Military history

Chapter 12

Overall Conclusions

In the fighting around the greater area of Caen there were a total of 134 Tigers employed—12 of them being the Tiger II. They were hardly ever employed in a strength greater than that of two platoons, however. The single largest cohesive operation took place on 11 July 1944 with the 21 tanks of schwere SS-Panzer-Abteilung 102 on both sides of Hill 112. These were joined by several vehicles of schwere SS-Panzer-Abteilung 101. The Tigers were predominately employed in the smallest of groups. To a certain extent, they represented stationary antitank-gun positions as a backstop for the forces in position or led immediate counterattacks at the local level to stabilize situations. A classical employment of armor was impossible due to the difficult terrain—diminished fields of view caused by countless folds in the ground and hedgerows—as well as the oppressive air supremacy of the Allies.

It was not possible to pull forces out of the line and regroup them for an attack at the formation level—as has been shown—due to the rapid succession of British offensives. Only the newly arrived II. SS-Panzer-Korps was able to accomplish this. This happened on 29 June 1944 just north of the Odon with a larger-scale counterattack southeast of Rauray, where it was able to stabilize a critical situation in conjunction with several Tigers of schwere SS-Panzer-Abteilung 101.

By the middle of August 1944, the Tigers were credited with knocking out more than 500 tanks. It is generally known, however, that the Allies could replace those losses within the span of several days, in contrast to the Germans. For example, German tank losses up to 23 July 1944 numbered 406. Added to this were 75 assault guns. Of those losses, only 17 were replaced by new vehicles. In the same period of time, the Allies lost some 2,395 tanks. The majority of these losses were caused by hand-held antitank weapons as well as PaK and Flak.

Wherever the Tigers went into action, they usually brought the Germans some stability for a limited period of time. Because the operational count of the battalions was usually very low—see the table in the appendices—they could exert no lasting effect at the operational level. When they were only employed individually towards the end of the breakout fighting, their success was limited. The question asked at the beginning—what contribution the Tiger made to the weeks-long defensive fighting in Normandy—can be answered as follows:

They contributed significantly to the fact that the July offensives of the British on both sides of Caen ended disastrously with heavy casualties, even though terrain was gained. The exhaustive, bloody fighting was otherwise borne on the shoulders of the infantry, since the terrain dictated the terms of employment. This was true for both sides.

The Tiger tank itself was generally vastly superior to its opponents in tank-on-tank engagements. It also proved to be quite capable of standing up to artillery fire and weapons employed on fighter-bombers. The table listing the reasons for vehicular losses proves this. Only the British Sherman armed with the 17-pounder main gun—the “Firefly”—which was firing a sub-caliber kinetic-energy round, was dangerous to the Tiger. This was demonstrated during the last engagement of SS-Hauptsturmführer Wittmann on 8 August 1944.

The German evaluations of the Allies were mixed. The British infantry and artillery enjoyed universal respect. That was less so the case when it came to British armored forces. Probably as a result of their own inferiority in terms of materiel, they operated cautiously and, almost without exception, in support of their heavily burdened infantry. There were just too few of the capable Firefly tanks available. The majority of the British antitank guns were also basically ineffective against the Tiger. The Canadian also enjoyed a solid reputation among the Germans, the Polish contingent less so. The Tiger battalions did not engage U.S. forces until the fighting for the Seine bridgeheads. In tank-on-tank engagements, the Tiger crews had little to worry about, but the Germans had enormous respect of the sheer materiel superiority the Americans enjoyed.

There were amazingly few losses caused by aerial attack. This stands in stark contrast to the dubious “kill lists” compiled by Allied fighter-bomber wings.

The Tiger crews often employed a simple trick whenever they were attacked by fighter-bombers: They set off smoke pots and grenades to simulate a vehicle on fire. Out of the forty-five tanks in each battalion, the following were confirmed losses from aerial attacks: eight by schwere Panzer-Abteilung 503; three by schwere SS-Panzer-Abteilung 101; and two by schwere SS-Panzer-Abteilung 102. The fighter-bomber personnel claimed they destroyed enemy vehicles every other mission. An actual analysis of loses on the ground tells a different story. For instance, of the 133 tanks destroyed in the Falaise Pocket, only 33 were knocked out from the air. Of the 82 armored vehicles knocked out around Chambois—the so-called “Shambles Area”—only two had been hit by aerial rockets (none Tigers). Along the Seine—the “Chase” Area—not a single one of the 98 destroyed armored vehicles was destroyed from the air.

