 12.52 hours—and two more shots from Ekins. The third Tiger started to burn. In Ekins’ own words “this all happened in about 12 minutes. All I was thinking was ‘get them before they get us.’ I fired twice [at the third Tiger]. He started burning. We reversed into cover. We reloaded and sorted ourselves out and sat back waiting.”
The enemy succeeded in advancing to Haut Mesnil in the course of the day. The enemy’s intent for the following day, 9 August 1944, was to advance at first light and move past Bretteville-le-Rabet on both sides. In the meantime, however, the German resistance had stiffened. There was bitter fighting at Bretteville-le-Rabet.
The commander of the 4th Armoured Brigade, Brigadier General E. L. Booth, then ordered the 28th Armoured Regiment—the British Columbia Regiment—to advance east past Bretteville-le-Rabet in close cooperation with the Algonquin Infantry Regiment. Its objective was to take Hill 195, a dominant terrain feature. By doing so, the Canadians would be in a position to cut off the Germans and hinder a withdrawal to the south over the N 158.
But the combat-inexperienced Canadians made a fatal mistake. Instead of turning right at Estrées-la-Campage (and heading south), they continued straight, thinking they were still going in the right direction. In the process, they submitted incorrect location reports by radio. Some of the tanks lost contact and became completely lost.
The regimental commander reported at 0841 hours that he had been attacked by German tanks, that he had already suffered ten losses of his own and that he desperately needed artillery support. As a result of the incorrect location repots, this was not possible. When the brigade command post sent an additional request for information at 0907 hours, it did not receive an answer. What had happened?
The German side had realized what was going on and had reacted rapidly. Kampfgruppe Wünsche, reinforced by seven Tigers, was alerted. It assembled in a patch of woods along Laison Creek near Assy, where it was protected from being observed from the south by Hill 140. It was then employed against the Canadians, who were one kilometer east of Estrées-la-Campage. They were taken in a pincers movement, with the Tigers coming from the southwest and Panthers and Panzer IV’s coming from the east. The unequal struggle raged for several hours.
Hopes were raised when the Polish Armored Division, which had been committed in this area in the meantime, formed up. These Polish forces had no idea that friendly forces were in front of them, however, and likewise opened fire on the bagged Canadians.
When the Canadians tried to identify themselves with yellow smoke, the German tank commanders noticed the Polish tanks that had advanced forward. The Germans turned them back while also knocking out several of their number. The fighting would have probably ended sooner, had Typhoon fighter-bombers not permanently also joined in the mêlée. Only a few Canadian tanks were able to get out. By late afternoon, the 28th Armoured Regiment had lost forty-four Shermans, two Stuarts and one Crusader. One hundred twelve soldiers were killed, including the battalion commander. Thirty-four Canadians were taken prisoner. German losses were slight; there was not a single Tiger among them. Thanks to the onset of darkness, what remained of the regiment was able to make it to Polish lines.
EMPLOYMENT OF SCHWERE SS-PANZER-ABTEILUNG 102 AGAINST THE CANADIAN ORNE BRIDGEHEADS
The 4th Armoured Division was given the mission the following day of finally taking the area around Hill 206 west of Pontigny. It was intended for the Polish Armored Division to take Hill 140. It was possible to take Hill 195—the original objective of the decimated British Columbia Regiment—under the cover of darkness and without too much fanfare. The 22nd Armoured Regiment was then ordered forward so that it could advance on Hill 206 to the south. In the face of the PaK barricade that had been established by the III. Flak-Korps, this was not possible. In the meantime, the Poles had been able to take Hill 140, but not without heavy losses (once again). The Tigers of the 3./schwere SS-Panzer-Abteilung 101 were able to knock out thirty-eight armored vehicles all by themselves.
The bulk of the 2./schwere SS-Panzer-Abteilung 102 was sent from the area east of Vassy via Condé-sur-Noireau to Kampfgruppe Wünsche on 9 August 1944, when a breakthrough towards Falaise was threatening as part of Operation “Totalize.”
After the vehicles were resupplied, they continued on to the northern outskirts of Bons-Tassily just to the west of the N 158. There they received the order to march to Martainville via Ussy. After the company had started to bivouac in the woods northwest of Tournebu, it was attached to the 271. Infanterie-Division as its divisional reserve. It then bivouacked in the Bois Halbout after a roundabout journey of more than sixty kilometers.
The remaining thirteen operational tanks of schwere SS-Panzer-Abteilung 102 were also moved on the same morning. Starting at 0700 hours, they left the area around Vire for the 12. SS-Panzer-Division “Hitlerjugend,” where they were able to arrive in time and participate in the fighting northeast of Hill 140 (see above).