The logistics and maintenance services played a decisive role in the successful fighting of the Tiger battalions. This has been emphasized over and over again in many conversations with tank crewmembers. In many cases, the German tanks had to conduct long road marches, which placed a lot of wear and tear on the vehicles even before they entered combat. The tables showing the operational readiness of the battalions indicate that there were rarely more than half a dozen vehicles in each battalion operational, even though the maintenance companies worked around the clock.

Less successful were the twelve Tiger II’s of schwere Panzer-Abteilung 503. They suffered a number of “teething problems” and were a nightmare for logistics personnel (different main-gun ammunition, different replacement parts).

With regard to logistics, the Germans suffered from a continuous shortage of repair and replacement parts and a lack of fuel. Occasionally, no operations were conducted because the fuel tanks were practically empty.

Divorced from the actual theme of this book, I would like to briefly address the question that often surfaces: How did it come about that the Allies, who enjoyed massive numerical superiority starting from about the middle of July 1944, needed so much time to bring about the decisive breakthrough?

The superiority of the Allies—in absolute numbers—was a given, but they were not without their worries, especially the British. Great Britain had stopped universal conscription between the two world wars and, as a consequence, did not have a large number of reservists. The number of formations that needed to be activated starting in 1939—including those for overseas obligations—was immense. In addition, there were not inconsiderable casualties in France in 1940 and in North Africa starting in 1941. As a result, no British formations were ever completely full through the very end of the war. This also applied to a certain extent to the Canadians.

The situation was always especially critical with regard to infantry, since their training takes considerably more time than, for instance, the artillery or logistics personnel. The heavy personnel losses in dead and wounded in June 1944 resulted in formations being replaced only partially with completely trained personnel. This fact was driven home to Montgomery on numerous occasions, including once by Winston Churchill himself.

As a result, the preparedness of the British to allow themselves to be engaged in a do-or-die fashion in casualty-intensive fighting was limited. In the final analysis, this was understandably also not considered necessary in the face of their own superiority on land and in the air. The issues involving the infantry had as a consequence that British armored formations were almost always without exception employed to directly support the infantry, usually in company-size elements.

At best, the British armored forces only had opportunity in North Africa to gather experience in the execution of wide-ranging, independent operations at the large-formation level. There were few aggressive armor commanders in the style of the Germans among their ranks.

Another aspect that bears examination is the quality of the major items of equipment. The post-war literature universally and constantly laments the fact that a nation of engineers such as the United Kingdom was incapable of constructing combat-effective tanks. In contrast to their artillery, which was also considered to be very effective by the Germans, the Cromwells and the Churchills that were developed were only moderately armored, underpowered and only lightly armed. In direct tank-versus-tank engagements against German counterparts, they were considerably inferior to some extent. Due to a lack of sufficient numbers of their own designs, approximately half of the British armored formations were equipped with the American Sherman tank. Although the American tank was less prone to mechanical failure, it was also inadequate in terms of combat power. Of course, this had a lasting psychological effect on the crews and put a brake on any type of boldness.

Finally, the terrain was decisive in Normandy. It was anything but “tank country.” It only permitted wide-ranging operations in isolated instances and, as a result, especially favored the defender.

Despite this, starting in British publications in the 1970’s and later, there were also very critical positions taken on leadership performance at the operational level. It is not without justification when it is claimed that a decision on the ground could have been forced earlier with a bit more decisiveness on the part of the leaders. In the long run, it is actually more likely that larger numbers of casualties were taken as a result of the long duration of the battles of attrition. The suffering and the death within the bravely fighting German formations also lasted longer as a result.

Only the Sherman “Firefly,” armed with a 17-pounder main gun, was capable of taking on the Tiger on equal terms. But there was only one “Firefly” in each platoon of four Shermans. The typical employment of tanks in Normandy is seen below, where a Churchill provides firepower and moral support to the slowly advancing infantry.

Largely ineffective against the Tiger was the British handheld antitank weapon, the PIAT. It consisted of a small-caliber hollow-shaped charge that was propelled against its target by means of a powerful spring. It often missed its target, and the charge was not very reliable.

British tanks were markedly inferior to the Tiger. Efforts to provide additional protection by means of expedient measures were largely moral in nature. On the other hand, the British artillery was demonstrably effective. It hit its targets reliably and reacted quickly.

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