Two Tigers of the 2./schwere SS-Panzer-Abteilung 102 were involved in combat as part of the 271. Infanterie-Division for the first time on 10 August 1944. They fought on the division’s left wing. About a dozen enemy tanks and a few armored cars had advanced as far as a depression at Espins, Le Monsul and areas to the west of the latter village. German infantry—some without weapons—was streaming back. Thanks to the presence of the Tigers, the infantry got its courage back. SS-Untersturmführer Loritz knocked out four enemy tanks.
On 11 August 1944, six tanks of the company were employed around the Bois Halbout. Two of them conducted an immediate counterattack on an enemy tank assembly area southwest of Le Moncel; four enemy tanks were knocked out. During the night, the Tigers pulled back to the Bois Halbout.
A report was received at 0700 hours that twenty-six enemy tanks were advancing to the south east of Barbery. The company then screened the roads to Espins and Fresney-le-Vieux with one Tiger each, while six tanks advanced along the road through Cingal towards Barbery. They took the high ground north of Cingal and then turned east. There was a report of five enemy tanks that had broken through that were accompanied by infantry. In all, seven tanks and one armored car were destroyed; afterwards, the Tigers secured the positions they had won. Towards noon, two hours of heavy artillery fire preceded an enemy attack.
SS-Unterscharführer Günther knocked out three enemy tanks and then had to pull back in the face of overwhelming force towards Tournebu. The five Tigers under the command of SS-Untersturmführer Loritz that were northeast of Tournebu were immediately ordered back to the Bois Halbout. Tiger 232 was penetrated by direct hits from two antitank guns. SS-Unterscharführer Moldenhauer and his gunner were killed immediately. The badly wounded radio operator jumped out of the tank and was captured. The driver kept his wits about him, pulled out of the column at high speed and returned to the assembly area, where the badly wounded loader could later be recovered.
The village, which had been occupied by the enemy in the meantime, had to be traversed. Loritz and his tanks tore through the town, all weapons firing, and entered the Bois Halbout. Several enemy armored vehicles were destroyed. The trampled-on British fled into the side streets or sought cover in the ruins. Several Germans who had been taken prisoner took advantage of the confusion and were able to flee.
Two Tigers screened southeast of Tournebu, while the remaining ones resupplied around 1700 hours on the road 200 meters southeast of Clair-Tizon. Six damaged Tigers were dispatched to the Maintenance Company. Differing orders were received, but march orders finally arrived for the company to move to Chateaux de la Motte and to screen north from there.
During the morning of 13 August 1944, the company bivouacked in the woods 500 meters southeast of Tournebu with three operational Tigers. It screened to the north from there. When the Essex Infantry Regiment of the Canadian 2nd Infantry Division formed up to attack from the direction of Barbery, the Tigers were able to bring it to a standstill.
The mission that had been received in the meantime—to clear the creek-bed area of the Laize in the vicinity of Clair-Tizon and to the north—did not happen, because friendly infantry did not show up. In its place, there was a short advance along the road from Clair-Tizon to the north with forces of the 271. Infanterie-Division. This was directed against the Canadian Regiment de Maisonneuve, which was attempting to expand its bridgehead over the Laize. Following this, the forces withdrew to ten meters south of Clair-Tizon.
In the meantime, the Canadians had gone over to the offensive again on the N 158. As a result, the danger grew that schwere SS-Panzer-Abteilung 102 would be cut off.
The operational objectives of Operation “Totalize” could not be achieved, despite a very promising beginning. The attack bogged down along the N 158, and the woods south of Quesnay could not be taken. Farther to the east, only a few patrols were able to get to the Laison River. Once again, the breakthrough to Falaise had not been achieved.
The majority of the German armor moved into the area south of Quesnay as reserves. There were skirmishes for two entire days north of the Laize at le Bu-sur-Rouvres that involved several Tigers of the 2./schwere SS-Panzer-Abteilung 102. The company knocked out seven enemy tanks on 12 August 1944 at this location. In the course of a night attack on the same day, an enemy tank company was surprised while it was refueling and completely destroyed. After this, the company moved to a fruit orchard in the vicinity of Assy and awaited further orders.
The oppressive air superiority caused amazingly few losses among the Tigers, but it crippled logistical traffic for most of the day. An ammunition truck of the battalion can be seen above (recognizable by the formation insignia on the vehicle’s rear). Whenever possible, the crews used the concealment afforded by the thick woods.
It was even advisable for the crews of antiaircraft weaponry to carefully camouflage themselves. The smaller-caliber weapons were ineffective against high-flying bombers anyway.
